(This address by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson restated American policy and was delivered at a time of relative stability in South Vietnam.)

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO VIET-NAM: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, June 1, 1956[1]

This past March, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Secretary of State on his visit to Saigon where we conversed with President Diem on the present and future problems of Viet-Nam. I was struck, as so many other recent observers have been, at the progress Free Viet-Nam has made in a few short months toward stability, security, and strength. President Diem seemed to reflect this progress in his own person. On the occasion of our earlier visit some 15 months ago, he seemed tense and gravely concerned about the problems facing Viet-Nam. This time he was reposed, poised, and appeared confident of the future of his country.

Among the factors that explain the remarkable rise of Free Viet-Nam from the shambles created by 8 years of murderous civil and international war, the division of the country at Geneva and the continuing menace of predatory communism, there is in the first place the dedication, courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself. In him, his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his people. Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure, and the entire free world has become the richer for his example of determination and moral fortitude. There is no more dramatic example of this fortitude than President Diem's decisions during the tense and vital days of the battle against the parasitic politico-religious sects in the city of Saigon in the spring of 1955. These decisions were to resist the multiple pressures to compromise that were building up around him, and to struggle to the victorious end for the sake of a just cause. The free world owes him a debt of gratitude for his determined stand at that fateful hour.

Consider Viet-Nam at three stages in its recent history:

First, in mid-1954, partitioned by fiat of the great powers against the will of the Vietnamese people, devoid of governmental machinery or military strength, drifting without leadership and without hope in the backwash of the defeat administered by the combined weight of Communist-impressed infantry and of Chinese and Russian arms.

Secondly, in early 1955, faced with the military and subversive threat of the Communists north of the 17th parallel, confronted with internal strife, its government challenged by the armed, self-seeking politico-religious sects, its army barely reformed and of uncertain loyalty, assailed from within by the most difficult problems, including that of having to absorb the sudden influx of three-quarters of a million refugees who would rather leave their ancestral lands and homes than suffer life under Communist tyranny:

[1] Department of State press release No. 289, May 31, 1956 (also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 11, 1956, pp. 972–974). This address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, was delivered before the American Friends of Viet-Nam, meeting at the Willard Hotel in Washington.

And finally Viet-Nam today, in mid-1956, progressing rapidly to the establishment of democratic institutions by elective processes, its people resuming peaceful pursuits, its army growing in effectiveness, sense of mission, and morale, the puppet Vietnamese politicians discredited, the refugees well on the way to permanent resettlement, the countryside generally orderly and calm, the predatory sects eliminated and their venal leaders exiled or destroyed.

Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to the new state of affairs in Viet-Nam could be cited than the voice of the people themselves as expressed in their free election of last March. At that time the last possible question as to the feeling of the people was erased by an overwhelming majority for President Diem's leadership. The fact that the Viet Minh was unable to carry out its open threats to sabotage these elections is impressive evidence of the stability and prestige of the government.

The United States is proud to be on the side of the effort of the Vietnamese people under President Diem to establish freedom, peace, and the good life. The United States wishes to continue to assist and to be a loyal and trusted friend of Viet-Nam.

Our policies in Viet-Nam may be simply stated as follows:

To support a friendly non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.

To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish the forces necessary for internal security.

To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by the non-Communist world.

To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civil and international war.

Our efforts are directed first of all toward helping to sustain the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of some 45,000, and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces and have a mission assisting the training of the army. We are also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police force. The refugees who have fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds made available by our aid program. In various ways our aid program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the common people of the country. The Vietnamese are increasingly giving attention to the basic development of the Vietnamese economy and to projects that may contribute directly to that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program only as freely invited.

I do not wish to minimize the magnitude of the task that still remains and of the problems that still confront this staunch and valiant member of the free world fighting for its independence on the threshold of the Communist heartland of Asia.

The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet-Nam. With monstrous effrontery, the Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuse Free Viet-Nam and its friends of violating the armistice pro-

visions which the Vietnamese and their friends, including ourselves, have scrupulously respected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselves signed the Geneva Accords while they, the Communists who have solemnly undertaken to be bound by these provisions, have violated them in the most blatant fashion.

The facts are that while on the one hand the military potential of Free Viet-Nam has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of nearly 200,000 members of the French Expeditionary Corps and by the reduction of the Vietnamese Army by more than 50,000 from the time of the armistice to the present as well as by the outshipment from Viet-Nam since the cessation of hostilities of over $200 million worth of war equipment, we have on the other hand reports of steady constant growth of the warmaking potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel.

Our reports reveal that in complete disregard of its obligations, the Viet Minh have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the Sino-Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of Chinese Communist military personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads, to establish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to the growth of the military potential of the zone under Communist occupation.

As so eloquently stated by the British Government in a diplomatic note released to the press and sent to Moscow in April of this year, and I quote:

> The Viet Minh army has been so greatly strengthened by the embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7 Viet Minh divisions in existence in July 1954 there are now no less than 20. This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South speaks for itself.

By lies, propaganda, force, and deceit, the Communists in Hanoi would undermine Free Viet-Nam, whose fall they have been unable to secure by their maneuverings on the diplomatic front. These people, whose crimes against suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lt. Dooley who addressed you this morning, have sold their country to Peiping. They have shamelessly followed all the devious zigzags of the Communist-bloc line so that their alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union is firmly consolidated. These are the people who are now inviting President Diem to join them in a coalition government to be set up through so-called "free elections."

President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. In this goal, we support them fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in his position that if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist there can be no free choice.

May those leaders of the north in whom the spirit of true patriotism still survives realize the futility of the Communist efforts to subvert Free Viet-Nam by force or guile. May they force the abandonment

of these efforts and bring about the peaceful demobilization of the large standing armies of the Viet Minh. May they, above all, return to the just cause of all those who want to reunify their country in peace and independence and for the good of all the people of Viet-Nam.

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(Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem visited Washington, D.C., from May 8 to 11, at which time this communiqué was issued. Viet Cong activity then was still at minor level.)

VIETNAMESE-UNITED STATES RELATIONS: Joint Statement Issued at Washington by the President of the United States and the President of Viet-Nam, May 11, 1957 [1]

His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and President Eisenhower have held discussions during President Ngo Dinh Diem's state visit as the guest of President Eisenhower during May 8–10.

Their discussions have been supplemented by meetings between President Ngo Dinh Diem and his advisers and Secretary of State Dulles and other American officials. These meetings afforded the occasion for reaffirming close mutual friendship and support between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. The two Presidents exchanged views on the promotion of peace and stability and the development and consolidation of freedom in Viet-Nam and in the Far East as a whole.

President Eisenhower complimented President Ngo Dinh Diem on the remarkable achievements of the Republic of Viet-Nam under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem since he took office in July 1954. It was noted that in less than three years a chaotic situation resulting from years of war had been changed into one of progress and stability.

Nearly one million refugees who had fled from Communist tyranny in North Viet-Nam had been cared for and resettled in Free Viet-Nam.

Internal security had been effectively established.

A constitution had been promulgated and a national assembly elected.

Plans for agrarian reform have been launched, and a constructive program developed to meet long-range economic and social problems to promote higher living standards for the Vietnamese people.

President Ngo Dinh Diem reviewed with President Eisenhower the efforts and means of the Vietnamese Government to promote political stability and economic welfare in the Republic of Vietnam. President Eisenhower assured President Ngo Dinh Diem of the willingness of the United States to continue to offer effective assistance within the constitutional processes of the United States to meet these objectives.

President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem looked forward to an end of the unhappy division of the Vietnamese people and

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[1] White House press release (text as printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, pp. 851–852).

confirmed the determination of the two Governments to work together to seek suitable means to bring about the peaceful unification of Vietnam in freedom in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It was noted with pleasure that the General Assembly of the United Nations by a large majority had found the Republic of Vietnam qualified for membership in the United Nations, which has been prevented by Soviet opposition.

President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem noted in contrast the large buildup of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Vietnam during the past 2½ years, the harsh suppression of the revolts of the people of North Vietnam in seeking liberty, and their increasing hardships. While noting the apparent diminution during the last 3 years of Communist-inspired hostilities in southeast Asia except in the Kingdom of Laos, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem expressed concern over continuing Communist subversive capabilities in this area and elsewhere. In particular, they agreed that the continued military buildup of the Chinese Communists, their refusal to renounce the use of force, and their unwillingness to subscribe to standards of conduct of civilized nations constitute a continuing threat to the safety of all free nations in Asia. To counter this threat, President Ngo Dinh Diem indicated his strong desire and his efforts to seek closer cooperation with the free countries of Asia.

Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability. The just settlement of problems of the area by peaceful and legitimate means within the framework of the United Nations Charter will continue to be the mutual concern of both Governments. Finally, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem expressed the desire and determination of the two Governments to cooperate closely together for freedom and independence in the world.

(Viet Cong activity began to increase by late 1957, obviously at the direction of North Vietnam, and reached serious proportions by 1959.)

THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE SECURITY AND PROGRESS OF VIET-NAM: Address by the President (Eisenhower), Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, April 4, 1959 (Excerpt)[1]

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Let us consider briefly the country of Viet-Nam and the importance to us of the security and progress of that country. It is located, as you know, in the southeastern corner of Asia, exactly halfway round the world from Gettysburg College.

[1] White House press release dated Apr. 4, 1959 (text as printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1959, pp. 579–583).

Viet-Nam is a country divided into two parts, like Korea and Germany. The southern half, with its 12 million people, is free but poor. It is an underdeveloped country; its economy is weak, average individual income being less than $200 a year. The northern half has been turned over to communism. A line of demarcation running along the 17th parallel separates the two. To the north of this line stand several Communist divisions. These facts pose to south Viet-Nam two great tasks: self-defense and economic growth.

Understandably the people of Viet-Nam want to make their country a thriving, self-sufficient member of the family of nations. This means economic expansion.

For Viet-Nam's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary. Now, the nation could create the capital needed for growth by stealing from the already meager rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work battalions. This enslavement is the commune system, adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any hostile outside action whatsoever.

Another way for Viet-Nam to get the necessary capital is through private investments from the outside and through governmental loans and, where necessary, grants from other and more fortunately situated nations.

In either of these ways the economic problem of Viet-Nam could be solved. But only the second way can preserve freedom.

And there is still the other of Viet-Nam's great problems—how to support the military forces it needs without crushing its economy.

Because of the proximity of large Communist military formations in the north, Free Viet-Nam must maintain substantial numbers of men under arms. Moreover, while the Government has shown real progress in cleaning out Communist guerrillas, those remaining continue to be a disruptive influence in the nation's life.

Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the military formations essential to it or, equally important, the morale—the hope, the confidence, the pride—necessary to meet the dual threat of aggression from without and subversion within its borders.

Still another fact! Strategically south Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of south Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

Viet-Nam must have a reasonable degree of safety now—both for her people and for her property. Because of these facts, military as well as economic help is currently needed in Viet-Nam.

We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the morale, the economic progress, and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom.

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(In view of the worsening situation in South Vietnam, President Kennedy announced on May 5, 1961 that Vice President Johnson would discuss with President Ngo Dinh Diem measures to help the country resist Communist pressures. The joint communique set forth the outcome of these discussions.)

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED AT SAIGON BY THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESIDENT OF VIET-NAM, MAY 13, 1961 [1]

Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President of the United States, has just completed a visit to the Republic of Viet-Nam, on behalf of President Kennedy and on invitation of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The enthusiastic welcome he received in Viet-Nam reflected a deep sense of common cause in the fight for freedom in Southeast Asia and around the world.

This recognition of mutual objectives resulted in concrete understandings between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States.

It is clear to the Government and the people of Viet-Nam and to the United States that the independence and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam are being brutally and systematically violated by Communist agents and forces from the north.

It is also clear to both Governments that action must be strengthened and accelerated to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of free Viet-Nam to choose their own way of life.

The two Governments agreed that this is the basic principle upon which their understandings rest.

The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

The United States is also conscious of its responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom.

The United States recognizes that the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recently reelected to office by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen despite bitter Communist opposition, is in the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the periphery of the Communist empire in Asia.

Free Viet-Nam cannot alone withstand the pressure which this Communist empire is exerting against it. Under these circumstances—the need of free Viet-Nam for increased and accelerated emergency assistance and the will and determination of the United States to provide such assistance to those willing to fight for their liberties—it is natural that a large measure of agreement on the means to accomplish the joint purpose was found in high-level conversations between the two Governments.

Both Governments recognize that under the circumstances of guerrilla warfare now existing in free Viet-Nam, it is necessary to give high

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1961, pp. 956–957.

priority to the restoration of a sense of security to the people of free Viet-Nam. This priority, however, in no way diminishes the necessity, in policies and programs of both Governments, to pursue vigorously appropriate measures in other fields to achieve a prosperous and happy society.

The following measures, agreed in principle and subject to prompt finalization and implementation, represent an increase and acceleration of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam. These may be followed by more far-reaching measures if the situation, in the opinion of both Governments, warrants.

First, it was agreed by the two Governments to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

Second, it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam should be increased, and that the United States would extend its military assistance programs to include support for an additional number of regular Vietnamese armed forces.

Third, it was agreed that the United States would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese civil guard force.

Fourth, it was agreed that the two Governments should collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist and work with Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages of free Viet-Nam.

Fifth, it was agreed that the assistance of other free governments to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its trouble against Communist guerrilla forces would be welcome.

Sixth, it was agreed that, to achieve the best possible use of available resources, the Vietnamese and the United States, in prosecution of their joint effort against Communist attacks in Viet-Nam, a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Viet-Nam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

Seventh, it was agreed that the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam would discuss new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas, to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort, in order that the people of Viet-Nam should benefit promptly from the restoration of law and order in their villages and provinces.

Eighth, it was agreed that, in addition to measures to deal with the immediate Viet-Nam guerrilla problem, the two Governments would work together toward a longer range economic development program, including further progress in the fields of agriculture, health, educations, fisheries, highways, public administration, and industrial development.

These longer range plans and programs would be developed in detail after further consideration and discussion.

Their goal would be a Viet-Nam capable of a self-sustained economic growth.

President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, on behalf of President Kennedy, established a sense of mutual confidence and respect which both believe essential to fulfillment of their objectives.

(In this exchange of messages, President Kennedy pledged increased assistance to Vietnam's defense effort.)

EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, DECEMBER 14 AND DECEMBER 7, 1961 [1]

President Kennedy to President Diem

DECEMBER 14, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your recent letter in which you described so cogently the dangerous condition caused by North Viet-Nam's efforts to take over your country. The situation in your embattled country is well known to me and to the American people. We have been deeply disturbed by the assault on your country. Our indignation has mounted as the deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnapping and wanton violence became clear.

Your letter underlines what our own information has convincingly shown—that the campaign of force and terror now being waged against your people and your Government is supported and directed from the outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva Accords designed to ensure peace in Viet-Nam and to which they bound themselves in 1954.

At that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." We continue to maintain that view.

In accordance with that declaration, and in response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance to your defense effort as well as help relieve the destruction of the floods which you describe. I have already given the orders to get these programs underway.

The United States, like the Republic of Viet-Nam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary. We shall seek to persuade the Communists to give up their attempts of force and subversion. In any case, we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and so long.

JOHN F. KENNEDY.

President Diem to President Kennedy

DECEMBER 7, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Since its birth, more than six years ago, the Republic of Viet-Nam has enjoyed the close friendship and cooperation of the United States of America.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 1, 1962, pp. 13–14.

Like the United States, the Republic of Viet-Nam has always been devoted to the preservation of peace. My people know only too well the sorrows of war. We have honored the 1954 Geneva Agreements even though they resulted in the partition of our country and the enslavement of more than half of our people by Communist tyranny. We have never considered the reunification of our nation by force. On the contrary, we have publicly pledged that we will not violate the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone set up by the agreements. We have always been prepared and have on many occasions stated our willingness to reunify Viet-Nam on the basis of democratic and truly free elections.

The record of the Communist authorities in the northern part of our country is quite otherwise. They not only consented to the division of Viet-Nam, but were eager for it. They pledged themselves to observe the Geneva Agreements and during the seven years since have never ceased to violate them. They call for free elections but are ignorant of the very meaning of the words. They talk of "peaceful reunification" and wage war against us.

From the beginning, the Communists resorted to terror in their efforts to subvert our people, destroy our government, and impose a Communist regime upon us. They have attacked defenseless teachers, closed schools, killed members of our anti-malarial program and looted hospitals. This is coldly calculated to destroy our government's humanitarian efforts to serve our people.

We have long sought to check the Communist attack from the North on our people by appeals to the International Control Commission. Over the years, we have repeatedly published to the world the evidence of the Communist plot to overthrow our government and seize control of all of Viet-Nam by illegal intrusions from outside our country. The evidence has mounted until now it is hardly necessary to rehearse it. Most recently, the kidnapping and brutal murder of our Chief Liaison Officer to the International Control Commission, Colonel Noang Thuy Nam, compelled us to speak out once more. In our October 24, 1961, letter to the ICC, we called attention again to the publicly stated determination of the Communist authorities in Hanoi to "liberate the South" by the overthrow of my government and the imposition of a Communist regime on our people. We cited the proof of massive infiltration of Communist agents and military elements into our country. We outlined the Communist strategy, which is simply the ruthless use of terror against the whole population, women and children included.

In the course of the last few months, the Communist assault on my people has achieved high ferocity. In October they caused more than 1,800 incidents of violence and more than 2,000 casualties. They have struck occasionally in battalion strength, and they are continually augmenting their forces by infiltration from the North. The level of their attacks is already such that our forces are stretched to the utmost. We are forced to defend every village, every hamlet, indeed every home against a foe whose tactic is always to strike at the defenseless.

A disastrous flood was recently added to the misfortunes of the Vietnamese people. The greater part of three provinces was inundated, with a great loss of property. We are now engaged in a nationwide effort to reconstruct and rehabilitate this area. The Communists are, of course, making this task doubly difficult, for they have seized upon the disruption of normal administration and communications as an opportunity to sow more destruction in the stricken area.

In short, the Vietnamese nation now faces what is perhaps the gravest crisis in its long history. For more than 2,000 years my people have lived and built, fought and died in this land. We have not always been free. Indeed, much of our history and many of its proudest moments have arisen from conquest by foreign powers and our struggle against great odds to regain or defend our precious independence. But it is not only our freedom which is at stake today, it is our national identity. For, if we lose this war, our people will be swallowed by the Communist Bloc, all our proud heritage will be blotted out by the "Socialist society" and Viet-Nam will leave the pages of history. We will lose our national soul.

Mr. President, my people and I are mindful of the great assistance which the United States has given us. Your help has not been lightly received, for the Vietnamese are proud people, and we are determined to do our part in the defense of the free world. It is clear to all of us that the defeat of the Viet Cong demands the total mobilization of our government and our people, and you may be sure that we will devote all of our resources of money, minds, and men to this great task.

But Viet-Nam is not a great power and the forces of International Communism now arrayed against us are more than we can meet with the resources at hand.

We must have further assistance from the United States if we are to win the war now being waged against us.

We can certainly assure mankind that our action is purely defensive. Much as we regret the subjugation of more than half of our people in North Viet-Nam, we have no intention, and indeed no means, to free them by use of force.

I have said that Viet-Nam is at war. War means many things, but most of all it means the death of brave people for a cause they believe in. Viet-Nam has suffered many wars, and through the centuries we have always had patriots and heroes who were willing to shed their blood for Viet-Nam. We will keep faith with them.

When Communism has long ebbed away into the past, my people will still be here, a free united nation growing from the deep roots of our Vietnamese heritage. They will remember your help in our time of need. This struggle will then be a part of our common history. And your help, your friendship, and the strong bonds between our two peoples will be a part of Viet-Nam, then as now.

NGO DINH DIEM

THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington, D.C.

(This communiqué focused on new joint efforts to accelerate and broaden assistance to the countryside and to support a comprehensive and coordinated counterinsurgency program.)

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES AND VIET-NAM ON THE EXPANSION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, JANUARY 4, 1962[1]

The Government of Viet-Nam and the United States Government announce a broad economic and social program aimed at providing every Vietnamese with the means for improving his standard of living. This program represents an intensification and expansion of efforts already made for the same purpose during the past few years.

Social facilities in the fields of education and health will be established throughout the country. Roads, communications and agricultural facilities will be developed to bring increasing prosperity to the people.

Measures to strengthen South Viet-Nam's defense in the military field are being taken simultaneously pursuant to the recent exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Diem.

All of these steps—economic, social, military—demonstrate the desire of both the United States and Vietnamese Governments to do their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi.

The Vietnamese and American Governments have worked out a comprehensive program as a follow-up to the study made by a joint group of experts under the leadership of Professor Vu Quoc Thuc of Viet-Nam and Dr. A. Eugene Staley of the United States, as well as later studies. Some measures have already been started. Others are in the advanced planning stage and will soon be underway.

The United States Government is furnishing additional aid to assist the Government of Viet-Nam is maintaining a level of essential imports which the Government of Viet-Nam could not otherwise finance. Priority will be given to imports required to meet the needs of the people, including the means of developing industries of Viet-Nam, and luxury goods will be excluded in accordance with current conditions of austerity. The Vietnamese Government, as recently announced, has taken steps to increase greatly the piaster resources available to it for financing the piaster costs of security, economic and social programs.

With this combination of dollars and piasters, the Government of Viet-Nam, with United States material and advisory support, will carry out the following programs at village and hamlet levels and in cities:

1. Training facilities for village officials will be set up to improve administration where government has the closest contact with the people.
2. The rural health program will be further developed. Maternity clinics have already been established in over half of the districts and first aid stations in about two-thirds of the villages. The objective is to extend this program to achieve 100 percent coverage. A nationwide program of inoculations against diphtheria, tetanus and whooping cough will be started. These programs will be concentrated in the near future in areas relatively free of Viet Cong domination and will be extended to other areas as Viet Cong are suppressed.
3. The education program will also be expanded. Public-primary schools have increased from 1,191 in 1954 to 4,668 in 1961. Over the same period the number of students has grown from 330,000 to 1,100,000. The goal is to extend primary schools to every village in the country. As with rural health facilities, the immediate aim is to expedite the extension of primary schools to all those villages in areas relatively free of Viet Cong and to extend them to villages in other areas as Communist guerrillas are eliminated.
4. Village communications are being developed, both to enable receipt of radio programs broadcast over the National Radio System (now nearing completion), and to provide the means for village communication with district headquarters. Such a communication system will make it possible to make emergency calls of any nature—for example, for emergency medical assistance.
5. New roads are being built to link rural communities with main highways and, in turn, with provincial and national centers. This program, already underway in many areas, will make it easier to ferret out Viet Cong guerrillas at the same time it lays potential for improving the lot of loyal citizens.
6. Adequate funds will be available to support and expand the agricultural credit system. It has already functioned successfully in many parts of the country, and as security is restored an increasing number of farmers will be able to borrow money cheaply in order to increase their production and income.
7. The program to control pests and insects, especially in central Viet-Nam where they have ravaged rice crops for the past two years, is ready to be launched on an extensive scale. It should materially improve the livelihood of peasants in the areas affected.
8. Special efforts will also be taken to enable the *montagnard* population in the High Plateau to share progress in this region with their Vietnamese compatriots. Resettlement will be accelerated where necessary to remove the population from Viet Cong pressures. Increased

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 22, 1962, pp. 141–142.

resources available to the Government of Viet-Nam will assist in the construction of resettlement villages and will permit helping inhabitants where necessary until they become self-supporting. Many of the Land Development Centers created during the past few years are now flourishing areas producing new crops like kenaf and ramie, and people living in them enjoy a bigger income than before. Similar prospects exist for new resettlement centers for *montagnards*, to which village improvements in health, education and communications will be extended.

9. Special efforts will be directed at reconstruction in flood-stricken regions in the Mekong Delta. These will include regroupment of people into new villages to which health, education and communications benefits will be extended. Road and canal construction will also be involved.

10. Extensive programs of public works will be undertaken to help relieve unemployment.

11. Industrial development which has been marked in the past two years will continue. In the field of cotton textiles, for example, a further investment of $6 million will go far toward making Viet-Nam nearly self-sufficient in cotton cloth. At the same time it will provide living for thousands of workers.

Increased United States assistance for both immediate economic and social measures and longer range development reflects the confidence of the United States Government in the future of free Viet-Nam. Both the Vietnamese and United States Governments also welcome the support and assistance of other Governments in carrying forward these programs for insuring the freedom of Viet-Nam and increasing the prosperity of the Vietnamese people.

DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS, JULY 23, 1962 [1]

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–62;

Welcoming the presentation of the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, incorporated in the present Declaration as an integral part thereof, and the text of which is as follows:

THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF LAOS,

Being resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of the Joint Communiqué of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos,

Solemnly declares that:

(1) It will resolutely apply the five principles of peaceful co-existence in foreign relations, and will develop friendly relations and establish diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighboring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos;

(2) It is the will of the Laotian people to protect and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos;

(3) It will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries;

(4) It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO.

(5) It will not allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever;

(6) Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Protocol, it will require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos;

(7) It will accept direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish to help the Kingdom of Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos;

(8) It will respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in particular the Geneva Agreements of 1962, and will abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles.

This statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos shall be promulgated constitutionally and shall have the force of law.

The Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the States participating in the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, and to all other States, to recognise the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos, to conform to these principles in all respects, and to refrain from any action inconsistent therewith.

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva Agreements of 1954;

Emphasising the principle of respect for the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos;

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question:

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic development of the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security in South-East Asia;

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they

[1] Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5410.

recognise and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. Undertake, in particular, that

(*a*) they will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;

(*b*) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos;

(*c*) they will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos;

(*d*) they will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek;

(*e*) they will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(*f*) they will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO;

(*g*) they will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;

(*h*) they will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind;

(*i*) they will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(*j*) they will not use the territory of any country, including their own for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other States to recognise, respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present Declaration.

4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to ensure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present Declaration.

5. The present Declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present Declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all the other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Declaration.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

PROTOCOL TO THE DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

Having regard to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Protocol

(*a*) the term "foreign military personnel" shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials;

(*b*) the term "the Commission" shall mean the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos set up by virtue of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and composed of the representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as Chairman;

(*c*) the term "the Co-Chairmen" shall mean the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–1962, and their successors in the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;

(*d*) the term "the members of the Conference" shall mean the Governments of countries which took part in the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–1962.

Article 2

All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible and in any case the withdrawal shall be completed not later than thirty days after the Commission has notified the Royal Government of Laos that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of this Protocol its inspection teams are present at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These points shall be determined by the

Royal Government of Laos in accordance with Article 3 within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol. The inspection teams shall be present at these points and the Commission shall notify the Royal Government of Laos thereof within fifteen days after the points have been determined.

ARTICLE 3

The withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall take place only along such routes and through such points as shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission. The Commission shall be notified in advance of the point and time of all such withdrawals.

ARTICLE 4

The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

ARTICLE 5

Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possible an arrangement to transfer the French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos.

If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as an exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos.

The French and Laotian Governments shall inform the members of the Conference, through the Co-Chairmen, of their agreement on the question of the transfer of the French military installations in Laos and of the employment of French military instructors by the Laotian Government.

ARTICLE 6

The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defence of Laos, is prohibited.

ARTICLE 7

All foreign military persons and civilians captured or interned during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within thirty days after the entry into force of this Protocol and handed over by the Royal Government of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that they may proceed to the destination of their choice.

ARTICLE 8

The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the Commission. In addition the Commission shall immediately report to the Co-Chairmen any violations or threats of violations of this Protocol,

all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Protocol, and also any other important information which may assist the Co-Chairmen in carrying out their functions. The Commission may at any time seek help from the Co-Chairmen in the performance of its duties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the Commission exercising general guidance.

The Co-Chairmen shall circulate the reports and any other important information from the Commission to the members of the Conference.

The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this Protcol and the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

The Co-Chairmen will keep the members of the Conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them.

ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.

The Commission shall exercise these functions in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the framework of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-fire arrangements made by the three political forces in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and with the Royal Government of Laos after its formation.

ARTICLE 10

The Commission shall supervise and control the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel. Inspection teams sent by the Commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the Commission in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol.

ARTICLE 11

The Commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.

It is understood that in the exercise of this function the Commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the Co-Chairmen of any violations or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this Article in accordance with Article 8.

ARTICLE 12

The Commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of Laos considers that a violation of Article 6 of this Protocol may have taken place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal Government of Laos and in full co-operation with it.

ARTICLE 13

The Commission shall exercise its functions under this Protocol in close co-operation with the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all levels will render the Commission all possible assistance in the performance by the Commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the Commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos.

ARTICLE 14

The Commission functions as a single organ of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961–1962. The members of the Commission will work harmoniously and in co-operation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the Commission.

Decisions of the Commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major questions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all recommendations by the Commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the initiation and carrying out of investigations (Article 15), decisions of the Commission shall be adopted by majority vote.

ARTICLE 15

In the exercise of its specific functions which are laid down in the relevant articles of this Protocol the Commission shall conduct investigations (directly or by sending inspection teams), when there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Laos or on the initiative of the Commission, which is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos.

In the latter case decisions on initiating and carrying out such investigations shall be taken in the Commission by majority vote

The Commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the Commission on particular questions may be expressed.

The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission resulting from investigations shall be adopted unanimously.

ARTICLE 16

For the exercise of its functions the Commission shall, as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-States of the Commission shall be equally represented. Each member-State of the Commission shall ensure the presence of its own representatives both on the Commission and on the inspection teams, and shall promptly replace them in the event of their being unable to perform their duties.

It is understood that the dispatch of inspection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. The points to which the Commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

ARTICLE 17

The Commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the Commission by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the Commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the Commission.

ARTICLE 18

The costs of the operations of the Commission shall be borne by the members of the Conference in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

(*a*) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the Commission and its subsidiary organs.

(*b*) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the Commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such other local services as may be appropriate. The Commission shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub-paragraph (*c*) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

(*c*) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the Commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a Fund to which all the members of the Conference shall contribute in the following proportions:

The Government of the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.

The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Laos, the Republic of Viet Nam and Thailand shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.

The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the Commission shall contribute 1 per cent each.

ARTICLE 19

The Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this Protocol, present a report with appropriate recomendations on the question of the termination of the Commission to the members of the Conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the Co-Chairmen shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the Commission.

ARTICLE 20

This Protocol shall enter into force on signature.

It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory States and to all other States and to all other States of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July one thousand and nine hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

(In May 1963 Buddhist riots in Hué set off disputes between the Vietnamese Government and the Buddhists. In August, martial law was proclaimed after increasing demonstrations, including immolations. Against this background, President Kennedy made the following statements.)

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S TV INTERVIEWS, SEPTEMBER 2, AND 9, 1963 (Excerpts)[1]

(a) CBS Interview, September 2

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MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties here, quite obviously.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

MR. CRONKITE. Do you think this Government has time to regain the support of the people?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel, I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 30, 1963, pp. 498–500

MR. CRONKITE. Hasn't every indication from Saigon been that President Diem has no intention of changing his pattern?

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years, and, as I say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that; but in the final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

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(b) NBC Interview, September 9

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MR. HUNTLEY. Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that our Government tends ocassionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it difficult to alter or shift that policy?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is true. I think in the case of South Viet-Nam we have been dealing with a Government which is in control, has been in control for 10 years. In addition, we have felt for the last 2 years that the struggle against the Communists was going better. Since June, however—the difficulties with the Buddhists—we have been concerned about a deterioration, particularly in the Saigon area, which hasn't been felt greatly in the outlying areas but may spread. So we are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are using our influence to persuade the Government there to take those steps which will win back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist.

MR. HUNTLEY. Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was lost—a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that.

MR. BRINKLEY. Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called "domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?

The PRESIDENT. No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.

Mr. BRINKLEY. In the last 48 hours there have been a great many conflicting reports from there about what the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was up to. Can you give us any enlightenment on it?

The PRESIDENT. No.

Mr. HUNTLEY. Does the CIA tend to make its own policy? That seems to be the debate here.

The PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent charge, but that isn't so. Mr. [John A.] McCone, head of the CIA, sits in the National Security Council. We have had a number of meetings in the past few days about events in South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated in every one, and the CIA coordinates its efforts with the State Department and the Defense Department.

Mr. BRINKLEY. With so much of our prestige, money, so on, committed in South Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little more influence there, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. We have some influence. We have some influence and we are attempting to carry it out. I think we don't—we can't expect these countries to do everything the way we want to do them. They have their own interest, their own personalities, their own tradition. We can't make everyone in our image, and there are a good many people who don't want to go in our image. In addition, we have ancient struggles between countries. In the case of India and Pakistan, we would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of the best way to defend the subcontinent against communism. But that struggle between India and Pakistan is more important to a good many people in that area than the struggle against the Communists. We would like to have Cambodia, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but there are ancient differences there. We can't make the world over, but we can influence the world. The fact of the matter is that with the assistance of the United States and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], Southeast Asia and indeed all of Asia has been maintained independent against a powerful force, the Chinese Communists. What I am concerned about is that Americans will get impatient and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia or they don't like the Government in Saigon, that we should withdraw. That only makes it easy for the Communists. I think we should stay. We should use our influence in as effective a way as we can, but we should not withdraw.

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(As dissension between the Buddhists and the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem increased, the U.S. reexamined its policy toward South Viet-Nam, as noted in the following three statements.)

U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, OCTOBER 2, 1963[1]

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor reported to the President this morning and to the National Security Council this afternoon. Their report included a number of classified findings and recommendations which will be the subject of further review and action. Their basic presentation was endorsed by all members of the Security Council and the following statement of United States policy was approved by the President on the basis of recommendations received from them and from Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

1. The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to deny this country to communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet-Nam.

2. The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.

3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it.

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet-Nam can be withdrawn.

4. The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet-Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affected the military effort, they could do so in the future.

5. It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society.

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[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 623.

(On November 1, a military coup by virtually the entire Vietnamese leadership against the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem took place and President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were assassinated. A provisional government was set up which was recognized by the United States on November 7. The following day, Secretary of State Rusk met with the press.)

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 8, 1963 (Excerpts)[1]

* * * * * * *

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the situation now in Viet-Nam, since we have recognized it, and what do you see ahead in the future as to the impact on U.S. policy in Southeast Asia?

A. Well, I think the great question which has been in front of us all along has been how to get on with the main job of assuring that South Viet-Nam is secure and able to work out its own future under its own leadership and without any interference from the outside.

Now, we were very much concerned when in 1959 the Viet Cong, with public support from Hanoi, moved to interfere in South Viet-Nam and indeed threatened to take it over, and there has been steady growth in assistance and help by the United States and others to South Viet-Nam in that struggle.

We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Viet-Nam indicated that there was a growing gap between the government and the people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country.

Now it is our hope that the political and the military leadership that has now formed a new government there in Viet-Nam will be able to rally the country, consolidate the effort, get on with the job, so that that country can be independent and free and secure.

As far as the United States is concerned, we do not have and have never had any special United States interest in terms of military bases or anything of that sort. Our primary concern with Viet-Nam is that it be secure and independent, as it is entitled to be, and we are hopeful now that there will be a consolidation of effort and that the central problem there will be dealt with with expedition, and we will do what we can to assist, and we have every reason to believe that the present leadership will do everything they can on their own side.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, your remarks on neutralization in Viet-Nam may be subject to misinterpretation. Just to sum it up here: You reject neutralization as a solution to the problem in Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I don't know—my point is I don't know what Hanoi talks about when they talk about neutralization. South Viet-Nam was not allied with anyone; it was not a military base for anyone. It was subjected to attack from the outside through penetration, infiltration, arms supplies, subversive activities, matters of that sort.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 25, 1963, pp. 810–811, 812, 814–815.

There can be peace in Southeast Asia if others would leave South Viet-Nam and Laos alone and let the peoples of those countries work out their own future.

My point is I don't know what they mean by neutralization, except that I suspect that it means that they are trying to find some formula by which they can bring South Viet-Nam within the Communist world.

* * * * * * *

Q. Mr. Secretary, in South Viet-Nam, do you think that the new regime can prosecute the war more effectively than Diem did? If so, why?

A. I think, actually, the principal problem that developed with respect to the previous regime was the alienation of apparently very large sections of the population. We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf of the total effort.

We are encouraged about the possibilities. But there is a good deal of unfinished business and some real problems ahead. But the reception, the support of the people themselves, will be vital in this type of guerrilla warfare. The attitude of the peoples becomes absolutely crucial. As I think it was Mao Tse-tung said, "If guerrillas are operating within a friendly population, every bush is an ally." Well, in the last period we feel that as far as the villages are concerned and the countryside is concerned, they become more and more the allies of the effort to eradicate the Viet Cong aggression. And we believe this will get an impetus from recent events and they can go ahead now with more confidence.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have twice referred to Hanoi's idea of neutralization in Viet-Nam. What is your understanding of the French point of view and their mention of a truce?

A. I think that was perhaps a comment from a very long-range point of view. It had very little to do with what happens tomorrow or the next day, perhaps commenting on the basis of what was anticipated at the time of the 1954 Geneva Accords. But we see no—we see no development specifically along that line from Paris or any ideas about any particular moves that ought to be taken at this time.

* * * * * * *

(On November 22, 1963 President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. In December President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Defense Secretary McNamara and CIA Director John A. McCone to Saigon to evaluate the new Government's war effort. This New Year's greeting from President Johnson pledged the energetic support of the United States.)

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO GEN. DUONG VAN MINH, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, December 31, 1963 [1]

DEAR GENERAL MINH. As we enter the New Year of 1964, I want to wish you, your Revolutionary Government, and your people full success in the long and arduous war which you are waging so tenaciously and bravely against the Viet Cong forces directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara have told me about the serious situation which confronts you and of the plans which you are developing to enable your armed forces and your people to redress this situation.

This new year provides a fitting opportunity for me to pledge on behalf of the American Government and people a renewed partnership with your government and people in your brave struggle for freedom. The United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Viet-Nam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory.

Our aims are, I know, identical with yours: to enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the north. As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Viet-Nam can be progressively withdrawn.

The United States Government shares the view of your government that "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam persists in its aggressive policy, neutralization of South Viet-Nam would only be another name for a Communist takeover. Peace will return to your country just as soon as the authorities in Hanoi cease and desist from their terrorist aggression.

Thus, your government and mine are in complete agreement on the political aspects of your war against the forces of enslavement, brutality, and material misery. Within this framework of political agreement we can confidently continue and improve our cooperation.

I am pleased to learn from Secretary McNamara about the vigorous operations which you are planning to bring security and an improved standard of living to your people.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 27, 1964, pp. 121–122.

I wish to congratulate you particularly on your work for the unity of all your people, including the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, against the Viet Cong. I know from my own experience in Viet-Nam how warmly the Vietnamese people respond to a direct human approach and how they have hungered for this in their leaders. So again I pledge the energetic support of my country to your government and your people.

We will do our full part to ensure that under your leadership your people may win a victory—a victory for freedom and justice and human welfare in Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNITED STATES TO INCREASE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO VIET-NAM: Statement by the White House, March 17, 1964 [2]

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, following their initial oral report of Friday, today reported fully to President Johnson and the members of the National Security Council. The report covered the situation in South Viet-Nam, the measures being taken by General Khanh and his government, and the need for United States assistance to supplement and support these measures. There was also discussion of the continuing support and direction of the Viet Cong insurgency from North Viet-Nam.

At the close of the meeting the President accepted the report and its principal recommendations, which had the support of the National Security Council and Ambassador Lodge.

Comparing the situation to last October, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor last reported fully on it, there have unquestionably been setbacks. The Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of two changes of government, and of more longstanding difficulties, including a serious weakness and overextension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet program. The supply of arms and cadres from the north has continued; careful and sophisticated control of Viet Cong operations has been apparent; and evidence that such control is centered in Hanoi is clear and unmistakable.

To meet the situation, General Khanh and his government are acting vigorously and effectively. They have produced a sound central plan for for the prosecution of the war, recognizing to a far greater degree than before the crucial role of economic and social, as well as military, action to insure that areas cleared of the Viet Cong survive and prosper in freedom.

To carry out this plan, General Khanh requires the full enlistment of the people of South Viet-Nam, partly to augment the strength of his antiguerrilla forces, but particularly to provide the administrators, health workers, teachers, and others who must follow up in cleared areas. To meet this need, and to provide a more equitable

[2] Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 6, 1964, pp. 522–523.

and common basis of service, General Khanh has informed us that he proposes in the near future to put into effect a National Mobilization Plan that will provide conditions and terms of service in appropriate jobs for all able bodied South Vietnamese between certain ages.

In addition, steps are required to bring up to required levels the pay and status of the paramilitary forces and to create a highly trained guerrilla force that can beat the Viet Cong on its own ground.

Finally, limited but significant additional equipment is proposed for the air forces, the river navy, and the mobile forces.

In short, where the South Vietnamese Government now has the power to clear any part of its territory, General Khanh's new program is designed to clear and to hold, step by step and province by province.

This program will involve substantial increases in cost to the South Vietnamese economy, which in turn depends heavily on United States economic aid. Additional, though less substantial, military assistance funds are also needed, and increased United States training activity both on the civil and military side. The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control

Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their overall conclusion that with continued vigorous leadership from General Khanh and his government, and the carrying out of these steps, the situation can be significantly improved in the coming months.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, AUGUST 5, 1964 [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 261–263.

were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. *America keeps her word.* Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. *The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole.* A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. *Our purpose is peace.* We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. *This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.* Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

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I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

SECURITY COUNCIL HEARS U.S. CHARGE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS: Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, August 5, 1964 [1]

I have asked for this urgent meeting to bring to the attention of the Security Council acts of deliberate aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States.

Naval vessels of my Government, on routine operations in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, have been subjected to deliberate and repeated armed attacks. We therefore have found it necessary to take defensive measures.

The major facts about these incidents were announced last night by the President of the United States and communicated to other governments at the same time I was instructed to request this meeting. I shall recount these facts for you, Mr. President, in chronological order so that all the members may have all the information available to my Government.

At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 2, 1964, the United States destroyer *Maddox* was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a southeasterly direction away from the coast about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Viet-Nam. The *Maddox* was approached by three high-speed North Vietnamese torpedo boats in attack formation. When it was evident that these torpedo boats intended to take offensive action, the *Maddox*, in accordance with naval practice, fired three warning shots across the bows of the approaching vessels. At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier *Ticonderoga*, which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide cover for the *Maddox*, the pilots being under orders not to fire unless they or the *Maddox* were fired upon first.

Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes, which the *Maddox* evaded by changing course. All three attacking vessels directed machinegun fire at the *Maddox*. One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the *Maddox*. After the attack was broken off, the *Maddox* continued on a southerly course in international waters.

Now, Mr. President, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the United States Government on patrol in the high seas—almost 30 miles off the mainland. Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attack in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response.

On August 3 the United States took steps to convey to the Hanoi regime a note calling attention to this aggression, stating that United States ships would continue to operate freely on the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law, and warning the authorities in Hanoi of the "grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces." This notification was in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva accords.

Our hopes that this was an isolated incident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 4, when it was nighttime in the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* were again subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of motor torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese navy. This time the American vessels were 65 miles from shore, twice as far out on the high seas as on the occasion of the previous attack. This time numerous torpedoes were fired. That attack lasted for over 2 hours.

There no longer could be any shadow of doubt that this was a planned, deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters. One could only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives, regardless of the consequences.

My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited and relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression. Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their support facilities. This action was limited in scale, its only targets being the weapons and facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves. Our fervent hope is that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be tolerated anywhere else.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 272–274.

I want to emphasize that the action we have taken is a limited and measured response, fitted precisely to the attack that produced it, and that the deployments of additional U.S. forces to Southeast Asia are designed solely to deter further aggression. This is a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that the United States cannot be diverted by military attack from its obligations to help its friends establish and protect their independence. Our naval units are continuing their routine patrolling on the high seas with orders to protect themselves with all appropriate means against any further aggression. As President Johnson said last night, "We still seek no wider war."

Mr. President, let me repeat that the United States vessels were in international waters when they were attacked.

Let me repeat that freedom of the seas is guaranteed under long-accepted international law applying to all nations alike.

Let me repeat that these vessels took no belligerent actions of any kind until they were subject to armed attack.

And let me say once more that the action they took in self-defense is the right of all nations and is fully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin make no sense whatsoever standing alone. They defy rational explanation except as part of a larger pattern with a larger purpose. As isolated events, the kidnapping of village officials in the Republic of South Viet-Nam makes no sense either. Neither does the burning of a schoolhouse—or the sabotage of an irrigation project—or the murder of a medical worker—or the random bomb thrown into a crowd of innocent people sitting in a cafe.

All these wanton acts of violence and destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in Southeast Asia for the past decade and a half. So does the arming of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam by the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. So does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of that nation. So does the fighting in Laos—and all the acts of subversion—and all the propaganda—and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva agreements—and the deliberate, systematic, and flagrant violations of those agreements by two regimes which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice are bound by their provisions.

The attempt to sink United States destroyers in international waters is much more spectacular than the attempt to murder the mayor of a village in his bed at night. But they are both part of the pattern, and the pattern is designed to subjugate the people of Southeast Asia to an empire ruled by means of force of arms, of rule by terror, of expansion by violence.

Mr. President, it is only in this larger view that we can discuss intelligently the matter that we have brought to this Council.

In his statement last night, President Johnson concluded by emphasizing that the mission of the United States is peace. Under the explicit instructions of President Johnson, I want to repeat that

assurance in the Security Council this afternoon: Our mission is peace.

We hoped that the peace settlement in 1954 would lead to peace in Viet-Nam. We hoped that that settlement, and the supplementary Geneva accords of 1962, would lead to peace in Laos. Communist governments have tried aggression before—and have failed. Each time the lesson has had to be learned anew.

We are dealing here with a regime that has not yet learned the lesson that aggression does not pay, cannot be sustained, and will always be thrown back by people who believe, as we do, that people want freedom and independence, not subjection and the role of satellite in a modern empire.

In Southeast Asia we want nothing more, and nothing less, than the assured and guaranteed independence of the peoples of the area. We are in Southeast Asia to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, alien assassination, managed by the North Viet-Nam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peiping.

Two months ago, when we were discussing in this Council the problems created on the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam frontier by the Communist Viet Cong, I defined our peace aims in Southeast Asia. I repeat them today:

There is a very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of United States military aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of Southeast Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone.

The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone.

The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in Southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforcible terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in Southeast Asia as we have elsewhere.

That is what I said to this Council in May. That is what I repeat to this Council in August.

When the political settlements freely negotiated at the conference tables in Geneva are enforced, the independence of Southeast Asia will be guaranteed. When the peace agreements reached long ago are made effective, peace will return to Southeast Asia and military power can be withdrawn.

SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION [1]

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

[1] Text of Public Law 88-408 [H.J. Res. 1145], 78 Stat. 384, approved Aug. 10, 1964.

COMPARISON OF RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN VARIOUS AREAS

Southeast Asia	Cuba	Formosa	Middle East
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Viet-Nam, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked U.S. naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace;	Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and	Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and	
Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom;	Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and	Whereas the United States has no territorial designs in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores;	
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of Southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area but desires only that they should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it	Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from continental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union;" and	Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and	
	Whereas the International Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it	Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and	
		Whereas the President of the United States on Jan. 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it	
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of	*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the United States is determined—	*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ	*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with

COMPARISON OF RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN VARIOUS AREAS—Continued

Southeast Asia	Cuba	Formosa	Middle East
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.	(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere; (b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and (c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.	thorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.	and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.
This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress, except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.		This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.	

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AUGUST 12, 1964 (Excerpt) [1]

In Viet-Nam, too, we work for world order.

For 10 years, through the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration, and this administration, we have had one consistent aim—observance of the 1954 agreements which guaranteed the independence of South Viet-Nam.

That independence has been the consistent target of aggression and terror. For 10 years our response to these attacks has followed a consistent pattern:

First, that the South Vietnamese have the basic responsibility for the defense of their own freedom.

Second, we would engage our strength and our resources to whatever extent needed to help others repel aggression.

Now, there are those who would have us depart from these tested principles. They have a variety of viewpoints. All of them, I am sure, you have heard in your local community.

Some say that we should withdraw from South Viet-Nam, that we have lost almost 200 lives there in the last 4 years, and we should come home. But the United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to Communist tyranny. This alternative is strategically unwise, we think, and it is morally unthinkable.

Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem of Viet-Nam. America can and America will meet any wider challenge from others, but our aim in Viet-Nam, as in the rest of the world, is to help restore the peace and to reestablish a decent order.

The course that we have chosen will require wisdom and endurance. But let no one doubt for a moment that we have the resources and the will to follow this course as long as it may take. No one should think for a moment that we will be worn down, nor will we be driven out, and we will not be provoked into rashness; but we will continue to meet aggression with firmness and unprovoked attack with measured reply.

That is the meaning of the prompt reaction of our destroyers to unprovoked attack. That is the meaning of the positive reply of our aircraft to a repetition of that attack. That is the meaning of the resolution passed by your Congress with 502 votes in favor and only 2 opposed. That is the meaning of the national unity that we have shown to all the world last week.

There is another consideration. Wherever the forces of freedom are engaged, no one who commands the power of nuclear weapons can escape his responsibility for the life of our people and the life of your children.

It has never been the policy of any American to sympathetically or systematically place in hazard the life of this nation by threatening

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 299–300.

nuclear war. No American President has ever pursued so irresponsible a course. Our firmness at moments of crisis has always been matched by restraint—our determination by care. It was so under President Truman at Berlin, under President Eisenhower in the Formosa Straits, under President Kennedy in the Cuba missile crisis—and I pledge you that it will be so long as I am your President.

In Viet-Nam, in Cyprus, and in every continent, in a hundred different ways, America's efforts are directed toward world order. Only when all nations are willing to accept peaceful procedures as alternative to forceful settlement will the peace of our world be secure.

(The following two statements were made after further governmental changes in Saigon, as a result of which Pham Khac Huu was selected chief of state and Tran Van Huong named Premier of South Vietnam.)

PRESIDENT JOHNSON REAFFIRMS THE BASIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIET-NAM, DECEMBER 1, 1964 [1]

The President today reviewed the situation in South Viet-Nam with Ambassador [Maxwell D.] Taylor, and with the Secretaries of State [Dean Rusk] and Defense [Robert S. McNamara], the Director of Central Intelligence [John A. McCone], and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler].

Ambassador Taylor reported that the political situation in Saigon was still difficult but that the new government under Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong was making a determined effort to strengthen national unity, to maintain law and order, and to press forward with the security program, involving a combination of political, economic, and military actions to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency. The Ambassador also reported that, although the security problems have increased over the past few months in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam, with uneven progress elsewhere, the strength of the armed forces of the government was being increased by improved recuriting and conscription and by the nearly 100-percent increase in the combat strength of the Vietnamese Air Force. Also, the government forces continue to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Cong.

On the economic front, Ambassador Taylor noted that agricultural output was continuing to increase, with U.S. assistance in fertilizers and pesticides playing an important role. He also noted that the

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 21, 1964, pp. 869–870.

prices of goods and the value of the piaster have remained remarkably stable. On the other hand, the Ambassador reported that increased interdiction of the communication routes by the Viet Cong is interfering to some extent with commerce within the country, and the recent typhoons and floods in central Viet-Nam have destroyed a large percentage of the crops and livestock in that region. The Vietnamese Government, with U.S. assistance, has moved promptly to organize a program which is bringing relief and rehabilitation to the stricken areas.

The President instructed Ambassador Taylor to consult urgently with the South Vietnamese Government as to measures that should be taken to improve the situation in all its aspects.

The President reaffirmed the basic U.S. policy of providing all possible and useful assistance to the South Vietnamese people and government in their struggle to defeat the externally supported insurgency and aggression being conducted against them. It was noted that this policy accords with the terms of the congressional joint resolution of August 10, 1964, which remains in full force and effect.

The meeting reviewed the accumulating evidence of continuing and increased North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong and of North Vietnamese forces in, and passing through, the territory of Laos in violation of the Geneva accords of 1962.

COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES AND VIET-NAM REGARDING MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM, DECEMBER 11, 1964 [1]

The Government of Viet-Nam has just completed a series of discussions with the United States mission with regard to measures which should be taken to improve the situation in South Viet-Nam in all its aspects.

The U.S. Government has offered additional military and economic assistance to improve the execution of the Government's programs and to restrain the mounting infiltration of men and equipment by the Hanoi regime in support of the Viet Cong.

The Government of Viet-Nam has accepted this offer of support, which includes provision for increased numbers of military, paramilitary and police forces, the strengthening of the air defense of South Viet-Nam, and further economic assistance for a variety of forms of industrial, urban and rural development.

For its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is reviewing ways of increasing the scope and effectiveness of its programs related to the development of security and local government in the rural areas.

Together the Government of Viet-Nam and the U.S. mission are making joint plans to achieve greater effectiveness against the infiltration threat.

In the course of the discussions, the U.S. representatives expressed full support for the duly constituted government of Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 28, 1964, pp. 904–905.

JOINT U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE RETALIATORY ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM: White House Statement, February 7, 1965 [1]

On February 7, U.S. and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to launch retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the southern area of North Viet-Nam which intelligence has shown to be actively used by Hanoi for training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet-Nam.

Results of the attack and further operational details will be announced as soon as they are reported from the field.

Today's action by the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments was in response to provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime.

Commencing at 2 a.m. on Feruary 7th, Saigon time (1 p.m. yesterday, eastern standard time, two South Vietnamese airfields, two U.S. barracks areas, several villages, and one town in South Viet-Nam were subjected to deliberate surprise attacks. Substantial casualties resulted.

Our intelligence has indicated, and this action confirms, that Hanoi has ordered a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations.

Moreover, these attacks were only made possible by the continuing infiltration of personnel and equipment from North Viet-Nam. This infiltration markedly increased during 1964 and continues to increase.

To meet these attacks the Government of South Viet-Nam and the U.S. Government agreed to appropriate reprisal action against North Vietnamese targets. The President's approval of this action was given after the action was discussed with and recommended by the National Security Council last night [February 6].

Today's joint response was carefully limited to military areas which are supplying men and arms for attacks in South Viet-Nam. As in the case of the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin last August, the response is appropriate and fitting.

As the U.S. Government has frequently stated, we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin* Feb. 22, 1965, pp. 238–239.

SERIOUS VIETCONG ATTACKS: Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, February 7, 1965 [1]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. In describing certain of the events which have taken place in South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam during the past 24 hours, I'll refer to this map which stands in front of us. On it we have shown the relative positions of China, Laos, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, and the South China Sea.

Approximately 24 hours ago, at 2 a.m. Sunday morning, February 7, Saigon time, the Viet-Nam Communist guerrillas carried out three attacks, one against installations in the Pleiku area, which is in the central part of South Viet-Nam, a second at Tuy Hoa, with an airstrip adjacent to it, an area near the coast, and a third aginst Viet-Nam villages near Nha Trang.

The first attack in the Pleiku area was carried out by a company of Viet Cong using 81-mm. mortars, the mortar fire was directed against the United States military compound at the Second Corps Headquarters of the South Vietnamese military forces, and simultaneously elements of the same company attacked the airstrip at Camp Holloway, at which were located United States helicopter forces on the outskirts of Pleiku.

This latter attack on the airstrip was accompanied by a ground probe during which small-arms fire was used, rifle grenades, demolition charges, and recoilless rifles. Following completion of the attacks a Viet Cong four-tube, 81-mm. mortar position was located outside the perimeter defense of the airstrip. Nearby were containers for 61 mortar rounds. The United States casualties in the Pleiku area were 7 killed, 109 wounded, and, of the 109, 76 of the wounded required evacuation.

In addition 5 United States helicopters were destroyed, 9 to 11 damaged, and 6 United States fixed-wing aircraft were damaged.

The second attack at Tuy Hoa was directed against Vietnamese villages in the area and against the storage tanks for aviation gas for the Vietnamase Air Force stationed at the Chop Chi Airfield. Again, 81-mm. fire was used, the storage tanks of aviation gas were set on fire. There were no United States casualties in that area.

The third attack, as I mentioned earlier, was against a village or series of villages about 15 miles northeast of Nha Trang. The reports of operations in this area are fragmentary, and I can't give you the results other than to say that we believe that there were no United States casualties there. Immediately following, the United States representatives in Saigon met with representatives of the South Vietnamese Government. They jointly agreed that joint retaliatory action was required. The President's approval of this action was given after the action was discussed with and recommended by the National Security Council at a meeting held between 7:45 p.m. and 9 p.m. last night.

As a result of this action, elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Feb. 22, 1965, p. 239.

On this map you see Hanoi, the capital of North Viet-Nam, Saigon, the capital of South Viet-Nam, the line of demarcation between the two countries at the 17th parallel. The targets agreed upon for the joint retaliatory attacks were barracks areas and staging areas in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam. As I say, elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks against those targets. These are the areas which Hanoi has used as bases for the infiltration of men and equipment out of the southern portion of North Viet-Nam across the border into Laos, down the corridor through Laos, and into South Viet-Nam. The infiltration routes are picturized on the map. One comes into the Pleiku area in the central part of Viet-Nam, and others come further south.

U.S. aircraft took off from three U.S. carriers that were steaming in the South China Sea. These carriers were steaming south of the 17th parallel, which is the line of demarcation between North and South Viet-nam, about 100 miles off the coast of South Viet-nam. The three carriers were the U.S.S. *Ranger*, U.S.S. *Hancock*, and U.S.S. *Coral Sea*.

Of the aircraft which took off from the carriers, 49 struck the Dong Hoi barracks and staging area in the southern part of North Viet-Nam. Certain other U.S. aircraft and certain South Vietnamese aircraft aborted because of adverse weather conditions and did not proceed to their target areas. Photo reconnaissance of the results of the strike is not yet available, but the combat crews upon their return to the carriers reported seeing heavy fires, heavy smoke, and substantial damage to military targets in the target area. One U.S. aircraft, an A–4 from the carrier *Coral Sea*, was lost. The pilot was seen to eject into the sea. Air-sea rescue operations are underway. All other aircraft returned safely to their bases.

SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 25, 1965 [3]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I should like to take a few moments of your time to try to draw together in the simplest and most fundamental way our attitude toward the situation in Southeast Asia.

[3] Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 15, 1965, pp. 362–371.

Some of the things which I shall say will repeat what has been said before, but memories here and abroad seem to be sometimes short. And it is important to repeat and draw together those matters which are at the center of the problem, because there is a great deal else which is peripheral and transitory.

1. The nations of Southeast Asia have a right to live in peace, free from aggression directed against them from outside their borders. Now, this is not an empty theory; it is a point of vital importance to the safety and, indeed, the very existence of more than a hundred smaller nations all over the world.

2. North Viet-Nam, in callous disregard of the agreements of 1954 and 1962, and of international law, has directed and supplied the essential military personnel and arms for a systematic campaign of terror and guerrilla action aimed at the overthrow of the Government of South Viet-Nam and at the imposition by force of a Communist regime. The evidence of North Viet-Nam's direct responsibility for this aggression has been repeatedly presented by the Government of Viet-Nam, the United States Government, and the International Control Commission. A full and up-to-date summary of the evidence establishing this responsibility will be available to you within a very few days. It is now being processed for publication.

3. The attitude of the United States toward threats to the peace in Southeast Asia has been made clear many times and in the most serious and formal ways:

(a) by the ratification of the Manila Pact in February 1955, which includes South Viet-Nam as a protocol state; (This treaty was approved by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1.)

(b) by a decision of President Eisenhower in 1954 to extend aid to South Vietnam, who said in a letter to the President of South Viet-Nam:

> The implications of the agreement concerning Viet-Nam have caused grave concern regarding the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive collaborators within.

and he went on to say that

> The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.

and then again (c) by the joint resolution of the Congress of the United States, passed in August 1964 by a combined vote of 502 to 2, which stated, among other things:

> That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

and that

> The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

and that

> * * * the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

(d) and then you should remind yourselves of the statement made by President Johnson on the occasion of signing that joint resolution:

To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.

To any in Southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

In that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of Southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way.

4. Now, it has been stated over and over again that the key to peace in Southeast Asia is the readiness of all those in that area to live at peace and to leave their neighbors alone. Now, there is no mystery about that formulation; those who are not leaving their neighbors alone know exactly what it means. It is an obligation under the 1954 agreements, under the 1962 accords on Laos, and under general international law. The illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms cannot be described as "leaving your neighbor alone."

5. There have been negotiated settlements in Southeast Asia, the most recent one as late as 1962. Those several agreements were intended to establish peace in that area; compliance with them by all concerned can achieve that result.

6. Now, since the Geneva conference of 1962, the United States has been in active and continuous consultation with other governments about the danger created by aggression in Southeast Asia. It has been discussed in the United Nations, in the SEATO and NATO Councils, and on innumerable occasions directly with other governments through diplomatic channels. We have had direct discussions with almost every signatory of the agreements of 1954 and 1962. What is still missing is any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing and what it knows it is doing against its neighbors. The absence of this crucial element affects the current discussion of "negotiation." Political channels have been and are open, and a considerable number of governments are actively interested in keeping them open to explore the possibilities of a peaceful solution. But a negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggression is not possible. And a negotiation which simply ends in bitterness and hostility merely adds to the danger.

7. Let me remind you that on February 17 the President said, and I am quoting:

As I have said so many, many times, and other Presidents ahead of me have said, our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country.

We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the continuing aggression of others.

These actions [he added] will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task.

Let me conclude by reaffirming, still once more, that the central object of American policy and action in peace in Southeast Asia and the safety of the independent states in that region. Many of the peoples of that area have been subjected to 25 years of turmoil and violence; they are entitled to peace. We ourselves much prefer to use our resources as a part of an international effort to assist the economic and social development of the peoples of that area than to have them diverted into the harsh necessities of resisting aggression.

I am ready for your questions, gentlemen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the association of the United States Government with the activities of these nations you referred to which are trying to keep open the channels of diplomacy?

A. Well, we are ourselves in regular contact with many governments in all parts of the world, through diplomatic means. We have not seen any basis on which we can ask anyone else to speak for us, and we do not know of anyone else who is purporting to speak for us.

But let me come back again with great emphasis—because I do think that it is central to this question of negotiation. And that is that the missing piece—the missing piece is any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors.

Now, in many of these postwar negotiations in the last 20 years, as you know, the negotiations have been frequently and most often preceded by some indication that those negotiations might have some chance of success. Now, that is the missing piece here—that is the missing piece.

The object is the safety and security of these smaller countries of Southeast Asia. In that issue all of the smaller countries of the world have a vital stake. It is at the heart of the very structure of international life, of the international state system. And it is the missing element, the unreadiness of Hanoi to stop doing what it is doing—that is the problem in this thing called negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you give that message to Hanoi by way of the Chinese Communists in the Warsaw meeting the other day?

A. We had a talk—I think it was yesterday. That talk revealed nothing new in the known positions of the two sides. That talk did not supply the missing piece that I am talking about. There was no indication in that talk that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what they are doing.

Q. Well, did you use that channel to get this word directly to them?

A. Our policy, along the lines that I have summarized here, was made clear there; it is made clear repetitively with governments all over the world, time and time again, and this was done yesterday.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is speculation here that the United States is now in the process of expanding its military role in Viet-Nam in hopes that this might convince the Hanoi government to provide this missing link.

A. I wouldn't speculate on that from that point of view. I would urge you to look at what I have said in my opening statement. Look at all of it—look at all of it taken together. That is the policy—that is the policy. How you feel you must act at a particular time and under particular circumstances under that policy and within that policy—for example, within the joint resolution of the Congress—depends upon circumstances from time to time. But the policy is to act to support the independence and safety of these countries of Southeast Asia. That is the policy.

And I would urge you to give serious consideration to all of the elements that I have indicated in my opening statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Secretary-General U Thant, in New York yesterday, in urging the beginning of some kind of informal discussions to

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restore peace in Viet-Nam, said, "I am sure that the great American people, if they only know the true facts and the background to the developments in South Viet-Nam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary." Now, are you hiding any true facts from the American people?

A. Well, I don't want to comment on that particular statement in any personal sense. I believe that there has been some clarification of that statement since then. But, as I have said to you gentlemen before, I don't know of any situation anywhere in the world on which the American people have been better informed, in more detail, on a current basis, both by officials and by the intensive effort of a vigorous and free press, that is the case with respect to South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps, sir, then you could clarify this point. There has been a noticeable, considerable difference of emphasis in the statements of the general objectives of United States policy in these terms. There have been times when the United States policy has been said to be to defend the freedom of the people of Viet-Nam. There have been other times when the policy of the United States has been said to be to resist the expansion of Chinese Communist aggression. Could you clarify that?

A. I think those two mean exactly the same thing. The expansion of Communist aggression involves the attempt to take over South Viet-Nam. I think that is looking at the same coin from both its sides.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-General said he had made a proposal to the United States. The White House said no such proposal has been presented to the President. Do you know of any such proposal?

A. Well, we have talked over the past 2 years informally and on a number of occasions with the Secretary-General, who carries a very heavy responsibility in his role at the United Nations, as well as with many governments in various parts of the world. Now, during that 2-year period, various suggestions have been discussed—sometimes by us, sometimes by others. But the proposals that I know about thus far have been procedural in nature. The missing piece continues to be the absence of any indication that Hanoi is prepared to stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors.

Now, these suggestions and procedural questions have been discussed, many of them publicly. This question of calling a conference, under what circumstances—these are procedural matters. What we are interested in, what is needed to restore peace to Southeast Asia, is substance, content, an indication that peace is possible in terms of the appetites and the attitudes of the other side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you evaluate the situation, the political situation in South Viet-Nam, in the light of the recent changes of government and whether or not you feel that an effective government is now possible there, and is that one of the missing pieces?

A. Well, we have been very deeply concerned, as you know, for some time about the question of the essential unity and solidarity of the Government in Saigon. Confusion on that matter—or the absence of unity—ramifies in a variety of directions and, of course, makes it that much more difficult for them and for us to act effectively to insure the independence and the safety of South Viet-Nam. And undoubtedly disunity and confusion in Saigon increases the expectation of the other side that, if they persist, they have a chance of success.

So we attach the highest possible priority to unity and solidarity among the South Vietnamese leaders and its Government.

I can express my belief, as well as my hope, that at least some of these problems of disunity have been resolved.

The recent so-called coup that involved—what—something like three battalions again, similar to the one of last September, did not interfere with the operation of the civilian government, or did not create a situation of bloodshed within the country.

But we are moving with hope and expectation and in the closest working relationship with the present Government in that country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your statement seems to suggest that only Hanoi's aggression gives any body and major danger to what some have also described as the coincident civil war in South Viet-Nam. Did you mean to suggest, sir, that if you obtain evidence that Hanoi stops doing what it is doing, the United States aid and assistance to the South Vietnamese Government would no longer be necessary to handle the local problem?

A. Well, let's be a little careful about this word "indigenous element." There are those who use that term, particularly in the Communist world, because the North Vietnamese are Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese are Vietnamese and they would like to have everyone believe that that is what is meant by letting the Vietnamese settle their own problems. But an attack by North Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam by military personnel and arms is aggression contrary to established agreements. Without the control of these operations from the North, without the manpower, the trained manpower sent from the North into the South, without the supply of arms and other key items of equipment from North to South, the indigenous aspect of this problem, the genuinely indigenous aspect of this problem, would be quite a different matter. It was this external aspect of the matter which explains the presence of the American military personnel in that area, the rapid increase in American personnel since 1961. It was the escalation of that infiltration. So I think we need to separate very carefully that part which is local, that part which is external; and the external part of it is the crucial aspect in terms of the pacification of the country and in terms of the establishment of peace in Southeast Asia.

Q. You mean then, also, sir, the withdrawal of such manpower as may have infiltrated as being part of stopping, doing——

A. Well, that is what they are doing; that is what they must stop.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect more active and perhaps collective support from other parties than Asians to the American effort in South Viet-Nam, and could you describe whether they have given any formal pledges?

A. Well, we have been discussing with other governments, as you know, for some time now, increased assistance to South Viet-Nam, political, through personnel, economic, in other ways. We have been encouraged in some cases to see that that increased assistance is forthcoming. We know that there are other governments that are considering now whether they might not be able to do more than they have been doing, not just those in Asia. We would welcome additional

support, and we think it is very important, both as an encouragement and practical support for South Viet-Nam and also as an indication to the other side of the international objection as to what the other side is trying to do here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to interpret your statement correctly, could you tell us whether or not you mean to suggest that it would be a precondition of any negotiation or conference that there must be an actual cessation of this penetration, or merely an indication of that?

A. No. I think that it is well for us and for everyone to concentrate on the meat of the matter. The meat of the matter is that Hanoi is sending these people and these arms into South Viet-Nam contrary to every agreement and contrary to international law. Now, if that problem is grappled with, then we can get into details. We can consider whether the meat involves a little salt and pepper and a dash of garlic, but here is the meat of the matter, and I think we ought to keep our eyes on that. That is the central, all-important element in this situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what kind of legal basis did the United States have to bomb the targets of North Viet-Nam?

A. Self-defense of South Viet-Nam and the commitments of the United States with respect to the security and the self-defense of South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if we could turn from Viet-Nam briefly, I wonder if we could go to the Middle East. I wonder, sir, what was the reason for our approval of the shipments of tanks to Israel? And, secondly, now that the German shipments have ceased, what plans does the United States have to see that Israel gets the remaining part of the arms shipment?

A. On the first part of your question, we have been interested in some sort of reasonable balance in the armed forces in that area. As you know, Western Europe has been the primary supplier of arms to Israel. We ourselves have tried not to be active in the Near East in the arms field, although we have taken some steps in that regard because for some years we have been trying to find some way in which to put some ceilings on this neighborhood arms race in the Near East. We have been working with the governments concerned to find out whether it is possible that this arms race might somehow be turned downward.

The second part of your question I am not able to get into—about the future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in response to an earlier question you equated Chinese Communist expansionism with the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam, but I don't believe you mentioned Peiping or Communist China in your opening statement. I wonder whether you could tell us what you believe the role of Red China and its guilt in this particular operation is?

A. Well, I think in my earlier statement I intended to comment on——

Q. You emphasized Hanoi.

A. I intended to comment in answer to an earlier question on Communist aggression and not specifically, necessarily Peiping or the Chinese Communist aggression at the same time. However, I think the role of Peiping here is pretty clear. They have gone to considerable lengths to make it public themselves. They have announced the doctrine of a militant world revolution, which they not only have adhered to in theory but have backed up in practice on more than one occasion. They have supported that doctrine with a harshness which has created very serious problems even within the Communist world, quite apart from problems with the free world.

Now we know that they have been giving encouragement, that they have been sending arms to North Viet-Nam, that many of these arms that we capture in South Viet-Nam are of Chinese origin, Chinese manufacture, and they have thrown their military and undoubtedly their economic weight behind what Hanoi is doing, and I would suspect that they have a very strong influence indeed in Hanoi's attitude in this present situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Hanoi and Peiping—what about the shipment of Russian supplies to North Viet-Nam?

A. We haven't precise information on that, but I think in the case of the Soviet Union, judging from their public as well as private statements over the last 2 years or so, I think they have all along taken about the same view of South Viet-Nam as have other members of the Communist world. They have had a somewhat different view on Laos where they had a very specific and clear commitment on Laos, but I think they have been less active in this present situation than these other two capitals by a very considerable——

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we return, sir, to what you restated several times as a critical point? Could you clarify for us in a diplomatic sense what it is that the United States would regard as evidence that Hanoi is stopping doing what it is doing? How could this be converted into a diplomatic, negotiable situation?

A. I don't think that it requires me at this time to try to spell that out in detail. We would find out very shortly on the ground, as well as through any diplomatic channel, whether there has been any change in the position in that respect. But I don't think it is appropriate for me to talk about complex sets of preconditions on their side or on our side or problems of that sort, because we still have this missing piece, which is the dominant element in the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for a number of years—excuse me, Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. I want to turn to an internal problem in the State Department. Mr. John Reilly, who took part in some unauthorized wiretaps in the Otepka case here several years ago, gave some untruthful testimony under oath before a committee of Congress on this, and now he has been hired by the FCC. I wonder if you could tell us if it is true that the State Department made no unfavorable comment in his personnel file on either the unauthorized wiretaps or the untruthful testimony under oath on a material matter?

A. I don't know what comments were made in his personnel file. I simply am uninformed on that point.

Q. Well, do you condone the unauthorized wiretaps, or have you looked into this at all?

A. As you know, sir, I have looked into this in great detail, but I am not going to get into this with you today.

Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, just a moment——

Q. I don't want to deal with the Otepka case.

A. Yes?

Q. Mr. Secretary, were we satisfied that all supplies and infiltration from the North had been stopped, would the United States be content to solve the indigenous aspects, the civil war aspects, by free elections under international supervision in South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, let's get to the first step first, and then if we get to that step, then we will have the luxury of indulging in the consideration of the second step.

Q. What are our policies with regard to the indigenous aspects of a civil war? Could you enlighten us on this?

A. Well, I think that the indigenous aspects of it could be brought to a conclusion very quickly and that the South Vietnamese people could turn back to the problem of building their country and improving their constitutional system, elevating the economic standards of the country and get on with the modernization of the country which has been their purpose from the beginning.

Q. But only by military force, Mr. Secretary?

A. I am not commenting on that. I think the pacification of the country would be easy if the external aggression were stopped.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for years now we have been talking about the war in South Viet-Nam as a guerrilla war. And yet today twice you spoke about the armed attack and aggression from one nation upon another. I wonder, sir, if this is, in substance, changing the context of our understanding of the war in Viet-Nam?

A. No. I think all along we have put the finger on this question of the infiltration of the personnel and of the arms from outside as the key to the problem, and if those are aggressive acts, that is aggression from the North, and that is the thing which is at the heart of the problem, I wouldn't characterize it as a different thing.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Sure.

Q. I did want to clear up two things here. You said you had looked into this matter, and I wondered, did you know there were unauthorized wiretaps and did you know there was untruthful testimony under oath? Those seem to be the pertinent points.

A. Well, I am aware of the circumstances involving both those points, but I won't make a characterization of either one of them at this point.

Q. Do you think it's all right? Did you approve it?

A. No, I am not making any comment about what I did or did not approve of about either one of those points.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in past press conferences I believe you have reiterated the theme that the war—and so has Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara—that the war has to be won in the South. Why now is all this talk about Hanoi and infiltration from the North? This is a relatively new theme, at least as far as the emphasis is concerned. Are you still of the mind that the war has to be won on the ground in the South?

A. Well, that part of it, of course, is extremely important and is crucial to the entire effort. But again let me go back to my opening statement, taken altogether. Because the aggression, these aggressive acts from the North have been—as we have made clear recently—have been increased both with respect to manpower and with respect to arms. The problem has increased in size and scale. And the necessary steps, therefore, change.

* * * * * * *

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. When we were involved in the Korean war, Chiang Kai-shek's offer of troops to participate was rejected. Now, as I understand it, South Koreans are being introduced into Viet-Nam. Can you tell us wherein the situations differ?

A. Well, the South Korean personnel that are going into South Viet-Nam are not going there for combat purposes. They will be primarily engaged, I understand, on engineering tasks here and there. They will have with them certain local guards in connection with those particular tasks. They were requested by the South Vietnamese Government. They have a limited mission. I think that explains that particular point.

The other question 15 years ago had many more complications in it.

Q. Are the South Koreans able to defend themselves if attacked?

A. The South Koreans and the United States are able to defend South Korea if attacked, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, without commenting on specific future operations, you did imply in one of your earlier answers that the concept of self-defense and United States security commitments would, in your view, give us the right to continue attacks.

A. I think the question was the legal basis for the action that had been taken in that regard.

Q. Well, that implied the broad concept of self-defense would permit——

A. That's correct.

Q. ——would permit further attacks without necessarily——

A. I was commenting on the legal basis, yes.

Q. Under that concept, Mr. Secretary, has the United States, by allowing American combat flights in South Viet-Nam, modified its previous position on the role of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, again, the policy remains the same. Look at the congressional resolution passed by a margin of 502 to 2. Now, the use of a particular weapon may change from time to time, or a type of aircraft, but the policy is the same. When the circumstances or changed circumstances require changed actions, those actions will be taken. But that does not mean an underlying change of policy. I have tried to put together in my opening statement the elementary and basic policy within which we are operating.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the negotiations, is it a fair summary of what you have been saying today that the United States is not prepared for any kind of negotiation on the war in South Viet-Nam with the governments of Hanoi and Peiping unless and until what you call this missing piece is provided?

A. Well, I would think that that would be the essential point in discovering whether what is broadly called the political process—whether it's diplomatic contacts or whatever—can help bring this question to a peaceful solution. I think that is crucial to it. There is no political gimmick by which you can bar the other side from

continuing aggression if they are determined to do so. That has to be met on the ground, factually, directly. There is no political wizardy which will change that until that will is changed, until the decision is changed on the other side.

Q. A related question, Mr. Secretary——

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your thinking on the present reception being accorded to Mr. Ulbricht of East Germany by Egypt?

A. Well, we consider the Federal Republic of Germany the spokesman for the German people on international affairs. We have not looked with favor upon any treatment of East Germany or its officials that would seem to undergird or underpin the division of the German people or enhance the position of the regime in East Germany.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Laos is also a part of this aggression from North Viet-Nam. The policy statements that you have been making today apply equally to Laos, do they, or just for Viet-Nam?

A. Yes. For brevity's sake I did not include Laos in detail, but the the same situation obtains there. In the case of Laos, we have an agreement as recent as 1962. I don't know of any single day since the signing of those agreements in which North Viet-Nam has been in compliance with them. Now, compliance with those agreements would make a big contribution to the peace of Southeast Asia. That is what they were for. Their entire purpose was to decide that everyone would leave the Laotians alone and let them run their own affairs. That is what it was all about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems that the congressional opinion that has been expressed over the last couple of weeks has not focused so much on goals of policy, which you have outlined, but the ability of the United States to realize them in Southeast Asia. Can you say why you think the new level of action which the U.S. has moved up to in Southeast Asia will realize these goals any more than the policy of simply fighting the war out in the South that we were following before?

A. Well, I think I would go back to the President's statement on February 17th and to the underlying policy of the congressional resolution itself. What is required is required. The commitment there is very clear with respect to this aggression and our commitment to the security of these countries of Southeast Asia.

No, I don't think one could look into the future and get a specific answer to your question as to how they will eventually develop. The other side is very much involved in writing that scenario. I think the policy and the determination and the attitude are clear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the British and the Russian Governments, as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, decided to convene it, in the absence of the missing piece, would the United States be prepared to attend this conference?

A. Well, I think they would be in consultation with the members of the conference before they convened it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is implied on the subject of negotiations that what you're saying is that the minimum on our side would be a status quo ante. That is, at the beginning of the guerrilla war, that South Viet-Nam would remain with its territorial integrity and independence.

A. Well, the heart of the problem is an assault upon the safety and the territorial integrity and independence of South Viet-Nam. If that is relieved and removed, then things can begin to move. That is the heart of the problem. That is why we have forces out there. They could come home tomorrow if that problem had not been created by aggression. They never would have been there in the first place. That is the central heart, the essence of the situation, and that is the problem that has to be dealt with.

Q. Thank you, sir.

LEGAL BASIS FOR UNITED STATES ACTIONS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM: Department of State Memorandum, March 8, 1965

I—The Issue

This memorandum considers the question whether United States-South Vietnamese actions against military targets in North Viet-nam are justified in international law, particularly in light of the United Nations Charter and the 1954 Geneva Accords on Viet-Nam. It concludes that these actions are fully justified.

II—The Facts

On February 27, the Department of State issued "Aggression From the North," a report of North Viet-Nam's campaign to conquer South Viet-Nam. That Report establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were trained in the North and ordered into the South by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the South is directed by the Military High Command in Hanoi. It shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet-Cong have been sent into South Viet-Nam from the North. The evidence plainly indicates that under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine, both political and military, for carrying on the war against South Viet-Nam.

The history of Hanoi's campaign to conquer South Viet-Nam is a long one. It was documented earlier in a report entitled "A Threat to the Peace" issued by the Department of State in December 1961. In a special report of June 1962, the International Control Commission in Viet-Nam concluded that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam was sending arms and men into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal government there, in violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

To meet the threat created by these violations of the Geneva Accords, and by North Viet-Nam's aggressive intervention contrary to general international law, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested United States assistance. We had been providing Viet-Nam since 1950–51 with both economic and military aid. This assistance was continued after the conclusion of the 1954 Geneva Accords, within the limitations prescribed by those agreements. It had become apparent, however, by 1961 that this limited assistance was not sufficient to meet the growing Communist threat. Consequently, in 1961, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested additional aid from the United States. The United States responded with increased supplies and with larger numbers of training and advisory personnel to assist the Vietnamese forces in prosecuting the war against the Viet Cong. This response was proportioned with the design of sustaining Viet-Nam in its defense against aggression without extending the conflict beyond the borders of the country.

The Communists, however, increased their intervention without regard to obligations under international law and international agreements by which they were bound. They stepped up the assistance from the North and increased the use of neighboring Laos as an infiltration route, in violation of the freshly concluded 1962 Geneva Agreement for the Settlement of the Laotian Question.

In more recent months North Viet-Nam has sharply increased the infiltration of men and equipment into the South, and virtually all personnel now coming in are natives of North Viet-Nam. Dramatically illustrative of Hanoi's role is the discovery along the South Vietnamese coast on February 16, 1965 of a huge cargo of arms, ammunition and other supplies, delivered by ship from North Viet-Nam. Major attacks by organized units are being launched against government forces. The North Vietnamese have even attacked United States vessels in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Thus, what began as covert and indirect aggression has become open armed aggression. This aggression has been carried out across the internationally agreed demarcation line of 1954 between North and South Viet-Nam, and across international frontiers between Viet-Nam and Laos.

III. International Law—the UN Charter

As has been seen, North Viet-Nam is engaged in a continuing armed aggression against South Viet-Nam in violation of international agreements and international law.

This being the case, what are the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States entitled to do under international law by way of response?

Under international law, the victim of armed aggression is obviously permitted to defend itself and to organize a collective self-defense effort in which others who are willing may join. This right is recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 states that—

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by the members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

As has been shown above, the whole course of conduct of North Viet-Nam, particularly as it has evolved in recent months, adds up to open armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. Indeed it is more than a single armed attack; it is a continuing program of armed aggression carried on across international frontiers and established demarcation lines. In these circumstances, South Viet-Nam has requested and received assistance from the United States and other nations in a collective defense effort.

Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter is also relevant to the Viet-Nam situation. Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that—

> All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In the first place, it is plain that the use of force against territorial integrity and political independence has been initiated by North Viet-Nam and not by anyone else. Secondly, paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter does not place an absolute prohibition on the use of force. It permits the use of force in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Moreover, the Charter itself specifically provides for the use of force in certain circumstances—action through the United Nations itself, action through regional arrangements, and action in self-defense. The actions of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam, being defensive in character and designed to resist armed aggression, are wholly consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and specifically with Article 2, paragraph 4.

It was as a measure of self-defense under Article 51 that the United States responded in August 1964 to the North Vietnamese attack on our vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. Those measures were immediately reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. The Security Council did not see fit to take any action to maintain or restore international peace and security in the area. Indeed, North Viet-Nam refused to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council and explicitly denied the right of the Council to examine this question.

The attacks against South Viet-Nam have mounted in intensity since August. In these circumstances, it has been mutually agreed between the Government of South Viet-Nam and the United States Government that further means of providing for the collective defense of South Viet-Nam are required. Prompt defensive action has been decided upon, and airstrikes have been made against military installations and facilities in North Viet-Nam which support the aggression against the South. The actions taken constitute a limited and measured response, fitted to the situation that called for it. Again, these measures have been reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As yet, the Council has taken no action to maintain an effective peace in the area. Until

the regime in Hanoi decides to cease its aggressive intervention in South Viet-Nam, or until effective steps are taken to maintain international peace and security in the area, the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam have every right to continue their individual and collective self-defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

IV—The Geneva Accords

It has been demonstrated that the North Vietnamese have repeatedly violated the 1954 Geneva Accords in a most serious and flagrant manner. In so doing, of course, North Viet-Nam is ignoring an international Agreement which it signed and by which is is bound. In addition, by the continued presence in neighboring Laos of North Vietnamese forces and their use of Laotian territory for infiltration into South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam is violating solemn commitments which it undertook in the 1962 Geneva Agreements to refrain from such activities.

In these circumstances, international law recognizes the principle that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles other parties at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the other party is prepared to observe its obligations.

The actions of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States are fully consistent with this principle. North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Agreements have created an immediate danger to the continued independence and integrity of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The response of South Viet-Nam and the United States is designed to meet this threat created by North Viet-Nam's disregard of the Accords. The extensive North Vietnamese violations certainly justify South Viet-Nam at least to withhold compliance with those provisions of the Accords which limit its ability to protect its very existence. Both South Viet-Nam and the United States have made clear that the actions which they have taken will no longer be necessary if North Viet-Nam would comply with the Accords.

PATTERN FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Address by President Johnson, Johns Hopkins University, April 17, 1965 [1]

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.

Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's steaming soil.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1965, pp. 606–610.

Why must we take this painful road? Why must this nation hazard its ease, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.

This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason and the waste of war, the works of peace. We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, some of the people of South Viet-Nam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from North to South.

This support is the heartbeat of the war.

And it is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination and kidnaping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large-scale raids are conducted on towns, and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Viet-Nam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

We hope that peace will come swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves. And we must be prepared for a long continued conflict. It will require patience as well as bravery—the will to endure as well as the will to resist.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes: armed hostility is futile—our resources are equal to any challenge—because we fight for values and we fight for principle, rather than territory or colonies, our patience and our determination are unending.

Once this is clear, then it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement. Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again 50 times and more to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready with this purpose for unconditional discussions.

And until that bright and necessary day of peace we will try to keep conflict from spreading. We have no desire to see thousands die in battle—Asians or Americans. We have no desire to devastate that which the people of North Viet-Nam have built with toil and sacrifice. We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.

But we will use it.

This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony. For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire—food for their hunger, health for their bodies, a chance to learn, progress for their country, and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle.

These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people. Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often wracked by diseases, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of 40.

Stability and peace do not come easily in such a land. Neither independence nor human dignity will ever be won, though, by arms alone. It also requires the works of peace. The American people have helped generously in times past in these works, and now there must be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world.

The first step is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development. We would hope that North Viet-Nam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible.

The United Nations is already actively engaged in development in this area, and as far back in 1961 I conferred with our authorities in Viet-Nam in connection with their work there. And I would hope tonight that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use the prestige of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.

For our part I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will joint in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress.

The task is nothing less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.

The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA. The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where thousands die every year from lack of care. Schools can be established to train people in the skills needed to manage the process of development. And these objectives, and more, are within the reach of a cooperative and determined effort.

I also intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of wheat and corn and rice and cotton.

So I will very shortly name a special team of outstanding patriotic, and distinguished Americans to inaugurate our participation in these programs. This team will be headed by Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former President of the World Bank.

This will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, and elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be turbulence and struggle and even violence. Great social change—as we see in our own country—does not alway come without conflict.

We must also expect that nations will on occasion be in dispute with us. It may be because we are rich, or powerful, or because we have made some mistakes, or because they honestly fear our intentions. However, no nation need ever fear that we desire their land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their institutions.

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we have the power, and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

The ordinary men and women of North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam, of China and India, of Russia and America, are brave people. They are filled with the same proportions of hate and fear, of love and hope. Most of them want the same things for themselves and their families. Most of them do not want their sons to ever die in battle, or to see their homes, or the homes of others, destroyed.

Well, this can be their world yet. Man now has the knowledge—always before denied—to make this planet serve the real needs of the people who live on it.

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.

A dam built across a great river is impressive.

In the countryside where I was born, and where I live, I have seen the night illuminated, and the kitchen warmed, and the home heated, where once the cheerless night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And all this happened because electricity came to our area along the humming wires of the REA. Electrification of the countryside—yes, that, too, is impressive.

A rich harvest in a hungry land is impressive.

The sight of healthy children in a classroom is impressive.

These—not mighty arms—are the achievements which the American nation believes to be impressive. And if we are steadfast, the time may come when all other nations will also find it so.

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Ask yourselves that question in your homes—and in this hall tonight. Have we, each of us, all done all we can do? Have we done enough?

We may well be living in the time foretold many years ago when it was said: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."

This generation of the world must choose: destroy or build, kill, or aid, hate or understand. We can do all these things on a scale that has never been dreamed of before.

Well, we will choose life. And so doing, we will prevail over the enemies within man, and over the natural enemies of all mankind.

U.S. REPLY TO 17-NATION APPEAL ON VIET-NAM, APRIL 8, 1965 [1]

We welcome the concern and interest of the governments participating in the Declaration of March 15; just as we welcome any initiative aimed at bringing peace to any part of the world. The Declaration is a constructive contribution to the effort for peace.

We fully agree with the general principles expressed in that Declaration. The fulfillment of those principles, which are an essential part of American policy everywhere, is the purpose of our presence in Vietnam.

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[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1965, pp. 610–612.

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The Declaration reaffirms the right of all people to self-determination. And so do we. We seek self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

The Declaration reaffirms the belief that recourse to force is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and independence. And so do we. We seek to bring peace and help restore those rights.

The signatory nations point out that they are "deeply concerned" at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam. And so are we. We should end the war by ensuring the independence of South Vietnam.

The basic cause of the conflict in Vietnam is the attack by North Vietnam on the independent nation of South Vietnam. The object of that attack is total conquest.

The regime in North Vietnam has sent trained military personnel and weapons of war on an increasing scale into South Vietnam. It has directed and supported a mounting campaign of terror, assassination, and military action against the Government and people of the Republic of South Vietnam.

The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against attack. In fulfillment of our long-standing commitments we have given such help. We will continue as long as we are needed, and until the aggression is halted. In these actions we seek only the security and peace of South Vietnam, and we threaten no regime.

The war against South Vietnam is a war of great brutality. Simple farmers are the target of assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their men are loyal to the government. Small and helpless villages are ravaged by sneak attacks. Large scale raids are conducted on towns; and terror strikes in the heart of cities.

We hope that the anger of people in every country will extend to those who commit these daily acts of violence in the South. We hope that the sympathy and compassion of every land will be held out to these victims of unprovoked attack. These are men and women, and even children, who die because they are attacked—not because they are attackers.

Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam—security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of an final settlement.

We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.

There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned, in large groups or in small ones, in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.

We have stated this position over and over again, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready—with this purpose—for unconditional discussions.

We believe that peace can be achieved in Southeast Asia the moment that aggression from North Vietnam is eliminated. That aggression has many elements. It has meant the training and infiltration of agents and armed forces—the procurement and supply of munitions—the bombing of compounds by night and Embassies by day—murdering secretaries and soldiers alike—in short, a whole campaign of terror and military action that is externally supported and directed. When these things stop and the obstacles to security and stability are removed, the need for American supporting military action will also come to an end.

And when conditions have been created in which the people of South Vietnam can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. At the same time, it should become possible to work out the future relationships between North and South Vietnam on the basis of mutual respect and determination to resolve their problems by peaceful means.

Because the aggressor has made great efforts to hide his actions, it will also be important to have new ways and means of assurance that aggression has in fact been stopped. The problems of such control and assurance are not easy. But these difficulties are not at the center of the problem. The center of the problem is in the realities of behavior. Those realities are known and felt in South Vietnam. They are known and understood by those who are responsible for them. It is by their ending in fact that the actions of the United States Government will be governed.

We also hope that the nations of the world can join in helping the countries of Southeast Asia in their own effort to improve the life of their people.

We have offered our help for a large-scale program of economic development embracing all of Southeast Asia. We hope that other industrialized nations will join.

We are glad of this Declaration. We believe that the nations which signed it are motivated by a deep and sincere purpose of peace. That is our purpose too. We hope it is shared by all others who are affected by this Declaration.

17-Nation Appeal[1]

The Appeal of the Heads of State and Government of Seventeen Non-Aligned Countries Concerning Crisis in Vietnam

Pursuant to the final Declaration of the Declaration of the Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964,

we, the undersigned Heads of state or government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts in South-East Asia and in certain regions of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in

[1] Handed to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson on Apr. 1 by a delegation composed of Ambassadors Dinke, Majid, and Micunovic and Ambassador Miguel A. Ribeiro of Ghana. The appeal was also delivered on Apr. 1 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Governments of Canada, Communist China, France, Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the Republic of Viet-Nam, and North Viet-Nam, as well as to the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam."

the United Natoins which prevents it from exercising fully its responsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace;

we solemly reaffirm the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force;

we reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states;

we express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom, and independence and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic consequences;

we are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam;

we are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations. We therefore make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions, so that a political solution to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and of the Declaration of the Conference of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo.

We invite the governments of all countries interested in maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal.

MARCH 15, 1965

MOHAMMAD YOUSUF, *Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Afghanistan*
AHMED BEN BELLA, *President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria*
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS, *President of the Republic of Cyprus*
DUDLEY SENANAYAKE, *Prime Minister of Ceylon*
HAILE SELASSIE, I, *Emperor of Ethiopia*
DR. KWAME NKRUMAH, *President of the Republic of Ghana*
SEKOU TOURE, *President of the Republic of Guinea*
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI, *Prime Minister of India*
MARSHAL ABDUL SALAM MOHAMED AREF, *President of the Republic of Iraq*
JOMO KENYATTA, *President of the Republic of Kenya*
MAHENDRA BIR BIKRAM, SHAH DEVA, *King of Nepal*
GENERAL MOHAMAD AMIN EL-HAFEZ, *President of the Syrian Arab Republic*
HABIB BOURGUIBA, *President of Tunisia*
GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, *President of the United Arab Republic*
JOSIP BROZ TITO, *President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*
KENNETH KAUNDA, *President of Zambia*
MILTON OBOTE, *Prime Minister of Uganda*

DEFINING SCOPE OF THE WAR: Address by Secretary Rusk, April 23, 1965[1] (Excerpt)

* * * * * * *

What is a "war of national liberation"? It is, in essence, any war which furthers the Communist world revolution—what, in broader terms, the Communists have long referred to as a "just" war. The term "war of national liberation" is used not only to denote armed insurrection by people still under colonial rule—there are not many of those left outside the Communist world. It is used to denote any effort led by Communists to overthrow by force any non-Communist government.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, May 10, 1965, pp. 697–699.

Thus the war in South Viet-Nam is called a "war of national liberation." And those who would overthrow various other non-Communist governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin American are called the "forces of national liberation."

Nobody in his right mind would deny that Venezuela is not only a truly independent nation but that it has a government chosen in a free election. But the leaders of the Communist insurgency in Venezuela are described as leaders of a fight for "national liberation"—not only by themselves and by Castro and the Chinese Communists but by the Soviet Communists.

A recent editorial in *Pravda* spoke of the "peoples of Latin America . . . marching firmly along the path of struggle for their national independence" and said, ". . . the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of the activities of Communist parties." It added:

> The Soviet people have regarded and still regard it as their sacred duty to give support to the peoples fighting for their independence. True to their international duty the Soviet people have been and will remain on the side of the Latin American patriots.

In Communist doctrine and practice, a non-Communist government may be labeled and denounced as "colonialist," "reactionary," or a "puppet," and any state so labeled by the Communists automatically becomes fair game—while Communist intervention by force in non-Communist states is justified as "self-defense" or part of the "struggle against colonial domination." "Self-determination" seems to mean that any Communist nation can determine by itself that any non-Communist state is a victim of colonialist domination and therefore a justifiable target for a "war of liberation."

As the risks of overt aggression, whether nuclear or with conventional forces, have become increasingly evident, the Communists have put increasing stress on the "war of national liberation." The Chinese Communists have been more militant in language and behavior than the Soviet Communists. But the Soviet Communist leadership also has consistently proclaimed its commitment in principle to support wars of national liberation. This commitment was reaffirmed as recently as Monday of this week by Mr. Kosygin [Aleksai N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers].

International law does not restrict international revolution within a state or revolution against colonial authority. But international law does restrict what third powers may lawfully do in support of insurrection. It is these restrictions which are challenged by the doctrine, and violated by the practice, of "wars of liberation."

It is plain that acceptance of the doctrine of "wars of liberation" would amount to scuttling the modern international law of peace which the charter prescribes. And acceptance of the practice of "wars of liberation," as defined by the Communists, would mean the breakdown of peace itself.

Viet-Nam presents a clear current case of the lawful versus the unlawful use of force. I would agree with General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnamese Commander in Chief] and other Communists that it is a test case for "wars of national liberation." We intend to meet that test.

Were the insurgency in South Viet-Nam truly indigenous and self-sustained, international law would not be involved. But the fact is that it receives vital external support—in organization and direction, in training, in men, in weapons and other supplies. That external support is unlawful for a double reason. First, it contravenes general international law, which the United Nations Charter here expresses. Second, it contravenes particular international law: the 1954 Geneva accords on Viet-Nam and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos.

In resisting the aggression against it, the Republic of Viet-Nam is exercising its right of self-defense. It called upon us and other states for assistance. And in the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the United Nations Charter, we and other nations are providing such assistance.

The American policy of assisting South Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom was inaugurated under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Our assistance has been increased because the aggression from the North has been augmented. Our assistance now encompasses the bombing of North Viet-Nam. The bombing is designed to interdict, as far as possible, and to inhibit, as far as may be necessary, continued aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

When that aggression ceases, collective measures in defense against it will cease. As President Johnson has declared:

> * * * if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end.

The fact that the demarcation line between North and South Viet-Nam was intended to be temporary does not make the assault on South Viet-Nam any less of an aggression. The demarcation lines between North and South Korea and between East and West Germany are temporary. But that did not make the North Korean invasion of South Korea a permissible use of force.

Let's not forget the salient features of the 1962 agreements on Laos. Laos was to be independent and neutral. All foreign troops, regular or irregular, and other military personnel were to be withdrawn within 75 days, except a limited number of French instructors as requested by the Lao Government. No arms were to be introduced into Laos except at the request of that Government. The signatories agreed to refrain "from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs" of Laos. They promised also not to use Lao territory to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries—a stipulation that plainly prohibited the passage of arms and men from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam by way of Laos. An International Control Commission of three was to assure compliance with the agreements.

What happened? The non-Communist elements complied. The Communists did not. At no time since that agreement was signed have either the Pathet Lao or the North Viet-Nam authorities complied with it. The North Vietnamese left several thousand troops there—the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion. Use of the corridor through Laos to South Viet-Nam continued. And the Communists barred the areas under their control both to the Government of Laos and the International Control Commission.

To revert to Viet-Nam: I continue to hear and see nonsense about the nature of the struggle there. I sometimes wonder at the gullibility of educated men and the stubborn disregard of plain facts by men who are supposed to be helping our young to learn—especially to learn how to think.

Hanoi has never made a secret of its designs. It publicly proclaimed in 1960 a renewal of the assault on South Viet-Nam. Quite obviously its hopes of taking over South Viet-Nam from within had withered to close to zero—and the remarkable economic and social progress of South Viet-Nam contrasted, most disagreeably for the North Vietnamese Communists, with their own miserable economic performance.

The facts about the external involvement have been documented in white papers and other publications of the Department of State. The International Control Commission has held that there is evidence "beyond reasonable doubt" of North Vietnamese intervention.

There is no evidence that the Viet Cong has any significant popular following in South Viet-Nam. It relies heavily on terror. Most of its reinforcements in recent months have been North Vietnamese from the North Vietnamese Army.

Let us be clear about what is involved today in Southeast Asia. We are not involved with empty phrases or conceptions which ride upon the clouds. We are talking about the vital national interests of the United States in the peace of the Pacific. We are talking about the appetite for aggression—an appetite which grows upon feeding and which is proclaimed to be insatiable. We are talking about the safety of nations with whom we are allied—and the integrity of the American commitment to join in meeting attack.

It is true that we also believe that every small state has a right to be unmolested by its neighbors even though it is within reach of a great power. It is true that we are committed to general principles of law and procedure which reject the idea that men and arms can be sent freely across frontiers to absorb a neighbor. But underlying the general principles is the harsh reality that our own security is threatened by those who would embark upon a course of aggression whose announced ultimate purpose is our own destruction.

Once again we hear expressed the views which cost the men of my generation a terrible price in World War II. We are told that Southeast Asia is far away—but so were Manchuria and Ethiopia. We are told that, if we insist that someone stop shooting, that is asking them for unconditional surrender. We are told that perhaps the aggressor will be content with just one more bite. We are told that, if we prove faithless on one commitment, perhaps others would believe us about other commitments in other places. We are told that, if we stop resisting, perhaps the other side will have a change of heart. We are asked to stop hitting bridges and radar sites and ammunition depots without requiring that the other side stop its slaughter of thousands of civilians and its bombings of schools and hotels and hospitals and railways and buses.

Surely we have learned over the past three decades that the acceptance of aggression leads only to a sure catastrophe. Surely we have learned that the aggressor must face the consequences of his action and be saved from the frightful miscalculation that brings all to ruin.

It is the purpose of law to guide men away from such events, to establish rules of conduct which are deeply rooted in the reality of experience.

ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS TO MEET MOUNTING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN VIETNAM: Message From the President of the United States, May 4, 1965[1]

To the Congress of the United States:

I ask the Congress to appropriate at the earliest possible moment an additional $700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam.

This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed.

In fiscal year 1965 we will spend about $1.5 billion to fulfill our commitments in southeast Asia. However, the pace of our activity is steadily rising. In December 1961, we had 3,164 men in South Vietnam. By the end of last week the number of our Armed Forces there had increased to over 35,000. At the request of the Government of South Vietnam in March, we sent Marines to secure the key Damang/Phu Bai area; 2 days ago, we sent the 173d Airborne Brigade to the important Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area. More than 400 Americans have given their lives in Vietnam.

In the past 2 years, our helicopter activity in South Vietnam has tripled--from 30,000 flying hours in the first quarter of 1963 to 90,000 flying hours in the first quarter of this year.

In February we flew 160 strike sorties against military targets in North Vietnam. In April, we flew over 1,500 strike sorties against such targets.

Prior to mid-February we flew no strike sorties inside South Vietnam. In March and April, we flew more than 3,200 sorties against military targets in hostile areas inside the country.

Just 2 days ago, we dispatched Gen. C. L. Milburn, Jr., Deputy Surgeon General of the Army, to assist U.S. representatives in Vietnam in formulating an expanded program of medical assistance for the people of South Vietnam. We are contemplating the expansion of existing programs under which mobile medical teams travel throughout the countryside providing on-the-spot medical facilities, treatment, and training in rural areas.

The additional funds I am requesting are needed to continue to provide our forces with the best and most modern supplies and equipment. They are needed to keep an abundant inventory of ammunition and other expendables. They are needed to build facilities to house and protect our men and supplies.

The entire $700 million is for this fiscal year.

The Secretary of Defense will today support this request before the appropriate congressional committees.

[1] H. Doc. 157, 89th Cong., 1st sess.

Nor can I guarantee this will be the last request. If our need expands I will turn again to the Congress. For we will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and Nation.

I have reviewed the situation in Vietnam many times with the Congress, the American people and the world. South Vietnam has been attacked by North Vietnam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help because our commitments, our principles, and our national interest demand it.

This is not the same kind of aggression with which the world has been long familiar. Instead of the sweep of invading armies, there is the steady, deadly stream of men and supplies. Instead of open battle between major opposing forces, there is murder in the night, assassination, and terror. Instead of dramatic confrontation and sharp division between nationals of different lands, some citizens of South Vietnam have been recruited in the effort to conquer their own country.

All of this shrouds battle in confusion. But this is the face of war in the 1960's. This is the "war of liberation." Kept from direct attack by American power, unable to win a free election in any country, those who seek to expand communism by force now use subversion and terror. In this effort they often enlist nationals of the countries they wish to conquer. But it is not civil war. It is sustained by power and resources from without. The very object of this tactic is to create the appearance of an internal revolt and to mask aggression. In this way, they hope to avoid confrontation with American resolution.

But we will not be fooled or deceived, in Vietnam or any place in the world where we have a commitment. This kind of war is war against the independence of nations. And we will meet it, as we have met other shifting dangers for more than a generation.

Our commitment to South Vietnam is nourished by a quarter century of history. It rests on solemn treaties, the demands of principle, and the necessities of American security.

A quarter century ago it became apparent that the United States stood between those who wished to dominate an entire continent and the peoples they sought to conquer.

It was our determined purpose to help protect the independence of the Asian peoples.

The consequence of our determination was a vast war which took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans. Surely this generation will not lightly yield to new aggressors what the last generation paid for in blood and towering sacrifice.

When the war was over, we supported the effort of Asian peoples to win their freedom from colonial rule. In the Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere we were on the side of national independence. For this was also consistent with our belief in the right of all people to shape their own destinies.

That principle soon received another test in the fire of war. And we fought in Korea, so that South Korea might remain free.

Now, in Vietnam, we pursue the same principle which has infused American action in the Far East for a quarter of a century.

There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power is essential, in the final test, if the nations of Asia are to be secure from expanding communism. Thus, when India was attacked, it looked to us for help, and we gave it gladly. We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians. But that means each Asian people must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or nation should overrun all the others.

Make no mistake about it. The aim in Vietnam is not simply the conquest of the South, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless. Once that is done, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and endless conquest. That is why Communist China opposes discussions, even though such discussions are clearly in the interest of North Vietnam.

Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense of South Vietnam. In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Vietnam. The U.S. Senate ratified that treaty and that obligation by a vote of 82 to 1.

Less than a year ago the Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, said that the United States was ready to take all necessary steps to meet its obligations under that treaty.

That resolution of the Congress expressed support for the policies of the administration to help the people of South Vietnam against attack—a policy established by two previous Presidents.

Thus we cannot, and will not, withdraw or be defeated. The stakes are too high, the commitment too deep, the lessons of history too plain.

At every turning point in the last 30 years, there have been those who opposed a firm stand against aggression. They have always been wrong. And when we heeded their cries, when we gave in, the consequence has been more bloodshed and wider war.

We will not repeat that mistake. Nor will we heed those who urge us to use our great power in a reckless or casual manner. We have no desire to expand the conflict. We will do what must be done. And we will do only what must be done.

For, in the long run, there can be no military solution to the problems of Vietnam. We must find the path to peaceful settlement. Time and time again we have worked to open that path. We are still ready to talk, without conditions, to any government. We will go anywhere, discuss any subject, listen to any point of view in the interests of a peaceful solution.

I also deeply regret the necessity of bombing North Vietnam.

But we began those bombings only when patience had been transformed from a virtue into a blunder—the mistaken judgment of the attackers. Time and time again men, women, and children—Americans and Vietnamese—were bombed in their villages and homes while we did not reply.

There was the November 1 attack on the Bien Hoa airfield. There was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. There was the February 7 attack on the Pleiku base. In these attacks 15 Americans were killed and 245 were injured. And they are only a few examples of a steady campaign of terror and attack.

We then decided we could no longer stand by and see men and women murdered and crippled while the bases of the aggressors were immune from reply.

But we have no desire to destroy human life. Our attacks have all been aimed at strictly military targets—not hotels and movie theaters and embassy buildings.

We destroy bridges, so it is harder to convey the instruments of war from north to south. We destroy radar stations to keep our planes from being shot down. We destroy military depots for the infiltration of men and arms to the south. We patrol routes of communications to halt the invaders. We destroy ammunition dumps to prevent the use of explosives against our men and our allies.

Who among us can feel confident that we should allow our soldiers to be killed, while the aggressor sits smiling and secure in his sanctuary, protected by a border which he has violated a thousand times. I do not believe that is the view of the American people or of the Congress.

However, the bombing is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to bring us closer to the day of peace. And whenever it will serve the interests of peace to do so, we will end it.

And let us also remember, when we began the bombings there was little talk of negotiations. There were few worldwide cries for peace. Some who now speak most loudly were quietly content to permit Americans and Vietnamese to die and suffer at the hands of terror without protest. Our firmness may well have already brought us closer to peace.

Our conclusions are plain.

We will not surrender.

We do not wish to enlarge the conflict.

We desire peaceful settlement and talks.

And the aggression continues.

Therefore I see no choice but to continue the course we are on, filled as it is with peril and uncertainty.

I believe the American people support that course. They have learned the great lesson of this generation: Wherever we have stood firm aggression has been halted, peace restored, and liberty maintained.

This was true in Iran, in Greece and Turkey, and in Korea.

It was true in the Formosa Strait and in Lebanon.

It was true at the Cuban missile crisis.

It will be true again in southeast Asia.

Our people do not flinch from sacrifice or risk when the cause of freedom demands it. And they have the deep, abiding, true instinct of the American people: When our Nation is challenged it must respond. When freedom is in danger we must stand up to that danger. When we are attacked we must fight.

I know the Congress shares these beliefs of the people they represent.

I do not ask complete approval for every phase and action of your Government. I do ask for prompt support of our basic course: Resistance to aggression, moderation in the use of power, and a constant search for peace. Nothing will do more to strengthen your country in the world than the proof of national unity which an overwhelming vote for this appropriation will clearly show. To deny and delay this means to deny and delay the fullest support of the American people and the American Congress to those brave men who are risking their lives for freedom in Vietnam.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 4, 1965.*

TEXT OF A STATEMENT ON VIETNAM BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF JULY 28, 1965[1]

WE WILL STAND IN VIETNAM

My fellow Americans, not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote,

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Vietnam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something that I don't understand. Why?

[1] Department of State Publication 7937, Released August 1965.

Well, I have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically every State in this Union. I have discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the east room of the White House.

Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

THE LESSON OF HISTORY

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one, but it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime, in two World Wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

It is this lesson that has brought us to Vietnam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government.

But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam, and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

There are great stakes in the balance.

Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism.

Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection.

In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened and an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would he renewed in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.

Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Vietnam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Vietnam.

INCREASE IN U.S. FORCES

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces and their attacks and the number of incidents. I have asked the commanding general, General [William C.] Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration and I will give the country due and adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.

We have also discussed with the Government of South Vietnam lately the steps that we will take to substantially increase their own effort, both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with these committees, the appropriate congressional committees, what we plan to to in these areas. I have asked them to be able to answer the questions of any Member of Congress.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present legislation to help meet part of this new cost until a supplemental measure is ready, and hearings can be held when the Congress assembles in January.

In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the present defense appropriations bill under consideration, to transfer funds in addition to the additional money that we will ask.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement.

We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat, for behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the American Nation.

U.S. WELCOMES UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.

We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly and many times, again and again, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there has been no answer.

But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Vietnam. So has the Government of South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposals. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

In this pursuit we welcome and we ask for the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials or any one of its 114 members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all of the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam.

PURPOSE OF U.S. ACTION

I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago, because we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory, but we insist and we will always insist that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision, and they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action. As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Vietnam enrich the condition of their life, to feed the hungry, and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase crops, and the worker to find a job.

It is an ancient but still terrible irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are really united in the simple, elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction—not as the price of peace, for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost, but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

A PERSONAL NOTE

Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every State in this Union—working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life. I think that I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.

There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. And education was something that you had to fight for. Water was really life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years—more than three decades—and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men and wise leaders struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people.

Now I am the President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every other American citizen have an equal opportunity, to help every family get a decent home, and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old.

As I have said before, that is what I have lived for. That is what I have wanted all my life, since I was a little boy, and I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of cruel wars. I am going to do all I can to see that that never happens.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy, we must have the courage to resist or we will see it all—all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom—all—all—will be swept away on the flood of conquest.

So, too, this shall not happen. We will stand in Vietnam.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO U THANT, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JULY 28, 1965 [1]

His Excellency U THANT,
Secretary General of the United Nations,
United Nations, N.Y.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I want you to know from me directly of the very great personal confidence which I place in Ambassador Goldberg. His appointment as permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations—and his acceptance of this responsibility in the circumstances—is, I hope, strong evidence that this Government places the very highest importance on the work of the United Nations and will continue to give it our utmost support.

I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg especially to maintain close contact with you on the situation in Vietnam. Your efforts in the past to find some way to remove that dispute from the battlefield to the negotiating table are much appreciated and highly valued by my Government. I trust they will be continued.

Meanwhile, as I stated publicly last April, the Government of the United States is prepared to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions. That remains our policy.

And as I stated in San Francisco last month, we hope that the members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, will use their influence to bring to the negotiating table all governments involved in an attempt to halt all aggression and evolve a peaceful solution. I continue to hope that the United Nations can, in fact, be effective in this regard.

I hope that you will communicate to us, through Ambassador Goldberg, any helpful suggestions that may occur to you that can strengthen our common search for the road to peace in southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

[1] White House press release dated July 28, 1965.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY 30, 1965 [1]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The President of the United States announced on July 28, 1965, certain steps being taken by my Government to lend further assistance to the Republic of Vietnam in resisting armed aggression.

At the same time the President reaffirmed to the Secretary General of the United Nations the willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions, and again invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about discussions in a negotiating forum. On July 29 the Secretary General immediately sent a most welcome and appreciated reply, stating his determination to pursue his efforts to remove the dispute over Vietnam from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

The Security Council, which has a legitimate interest in the peace of southeast Asia, has been kept informed of the policy of my Government with respect to the dangerous course of events in that part of the world. For example, my late predecessor, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, told the Council more than a year ago on May 21 1964:

> * *, * the United States has no, repeat *no*, national military objective anywhere in southeast Asia. U.S. policy for southeast Asia is very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the peoples of that area can go about their own independent business in whatever associations they may freely choose for themselves without interference from the outside.

Members of the Council also are aware of the prolonged and repeated efforts of the U.S. Government to open a path to peaceful solution of the disputes of southeast Asia, beginning with our acceptance of the terms of the Geneva Accords of 1954. These efforts have included—

Various approaches to Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow.

Support of peaceful overtures by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Favorable reactions to proposals made by 17 nonalined nations, and later by the Government of India.

Approval of efforts by the Secretary General of the United Nations to initiate peace talks.

Endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations in south-

[1] U.S. mission to the United Nations press release 4610, dated July 30, 1965.

east Asia, including a U.N. mission of observers along the frontier between Vietnam and Cambodia, a U.N. mission to investigate alleged suppression of minority rights in Vietnam, and a U.N. invitation to Hanoi to participate in Security Council discussions of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Major participation, directly and through the United Nations, in economic and social development projects in southeast Asia.

A direct appeal by the President of the United States to the members of the United Nations to use their influence in bringing all parties to the peace table.

Repeated assertions on the highest authority that the United States is prepared to engage in negotiations or discussions of any character with no prior conditions whatever.

On at least 15 occasions in the past four and a half years, the United States has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in southeast Asia by peaceful negotiations.

I am sure that the other members of the Security Council share the deep regrets of my Government in the fact that none of these initiatives has met with any favorable response whatever. It is especially unfortunate that the regime in Hanoi, which, along with the Republic of Vietnam, is most directly involved in the conflict, has denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute in any manner and has even refused to participate in the discussions in the Council.

Nonetheless, our commitments under the Charter of the United Nations require us to persist in the search for a negotiated end to the cruel and futile violence that ravages the Republic of Vietnam. This responsibility—to persist in the search for peace—weighs especially upon the members of the Security Council, the primary organ of the United Nations for peace and security affairs.

The purpose of this communication therefore is to reemphasize to the members of the Council the following points:

First, that the United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.

Third, the United States will continue to explore, independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honorable and durable peace in southeast Asia.

Fourth, the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.

It is the hope of my Government that the members of the Security Council will somehow find the means to respond effectively to the challenge raised by the present state of affairs in southeast Asia.

I respectfully request that this communication be circulated to the members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

LETTER FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY MACARTHUR TO SENATOR FULBRIGHT, AUGUST 2, 1965, TRANSMITTING A PAPER ENTITLED: THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the course of Ambassador Lodge's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee July 27 you asked if the Department could supply a statement for the record on our commitment to assist South Vietnam.

Since this commitment was developed, restated, and redefined on several occasions during the last 15 years, I am enclosing a listing of the various agreements, public statements, communiques, and letters that together constitute the U.S. commitment to help South Vietnam defend itself against Communist aggression.

If I can be of any further assistance to you or the committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM

1. December 23, 1950: Realizing that the Communist-led Vietminh drive against the French in Indochina was part of the general Communist offensive in the Far East whose northern front was in Korea, the United States, under the Truman administration, signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (Pentalateral Agreement) with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This agreement, authorized by Public Law 329, 81st Congress, provided for indirect U.S. military aid through France to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

2. September 7, 1951: The United States signed an agreement authorized by Public Law 535, 81st Congress, with Premier Tran Van Huu's government providing for direct U.S. economic aid to Vietnam.

3. July 21, 1954: During the concluding plenary session of the Geneva conference, the head of the U.S. delegation, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, made a unilateral U.S. declaration. The main points of this declaration were as follows:

(*a*) The United States "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the Geneva agreements.

(*b*) The United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

(*c*) The United States "shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly" (p. 61).[1]

4. October 23, 1954: President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem pledging U.S. aid and support to South Vietnam (p. 67).

5. January 1, 1955: On the basis of the existing Pentalateral Agreement, the United States began sending direct supporting assistance to the Vietnamese armed forces.

[1] Page references are to the committee print dated June 16, 1965, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled "Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam."

6. February 19, 1955: The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO Treaty) came into force. In a protocol to the treaty, the "SEATO umbrella" was extended to cover Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos should these countries request SEATO assistance in resisting Communist aggression. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1 (p. 62).

7. March 7, 1955: The United States, under the Eisenhower administration, and the government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem signed an agreement which supplemented the agreement mentioned in (2) above.

8. July 6, 1956: Vice President Richard Nixon visited Vietnam and delivered a letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem stating that President Eisenhower looked forward to many years of cooperation between the two countries.

9. May 11, 1957: A joint communique of President Eisenhower and President Diem was issued in Washington. President Eisenhower assured President Diem of the willingness of the United States to continue to offer effective assistance within the constitutional processes of the United States to promote political stability and economic welfare in the Republic of Vietnam (p. 73).

10. October 26, 1960: In a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth anniversary, President Eisenhower assured President Diem that "for so long as our strength can be useful, the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."

11. May 13, 1961: At the close of Vice President Johnson's visit to Vietnam, a joint Vietnamese-United States communique was issued stating that:

(*a*) Both Governments will extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid.

(*b*) Vietnam's regular armed forces will be increased with U.S. assistance.

(*c*) The United States will provide assistance for the entire Vietnamese Civil Guard.

(*d*) U.S. military experts will be used to assist Vietnam's armed forces in health, welfare, and public works activities at the village level.

(*e*) A special group of U.S. economic and fiscal experts will be sent to Vietnam to work out a financial plan as the basis for joint efforts (p. 77).

12. August 2, 1961: President Kennedy declared that the United States would do all it could to save South Vietnam from communism.

13. October 26, 1961: In a letter to President Diem, President Kennedy reaffirmed U.S. determination "to help Vietnam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through economic growth."

14. December 7 and 14, 1961: An exchange of messages between President Diem and President Kennedy resulted in President Kennedy's stating that the United States, in response to the Vietnamese Government's request, was prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and preserve its independence. President Kennedy went on to promise that the United States would promptly increase its assistance to Vietnam's defense efforts against Communist aggression (p. 84).

15. January 4, 1962: The United States and Vietnamese Governments issued a joint communique on the expansion of economic development programs which called for both Governments to do "their utmost to improve the protection and prosperity of the Vietnamese in the face of Communist guerrilla aggression and depredations directed and supported by the Communist regime in Hanoi" (p. 86).

16. November 24, 1963: President Johnson affirmed the U.S. intention to continue its military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Communist Vietcong.

17. December 31, 1963: In a New Year message to Gen. Duong Van Minh, President Johnson pledged that the "United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Vietnam American personnel and material as needed to assist you in achieving victory" (p. 106).

18. April 20, 1964: President Johnson stated that no one should "doubt that we are in this battle as long as South Vietnam wants our support and needs our assistance to protect its freedom."

19. August 7, 1964: The Congress approved the southeast Asia resolution by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House of Representatives. The resolution stated that "the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It also declared that the United States was prepared "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the used of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom" (p. 128).

20. April 7, 1965: In his speech at Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson stated that he intended to keep the promise repeated since 1954 to help South Vietnam. "To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong" (p. 197).

21. May 4, 1965: In his message to the Congress accompanying a request for an additional $700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam, President Johnson stated: "This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our efforts to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed." The House approved the appropriation by a vote of 408 to 7 and the Senate by a vote of 88 to 3 (p. 219).

22. July 28, 1965: President Johnson told his press conference that "We are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years, have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation."

WILLIAM BUNDY'S APPEARANCE ON EDUCATIONAL TV, AUGUST 3, 1965 (Excerpts) [1]

Question. Is there a military solution in Vietnam short of a third world war? Just how high is the military escalator? Are we prepared to make

[1] Typed transcript.

major concessions to achieve a political settlement in Vietnam? These, and other questions, we will discuss in a moment.

ANNOUNCER. WETA, Washington, D.C., and the Eastern Edcuational Network present "Foreign Policy 1965—Vietnam." Here is your host and moderator, Peter Lisagor, Washington bureau chief for the Chicago Daily News. Mr. Lisagor.

Mr. LISAGOR. Our guest at this discussion is Mr. William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Prof. George Kahin, the director of the southeast Asian program at Cornell University, Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming, a supporter of the administration policies in Vietnam, and Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, who has grave misgivings about that policy.

Question. Professor Kahin, you seem to be stirring here. One of the disquieting things, it seems to me, that many Americans think about Vietnam is that the North Vietnamese—Hanoi does not seem to be listening to what Mr. Bundy says—the message that Mr. Bundy says we're trying to take to them. And I wondered whether you think that this military effort to convey the message is a correct one, or a valid one?

Professor KAHIN. I think we have the right to question why Hanoi should not doubt our sincerity when, on several occasions last fall, and as late as February, before our second phase of bombing began, they tried persistently to get in touch with us through Adlai Stevenson and U Thant on two occasions, indicating they wanted negotiations. Their view is that we turned both of these down—both Stevenson and Thant were apparently of this cast of mind too, lodging responsibility with us for the turndown, and meantime they see us having turned to a policy of aerial bombardment in order to increase our leverage at the negotiating table. And I think it's difficult to understand how someone with a pistol at their head, who takes some pride in having just thrown off colonial rule, is going to be induced to sit down and negotiate while that pistol is still at their head.

Mr. LISAGOR. I'd like to come back to a question that Mr. Kahin raised, Mr. Bundy. He said earlier that the North Vietnamese made some passes through the late Adlai Stevenson and Secretary General U Thant at the U.N. That seemed new to me. I don't recall any overtures made. Were there any overtures made?

Mr. BUNDY. Thant has said that there was an indication that the North Vietnamese were prepared to talk. Now, I say frankly that there were numerous third-country contacts with North Vietnam that were reported to us throughout this period, and they were from people whose reliability we thought was pretty good, and none of those gave any indication that this was anything other than a tactical maneuver on their part or that there was any desire on their part to talk about anything other than their terms, which have always been the so-called program of the liberation front, which is that the liberation front moves in to a coalition government in Saigon, which I call the Polish route, which simply means that you get in short order a Communist takeover. And I may say, for what it's worth, on this question of free elections, and I think it's worth a lot, that you have the North Vietnamese statement of position, which on this point is quite clear. You've got to accept in principle, the program of the liberation front. The program of the liberation front provides for a coalition government at once with the Communists in a very strong position, and it doesn't talk about elections at all as a precedent to

that step. In other words, you've just got to accept that, so that the Government of South Vietnam in talking about establishing the Government structure in due course by democratic processes, we—the President last week in talking about free elections—we're talking about something that really has to do with determining the will of the people. The Communists are talking about a readymade solution tailored their way.

THE QUESTION OF A FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR IN VIETNAM: State Department Position, PAPER, DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1965 [1]

The question has been raised whether it would be desirable for the President to seek a formal declaration of war against North Vietnam. This question should be considered with respect to both international and domestic considerations.

INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

From the international standpoint it seems undesirable to request a declaration of war for the following reasons:

1. The policy of the United States in Vietnam is to assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, at the latter's request, in thwarting an armed aggression from North Vietnam and to achieve a workable settlement of the dispute among the principal parties involved. This policy is pursued with limited aims, seeking to end the aggression against South Vietnam without threatening the destruction of North Vietnan, allowing a miscalculation by the enemy as to our intentions, or unnecessarily enlarging the scope of the conflict. The United States believes that the struggle must be won primarily in South Vietnam and is in that context a defensive military effort.

2. To declare war would add a new psychological element to the international situation, since in this century declarations of war have come to imply dedication to the total destruction of the enemy. It would increase the danger of misunderstanding of our true objectives in the conflict by the various Communist states, and increase the chances of their expanded involvement in it. Such a declaration would question the sincerity of the President's claims concerning his desire for a peaceful settlement allowing the various nations of the area, including North Vietnam, to live together in economic cooperation, and his reiteration that we do not threaten the existence of North Vietnam.

3. On balance, a declaration of war—which would be the first and only since the signing of the United Nations Charter—would significantly reduce the flexibility of the United States to seek a solution among extremely complex factors and reduce our adversary's own reasoned approach to a solution, when U.S. policy from the beginning has attempted to avoid closing off any possible avenue of resolution and to make the North Vietnamese more rather than less rational in the situation.

4. There is nothing in modern international law which requires a state to declare war before engaging in hostilities against another state;

[1] Prepared by the Department of State at the request of the committee staff.

nor would a formal declaration of war impose any obligations on an enemy by which he would not otherwise be bound.

5. Absence of a formal declaration of war is not a factor which makes an international use of force unlawful. The only relevant legal question is whether the use of force is justified. Examples of hostilities begun without prior declarations of war abound in recent history. The fighting in Korea from 1950 to 1953, that in Indochina from 1947 to 1954, that in and around the Suez Canal in 1956, and that in west New Guinea between the Dutch and Indonesians in the spring and summer of 1962 all took place without benefit of declarations of war. We are not aware that the absence of declarations of war in these cases has been alleged to constitute a violation of international law.

6. The legal rules of international law concerning the conduct of armed conflicts apply to all armed conflicts without regard to the presence or absence of declarations of war. All that is required is armed conflict between two or more international entities. The 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims were specifically made applicable to any "armed conflict of an international character" between two or more of the parties. The rules of war embodied in the Hague conventions formulated in the early years of this century are considered, in general, to be part of customary international law binding on all states, and their applicability is unrelated to declarations of war.

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

From the point of view of U.S. law it would be undesirable for the President to seek a declaration of war for the following reasons:

1. A declaration of war is not necessary either to authorize the actions that have been taken by the United States in Vietnam or to provide an expression of congressional intent on the Vietnamese situation. The President has power under article II, section 2, of the Constitution as Commander in Chief to deploy U.S. military forces to Vietnam for the purpose of assisting South Vietnam to defend itself from armed aggression by North Vietnam. Since the Constitution was adopted, there have been at least 125 instances in which the President, without congressional authority and in the absence of a declaration of war, has ordered the Armed Forces to take actions or to maintain positions abroad. Some of these historical instances have involved the use of U.S. forces in combat. Congressional intent is expressed by the joint resolution of Congress of August 10, 1964, passed by a combined vote of 504 to 2, explicitly approving all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, in the defense of freedom in southeast Asia. A much fuller presentation of the views of the executive branch on the question of the President's constitutional authority was published in February 1951, as a joint committee print of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services.

2. A declaration of war does not seem necessary in order to provide emergency authority to the executive branch. Many laws become operative in time of national emergency or in time of war. Most of these are operative today by virtue of the state of emergency proclaimed by President Truman in December 1950. These laws give the executive branch increased power to deal with the problems in Vietnam as well as other areas of the world. For example, they include special authority with respect to the movement of aliens in and out of the United States; the Armed Forces, Reserves, and the National Guard; procurement of material for the services; transactions in foreign exchange; Government contracts; security and the protection of defense information; and defense transportation. A few emergency laws would not come into effect unless there were a declaration of national emergency or of war subsequent to the 1950 declaration of national emergency. However, there are only a few laws which can become operative ouly in time of war, and they have not been found necessary for the conduct of hostilities in Vietnam.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI OF ITALY, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER, 1965 [1]

FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, NOVEMBER 20, 1965

Hon. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President of the United States.

MR. PRESIDENT: In the interview which you graciously accorded me at the end of May you repeated anew your firm intention to seek assiduously a negotiated solution for the conflict in Vietnam.

In the hope of being able to assist in the realization of this noble purpose, I bring to your attention the following:

On Thursday, November 11, in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and the President of the Council, Van Dong, expressed to two persons (known to me) the strong desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Vietnam and, in summary, stated—accourding to what they wrote me—that—

> in order for the peace negotiations to come about, there will be necessary (*a*) a cease-fire (by air, by sea, by land) in the entire territory of Vietnam (north and south); the cessation—that is, of all beligerent operations (including therefore also the cessation of debarkation of further American troops); (*b*) a declaration according to which the Geneva agreements of 1954 will be taken as the basis for the negotiations—a declaration made up of the four points formulated by Hanoi, points that are in reality the explanation of the Geneva text and which, therefore, can be reduced to a single point: application, in other words, of the Geneva accord.

The text of the communication which I have received adds that "the government in Hanoi is prepared to initiate negotiations without first requiring actual withdrawal of the American troops."

To the same interlocutors Ho Chi Minh said: "I am prepared to go anywhere; to meet anyone."

These are the essential points that one of the two interlocutors of Ho Chi Minh and Van Dong sent me in writing last night and which, in this letter of mine—confided to Mr. A. Goldberg, the U.S. representative to the U.N., so, that he can deliver it promptly and confidentially—I bring word for word to your attention.

You surely have other elements by which to judge the importance of the above. As President of the 20th Assembly, as a high official of Italy, as a sincere friend of the United States and of yourself, I hope that this contribution to the sought-for peaceful solution, always more necessary and more urgent, may be a useful one. And I am at your disposition for any step that you consider opportune in the matter.

[1] Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 3, 1966, pp. 11–13.

With sincere pleasure at your recovery and with best wishes for your high mission, I send my respectful greetings.

Yours,

AMINTORE FANFANI.

SECRETARY RUSK'S REPLY TO FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI, DECEMBER 4, 1965

His Excellency AMINTORE FANFANI,
Foreign Minister of Italy.

DEAR MR. FANFANI: My Government is most grateful to you for your help and cooperation in transmitting views attributed to the North Vietnamese Government on negotiations to deal with the problem of Vietnam. We have carefully examined the suggestions you have conveyed, and I wish to make the following comments:

1. As it has repeatedly stated, the United States is prepared to enter into discussions or negotiations with any government at any time without any preconditions whatsoever. We reaffirm this willingness.

2. Although there is some ambiguity in the statement of Hanoi's position, your source seems to indicate that Hanoi would agree that negotiations might be undertaken on the basis of the Geneva agreements of 1954 without any qualifications or conditions. We for our part would be willing to engage in negotiations on this basis without any qualifications or conditions.

3. The United States does not, however, agree with the contention that the four points advanced by Hanoi constitute an authentic interpretation of the Geneva agreements of 1954. Elements in the four points, notably the political program of the so-called National Liberation Front, have no basis in the Geneva agreements, and Hanoi's apparent insistence on a prior declaration accepting the four points thus appears both to be inconsistent with the agreements and to require a substantive condition to negotiations. Nevertheless, we are prepared to include these four points for consideration in any peace talks along with any proposals which the United States, South Vietnam, and other governments may wish to advance.

4. Your sources also mention another apparent Hanoi condition calling for a cease-fire and other measures prior to negotiations. The United States would be prepared for negotiations without the imposition of any conditions of this nature. However, if a reduction or cessation of hostilities were to be arranged prior to negotiations, it seems self-evident that it would have to be on an equitable and reciprocal basis. If there were a cessation of certain military activities on the one side, there would have to be an equivalent cessation of military activities on the other. The formulation proposed by Hanoi's leaders does not appear to meet this test, for example, in that it imposes no restraint on the continued infiltration of forces and equipment from North to South Vietnam.

5. The U.S. Government notes the message conveyed that North Vietnam would not insist on the actual withdrawal of American forces prior to the initiation of negotiations. However, the clarification of this point, though not without significance in the light of conflicting public statements by Hanoi on the subject, still leaves the questions discussed in 2 and 3 above.

We are thus far from persuaded that statements by Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong quoted by your Italian sources indicate a real willingness for unconditional negotiations. We would be pleased, for our part, however, on the basis of the considerations set forth above and perhaps in light of any further soundings your sources may make with Hanoi to discuss this matter further with you. I have asked Ambassador Goldberg, who bears this letter, to make himself available to you at any time for this purpose.

Further, if it develops following such discussions, or further contact by you with your sources, that a direct discussion with your Italian sources is deemed fruitful, a representative of the United States would be authorized to meet with them privately.

Finally, let me make it clear that you are free to draw on tbe contents of this letter, in any way you may desire, in communicating with your sources. We would welcome your continuing assistance on this important matter.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK.

FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI'S REPLY TO SECRETARY RUSK, DECEMBER 13, 1965

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I received on December 6 your letter which Ambassador Goldberg had previously announced to me on November 29.

The same day I summarized in a document of mine essential observations made by you on various points and I have just received word that on Wednesday last, December 8, said document has been confidentially delivered into the hands of a qualified representative in order to be forwarded to Hanoi. I think, as of today, said document has already reached its final destination.

I would like to add I desire, Mr. Secretary, to thank you very much for the confidence and trust in my person you and the American Government have confirmed in your letter. I can assure you that, as soon as I receive any reaction on the points contained in the letter, I will inform you immediately.

Anticipating the pleasure of meeting you next week in Washington, I remain, Mr. Secretary,

AMINTORE FANFANI.

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 26, 1965 (Excerpts) [1]

Since my return from the Inter-American Conference I have read what has been said during my absence about the so-called peace feelers of last autumn. I have also seen the fragment on this subject which appeared recently in a national magazine. It is true that last autumn Ambassador Stevenson was informed by Secretary General U Thant that he had been informed indirectly that Hanoi would be willing to have a contact with the United States and that the Secretary General had suggested Rangoon as a suitable site.

[1] Department of State press release No. 276, dated Nov. 26, 1965.

When this matter arose, it was considered in the light of a great deal of information available at the time about the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi and, indeed, of other governments in the Communist world. I am not at liberty to cite all of these contacts, which were numerous, but you will recall that the Canadian Minister of External Affairs reported to his House of Commons in June of this year that the Canadian Commissioner on the ICC had made several trips to Hanoi over the 8 months prior to the end of May. There were other public indications such as the failure of the Polish proposals on Laos and the refusal of Hanoi to attend the U.N. Security Council in August. I myself had a number of discussions with the representatives of other governments, including Communist governments. It seems clear beyond a peradventure of doubt that Hanoi was not prepared to discuss peace in southeast Asia based upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking toward the lifting of aggression against South Vietnam. Indeed, in the latter part of 1964 Hanoi increased its infiltration, including units of its regular army. They undoubtedly felt that they were on the threshold of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied that they had made any proposals for negotiations.

Throughout all of last year, the general attitude of the Communist world was that they might consider some device to save the face of the United States while they themselves imposed their will upon South Vietnam. Our attitude was and is that we are not interested in saving face but in saving South Vietnam.

It is worth recalling that President Kennedy and his principal advisers made a far-reaching review of the situation in southeast Asia early in 1961, and determined to do everything possible to find a peaceful settlement based upon the integrity and the safety of the smaller nations of southeast Asia. President Kennedy's talks with Chairman Khrushchev in June 1961 led to agreement in principle on Laos but not on Vietnam. The Laotian Conference succeeded in concluding the agreement of 1962, an agreement which failed because Hanoi refused to comply with it in any way, shape, or form. Nevertheless, during and after that conference the United States has had repeated discussions about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in southeast Asia.

Hanoi, in their well-known four points, has indicated its basic position on Vietnam. They have refused to accept the suggestion that their points can he discussed along with all other points presented by other governments. They, therefore, exclude in advance the position which they know the United States and others will take; namely, that North Vietnam must stop its aggression against South Vietnam and discontinue its effort to impose the program of the National Liberation Front on South Vietnam by force.

There have been many efforts by the United States and by other governments throughout the past 5 years to achieve peace for the nations of southeast Asia. Leaving aside all questions of diplomatic procedure, there has not been and there is not now any indication from Hanoi that they are prepared to accept the self-determination and the independent existence of their neighbors as free countries rather than what the Communist countries have come to call their wars of national liberation.

You are familiar with many initiatives which have been taken during the past year to bring this matter from the battlefield to the conference table and you are also familiar with the increased infiltration by North Vietnam to impose their will by force.

Our task remains, therefore, that which President Johnson has often stated; namely, to assist our friends in South Vietnam to repel the aggression against them and, at the same time, to keep open every possibility of a peaceful settlement. For this purpose, as President Johnson has repeatedly declared, we are prepared for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned, or, as the 17 nonalined nations phrased it, negotiations without preconditions.

Question. Mr. Secretary, in the light of your statement about the Vietnamese situation, if today we had such an indication through Mr. Thant or any other channel that they were prepared to contact, apparently without specific conditions, would we accept?

Answer. Well, the President has said, on more than one occasion, and so have I, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions or, as the 17 nations put it, negotiations without precondition.

In view of the statement made by Hanoi in the last 24 hours, I would not predict that this is likely to occur in the next week or so.

Question. Well, would you say, then, that we have somwhat softened our position; that is whereas last year we sensed—we attached some conditions to our position, that this time——

Answer. No, I think this is a problem of nuance here.

President Johnson said in April of this year, publicly and clearly, witbout any doubt whatever, that we are prepared for unconditional discussions.

Prior to that time the discussions had been private; that is, our attitude on this had been private.

I have myself spent hours and hours and hours since 1961 with representatives of the other side talking about peace in southeast Asia. There was never any period when we were unwilling to talk about peace in southeast Asia.

Now, at the time last autumn, I want to comment, and I cannot pursue it, that this was not the only contact by any means. There were many contacts with the other side, including Hanoi. This was not the only contact.

This particular incident had to be looked at in—against the background of a very considerable activity that was going on among the foreign offices of the world, to determine whether or not this particular thing made a significant difference.

Question. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that there was no change in American policy in so far as negotiations are concerned dating from last April 7?

Answer. Well, in April the President said at Baltimore that we are prepared for unconditional discussions. I think that perhaps that was the first time that it had been said in just those words publicly. But this was not a major change in the sense that for the past 5 years we have been in continuous contact with representatives of the Communist world about peace in southeast Asia. There has never been any cessation of discussion on this subject. There has has never been any lack of opportunity to bring this matter of peace to the conference table, if the other side is prepared to stop trying to impose their will be force on South Vietnam.

So that if there was a difference in the public way in which this matter was stated, there was no difference in the basic objective of

the United States, and no difference on the point that we were in regular contact with the Communist world.

Question. When you say without preconditions, however, you are talking only about without preconditions of getting in the same room to open discussions, are you not, because you listed a number of conditions which the United States would have in terms of the settlement to be reached at any such discussions.

Answer. Well, I do not suppose that anyone would expect the United States, in agreeing to discussions without preconditions, to imply thereby that we are going to accept the program of the other side in such discussions.

Question. Therefore you concede that the other side will also come with its preconditions.

Answer. Well, we have already said to the other side—we have already said publicly to the other side that we are prepared to talk about their proposals along with the proposals of all the other governments concerned, and they have turned that down.

Question. Your point is that as of today, aside from the technical problem which you call getting a meeting started, the situation is that we are willing to listen to their preconditions for settlement as well as our own, that they are not willing to listen to our preconditions as well as theirs.

Answer. Well, the question of whether, for example, their four points, Mr. Roberts, are preconditioned to any discussion, or any conference, has varied a little over time.

There have been moments, quite frankly, when it has appeared that tbey were rigid preconditions, that these four points would have to he accepted before there can be any serious discussions.

There have been other times when we had the impression that there were not necessarily preconditions to discussions, but tbat they would be the points on which the other side would insist as necessary for peace.

I would—one has the impression that in recent weeks their attitude has been moving toward these four points as preconditions somewhat more than might have been our impression for a time. We don't know. We don't know.

But what we are saying is that if they want to come to the conference table, if they want to have discussions, we will discuss, and in those discussions they can say anything that they want to. But we must be free to say anything that we want to. And then we will try to find our whether there is a basis for peace.

But we are not going to limit discussions to their four points.

Now, these have got to be discussions in which governments can talk like governments, discuss their problems, their interests, their demands, to see whether in that kind of mutual discussion there is any basis for peace.

Now, we did that in 1961, on Laos, and it seemed, in the Vienna conversations between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, that there was a basis for a settlement of the Laotian question.

No such basis appeared in discussing Vietnam.

We got the conference and the agreement on Laos.

And as I pointed out in my statement, the problem with that is that Hanoi never complied with it.

But I don't want to leave the impression that we are—I think it is important to be clear on two things; that we are prepared for discussions, without conditions, without preconditions. But we are not going to promise in advance or at any time that we are going to give away the basic interests of the South Vietnamese people and South Vietnam, and the interests of the United States when we go into such discussions. The other side is not going to do that.

So the problem is to find out whether, given the attitudes, the interests, the commitments of the two sides, if peace is possible.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT, JANUARY 5, 1966 [1]

His Excellency U THANT,
Secretary General, United Nations.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: My Government has during the past 2 weeks been taking a number of steps in pursuit of peace which flow in part from our obligations under the United Nations Charter, of which we are most mindful, and in part from the appeals which His Holiness the Pope and you addressed just before Christmas to us and to others. I believe it would be of interest to you, in addition to what we have already communicated to you privately, and to all States members of the United Nations to know more precisely what we have done, and what we have in mind.

You will observe that we have already responded in terms which go somewhat beyond the appeals earlier addressed to us. President Johnson dispatched messages, and in several cases personal representatives, to His Holiness the Pope, to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to a considerable number of chiefs of state or heads of government, reaffirming our desire promptly to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam and to do all in our power to move that conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. In this connection, our bombing of North Vietnam has not been resumed since the Christmas truce.

Among the points made in our messages conveyed to a number of governments are the following: That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussion or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

I should appreciate it if this letter could be communicated to all members of the United Nations as a Security Council document.

[1] U.S. mission to the United Nations press release No. 4781, dated Jan. 5, 1966.

I should urge them in examining it to recall President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General in which the President invited all members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, to use their influence to bring about unconditional discussions, and my letter of July 31, 1965 (document S/6575) to the President of the Security Council in which I said, inter alia, that the United States stands ready as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world. I should hope that on the present occasion also organs of the United Nations and all States would give even more earnest thought to what they might do to help to achieve these ends.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

U.S. OFFICIAL POSITION ON VIETNAM: State Department Press Release, January 3 and 7, 1966 [1]

The following statements are on the puhlic record about elements which the United States believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia:

I. THE FACT OF AGGRESSION

The simple fact is that tens of thousands of trained and armed men, including units of the North Vietnamese regular army, have been sent by Hanoi into South Vietnam for the purpose of imposing Hanoi's will on South Vietnam by force. It is this external aggression which is responsible for the presence of U.S. combat forces. Indeed, it was not until the early summer of 1965 that the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam reached the number of those which have been infiltrated by Hanoi. If this aggression from the outside were removed, U.S. combat forces would not be needed.

II. THE U.S. COMMITMENT

The United States has a clear and direct commitment to the security of South Vietnam against external attack. This commitment is based upon bilateral agreements between the United States and South Vietnam, upon the SEATO Treaty (whose obligations are both joint and several), upon annual actions by the Congress in providing aid to South Vietnam, upon the policy expressed in such Congressional action as the August 1964 resolution, and upon the solemn declarations of three U.S. Presidents. At stake is not just South Vietnam, nor even Southeast Asia: there is also at stake the integrity of a U.S. commitment and the importance of that commitment to the peace right around the globe.

III. INITIATIVES FOR PEACE

A. We are not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past five years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. Reports of "peace feelers" have to do with initiatives by third parties. Hanoi has denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers." We ourselves know of none. During 1965 Hanoi has consistently insisted

[1] Department of State press releases dated Jan. 3 and 7, 1966.

that its four points must be accepted as the sole basis for peace in Vietnam. The third of these four points would require the imposition of the program of the liberation front upon South Vietnam, whether the South Vietnamese wanted it or not.

B. The initiatives for peace undertaken by our side, and by many other governments, would be hard to count. They began with President Kennedy's talk with Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961 and have not ceased. The publicly known initiatives have been multiplied many times by private initiatives not yet disclosed. On the public record, however, are the following instances:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in June 1961.
2. Geneva Conference on Laos.
3. U.S. reference of Gulf of Tonkin matter to the UN Security Council in August 1964.
4. The Polish proposal to convene the two Co-Chairmen and the three members of the ICC (India, Canada and Poland) to take up the question of Laos.
5. The call of 17 non-aligned nations for negotiations without preconditions.
6. Attempts by U Thant to visit Hanoi and Peiping.
7. President Johnson's call for nnconditional discussions.
8. The British Commonwealth Committee on Vietnam.
9. Attempted or actual visits by Patrick Gordon Walker, Mr. Davies (MP), and Ghanian Delegation.

IV. U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BASKET OF PEACE

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof.
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it.
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it.
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions.
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose.
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia.
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured.
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice.
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision.
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonalined or neutral if that be their option.
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars.
13. The President has said: "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment

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Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

LETTER FROM ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTING AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM, JANUARY 31, 1966 [1]

His Excellency ROGER SEYDOUX,
President of the Security Council.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

As you know, the U.S. Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva Accords, of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations.

In President Johnson's letter of July 28, 1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General, we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of United Nations members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance by its Government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24 and continued that suspension for some 37 days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in 14 points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General.

I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows:

That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

[1] U.S. Mission to the United Nations press release No. 4798 dated Jan. 31, 1966.

Subsequently, the President in his state of the Union address on January 12 reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these U.S. views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government.

Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead, there have been from Hanoi, and of course from Peiping as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain heads of state which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations: on the contrary, he insisted upon a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable.

Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts then in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive action on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope only 2 days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the United Nations confided to neutral nations might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question."

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, TO AMBASSADOR ROGER SEYDOUX, PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, JANUARY 31, 1966 [1]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As a supplement to my letter to you of this date, requesting that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam, I submit herewith a draft resolution which I request be circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Vietnam,

Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Noting that the provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented,

Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honorable settlement of the conflict in Vietnam,

Recognizing the right of all peoples, including those in Vietnam, to self-determination,

1. *Calls for* immediate discussions without preconditions at _____ on _____ date, among the appropriate interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia,

2. *Recommends* that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervision,

3. *Offers* to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators,

4. *Calls on* all concerned to cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution,

5. *Requests* the Secretary General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, JANUARY 31, 1966 [2]

For 37 days, no bombs fell on North Vietnam. During that time, we have made a most intensive and determined effort to enlist the help and the support of all the world in order to persuade the government in Hanoi that peace is better than war, that talking is better than fighting, and that the road to peace is open.

Our effort has met with understanding and support throughout most of the world, but not in Hanoi and Peiping. From those two capitals have come only denunciation and rejection.

In these 37 days, the efforts of our allies have been rebuffed. The efforts of neutral nations have come to nothing. We have sought, without success, to learn of any response to efforts made by the governments of Eastern Europe. There has been no answer to the enlightened efforts of the Vatican. Our own direct private approaches have all been in vain.

[1] U.S. Mission to the United Nations press release No. 4709 dated Jan. 31, 1966.
[2] White House press release dated Jan. 31, 1966.

The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that was published 3 days ago. They persist in aggression. They insist on the surrender of South Vietnam to communism. It is, therefore, very plain that there is no readiness or willingness to talk, no readiness for peace in that regime today. And what is plain in words is also plain in acts. Throughout these 37 days, even at moments of truce, there has been continued violence against the people of South Vietnam, against their Government, against their soldiers, and against our own American forces.

We do not regret the pause in the bombing. We yield to none in our determination to seek peace. We have given a full and decent respect to the opinions of those who thought that such a pause might give new hope for peace in the world.

Some said that 10 days might do it. Others said 20. Now, we have paused for twice the time suggested by some of those who urged it. And now the world knows more clearly than it has ever known before who it is that insists on aggression and who it is that works for peace.

The Vietnamese, American, and allied troops that are engaged in South Vietnam, with increasing strength and increasing success, want peace, I'm sure, as much as any of us here at home. But while there is no peace, those men are entitled to the full support of American strength and American determination—and we will give them both.

As Constitutional Commander in Chief, I have, as I must, given proper weight to the judgment of those, all of those, who have any responsibility for counseling with me or sharing with me the burdensome decisions that I am called upon to make: the distinguished Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, my national security adviser, and America's professional military men, represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

These advisers tell me that if continued immunity is given to all that support North Vietnam aggression, the cost in lives—Vietnamese lives and American lives and allied lives—will only be greatly increased.

In the light of the words and actions of the Government in Hanoi for more than 37 days now, it is our clear duty to do what we can to limit these costs.

So on this Monday morning in Vietnam, at my direction, after complete and thorough consultation and agreement with the Government of South Vietnam, U.S. aircraft have resumed action in North Vietnam.

They struck the lines of supply which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and the Government of South Vietnam.

Our air strikes on North Vietnam from the beginning have been aimed at military targets and have been controlled with the greatest of care. Those who direct and supply the aggression really have no claim to immunity from military reply.

The end of the pause does not mean the end of our own pursuit of peace. That pursuit will be as determined and as unremitting as the pressure of our military strength on the field of battle.

In our continuing pursuit of peace, I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg at the United Nations to ask for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council. He will present a full report on the situation in Vietnam, and a resolution which can open the way to the conference table.

This report and this resolution will be responsive to the spirit of the renewed appeal of Pope Paul, and that appeal has our full sympathy.

I have asked Secretary Rusk to meet with the representatives of the press later this morning to give to the country and to the entire world, a thorough and a comprehensive account of all of the diplomatic efforts conducted in these last 5 weeks in our continuing policy of peace and freedom for South Vietnam.

DECLARATION OF HONOLULU, FEBRUARY 8, 1966 [1]

PART I

The Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America jointly declare—

their determination in defense against aggression,
their dedication to the hopes of all the people of South Vietnam,
and their commitment to the search for just and stable peace.

In pursuit of these objectives the leaders of their governments have agreed upon this declaration, which sets forth—

the purposes of the Government of Vietnam,
the purposes of the Government of the United States,
and the common commitment of both Governments.

PART II

THE PURPOSES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

Here in the mid-Pacific, halfway between Asia and North America, we take the opportunity to state again the aims of our government.

We are a government—indeed a generation—of revolutionary transformation. Our people are caught up in a mortal struggle.

This struggle has four sides.

1. *We must defeat the Vietcong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil.*—We are the victims of an aggression directed and supported from Hanoi. That aggression—that so-called "War of National Liberation"—is part of the communist plan for the conquest of all of Southeast Asia. The defeat of that aggression is vital for the future of our people of South Vietnam.

2. *We are dedicated to the eradication of social injustice among our people.*—We must bring about a true social revolution and construct a modern society in which every man can know that he has a future; that he has respect and dignity; that he has the opportunity for himself and for his children to live in an environment where all is not disappointment, despair and dejection; that the opportunities exist for the full expression of his talents and his hopes.

[1] White House press release dated Feb. 8, 1966.

3. *We must establish and maintain a stable, viable economy and build a better material life for our people.*—In spite of the war, which creates many unusual and unpredictable economic situations, we are determined to continue with a policy of austerity; to make the best possible use of the assistance granted us from abroad; and to help our people achieve regular economic growth and improved material welfare.

4. *We must build true democracy for our land and for our people.*—In this effort we shall continue to imbue the people with a sense of national unity, a stronger commitment to civic responsibility. We shall encourage a widened and more active participation in and contribution to the building of a free, independent, strong and peaceful Vietnam. In particular, we pledge again—

to formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, including an electoral law;

to take that constitution to our people for discussion and modification;

to seek its ratification by secret ballot;

to create, on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government.

These things shall be accomplished mainly with the blood, intelligence, and dedication of the Vietnamese people themselves. But in this interdependent world we shall need the help of others—to win the war of independence; to build while we fight; to reconstruct and develop our nation when terror ceases.

To those future citizens of a free, democratic South Vietnam now fighting with the Vietcong, we take this occasion to say come and join in this national revolutionary adventure:

Come safely to join us through the open arms program;

Stop killing your brothers, sisters, their elders and their children;

Come and work through constitutional democracy to build together that life of dignity, freedom, and peace those in the north would deny the people of Vietnam.

Thus, we are fighting this war. It is a military war, a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution.

PART III

THE PURPOSES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

(1) The United States of America is joined with the people and Government of Vietnam to prevent aggression. This is the purpose of the determined effort of the American Armed Forces now engaged in Vietnam. The United States seeks no bases. It seeks no colonial presence. It seeks to impose no alliance or alinement. It seeks only to prevent aggression, and its pledge to that purpose is firm. It aims simply to help a people and government who are determined to help themselves.

(2) The United States is pledged to the principles of the self-determination of peoples and of government by the consent of tbe governed.