


HMH

463

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HMH 463 "Eagle Pull" & "Frequent Wind" Report

Mar - May 75



EAGLE
PULL

FREQUENT
WIND

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DOCUMENT 1
ENCLOSURE (1)
UNCLASSIFIED

463 DEPLOYMENT MARCH-MAY 1975

<u>DATE:</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
21 MARCH	-RECEIVED WARNING ORDER.
22 MARCH	RECEIVED FMF PAC EXECUTE ORDER.
23 MARCH	STAGED 130 SHORT TONS OF CARGO-FLEW 2 AIRCRAFT ABOARD USS HANCOCK.
24 MARCH	FLEW 13 AIRCRAFT ABOARD USS HANCOCK.
25 MARCH	FLEW LAST AIRCRAFT ABOARD USS HANCOCK, COMPLETED LOADING.
26 MARCH	HMH-463 DEPARTED PEARL HARBOR.
3 APRIL	ADVANCE PARTY ARRIVES CUBI.
6 APRIL	USS HANCOCK ARRIVES CUBI.
9 APRIL	USS HANCOCK DEPARTED CUBI WITH 16-CH-53's/16-CH-46's/4-COBRAS/2-UHIES DESTINATION, SOUTH VIETNAM WATERS.
10 APRIL	DESTINATION CHANGED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM WATERS TO CAMBODIAN WATERS.
11 APRIL	ARRIVAL IN CAMBODIAN WATERS. 6 AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN PAINTED WITH LOW INFRARED REFLECTIVE PAINT.
12 APRIL	<u>EXECUTED MISSION "EAGLE PULL."</u>

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DOCUMENT 1
ENCLOSURE (1)
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"EAGLE PULL"

AREA

- ROUTES (SEE MAP)
- CITY ORIENTATION (SEE MAP)
- LZ DESCRIPTION (SEE PHOTO)
- COMM PROCEDURES

MISSION PHAN

- 1st WAVE-12 CH-53's FROM USS OKINAWA (HMH-463) WITH GSF, LAND LZ-"HOTEL", DROP GSF AND PICK UP EVACUEES.
- 2nd WAVE-12 CH53's FROM USS HANCOCK (HMH-463) LAND LZ-"HOTEL" PICK UP GSF.
- AIRFORCE CH-53's FROM THAILAND, PROVIDE SAR AND EXTRA EVACUEE LIFT CAPABILITY IF NEEDED.

HMH-463 MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

- 12 APRIL 0745-COMMENCED LAUNCH OF 14 CH-53's FROM USS HANCOCK.
- 0855-FIRST FLIGHT OF 3 AIRCRAFT STARTED INBOARD FOR ARRIVAL LZ-"HOTEL" AT 0955.
- 0945-FIRST FLIGHT ARRIVES AT HOLDING POINT "OSCAR".
- 1030-FIRST FLIGHT ARRIVES LZ-"HOTEL".
- 12 AIRCRAFT LANDED LZ-"HOTEL" AND EXTRACTED GSF.
- 2 AIRBORNE SPARE CH-53's ORBITED LZ-"HOTEL".
- 1115-FIRST FLIGHT LANDED ABOARD USS OKINAWA DROPPED GSF AND RETURNED TO USS HANCOCK.
- 1230-ALL HMH-463 AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO USS HANCOCK, MISSION COMPLETE.

TACTICS

ENEMY FIRE

- ARTILLERY: SPACING OF FLIGHT
- SPEED OF EXTRACTION

MISSION SUMMARY

HMH-463:

- FLEW 39 SORTIES
- FLEW 56.5 HOURS
- EXTRACTED 286 GSF

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

- 14 AIRCRAFT STACKED AT HOLDING POINT "OSCAR".
- POOR UHF COMM. WITH ABCCC ("CRICKET")
- EVACUEE LOADS WERE NOT READY AT LZ-"HOTEL".
- 100 MILES OVER ENEMY TERRAIN WITH BROKEN CLOUD COVER AND NO NAVAIDS OR RADAR CONTROL.

DOCUMENT 1
ENCLOSURE (1)
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DATEEVENT

14 April

USS HANCOCK LEFT CAMBODIAN WATERS
FOR SINGAPORE

15 April

PLACED ON 72 HOUR STANDBY FOR SAILING

16 April

USS HANCOCK ARRIVES SINGAPORE

18 April

USS HANCOCK PLACED ON 4 HOUR SAILING
NOTICE, USS HANCOCK DEPARTED SINGA-
PORE 2030 FOR SOUTH VIETNAM WATERS.

19 April

ALL ALE-29's INSTALLED

20 April

USS HANCOCK ARRIVED SOUTH VIETNAM
WATERS. LT COL FEX WITH BOEN CAREY,
FLEW INTO SAIGON TO CONFER WITH GEN
SMITH. SQUADRON PLACED ON 4 HOUR ALERT
READINESS POSTURE.

21 April

USS OKINAWA ARRIVED SOUTH VIETNAM
WATERS.

28 April

0200 - SQUADRON PLACED ON 1 HOUR ALERT
FOR MISSION: "FREQUENT FLY". 1300 -
SQUADRON PLACED BACK ON 6 HOUR ALERT
STATUS.

29 April

14 AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN PAINTED WITH LOW
INFRARED REFLECTIVE PAINT. SQUADRON
PLACED ON 1 HOUR ALERT STATUS. EXECUTED
MISSION "FREQUENT FLY".DOCUMENT 1
ENCLOSURE (1)
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"FREQUENT WIND"

AREA

- ROUTES (see map)
- CITY ORIENTATION (see map)
- LZ's DESCRIPTIONS (see photo)
- COMM PROCEDURES

MISSION PLAN

- 1st WAVE - 12 CH-53's FROM USS OKINAWA (HMH-462) WITH GSF LAND IN LZ's AT 1500 - BRING OUT EVACUEES IF POSSIBLE.
- 2nd WAVE - 12 CH-53's FROM USS HANCOCK (HMH-463) WITH GSF LAND IN LZ's AT 1510 - BRING OUT EVACUEES IF POSSIBLE.
- 3rd WAVE - 12 CH-53's FROM USS MIDWAY COMPOSED OF 3 HMH-463 AIRCRAFT AND 9 AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT, LAND IN LZ's AT 1520 BRING OUT EVACUEES.
- ALL WAVES WILL BREAK UP INTO 3 AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS AND CONTINUE EVACUATION.
- 2 CH-46's FROM USS HANCOCK WILL BE AIRBORNE SAR - HOLDING AT POINT WISHBONE.
- 2 CH-46's FROM USS OKINAWA PROVIDE AIRBORNE "SPARROW HAWK" WITH GSF, JUST SOUTH OF POINT WISHBONE.
- 2 COBRAS FROM USS HANCOCK PROVIDE PROTECTIVE FIRE FOR AIRCRAFT BETWEEN POINT WISHBONE AND POINT KEYHOLE.
- 2 COBRAS FROM USS OKINAWA PROVIDE PROTECTIVE FIRE FOR AIRCRAFT BETWEEN POINT WISHBONE TO "FEET WET".

HMH-463 MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

- 29 April - 1235 - COMMENCED LAUNCH TO CTF-76 SHIPS FOR GSF PICKUP.
 1440 - 12 CH-53's FROM USS OKINAWA (HMH-462) HEADED INBOUND FOR 1500 L-HOUR.
 1450 - 12 CH-53's FROM USS HANCOCK (HMH-463) HEADED INBOUND FOR A 1510 LANDING.
 1500 - 12 CH-53's FROM USS MIDWAY LEAD BY 3 HMH-463 AIRCRAFT FOLLOWED BY 9 AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT HEADED INBOUND FOR A 1520 LANDING.

30 April - 0630 - LAST HMH-463 CH-53 LANDED.

TACTICS

- ENEMY FIRE

AAA

SA-7's

SMALL ARMS

CLOUD COVER

AIRCRAFT LIGHTS

EVASIVE MANEUVERS

ALTITUDE AND ROUTE CHANGES

MISSION SUMMARY

HMH-463

- FLEW 137 SORTIES
- FLEW 155.4 HOURS
- INSERTED 403 GSF

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DOCUMENT 1
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- EXTRACTED 1,000 REF
- EXTRACTED 250 REFUGERS AND EVACUEES
- AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME PER AIRCRAFT - 9.7 HOURS
- AVERAGE FLIGHT TIME PER AIRCRAFT - 9.1 HOURS

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

- LZ CONTROL USED 54 RADIO WHICH BECAME VERY WEAK AFTER FOUR HOURS USE, CAUSING MANY AIRCRAFT TO BE STUCK AT POINT KEYHOLE.
- INACCURATE BRIEF ON NUMBER OF EVACUEES AND ESTIMATED DURATION OF MISSION.
- LZ CONTROL COULD NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION ON NUMBER OF EVACUEES REMAINING.
- CONFUSION WHEN USING L/L COMMAND WHEN LANDING AND REFUELING FROM SHIPS.
- NO NAV AIDS OR RADAR COVERAGE.
- LZ'S NOT MARKED FOR NIGHT EXTRACTION.
- ADVERSE WEATHER.
- MISSION DEVELOPED INTO NIGHT EXTRACTION.

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DATEEVENT

1 May

DEPARTED SOUTH VIETNAM WATERS FOR
SUBIC BAY, PI

3 May

USS HANCOCK ARRIVED SUBIC

4 May

HHH-453 DISBARBED FROM USS HANCOCK
TO USS ENTERPRISE.

5 May

USS ENTERPRISE SET SAIL FOR HAWAII.

14 May

HHH-453 LAUNCHED ALL UP AIRCRAFT FOR
RETURN TO NCAS KANEONE. USS ENTERPRISE
UNLOADED.CURRENT PROBLEMS

- AVCAL
- FISCAL

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DOCUMENT 1
ENCLOSURE (1)
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MARINE HEAVY HELICOPTER SQUADRON 463
 Marine Aircraft Group 24
 1st Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force
 FPO San Francisco 96602

3:JRH:fs
 3710
 2 May 1975

WORKING PAPERS

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding Officer, Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 3

Subj: Operations Summary of Flight Ops in Support of
 "Frequent Wind"

Encl: (1) Detailed Narrative of Flights
 (2) Detailed Outline of Individual Flights
 (3) Lessons Learned

1. HMH-463 (rein) flew 287 sorties for 308.5 total hours in support of Operation Frequent Wind. The CH-53's inserted 403 GSF personnel while extracting 182. A total of 2984 evacuees were extracted by the CH-53's of HMH-463.

2. Detachments from HMM-164 and HMM-165 presently "OPCON" to HMH-463 carried a total of 116 GSF personnel and 869 evacuees.

3. HMH-463 flight time flown by type aircraft on "Frequent Wind":

(a) CH-53's Flew 155.4 hours

(b) CH-46's Flew 132.7 hours

(c) AH-1J's Flew 20.4 hours

4. HMH-463 (rein) average flight time flown by the aircraft:

(a) CH-53's Flew an average of 9.7 hours per airframe

(b) CH-46's Flew an average of 8.2 hours per airframe

(c) AH-1J's Flew an average of 5.1 hours per airframe

5. A more detailed breakdown of HMH-463 flights and individual events are found in enclosures (1) and (2). Enclosure (3) gives lessons learned from mission. Detachments OPCON to HMH-463 will submit data individually as requested by Higher Authority.

Operations Summary of Flight Operations in Support of "Frequent Wind"

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DOCUMENT 2
 ENCLOSURE (1)

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PINEAPPLE 5-0 FLIGHT

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>PILOT</u>	<u>COPLOT</u>	<u>FLT TIME</u>
5-1	LTCOL FIK	1/LT FAUNERIDGE 1/LT DAVIS	12.8
5-2	CAPT JONES	1/LT BUBSEY	11.7
5-3	1/LT WEISS	1/LT STEELE	12.5

SUMMARY

Flight 5-0 departed USS HANCOCK at 1240 and proceeded to USS VANCOUVER for the pick up of Ground Support Forces. Five - zero Flight loaded a total of 117 GSF and proceeded to Hancock for refueling. At approximately 1440, 5-0 flight proceeded inbound to Hope. After 5 minutes holding at Hope, 5-0 flight proceeded inbound to the DAO compound. Alamo directed 5-1 into LZ-37 where he landed and picked up 69 evacuees. Flight 5-2, 5-3 landed LZ-38 and picked up 47 and 49 evacuees respectively. The flight received small arms in the vicinity of LZ-38. Several buildings West of the DAO were on fire and several explosions were seen between Bien Hoa and Saigon. Flight 5-0 departed the DAO together and proceeded outbound for landing and refueling at the USS OKINAWA. The flight departed for Hope. Upon arrival, HMC ordered a return to USS HANCOCK. After a short delay, the flight landed, topped off with fuel and was again directed into Saigon. About this time (1800) the weather began deteriorating rapidly, the ceiling lowered and the clouds were building higher. 5-2 landed in LZ-38, 5-1 and 5-3 landed in LZ-37. 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 picked up 60, 68, and 91 evacuees respectively. Flight 5-3 became separated from the lead aircraft at this point due to the time required to load the extra pack. Flights 5-1, 5-2 returned to the USS MOBILE while 5-3 landed at the USS MT VERNON with an unfavorable 20 knot tail wind. After refueling the flight rejoined over the USS OKINAWA and returned for its third trip into Saigon.

Flight 5-3 began receiving light to medium AAA fire from the vicinity of Vung Tau but no hits were received. After descent into the city, at 500 feet altitude, 5-3 was fired upon by an SA-7. The crew chief immediately fired a MK-50 flare and the aircraft reduced power, turned, and successfully evaded the missile. At this time, darkness had set in over the city. After a short delay over the DAO, flights 5-1, 5-2 landed in LZ-37 and picked up 78 and 68 evacuees respectively. Flights 5-1 and 5-2 departed and returned outbound. Upon their departure, 5-3 was cleared and landed in LZ-36 where it picked up 59 evacuees. 5-1 reported automatic weapons firing outbound in the vicinity of a highway below Newport. Flight 5-1 was directed to the USS VANCOUVER while 5-2, 5-3 landed on the Okinawa. All three aircraft took off and entered the delta region just like Hancock in anticipation of landing and inspecting the structure. Shortly after entering, a CH-46 crashed off the port beam and 5-1 went down and hovered with his spotlight on the survivors until the SA-7 could be launched. After nearly

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ENCLOSURE (1)
TAB (A)

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2 hours in the pattern, the aircraft were landed and shutdown for inspection. Approximately 25 minutes later, 5-0 flight launched independently and rendezvoused enroute to Hope. In the region near Vung Tau and Hope, 5-3 observed medium to heavy AAA and automatic weapons fire, as well as numerous mortar firings. Upon entering the city limits, a military convoy was noted on a highway leading from Newport. All aircraft noted an extreme amount of automatic weapons activity in the city proper. Events 5-1 and 5-2 landed at LZ-37 and loaded 40 and 37 GSF respectively, while 5-3 orbited overhead. After 5-3 was cleared into the zone, 5-1 and 5-2 departed. 5-1 proceeded to the Okinawa, having taken automatic weapons fire in the areas around the DAO and the U. S. Embassy. Just South of Nha Be, 5-2 observed an SA-7 firing. The crew chief fired approximately 11 ALE-29 flares and 8 MK-50 flares and the missile was diverted. 5-2 proceeded direct to the Hancock and shut down. Event 5-3 remained in LZ-37 for about 25 minutes while awaiting more 53's. This was to allow complete extraction of remaining GSF. 5-3 finally lifted with 44 GSF and proceeded to USS DULUTH for refueling. After take-off, 5-3 proceeded to the Hancock where 5-1 was waiting to determine the status of 5-3. Both aircraft landed about 0130 and shutdown.

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ENCLOSURE (1)
TAB (A)

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PINEAPPLE 6-0 FLIGHT**CONFIDENTIAL**
FLIGHT TIME

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CO-PILOT</u>	<u>FLIGHT TIME</u>
6-1	MAJ HOWELL	LT STONECYPHER	14.0
6-2	CAPT CALKINS	1STLT SANTILLO	8.3
6-3	1STLT CIPPARONE	1STLT FARRIER	10.2

SUMMARY:

Flight 6-0 tookoff from USS HANCOCK at 1300 and proceeded to USS Vancouver. Pineapple 6-1 was the first to land and pick up his load of 40 GSF. Six-one then departed Vancouver and landed on USS MT Vernon to await L Hour. During this time Pineapple 6-2 and 6-3 landed on the USS Vancouver loaded up with 22 GSF, 2 mules with 106's each, and awaited L Hour. At approximately 1430 Pineapple 6-1 departed the USS MT Vernon flew over USS Vancouver collecting the rest of his flight and started inbound to Point Hope. Flight 6-0 reached Point Hope and was directed to hold for approximately 15 minutes due to the complete saturation of the inbound route. Shortly they were cleared inbound and continued to point Wishbone. Upon arrival at Wishbone the Flight turned toward Point Keyhole. Abeam Newport Pineapple 6-1 and Flight came under small arms fire which was seen by starboard gunners. Fire was arking under aircraft so no retaliatory fire was used. LZ control directed the Flight into the DAO Compound where 6-1 landed in LZ-37, dropped off the GSF and picked up 79 evacs. Pineapple 6-2 and 6-3 landed in LZ-35, dropped off their GSF and picked up evacs. Six-two loaded 65 evacs while 6-3 unloaded 58 evacs. Flight 6-0 took off individually once loaded and rendezvoused at Point Hope. The Flight then proceeded to USS Hancock where they discharged all evacuees and loaded approximately 40 GSFs in each aircraft. After takeoff from USS Hancock, Pineapple 6-1 contacted HDC and gave loads aboard. HDC directed Flight 6-0 to return to USS Hancock and discharge GSF personnel. They were not needed in Saigon LZ's.

Subsequently, Flight 6-0 again departed USS Hancock and proceeded to the Saigon area. AAA fire was received while flying over Wishbone - Newport area. All AAA fire seemed to explode about 500-1000' below aircraft. Light small arms fire was also seen. LZ control landed Pineapple 6-1 into LZ-38, while Pineapple 6-2 and 6-3 landed in LZ-35 where they picked up 75 and 60 evacs respectively. Pineapple 6-1 loaded 61 evacs and departed the zone. As Pineapple 6-2 and 6-3 were loaded, they took off individually. The Flight again rendezvoused at Point Mercy and proceeded back to USS Hancock where they dropped off the evacs and refueled their aircraft. After departing the USS Hancock Pineapple flight encountered heavy cloud buildups which required the flight to climb to 8-9000'. Once on the other side of the cloud bank Saigon could be seen through a scattered broken layer. Due to the clouds, it was necessary to bring the Flight down over Newport to enter the area. With Pineapple 6-1 approximately

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CLOSURE

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aboard the US Embassy, Pineapple 6-3 radiated a "Mayday", "hit and going down". Six-one turned quickly to the right to try and see 6-3 and where he was going down. During this time 6-2 was reporting multiple SA-7 firings, was releasing flares and taking evasive action. Pineapple 6-1 had visual contact with Pineapple 6-3 by this time and followed him into the US Embassy zone. After regaining contact with 6-3, Pineapple 6-1 found out that 6-3 was ok but 6-2 was calling mechanical problems, loss of YAW Air Servo, and was returning to USS Hancock. After checking aircraft over for damage, Pineapple 6-3 lifted out of the Embassy LZ with 48 evacs. Pineapple 6-1 saw 6-3 lift out of the Embassy and quickly landed in LZ picking up 64 evacs. After takeoff, Pineapple 6-1 flew to USS MT Vernon and dropped off the evacuees. While refueling aboard USS MT Vernon, Pineapple 6-1 heard that Pineapple 6-3 was down status aboard USS Hancock. Pineapple 6-1 departed USS MT Vernon for another trip. Upon approach to point hope, heavy AAA fire was received from Vung Tau area. Six-one climbed to 7,500' and continued inbound. Upon arrival at Wishbone, HHC directed 6-1 to switch LZ-Control. Control instructed 6-1 to land LZ-37. Upon landing, 23 GSF troops, 2 mules with 106's were loaded aboard and 6-1 departed zone receiving light small arms fire from the Southwest. Flying at 5500' with lights on dim flash, 6-1 flew back to USS Vancouver, unloaded GSF, refueled, and departed back into Saigon. Upon arrival at edge of city HHC directed that 6-1 go to US Embassy. An approach was set up and 6-1 landed at Embassy parking lot picking up 67 evacs. Sniper fire was received as 6-1 pulled out of the LZ. Pineapple 6-1 again landed aboard USS Vancouver unloaded evacs and departed for Saigon. Six-one received AAA fire from Vung Tau with flashes exploding approximately 100 meters right of aircraft. Some small boats just off Point Hope fired small arms at the aircraft but due to altitude was not effective. Pineapple 6-1 landed in Embassy parking lot, picked up 69 evacs and started return trip to USS Hancock. Upon reaching Point Merop 6-1 asked HHC for permission to shut aircraft down on USS Hancock to check rotor head and hydraulic systems. Permission was granted and at 0110 30 April 6-1 landed on USS Hancock and shutdown. Minor maintenance was performed on YH-12 and at 0225, Pineapple 6-1 launched out again from USS Hancock for US Embassy in Saigon. No fire was received except when entering Embassy LZ where sniper fire was taken. Six-one landed, picked up 84 evacuees and headed back out when all ICS comm in the aircraft was lost along with a hard over in the YAW/ALT AMP. Pineapple 6-1 landed aboard the USS Hancock at 0410 30 April with aircraft in a down status.

During the mission 6-1 reported one missile, expended no ammo expended no MK-50 flares, expended no ALX-29 flares, received moderate AAA fire and moderate small arms fire.

During mission 6-2 reported 3-4 missiles, expended no ammo fired 4 MK-50 flares, expended no ALX-29 flares, received moderate AAA fire and light small arms fire.

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DOCUMENT 2
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SAS (5)

During miss 6-3 reported 3-4 missile expended no
Fired 3 MK-50 flares, expended no ALB-29 flares, received
moderate AA fire and light small arms fire. **CONFIDENT**

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DOCUMENT 2
ENCLOSURE (1)
TAB (3)

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PINKAWAY 7-0 FLIGHT

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EVENT	PILOT	CO-PILOT	HOURS
7-1(A)	MAJ ALLEN	LT DAVIS LT REED	12.0
7-2	CAPT EDWARDS	LT HIELD LT REED	10.2
7-3	CAPT WALINSKI	LT SCHWARTZ	8.5
7-1(B)	CAPT PORTER	MAJ ALLEN	1.9

SUMMARY

As the mission kicked off at approximately 1230 29 April 1975, 7-0 Flight departed Hancock for the USS Peoria. Upon arrival at the USS Peoria 7-1 picked up 39 GSF 7-2 picked up 40 GSF and 7-3 picked up 38 GSF and returned to the USS Hancock to refuel. Upon arrival USS Hancock, 7-0 flight was put into the Delta pattern then landed, refueled, and waited for final execution order for Operation Frequent Wind. At approximately 1430 the final execution order was given and 7-0 Flight launched with GSF inbound to Saigon. After following the pre-briefed route and upon arrival at Keyhole, 7-0 Flight was sent to LZ 35 to unload its GSF and load evacuees. Seven-one lifted off with 77 evacs, 7-2 with 80 evacs and 7-3 with 58 evacs and the flight was returned to awaiting shipping to unload. Seven-one was sent to the USS Mt Vernon to unload and refuel, with 7-2 and 7-3 directed to the USS Vancouver to accomplish the same. Seven-zero Flight lifted from its respective ships and was directed inbound to Saigon for another evacuee pickup. Upon arrival at Keyhole 7-0 Flight was again directed to LZ 35. Upon approaching the LZ automatic weapons fire was taken but all aircraft got into the zone. Seven-one picked up 89 evacs, 7-2 85 evacs and 7-3 75 evacs and the flight again experienced automatic weapons fire as it left the LZ outbound to shipping. Upon going feetwet 7-1 was directed to the USS Duluth for its pax drop and refueling with 7-2 and 7-3 being directed to the USS Vancouver. The flight again lifted off and went inbound to Saigon. The weather was getting pretty bad with squall lines developing along with darkness rapidly approaching. The flight inbound was intermittently IFR and visibility low. Upon arrival at Keyhole the flight was again directed to LZ 35 and took automatic weapons fire going in and out of the LZ. While in the LZ a mortar round dropped approximately 25' behind 7-3. Seven-one picked up 96 evacs, 7-2 100 evacs and 7-3 78 evacs and returned outbound to shipping. Seven-one and 7-2 dropped evacs on the USS Vancouver and 7-3 on the USS Duluth. The USS Duluth was having refueling problems and as 7-1 and 7-2 were sent inbound 7-3 was directed to USS Hancock to wait for 7-1 and 7-2's return. At Hope 7-1 and 7-2 were sent back to USS Hancock (because of a high amount of aircraft in the city) to refuel

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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and check the aircraft heads. These aircraft inspection, 7-2 and 7-3 went down due to mechanical problems while 7-1 refueled and returned inbound to Saigon. Upon entering the city 7-1 took AA and small arms fire and continued to LZ 37 to pick up CB CCF. Seven-one departed the LZ, again received AAA and small arms fire while exiting the city, and returned to the USS Hancock to unload and shut-down.

At 0200 it was learned that more aircraft were needed so 7-1 was relaunched with Captain POWERS as the RAC and Major ALLEN as the Co-Pilot, because Major ALLEN had an excessive amount of flight hours that day. Seven-one lifted off and was sent inbound to the US Embassy. Upon entering the city 7-1 encountered heavy automatic weapons fire and two SA-7's which were diverted with the use of flares. Sixty-eight evacs were picked up at the Embassy and 7-1 went outbound to return to shipping. Upon leaving the city heavy fire was again taken with possible SA-7 firings. Going fast wet at Hope automatic weapons were fired from boats off shore. Seven-one was directed to the USS Duluth but enroute lost the #1 generator and smelled fumes of a possible electrical fire which extinguished upon turning off the Vent Blower. Seven-one then directed to the USS Hancock, made an uneventful landing, and shut-down.

DOCUMENT 2

ENCLOSURE (1)

TAB (C)

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PINEAPPLE 8-0 FLIGHT

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>PILOT</u>	<u>CO-PILOT</u>	<u>FLIGHT TIME</u>
8-1	WAY MCCABE	LT MACPHEE	12.0
8-2	LT PRICE	CAPT DRYER	10.4
8-3	LT PRENDERGAST	LT SHILLITO	10.4

SUMMARY

The 8-0 Flight departed USS Hancock at 1300, 29 April 1975 and entered the Delta pattern at USS Okinawa where we held for BMH-462 aircraft to get airborne. At 1425 we landed on USS Okinawa and refueled. Eight - one then picked up 40 GSF personnel, 8-2 got 33 GSF and 8-3 received 16 GSF and one 106 recoilless rifle with mine and ammunition. We departed USS Okinawa, held at Point Hope, then proceeded inbound at HDCs direction. We held again momentarily at Point Wishbone, then flew direct to the DAO Compound. Eight-one landed in LZ-36, dropped his GSF and picked up 52 evacuees. Eight-two landed in LZ-37, dropped off his GSF and loaded 53 evacuees. Eight-three landed in LZ-36, dropped his GSF and 106 and picked up 66 evacuees. Mortar fire was taken at LZ-37 while 8-2 was in the zone.

On lift-off we joined as a flight and proceeded outbound uneventfully. Eight-one unloaded/refueled on USS Mobile, 8-2 and 8-3 unloaded/refueled on USS Denver. At HDCs direction the flight then returned to USS Hancock to pick up more GSF personnel. This turned out to be incorrect information, we refueled and returned to Point Hope.

The 8-0 flight was cleared inbound and flew the normal route in. We encountered no direct opposition, landing at LZ-36 where 8-1 picked up 68 evacuees, and 8-2 and 8-3 received 60 each. On the return flight we took heavy AAA and automatic weapons fire North-Northwest of Vung Tau at 6500' - 7000' altitude. Many tracers in heavy bursts were reported by all three crews, once completely enveloping 8-2. Eight-three also reported isolated grey puffs of flak. The flight diverted over cloud banks and received no hits. Eight-one unloaded/refueled on USS Mobile, 8-2 on USS Denver, and 8-3 on USS Vancouver. Eight-one developed a generator problem, so 8-2 and 8-3 headed toward point Hope as a flight of two. When we reached Point Hope 8-1 called to rejoin the flight and 8-2/8-3 held for 30 minutes.

With the 8-0 flight rejoined we flew the normal route inbound, held momentarily at Keyhole, and proceeded to the DAO Compound where we held for about 10 minutes at low altitude. This was necessary because we made an approach to LZ-37 without the knowledge that other aircraft were in the zone waiting to be loaded. Eight-two reported the flight was taking small arms fire during that time.

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After the aircraft at LZ-37 departed, it was relayed to us that there were no more loads there and AAG-1 directed all aircraft to the U.S. Embassy. Eight-two and 8-3 were now at BINCO Fuel and the Embassy had more aircraft than it could handle, so we proceeded outbound to Point Mercy. Eight-one refueled on USS MT Vernon, 8-2 and 8-3 refueled on USS Vancouver. The flight then rejoined in the Delta pattern at USS Hancock where we held due to the CH-46 emergency. After one hour of holding we landed, refueled, shutdown and checked the aircraft. Eight-two had a #2 AMP and #2 Gyro replaced, all three aircraft were serviced up and the flight launched to Point Hope. Eight-one experienced problems and turned back, entering the Delta pattern at USS Hancock. Eight-two and 8-3 were instructed by Fairmount by direction of CTF-79 to RTB and shutdown. Eight-two and 8-3 entered Charlie, made final landing aboard USS Hancock, shutdown and folded.

No ammunition was expended by any members of the 8-0 flight. Eight-one fired 3 ALE-29 Flares on an unconfirmed missile launch and 8-2 fired 1 ALE-29 Flare by mistake.

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During the mission, 9-1 reported no missiles, no ammo was expended, only occasional AAA fire was taken along with moderate small arms fire.

During the mission, 9-2 reported no missiles, no ammo was expended, only occasional AAA fire along with moderate small arms fire.

During the mission, 9-3 reported no missiles, no ammo was expended, moderate AAA was reported with moderate small arms fire.

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LESSONS LEARNED

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1. RADAR FLIGHT FOLLOWING.

(a) DISCUSSION. Radar flight following was not provided for helicopter flights during the mission. This resulted in navigation problems for aircraft during the hours of darkness and IFR conditions.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. Assign ships/aircraft the responsibility of radar flight following to enable all aircraft to be under radar contact during all phases of the operation. This contact would have prevented many aircraft from straying off safe enroute corridors.

2. EXCESSIVE RADIO TRAFFIC.

(a) DISCUSSION. The HEC, land-launch, ABCOL, and LZ control frequencies were all over-crowded with radio calls. This was not due to excessive transmissions by each aircraft, but by the large number of aircraft involved in the operation.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. That separate frequencies be assigned by flights or by inbound/outbound leg to enable aircraft on the same route to have adequate communications with the controlling agency.

3. LANDING ZONE COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) DISCUSSION. The FM radios being used for communications in the DAO Landing Zone became weak after the first four hours of the operation, resulting in the stacking of as many as twelve aircraft over checkpoint KEYHOLE.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. That UHF radios be used as the primary means of communications with USMC helicopters. If FM radios must be used, that back-up radios and/or batteries be utilized to ensure adequate communications between air and ground units at all times.

4. LOCATIONS OF SHIPS.

(a) DISCUSSION. The six ships which were utilized for refueling and passenger drops were not readily identifiable. Some of the ship's TACANS were inoperative and they did not appear to be on parallel courses nor did they appear to be equally spaced.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. Establish refueling/passenger embark ships on parallel courses and equidistant to enable identification by position and ensure each ship has a functioning navaid for positive identification during bad weather or night operations.

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LESSONS LEARNED

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(b) RECOMMENDATION. Establish refueling/passenger disembark ships on parallel courses and equidistant to enable identification by position and ensure each ship has a functioning navaid for positive identification during bad weather or night operations.

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5. LAND/LAUNCH COMMUNICATION FREQUENCY.

(a) DISCUSSION. Aircraft were briefed not to use land/launch common for landing on the six refueling ships except in emergency situations. In most cases, aircraft required communication with ships and a radio frequency saturation occurred.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. Realize that aircraft must communicate with ships during the landing phase of operation, especially in a heavy configuration, and assign a frequency for each ship, or at least more than one frequency for six ships plus an overall controller.

6. MISSION START TIME.

(a) DISCUSSION. L-Hour for the mission was 1500H.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. That a mission of this scope and duration (20 hours) be begun at an early morning hour, since some crews were flying at the end of a 24-hour-day.

7. PLANNING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) DISCUSSION. The number of passengers to be lifted out prior to the mission was estimated to be less than 1,500. There were approximately 9,000 evacuees and GSF taken from Saigon during the FREQUENT WIND mission.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. Accurate information is essential for planning such things as crew days and changes, aircraft maintenance requirements, flares and ammunition, and meals.

8. MISSION UPDATE.

(a) DISCUSSION. During the mission, it was almost impossible to get an accurate indication of the number of evacuees left in any of the zones. This information is essential for planning the flow of flights, the landing zone to be used, and the duration of the mission.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. That ground personnel keep an accurate count of the passengers remaining at any given time.

9. AAA SITES.

(a) DISCUSSION. For the duration of the operation, AAA sites were reported firing from at least two positions.

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(b) RECOMMENDATION. As active AAA sites are located, call in tactical air strikes to terminate the danger caused by these sites.

10. INCORRECT OR INCOMPLETE DIRECTIONS.

(a) DISCUSSION. Upon completion of the first round trip to the LZ, approximately twelve aircraft were directed to RAMPAGE to pick up additional GSF. When the aircraft had been orbiting for approximately 30 minutes and were awaiting a green dash, a return call to HDC revealed that no aircraft was supposed to pick up additional GSF. The delay caused by this holding evolution caused all aircraft to re-fuel and caused a over-load condition upon returning to the LZ. Throughout the operation, there were numerous cases of excessive orbiting over ships when aircraft should have been directed to LZ's.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. That better coordination be used by FAIRMONT in assigning aircraft to ships for refueling along with FAIRMONT being informed quickly of any changes to the mission.

11. FIELD TACAN AT LZ.

(a) DISCUSSION. A field TACAN at either LZ would have proved to be an invaluable aid to navigation during darkness and IFR weather. Many AAA firings and some SA-7 firings are attributed to pilots who were not on the prescribed route due to weather or darkness.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. That a field TACAN be used as an aid to navigation.

12. LZ MARKING.

(a) DISCUSSION. The LZ's were not easily discernable at night.

(b) RECOMMENDATION. That fluorescent paint, strobe lights, or bean-bag lights be used to mark LZ's at night.

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