M-493-68

MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 362
Marine Aircraft Group 15 (REIN)
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac
FFO San Francisco, 96602

UNCLASSIFIED

3:JGB: wpw 03B21368 5740 31 July 1968

DEOLIDE (WORSAM

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commander, Task Group 79.4

Subj: Command Chronology for Period 1 June to 30 June 1968

Ref: (a) MOO 5740.2A (b) CTG OpOrd

Encl: √(1) HMM-362 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted.

2. Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified DOD Dir 5200.10.


W. H. SHAUER Jr.



MM-362

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MARINE MEDIUM HILLOPTER SQUADHON 362 Marine Aircraft Group 15 (REIN) 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac FPO San Francisco, 96602

# COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 June to 30 June 1968

#### INDEX

PART I

- ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II

- NARRATIVE SUMMARY

PART III


- SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV

- OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

VTAB-A-Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Fortress Attack Mapoleon/Maline VTAB-B-Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Fortress Attack Trapoleon/Boline/Acottonal I

UNCLASSIFIED



Command Chronology 1 June to 30 June 1968



# PART I

# ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

# 1. SQUADRON STAFF

Commanding Officer	Major W. H. SHAUER Jr.	1-30 June
Executive Officer	Major E. A. HOUSE	1-30 June
Administrative Officer	Captain G. W. RUSSELL Jr.	1-30 June
Operations Officer	Captain C. S. CHAMPION	1-30 June
Intelligence Officer	Captain R. E. BELL	1-30 June
Logistics Officer	Captain G. G. AIMSTRONG	1-30 June
Maintenance Officer	lstLt. J. H. GARBRICK	1-30 June

# 2. LOCATION

a. Throughout the reporting period, HMM-362 functioned as a helicopter support squadron assigned to Marine Aircraft Group 15 (REIN), under the operational control of CTG 79.4 SLF "A".

b. HMM-362 was located aboard the USS Princeton, LPH-5, 1-30 June 1968.

# 3. AVELAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

usm c		USN	USN		
OFF 41	ENL 231	OFF	ENT 3		
-40-	<b>عر</b> ـ	-	•		

4. IMPORTANT VISITORS

NONE



ENCLOSURE (1) SECRET (NOFORN)



#### PART II

#### NAIRATIVE SUMMARY

During the reporting period 1-30 June 1968, HMM-362 operating aboard the USS Princeton, LPH-5, was under the operational control of CTG 79-4, SLF "A" with the exception of 1 June 1968 during which, HMM-362 located at Phu Bai was under the operational control of MAG-36. The primary activities during this period were day and night medevac standby, combat resupply, and administrative and logistic missions.

During this period, HMM-362 supplied eight aircraft per day to augment First Marine Aircraft Wing in the Northern I Corps Area. In addition, four aircraft were provided to SLF "A" daily, to meet their requirements. The aircraft sent to 1st MAW were fragged as Command and Control birds for the Third, Ninth and Fourth Marine Regiments in the Dong Ha and Khe Sanh area, performing a variety of utility tasks.

Although limited due to a lack of pilots, the squadron met its daily committments of 14 aircraft and crews and when the need arose supplied additional aircraft and crews. The average pilot time for the month was 101.6 hours with the high time of 142.0 hours.







# PART III

# SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 2 June = HiP-362 loaded aboard USS Princeton to continue operations for ONG 79.4, SLF "A".
- 3 June HEW-362, while simultaneously providing four aircraft to augment J.st MAW and four aircraft for administrative/liaison missions for the SLF, successfully backloaded HLT 2/4 Rear. Two aircraft augmenting 1st MAW took heavy automatic weapons fire in the Khe Sanh area, no hits and no casualties.
- 4 June One aircraft of HMM-362 experienced an engine failure and another a transmission failure. Both aircraft were left at Dong Ha and the crews returned to the ship.
- 5 June One aircraft of HMM-362 was lost when it had an engine failure over the water. The pilot autototated to within 200 yards of shore and the crew members exited without injury. The aircraft was a strike.
- 11 June While on a medevac mission in the Khe Sanh area, one aircraft from HMM-362 was repeatedly forced out by enemy fire. The pilot finally managed to maneuver into the zone and enplane the medevacs. The aircraft was then forced out of the zone by enemy fire, but the mission was successfully completed and no damage or injuries were incurred.
- 14 June Two aircraft from HMM-362 landed at Khe Sanh and encountered heavy mortar and rocket attack. Both aircraft lifted from Khe Sanh with negative hits.
- 15 June One aircraft of HNM-362 while attempting a medevac pickup at YD 156638 where forced out of the zone three times by enemy artillery. On the fourth landing the medevacs were successfully lifted from the zone.
- 16 June One aircraft of HM-362 experienced an engine failure in Danang area while taking off. All personnel aboard escaped without injury.
- 18 June One aircraft of HAM-362 while leaving a zone at XD 973470 received heavy .50 caliber fire taking three hits. The gunners were unable to return fire due to the disposition of friendly troops and not being able to pinpoint the enemy position.
- 22 June Aircraft of HMM-362 received mortar fire while in the zone at



Time (All Section )

XD 966466. No hits nor injuries resulted.

- 25 June Aircraft of HMM-362 made numerous fire reports all involving artillery, rockets and mortars. All incidents were in the Khe Sanh area and the surrounding zones. In addition several airbursts were reported. No hits nor injuries were reported.
- 26 June = One aircraft of HMM-362 discovered one hit from small arms fire at completion of the hop. Source unknown.



#### PART IV

# OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

1.	FLIGHT DATA	1-30 Jun 68	FORTHESS ATTACK III NAPOLEON/SALINE/SCOTL ND II		
	FLIGHT HOURS	1,960.7 4,890.0	920 <b>.</b> 9 <b>1.28</b> 0		
	Z/TROOPS	6 <b>,</b> 0 <del>5</del> 2	2,236		
	TONS OF CARGO	120.9	99•3		
	<b>№</b> ₿₽₽ <b>VCS</b>	787	252		
	Casualitles	. 0	0		
	SHIPBOARD LANDINGS (DAY)	1,015	623		
	SHIPBOLAD LANDINGS (NIGHT	111	0		



COPENS A/ARPT, OPN FORTRESS ATTACK /NAPOLEON/SALVE & JUNE 172

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MARINE MEDIUM HELICOPTER SQUADRON 362 Marine Aircraft Group 15 (REIN) 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, FMFPac FPO San Francisco 96602

> 3:JGB:gpk 03/126068 37780 8 June 1968

From:

Commanding Officer

To:

Commander, Task Group 79.4

After Action Report, Operation Fortress Attack II/Napoleon/Saline; submission of (U)

Ref: (a) Annex "J" to CTG 79.4 Operation Plan 120A-68

Encl:  $\sqrt{(1)}$  Chronology of Significant Events

(2) Analysis of Helicopter Operations
(3) Statistics for Operation Fortress Attack II/Napoleon/Saline

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (3) are submitted.

 This letter may be downgraded to "UNCLASSIFIED" upon removal of enclosures (1) through (3).

# DECLASSIFIED

NO FORN

# INDEX

ENCLOSURE (1) CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

ENCLOSURE (2) ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

ENCLOSURE (3) STATISTICS FOR OPERATION FORTRESS ATTACK II/NAPOLEON/SALINE

# CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

#### 15 Apr 1968

HMM-362 Op Con to CTG 79.4 as of 1200H. The squadron completed its on load to the LPH-2.

# 16 Apr 1968

One administrative and four logistic and resupply missions were completed. In addition, thirty squadron pilots were day carrier qualified and eight night carrier qualified.

#### 17 Apr 1968

Five command control, logistic and administrative missions were completed. Day and night carrier qualifications continued.

# 18 Apr 1968

Seven command and control, logistic and administrative missions were completed. Day and night carrier qualifications were completed.

#### 19 Apr 1968

Six command and control, logistic, and administrative missions were completed.

#### 20 Apr 1968

Eight command and control, logistic, and administrative missions were completed with one night medevac mission also accomplished.

#### 21 Apr 1968

Eight command and control, logistic, and administrative missions were completed.

#### 22 Apr 1968

Six command and control, logistic and administrative missions were completed along with three battlefield medevacs.

#### 23 Apr 1968

Eleven command and control, logistic and administrative missions were completed along with three battlefield medevacs.



# 24 Apr 1968

Nine command and control, logistic, and administrative missions were completed.

#### 25 Apr 1968

Ten command and control, logistic, and administrative were completed. One mission was aborted due to aircraft down. One mission recieved small arms fire with no hits.

# 26 Apr 1968

Eight command and control, logistic, and administrative missions were completed.

# 27 Apr 1968

Seven command and control, logistics, and administrative missions were completed along with seven medevacs.

#### 28 Apr 1968

Eight command and control, logistic, and administrative missions were completed. Four medevac missions were completed on this night totaling fourteen medevacs, eight of which were energency catagory. During one of these missions, one night medevac aircraft was hit by automatic small arms and mortar fire in the zone, resulting in all four crewmen wounded. The pilot was wounded seriously losing his left eye. Despite the wounds and an extensively damaged aircraft, four medevacs (one energency) were moved to a secure area to be evacuated by the wingman. One other fire incident (airburst) was observed during the day.

#### 29 Apr 1968

Ten command and control, logistics, and administrative, and medevac missions were completed. One aircraft received one hit from emall arms fire.

#### 30 Apr 1968

Six command and control, logistics, and administrative missions were completed. Eight fire incidents occured involving two aircraft. The fire was small arms fire and mortars, aircraft received no hits.



Only one administrative mission and one command and control mission was completed. All other missions were diverted to medevac missions in HLT 2/4's operational area. A total of eighty three personnel were medevaced. Three incidents of mortar and small arms fire with no hits were reported.

# 2 May 1968

Fifteen medevac and emergency resupply missions were completed. A total of one hundred thirty two personnel were medevaced. At 1800H, an emergency resupply and combat troop reinforcement mission commenced and was completed at 0200H.

# 3 May 1968

Nine command and control, logistic and administrative missions were completed. During this period sixty six personnel were medevaced. Two incidents of small arms and mortar fire were reported with no hits.

# 4 May 1968

Fight command and control, logistic, administrative, and medevac missions were completed. Forty four were accomplished. Two aircraft were assigned to support the 1st MAW, these aircraft flew 4.9 hours.

#### 5 May 1968

Four command and control, logistic, administrative, and medevac missions were accomplished. Medevacs totaled thirty personnel. Support for 1st MAW continued with three aircraft. These aircraft flew 14.3 hours.

#### 6 May 1968

Six command and control, logistic, administrative and medevac missions were accomplished with twelve personnel medevaced.

#### 7 May 1*9*68

Ten command and control, logistic, and administrative missions were accomplished.

#### 8 May 1968

Eight administrative, logistic, and command and control missions were accomplished. One aircraft was damaged by small arms fire enroute to Phu Bai Air Base.



#### 9 May 1968

Six administrative, logistic, and command and control missions were accomplished. Support for 1st MAW continued with four aircraft, flying 3.8 hours.

#### 10 May 1968

Nine administrative, logistic, and command and control missions were accomplished. Six aircraft supported 1st MAW committments flying 39.1 hours.

#### 11 May 1968

Fight administrative, logistic, command and control and medevac missions were accomplished. Six aircraft were sent to 1st MAW for working birds as requested. Two of these aircraft were sent back due to the lack of missions. The remaining four aircraft flew 23.2 hours.

# 12 May 1968

Seven administrative, logistic, command and control and medevac missions were accomplished. Six aircraft were sent to Quang Tri for 1st MAW flying 32.3 hours in support of Division units.

#### 13 May 1968

Seven administrative, logistic, command and control, and medevac missions were accomplished. Four aircraft were sent to 1st MAW as working birds, flying 16.7 hours. YL-4 experienced engine failure and was left at YD 280665. YL-8 experienced engine failure lifting from the USS Sanctuary. Pilot ditched in water at 10723.7E, 1651.7N. All personnel were rescued except the gunner who perished. YL-10 received a mortar round at YD 062543. The pilot flew the aircraft to YD 115555 where he was forced to land. The wingman picked up all four crewmembers. Three of the crew were wounded and were medevaced.

#### 14 May 1968

Five administrative, logistic, command and control and medevac missions were accomplished. Two aircraft supported 1st MAW, flying 9.4 hours. Two aircraft shutdown at YD 244588 received artillery and rockets. They turned up and left the zone while still under fire.

# 15 May 1968

Seven administrative, lògistic, command and control and medevac missions were accomplished. Six aircraft were sent to Quang Tri to support



1st MAW. Only two were utilized in the morning. Those aircraft flew 21.8 hours.

# 16 May 1968

Six administrative, logistic, command and control and medevac missions were accomplished. HLT 2/4 rear was offloaded to Dong Ha. Advance Party and five aircraft sent to USS Princeton.

# 18 May 1968

Squadron offloaded to Phu Bai to operate under MAG-36, 1st MAW, temporarily, while the ARG CTG 76.4 proceeded to Subic for upkeep.





#### ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

#### 1. General

Helicopter operations were conducted from the USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) during operation Fortress Attack II/Napoleon/Saline II.

#### 2. Helicopter Utilization

a. The overall utilization of helicopters was very good. Some difficulties were experienced when HDC would switch missions on sections who were still working previously briefed missions. Also at times sections were unnecessarily split by HDC. The augmentation of aircraft to 1st MAW for support were not most effectively utilized in all instances. Occasionally the SLF "A" aircraft provided to the 1st MAW were not used for half the day and sometimes not at all. When used, and proceeding on a mission, the pilots often found two other aircraft already there working. This was due to a lack of organization and control ashore.


#### b. LPH-2 Squadron Relations


Relations between the LPH-2 and the squadron were conducted in a highly professional and effective manner and were mutually satisfying during this period. Those problems encountered were met by a joint effort on the part of HDC and the squadron to correct them.

#### c. Communication and Coordination

Communications and coordination between the SLF, BLT and squadron were excellent. Very few difficulties were experienced. Between the LPH and the squadron however, some communication and control difficulties were encountered. UHF radio communications between the squadron aircraft and the ship was severely limited by the imposition COMSEC with the result that often the pilots were not sure of mission requirements. Flights occasionally would return to the ship still on a mission and be diverted to another mission by means of a slip of paper without being completely briefed as to mission requirements. This procedure did not permit pilots to adjust fuel load, or aircraft with mission limitations in order to accomplish the mission. Section integrity was violated by directions from HDC without regard to prebriefed mission or aircraft limitations. Additionally, these changes were not always passed to the squadron operations section with the result that the squadron many times did not know at all times what missions its aircraft were performing.


c. Operations of ELT 2/4 Logistic Support Area. These personnel were outstanding in their work and utlization of aircraft available to them. They moved the maximum amount of cargo/personnel as expeditiously as possible every time we worked with them.





# 3. Conclusions

- a. Aircraft provided to 1st MW must be utilized properly and positively controlled by the appropriate DASC. The frag should be provided to the SLF with a complete brief to include frequency, call sign, location, nature of mission and any other available information.
- b. The ship must coordinate with the squadron when changing missions aircraft, and diverting sections. Section of aircraft should not be split without regard to aircraft limitations and current mission status.
- c. The aircraft should be loaded as the pilot specifies, when carrying internal loads, since the amount of cargo he can handle will increase with each trip till he refuels.





# STATISTICS FOR OPERATION FORTRESS ATTACK II/NAPOLEON/SALINE II

DA TE	SOR TIES	PAX	TONS CARGO	MEDEVAC	HOURS.	
15 Apr 1968 16 Apr 1968 17 Apr 1968 18 Apr 1968 19 Apr 1968 20 Apr 1968 21 Apr 1968 22 Apr 1968 23 Apr 1968 24 Apr 1968 25 Apr 1968 26 Apr 1968 27 Apr 1968 28 Apr 1968 29 Apr 1968 29 Apr 1968 30 Apr 1968 3 May 1968 4 May 1968 5 May 1968 6 May 1968 7 May 1968 7 May 1968 10 May 1968 11 May 1968 12 May 1968 13 May 1968 14 May 1968 15 May 1968 16 May 1968 17 May 1968 16 May 1968 17 May 1968 18 May 1968 17 May 1968 18 May 1968	24 419 172 132 137 845 129 143 156 152 158 159 148 166 168 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169	19 67 69 136 135 159 129 164 121 125 147 149 199 172 233 157 81 205 112 248 159 286 265 251 202 123 136 147 288 47	0.5 6.7 2.0 5.5 4.0 5.1 3.0 5.1 2.7 6.1 3.7 6.1 3.7 12.5 4.0 12.5 3.8 4.2 3.9 12.5 6.5 2.6 3.7 5.7 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7	010304033041723432643024138502226200	20.2 42.8 53.8 49.0 44.0 39.1 29.3 47.4 46.9 57.6 45.2 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3 45.3	
TO TAL	5,425	6,314	149.25	623	1,599.7	
No. aircraft hit by enemy fire  No. fire incidents  No. aircraft damaged or destroyed operationally  No. personnel wounded in action  No. personnel killed in action  1						