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II

PREFACE

This compilation was first published by the Committee on Foreign Relations on January 14, 1965, updated on June 16, 1965, and issued as a revised edition. The second revised edition was published in March 1966. This third revised edition includes documents through June 1967.

It contains material deemed useful in discussion of the situation in southeast Asia. The material has been assembled by the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations with the assistance of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, and the Department of State.

It should be noted that this compilation is limited to statements by officials of the executive branch and pertinent official documents, with the exception of the material on the positions of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front, and Secretary General U Thant (which in most instances were obtained through the Department of State). The volume would, of course, be more useful if it also contained materials from sources outside the Government, such as articles by experts on southeast Asia. However the selection of nonofficial items for inclusion would have placed the committee in a most difficult position. Rather than run the risk of subjecting the committee and its staff to attack for showing bias in one way or another on the most controversial foreign policy issue to arise in many years, it was decided to limit the contents to the scope indicated above. Therefore, this volume does not pretend to be a well-rounded treatment of the subject.

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

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A. SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1948-1967

Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, and the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations¹

1948

June 5.—Bao Dai, French High Commissioner Emile Bollert, and Gen. Nguyen Van Xuan sign the Baie d'Along Agreement to establish State of Vietnam with Bao Dai as chief of state within the French Union.

1949

March 8.—The Elysee Agreement, in the form of an exchange of letters between Bao Dai and President Auriol of France, outlines the general principles affecting French-Vietnam relations.

June 14.—An exchange of letters between Bao Dai and French High Commissioner Leon Pignon puts into effect the Elysee Agreement. United States sends message of welcome to Bao Dai.

July 1.—Bao Dai decrees formally establishes State of Vietnam and provide a basis for its organization on a constitutional framework.

1950

February 7.—Great Britain and the United States extend de jure welcomes to Vietnam.

February 19.—U.S. consulate general in Saigon is raised to Legation and Minister accredited to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

December 23.—United States signs Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for indirect U.S. military aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

1951

September 7.—United States signs agreement with Vietnam for direct economic assistance.

September 8.—Delegates from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos participate in the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco.

1952

July.—U.S. Legation in Saigon is raised to Embassy status. U.S. Ambassador presents credentials to Bao Dai. Vietnamese Embassy is established in Washington, D.C.

October 12.—The 200th U.S. ship carrying military aid arrives in Saigon.

¹ This chronology has been compiled primarily on the basis of "Deadline Data on Work Affairs," Deadline Data, Inc., New York, and Memorandum RFE-14, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Jan. 10, 1962, and the current press.

1954

- May 8-July 21.*—Geneva Conference on Indochina. The delegates are from Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. (joint chairmen), France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and the Vietminh regime. Agreements are signed on July 20 and 21 and the main provisions concerning Vietnam are that (1) Vietnam is to be partitioned along the 17th parallel into North and South Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on foreign military bases and personnel and on increased armaments, (3) countrywide elections, leading to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, are to be held by July 20, 1956, and (4) an International Control Commission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to the agreements. The United States issues a unilateral declaration stating that it (1) "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva agreements, (2) "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security," and (3) "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the U.N. to insure that they are conducted fairly."
- July 7.*—Head of State and former Emperor Bao Dai appoints Ngo Dinh Diem Premier of Vietnam.
- August.*—Flow of almost 1 million refugees from North to South Vietnam begins.
- October 11.*—The Communist Vietminh regime formally takes over control of Hanoi and North Vietnam.
- October 24.*—President Eisenhower sends a letter to Premier Diem of South Vietnam stating that American assistance will be given hereafter not through the French authorities, but directly to the Government of South Vietnam. The letter also states that the U.S. Government "expects this aid will be met by * * * undertaking needed reforms."
- December 29.*—Conference of France and the Associated States (Cambodia, etc.) terminates the economic and customs union between the Associated States.

1955

- January 1.*—United States promises to render direct assistance to Vietnam, on the basis of the existing pentilateral agreement of December 1950, for support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.
- February 5.*—Premier Diem decrees the first of a series of laws initiating important and extensive land reform program.
- February 12.*—The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) takes over the training of the South Vietnamese Army, following the relinquishing of command authority by the French.
- February 19.*—Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO)—with its protocol covering Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—comes into force.

- March 2.*—Cambodia's King Sihanouk abdicates in favor of his father Prince Norodom Suramarit after criticism by the International Supervisory Commission of his proposed electoral reforms.
- March 7.*—United States and South Vietnam sign agreement which supplements existing economic cooperation agreement of September 1951.
- March 29.*—Armed revolt is precipitated in Saigon by the Binh Xuyen political-bandit group, spreading ultimately into large-scale disidence in the southern provinces with the participation of elements of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects.
- April 17.*—South Vietnamese Government appeals to the U.N. against the North Vietnamese Communists, who, in violation of the Geneva agreements, prevent northerners from migrating to South Vietnam.
- April 23.*—Chou En-lai and the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister gives assurances of "noninterference" to ex-King Sihanouk of Cambodia.
- May 10.*—Premier Diem forms a new Cabinet composed largely of his own followers.
- May 16.*—United States signs agreement with Cambodia for direct military aid to replace the aid formerly given through the French Government.
- July.*—Communists initiate first overt propaganda move in South Vietnam by distributing literature signed by North Vietnam's "National United Front."
- July 1.*—France formally relinquishes command authority over the Vietnamese Navy.
- July 7.*—French formally transfer Nha Prang Airbase to Vietnamese control.
- July 20.*—Talks were scheduled to begin (according to Geneva agreement) for the preparation of all-Vietnam elections to be held on July 20, 1956, to reunite the country. The Government of South Vietnam rejects the North Vietnamese Government's invitation to discuss the elections, on the grounds that in North Vietnam the people would not be able to express their will freely and that falsified votes in North Vietnam could overrule the votes in South Vietnam.
- August 16.*—Last French High Commissioner in Vietnam departs.
- September 25.*—Cambodia leaves the French Union. Cambodia declared an "independent and sovereign state" by the Cambodian National Assembly.
- October.*—Binh Xuyen is defeated as an organized armed insurgent force.
- October 23.*—A national referendum deposes Bao Dai, former Emperor and since March 7, 1949, head of State of Vietnam. Ninety-eight percent of the votes express preference for Premier Diem.
- October 26.*—A Republic is proclaimed by Ngo Dinh Diem who becomes the first President of South Vietnam.
- October 31.*—President Diem issues his first order to the Vietnamese Armed Forces as their supreme commander.
- December 12.*—U.S. consulate in Hanoi is closed.

1956

- January.*—South Vietnamese Army units occupy Tay Ninh, principal Cao Dai political center, leading to breakup of the organized Cao Dai armed insurgency. Agreement with Cao Dai leaders on February 28 legalizes Cao Dai religious practices and forbids its political activities as a religious sect.
- February 12.*—Tran Van Soai, leader of an important Hoa Hao faction, surrenders. Ba Cut, another principal Hoa Hao leader, is captured on April 13, leading to breakup of organized Hoa Hao armed insurgency.
- February 18.*—Sihanouk on a visit to Peiping declares that Cambodia renounces SEATO protection.
- March 4.*—General elections for South Vietnam's first National Constituent Assembly, which is to have 123 members, results in the victory of the National Revolutionary Movement and other political parties supporting President Diem.
- March 31.*—Souvanna Phouma becomes Prime Minister of Laos.
- April 6.*—Vietnam Government announces it will continue to cooperate with the ICC and reiterates its position of supporting Vietnam-wide elections at such time as conditions in Communist North Vietnam permit genuinely free voting.
- May 9.*—Communist China signs a 2-year economic and technical aid agreement with Cambodia.
- May 17.*—Soviet Union announces the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.
- July 4.*—Constituent Assembly in Vietnam approves unanimously a draft constitution providing for a strong executive with safeguards for individual citizens. The President, whose term of office is to be 5 years, has veto power over all legislation of the unicameral parliament and may rule by decree when the National Assembly (elected for 4 years) is not in session.
- July 6.*—U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon visits Vietnam, hands to President Diem of South Vietnam a letter in which President Eisenhower declares he is looking forward to many years of partnership between the two countries. As guest speaker before the Constituent Assembly, Nixon declares that "the militant march of communism has been halted."
- July 30.*—Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC is established preparatory to the transfer of functions from the French liaison mission.
- August 5.*—Accord reached between Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong for establishment of a coalition government.
- September 19.*—French Air Force officially transfers the Touraine Airbase to Vietnamese control.
- October 26.*—South Vietnam's first constitution is promulgated and the National Constituent Assembly is officially transferred into a National Assembly.

1957

- January 3.*—International Control Commission reports that between December 1955 and August 1956 neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam have been fulfilling their obligations under the 1954 armistice agreement.
- May 5-19.*—President Diem visits the United States. He addresses on May 9 a joint session of Congress. In a joint communique (issued May 11), President Eisenhower and President Diem declare that both countries will work toward a "peaceful unification" of Vietnam. The United States will continue helping South Vietnam to stand firm against communism.
- June.*—French naval and air force training mission withdrawn.
- July 29.*—United States establishes consulate in Hue.
- October 22.*—Bombing of U.S. MAAG and USIS installations in Saigon; U.S. personnel injured.
- November 19.*—Two Pathet Lao leaders receive Cabinet portfolios to form government of national union.

1958

- January 4.*—Large Communist guerrilla band attacks plantation north of Saigon, reflecting steady increase in Communist armed activity in South Vietnam since mid-1957.
- May 17.*—North Vietnamese liaison mission to the ICC withdrawn from Saigon.
- June 25.*—Cambodian royal proclamation, alleging that South Vietnamese troops have "invaded" and occupied several Cambodian border villages; accuses South Vietnam of 19 cases of violation of Cambodian territory since January 1957. Allegation is repudiated by the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam.
- July 18.*—Cambodia recognizes Communist China.
- September 10.*—France and South Vietnam sign agreement under which France provides aid for the Vietnam Government's agrarian reform program—1,490 million francs.
- November 19.*—Cambodia signs trade and payments agreement with North Vietnam.

1959

- May 13.*—Japan signs a World War II reparations and loan agreement with South Vietnam.
- June.*—Pathet Lao resumes attack in northern provinces of Laos.
- July 8.*—Communist guerrillas attack Vietnamese military base at Bien Hoa, killing and wounding several U.S. MAAG personnel.
- July 10.*—In Belgian Communist publication Red Flag, Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnamese Communist regime, states "we are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."
- July 31.*—Lao Government announces renewed Pathet-Lao attacks on Government forces.

1959—Continued

- August 30.**—Second national elections give the National Revolutionary Movement and other pro-Government political parties overwhelming majority in the National Assembly in South Vietnam.
- October 30.**—Spokesman of the Vietnamese Army discloses that a campaign against Communist guerrillas in the country's southernmost region, the Camau Peninsula, resulted in heavy guerrilla losses.
- November 14.**—French Minister of Finance and Vietnamese Vice President initial (in Saigon) agreements for the settlement of financial claims between the two countries and for a French loan of 7 billion (old) francs (about \$14 million) and a credit of 11 billion (old) francs (about \$22 million) for the purchase by South Vietnam of capital equipment.
- December 31.**—General Nosavan takes over control of Lao Government.

1960

- April 17.**—North Vietnam protests to the chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference (Britain and the U.S.S.R.) against a "formidable" increase of personnel in the American Military Assistance and Advisory Group in South Vietnam; and accuses the United States of turning South Vietnam into "a U.S. military base for the preparation of a new war."
- April 30.**—An opposition group of 18, calling themselves the Committee for Progress and Liberty, send letter to President Diem demanding drastic economic, administrative, and military reforms.
- May 3.**—Cambodian armed forces repulsed South Vietnamese troops who had crossed into Cambodia.
- May 5.**—United States announces that at the request of the Government of South Vietnam, the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group will be increased by the end of the year from 327 to 685 members.
- June-October.**—Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam increase.
- June 1-2.**—U.S. top-level policy conference on southeast Asia (in Hawaii).
- June 13.**—Prince Sihanouk becomes Chief of State of Cambodia.
- July 2.**—Prince Sihanouk declares that if the United States does not "radically revise" its military aid policy, he will ask the Soviet bloc for aircraft and arms.
- July 20.**—Vietnamese National Assembly delegation leaves Saigon for 6-week visit to the United States.
- August 9.**—Kong Le takes over Vientiane in coup.
- August 15.**—Prince Souvanna Phouma becomes Premier of Laos again.
- September 29.**—Sihanouk urges the East and West power blocs to turn Cambodia and Laos into a guaranteed neutralized buffer zone as means of bringing peace to southeast Asia.
- October 26.**—President Eisenhower assures President Ngo Dinh Diem, in a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

- November 10.**—South Vietnam Government sends letter to the ICC charging that Communist attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area in October (1) involved regular army forces from Communist North Vietnam through Laos, (2) constituted open aggression which was well prepared, commanded by high-ranking officers, and conducted by regular forces trained in North Vietnam, and (3) employed weapons made in North Vietnam and other Communist countries.
- November 11.**—Military coup attempt against President Diem's regime. Paratroop battalions led by Col. Nguyen Van Thi and Lt. Col. Vuong Van Dong besiege the presidential palace. An order of the day issued by Colonel Thi declares that struggle against the Communists will be intensified, that President Diem is guilty of autocratic rule and nepotism and has "shown himself incapable of saving the country from communism and protecting national unity."
- November 12.**—Loyalist troops enter the capital and subdue the rebels. According to press reports from Saigon, an estimated 200 soldiers and civilians were killed during the fighting.
- November 13.**—U.S. State Department expresses satisfaction at the failure of the coup against President Diem and also hopes that "his powers will be established on a wider basis with rapid implementation of radical reforms and energetic action against corruption-suspected elements."
- November 16.**—Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother and political adviser, announces that President Diem plans to appoint a new Government and introduce a far-reaching reform program based on reports of the Ford Foundation and of a French study group.
- December 16.**—Phoumi Nosavan retakes Vientiane.

1961

- January 4.**—Prince Boun Oum installed as Premier of Laos.
- January 29.**—Radio Hanoi praises establishment of the "National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV)," allegedly founded in December 1960. On January 30, Radio Hanoi, quoting the press organ of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam, states that the "sacred historical task" of the NFLSV is "to overthrow the U.S.-Diem clique" and "to liberate the south."
- February 6.**—President Diem announces (at the first press conference held by him in 5 years) his administrative reform program.
- February 7.**—President Diem announces he will be a candidate for reelection in the presidential elections to be held on April 9.
- March 6.**—Pathet-Lao forces begin advance toward Luang Prabang and Vientiane.
- March 10.**—The Communist-led newly formed National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam announces that a guerrilla offensive against the Government will be started to prevent the holding of the April 9 elections. The "National Front" also declares that it will fight with every means the "dictatorial regime set up by the Americans," that it stands for the "peaceful reunification of the country."

1961—Continued

- March 27.**—Cambodian and South Vietnamese representatives reach agreement in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on settling the Cambodian refugee problem which has recently strained relations between the two countries. Large numbers of Cambodians settled in Vietnam crossed into Cambodia during the past weeks complaining that both Communist guerrillas and Government forces have committed atrocities against them.
- April 3.**—United States-Vietnamese Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations signed in Saigon. National Assembly ratifies treaty on June 14.
- April 4.**—President Diem appeals to the ICC to make an "immediate and energetic investigation" of growing Communist terrorism and subversion throughout South Vietnam.
- April 9.**—President Diem and Vice President Tho are elected by an overwhelming majority in Vietnam's presidential elections.
- April 22.**—Prince Souvanna Phouma, in Moscow, signs joint communique calling for neutralizing of Laos.
- May 2.**—North Vietnam calls for a cease-fire in Laos.
- May 5.**—President Kennedy declares at a press conference that consideration is being given to the use of U.S. forces, if necessary, to help South Vietnam resist Communist pressures. He declares that this will be one of the subjects discussed during the forthcoming visit of Vice President Johnson in South Vietnam.
- May 11-13.**—U.S. Vice President Johnson in South Vietnam. Joint communique on May 13 declares that additional U.S. military and economic aid will be given to help South Vietnam in its fight against Communist guerrilla forces.
- May 12.**—International Control Commission reports a de facto cease-fire has been brought about in Laos.
- May 16.**—Fourteen-nation conference on Laos convened in Geneva.
- June 4.**—President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, in Vienna, reaffirm their support of a neutral and independent Laotian Government and of international agreements to assure Lao neutrality.
- June 12.**—Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and North Vietnamese Premier Phan Van-dong (in Peiping on a visit) accuse the United States of aggression and intervention in South Vietnam.
- June 21.**—Three Lao princes meet at Zurich and agree to form coalition government.
- August 2.**—President Kennedy declares that the United States will do all it can to save South Vietnam from communism.
- September 1-4.**—Series of attacks by 1,000 Communist guerrillas in Kontum Province. Army Command communique states that during the month of August there were 41 engagements between Government forces and Communist rebels in South Vietnam.
- September 17.**—British advisory mission on administrative and policy matters, headed by R. G. K. Thompson (former Permanent Defense Secretary in Malaya), leaves for South Vietnam.
- September 18.**—Communist forces estimated at 1,500 men attack and seize the capital of Phuoc Thanh Province, only 60 miles from Saigon.
- September 25.**—President Kennedy, addressing the U.N. General Assembly in New York, declares that a threat to peace is "the smoldering coals of war in southeast Asia."

- October 1.**—Military experts of SEATO meet in Bangkok, Thailand, to consider the increasing Communist menace to South Vietnam. Adm. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Navy commander in chief in the Pacific, declares that there is no immediate prospect of using U.S. troops to stop the Communist advance in southeast Asia, but he indicates that among the plans evolved for "every eventuality" some do call for the use of American troops.
- October 2.**—President Diem declares at the opening of the National Assembly's budgetary session: "It is no longer a guerrilla war waged by an enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped and who seeks a strategic decision in southeast Asia in conformity with the orders of the Communist international." The President also says that the U.S. committee headed by Dr. Eugene Staley recommended an increase in aid both for military measures and for economic and social development.
- October 8.**—The three Laotian princes—neutralist Souvanna Phouma, pro-Western Boun Oum, and pro-Communist Souphanouvong—agree on Souvanna Phouma as head of coalition government. Agreement subsequently breaks down in dispute over distribution of Cabinet posts.
- October 11.**—President Kennedy announces (at his new conference) that he is sending Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, his military adviser, to South Vietnam to investigate there the military situation and to report on it to him personally.
- October 13.**—State of emergency is proclaimed in South Vietnam by President Diem. On the same day the President also begins a series of consultations with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.
- October 26.**—Sihanouk declares that he has "lost all confidence in the Americans," and that Cambodia "is ready to do without American aid if it implies * * * obligation * * *."
- November 16.**—Following closely the recommendations in General Taylor's report, President Kennedy (with the approval of the National Security Council) decides to bolster South Vietnam's military strength, but not to commit U.S. combat forces at this time.
- December 8.**—U.S. State Department publishes "white paper" that South Vietnam is threatened by "clear and present danger" of Communist conquest.
- December 14.**—U.S. President Kennedy pledges increased aid to South Vietnam.

1962

- February.**—United States withholds cash grant aid from Lao Government "pending further progress toward formation of a government of national union."
- January 4.**—A joint United States-South Vietnamese communique announces "broad economic and social program [to raise living standards], * * * Measures to strengthen South Vietnam's defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously."
- February 7.**—Two U.S. Army air support companies totaling 300 men arrive in Saigon, increasing (according to the New York Times) the total of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam to 4,000.
- February 8.**—United States reorganizes its South Vietnam military command, establishes new "U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam" under four-star Gen. Paul D. Harkins.

1962—Continued

- February 24.**—In a Peiping Radio broadcast, Communist China declares her security seriously threatened by an “undeclared war” being waged by the United States in South Vietnam. The broadcast demands the withdrawal of U.S. personnel and equipment.
- February 27.**—Two fighter planes, piloted by members of the South Vietnam Air Force, bomb and strafe Presidential palace in Saigon for 25 minutes. President Diem and his staff not injured.
- March 17.**—Tass Soviet news agency publishes Soviet Ministry note to the signatories of the 1954 Geneva agreements. The note charges the United States with creating “a serious danger to peace” by its “interference” in South Vietnam, in contravention of the Geneva agreements, and demands immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.
- March 22.**—“Operation Sunrise,” a comprehensive plan to eliminate the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam, begins with a mopping-up operation of rebels in Binh Duong Province.
- April 20.**—National Assembly pledges full support to President Diem’s plan to establish thousands of “strategic hamlets” in the Communist-infested Mekong Delta during the current year.
- May 6-27.**—Communist forces in Laos gain control of large territories; about 2,000 Lao Royal Army troops with their commander flee into Thailand crossing the Mekong River.
- May 15.**—President Kennedy announces that at the request of the Thai Government and “because of recent attacks in Laos by Communist forces and the subsequent movement of Communist military units toward the border of Thailand,” he has ordered U.S. military forces to Thailand.
- May 22.**—President Diem promulgates the protection of morality law, which prohibits all dancing and beauty contests, and makes prostitution and “unnatural methods” of birth control illegal.
- June 2.**—Canadian and Indian members of the ICC find North Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression against South Vietnam. The Polish delegation to the Commission rejects the charge.
- June 12.**—Three Lao factions sign an agreement for the establishment of a neutralist regime under Souvanna Phouma with Cabinet posts to be divided between the three factions.
- June 26.**—South Vietnam’s National Assembly votes to extend its term of office by 1 year, to August 1963. The explanation given is that it is impossible to hold elections now, because it would tie down troops needed against the Communist guerrillas.
- July 6.**—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declares that, while a final victory over the Communists in South Vietnam is years away, he is encouraged by the increased effectiveness of U.S. aid to the South Vietnamese forces.
- July 23.**—Declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos is signed by 14-nation conference at Geneva.
- July 30.**—United States completes the withdrawal of the 5,000 Marines sent to Thailand.
- August 20.**—Sihanouk asks President Kennedy for an international conference to guarantee Cambodia’s neutrality—threatens to ask for Chinese Communist protection in the absence of guarantees.

- September 12.**—General Taylor, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visits the central highland of South Vietnam where mountain peasants (montagnards) are being trained by the U.S. special forces for war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas.
- October 26.**—National Assembly extends by 1 year President Diem’s emergency powers to rule by decree.
- November 8.**—South Vietnam withdraws its Ambassador to Laos as a result of Laos’ establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.
- December 6.**—South Vietnamese Government protests to the ICC against the introduction of Chinese-made weapons and ammunition. A large cache was discovered by a patrol in the central highlands.
- December 29.**—Government in Saigon announces that 4,077 strategic hamlets have been completed (of a total of 11,182 to be built) and that 39 percent of South Vietnam’s population is now living in these communities.

1963

- January 9-11.**—Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific confers with Gen. Paul D. Harkins and declares, before his departure, that the Vietcong guerrillas face “inevitable” defeat, and he says: “I am confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war.”
- March-June.**—Pathet-Lao launch attack on Kong Le’s forces.
- March 6.**—U.S. military sources report that the Vietnamese Navy has taken over patrol of South Vietnam’s coast from the U.S. 7th Fleet.
- April 8-10.**—SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris (to discuss the Communist threat to southeast Asia) issues communique on April 10 expressing “concern over the continuing and widening threats to the security” of the treaty area; takes note of the “considerable progress” made in South Vietnam in the fight against Communist subversion and rebellion; emphasizes that effective measures to “prevent and counter subversion continues to be a major task facing the member countries”; and notes the improvements in the “plans for defensive action, in the light of changing and anticipated situations.”
- April 10.**—SEATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris calls on the parties to the 14-nation Geneva Conference “to assure the maintenance of peace, neutrality, and national unity” in Laos.
- April 14.**—U.S. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman (in a television interview) says that President Kennedy has decided that the United States must not become involved in the continuing conflict in Laos. He says that there are no plans to commit U.S. troops, and military supplies will only be sent if requested by the Lao Government.
- April 17.**—President Diem proclaims an “open arms” campaign to induce Vietcong guerrillas to give up their weapons and return to the side of South Vietnam.

1963—Continued

- April 22.*—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk calls the situation in South Vietnam "difficult and dangerous," and says that the United States "cannot promise or expect a quick victory" and that its role is "limited and supporting."
- May 8.*—Riot erupts in northern city of Hue, former imperial capital, 400 miles north of Saigon. Involves Buddhist celebration of the anniversary of Buddha's birth and the flying of flags on the special day—12 persons are killed, including some children. Buddhist leaders charge that Government troops fired into the crowd, while Government officials say that Communists were responsible for the explosion.
- June 3.*—Buddhist demonstrations break out in Hué. Martial law is swiftly imposed.
- June 7.*—President Diem (in a broadcast) appeals for calm and makes a partial concession to Buddhist demands that the Government accept responsibility for the incidents in Hue.
- June 11.*—Buddhist monk (Thich Quang Duc) commits suicide by burning himself to death with gasoline in front of the Cambodian legation. Further aggravates religious crisis involving South Vietnamese Buddhists.
- June 15.*—Tentative agreement is reached between Buddhist leaders and representatives of President Diem to end alleged religious discrimination and meet Buddhist demands.
- June 16.*—Government troops use tanks, tear gas, clubs, firearms, and barbed wire to suppress riots in Saigon which follow an agreement between Buddhist leaders and the Government.
- June 27.*—President Kennedy announces (in Ireland while on a European tour) the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge as the next American Ambassador to South Vietnam, effective September 1963, to succeed Frederick Nolting.
- July 11.*—U.S. Ambassador Nolting returns to South Vietnam after consultations in Washington and issues a statement assuring continued U.S. support to President Diem and warning that "unity of purpose and purpose in action" must not be weakened by "internal dissension."
- July 17.*—Armed policemen use clubs against 1,000 Buddhists protesting religious discrimination in front of a pagoda in Saigon. On the same day, President Kennedy says (at his news conference) that the religious crisis in South Vietnam is interfering with the war effort against the Vietcong guerrillas and expresses hope that President Diem and Buddhist leaders will "reach an agreement on the civil disturbances and also in respect for the rights of others."
- August 21.*—Martial law is proclaimed throughout South Vietnam by President Diem after hundreds of armed police and government troops raided the main Buddhist Xa Loi pagoda in Saigon.
- August 22.*—Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau (a Buddhist) submits his resignation to President Diem. Also on the same day, South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States Tran Van Chuong (father of Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu) resigns. Both resign in disapproval of Government policies toward Buddhists. Department of State issues statement deploring action against Buddhist pagodas.

- August 26.*—U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents his credentials to President Diem.
- August 27.*—Cambodia breaks off diplomatic relations with South Vietnam.
- August 29.*—French President de Gaulle issues policy statement on South Vietnam. He declares that France is able "to appreciate the role this people would be capable of playing in the current situation of Asia for its own progress and for the benefit of international understanding once it was able to exercise its activity in independence from foreign influence, in internal peace and unity, and in concord with its neighbors. Today, more than ever, this is what France wishes for all of Vietnam."
- August 30.*—French Ambassador to the United States Herve Alphand declares, after meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that General de Gaulle's statement is part of a long-range French political solution which would reunify North and South Vietnam in "independence and neutrality" and that his declaration is not meant as a slap at the United States.
- September 2.*—Times of Vietnam charges that U.S. Central Intelligence Agency agents had planned a coup d'etat for August 28 to overthrow President Diem. On the same day, U.S. President Kennedy declares (in a television interview with CBS Correspondent Walter Cronkite) that the United States is prepared to continue to assist South Vietnam "but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months, the Government has gotten out of touch with the people."
- September 5.*—President Diem declares (in a press interview) that "the Government considers this [Buddhist] affair closed." He denies reports that his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu has taken control of the Government. On the same day, Ngo Dinh Nhu says (in a press interview): "I have never controlled the Government."
- September 8.*—David Bell, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, warns (in a television interview) that the U.S. Congress may cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem government changes its policies. Cambodia receives from Soviet Union three MIG-17 jet fighters and other military equipment.
- September 9.*—President Kennedy (in a televised interview) says that he doesn't think "it would be helpful at this time" to reduce U.S. aid to South Vietnam, because that might bring about a collapse similar to that of the Chiang Kai-shek government in China after World War II. On the same day, U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge confers with President Diem.
- September 14.*—Presidential decree announces end of martial law in Vietnam on September 16.
- September 21.*—President Kennedy orders Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to go to South Vietnam to review the military efforts against the Communist Vietcong. McNamara and Taylor in South Vietnam from September 24 to October 1.

1963—Continued

- September 27.*—Elections are held for the 123-member National Assembly. All candidates were approved in advance by the Government; many were unopposed, including President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wife, Mme. Nhu.
- October 2.*—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, report to President Kennedy and the National Security Council on their mission to South Vietnam. The statement says that the United States will continue its "policy of working with the people and Government of South Vietnam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Vietcong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central object of our policy in South Vietnam."
- October 7.*—Mme. Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Diem, arrives in New York to begin a 3-week unofficial visit to the United States.
- October 8.*—U.N. General Assembly agrees to send a factfinding mission to South Vietnam to investigate charges of Government oppression of Buddhists. The Diem government on October 4 had invited the U.N. to send such a mission.
- October 24.*—U.N. factfinding mission on the Buddhist situation in South Vietnam arrives in Saigon, and on the next day confers with President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.
- October 27.*—Buddhist monk burns himself to death in Saigon—the seventh such suicide since June 11.
- November 1.*—Military coup (organized by the key generals of the armed forces) against the Diem regime. Rebels lay siege to the presidential palace in Saigon which is captured by the following morning. President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu escape from the palace, but a few hours later are taken by the rebels, and while being transported in an armored carrier to rebel headquarters they are assassinated. A proclamation broadcast by the leaders of the coup (a council of generals, headed by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh) declares that they have "no political ambitions" and that the fight against the Communists must be carried on to a successful conclusion.
- November 2.*—Military leaders in South Vietnam set up a provisional Government headed by former Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho (a Buddhist) as Premier. The Constitution is suspended and the National Assembly dissolved. Buddhists, students, and other political prisoners arrested by the former regime are released.
- November 4.*—Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho of South Vietnam announces formation of a mixed military-civilian Cabinet which has been approved by the military leaders. United States recognizes the new provisional Government of South Vietnam. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk rejects, during a press conference, French President de Gaulle's proposals for a neutral, independent Vietnam, stating that the result would be a Communist Vietnam.
- November 9.*—United States announces resumption of its commodity-import aid to South Vietnam, suspended in August.

- November 14.*—President Kennedy, in his news conference, states his confidence in General Harkins and denies reports that Harkins "lost his usefulness in Vietnam because of his identification with the Diem regime."
- November 15.*—U.S. military spokesman in Saigon reports that 1,000 U.S. servicemen will be withdrawn from South Vietnam, beginning December 3.
- November 19.*—Sihanouk declares end to all U.S. military and economic aid to Cambodia, charging that the CIA is trying to oust him from power.
- November 20.*—U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk confer in Honolulu, Hawaii, with U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge and commander of U.S. military operations in the area, Gen. Paul D. Harkins.
- November 22.*—President John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas, Tex. His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, affirms on November 24 the U.S. intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Communist Vietcong.
- December 12.*—Sihanouk announces the recall of the Cambodian Ambassador to the United States and the entire staff.
- December 14.*—U.S. military spokesman in Saigon reports on stepped up guerrilla attacks on hamlets, outposts, and patrols in November, estimating Government casualties at 2,800 and Vietcong losses at 2,900. He also reports that enough weapons were captured by the Vietcong to arm five 300-man battalions.
- December 19-20.*—U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara and Director of CIA, John A. McCone in Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war efforts against the Vietcong.

1964

- January 2.*—Secretary Rusk announces in news conference that "A Vietnamese Army group seized in the delta area of Vietnam some 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, weapons like mortars, recoilless ammunition, made in China" and that almost certainly Hanoi was primarily responsible for their infiltration into South Vietnam.
- January 6.*—Government decrees a three-man military command over the Vietnamese forces and Government (consisting of Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh (chief of state), Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don and Maj. Gen. Le Van Kim).
- January 10.*—Sihanouk postpones the departure date for U.S. aid personnel, who had been told to leave Laos by January 15.
- January 11.*—Sihanouk says he is willing to accept U.S. aid if it is offered "without conditions."
- January 27.*—U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara in a speech before the House Armed Services Committee states that the situation in South Vietnam "continues grave," but that "the survival of an independent Government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of southeast Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures with our capability to prevent a Communist victory." France establishes diplomatic relations with Communist China.

1964—Continued

- January 30.*—Military coup, organized by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, ousts Government of Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh from power in South Vietnam.
- February 4-6.*—Vietcong launches offensive in Tay Ninh province and the Mekong Delta; in ensuing fighting hundreds of Government troops are reported dead.
- February 7.*—When asked at a press conference about certain neutralization proposals regarding South Vietnam, Secretary Rusk reiterates U.S. policy that, "If the agreements which have already been reached and which have been signed by those in the north would be fulfilled, there could be peace in southeast Asia."
- February 8.*—Maj. Gen. Khanh, leader of the military junta, announces formation of a new Vietnamese Government with himself as Premier, Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh as nominal Chief of State, and a mixed civilian-military Cabinet in charge of administration.
- February 19.*—Sihanouk proposes that a four-nation agreement be signed by the United States, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Cambodia to "recognize" Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity.
- March 7.*—General Khanh announces a 1-year reform program to rebuild South Vietnam's political and administrative structure and raise standard of living.
- March 8-12.*—McNamara and Taylor in Saigon.
- March 22.*—Vietnam Military Council gives unanimous vote of confidence to Premier Khanh.
- April 13-15.*—SEATO Ministerial Council communique declares the defeat of Vietcong is "essential" to the security of southeast Asia and SEATO to fulfill its treaty obligations.
- April 19.*—Military coup (by rightwing generals) against the government of Souvanna Phouma in Laos. United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and France protest the coup as a violation of the Geneva accords.
- April 23.*—Legitimate government of Souvanna Phouma restored in Laos.
- April 25.*—General Westmoreland to replace General Harkins in Saigon.
- May 1.*—Souvanna Phouma announces merger of rightwing and neutralist forces in Laos.
- May 2.*—Explosion in Saigon Harbor sinks U.S. aircraft transport ship.
- May 12.*—Secretary Rusk asks NATO members to give greater support to South Vietnam.
- May 12-13.*—Secretary McNamara and General Taylor make fifth on-the-spot review of South Vietnam.
- May 13.*—Cambodia calls for urgent meeting of U.N. Security Council to consider the "repeated acts of aggression" by United States-South Vietnamese forces.
- May 17.*—Pathet Lao forces begin overrunning neutralist forces in the Plain of Jars.
- May 20.*—France proposes reconvening of 14 nation conference on Laos in Geneva. This proposal is rejected by the United States and United Kingdom and endorsed by the Soviet Union, Poland, Cambodia, India, and Communist China.

- May 21.*—United States initiates reconnaissance flight over Laos.
- May 22.*—Secretary Rusk stating the choices in Vietnam, says: "A third choice would be to expand the war. This can be the result if the Communists persist in their course of aggression."
- May 25.*—U.N. Security Council considers establishment of a commission of experts "to help define and mark the border line between South Vietnam and Cambodia."
- May 27.*—United States announces that several T-28 fighter-bombers have been sent to Laos.
- June 6-7.*—Two U.S. reconnaissance planes are shot down by Pathet Lao ground fire from the Plain of Jars.
- June 12.*—President de Gaulle calls for an end to all foreign intervention in South Vietnam.
- June 23.*—President Johnson announces appointment of General Taylor to be U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and Alexis Johnson as Deputy Ambassador.
- August 2.*—U.S.S. *Maddox* is attacked in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.
- August 4.*—Destroyer *C. Turner Joy* and destroyer *Maddox* are attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats.
- August 4.*—President Johnson orders U.S. "air action" against "gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam."
- August 5.*—President Johnson's message to Congress; joint resolution is introduced "To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia."
- August 5.*—United States sends reinforcements to Tonkin Bay area.
- August 6.*—Cambodia charges "Americans in uniform joined South Vietnamese in firing into Cambodia."
- August 7.*—U.S. Congress approves southeast Asia resolution (Senate vote, 88-2; House vote, 416-0). General Khanh declares state of emergency in Vietnam.
- August 11.*—President Johnson signs southeast Asia resolution into law (Public Law 88-408).
- August 16.*—General Khanh elected Vietnamese President by Military Revolutionary Council, ousts Duong Van Minh as chief of state and installs new constitution.
- August 25.*—General Khanh promises liberalization of regime after repeated protests by Vietnamese.
- August 27.*—New Vietnam Constitution is withdrawn; Revolutionary Council disbands; General Khanh, Duong Van Minh, and Tran Thien Khiem are named provisional leaders.
- August 29.*—Nguyen Xuan Oanh is named acting premier of Vietnam to head caretaker government for 2 months. He states General Khanh has suffered mental and physical breakdown.
- September 3.*—General Khanh resumes premiership; Taylor sees him "rested and recovered"; dissolves triumvirate and restores Duong Van Minh to position of chief of State. Cambodia charges South Vietnam launched "major attack" near Koh Rokar, penetrating into Cambodia territory.
- September 13.*—Bloodless coup by Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat against General Khanh in Saigon.
- September 13.*—Forces loyal to General Khanh regain control of Vietnam Government.

1964—Continued

- September 15.*—Cambodia indefinitely postpones presentation of credentials by U.S. Ambassador-designate Kidder.
- September 16.*—Laotian talks in Paris end because of deadlock.
- September 18.*—U.S. Defense Department reports U.S. destroyers in Tonkin Gulf fire on and presumably hit four or five hostile targets.
- September 19.*—Vietnam Government makes sweeping changes in military command following abortive coup of September 13.
- September 26.*—Vietnam High National Council formally inaugurated and is charged with preparing a new constitution.
- October 2.*—Sihanouk, at Communist China's 15th anniversary celebration, says China will grant Cambodia military and economic assistance.
- October 20.*—Revolutionary Council presents new Vietnam constitution.
- October 21.*—United States charges Cambodian troops crossed South Vietnam border and seized a U.S. officer.
- October 24.*—USAF C-123 loaded with ammunition shot down by Cambodia.
- October 25.*—United States charges Cambodians fired on U.S. helicopter in South Vietnam searching for missing U.S. officer.
- October 26.*—Vietnam Revolutionary Council elects Phan Khac Suu chief of state.
- October 27.*—Cambodia claims it shot down U.S. C-123. United States admits plane over Cambodian territory due to "mapreading error."
- November 1.*—Tran Van Huong named Premier of Vietnam.
- November 2.*—Russia delivers new arms shipment to Cambodia to replace American equipment.
- December 4.*—South Vietnam military leaders announce support of Premier Tran Van Huong's government.
- December 8-17.*—Ambassador Bonsal meets with Cambodian Delegate Son Sann in New Delhi in an attempt to clear away misunderstandings.
- December 20.*—Military stage purge; dissolve civilian High National Council (provisional legislature). United States opposes power takeover of military and dissolution of civilian parliament.
- December 21.*—General Khanh supports power of military versus U.S. appeals; declares Vietnam forces would not fight "to carry out the policy of any foreign country."
- December 24.*—Terrorist bombing in Saigon kills 2 Americans and wounds 52 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

1965

- January 8.*—South Korea sends 2,000 military advisers to South Vietnam.
- January 13.*—Defense Department confirms that two U.S. planes were shot down over Laos.
- January 27.*—Premier Huong ousted. General Khanh asked to solve the political crisis.

- January 28.*—General Khanh nominates Nguyen Xuan Oanh as acting Premier.
- February 6.*—Russian Premier Kosygin arrives in Hanoi.
- February 7.*—President Shastri of India proposes a meeting between Russian and American leaders to solve problems of southeast Asia.
- February 7.*—Communist guerrillas stage attack on U.S. outpost. U.S. planes strike targets in North Vietnam. U.S. dependents evacuated from South Vietnam.
- February 8.*—South Vietnamese Air Force planes accompany U.S. air mission into North Vietnam. President Johnson indicates that further developments depend on Communist response. Indian Foreign Ministry requests a new Geneva conference.
- February 8.*—Premier Kosygin announces Soviet willingness to aid North Vietnam if she is invaded.
- February 10.*—Vietcong blow up U.S. military billet at coastal city of Quinhon, killing 23 soldiers.
- February 11.*—Secretary General U Thant calls for international negotiations on Vietnam inside or outside of the U.N.
- February 15.*—Chinese Communists threaten to enter the war if American troops enter North Vietnam.
- February 16.*—South Vietnamese Armed Forces Council announces that Phan Huy Quat has been named new premier.
- February 18.*—South Vietnamese Army and Marine units stage bloodless coup in Saigon and oust General Khanh.
- February 19.*—Khanh regains temporary control of the Government.
- February 20.*—Armed forces council demands resignation of General Khanh.
- February 21.*—Khanh bows to council demands for resignation.
- February 24.*—Premier Phan Huy Quat announces South Vietnam's determination to end the war with honor.
- February 25.*—North Vietnamese officials state negotiations would be considered if American troops were withdrawn.
- February 27.*—State Department issues white paper detailing charges of aggression on the part of North Vietnam.
- February 27.*—Prince Sihanouk calls for a new Geneva conference on Indochina.
- February 28.*—United States and South Vietnamese officials declare that President Johnson has decided to open continuous limited air strikes against North Vietnam in order to bring about a negotiated settlement.
- March 1.*—President Quat rules out peace until the North Vietnamese stop their infiltration into South Vietnam.
- March 6.*—Two U.S. Marine battalions sent to South Vietnam for limited duty.
- March 8.*—Secretary General U Thant proposes that the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, France, Communist China, and North and South Vietnam participate in a preliminary conference.
- March 9.*—United States rejects U Thant's offer until North Vietnam stops its aggression against South Vietnam.
- March 22.*—United States discloses that it has provided the South Vietnamese Army with certain types of nonlethal gases.
- March 23.*—Russian Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev hints of Russian participation in the war.

1965—Continued

- March 25.*—In a public statement President Johnson held out to North Vietnam the prospect of economic aid if peace is secured.
- March 29.*—Bomb explodes outside U.S. Embassy in Saigon, causing heavy damage and casualties.
- April 1.*—Seventeen nonaligned nations meeting in Belgrade appeal for immediate negotiations.
- April 2.*—United States announces intention of sending several thousand more troops to South Vietnam.
- April 7.*—President Johnson, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University stresses our willingness to negotiate, and suggests a \$1 billion aid program for southeast Asia.
- April 8.*—U.S.S.R. proposes international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality.
- April 8.*—Peiping announces that U.S. peace offer is a trick.
- April 11.*—North Vietnam officials denounce President Johnson's offer to negotiate.
- April 12.*—Gordon Walker is unsuccessful in British attempts to meet with officials in Hanoi and Peiping over southeast Asia.
- April 14.*—The United States urges Hanoi to consider the plea of 17 nonaligned nations for peace talks.
- April 23.*—Secretary Rusk requests Cambodian parley.
- May 3.*—Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with the United States.
- May 4.*—President Johnson requests \$700 million supplemental appropriation for Department of Defense for Vietnam effort.
- May 5.*—House of Representatives approves President's request for additional \$700 million in defense funds by vote of 408 to 7.
- May 5.*—SEATO condemns Communist aggression in Vietnam war.
- May 6.*—Senate passes \$700 million supplemental appropriation bill by vote of 88 to 3.
- May 6.*—Two U.S. Marine battalions sent to Vietnam; first combat units to be deployed to South Vietnam.
- May 12.*—Red Chinese Chief of Staff calls for preparation for atomic war. President Johnson declares that Peiping prevents Hanoi from agreeing to talks.
- May 13.*—United States halts bombing missions on North Vietnam.
- May 19.*—United States resumes air attacks on North Vietnamese targets.
- May 25.*—Soviets announce construction of anti-aircraft missile sites are underway around the capital of North Vietnam.
- June 1.*—President asks Congress to authorize \$89 million for expanded program of economic and social development in southeast Asia.
- June 7.*—U.S. military authorities disclose that number of American military personnel in South Vietnam has passed 50,000 mark. (Army, 21,500; Marine Corps, 16,500; Air Force, 9,500; and Navy, 3,500).
- June 7.*—By vote of 42 to 26 Senate adopts amendment adding \$89 million to foreign aid bill in accordance with President's request of June 1.

- June 8.*—State Department spokesman says that U.S. military command in South Vietnam has been authorized to send American troops into combat alongside Vietnamese forces if such "combat support" is requested by South Vietnam.
- June 9.*—White House issues statement that "There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks."
- June 12.*—Spokesman announced that Premier Quat had decided to hand back the reins of government to the military following Chief of State Suu's refusal to approve proposed cabinet changes.
- June 16.*—Secretary McNamara announces new troop movements to Vietnam which will bring total there to over 70,000.
- June 17.*—A four-nation British Commonwealth peace mission to find an end to the Vietnam war is formed at the opening session of a Commonwealth conference in London. The mission will consist of representatives from Britain, Ghana, Nigeria, and Trinidad-Tobago.
- June 24.*—The new South Vietnamese Government under Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky announces a series of measures including a formal state of war, extension of Saigon's curfew, and price controls.
- June 24.*—The Saigon government also severs diplomatic relations with France but retains consular ties.
- June 24.*—Soviet news agency Tass reports that Soviet Premier Kosygin has informed the Ambassadors of Britain, Ghana, and Nigeria that he would refuse to meet with the Commonwealth peace mission.
- June 25.*—Communist China formally rejects any visit by the Commonwealth peace mission to Peiping. Two days later a similar response is received from the National Liberation Front of the Vietcong.
- June 25.*—President Johnson in an address at ceremonies in San Francisco commemorating the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter declares that "bilateral diplomacy" for a peaceful settlement has "yielded no results." He adds, "I now call upon this gathering of the nations of the world to use all their influence, individually and collectively, to bring to the table those who seem determined to make war. We will support your efforts as we will support effective action by any agent or agency of these United Nations."
- June 25.*—Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth issue a "Statement of Guidance" outlining the objectives of the Commonwealth's Vietnam peace mission. Expressing "grave doubts" as to an early solution of the conflict "by military means" the mission states its objectives as: (1) "A suspension of all U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam." (2) A North Vietnamese halt in "the movement of any military forces or assistance or material to South Vietnam." (3) "A total cease-fire on all sides to enable a conference to seek a peaceful solution."
- June 28.*—American troops participate in their first major attack of the Vietnamese war.
- July 1.*—North Vietnam formally rejects a request by the British Commonwealth peace mission on Vietnam for talks in Hanoi.

1965—Continued

- July 4.*—In a Voice of America broadcast Secretary of State Dean Rusk says that on several occasions, the United States, acting through an unnamed intermediary, had asked Hanoi "what would be stopped if we stopped the [aerial] bombing * * * we've never had a reply."
- July 8.*—The White House announces that Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor has resigned as U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and will be replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge.
- July 10.*—President Johnson declares in a press conference that in Vietnam, "we committed our power and our honor and that has been reaffirmed by three Presidents."
- July 12-18.*—The United States begins a large-scale buildup of its forces in South Vietnam.
- July 14-21.*—Ambassador Lodge and Defense Secretary McNamara arrive in Saigon and confer with General Taylor, General Westmoreland, and South Vietnamese Premier Ky.
- July 15.*—A "voluntary censorship" of news is requested of journalists by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- July 15.*—U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman begins informal talks in Moscow with Soviet Premier Alexey Kosygin.
- July 20.*—Secretary McNamara leaves Vietnam after receiving requests for additional U.S. troops. He states that "in many respects there has been a deterioration" in the Vietnam war since his last visit 14 months ago.
- July 28.*—In a press conference, President Johnson states: "We must not let this [the unconventional nature of the fighting] mask the central fact that this is really war."
- July 28.*—U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg delivers a note to Secretary General U Thant from President Johnson asking the U.N. to employ its "resources, energy, and immense prestige" in finding ways "to halt aggression and bring peace in Vietnam."
- August 11.*—The Soviet Union indicates, in an editorial, in the Communist Party paper, Pravda, that it would have no part of any American efforts to involve the U.N. in Vietnam.
- August 13.*—The United States formally affirms its adherence to the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war and war victims.
- August 18.*—The Senate approves a \$1.7 billion supplementary appropriation for military operations in Vietnam.
- August 19.*—The Defense Department reports that 561 Americans had been killed, 3,024 wounded, and 44 missing in Vietnam between January 1, 1961, and August 16, 1965.
- August 23.*—The U.S. policy in Vietnam is reaffirmed in a White House pamphlet entitled "Why Vietnam."
- August 24.*—The House Republican Committee on Planning and Research issues a "white paper" criticizing the administration's actions in Vietnam. It accuses the Johnson administration of "an uncertain policy," "lack of candor," and "misleading statements."
- October 4.*—Pope Paul VI flies to New York to address the United Nations where he makes a plea for an end to the war in Vietnam.
- October 14.*—The Defense Department orders a military draft call of 45,224 men for December, the biggest quota since the Korean war.

- October 15-16.*—The student-run National Coordinating Committee To End the War in Vietnam sponsors a series of nationwide demonstrations. A number of sympathy demonstrations were also staged in foreign cities.
- October 18.*—David J. Miller, 22, a volunteer worker in a relief program run by the Catholic Worker, is arrested by FBI agents in Hookset, N.H., for burning his selective service card on October 15 in New York.
- October 21.*—U.S. Defense Department casualty report states: Vietcong deaths in 1965 totaled about 25,000; 830 U.S. military personnel had been killed between January 1961 and October 18, 1965.
- October 23.*—U.S. military authorities in Saigon reported that U.S. forces in South Vietnam have reached a total of 148,300 men: 89,000 Army, 8,000 Navy, 37,000 Marine Corps, 14,000 Air Force, and 300 Coast Guard.
- November 2.*—Norman R. Morrison, 32, a Quaker of Baltimore, Md., commits suicide by fire in front of the Pentagon "to express his concern over the great loss of life and human suffering caused by the war in Vietnam."
- November 9.*—Roger Allen LaPorte 22, of the pacifist Catholic Worker movement, burns himself in front of U.N. headquarters in New York as a protest against war. LaPorte dies of his injuries on November 10.
- November 11.*—Defense Secretary McNamara announces that the administration "believes it will be necessary to add further to the strength of U.S. combat forces in Vietnam."
- November 15.*—Correspondent Eric Sevareid reports in a Look magazine article that the United States rejected a Hanoi proposal in 1964 that United States and North Vietnamese representatives meet in Rangoon, Burma, to discuss a possible means of ending the Vietnam war. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey states that "on the basis of the total evidence available to us, we did not believe at any time that North Vietnam was prepared for serious talks."
- November 17.*—The State Department confirms that another North Vietnamese peace *feeler* had been made May 20, 1965, during talks in Paris between a Hanoi representative and French officials.
- November 17.*—In a letter to U.S. Physicist Linus Pauling, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh charges that U.S. proposals for peace negotiations were "deceitful talk."
- November 18.*—A Defense Department casualty report states that 108 U.S. soldiers were slain in the week ending November 15, a weekly record total, bringing to 1,095 the number of Americans slain since January 1, 1961.
- November 26.*—The North Vietnamese official newspaper, Nhan Dan denies that Hanoi has issued any proposals for peace negotiations with the United States.
- November 27.*—Marchers variously estimated as numbering from 15,000 to 35,000 converge on the White House in a march on Washington for peace in Vietnam initiated by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (Sane).

1965—Continued

- November 27.*—The Vietcong release two U.S. soldiers who had been captured November 24, 1963. A National Liberation Front broadcast claims that the prisoners are free in appreciation for the antiwar demonstrations in the United States.
- November 28-29.*—Defense Secretary McNamara meets with U.S. military leaders in Saigon. It is reported that the U.S. military authorities request that U.S. forces in Saigon be increased to 350,000 to 400,000 men.
- November 29.*—Defense Secretary McNamara states in a press conference that the Vietcong's "expressed determination to carry on the conflict * * * can lead to only one conclusion—that it will be a long war."
- December 1.*—In a meeting with British Foreign Minister Stewart, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declares that peace talks on the Vietnamese war would be conditioned on the halting of U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam.
- December 9.*—Ho Chi Minh, in an interview with British Journalist Felix Greene, calls President Johnson's offer of unconditional talks "absolutely unacceptable."
- December 15.*—U.S. Air Force planes bomb and destroy a North Vietnamese thermal power plant at Uongbi in the first American air raid on a major North Vietnamese industrial target.
- December 17.*—U.S. Government sources confirm a report that Ho Chi Minh relayed an offer to hold talks leading to negotiations through two private Italian intermediaries.
- December 18.*—A North Vietnamese statement calls reports of Hanoi's peace feelers "sheer groundless fabrications."
- December 19.*—U.S. Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, reports to President Johnson on an international fact finding mission he had conducted for the President.
- December 24-25.*—A 1-day Christmas truce is agreed to by the United States and the Vietcong. The United States also suspends air strikes as part of the short cease-fire.
- December 25.*—Upon the expiration of the 30-hour cease-fire General Westmoreland issues an order to United States and allied troops to retain their defensive posture and not to fire unless attacked.
- December 26.*—United States and South Vietnamese offensive operations are resumed in the face of a resumption of heavy Vietcong attacks; however, the suspension of air raids on North Vietnam is continued.
- December 28.*—The Vietcong propose a 4-day cease-fire for January 20-23, 1966, to mark the Vietnamese lunar New Year. U.S. troops are not included in the proposal; nevertheless, American officials report that U.S. troops would accept the truce if Premier Ky did.
- December 29.*—The United States dispatches high-ranking emissaries to various capitals of the world to sound out the possibilities of achieving a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war.

1966

- January 1.*—Pope Paul VI makes public messages he had sent on December 31 to Moscow, Peiping, Hanoi, and Saigon urging their leaders to seek an end to the Vietnam war.
- January 2-3.*—U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Arthur Goldberg, and Vice President Humphrey return from foreign tours representing part of a concerted U.S. campaign to achieve a cease-fire and peace in Vietnam. Their efforts are denounced by the North Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan, as a "noisy propaganda campaign."
- January 3.*—Cambodia informs the U.N. that it will use force to repel any invasion of its territory by United States and South Vietnamese troops.
- January 7-12.*—A five-man Soviet mission, led by C. P. Central Committee Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin visits Hanoi and arranges for increased Soviet military aid to North Vietnam.
- January 8.*—Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield and four other Senators file a report with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee based on their trip to South Vietnam and other countries. The report expresses the view that "a rapid solution to the conflict in Vietnam is not in immediate prospect." The report states that despite the U.S. expanded military effort, the Vietcong offensive had only been "blunted," not "driven back."
- January 9.*—Yale Prof. Staughton Lynd returns to New York after an unauthorized 10-day visit to North Vietnam where he held a 90-minute interview with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong.
- January 15.*—Secretary Rusk and Ambassador at large Averell Harriman meet with South Vietnam Premier Ky in Saigon, reportedly to allay South Vietnamese fears that U.S. peace efforts would be detrimental to the Saigon regime.
- January 15.*—South Vietnam Premier Ky pledges a popular referendum in October on a new constitution for South Vietnam to pave the way for "real democratic elections in 1967" for a civilian government to replace the current military regime. One of the government's principal tasks in 1966, he declares, will be a rural construction program.
- January 16.*—A communique issued at the end of the United States-South Vietnamese talk states: "The basic positions of the two Governments were consistent in all fundamental respects." The communique also restated Saigon's demands that "all aggression" in South Vietnam must stop before Ky's regime would attend a peace conference.
- January 16.*—Communist China denies what it states are Soviet-supported rumors that Peiping is impeding the transshipment of Soviet military equipment through China to North Vietnam.
- January 17.*—Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps commandant, declares after returning from a 13-day tour of southeast Asia: "You can kill every Vietcong and North Vietnamese and still lose the war unless" the Vietnamese villages are rehabilitated and reorganized.
- January 19.*—The President sends Congress a request for an additional \$12.76 billion in supplemental funds primarily for Vietnam expenses. New authorization will be needed for \$4.8 billion of this amount.

1966—Continued

- January 20.*—Defense Secretary McNamara reports that the United States lost 351 planes and helicopters in Vietnam in 1965.
- January 20.*—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant infers in a news conference that any future South Vietnamese Government should include the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong.
- January 20-23.*—The Vietnamese lunar New Year is marked by a temporary cease-fire. The truce was largely observed although many instances of minor clashes are reported. The truce expires at 6 p.m. on January 23.
- January 21.*—Secretary of State Rusk says in a Washington news conference: "I regret that I cannot report * * * any positive and encouraging response [from North Vietnam] to the hopes of the overwhelming majority of mankind," for negotiations to end the Vietnamese war.
- January 24.*—North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh states in a message to world Communist leaders that the United States must accept Hanoi's four-point peace formula as the basis for ending the war and that if the "United States really wants peace it must recognize" the NLF "as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam."
- January 24.*—President Johnson submits his budget for fiscal year 1967 to Congress. The budget proposes a \$4.2 billion increase in defense expenses to a total of \$57.05 billion. The President also requests \$9.1 billion of new obligational authority for Vietnam expenses. Vietnam expenditures for fiscal 1967 are estimated at \$10.5 billion.
- January 24.*—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hears 3 hours of testimony from Secretary Rusk in a closed hearing. It is reported that Rusk opposes Senator Fulbright's suggestion that the Vietcong be invited to peace talks before the bombings are resumed.
- January 31.*—President Johnson announces in a broadcast speech the resumption of U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. At the same time he instructs U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg formally to request the U.N. Security Council to intervene in the crisis to seek an international conference to end the war and establish a permanent peace in southeast Asia.
- January 31.*—Secretary Rusk at a news conference following President Johnson's speech summarizes "the unprecedented effort of the past 40 days, an effort aimed at peace, and the tragically negative responses from Hanoi."
- February 1.*—The U.N. Security Council meets to consider a U.S. draft resolution calling for Council action to arrange an international conference to bring peace to South Vietnam and southeast Asia.
- February 2.*—The North Vietnamese foreign ministry formally rejects any U.N. action on the Vietnamese war.
- February 2.*—The U.N. Security Council agrees by a 9-to-2 vote (U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria opposed; France, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda abstaining) to consider the Vietnam war.

- February 4.*—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara refuses on the grounds of security to testify publicly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His position is publicly endorsed by President Johnson.
- February 6.*—President Johnson and other U.S. officials arrive in Honolulu for discussions with Premier Ky and other Saigon representatives concerning the Vietnamese war. In his remarks at airport ceremonies President Johnson declares that those who "counsel retreat" from the war "belong to a group that has always been blind to experience and deaf to hope."
- February 7.*—Retired Lt. Gen. James Gavin appears before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to present his views on the Vietnam conflict.
- February 7.*—Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, states that he doesn't agree with an attitude of "quiet and acquiescence" on the part of Congress toward administration policies in Vietnam.
- February 8.*—President Johnson states his determination, at the conclusion of the 3-day Honolulu conference, to fight the battle against aggression as well as the battle for social construction in Vietnam.
- February 8.*—Vice President Humphrey leaves Honolulu for Saigon with Premier Ky and other Vietnamese leaders, reportedly to spur action on economic and social problems in South Vietnam.
- February 10.*—Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former U.S. Ambassador George Kennan urges the United States to seek an orderly end to the Vietnam conflict without enlarging it in order to concentrate on "potentially more important" world problems.
- February 11.*—President Johnson in a news conference disavows any desire to escalate the war. However, he adds that "additional troops" will be sent as militarily required.
- February 11.*—Le Duc Tho, a leading North Vietnamese Communist, castigates a minority in the Hanoi government opposed to a long drawn out war in an article appearing in the official party publication Hoc Tap. Tho also accuses this faction of favoring negotiations with the United States.
- February 14.*—Vice President Humphrey announces that the United States will increase military aid to Thailand to meet the threat posed by Communist guerrillas in that country.
- February 17.*—Gen. Maxwell Taylor testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States intends to wage a limited war in Vietnam.
- February 18.*—Secretary Rusk, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, places emphasis on the SEATO Pact as the legal basis for the U.S. commitment in Vietnam.
- February 19.*—Senator Robert Kennedy states that the National Liberation Front should be included in any postwar Saigon Government. Senator Kennedy later (February 22) clarified his position, stating that the NLF should not be "automatically excluded" from power in an interim Government preceding elections.
- February 20.*—South Korea announces it will send an additional division and a regiment to South Vietnam.
- February 21.*—Vice President Humphrey criticizes Senator Kennedy's suggested inclusion of the NLF in a Vietnam coalition govern-

- ment, asserting that popular front governments are either paralyzed from within or taken over by the Communists.
- March 1.*—Congress approves a \$4.8 billion military authorization bill to provide additional funds for the Vietnam war.
- March 1.*—President Johnson renews his offer of aid to North Vietnam and exhorts Hanoi to negotiate.
- March 2.*—Secretary McNamara reveals that the U.S. forces in South Vietnam had reached a total of 215,000 men, with 20,000 additional men on their way.
- March 5.*—Gen. Maxwell Taylor proposes the mining of Haiphong harbor.
- March 6.*—Communist China accuses the Soviet Union of pressing North Vietnam to negotiate.
- March 8.*—Australia announces its intention of tripling its Vietnam force from 1,500 to 4,500 by June 1966.
- March 9.*—U.S. planes carry out the heaviest bombardment of the war, and U.N. Secretary General U Thant issues an appeal for a cessation of the bombing, a reduction of military activities, and participation of the National Liberation Front in any peace settlement.
- March 10.*—The South Vietnamese Government removes Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chan Thi as District Commander in Hue on the grounds that he was acting independently of the Government.
- March 11.*—Vice President Humphrey bars any settlement of the Vietnam war that would give the Vietcong a role in a coalition government not earned in free elections.
- March 10-16.*—Protests in Hue and Danang ensue over the dismissal of General Thi and, thought increasingly anti-American, urge U.S. support against the Government. Buddhist demonstrations begin in Saigon, protesting General Thi's removal and demanding a return to civilian rule.
- March 18.*—South Vietnam's Government votes to make no concessions to Buddhist demonstrators.
- March 23.*—General strikes occur in Danang and Hue.
- March 25.*—Premier Ky announces that a committee will be appointed to draft a constitution to be followed by elections.
- March 31.*—10,000 Buddhists demonstrate in Saigon.
- April 2-5.*—Anti-government demonstrations intensify in Saigon and spread to other leading towns in South Vietnam. Premier Ky threatens the use of troops and flies to Danang to quell the rebellion.
- April 6.*—Secretary General Thant states that all parties in the Vietnam conflict must accept the concept of a unified, independent and nonaligned country, guaranteed by all the major powers.
- April 11.*—Defense Department officials acknowledge that Buddhist demonstrations have hampered operations against the Vietcong.
- April 12.*—B-52's from the U.S. Strategic Air Command base in Guam bomb North Vietnam for the first time. The press reports a Pentagon decision to use B-52's regularly in bombing the north.
- April 12-14.*—The National Political Congress (boycotted by Buddhist and Catholic organizations) meets in Saigon and adopts a program designed to meet Buddhist demands. Demonstrations end.
- April 16.*—South Vietnam's military National Leadership Committee sets elections for a Constituent Assembly in August.
- April 18.*—Senator Mike Mansfield proposes a "direct confrontation across a peace table" between the United States, Communist

- China, North Vietnam, and "essential elements" from South Vietnam, to be held in either Japan or Burma—a proposal rejected by Peiping April 21. Hanoi on April 22 calls Senator Mansfield's proposal a "new peace trick."
- April 22.*—Pauline Frederick, NBC reporter, quotes a Soviet informant as stating that North Vietnam would be willing to enter into peace negotiations, if the United States would halt the bombing of the north.
- April 24.*—Communist MIG-17's appear in strength for the first time in the air war in North Vietnam.
- April 25.*—Senator Richard Russell proposes a poll in major South Vietnamese cities to decide whether the Vietnamese people want U.S. assistance. He asserts that if the answer is "No," the U.S. should pull out.
- April 26.*—The State Department reiterates previous warnings that planes of Communist China or other nations attacking allied aircraft over North Vietnam will be pursued into the territory of their home "sanctuary" if necessary.
- April 26.*—North Vietnam's official news agency reports speeches by Ho Chi Minh and Premier Pham Van Dong before the National Assembly reaffirming Hanoi's four points as the conditions for peace in Vietnam.
- April 30.*—U.S. officials in Saigon set the rate of North Vietnamese infiltration of the south at 5,500 men per month.
- May 1.*—An American battalion drives Communist units across the ill-defined frontier into Cambodia.
- May 2.*—Secretary McNamara predicts an increase in U.S. troop strength in order to offset rising North Vietnamese infiltration.
- May 3.*—U.S. forces fire on Vietcong units in Cambodia.
- May 7.*—Premier Ky declares that he has no intention of resigning following the election of a constituent assembly.
- May 13.*—Communist China charges that five U.S. planes had "flagrantly" intruded over Yunnan Province May 12.
- May 15-23.*—Vietnamese Government troops regain control of Danang from pro-Buddhist army units.
- May 18.*—The United States protests to Cambodia concerning the Vietcong's use of its territory.
- May 20-23.*—Saigon police and army units break up massive Buddhist demonstrations.
- May 22.*—Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, states that President Johnson has decided against expanding the list of bombing targets in North Vietnam to include industrial and port installations, and fuel storage facilities.
- May 24.*—Secretary General Thant calls on the parties participating in the Vietnam war to start scaling down military operations and to agree to discussions among all powers concerned, including the Vietcong and Communist China.
- May 31.*—Buddhist leaders and South Vietnamese Government officials begin talks in Saigon in an attempt to resolve the 2½-month-old political crisis.
- May 31.*—Anthony Eden proposes the establishment of a neutral belt composed of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as a means of ending the war.

- June 3.*—South Vietnam requests United Nations observers at the Constituent Assembly elections now scheduled for September. The reaction at U.N. headquarters is described as cool.
- June 6.*—South Vietnam's ruling military National Leadership Committee of 10 generals is expanded to include 10 civilians.
- June 8.*—Buddhist leader Tri Quang begins a fast in protest against American support of Premier Ky.
- June 16.*—South Vietnam's Government moves troops into Hue to deal with Buddhist disorders.
- June 18.*—President Johnson, at a news conference, declares that the United States would persist in using "the ground, naval, and air strength required to achieve our objective" and warns that: "I must observe that this does not mean that we shall not increase our forces or our operations."
- June 20.*—Premier Ky signs a decree setting September 11 as the date for the election of a constituent assembly to be known as the National Constituent Assembly, which will draft a new constitution.
- June 23.*—South Vietnamese troops seize the principal Buddhist stronghold in Saigon, the Unified Buddhist Church's Secular Affairs Institute.
- June 26.*—Secretary Rusk, in Canberra, Australia, states that he see no prospects for an early peace in Vietnam.
- June 29.*—American planes conduct the first of continuing attacks on oil installations in the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
- June 30.*—Speaking in Omaha and Des Moines, President Johnson warns that attacks on military targets in North Vietnam "will continue to impose a growing burden and a high price on those who wage war against the freedom of their neighbors," and calls for unconditional peace talks, saying "there need only be a room and a table and people willing to talk respectfully."
- July 2.*—State Department officials estimate that 40,000 Chinese workers are in North Vietnam repairing bombed facilities.
- July 5.*—Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt, speaking before the National Press Club, endorses U.S. policy in Asia, including the bombing of North Vietnam.
- July 6.*—Several captured American pilots are paraded through the streets of Hanoi. Communist mobs demand their punishment.
- July 7.*—The Warsaw Pact nations issue a declaration stating that they are ready to send "volunteers" to Vietnam, if Hanoi asks for them.
- July 7.*—Prime Minister Gandhi of India calls for an immediate end to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and a peace conference to end the war.
- July 8.*—South Vietnam's Chief of State, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, states that the allies should invade North Vietnam if necessary in order to end the war.
- July 9.*—Communist China rules out reconvening the Geneva Conference on Vietnam unless the United States withdraws its troops from that country.
- July 10.*—The Defense Department announces that U.S. forces in Vietnam will expand to 375,000 by the end of 1966 and to 425,000 by the spring of 1967.
- July 11.*—The United States is reported to be carrying out over 100 air strikes a day over Communist infiltration routes in Laos.

- July 12.*—Premier Sato of Japan calls on North Vietnam to enter into peace talks with the United States.
- July 14.*—Secretary Rusk warns Hanoi against trying captured U.S. pilots as war criminals.
- July 15.*—Eighteen U.S. Senators who had expressed opposition to administration policy in Vietnam sign a statement calling on North Vietnam to refrain from any act of vengeance against captured American airmen.
- July 16.*—Secretary General Thant urges North Vietnam to exercise restraint in its treatment of American prisoners and calls on both sides to observe the 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.
- July 16.*—Prime Minister Gandhi, in Moscow, reaffirms her belief that a cessation of the U.S. air raids over North Vietnam is a precondition for negotiations to end the war.
- July 19.*—North Vietnamese Ambassadors in Peiping and Prague report that captured American pilots will go on trial in Hanoi.
- July 20.*—At a news conference, President Johnson warns Hanoi that the American people would regard war-crime trials of American prisoners as "very revolting and repulsive" and that they would "react accordingly." Pope Paul calls on North Vietnam to accord American prisoners "the safety and the treatment provided for by international norms."
- July 23.*—In response to a cable from the President of CBS, Ho Chi Minh declares there is "no trial in view" for American prisoners. Speaking in Indianapolis, President Johnson says: "We are not going to run out on South Vietnam. . . . However long it takes, we will persist until the Communists end the fighting or negotiate an honorable peace."
- July 24.*—North Vietnam's official publication Nhan Dan reiterates Hanoi's four point plan as the "sole basis" for settling the Vietnam problem.
- July 25.*—In an interview published in U.S. News & World Report Premier Ky urges an allied invasion of North Vietnam even at the risk of a military confrontation with Communist China, as the sole alternative to a long war. The Department of State tells reporters that the United States is "not seeking any wider war. . . . We do not threaten any regime."
- July 30.*—B-52 bombers initiate the first of series of attacks on growing North Vietnamese troop concentrations in and around the demilitarized zone.
- July 31.*—Premier Ky states that he will not be a candidate for President in 1967.
- August 3.*—Thailand proposes an all-Asian peace conference on Vietnam. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia suggests that the United States should negotiate directly with the Vietcong.
- August 3.*—A House Appropriations Subcommittee makes public testimony of May 11 by Secretary Rusk in which he said that the United States observes a no-bombing buffer zone along North Vietnam's border with Red China.
- August 7.*—Former Vice President Nixon, in Saigon, suggests that 500,000 American troops are needed in Vietnam to shorten the war.
- August 9.*—Premier Ky expresses a willingness to negotiate an end of the war with North Vietnam, provided "they would be willing to compromise" by agreeing to accept the 17th parallel as the border and "to withdraw their agents and soldiers from South Vietnam."

- August 10.*—Thailand's Premier officially opens the U.S. airbase at U-Tapao, capable of handling B-52 bombers.
- August 13-14.*—At the end of 2 days of conferences with General Westmoreland in Texas, President Johnson warns that, while a Communist military take-over in South Vietnam is impossible, there will be no quick victory.
- August 18.*—North Vietnam denounces the proposed all-Asia peace conference as "shop-worn merchandise" from President Johnson's "clique."
- August 24.*—President Johnson endorses proposals for an all-Asian conference to settle the Vietnam war, but cautions that "we do not want to make it appear that we are trying to direct it or force it."
- August 28.*—The U.S.S.R. announces that it is training North Vietnamese fighter pilots at an unidentified Soviet airbase.
- August 30.*—Chinese Communist Party newspaper, Peoples Daily, calls for anti-American uprisings throughout the world, claims that U.S. forces are "bogged down" in Vietnam.
- September 1.*—President Charles de Gaulle calls on the United States to pledge to withdraw from South Vietnam in a fixed period as a step toward restoring peace, declaring that such a pledge of U.S. military withdrawal would be a prelude to genuine international negotiations on peace in Vietnam.
- September 5.*—President Johnson says that a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam is dependent upon a pull-out of Communist forces.
- September 11.*—South Vietnam voters (80.8 percent of those eligible) elect a 117-member constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and pave the way for restoration of civilian government in 1967.
- September 22.*—Ambassador Goldberg states that the United States will halt the bombing of North Vietnam when it receives assurances, privately or otherwise, that Hanoi will respond by a reduction of its war effort. The United States will then be prepared to participate in a mutual withdrawal of military forces under international supervision.
- September 24.*—Both Communist China and North Vietnam reject the U.S. peace proposals put forward by Ambassador Goldberg.
- September 27.*—President Johnson accepts the invitation of President Marcos of the Philippines to attend a heads of government conference in Manila to discuss the Vietnam conflict.
- October 3.*—The Soviet Union announces a new aid agreement with North Vietnam providing for both military and economic assistance. Washington officials cite evidence that Russian advisers might at times be operating Hanoi's air defenses.
- October 4.*—U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Foy D. Kohler, warns that an American blockade of North Vietnam would raise the risk of a military confrontation with the U.S.S.R.
- October 4.*—French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville is reported to have told President Johnson that North Vietnam no longer believes it can achieve a military victory, but that it is in no mood for negotiations.
- October 6.*—North Vietnam rejects Secretary General Thant's appeal for a mutual de escalation of the ground war but endorses his call for a cessation of the U.S. bombing of the north.

- October 10.*—The Soviet Union declares that an end to the U.S. air raids on North Vietnam is the key to improved Soviet-American relations.
- October 13.*—President Johnson rules out ending the bombing of North Vietnam without an indication that Hanoi will, in turn, deescalate its military activities in South Vietnam.
- October 14, 1966.*—U.S. pilots fly a record 175 missions over North Vietnam.
- October 16.*—President Johnson leaves on a 17-day trip that will include the Manila Conference.
- October 24.*—The Manila Conference opens. Premier Ky tells the Conference that South Vietnam will press a program of political-economic reform.
- October 25.*—The United States and five other nations assisting South Vietnam militarily offer to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam 6 months after Hanoi disengages itself from the war.
- October 26.*—President Johnson pays a surprise visit to Camranh Bay, South Vietnam, and pledges full support to U.S. forces.
- October 27.*—Hanoi and Peking reject the Manila Conference's mutual troop withdrawal offer.
- November 5.*—Secretary McNamara states that the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam will continue to grow in 1967 but at a lower rate than the increase in 1966.
- November 10.*—North Vietnam announces that the U.S.S.R., China, and other Communist countries have pledged increased aid, both military and economic.
- November 12.*—Hanson Baldwin, New York Times military writer, asserts that Pentagon military experts have estimated that 600,000 to 750,000 U.S. troops are needed in South Vietnam to achieve the objectives of defeating the Communists and pacifying the country.
- November 18.*—Secretary Rusk states that the United States might agree to a short holiday truce in December but does not intend to begin another prolonged bombing pause. He repeats the U.S. position that Hanoi must indicate that it will take reciprocal action in response to a halt in the bombing.
- November 25.*—The Vietcong offers to observe 48-hour truces at both Christmas and New Year's. On November 30, South Vietnam follows suit, adding a 4-day period for the Vietnamese New Year (February 8-12).
- November 26.*—The New York Times reports that U.S. advisers and other military personnel are taking an active part in operations against Communist guerrillas in Thailand.
- December 2.*—Premier Ky announces that U.S. troops will be stationed in the Mekong Delta area, where operations previously were conducted solely by the South Vietnamese Army.
- December 2-5.*—U.S. bombers stage heavy raids on truck depots, rail yards, and fuel dumps in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi.
- December 7.*—The State Department confirms reports that U.S. helicopter crews are flying Thai troops to zones where antiguerrilla operations are taking place.
- December 8.*—Pope Paul urges the combatants in Vietnam to extend the holiday truces into an armistice and begin peace negotiations.
- December 8.*—Air Force Secretary Brown asserts that the U.S. bombing of infiltration routes has severely hampered the enemy's capability and has reduced his ability to launch major attacks.

- December 12.*—The New York Times reports that the Soviet Union has sent North Vietnam 100 new Mig 17, 19, and 21 jet fighters, thus doubling the size of Hanoi's air force. The State Department and Defense Department neither confirm nor deny the report.
- December 13.*—The Soviet press agency Tass claims that U.S. planes attacked residential areas of Hanoi.
- December 14-15.*—U.S. officials admit that American aircraft have bombed military targets in Hanoi but deny Soviet charges.
- December 16.*—Communist China charges that American planes bombed its Embassy in Hanoi. Rumania follows suit December 17.
- December 19.*—The United States asks Secretary General Thant to take whatever steps he considers necessary to bring about cease-fire talks in Vietnam.
- December 21.*—North Korean pilots are reported to be flying Mig jet fighters in North Vietnam and training Hanoi's pilots.
- December 25.*—Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times begins a visit to North Vietnam and claims U.S. planes have bombed towns and cities including Namdinh, the country's third largest city. U.S. officials admit that American planes have "accidentally struck civilian areas while attempting to bomb military targets."
- December 30.*—Britain invites North and South Vietnam to begin cease-fire talks on British territory.
- Britain invites North and South Vietnam to begin cease-fire talks on British territory.
- December 31.*—Secretary General Thant, in a reply to the U.S. request that he take the initiative in bringing about a Vietnam settlement, calls on the United States to halt "unconditionally" its bombing of North Vietnam.
- December 31.*—President Johnson states that targets bombed in North Vietnam are military in nature and that the United States makes every effort to minimize civilian casualties.
- December 31.*—U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam reaches 389,000. U.S. battle deaths in Vietnam reached 6,644, while total wounded reached 37,738.

1967

- January 1.*—The National Liberation Front announces that it will observe a 7-day truce during the Lunar New Year celebration of February 1967. U.S. planes down seven Communist Mig fighters, North Vietnam's biggest daily loss of the war.
- January 3.*—South Vietnam accepts the British proposal of December 30. North Vietnam rejects it.
- January 3.*—North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong asserts that Hanoi's four points are not "conditions" for peace talks but constitute a "basis for settlement" and "valid conclusions for discussion." U Thant states that North Vietnam's willingness to negotiate depends on an unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing.
- January 3.*—Thailand announces its intention to send troops to Vietnam and begins to train a 2,400-man volunteer regiment, which is expected to be sent in the summer of 1967.
- January 4.*—Senate Majority Leader Mansfield proposes that U.S. troops seal off South Vietnam by setting up a defensive line running along the 17th parallel. Such a line, he said, should be extended into Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail and other infiltration routes.

- January 5.*—North Vietnam's chief diplomatic representative in Western Europe states that if the United States will "definitively and unconditionally" stop bombing his country, Hanoi will "examine and study" proposals for negotiations.
- January 8.*—Ambassador Lodge predicts "sensational" military gains in 1967 and that open peace negotiations would probably never take place. United States and South Vietnamese troops begin Operation Cedar Falls in the Mekong Delta, the largest single offensive of the war.
- January 10.*—In a released statement, U Thant rejects the view that Vietnam is vital to U.S. security and dismisses the so-called "domino theory." He also states his disagreement with "the generally held view that the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam is a stooge of Hanoi" and describes the NLF as "an independent entity" similar to the National Liberation Front of Algeria.
- January 11.*—Hanoi demands that Thailand prohibit the United States from using bases in its territory to bomb North Vietnam.
- January 13.*—Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says the United States will not bomb Mig bases in North Vietnam.
- January 13.*—Representatives of seven Asian nations tell U Thant that the outcome of the Vietnam war is very important to the security of Southeast Asia and adjacent territories.
- January 15.*—French editor Rene Dabernat of the magazine, Paris March, states that Peking informed Washington that it would not enter the Vietnam war, if the United States would not invade Red China and/or North Vietnam and would not bomb the dikes of the Red River in North Vietnam. The State Department declines to comment on the statement.
- January 17.*—South Vietnam proposes talks with Hanoi on extending the Lunar New Year's truce.
- January 20.*—Senator John Stennis calls for an intensification of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam to include industrial and power installations and jet airfields. He also predicts that over 500,000 American troops will be needed in South Vietnam by the end of 1967.
- January 23.*—In his annual posture statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee and Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Secretary McNamara lists enemy strength in South Vietnam at 275,000 men including 45,000 North Vietnamese regulars. The Secretary claims that U.S. strategy is limiting the buildup of Communist forces in the south, because they are losing as many men as they can recruit.
- January 23.*—Senator Fulbright's book "The Arrogance of Power" is published, detailing an eight-point peace plan for Vietnam which provides for a series of negotiations between all parties concerned including the Vietcong, the cessation of U.S. air attacks against North Vietnam and a reduction of U.S. military operations, and the eventual neutralization of South Vietnam.
- January 25.*—The Associated Press reports an order by the Johnson administration barring American planes from venturing within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi.
- January 25.*—The President presents his budget for fiscal year 1968 to Congress. For Vietnam, it estimates expenditures at \$21.9 billion. Total defense spending for fiscal 1968 is estimated at \$73.1 billion.

Defense Department expenditures for Vietnam in fiscal 1967 are estimated at \$19.4 billion.

January 26.—U.S. officials acknowledge previous reports of secret negotiations with the National Liberation Front but claim that these dealt only with American prisoners held by the Vietcong.

January 28.—North Vietnam's Foreign Minister asserts that "it is only after the unconditional ending of the bombing and other acts of war being carried out by the United States against North Vietnam that there can be talks between the two countries." He also reiterates that Hanoi's four points provide the basis of a settlement.

January 31.—Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, urges a prudent deescalation of the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace talks, although he describes the prospects for negotiations as gloomy.

January 31.—The State Department declares that it sees no change in Hanoi's position on the opening of negotiations despite the January 28 comments of North Vietnam's Foreign Minister.

February 2.—President Johnson, at a news conference, says that he is unaware of any serious North Vietnamese effort to stop the fighting and move toward negotiations.

February 2.—The U.S.S.R. charges Communist China with hampering its aid shipments to North Vietnam.

February 8.—The Lunar New Year's truce begins.

February 8.—Premier Kosygin, in London for discussions with British officials, says that an unconditional halt in the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam is necessary to enable negotiations to take place.

February 8.—In a message to Pope Paul, President Johnson expresses the hope that the New Year's truce can be extended and open the way for negotiations.

February 9.—Secretary Rusk tells newsmen that the United States will not cease bombing North Vietnam until Hanoi shows a willingness to reduce its military effort in the south. He accuses Hanoi of trying to secure a halt in the air raids without any limitations on its own military activities.

February 10.—The State Department voices "serious concern" over reports that North Vietnam has taken advantage of the New Year's truce to increase its supplies to Communist forces in the south. Ambassador Goldberg reaffirms the U.S. willingness to enter into negotiations without preconditions.

February 11.—The Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* terms an end of the U.S. bombing a first step to the limiting of military operations in Vietnam and ultimately their cessation.

February 12.—The Allies resume ground action with the end of the truce, but U.S. planes do not bomb the north.

February 13.—Premier Kosygin ends his visit to Britain. Both Britain and the U.S.S.R. pledge to make every possible effort to achieve peace in Vietnam.

February 14.—The United States bombs North Vietnam after a pause of nearly 6 days. President Johnson cites Hanoi's "major resupply efforts" during the break as justification for this action.

February 14.—Radio Hanoi declares that there can be no bargaining on North Vietnam's demand that the United States halt the bombing "unconditionally and for good."

February 15.—Secretary McNamara tells newsmen that the northern bombing has been effective but that the major military objectives of the war must be achieved in South Vietnam.

February 20.—A Chinese Communist Party newspaper publishes an article opposing any negotiations in return for a halt in the U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam.

February 23-24.—25,000 Allied troops begin Operation Junction City in a wide area near the South Vietnam-Cambodia border. U.S. artillery in South Vietnam shells North Vietnam for the first time.

February 24.—Secretary McNamara states at a news conference that the United States might bomb new targets in North Vietnam.

February 25.—A newly released Gallup Poll indicates that 67 percent of the American people favor continuing the bombing of North Vietnam.

February 27.—U.S. planes begin to drop mines in North Vietnam's rivers.

February 27.—A high-level North Vietnamese delegation arrives in Rangoon, Burma. Rumors circulate that it will meet with Secretary General Thant, who is vacationing there.

March 1.—North Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong states that he does not think there is any possibility of negotiations between the opposing sides in Vietnam.

March 1.—The Senate, by a vote of 75 to 19, passes a resolution tied to a \$4.5 billion military spending bill (for fiscal 1967) pledging support to President Johnson and others who are trying to prevent the expansion of the Vietnam war. President Johnson signs the bill on March 16 with the resolution attached.

March 2.—Senator Robert Kennedy proposes a three-step peace plan with Vietnam providing for a suspension of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and an offer to negotiate within a week, negotiations linked with a mutual agreement not to increase the scale of infiltration and reinforcement, and a settlement allowing all major political elements in South Vietnam to participate in elections. The administration immediately replies, reaffirming U.S. policy that Hanoi must reduce its military activities in response to a suspension of the bombing.

March 3.—A North Vietnamese diplomat in Rangoon states that Secretary General Thant held discussions on Vietnam with envoys from Hanoi.

March 6.—Premier Kosygin declares that the recent U.S. escalation of the war will result in a corresponding increase in Communist aid to Hanoi.

March 8.—Former presidential adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger charges that the Johnson administration does not want to enter into negotiations on Vietnam.

March 10.—U.S. warplanes bomb the North Vietnamese Thainguayen iron and steel works for the first time.

March 15.—President Johnson announces in Nashville that Ellsworth Bunker will replace Henry Cabot Lodge as U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam.

March 16-20.—The House and Senate pass a \$12.2 billion supplemental (fiscal 1967) defense money bill for Vietnam. Senate vote, 77-3; House vote, 385-11.

March 20.—President Johnson arrives on Guam for meetings with United States and South Vietnamese officials. Premier Ky, in his opening speech, opposes a coalition government in South Vietnam which would include the Vietcong.

March 21.—North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry discloses that President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh exchanged letters in February. Ho rejected the President's call for peace talks unless the United States halted the bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam.

March 22.—U.S. officials announce plans to base B-52 bombers in Thailand for use in Vietnam.

March 23.—Senator Edward Brooke, upon his return from Southeast Asia, shifts his position on Vietnam to one of general support for administration policy. He expresses the opinion that North Vietnam at present is not interested in meaningful negotiations.

March 26.—Senator Stuart Symington suggests that the United States should bomb more meaningful targets in North Vietnam and indicates such targets should include Hanoi's Mig airfields.

March 27.—South Vietnam's Government approves the new constitution voted by the Constituent Assembly on March 18. The constitution was promulgated on April 1.

April 1.—The Government also decrees that elections for the President and the Senate will be held September 1, 1967, while the lower house of the Parliament will be chosen October 1, 1967.

March 27.—A Senate Armed Services subcommittee issues a report charging that restrictions on U.S. pilots bombing North Vietnam have resulted in increased American casualties in the air war. The report proposes a relaxation of these limitations.

March 28.—Secretary General Thant discloses that, on March 14, he proposed to both sides a "standstill" truce in Vietnam as a first step toward peace negotiations. The United States and South Vietnam approved the plan but Hanoi rejected it.

March 28.—Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai, in an interview published in several U.S. newspapers in May, warns that China will enter the war if a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam occurs which threatens China's "security". Chou states that "Americans won't be allowed to approach our borders." He reportedly states that China would intervene if Hanoi was threatened with a "sellout peace" arranged by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He repeats past statements by Chinese leaders that war between the U.S. and China is inevitable, but does not indicate that he believes such a war is imminent. Chou states that the Chinese had warned North Vietnamese leaders in January not to propose negotiations with the United States in exchange for a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

March 31-April 1.—Senator Joseph Clark proposes that the United States put U Thant's standstill cease-fire into effect unilaterally. Thant endorses Clark's idea.

April 3.—The State Department expresses concern that North Vietnam is brainwashing captured American pilots to obtain propaganda statements attacking U.S. policy.

April 8.—Saigon announces it will observe a 1-day truce on Buddha's birthday, May 23. The United States says it will observe the truce, including a halt to all bombing, but states that if the Communists use the period to resupply their troops then air attacks might be resumed.

April 11.—U.S. officials state that the Soviet Union and Communist China have apparently worked out an agreement to speed the flow of Soviet aid to North Vietnam.

April 18.—A SEATO ministerial meeting opens in Washington. Adm. Ulysses S. G. Sharp, commander of U.S. Pacific Forces, tells a Pentagon news conference that at least three North Vietnamese divisions threaten "a large-scale attack" along South Vietnam's northern border.

April 18.—Saigon, in response to a Canadian proposal, suggests that one means of bringing about peace might be a withdrawal by both sides from the demilitarized zone. Hanoi had already rejected the Canadian proposal.

April 19.—The United States proposes that both sides pull back military forces 10 miles from the demilitarized border zone as a first step toward peace talks. The North Vietnamese on April 21 rejected the proposal, calling it a "trick." The NFL on April 23 denounced the U.S. proposal.

April 20.—The SEATO ministers end their conference by issuing a communique stressing "that reciprocity is an essential element of any acceptable proposal for reduction in the fighting" in Vietnam.

April 20.—U.S. planes bomb two powerplants inside Haiphong for the first time. The United States and allies participating in the Vietnam war hold a strategy conference in Washington.

April 24.—U.S. planes attack two North Vietnamese MIG bases, marking the first strike against such installations.

April 24.—Communist China claims to have shot down 2 U.S. jets over Kwangsi Province bordering North Vietnam.

April 26.—Secretary McNamara states that North Vietnamese MIG activity has increased sufficiently within the last 3 weeks to justify bombing raids on the MIG bases.

April 27.—The Vietcong announces in a radio broadcast that it will observe a 48-hour truce for Buddha's birthday on May 23.

April 27.—Senator John McClellan charges that the use of some U.S. aid funds in Vietnam has been improper and "of highly questionable legality." He also describes the program as showing "gross laxity and inefficiency."

April 28.—In a speech before Congress, Gen. William Westmoreland predicts that U.S. forces will "prevail in Vietnam over the Communist aggressor." He also asserts that "in evaluating the enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he believes our Achilles heel is our resolve."

April 29.—State Department officials warn of the possibility of a full-scale North Vietnamese invasion across the demilitarized zone and assert that a major attack of this type could change the nature of the war from a guerrilla to a conventional one.

April 30.—Communist China rejects a recent appeal by Soviet Communist Party leader Brezhnev for unity in aiding North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

April 30.—South Vietnam rules out any extension of the truce on Buddha's birthday without direct negotiations between Saigon and North Vietnam.

May 1.—In a speech before the annual meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Secretary Rusk lists 28 peace proposals "made by ourselves and others" which North Vietnam had turned down.

May 1.—The Senate Republican Policy Committee releases a staff study critical of many aspects of U.S. Vietnam policy. The report questioned whether Republicans should continue to support “an open-ended—unilateral commitment to an Asian land war.” Some Republican Senators, including Senate Minority Leader Dirksen, insisted this did not mean that Republicans might withdraw their support of administration policy in Vietnam. Senator Dirksen said that while “preserving the right of full and fair inquiry and criticism—we reaffirm our position standing four-square behind (the Commander-in-Chief) and our field, air and sea commanders in Southeast Asia.”

May 2.—The New York Times reports information received from “informed sources” in Saigon that General Westmoreland had asked President Johnson to increase American strength in Vietnam to at least 600,000 men.

May 3.—At a news conference, President Johnson states that he has no “imminent” plans to substantially increase U.S. fighting strength in Vietnam.

May 4.—Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Rusk declares that the United States “is not contemplating any nuclear ultimatum to North Vietnam” and insists that the United States remains ready and eager to meet with North Vietnamese leaders. He rules out, however, any unconditional halt to the American bombing of North Vietnam.

May 4.—Senator Cooper warns of the danger of a confrontation with Communist China if the Vietnam war continues to escalate. He calls on the administration to confine bombing to infiltration routes entering South Vietnam.

May 5.—U.S. Marines capture the third and final peak of Hill 881 after days of bitter fighting.

May 8.—Administration officials state that the United States did not bomb the immediate Hanoi area from mid-December to late April in an unsuccessful effort to open negotiations with North Vietnam. Washington reportedly informed the Ho Chi Minh regime that if it took reciprocal steps, the United States would make other moves to deescalate the fighting.

May 10.—U.N. Secretary General Thant calls on the United States to “take a calculated risk” and halt the bombing of North Vietnam. He asserts his belief that such a step would result in peace talks within “a few weeks’ time.”

May 11.—Secretary General Thant expresses his fear that “the initial phase of world war III” is being fought in Vietnam. He states that if the present trend in the fighting continues, a United States-Chinese Communist confrontation is inevitable.

May 11.—South Vietnam’s Premier Ky tells his Cabinet that he will run for president in the election scheduled for September 3. Later, Lt. Gen. Nguyen van Thieu, the country’s chief of state, said it was “entirely possible” that he would oppose Ky in the contest.

May 13.—Premier Ky indicates he might respond “militarily” if a civilian whose policies he disagreed with is elected president. Ky also declares that press censorship will continue during the election campaign. On his reasons for continuing censorship, Ky on June 18 stated: “There are parts of a constitution that can be respected right away and there are others that take time.”

May 14.—South Vietnam’s Chief of State Thieu states his belief that 50,000 American or allied troops will be needed 10 to 20 years after the end of the Vietnam war to guard against future aggression. He also states that he expects heavy fighting to continue for 2 to 3 years followed by 3 or 4 years of cleanup operations.

May 14.—General Lewis W. Walt, U.S. Marine Commander in Vietnam, states that more allied troops are needed there, particularly in order to insure the success of the pacification effort.

May 15.—South Vietnam’s National Assembly rules that military men can run for the presidency in the September 3 elections without resigning from the armed forces.

May 15.—Senator Mansfield, in a Senate speech, repeats previous calls for a U.N. Security Council meeting, to be attended by all belligerents, to debate and attempt to achieve a peaceful solution of the Vietnam war.

May 17.—Sixteen U.S. Senators, who in the past have criticized the extent of American involvement in Vietnam, issue a statement urging North Vietnam to negotiate and warning that, despite disagreements with some aspects of U.S. policy, they remain “steadfastly opposed” to an unilateral withdrawal of American forces.

May 18-19.—U.S. and South Vietnamese forces for the first time in the war, move into the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam while U.S. planes bomb a powerplant 1 mile north of the center of Hanoi.

May 19.—South Vietnam’s chief of state Thieu declares his candidacy for President in the September 3 elections. Then on June 14 made a “formal” announcement of his candidacy.

May 21.—In a television interview, General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states that U.S. commanders in Vietnam have strict orders to stay out of North Vietnam even if engaged in “hot pursuit” of the enemy. He said that: “We have no intention of invading North Vietnam.”

May 22.—In issuing his Memorial Day proclamation, President Johnson calls on North Vietnam to help negotiate a way “out of this bloody impasse.”

May 23.—State Department officials reportedly state that if Communist China intervenes with massive forces in Vietnam, the United States would have to take action with everything it had. They add that they consider a Chinese intervention very unlikely at the present time.

May 24.—Former Premier Tran Van Huong announces his candidacy for President of South Vietnam.

May 30.—Secretary of Defense McNamara authorizes the Navy to spend \$800,000 for “exploratory” demothballing of the battleship *New Jersey* to see how much it will cost to prepare it for service off Vietnam. Press reports earlier in May had claimed a decision had been made by the Defense Department to recommission a battleship for Vietnam service.

May 31.—The National Liberation Front issues a statement that it will “respect the territorial integrity of Cambodia in its present borders” and “recognize and undertake to respect the present border between South Vietnam and Cambodia.”

June 11.—U.S. jets attack the North Vietnamese airfield at Kep. (Reconnaissance photos show 10 MIG’s destroyed or damaged.)

June 12.—South Vietnam releases 39 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners at the border separating North and South Vietnam. According to press reports, the U.S. Government prompted the move because of its concern over the treatment of American captives in North Vietnam and in the hope that Hanoi might respond by releasing sick and wounded prisoners.

June 12.—U.S. military spokesmen state that U.S. planes have destroyed 115 North Vietnamese aircraft, roughly equal to the strength of the North Vietnamese combat air force in 1965. However, American intelligence sources reportedly have stated that Soviet deliveries of MIG fighters have kept the Hanoi air force at a strength of 100 planes or more.

June 13.—Prince Norodom Sihanouk announces that Cambodia will establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and that both Hanoi and the Vietcong have recognized Cambodia's frontiers.

June 15.—The Constituent Assembly, acting as the provisional national legislature, promulgates the electoral law for both senatorial and presidential elections in South Vietnam. The law had been passed by the assembly on May 16. Both elections are scheduled to take place on September 3. All senatorial candidates will run on a nationwide basis.

June 15.—Premier Ky states that 600,000 U.S. troops are needed in Vietnam. Ky also said he had changed his mind about his earlier statement that he would not oppose Chief of Staff Thieu in the presidential election.

June 19.—U.S. pilots fly 166 missions against targets in North Vietnam, making this the heaviest day of air activity since last November.

June 20.—The United States formally expressed regret for damages caused to the Soviet ship *Turkestan* on June 2 off the North Vietnamese port of Campha. The Department of Defense on June 18 had conceded that fire from U.S. planes aimed at anti-aircraft guns protecting Campha may have struck the *Turkestan*. The U.S. note added that every effort would be made to "insure that such incidents do not occur." The United States had earlier denied Soviet charges that American planes had damaged the Soviet ship.

June 22.—According to Department of Defense figures, total U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam is 463,000 as of June 17. U.S. combat deaths stand at 11,099 and number of wounded totals 67,083. Four hundred seventy-six U.S. servicemen are missing while 184 are captured or interned. U.S. deaths resulting from noncombat causes reaches 2,159. Total ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) strength is over 600,000, while ARVN deaths total 47,695. Other free world forces in South Vietnam total 54,000. Communist force strength in South Vietnam is estimated to be 294,000, including 50,000 North Vietnamese regulars.

B. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ON UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS¹

(On March 8, 1949, France signed an agreement with the state of Vietnam under Bao Dai, agreeing to recognize the independence of Vietnam. Similar agreements were later signed with Cambodia and Laos.)

UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF VIET-NAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA: Statement by the Department of State, February 7, 1950²

The Government of the United States has accorded diplomatic recognition to the Governments of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia.

The President, therefore, has instructed the American consul general at Saigon to inform the heads of Government of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia that we extend diplomatic recognition to their Governments and look forward to an exchange of diplomatic representatives between the United States and these countries.

Our diplomatic recognition of these Governments is based on the formal establishment of the State of Viet Nam, the Kingdom of Laos, and the Kingdom of Cambodia as independent states within the French Union; this recognition is consistent with our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence.

In June of last year, this Government expressed its gratification at the signing of the France-Vietnamese agreements of March 8, which provided the basis for the evolution of Vietnamese independence within the French Union. These agreements, together with similar accords between France and the Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, have now been ratified by the French National Assembly and signed by the President of the French Republic. This ratification has established the independence of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia as associated states within the French Union.

It is anticipated that the full implementation of these basic agreements and of supplementary accords which have been negotiated and are awaiting ratification will promote political stability and the growth of effective democratic institutions in Indochina. This Government is considering what steps it may take at this time to further these objectives and to assure, in collaboration with other like-minded nations, that this development shall not be hindered by internal dissension fostered from abroad.

¹ The matter printed in italics is a staff note on the documents and not part of the official text.

² Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 20, 1950, pp. 291-292.

The status of the American consulate general in Saigon will be raised to that of a legation, and the Minister who will be accredited to all three states will be appointed by the President.

(Hostilities between the French and Viet Minh Forces began late in 1946 and gradually worsened until the Geneva Agreements of 1954. This statement marks the beginning of U.S. military and economic assistance to the Associated States and France to restore stability in the area. Formal agreements were signed later.)

EXTENSION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID: Statement by the Secretary of State, May 8, 1950¹

The [French] Foreign Minister and I have just had an exchange of views on the situation in Indochina and are in general agreement both as to the urgency of the situation in that area and as to the necessity for remedial action. We have noted the fact that the problem of meeting the threat to the security of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos which now enjoy independence within the French Union is primarily the responsibility of France and the Governments and peoples of Indochina. The United States recognizes that the solution of the Indochina problem depends both upon the restoration of security and upon the development of genuine nationalism and that United States assistance can and should contribute to these major objectives.

The United States Government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM: Note From the American Chargé d'Affaires at Saigon to the Chiefs of State of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, May 24, 1950²

I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States has decided to initiate a program of economic aid to the States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. My Government has reached this decision in order to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to restore stability and pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

With these purposes in mind, the United States Government is establishing, with headquarters in Saigon and associated with the United States Legation, a special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. This mission will have the responsibility of working with the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and

¹ Issued at Paris, where the Secretary of State was attending a Western Foreign Ministers meeting; Department of State *Bulletin*, May 22, 1950, p. 821.

² Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1950, pp. 977-978. David Bruce, the American Ambassador at Paris, simultaneously delivered an identical note to the President of the French Union.

with the French High Commissioner in developing and carrying out a coordinated program of economic aid designed to assist the three countries in restoring their normal economic life. The members of the American economic mission will, at all times, be subject to the authority of the Government of the United States and will not become a part of the administrations of the Associated States.

The Government of the United States recognizes that this American assistance will be complementary to the effort made by the three Associated States and France, without any intention of substitution. American aid is designed to reinforce the joint effort of France and the Governments and peoples of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, on whom rests the primary responsibility for the restoration of security and stability.

United States economic aid will be granted in accordance with separate bilateral agreements between each of the Associated States and the United States of America. The approval of these agreements will be subject to legal conventions existing between the Associated States and France. Initial economic aid operations, however, may begin prior to the conclusion of these agreements.

The United States Government is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the three governments and the French High Commissioner to reach agreement among themselves for the coordination of those matters relating to the aid program that are of common interest. The American economic mission will maintain contact with the three Associated States, with the French High Commissioner in Indochina and, if desired, with any body which may be set up by the Associated States and France in connection with the aid program.

Mr. Robert Blum has been appointed Chief of the United States special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Identical letters are being addressed today to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the President of the French Union.

THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM: Statement by the Departments of State and Defense, September 23, 1951¹

Discussions which have been going on for the past week between General of the Army, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner in Indochina, and Commander in Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, and officials of the Departments of Defense and State were concluded September 22 in an atmosphere of cordiality and unity of purpose.

The participants were in complete agreement that the successful defense of Indochina is of great importance to the defense of all Southeast Asia. United States officials stated that General de Lattre's presentation of the situation in that area had been invaluable to them and had demonstrated that United States and French policies in the Associated States were not at variance.

In the course of the discussions with the Department of Defense, the military-aid program for Indochina was reexamined, with the

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 570.

result that considerable improvement will be made in the rate of deliveries of many items of equipment. General de Lattre has been advised that the question of additional aid for the French and Vietnamese forces in Indochina in the fiscal year 1952 program is under study by the United States Government.

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THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA: Communiqué Regarding Discussions Between Representatives of the United States, France, Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 1952¹

Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister in the French Cabinet for the Associated States in Indochina, has just concluded a series of conversations with U.S. Government officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Office of Director for Mutual Security, the Mutual Security Agency, and Department of the Treasury. The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Viet-Nam have also participated in these talks.

The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of views and information was the common recognition that the struggle in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are engaged against the forces of Communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to Communist attempts at conquest and subversion. There was unanimous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military operations, in spite of the continuous combat and aid received by the Communist forces of the Viet-Minh from Communist China. The excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was found to be a source of particular encouragement. Special tribute was paid to the 52,000 officers and men of the French Union and Associated States' armies who have been lost in this six years' struggle for freedom in Southeast Asia and to the 75,000 other casualties.

In this common struggle, however, history, strategic factors, as well as local and general resources require that the free countries concerned each assume primary responsibility for resistance in the specific areas where Communism has resorted to force of arms. Thus the United States assumes a large share of the burden in Korea while France has the primary role in Indochina. The partners, however, recognize the obligation to help each other in their areas of primary responsibility to the extent of their capabilities and within the limitations imposed by their global obligations as well as by the requirements in their own areas of special responsibility. It was agreed that success in this continuing struggle would entail an increase in the common effort and that the United States for its part will, therefore, within the limitations set by Congress, take steps to expand its aid to the French Union. It was further agreed that this increased assistance over and above present U.S. aid for Indochina, which now approximates one third of the total cost of Indochina operations, would be especially devoted to assisting France in the building of the national armies of the Associated States.

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1952, p. 1010.

Mr. Letourneau reviewed the facts which amply demonstrate the determination of the Associated States to pursue with increased energy the strengthening of their authority and integrity both against internal subversion and against external aggression.

In this connection Mr. Letourneau reminded the participants that the accords of 1949, which established the independence within the French Union of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, have been liberally interpreted and supplemented by other agreements, thus consolidating this independence. Mr. Letourneau pointed out that the governments of the Associated States now exercise full authority except that a strictly limited number of services related to the necessities of the war now in progress remain temporarily in French hands. In the course of the examination of the Far Eastern economic and trade situation, it was noted that the Governments of the Associated States are free to negotiate trade treaties and agreements of all kinds with their neighbors subject only to whatever special arrangements may be agreed between members of the French Union.

It was noted that these states have been recognized by thirty-three foreign governments.

The conversations reaffirmed the common determination of the participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

Mr. Letourneau was received by the President, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Foster, as Acting Secretary of Defense. Mr. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, acted as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation participating in the conversations.

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SUPPORT BY NATO OF THE FRENCH UNION DEFENSE EFFORTS IN INDOCHINA: Resolution Adopted by the North Atlantic Council, December 17, 1952¹

The North Atlantic Council

Recognizes that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world;

HAVING BEEN INFORMED at its meeting in Paris on the 16th December of the latest developments in the military and political situation in Indo-China;

Expresses its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and

Acknowledges that the resistance of the free nations in South-East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community;

And therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the NATO governments.

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.

ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES AID FOR FRANCE AND INDOCHINA: Joint Franco-American Communiqué, September 30, 1953¹

The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have for 8 years been engaged in a bitter struggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring the liberty of the new and independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its declaration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina, through negotiations with the Associated States.

The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United States will make available to the French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed \$385 million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and the Associated States.

The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and programs for its NATO forces.

(On May 7, 1954 Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet Minh Forces after a long siege. This development led France to submit armistice proposals to the Geneva Conference convened the previous month to discuss Korea and "peace in Indochina." This statement sets forth the United States position on the Geneva negotiations.)

THE THREAT OF DIRECT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954 (Excerpt)²

At the moment, Indochina is the area where international communism most vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho

Chi-Minh. Last year President Eisenhower, in his great "Chance for Peace" address, said that "aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action." But the French were then opposed to what they called "internationalizing" the war. They preferred to treat it as a civil war of rebellion. However, on July 3, 1953, the French Government made a public declaration of independence for the three Associated States, and in September it adopted the so-called Navarre plan, which contemplated a rapid buildup of national native forces. The United States then agreed to underwrite the costs of this plan.

But last winter the fighting was intensified and the long strain began to tell in terms of the attitude of the French people toward a war then in its eighth year. Last March, after the siege of Dien-Bien-Phu had begun, I renewed President Eisenhower's proposal that we seek conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. I went to Europe on this mission, and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva Conference.

Meanwhile, the burdens of a collective defense in Indochina have mounted. The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at Geneva, while intensifying their fighting in Indochina. The French and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of political uncertainty at their rear. I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that the situation is grave but by no means hopeless. The future depends largely on decisions awaited at Paris, London, and Geneva.

The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression by the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is one of restoring tranquility in an area where disturbances are fomented from Communist China, but where there is no open invasion by Communist China. This task of pacification, in our opinion, cannot be successfully met merely by unilateral armed intervention. Some other conditions need to be established. Throughout these Indochina developments, the United States has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear the conditions which, in its opinion, might justify intervention. These conditions were and are (1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.

Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacrifices incident to committing our Nation, with others, to using force to help to restore peace in the area.

Another problem might, however, arise. If the Chinese Communist regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is determined to pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the situation would be different and another issue would emerge. That contingency has already been referred to publicly by the President and myself. The President, in his April 16, 1953, address, and I myself, in an ad-

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 486-487.

² Delivered before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp. 971-973.

dress of September 2, 1953, made clear that the United States would take a grave view of any future overt military Chinese Communist aggression in relation to the Pacific or Southeast Asia area. Such an aggression would threaten island and peninsular positions which secure the United States and its allies.

If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a deliberate threat to the United States itself. The United States would of course invoke the processes of the United Nations and consult with its allies. But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for decisions closely touching our own security and self-defense.

There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that the attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war with Communist China. That is clearly false. If we had wanted such a war, it could easily have been based on the presence of Chinese aggressors in Korea. But last July, in spite of difficulties which at times seemed insuperable, we concluded a Korean armistice with Communist China. How could it be more surely demonstrated that we have both the will to make peace and the competence to make peace?

Your Government wants peace, and the American people want peace. But should there ever be openly launched an attack that the American people would clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, then the right of self-preservation would demand that we—regardless of any other country—meet the issue squarely.

It is the task of statesmanship to seek peace and deter war, while at the same time preserving vital national interests. Under present conditions that dual result is not easy to achieve, and it cannot be achieved at all unless your Government is backed by a people who are willing, if need be, to sacrifice to preserve their vital interests.

At the Geneva Conference I said: "Peace is always easy to achieve—by surrender." Your Government does not propose to buy peace at that price. We do not believe that the American people want peace at that price. So long as that is our national will, and so long as that will be backed by a capacity for effective action, our Nation can face the future with that calm confidence which is the due of those who, in a troubled world, hold fast that which is good.

(The Geneva Agreements theoretically ended the war between French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These states were to become fully independent countries, with the last-named partitioned near the 17th parallel into two states pending reunification through "free elections" to be held by July 20, 1956. The United States and Vietnam are not signatories to these agreements.)

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM, July 20, 1954¹

CHAPTER I—PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

Article 1

A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their

¹ IC/42/Rev. 2, 20 July 1954.

withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.

The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (omitted).

It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.

Article 2

The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 3

When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.

Article 4

The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.

All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

Article 5

To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 6

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 7

No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.

Article 8

Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of

civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

Article 9

Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.

CHAPTER II—PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT

Article 10

The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 11

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.

Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:

Northern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 27 July 1954

Central Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 1 August 1954

Southern Viet-Nam at 8:00 a. m. (local time) on 11 August 1954

It is agreed that Peking mean time shall be taken as local time.

From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.

Article 12

All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces;

(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:

(1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.

(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.

Article 13

From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.

The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.

Article 14

Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:

(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;

(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on,

such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.

Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notices shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.

The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.

(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.

(d) From the date of entry into force of the present agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.

Article 15

The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement;

(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly installments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;

(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;

(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;

(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer;

(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact

procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:

1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.

The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps¹ annexed to the present Agreement.

In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 metres from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.

During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:

- meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island
- northern coast of the Ile Rousse (excluding the island), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines
- meridian of Chanpha-Mines.

2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following order and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement):

<i>Forces of the French Union</i>	<i>Days</i>
Hanoi perimeter.....	80
Haiduong perimeter.....	100
Haiphong perimeter.....	300 ✓

Forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam

Ham Tan and Xuyenmcc provisional assembly area.....	80
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area—first instalment.....	80
Plaine des Jones provisional assembly area.....	100
Point Camau provisional assembly area.....	200
Central Viet-Nam Provisional assembly area—last installment.....	300

CHAPTER III—BAN ON INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES

Article 16

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.

It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel on a temporary duty basis and the return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:

(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French

¹ Not reprinted here.

Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.

(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same echelon or by personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do their overseas service there;

(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion—or the corresponding echelon for air and naval forces;

(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.

(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below:

(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.

All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing.

(g) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 17

(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited.

(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north

of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.

Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.

(c) The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below;

(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms and munitions of all types in the form of un-assembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited;

(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms and munitions of all types.

In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced.

(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

Article 18

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

Article 19

With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

Article 20

The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:

- Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line:
Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;
- Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line:
Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.

CHAPTER IV—PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

Article 21

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Viet-Nam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Viet-Nam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Viet-Nam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or the zone of their choice.

CHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

Article 22

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 23

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

Article 24

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet-Nam.

For the purposes of the present Article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

Article 25

The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 26

The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 27

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring and observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

CHAPTER VI—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN VIET-NAM

28. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.

30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties, a Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.

31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.

32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General.

The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the re-grouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.

33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:

(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Viet-Nam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.

(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.

Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.

34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.

It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.

35. The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . .). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties, effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.

(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the re-grouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.

(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.

37. The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.

39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the international Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:

(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;

(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party;

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.

44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to fulfill the the tasks provided for in article 36.

45. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

46. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

47. All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Viet-Nameese, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam	For the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indo-China
TA-QUANG BUU,	Brigadier-General DELFÈIL.
<i>Vice-Minister of National Defence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam</i>	

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM

I. DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

(Article 1 of the Agreement: Reference Map: Indo-China 1/100,000)

(a) The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as follows, reading from east to west:

the mouth of the Song Ben Hat (Cua Tung River) and the course of that river (known as the Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then the parallel of Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Viet-Nam frontier.

(b) The demilitarized zone shall be delimited by Trung Gia Military Commission in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.

II. GENERAL DELINEATION OF THE PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY AREAS

(Article 15 of the Agreement; Reference Maps: Indo-China 1/400,000)

(a) NORTH VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the French Union forces

1. The perimeter of Hanoi is delimited by the arc of a circle with a radius of 15 kilometres, having as its centre the right bank abutment of

Doumer Bridge and running westwards from the Red River to the Rapids Canal in the northeast.

In this particular case no forces of the French Union shall be stationed less than 2 kilometres from this perimeter, on the inside thereof.

2. The perimeter of Haiphong shall be delimited by the Song-Van-Uc as far as Kim Thanh and a line running from the Song-Van-Uc three kilometres northeast of Kim Thanh to cut Road No. 18 two kilometres east of Mao-Khó. Thence a line running three kilometres north of Road 18 to Cho-Troi and a straight line from Cho-Troi to the Mong-Duong ferry.

3. *A corridor contained between:*

In the south, the Red River from Thanh-Tri to Bang-Nho, thence a line joining the latter point to Do-My (South-west of Kesat), Gia-Loc and Tien Kieu;

In the north, a line running the Rapids Canal at a distance of 1,500 metres to the north of the Canal, passing three kilometres north of Pha-Lai and Seven Pagodas and thence parallel to Road No. 18 to its point of intersection with the perimeter of Haiphong.

Note: Throughout the period of evacuation of the perimeter of Hanoi, the river forces of the French Union shall enjoy complete freedom of movement on the Song-Van-Uc. And the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam shall withdraw three kilometres south of the south bank of the Song-Van-Uc.

Boundary between the perimeter of Hanoi and the perimeter of Haiduong

A straight line running from the Rapids Canal three kilometres west of Chi-ne and ending at Do-My (eight kilometres south-west of Kesat).

(b) CENTRAL VIET-NAM

Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the forces of the Viet-Nam People's Army south of the Col des Nuages parallel

The perimeter of the Central Viet-Nam area shall consist of the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Quang-Ngai and Binh-Dinh as they were defined before the hostilities.

(c) SOUTH VIET-NAM

Three provisional assembly areas shall be provided for the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.

The boundaries of these areas are as follows:

1. Xuyen-Moc, Nam-Tan Area

Western boundary: The course of the Song-Ray extended northwards as far as Road No. 1 to a point thereon eight kilometres east of the intersection of Road No. 1 and Road No. 3.

Northern boundary: Road No. 1 from the above-mentioned intersection to the intersection with Route Communale No. 9 situated 27 kilometres west-south-west of Phanthiet and from that intersection a straight line to Kim Thanh on the coast.

2. *Plain des Jongs Area*

Northern boundary: The Viet-Nam-Cambodia frontier.

Western boundary: A straight line from Tong-Binh to Binh-Thanh.

Southern boundary: Course of the Fleuve Antérieur (Mekong) to ten kilometres south-east of Cao Lanh. From that point, a straight line as far as Ap-My-Dien, and from Ap-My-Dien a line parallel to and three kilometers east and then south of the Tong Doc-Loc Canal, this line reaches My-Hanh-Dong and thence Hung-Thanh-My.

Eastern boundary: A straight line from Ifung-Thanh-My running northwards to the Cambodian frontier south of Doi-bao-Voi.

3. *Point Camau Area*

Northern boundary: The Song-Cai-lon from its mouth to its junction with the Rach-Nuoc-Trong, thence the Rach-Nuoc-Trong to the bend five kilometers north-east of Ap-Xeo-La. Thereafter a line to the Ngan-Dua Canal and following that Canal as far as Vinh-Hung. Finally, from Vinh-Hung a north-south line to the sea.

AGREEMENT OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN CAMBODIA, JULY 20, 1954¹

CHAPTER I—PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS GOVERNING EXECUTION OF THE CEASE-FIRE

Article 1

As from twenty-third July 1954 at 0800 hours (Pekin mean time) complete cessation of all hostilities throughout Cambodia shall be ordered and enforced by the Commanders of the Armed Forces of the two parties for all troops and personnel of the land, naval and air forces under their control.

Article 2

In conformity with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, there shall be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Cambodia, in all the combat areas and for all the forces of the two parties.

To obviate any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the ending of hostilities and all other operations arising from cessation of hostilities are in fact simultaneous,

(a) due allowance being made for the time actually required for transmission of the cease-fire order down to the lowest échelons of the combatant forces of both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Cambodia shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 7 August 1954. It is agreed that Peking mean time shall be taken as local time.

¹ IC/52, 21 July, 1954, Original: French.

(b) Each side shall comply strictly with the time-table jointly agreed upon between the parties for the execution of all operations connected with the cessation of hostilities.

Article 3

All operations and movements connected with the execution of the cessation of hostilities must be carried out in a safe and orderly fashion.

(a) Within a number of days to be determined by the Commanders of both sides, after the cease-fire has been achieved, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous devices placed by it. Should it be impossible to complete removal and neutralization before departure, the party concerned will mark the spot by placing visible signs. Sites thus cleared of mines and any other obstacles to the free movement of the personnel of the International Commission and the Joint Commission shall be notified to the latter by local military Commanders.

(b) Any incidents that may arise between the forces of the two sides and may result from mistakes or misunderstandings shall be settled on the spot so as to restrict their scope.

(c) During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.

CHAPTER II—PROCEDURE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE TERRITORY OF CAMBODIA

Article 4

1. The withdrawal outside the territory of Cambodia shall apply to:

(a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the French Union;

(b) the combatant formations of all types which have entered the territory of Cambodia from other countries or regions of the peninsula;

(c) all the foreign elements (or Cambodians not natives of Cambodia) in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic, financial or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Viet-Nam military units.

2. The withdrawals of the forces and elements referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and their military supplies and materials must be completed within 90 days reckoning from the entry into force of the present Agreement.

3. The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals of all the forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of the Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take any

action likely to create difficulties for such withdrawals. They shall assist one another as far as possible.

4. While the withdrawals are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of public property or any attack on the life or property of the civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

5. The Joint Commission and the International Supervisory Commission shall supervise the execution of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal.

6. The Joint Commission in Cambodia shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals of the forces on the basis of the above-mentioned principles.

CHAPTER III—OTHER QUESTIONS

A. THE KHMER ARMED FORCES, NATIVES OF CAMBODIA

Article 5

The two parties shall undertake that within thirty days after the cease-fire order has been proclaimed, the Khmer Resistance Forces shall be demobilized on the spot; simultaneously, the troops of the Royal Khmer Army shall abstain from taking any hostile action against the Khmer Resistance Forces.

Article 6

The situation of these nationals shall be decided in the light of the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at the Geneva Conference, reading as follows:

“The Royal Government of Cambodia,

In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the Kingdom,

Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the national community and to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom provides;

Affirms that all Cambodian citizens may freely participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot.”

No reprisals shall be taken against the said nationals or their families, each national being entitled to the enjoyment, without any discrimination as compared with other nationals, of all constitutional guarantees concerning the protection of person and property and democratic freedoms.

Applicants therefor may be accepted for service in the Regular Army or local police formations if they satisfy the conditions required for current recruitment of the Army and Police Corps.

The same procedure shall apply to those persons who have returned to civilian life and who may apply for civilian employment on the same terms as other nationals.

B. BAN ON THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS, MILITARY BASES

Article 7

In accordance with the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at 2400 hours on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers:

“The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.

“During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory.”

C. CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND PRISONERS OF WAR—BURIAL

Article 8

The liberation and repatriation of all civilian internees and prisoners of war detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of whatever nationality, captured since the beginning of hostilities in Cambodia during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Cambodia shall be liberated after the entry into force of the present Armistice agreement.

(b) The term “civilian internees” is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

Article 9

After the entry into force of the present Agreement, if the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Cambodian commander shall, within a specified period, authorize the exhumation and removal of the bodies of deceased military personnel of the other party, including the bodies of prisoners of war or personnel deceased and buried on Cambodian territory.

The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is to be carried out and the time limit within which it must be completed.

CHAPTER IV—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN CAMBODIA

Article 10

Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

Article 11

An International Commission shall be responsible for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Phnom-Penh.

Article 12

The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Phnom-Penh, Kompong-Cham, Kratié, Svay-Rieng, Kampot. These points of location may be altered at a later date by agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering on the land and sea frontiers of Cambodia. The mobile teams shall have the right to move freely within the limits of their zones of action, and they shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfillment of their tasks (provision of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for enquiries, security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Cambodian command, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them under the present Agreement.

Article 13

The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

- (a) control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected;

- (b) control the release of prisoners of war, and civilian internees;

- (c) supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Cambodia, the application of the Cambodian declaration concerning the introduction into Cambodia of military personnel and war materials on grounds of foreign assistance.

Article 14

A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Joint Commission may form joint groups the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.

The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Cambodia for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavor to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The Joint Commission may send joint groups to follow the forces in their movements; such groups shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.

Article 15

The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the parties concerned.

Article 16

The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Joint Commission or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

Article 17

The inspection teams shall transmit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigations and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

Article 18

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed; the Commission shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures to be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

Article 19

When the Joint Commission is unable to reach agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

Article 20

The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of article 21. If the votes are equally divided, the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

Article 21

On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan,

(b) violation or threats of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,

the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

Article 22

If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 21, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

Article 23

The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to perform the tasks prescribed in article 13.

Article 24

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Laos.

The Secretaries-General of those three Commissions shall be responsible for coordinating their work and for relations between them.

Article 25

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and in Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Viet-Nam and in Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.

CHAPTER V—IMPLEMENTATION

Article 26

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 27

The present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall apply to all the armed forces of either party.

Article 28

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of their functions.

Article 29

The Joint Commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the two parties, shall assist the parties in the implementation of all the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, ensure liaison between the two parties, draw up plans for the implementation of the Agreement, and endeavour to settle any dispute arising out of the implementation of the said clauses and plans.

Article 30

The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 31

The signatories of the present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all personnel under their command.

Article 32

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary be examined by the Commands of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

Article 33

All the provisions of the present Agreement shall enter into force at 00 hours (Geneva time) on 23 July 1954.

Done at Geneva on 20 July 1954.

For the Commander-in-Chief of the Units of the Khmer Resistance Forces and for the Commander-in-Chief of the Viet-Nam Military Units	For the Commander-in-Chief of the Khmer National Armed Forces
(signed) TA-QUANG-BUU	(signed) General NHIK TIUOLONG

Vice-Minister of National Defence
of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam

AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN LAOS, JULY 20, 1954¹

CHAPTER I—CEASE-FIRE AND EVACUATION OF FOREIGN ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Article 1

The Commanders of the armed forces of the parties in Laos shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Laos by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.

Article 2

In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout the territory of Laos in all combat areas and for all forces of the two parties.

In order to prevent any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and movements of the opposing forces are in fact simultaneous.

(a) Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Laos shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 6 August 1954. It is agreed that Peking meantime shall be taken as local time.

(b) The Joint Commission for Laos shall draw up a schedule for the other operations resulting from the cessation of hostilities.

Note: The cease-fire shall become effective 15 days after the entry into force of the present Agreement.

Article 3

All operations and movements entailed by the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:

(a) Within a number of days to be determined on the spot by the Joint Commission in Laos each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substance placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there.

(b) As regards the security of troops on the move following the lines of communication in accordance with the schedule previously drawn up by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos, and the safety of the assembly areas, detailed measures shall be adopted in each case by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos. In particular, while the forces of one party are withdrawing by a line of communication passing through the territory of the other party (road or waterways) the forces of the latter party shall provisionally withdraw two kilometres on either side of such line of communication, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movement of the civil population.

¹ IC/51, Rev. 1, 20 July 1954, Original: French.

Article 4

The withdrawals and transfers of military forces, supplies and equipment shall be effected in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, supplies and equipment of the two parties shall be completed within a period of 120 days from the day on which the Armistice Agreement enters into force.

The two parties undertake to communicate their transfer plans to each other, for information, within 25 days of the entry into force of the present Agreement.

(b) The withdrawals of the Viet-Nameese People's Volunteers from Laos to Viet-Nam shall be effected by provinces. The position of those volunteers who were settled in Laos before the hostilities shall form the subject of a special convention.

(c) The routes for the withdrawal of the forces of the French Union and Viet-Nameese People's Volunteers in Laos from Laotian territory shall be fixed on the spot by the Joint Commission.

(d) The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals and transfers of all forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of this Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take action of any kind whatever which might hinder such withdrawals or transfers. The parties shall assist each other as far as possible.

(e) While the withdrawals and transfers of the forces are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of any public property or any attack on the life or property of the local civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.

(f) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall supervise the implementation of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal and transfer.

(g) The Joint Commission in Laos shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals and transfers of the forces in accordance with the above-mentioned principles.

Article 5

During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.

CHAPTER II—PROHIBITION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FRESH TROOPS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS

Article 6

With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited.

Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and non-commissioned officers.

Article 7

Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of Laos.

Article 8

The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane.

The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men.

Article 9

Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accordance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal Government of Laos on 20 July 1954, the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and military equipment of all kinds is prohibited, with the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos.

Article 10

The new armaments and military personnel permitted to enter Laos in accordance with the terms of Article 9 above shall enter Laos at the following points only: Luang-Prabang, Xieng-Khouang, Vientiane, Seno, Pakse, Savannakhet and Tchépone.

CHAPTER III—DISENGAGEMENT OF THE FORCES—ASSEMBLY AREAS— CONCENTRATION AREAS

Article 11

The disengagement of the armed forces of both sides, including concentration of the armed forces, movements to rejoin the provisional assembly areas allotted to one party and provisional withdrawal movements by the other party, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the cease fire.

Article 12

The Joint Commission in Laos shall fix the site and boundaries:

- of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the Vietnamese People's Volunteer Forces,
- of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the French forces in Laos,
- of the twelve (12) provisional assembly areas, one to each province, for the reception of the fighting units of "Pathet Lao".

—The forces of the Laotian National Army shall remain *in situ* during the entire duration of the operations of disengagement and transfer of foreign forces and fighting units of "Pathet Lao".

Article 13

The foreign Forces shall be transferred outside Laotian territory as follows:

(1) *French Forces:* The French forces will be moved out of Laos by road (along routes laid down by the Joint Commission in Laos) and also by air and inland waterway;

(2) *Vietnamese People's Volunteer forces:* These forces will be moved out of Laos by land, along routes and in accordance with a schedule to be determined by the Joint Commission in Laos in accordance with principle of simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces.

Article 14

Pending a political settlement, the fighting units of "Pathet Lao", concentrated in the provisional assembly areas, shall move into the Provinces of Phongsaly and Sam-Neua, except for any military personnel who wish to be demobilised where they are. They will be free to move between these two Provinces in a corridor along the frontier between Laos and Viet-Nam bounded on the south by the Line SOP KIN, NA MI-SOP SANG, MUONG SON.

Concentration shall be completed within one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement.

Article 15

Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations for their activities during the hostilities and also undertakes to guarantee their democratic freedoms.

CHAPTER IV—PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

Article 16

The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:

(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Laotian and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Laos, during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Laos, shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire comes into effect.

(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed strife between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.

(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.

CHAPTER V—MISCELLANEOUS

Article 17

The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.

Article 18

In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the forces of either

party shall, within a specified period after the entry into force of the present Agreement, permit the graves service of the other party to enter that part of Laotian territory under his military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war.

The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is carried out and the time limits within which it must be completed. The Commanders of the forces of each party shall communicate to the other all information in his possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.

Article 19

The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other party, and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

For the purpose of the present article the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.

Article 20

The Commander of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint organs and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 21

The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission and its joint groups and of the International Commission and its inspection teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.

Article 22

The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all military personnel under their command.

Article 23

The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be examined by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.

CHAPTER VI—JOINT COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SUPERVISION AND CONTROL IN LAOS

Article 24

Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.

Article 25

An International Commission shall be entrusted with control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the Agreement on

the cessation of hostilities in Laos. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Vientiane.

Article 26

The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.

The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Paksé, Seno, Tchépone, Vientiane, Xieng-Khonang, Phongsalay, Sophao (province of Samneua). These points of location may, at a later date, be altered by agreement between the Government of Laos and the International Commission.

The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be regions bordering the land frontiers of Laos. Within the limits of their zones of action, they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provisions of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for holding enquiries, the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc. . . .). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.

Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Command of the party concerned, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.

Article 27

The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:

(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected:

(b) Control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees:

(c) Supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Laos, the implementation of the provisions regulating the introduction into Laos of military personnel and war materials;

(d) Supervise the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to rotation of personnel and to supplies for French Union security forces maintained in Laos.

Article 28

A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The Joint Commission shall form joint groups, the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.

The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Laos for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.

It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavour to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The joint groups shall follow the forces in their movements and shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.

Article 29

The Joint Commission and the joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the parties concerned.

Article 30

The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.

Article 31

The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigation and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.

Article 32

If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.

Article 33

When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

Article 34

The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 35. If the votes are equally divided, the chairman's vote shall be decisive.

The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

Article 35

On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,

(a) refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan;

(b) violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces,
the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.

Article 36

If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.

If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 35, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.

The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.

Article 37

The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to fulfill the tasks prescribed in article 27.

Article 38

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos shall act in close co-operation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.

Article 39

The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be reduced unanimously. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.

CHAPTER VII

Article 40

All the provisions of the present Agreement, save paragraph (a) of Article 2, shall enter into force at 24 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.

Article 41

Done in Geneva (Switzerland) on 20 July 1954, at 24 hours, in the French language.

FINAL DECLARATION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954¹

Final declaration, dated July 21, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on

¹ IC/48/Rev. 2, 21 July 1954, Original: French

the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Nameese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the

sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

18. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.

THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS IN INDOCHINA: Statement by the President, July 21, 1954¹

I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reached at Geneva to stop the bloodshed in Indochina.

The United States has not been a belligerent in the war. The primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested with those nations which participated in the fighting. Our role at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful where desired and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into account the needs of the interested people. Accordingly, the United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in article 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.

As evidence of our resolve to assist Cambodia and Laos to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of free nations, we are requesting the agreement of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an Ambassador or Minister to be resident at their respective capitals (Phnom Penh and Vientiane). We already have a Chief of Mission at Saigon, the capital of Viet-Nam, and this Embassy will, of course, be maintained.

The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that general area.

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 163.

(This unilateral declaration by the United States Government sets forth its position with regard to the Geneva Accords, which it did not sign.)

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE¹ AT THE CONCLUDING PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, JULY 21, 1954²

As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters:

Declaration

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future.

¹ Walter Bedell Smith.

² Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 2, 1954, pp. 162-168.

(This treaty was envisaged by the United States several years before its creation but was especially sought by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles after the Geneva Conference. The treaty entered into force on February 19, 1955.)

SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY AND PROTOCOL THERETO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1954¹

Text of Treaty

The Parties to this Treaty,
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

¹ 6 UST 81; Treaties and Other International Acts Series 8170.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of **armed attack** in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

For Australia:
R. G. CASEY

For France:
G. LA CHAMBRE

For New Zealand:
CLIFTON WEBB

For Pakistan:
Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan.
ZAFRULLA KHAN

For the Republic of the Philippines:
CARLOS P. GARCIA
FRANCISCO A. DELGADO
TOMAS L. CABILI
LORENZO M. TAÑADA
CORNELIO T. VILLAREAL

For the Kingdom of Thailand:
WAN WATTHAYAKON KROMMUN NARADHIP BONGSPRABANDH

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
READING

For the United States of America:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
H. ALEXANDER SMITH
MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD

I CERTIFY THAT the foregoing is a true copy of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty concluded and signed in the English language at Manila, on September 8, 1954, the signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of Foreign Affairs to be affixed at the City of Manila, this 14th day of October, 1954.

[SEAL]

Raul S. Manglapus
RAUL S. MANGLAPUS
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs

Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

DESIGNATION OF STATES AND TERRITORY AS TO WHICH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND ARTICLE III ARE TO BE APPLICABLE

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

(With the Geneva accords, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became fully independent states. Accordingly this communiqué announced agreement by France and United States to channel U.S. assistance directly to these countries.)

DIRECT AID TO THE ASSOCIATED STATES: Communiqué Regarding Franco-American Conversations, September 29, 1954¹

Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank and useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are in full agreement on the objectives to be attained.

The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954, has provided a firmer basis than heretofore to assist the free nations of Asia in developing and maintaining their independence and security. The representatives of France and the United States wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments for the principles of self-government, independence, justice and liberty proclaimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954.

The representatives of France and the United States reaffirm the intention of their governments to support the complete independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Both France and the United States will continue to assist Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam in their efforts to safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfare of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United States are assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the resettlement of the Vietnamese who have of their own free will moved to free Viet-Nam and who already number some 300,000.

In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives

¹ Issued at Washington; Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 634. The United States was represented by Acting Secretary Smith and France by Guy LaChambre, Minister of State for Relations with the Three Associated States, and Edgar Faure, Finance Minister.

of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned, within the limits permitted under the Geneva agreements and to an extent to be determined. The United States will consider the question of financial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these circumstances in addition to support for the forces of each of the three Associated States. These questions vitally affect each of the three Associated States and are being fully discussed with them.

The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to that state. The United States representatives will begin discussions soon with the respective governments of the Associated States regarding direct aid. The methods for efficient coordination of French and United States aid programs to each of the three Associated States are under consideration and will be developed in discussions with each of these states.

After the bilateral talks, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Washington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were invited to a final meeting to have an exchange of views and information on these matters. The representatives of all five countries are in complete agreement on the objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in Indochina.

AID TO THE STATE OF VIET-NAM: Message From the President of the United States to the President of the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, October 23, 1954¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

Your recent requests for aid to assist in the formidable project of the movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese citizens away from areas which are passing under a *de facto* rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort.

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The

¹ Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1954, pp. 735-736.

Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

MISSION OF THE SPECIAL UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IN VIET-NAM: ¹ Statement Issued by the White House, November 3, 1954 ²

The President on November 3 designated Gen. J. Lawton Collins as Special United States Representative in Viet-Nam with the personal rank of Ambassador, to undertake a diplomatic mission of limited duration. He will coordinate the operations of all U.S. agencies in that country.

General Collins will proceed immediately to Saigon, where he will confer with Ambassador Donald R. Heath prior to the latter's already scheduled return to the United States for reassignment following 4½ years of distinguished service in Indochina. For the duration of this assignment General Collins will relinquish his other duties, including that of U.S. representative on the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since the conclusion of hostilities in Indochina, the U.S. Government has been particularly concerned over developments in Viet-Nam, a country ravaged by 8 years of war, artificially divided into armistice zones, and confronted by dangerous forces threatening its independence and security.

The U.S. Government is fully aware of the immense tasks facing the Government of Viet-Nam in its effort to achieve solidarity, internal security, and economic rehabilitation. The United States has already played an important role in the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Communist rule in North Viet-Nam.

Moreover, as the President told Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in his letter of October 23d, U.S. representatives in Viet-Nam have been instructed to consider with the Vietnamese authorities how a program of American aid given directly to Viet-Nam can best assist that country. General Collins will explore this matter with Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and his Government in order to help them resolve their present critical problems and to supplement measures adopted by the Vietnamese themselves.

In executing his temporary mission, General Collins will maintain close liaison with the French Commissioner General, Gen. Paul Ely, for the purpose of exchanging views on how best, under existing circumstances, the freedom and welfare of Viet-Nam can be safeguarded.

¹ Gen. J. Lawton Collins.

² Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 22, 1954, pp. 777-778.

(A national referendum on October 23, 1955 deposed Bao Dai, former Emperor and since March 7, 1949, head of state of Vietnam, who had lived mostly abroad. On October 26, Diem became first President of South Vietnam and proclaimed a Republic.)

RECOGNITION OF THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE OF VIET-NAM: Statement by the Department of State, October 26, 1955 ²

On October 26, the Government of Viet-Nam sent the following communication to the American Embassy at Saigon:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the United States Embassy that by referendum October 23 the Vietnamese people have pronounced themselves in favor of the deposition of Bao Dai and have recognized President Diem as Chief of State. It is hoped that the Government of the United States will continue as in the past to entertain diplomatic relations with the new Government of the State of Viet-Nam."

U.S. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt, under instructions, has replied as follows:

"The Government of the United States looks forward to maintaining with the new Government of Viet-Nam the same cordial and friendly relations which have in the past so happily existed between the two governments."

The United States affirms its intention to maintain friendly relations with the Government of Viet-Nam. We are glad to see the evolution of orderly and effective democratic processes in an area of Southeast Asia which has been and continues to be threatened by Communist efforts to impose totalitarian control.

¹ Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 10, 1955, pp. 51-52.

² Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 760.