

It, therefore, gives its full support to the purpose of free elections proclaimed by the Government of South Vietnam and to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural construction. The United States will give its full support to measures of social revolution including land reform based upon the principle of building upward from the hopes and purposes of all the people of Vietnam.

(3) Just as the United States is pledged to play its full part in the worldwide attack upon hunger, ignorance, and disease, so in Vietnam it will give special support to the work of the people of that country to build even while they fight. We have helped and we will help them—to stabilize the economy—to increase the production of food—to spread the light of education—to stamp out disease.

(4) The purpose of the United States remains a purpose of peace. The U.S. Government and the Government of Vietnam will continue in the future, as they have in the past, to press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum. The world knows the harsh and negative response these efforts have thus far received. But the world should know, too, that the U.S. Government and the Government of Vietnam remain determined that no path to peace shall be unexplored. Within the framework of their international commitments, the United States and Vietnam aim to create with others a stable peace in Southeast Asia which will permit the governments and peoples of the region to devote themselves to lifting the condition of man. With the understanding and support of the Government of Vietnam the peace offensive of the U.S. Government and the Government of South Vietnam will continue until peace is secured.

#### PART IV

##### THE COMMON COMMITMENT

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again—  
 To defense against aggression;  
 To the work of social revolution;  
 To the goal of free self-government;  
 To the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease; and  
 To the unending quest for peace.

#### JOINT COMMUNIQUE BY PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND LT. GEN. NGUYEN VAN THIEU, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM, FOLLOWING TALKS IN HONOLULU, HAWAII, AT THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 7 to 8, 1966<sup>1</sup>

1. The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam have concluded 3 days of the most intense and friendly discussion, and their fundamental concord of purpose and policy is stated in the Declaration of Honolulu which they are issuing together today. In addition, there has been

opportunity for extended review of many urgent specific questions, both at the level of the Chiefs of Government and at the level of Cabinet Ministers. The results of this immediate discussion are reported in the remaining paragraphs of this communique.

2. The leaders of the two Governments, with their advisers, reviewed the intense efforts for peace undertaken by the Government of the United States between Christmas and the end of January. Both Governments noted with regret the total absence of a present interest in peace on the part of the Government of North Vietnam. They reviewed the present diplomatic situation in the United Nations and elsewhere, and they agreed upon continued diplomatic efforts for peace.

3. The economic advisers of the two Governments had a thorough discussion of their cooperative programs for maintaining economic stability and controlling the cost of living in a war-torn country. On the basis of their reports, the President and the Chief of State and Prime Minister have agreed that their two Governments will take further concrete steps to combat inflation in Vietnam.

4. The leaders of the two Governments received comprehensive reports on the intensified program of rural construction. The Government of Vietnam set forth a plan for efforts of particular strength and intensity in areas of high priority, and the President gave directions to insure full and prompt support by all agencies of the U.S. Government.

5. In the construction program three particular points were agreed on as essential for rapid progress:

(1) Continued emphasis by both Vietnamese and allied forces on the effort to build democracy in the rural areas—an effort as important as the military battle itself.

(2) Continued emphasis on the design of rural construction work to meet the people's needs for larger output, more efficient production, improved credit, handicrafts and light industry, and rural electrification.

(3) Concentration of resources—both Vietnamese and American—in selected priority areas which are properly related to military plans so that the work of rural construction can be protected against disruption by the enemy.

6. Cabinet members of both Governments had thorough discussions of special needs of the people of South Vietnam in the fields of agriculture, health, and education. In agriculture it was agreed that special effort would be made to move agriculture know-how—particularly new species of highly productive rice and corn and vegetable seed—from the experimental station to the farmer in the fields. Steps for more rapid land reform were carefully reviewed. It was agreed that Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and a team of agricultural experts would proceed at once to Vietnam for the purpose of developing enlarged programs of agricultural cooperation.

7. It was also agreed that programs in health and education would be intensified. The President pledged that he would soon dispatch teams of experts in those fields to Vietnam under the direction of Secretary Gardner. Both Governments agreed to make increased efforts in the training of health personnel, in providing teams for medical care, and creating a stronger medical logistics system. They also agreed to strengthen their cooperation in building elementary schools, in training teachers, in reinforcing vocational and technical education, and in supplying textbooks.

<sup>1</sup> White House press release dated Feb. 8, 1966.

8. It was agreed that the refugees who have of their own free will come over from the enemy side must be adequately cared for and prepared to resume a useful role in society. The Government of Vietnam described its plans to meet this problem and the President assured them of full American support. It was agreed that a special effort will be made to provide good schools for refugee children.

9. There was a full discussion of the military situation and of military plans and programs. The leaders of the two Governments reached full agreement upon a policy of growing military effectiveness and of still closer cooperation between the military forces of Vietnam and those of the United States. They reaffirmed their determination to act with all possible regard for the rights of innocent civilians, to adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the treatment of prisoners of war, and to act with full respect for the independence and territorial integrity of neighboring countries which wish to live in peace.

10. Finally, it was agreed that the leaders of the two Governments will have further meetings like this one in the future for the continued execution of the policies and purposes of the Declaration of Honolulu.

#### THE U.S. COMMITMENT IN VIET-NAM: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES: Statements by Secretary Rusk and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations<sup>1</sup>

SECRETARY RUSK, FEBRUARY 18, 1966

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: The immediate occasion for these hearings is a request by the President for a supplemental appropriation to the AID administration of \$415 million, of which \$275 million are intended for South Viet-Nam. Mr. David Bell, the Administrator of AID, and I have both already testified on this particular request. These hearings, as the chairman has pointed out, have also entered into the largest and most far-reaching aspects of our interests and involvements in Southeast Asia. For my part, I welcome this opportunity to appear again before the committee to discuss with you these larger issues.

Since World War II, which projected the United States into the role of major world power, we Americans have had to face a series of difficult tasks and trials. On the whole, we have faced them very well. Today we are facing another ordeal in Southeast Asia, which again is costing us both lives and treasure.

South Viet-Nam is a long way from the United States, and the issues posed may seem remote from our daily experience and our immediate interests. It is essential, therefore, that we clearly understand—and so far as possible agree on—our mission and purpose in that faraway land.

Why are we in Viet-Nam? Certainly we are not there merely because we have power and like to use it. We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the universe. We do not go around the world looking for quarrels in which we can intervene. Quite the contrary. We have recognized that, just as we are not gendarmes of the universe, neither are we the magistrate of the universe. If other governments, other institutions, or other regional organizations can find solutions

to the quarrels which disturb the present scene, we are anxious to have this occur. But we are in Viet-Nam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live.

The situation we face in Southeast Asia is obviously complex but, in my view, the underlying issues are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental. I am confident that Americans, who have a deep and mature understanding of world responsibility, are fully capable of cutting through the underbrush of complexity and finding the simple issues which involve our largest interests and deepest purposes. I regard it, therefore, as a privilege to be able to discuss these problems with the committee this morning—to consult with you—and at the same time to try to clarify for the American people the issues we must squarely face.

I do not approach this task on the assumption that anyone, anywhere, has all the answers or that all wisdom belongs to the executive branch of the Government, or even to the Government itself. The questions at issue affect the well-being of all Americans, and I am confident that all Americans will make up their own minds in the tradition of a free and independent people. Yet those of us who have special responsibilities for the conduct of our foreign policy have had to think hard and deeply about these problems for a very long time. The President, his Cabinet colleagues, and the Congress, who share the weightiest responsibilities under our constitutional system, have come to certain conclusions that form the basis for the policies we are now pursuing.

#### THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE

Perhaps it is worth pointing out that those who are officially responsible for the conduct of our public affairs must make decisions—and must make decisions among existing alternatives. None of us in the executive or the legislative branch has fulfilled our responsibilities merely by formulating an opinion—we are required to decide what this nation shall do and shall not do and are required to accept the consequences of our determinations.

What are our world security interests involved in the struggle in Viet-Nam?

They cannot be seen clearly in terms of Southeast Asia only or merely in terms of the events of the past few months. We must view the problem in perspective. We must recognize that what we are seeking to achieve in South Viet-Nam is part of a process that has continued for a long time—a process of preventing the expansion and extension of Communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the perimeter of Communist power.

This is the problem as it looks to us. Nor do the Communists themselves see the problem in isolation. They see the struggle in South Viet-Nam as part of a larger design for the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat.

I have observed in the course of your hearings that some objection has been raised to the use of the term "Communist aggression." It seems to me that we should not confuse ourselves or our people by turning our eyes away from what that phrase means. The underlying

<sup>1</sup> Department of State Bulletin, vol. LIV, No. 1393, Mar. 7, 1966, pp. 1-17.

crisis of this postwar period turns about a major struggle over the very nature of the political structure of the world. Before the guns were silent in World War II, many governments sat down and thought long and hard about the structure of international life, the kind of world which we ought to try to build, and wrote those ideas into the United Nations Charter. That charter establishes an international society of independent states, large and small, entitled to their own national existence, entitled to be free from aggression, cooperating freely across national frontiers in their common interests, and resolving disputes by peaceful means.

But the Communist world has returned to its demand for what it calls a "world revolution," a world of coercion in direct contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations. There may be differences within the Communist world about methods, and techniques, and leadership within the Communist world itself, but they share a common attachment to their "world revolution" and to its support through what they call "wars of liberation."

So what we face in Viet-Nam is what we have faced on many occasions before—the need to check the extension of Communist power in order to maintain a reasonable stability in a precarious world. That stability was achieved in the years after the war by the valor of free nations in defending the integrity of postwar territorial arrangements. And we have achieved a certain stability for the last decade and a half. It must not be overthrown now.

Like so many of our problems today, the struggle in South Viet-Nam stems from the disruption of two world wars. The Second World War completed a process begun by the first. It ripped apart a structure of power that had existed for 100 years. It set in train new forces and energies that have remade the map of the world. Not only did it weaken the nations actively engaged in the fighting, but it had far-reaching secondary effects. It undermined the foundations of the colonial structures through which a handful of powers controlled one-third of the world's population. And the winds of change and progress that have blown fiercely during the last 20 years have toppled those structures almost completely.

Meanwhile the Communist nations have exploited the turmoil of a time of transition in an effort to extend Communist control into other areas of the world.

#### CHECKING COMMUNIST AMBITIONS

The United States first faced the menace of Communist ambition in Europe, when one after another of the nations on the boundaries of the Soviet Union fell under the dominion of Moscow through the presence of the Red army.

To check this tidal wave the United States provided the Marshall Plan to strengthen the nations of Western Europe and then moved to organize with those nations a collective security system through NATO. As a result, the advance of Soviet Communist power was stopped and the Soviet Union gradually adjusted its policies to this situation.

But within a year after the establishment of NATO, the Communists took over China. This posed a new and serious threat, particularly to those weak new nations of the Far East that had been formed out of colonial empires.

The problems in Asia were, of course, different from those in Europe. But the result was much the same—instability, uncertainty, and vulnerability to both the bully and the aggressor. Western Europe, with its established governmental and traditional social institutions, recovered quickly. But certain of the new nations of Asia—particularly those that had not known self-government for a century or more—continued to face a far more formidable problem, which they still face.

The first test in Asia came in Korea, when the United Nations Forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea supported by material aid from the Soviet Union. It stopped the Chinese Army that followed. It brought to a halt the Communist effort to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the Korean Peninsula.

We fought the Korean war, which like the struggle in Viet-Nam occurred in a remote area thousands of miles away, to sustain a principle vital to the freedom and security of America—the principle that the Communist world should not be permitted to expand by overrunning one after another of the arrangements built during and since the war to mark the outer limits of Communist expansion by force.

Before the Korean war had ended, the United States, under President Truman, moved to settle and consolidate the situation in the Pacific through a peace treaty with Japan, and through bilateral security treaties with Japan and the Philippines, and through the ANZUS treaty with Australia and New Zealand.

Hardly had the Korean war been finished when France, which had been fighting a protracted struggle in Indochina, decided to relinquish its political presence in Southeast Asia. After a brief negotiation it came to terms with the Communist forces that had captured the nationalist movement. The result was the division of Indochina into four parts: a Kingdom of Cambodia, a Kingdom of Laos, and Viet-Nam divided at the 17th parallel between the Communist forces in the North and a non-Communist Vietnamese government in the South.

Recognizing that the Communists had not abandoned their ambitions, the United States Government, under President Eisenhower, took steps to secure the situation by further alliances. Bilateral treaties were concluded with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Formosa. In the Middle East the so-called "northern tier" of countries lying to the south of the Soviet Union entered into the Baghdad Pact, which established what is now known as CENTO—the Central Treaty Organization. The United States did not become a formal member of this alliance, which is composed of Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. But we are closely associated with CENTO and have bilateral military assistance agreements with its regional members, concluded by the Eisenhower administration.

In order to give support to the nations of Southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in the creation of an alliance embodied in a treaty and reinforced by a collective security system known as SEATO—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In this alliance the United States joined with Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines to guarantee the security not only of the member nations but also to come to the aid of certain protocol states and territories if they so requested.

South Viet-Nam was included in this protocol. The United States had not been a party to the agreements made in Geneva in 1954, which France had concluded with the Communist Vietnamese forces known as the Viet Minh. But the Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, stated under instructions that the United States would not disturb the agreements and "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the \* \* \* agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

Under Secretary Smith's statement was only a unilateral declaration, but in joining SEATO the United States took a solemn treaty engagement of far-reaching effect. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides that "each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack \* \* \* would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Viet-Nam.

The language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it imposes is not only joint but several. The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative. Nor does the treaty require a collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. If the United States determines that an armed attack has occurred against any nation to whom the protection of the treaty applies, then it is obligated to "act to meet the common danger" without regard to the views or actions of any other treaty member.

The far-reaching implications of this commitment were well understood by this committee when it recommended, with only the late Senator [William] Langer dissenting, that the Senate consent to the ratification of the treaty. The committee's report states:

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests. There are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.

Following this committee's recommendation, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1, the late Senator Langer dissenting. All members of this distinguished committee who were then Senators voted for that treaty.

Our multilateral engagement under the SEATO treaty has been reinforced and amplified by a series of bilateral commitments and assurances directly to the Government of South Viet-Nam. On October 1, 1954, President Eisenhower wrote to President Diem offering "to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." In 1957 President Eisenhower and President Diem issued a joint statement which called attention to "the large build-up of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Viet-Nam" and stated:

Noting that the Republic of Viet-Nam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence

of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that "the United States is determined that the Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render."

On December 14, 1961, President Kennedy wrote to President Diem, recalling the United States declaration made at the end of the Geneva conference in 1954. The President once again stated that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence." This commitment has been reaffirmed many times since.

These, then, are the commitments we have taken to protect South Viet-Nam as a part of protecting our own "peace and security." We have sent American forces to fight in the jungles of that beleaguered country because South Viet-Nam has, under the language of the SEATO treaty, been the victim of "aggression by means of armed attack."

There can be no serious question as to the existence and nature of this aggression. The war is clearly an "armed attack," cynically and systematically mounted by the Hanoi regime against the people of South Viet-Nam.

The North Vietnamese regime has sought deliberately to confuse the issue by seeking to make its aggression appear as an indigenous revolt. But we should not be deceived by this subterfuge. It is a familiar Communist practice. Impeded in their efforts to extend their power by the use of classical forms of force such as the invasion of Korea, the Communists have, over many years, developed an elaborate doctrine for so-called "wars of national liberation" to cloak their aggressions in ambiguity.

A "war of national liberation," in the Communist lexicon, depends on the tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion. It has a particular utility for them since it gives an advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly in countries where the physical terrain makes clandestine infiltration relatively easy.

At the same time the Communists have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation a sense of ambiguity that they can exploit to their own advantage.

#### NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

Yet, in spite of Communist efforts to confuse the issue, the nature of the conflict in South Viet-nam is very clear.

Let me review the facts.

With the benefit of hindsight no one can doubt that, in agreeing to the 1954 accords, the regime in Hanoi fully expected that within a relatively short period the South Vietnamese would fall under their control. The South seemed overburdened with troubles. Its formidable economic problems were complicated by the need to absorb almost 1 million North Vietnamese, who—having seen the true face of communism—fled South after the 1954 accords. The North, moreover, had concealed resources in the South. At the time of the accords in 1954, many Communists fighting with the Viet Minh had been directed by the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to stay in the South, to

hide their arms, and to devote their efforts to undermining the South Vietnamese Government. These efforts of subversion were in the initial years quite unsuccessful.

Much to the dismay of the Hanoi regime, South Viet-Nam made substantial progress in spite of the extraordinary problems it faced, while North Viet-Nam lagged far behind. As a consequence the Communist leaders in North Viet-Nam were forced to conclude that more active measures were necessary if the subversion in South Viet-Nam were to succeed.

During the 5 years following the Geneva conference the Hanoi regime developed a secret political-military organization in South Viet-Nam based on the cadres who had been ordered to stay in the South. Many of the activities of this organization were directed toward the assassination of selected South Vietnamese civilians. More than 1,000 civilians were murdered or kidnaped from 1957 to 1959. In 1960 alone, terrorists assassinated 1,400 local government officials and kidnaped 700 others, while armed guerrillas killed 2,200 military and security personnel.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam—held its Third Party Congress in Hanoi. That Congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Viet-Nam. Three months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning in 1960 the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate into South Viet-Nam the disciplined adherents whom the party had ordered North at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954, these men had been trained in the arts of sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

All of this was documented by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. That body, established to supervise the performance of the Viet-Nam cease-fire, is composed of Indian, Polish, and Canadian members. The Legal Committee, with Poland objecting, reported in 1962:

There is evidence to show that arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the North to the zone in the South with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, against the armed forces and administration of the zone in the South.

There is evidence that the PAVN [i.e., the North Vietnamese Army] has allowed the zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the South.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated 10,000 men into the South. In 1962, 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated. And by the end of 1964, North Viet-Nam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of Southerners who had gone North. Since then, the greater number of men infiltrated into the South have been nativeborn North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly larger num-

bers. Today there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the South.

I have reviewed these facts—which are familiar enough to most of you—because, it seems to me, they demonstrate beyond question that the war in Viet-Nam is as much an act of outside aggression as though the Hanoi regime had sent an army across the 17th parallel rather than infiltrating armed forces by stealth. This point is important since it goes to the heart of our own involvement. Much of the confusion about the struggle in South Viet-Nam has arisen over a failure to understand the nature of the conflict.

For if the war in South Viet-Nam were—as the Communists try to make it appear—merely an indigenous revolt, then the United States would not have its own combat troops in South Viet-Nam. But the evidence is overwhelming that it is, in fact, something quite different—a systematic aggression by Hanoi against the people of South Viet-Nam. It is one further effort by a Communist regime in one-half of a divided country to take over the people of the other half at the point of a gun and against their will.

Up to this point I have tried to describe the nature of our commitments in South Viet-Nam and why we have made them. I have sought to put those commitments within the framework of our larger effort to prevent the Communists from upsetting the arrangements which have been the basis for our security. These policies have sometimes been attacked as static and sterile. It has been argued that they do not take account of the vast changes which have occurred in the world and are still in train.

These contentions seem to me to miss the point. The line of policy we are following involves far more than a defense of the *status quo*. It seeks rather to insure that degree of security which is necessary if change and progress are to take place through consent and not through coercion. Certainly, as has been frequently pointed out, the world of the mid-20th century is not standing still. Movement is occurring on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Communism today is no longer monolithic; it no longer wears one face but many, and the deep schism between the two great power centers of the Communist world—Moscow and Peking—is clearly one of the major political facts of our time.

There has been substantial change and movement within the Soviet Union as well—and perhaps even more among the countries of Eastern Europe. These changes have not been inhibited because of our efforts to maintain our postwar arrangements by organizing the Western alliance. They have taken place because of internal developments as well as because the Communist regime in Moscow has recognized that the Western alliance cannot permit it to extend its dominion by force.

Over time the same processes hopefully will work in the Far East. Peking—and the Communist states living under its shadow—must learn that they cannot redraw the boundaries of the world by force.

What we are pursuing, therefore, is not a static concept. For, unlike the Communists, we really believe in social revolution and not merely in power cloaked as revolution. We believe in constructive change and encourage it. That was the meaning of President Johnson's initiatives at the Honolulu conference—to encourage the efforts of the South Vietnamese Government to transform the country in a way that will correct ancient injustices and bring about a better life for all the people.

## A LIMITED AND WELL-DEFINED OBJECTIVE

In meeting our commitments in South Viet-Nam we are using substantial military forces. At the same time, we are making it quite clear to North Viet-Nam and to the world that our forces are being employed for a limited and well-defined objective.

What we seek in South Viet-Nam is to bring about a restoration of the conditions contemplated by the accords of 1954. We seek, in other words, to restore the integrity of the settlement made between the French Government and the Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh—a settlement which was joined in by the United Kingdom, Communist China, the Soviet Union, Laos, and Cambodia. This settlement forms a part of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.

Unfortunately, the limited nature of our purpose is foreign to the philosophy of the Communist world. It may be hard, therefore, for them to realize that the United States seeks no territorial aggrandizement in South Viet-Nam or anywhere in Southeast Asia. We do not wish to maintain our troops in that area any longer than is necessary to secure the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. We want no permanent military bases, no trade advantages. We are not asking that the Government of South Viet-Nam ally itself with us or be in any way beholden to us. We wish only that the people of South Viet-Nam should have the right and the opportunity to determine their future in freedom without coercion or threat.

For months now we have done everything possible to make clear to the regime in Hanoi that a political solution is the proper course. If that regime were prepared to call off the aggression in the South, peace would come in almost a matter of hours. When that occurred, the people of North Viet-Nam could safely go about their business. For we do not seek to destroy the Hanoi regime or to force the people of North Viet-Nam to accept any other form of government. And—under conditions of peace—we would be quite prepared for the North Vietnamese people to share with the other peoples of Southeast Asia in the economic and technical help that we and other nations are extending to that area.

This is the simple message that we have tried to convey to Hanoi through many channels. We have sought in every way to impress upon the Communist world the ease with which peace could be attained if only Hanoi were willing.

We have used every resource of diplomacy. I know of no occasion in history where so much effort has been devoted—not only on the part of the United States but of many other nations—in an effort to bring about a political solution to a costly and dangerous war. I know you are generally familiar with the record.

But to this point the sounds from the other side have been harsh and negative. The regime in Hanoi has been unwilling to accept any of the possibilities open to it for discussion. All we have heard is the constant insistence that they will not negotiate unless we accept in advance their four points. Yet the effect of those four points, as propounded by Hanoi, would be to give away the very purposes for which we are fighting and to deliver the people of South Viet-Nam against their will to the domination of a Communist regime.

To understand the situation realistically, we should not underestimate the harshness of the Communist side or overestimate the ease of a political solution.

From time to time we have heard it suggested that we should seek a Geneva conference, or enlist the good offices of the conference cochairmen, or take the problem to the United Nations, or invite the mediation efforts of neutral nations. Well, we have done all of these things, and in most cases we have done them repeatedly—with no result.

We heard it suggested also, by governments and individuals on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that no peace was possible so long as American planes were flying bombing missions over North Viet-Nam but that negotiations might be possible if the bombing were discontinued. We did that also—not once but twice. The last pause, as this committee will recall, lasted more than 37 days. And again with no response.

## THE "14 POINTS"

Certainly we shall do everything consistent with our national objectives to seek a solution through diplomacy. There is no doubt as to the elements for an honorable peace as we see it. We have made them clear again and again. Most recently we have summarized them in the form of "14 points."

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question or reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;
13. The President has said "The Viet-Cong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has

not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

These 14 points are on the public record. Our Government has made quite clear what kind of peace we are prepared to accept—a peace that will guarantee the security of South Viet-Nam, a peace that will stop armed aggression in violation of international agreements and international law.

This is the position that we have made known to the other side both directly and through intermediaries. How does this compare with the position of the Hanoi regime?

#### HANOI'S FOUR POINTS

Both Hanoi and Peking have repeatedly rejected our proposal for unconditional discussions. They have insisted instead that before any discussions can take place our side must agree in advance to the four points of Hanoi's program. The words that they have used have differed from formulation to formulation. Sometimes they have said their points are the "sole basis" for negotiations, sometimes the "most correct basis." But the effect is the same. What they are insisting upon is that we accept in advance their substantive position and then discuss only the ways in which it shall be given effect. The technique of demanding such substantive agreement in advance is a familiar Communist negotiating tactic. It does not mean that the basic points are open for discussion or that they can be loosely interpreted. It means just what it says.

We have subjected these four points to the most careful scrutiny. What do they reveal?

The first point calls for "recognition of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity." This point also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, dismantling of our military bases, and abolition of our military alliance with the Government of South Viet-Nam "in strict conformity with the Geneva Agreements."

The United States has made clear that we, too, are prepared to support a restoration of the provisions of the Geneva agreements and that we are prepared to withdraw our troops and dismantle military bases once there is compliance with the accords by all parties. We have said also that we would not expect or require a military alliance with a free South Viet-Nam.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements, and these, too, we could agree to under the conditions I have indicated.

The fourth point provides that the issue of peaceful reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese people without foreign intervention. This also we could accept if it be clearly understood that conditions must first be created both in the North and South that will make it possible for truly free elections to be held.

It is in the third point that the core of the Communist position is disclosed. That point provides that "The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front."

#### CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

To understand the significance of this point, it is necessary not only to examine what is meant by the "program of the National Liberation Front" but to explore somewhat further the character of the Front itself and the purposes it serves in the tactics of the North Vietnamese regime.

Let us turn first to the Front itself. Both Hanoi and Peking have made clear again and again—and they have been joined in this by other Communist powers—that negotiations will be possible only when the United States recognizes the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people."

What are the implications of this proposal, and why are the Communists urging it so insistently?

The evidence is overwhelming that the National Liberation Front is exactly what its name implies—a Communist front organization intended to give support to the deliberate fiction that the war in Viet-Nam is an indigenous revolt. The Front is, as the facts make clear, an invention of the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam, to serve as a political cloak for its activities in the South.

As I have noted earlier, the Front was created by the North Vietnamese Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after North Viet-Nam's military leader, General [Vo Nguyen] Giap, announced: "The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country." The individuals proclaimed as leaders of the Front are not personalities widely known to the Vietnamese people, either in the North or in the South. To suggest that they represent the aspirations of the Vietnamese people is absurd. The significant fact is that at no time has any single individual of political significance in South Viet-Nam adhered to the Front or to its policies. While some Vietnamese leaders and groups may differ among themselves on how the country is to be led, none of them differs on the fact that the Front does not speak for them.

In 1961 Hanoi sought to strengthen the fiction of the Front's indigenous origins by creating a seemingly independent Communist Party as the principal element of the Front. It therefore established the People's Revolutionary Party. A secret Lao Dong circular dated December 7, 1961, advised party members that "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually our Party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam unified from North to South under the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which is President Ho. \* \* \* during these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Viet-Nam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose."

The People's Revolutionary Party has not concealed its role in the Front. It has frankly stated that it is the dominant element. On February 15, 1961, the Viet Cong Committee for the South went even farther, stating that in time the Communist Party would "act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam." In other words, the Communists have told their followers that, at the proper moment, they would emerge from cover and cast off the disguise of the National Liberation Front.

And so the Communists have a clear purpose in insisting that we recognize the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of

the South Vietnamese people. For them this is not a procedural question but a major question of substance. They insist on our recognition of the Front as the sole spokesman for the people of South Viet-Nam since our acceptance of the Front in that capacity would in effect mean our acceptance of the Communist position as to the indigenous nature of the conflict and thus our acceptance of a settlement on Hanoi's terms—which would mean delivering South Viet-Nam into the control of the Communist North.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not asserted nor do we assert an unreasoning attitude with regard to the Front. The President said in his state of the Union message, "We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and we will consider the views of any group"—and that, of course, includes the Front along with other groups.

To the extent then that the Front has any validity as a representative of a group, the views of that group can be heard and the issue of the Liberation Front should, as the President has said, not prove "an insurmountable problem."

It remains a problem only because Hanoi insists on using it to establish its own substantive position—that the Front represents the hopes and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people—and hence should control them.

The significance of this issue is clearly seen when one examines the so-called "Program of the National Liberation Front" as it was announced from Hanoi on January 29, 1961, and revised and amplified in a second publication on February 11 that same year. The first point of this program discloses the full Communist intention. It calls for the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government in Saigon and the establishment of a coalition government from which the government in Saigon would be totally excluded.

In other words, the Hanoi regime is demanding the following preconditions to which the United States must agree before the Communists will even condescend to negotiate:

First, that the South Vietnamese Government be overthrown;

Second, that the Liberation Front, the creature and agent of Hanoi, be accepted as the sole bargaining representative for the South Vietnamese people;

Third, that South Viet-Nam be put under the control of a coalition government formed by the Communists and from which the South Vietnamese Government would be excluded.

May I conclude, therefore, Mr. Chairman, with certain simple points which are at the heart of the problem and at the heart of United States policy in South Viet-Nam.

1. The elementary fact is that there is an aggression in the form of an armed attack by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam.
2. The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam to repel this aggression.
3. Our commitments to South Viet-Nam were not taken in isolation but are a part of a systematic effort in the postwar period to assure a stable peace.
4. The issue in Southeast Asia becomes worldwide because we must make clear that the United States keeps its word wherever it is pledged.
5. No nation is more interested in peace in Southeast Asia or elsewhere than is the United States. If the armed attack against South

Viet-Nam is brought to an end, peace can come very quickly. Every channel or forum for contact, discussion, or negotiation will remain active in order that no possibility for peace will be overlooked.

#### GENERAL TAYLOR, FEBRUARY 17, 1966

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen: I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee for your willingness to hear my views on the situation in South Viet-Nam. I am afraid that they will not be new to many of you since you have often heard me express them in the days when I was an official of the Government. I agree thoroughly with the motivating purpose of these hearings, namely, to analyze the reasons why we are involved in South Viet-Nam, the importance of this involvement, and the effectiveness with which we are dealing with the resultant problems. If my personal views can assist in clarifying these points, I am most happy to present them.

For the purpose of providing a basis for our subsequent discussion, with your permission I would like to make a continuous statement which will undertake to answer three basic questions. First, what are we doing in South Viet-Nam? Secondly, how are we doing it? Finally, can we improve upon what we are doing?

#### WHAT ARE WE DOING IN VIET-NAM?

A simple statement of what we are doing in South Viet-Nam is to say that we are engaged in a clash of purpose and interest with the militant wing of the Communist movement represented by Hanoi, the Viet Cong, and Peking. Opposing these Communist forces, in the front rank stand the Government and people of South Viet-Nam, supported primarily by the United States but assisted in varying degree by some 30 other nations.

The purpose of the Hanoi camp is perfectly clear and has been since 1954. It is to absorb the 15 million people of South Viet-Nam into a single Communist state under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his associates in Hanoi. In the course of accomplishing this basic purpose, the Communist leaders expect to undermine the position of the United States in Asia and to demonstrate the efficacy of the so-called "war of liberation" as a cheap, safe, and disavowable technique for the future expansion of militant communism.

Our purpose is equally clear and easily defined. In his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, President Johnson did so in the following terms:

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

This has been our basic objective since 1954. It has been pursued by three successive administrations and remains our basic objective today.

Like the Communists, we have secondary objectives derived from the basic one. We intend to show that the "war of liberation," far from being cheap, safe, and disavowable, is costly, dangerous, and doomed to failure. We must destroy the myth of its invincibility in order to protect the independence of many weak nations which are vulnerable targets for subversive aggression—to use the proper term

for the "war of liberation." We cannot leave while force and violence threaten them.

The question has been raised as to whether this clash of interests is really important to us. An easy and incomplete answer would be that it must be important to us since it is considered so important by the other side. Their leadership has made it quite clear that they regard South Viet-Nam as the testing ground for the "war of liberation" and that, after its anticipated success there, it will be used widely about the world. Kosygin told Mr. Reston in his interview of last December:

We believe that national liberation wars are just wars and they will continue as long as there is national oppression by imperialist powers.

Before him, Khrushchev, in January 1961, had the following to say:

Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people serve as the latest example of such wars. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable. Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank of peoples waging liberation struggles.

General Giap, the Commander in Chief of the North Vietnamese forces, has made the following comment:

South Viet-Nam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world.

The Minister of Defense of Communist China, Marshal Lin Piao, in a long statement of policy in September 1965, described in detail how Mao Tse-tung expects to utilize the "war of liberation" to expand communism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

These testimonials show that, apart from the goal of imposing communism on 15 million South Vietnamese, the success of the "war of liberation" is in itself an important objective of the Communist leadership. On our side, we can understand the grave consequences of such a success for us. President Eisenhower in 1959 stressed the military importance of defending Southeast Asia in the following terms. He said:

Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries of Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. \* \* \* The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

This view has often been referred to as the "domino theory." I personally do not believe in such a theory if it means belief in a law of nature which requires the collapse of each neighboring state in an inevitable sequence, following a Communist victory in South Viet-Nam. However, I am deeply impressed with the probable effects worldwide, not necessarily in areas contiguous to South Viet-Nam, if the "war of liberation" scores a significant victory there. President Kennedy commented on this danger with moving eloquence: "The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the southern half of the globe—Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East—the lands of the people who harbor the greatest hopes. The enemies of freedom think they can destroy the hopes of the newer nations and they aim to do it before the end of this decade.

This is a struggle of will and determination as much as one of force and violence. It is a battle for the conquest of the minds and souls as much as for the conquest of lives and territory. In such a struggle, we cannot fail to take sides."

Gentlemen, I think a simple answer to the question, what are we doing in South Viet-Nam, is to say that for more than a decade we have been taking sides in a cause in which we have a vital stake.

My second question was, how are we doing in the pursuit of our objectives in South Viet-Nam? Both sides in the struggle have over the years developed the current strategies which are now in confrontation. During 1964 and 1965, the Hanoi leadership attempted to exploit the political turbulence which followed the fall of President Diem in November 1963. Greatly encouraged by the disorder which marked the political scene in Saigon, the Communist leadership made a massive effort to press on to victory. To meet the growing needs in military manpower, they began the infiltration of personnel of the North Vietnamese army, first as individual replacements, later as formed tactical units. Utilizing this new strength, they intended to make the monsoon offensive of 1965 a major drive for significant military victories. Concurrently they increased the sabotage directed at the land communication system in South Viet-Nam for the purpose of hampering the distribution of commodities and thus adding to the economic stresses in the South. Terrorism was stepped up and directed with added frequency at United States personnel and installations. They apparently hoped to be able to seize and hold politically important localities such as district and provincial capitals, to demoralize the Vietnamese people and Government, and to demonstrate to the United States that we were backing a cause which must inevitably fail.

#### A FOUR-POINT STRATEGY

Faced with this growing threat, the Vietnamese Government and our American officials were obliged to develop a counterstrategy to blunt and defeat the intensified efforts of our adversaries. It evolved out of the experience of the preceding months and years and assumed its full form with the critical decisions in 1965 to introduce United States ground forces and to initiate the bombing campaign against military targets in the North.

Both of these courses of action had been under consideration at least since November 1961, when I presented my report to President Kennedy following a visit to Saigon to appraise the growing criticality of the situation there. We did not take either action at that time, but my report contained the following comment with regard to the possible necessity of using airpower against the source of the Viet Cong support in North Viet-Nam:

While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken now, I would not suggest that it is the final word, guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war declared on South Viet-Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of the aggression after the fact that external aggression is clearly established?

By February 1965, it became clear that we could no longer tolerate this clandestine support from the immune sanctuary in North Viet-Nam which served as the external base for the Viet Cong insurgency.

#### INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS OF GROUND COMBAT

In brief, the strategy which we have been and are pursuing consists of four components. The first includes the many activities directed at increasing the effectiveness of our ground combat against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in South Viet-Nam. For this purpose, we have made the utmost efforts to increase the indigenous forces of South Viet-Nam, always mindful that this is a Vietnamese war in which we should do only those things which the Vietnamese cannot do for themselves or cannot do in time to avert defeat. From July 1954 to July 1955 the armed forces and police of South Viet-Nam were increased by some 140,000 trained men, a very creditable effort on the part of this small country, where military leadership and administrative experience are inevitably in short supply. As of today, the overall military strength in South Viet-Nam is approaching 700,000, the largest military force in being among all of our allies worldwide.

Encouraging though the results have been in increasing the Vietnamese strength, during the year cited our intelligence authorities believed that the Viet Cong increased their total strength by some 60,000. In other words, we were advancing at a rate only a little better than 2 to 1 in our favor. Since history has shown that the government forces successfully opposing a guerrilla insurgency in the past have required a much greater preponderance of strength—10 to 1 or 12 to 1, for example—it was quite clear that the Vietnamese could not raise forces fast enough to keep pace with the growing threat of the Viet Cong in time. It was this sobering conclusion that led to the decision to introduce American ground forces with their unique mobility and massive firepower to compensate for the deficiency in Vietnamese strength. With such forces available, it was felt that the ratios of required strength cited above would lose much of their validity.

I am thoroughly aware of the concern of this committee over the growing requirement for American troops in South Viet-Nam. Is this an endless requirement in an open-ended war? I do not believe that anyone can give a completely satisfactory reply to this question, but I can suggest the consideration of certain limiting factors which have a bearing on the matter.

First, on our side, we are not setting as an objective for our ground forces the occupation of all South Viet-Nam or the hunting down of the last armed guerrilla. We are in Viet-Nam to safeguard the people who are the real target of the enemy. Terrain has little meaning except insofar as it supports people. Thus the extent of control and protection of population is the true measure of progress rather than control of territory. By the former indicator we are not doing too badly. Senator [Mike] Mansfield estimates in his recent report that the government controls about 60 percent of the population, the Viet Cong about 22 percent, leaving 18 percent contested. When I left Saigon last July, those figures were 53 percent, 25 percent, 22 percent.

The point I wish to make is that, when one expresses our military objective in terms of securing a high proportion of the population, the troop requirement loses some of its impression of open-endedness.

Under this concept, the prime target of our United States forces becomes the main-line enemy units which constitute the greatest threat to population—not the entire guerrilla force wherever found.

Another limiting factor is the logistic difficulty of the Viet Cong in supporting increased numbers of troops in combat. The combination of air attacks on their lines of supply and of increasing ground attacks on their units, which must then consume supplies at an increased rate, places some kind of ceiling on the forces they can maintain in South Viet-Nam. I wish I knew exactly where that ceiling is, but our basic data on Viet Cong logistics are too uncertain to permit precision. But the point is that there are factors which tend to keep our troop requirement finite and limit the capability of Hanoi to support large numbers of additional forces in the South.

#### USE OF AIRPOWER AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM

The second component of our strategy relates to the use of airpower against military targets in North Viet-Nam. It is well to remind ourselves of the reasons which impelled us to this decision. There were three which we recognized perfectly at the time of the decision and which remain valid today. The first was to give the people of South Viet-Nam the assurance for the first time of imposing a direct penalty on the source of the aggression. For 11 years they had suffered the depredations of the Viet Cong without exacting any price from the country which provided the direction and support. The morale of the people and that of the armed forces in Viet-Nam received an inestimable lift from the decision to use the air forces of both our countries against military targets in the homeland of the enemy—a lift which has certainly contributed to sustaining their will to continue the fight.

The second reason for the decision was to use airpower, insofar as it could be effective, to limit and render more difficult the infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. It was perfectly clear from the start, as it is clear today, that airpower would not be able to stop infiltration. We were quite sure, however, that it could impose a ceiling on the forces which could be sustained in combat in South Viet-Nam. I do not believe that anyone who has reflected on the effect of the destruction of bridges, ports, rail yards, and similar facilities, and on the effect of the limitation of daylight movement on the roads throughout a large part of North Viet-Nam can avoid the conclusion that the air campaign has had an important effect in slowing down infiltration and in raising its price. A testimonial to its effectiveness was the feverish activity in North Viet-Nam during the bombing pause to repair bomb damage and to move transport in daylight.

The third reason for the decision to use our airpower was to provide a sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Viet Cong insurgency. In spite of their defiant statements of determination to endure these attacks forever, I for one know from experience that no one derives any enjoyment from receiving incoming shells and bombs day after day, and I have no doubt that the warning message is getting through to the leadership of Hanoi.

In a very real sense, the objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership. We hope that, in due course, the combination of the Viet Cong failure to win victory on the ground in South Viet-Nam and the effect of continued air attacks will present to the Hanoi leadership a situation so disadvantageous that they will decide that it is in their interest to halt their aggression, redefine their aims, and join with us in discussing ways and means of improving the lot of all Viet-Nam.

#### NONMILITARY ACTIVITIES

The third component of our current strategy includes all of those nonmilitary activities which are so important but which receive too little public attention. It is not that our leaders have been unaware of the importance of better government, better living conditions, and the promise of a better future for the people of this country. Unfortunately lack of security and governmental instability were for a long time factors limiting the effectiveness of the many programs for development and reconstruction. But now, with the growing military effectiveness of our forces on the ground and the slowly developing maturity of the civil leadership in Saigon and in the provinces, I hope that conditions will permit much greater progress than in the past in bringing the benefits of a comparatively normal life to this war-weary people. As you know, the recent Honolulu conference devoted most of its time to a consideration of these nonmilitary activities. If we are to leave a viable country after the end of the Viet Cong insurgency, it is essential that we make progress even under the conditions of war in stabilizing the government, the society, and the economy.

#### EFFORTS TO INITIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

The fourth component of our strategy is that which relates to our political and diplomatic efforts to initiate the discussion of a peaceful settlement of this conflict. The so-called "peace offensive" is so well known as to require no discussion at this time, as is also the discouraging lack of response from the other side. I am obliged to feel that the Hanoi leadership is not yet convinced that it must mend its ways. Perhaps they still hope for some kind of military victory in the South. Certainly they are not convinced that in some way the United States cannot be detached from the support of South Viet-Nam. They hope against hope that through international or domestic pressures our Government can be forced off course. They have not forgotten that the Viet Minh won more in Paris than in Dien Bien Phu and believe that the Viet Cong may be as fortunate in Washington. They doubt the will of the American public to continue the conflict indefinitely. In a contest of patience, they expect to win even though North Viet-Nam, like the South, has been constantly at war for over 20 years. Until it becomes perfectly clear to them that we are going to stay on course regardless of anything they do, I am afraid we are not likely to see them at a conference table. Or if they come unconvinced of the inevitability of the failure of their present course, we can expect them to stall, delay, and maneuver just as they did at Panmunjom in Korea for over 2 years.

#### A SUMMARY OF U.S. STRATEGY

In summary, then, our four-point strategy consists of a complex but coherent package of measures designed to improve the effectiveness of our forces on the ground in South Viet-Nam, to exploit our air superiority by attacking military targets in North Viet-Nam, to stabilize the political, social, and economic systems in South Viet-Nam, and to seek an honorable negotiated settlement of the conflict. It is limited as to objective, as to geographical scope, as to weapons and forces employed, and as to targets attacked. All parts of it are interrelated; all parts are indispensable; we must be successful on all fronts. The key, I believe, is inexorable pressure at all points, directed at the will, the ability, and the means of the Communist aggressors.

It is a fair question to ask whether this is the best strategy to attain our basic objective. I am the first to concede that we can and must do better in all four categories of our efforts, but, unhappily, progress toward peaceful negotiations is a bilateral affair which can progress only with some cooperation from Hanoi. As you know, thus far that cooperation has been withheld.

Having conceded the need and possibility for improvement within the components of our current strategy, I must add in honesty that I know of no new strategic proposal which would serve as a better alternative to the one which I have described—that is, provided we do not sacrifice our basic objective. There are, of course, the two old alternatives which we have always rejected and I hope will continue to reject—to withdraw and give up our basic objective or to widen the war by massive air attacks on the North Vietnamese and even on Chinese targets. These two courses of action appear so to contravene our national and international interests that I shall not take the time of the committee to discuss them here.

#### THE SO-CALLED "HOLDING STRATEGY"

The only new proposal of which I am aware is the so-called "holding strategy" which, in its least extreme form, calls for a cessation of United States reinforcements and a limitation of military operations to those necessary for the security of our forces and for the maintenance of our military presence. On several occasions I have expressed myself in opposition to such a course of action. To button up our troops in defensive positions and thus to sacrifice their unique attributes of mobility and firepower would constitute the abandonment of our allies on the battlefield and would assign a most inglorious mission to our troops who, for the present, have high morale and complete confidence in their ability to cope with the Viet Cong in the field. The effect of such behavior on our Vietnamese allies could be disastrous. At a minimum, it would destroy all confidence in Viet-Nam in ultimate success and would encourage the timid and the wavering to turn to the Viet Cong for protection and to the Liberation Front for political accommodation.

Another serious result of such passivity would be the impossibility of obtaining honorable terms at any peace table. The Communists are tough enough to deal with when one has the upper hand. They would never give us acceptable terms if the military situation reflected weakness on our part and a readiness to withdraw. Our only alterna-

tive would be to accept dishonorable terms or to continue to sit out the war indefinitely on a supine defensive. I can hardly see the American public or this Congress long supporting such a course of action. Thus I am obliged to conclude that the so-called "holding strategy" is really not an alternative way of reaching our objective of an independent South Viet-Nam free from attack. We could never reach it on such a course. Rather than being a true alternative, it amounts to the modification and erosion of our basic objective and hence appears to me to be unacceptable.

In conclusion, I feel that our present strategy is the best that has been suggested and that it is important that we adhere to it, always striving to improve our performance within the confines of its general concept. Certainly it is not without risks—but little of value in this world is accomplished without risk. It seems to me that the risks entailed are warranted by the importance of our stake in Southeast Asia.

Congress recognized this importance in the wording of the joint resolution of August 1964: "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." I subscribe to those words and believe we should live by them and by the words of President Johnson when he said in regard to our commitment in South Viet-Nam: "We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

#### "A CONVERSATION WITH HUBERT HUMPHREY," APRIL 19, 1966<sup>1</sup> [Excerpts]

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Vice President, this administration seems to have given the American people several explanations as to why we are in Vietnam, beginning with the letter from Mr. Eisenhower about aid, and all the way up to the SEATO Treaty.

Do you think this has been well done in terms of persuading the people that there is a clear and consistent policy?

Vice President HUMPHREY. It is always easier, of course, to persuade people, or to get a message to the American people, if there is a sudden development.

For example, it did not take much persuading of the American people when Pearl Harbor happened. And, indeed, it didn't take a great deal of persuading of the American people after Dunkirk. These were dramatic events that compelled everyone's—well, that compelled everyone to know what was going on, the information was there, the drama was there. It was rather, it was simple, even though horrible. And a declaration of war, for example, surely compels people to know what is going on.

<sup>1</sup> CBS News Special Report, as broadcast over the CBS Television Network and the CBS Radio Network, Apr. 19, 1966.

In this situation, though, it is much more complex. The war is different itself. It is a political war. It is a guerrilla war. It is an area of the world that is in revolution—instability of government, the fragility of the—the fragile nature of the political institutions. All of this makes it very complicated to find any simple, direct answers to the problems in Southeast Asia, or to give simple, direct, understandable statements as to what we are seeking to do.

And it is, as you have indicated—we sort of approached the Vietnamese situation by walking up and putting our toe into that trouble—into those troubled waters, and then going in just a little deeper, starting back in 1965, where we made some commitments, economic commitments at that time.

But I think our objectives are rather clear—to defeat the aggression, to stop the aggression, to prevent the success of aggression, we have said, and to give the peoples of South Vietnam their opportunity to make their own choice, to design their own government, to have free elections for the establishment of their own government, and ultimately to make a decision as to whether or not they wish to unite in one country or to have two countries.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Vice President, to use your own figure of speech, we began by putting our toe in the water, and certainly now we are in it up to our neck.

How wise and how fair is it for the American people to be involved to that extent without a declaration of war?

Vice President HUMPHREY. I personally believe that a declaration of war would only exacerbate the situation. I think it would create a highly emotional fever in this country that would truly escalate the struggle.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Why do you think that?

Vice President HUMPHREY. Because the whole attitude of the people changes. The organization of your country changes. The activities of your government change.

One of the things that we have tried to do in this period is to continue to operate an economy on a rather normal basis without the strict controls that come in by the declaration of war or a national emergency.

Furthermore, you trigger a whole series of events once there is a declaration of war. It is a matter of telling the rest of the world—join up. It really is putting up a signal that you are not only in trouble, but trouble is everywhere, and you may want to join in that trouble.

Mr. SEVAREID. It looks to a lot of people as though the troubles of Marshall Ky in Saigon more or less date from the Honolulu Conference, when he came to see President Johnson. Is there a direct connection?

Vice President HUMPHREY. Not at all. I wouldn't think there was any direct connection. There, of course, this is the sort of a base line for American journalism, because Prime Minister Ky took on added significance in the American mind, in the American communication media, from the Honolulu Conference. He had high visibility at that

particular time because the President of the United States was at the conference, and because the conference was a very important conference.

There had to be some identification with individuals because individuals make up government and the only government that was available at that time in Saigon was the government representatives that the President met with in Honolulu.

I would never want anyone to underestimate the meaning of the Honolulu Conference, and the Honolulu Declaration. If that is studied carefully, I think it has as much significance for the future of Asia as the Atlantic Charter had for the future of Europe.

Mr. AGRONSKY. What do you have in mind when you say that?

Vice President HUMPHREY. Because the Honolulu Declaration that came from that conference, while in terms of current history was directed towards Vietnam, it was a much broader declaration. It was directed towards an Asia, a modern Asia, an Asia with abundance, an Asia with social justice, an Asia at peace, an Asia with tremendous programs of social, economic betterment. That is the way I read the Honolulu Declaration. And I have studied very carefully and frankly have been very much moved by it.

I regret that more attention has not been given to that declaration, and a little less attention to the personalities involved.

Mr. AGRONSKY. This was the articulation of a Johnson doctrine for Asia?

Vice President HUMPHREY. Yes, I think it was. I really believe that, sir. I had not heard it put quite that way, but as you have said it, that would be as I would envision it and see it.

Now, what was said in this declaration was a pledge to ourselves and to posterity to defeat aggression, to defeat social misery, to build viable, free political institutions and to achieve peace.

Now, those are broad terms, but these are great commitments. And then you add onto this, sir, our relationships with India and Pakistan, but particularly now India, where the discussions between our two governments have gone far beyond just food; they have gone into the whole matter of development of the economy, the social, political structure.

I think there is a tremendous new opening here for realizing the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia, not just here at home. And I regret that we have not been able to dramatize it more.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Vice President, there are immense implications, it seems to me, in what you are saying here.

Vice President HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. SEVAREID. You seem to me to be saying that the Johnson doctrine, if we may call it that, is proposing a relationship between this country and Asia, far away as it is, and sprawling and diverse as it is, a relationship as fundamental, as long-lasting, intimate, and possibly expensive as our historic associations with Europe. Is it of this scale, of this magnitude?

Vice President HUMPHREY. I think so.

Mr. SEVAREID. Then the American people have not really been told that we are taking on another half of the world as our intimate and chief responsibility.

Vice President HUMPHREY. Well, I don't think they ought to be called that, because that is not the case. It is not our responsibility. I think the American people have been told, again by the cruel facts of war in Vietnam, that we are involved in Asia. Whatever one may think about the struggle in Vietnam—and there are honest differences of opinion about how it ought to be conducted, whether we ever should have been there and how we are going to get out—and I don't want to spend my time arguing the details of that.

We have our problems there; but I do know this, that we are there and that it is almost like the first voyage of an explorer into a new land. The ship has almost been cast, has almost been tossed—storm tossed on the shore and on the beach, but we are there. And we are going to be in Asia for a long, long time. That is what these hearings are all about, about our relationship with Communist China. There is no way that we can really ignore this part of the world, or should we.

We can't be a great power like America with a half world or, as I have said so many times, a world power with a half world involvement, or a world power with a half world knowledge.

Our first objective, it seems to me, should be to be better acquainted with this part of the world in depth, to know more. And I suppose one in public life should not admit his own inadequacies, but it is very difficult for anyone to conceal them, so you might just as well admit them. How little we know, how regrettably how little I have known about Asia—even though I thought I was a student of government and of international politics, if not a good practitioner, at least a student of it. But now Vietnam has compelled us to take a good look at where we are and whether we—and what we are going to do about this part of the world.

It does not mean that we manage it. The one thing that I learned on my visit to Asia, the one impression that I came back with was that Asians themselves want to make Asian policy, they want to take their own initiatives, they want our help, they want our cooperation they desperately need it. They need our know-how. They need our technical assistance.

When I returned I said to many of my associates in government, this is going to really challenge us. This will be the test of our leadership capability. We have great military men in our nation. We have powerful weapons. I think we can be very proud of their achievements and their competence. The question is do we have the same statesmanship quality to help build nations.

We are literally being called upon to help a people build a whole new society. And I have said to many of my good liberal friends in government—I said, "Look, we ought to be excited about this challenge, because here is where we can put to work some of our ideas of how a—nation building, of new concepts of education, development of local government, the improvement of the health standards of

people, and really the achievement and the fulfillment of social justice.”

Mr. SEVAREID. This Vietnam war seems to have become a kind of a measuring rod for a person's general political philosophy in this country, and we are told now, in the press and by many speakers around the country, that you are losing your liberal identification and your liberal following, after a lifetime of enjoying it, because of your support of this war.

Vice President HUMPHREY. Did you say a lifetime of enjoying it?

Mr. SEVAREID. You have enjoyed their support. No doubt much pain with it.

Do you feel this is true?

Vice President HUMPHREY. I think it is fair to say that a number of my old friends disagree with me on my position on the struggle in Vietnam. I respect their right to do so and I respect their point of view.

But I must say in all candor that if a lifetime—and you are right—if a lifetime of service to progressive and liberal causes and legislation is to fall by the wayside because of a disagreement over an action in Vietnam, then the reliability of friendship is found wanting.

I have disagreed with many a man in public life on a particular issue, and yet joined with him again with great respect and admiration in another struggle.

I used to lose friends because I was for medicare. I lost a lot of them. I lost many good supporters. They called me all kinds of things. I lost a host of friends when I advocated civil rights. But I was right, and I felt it deeply. It was not politically popular. I want to make it quite clear, that was a political albatross for years. I carried a heavy load but I felt it.

Mr. AGRONSKY. You feel it is unfair, then, to take away your liberal credentials as a result of the Vietnam—

Vice President HUMPHREY. Well, I don't think a man ought to say it is unfair. Everybody is entitled to their own peeve. But I have not really found too many people that dislike Hubert Humphrey for one particular issue. There are apparently quite a few that are not too fond of him, both conservative and liberal.

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#### REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT ON NATIONWIDE RADIO-TV TO AMERICAN ALUMNI COUNCIL, FROM THE WHITE HOUSE THEATER [Excerpts]<sup>1</sup>

In all these regions we, too, have a very big stake.

Nowhere are the stakes higher than in Asia. So I want to talk to you tonight about Asia and about peace in Asia.

Asia is now the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order, and for life itself.

This is true because three out of every five people in all this world live in Asia tonight. This is true because hundreds of millions of them exist on less than 25 cents a day.

This is true because Communists in Asia tonight still believe in force in order to achieve their Communist goals.

So if enduring peace can ever come to Asia, all mankind will benefit. But if peace fails there, nowhere else will our achievements really be secure.

By peace in Asia I do not mean simply the absence of armed hostilities. For wherever men hunger and hate there can really be no peace.

I do not mean the peace of conquest. For humiliation can be the seedbed of war.

I do not mean simply the peace of the conference table. For peace is not really written merely in the words of treaties, but peace is the day-by-day work of builders.

The peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors; between rich nations and poor; between small nations and large; between men whose skins are brown and black, and yellow and white; between Hindus and Moslems, and Buddhists and Christians.

It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace: through international trade; through the free flow of people and ideas; through full participation by all nations in an international community under law; and through a common dedication to the great task of human progress and economic development.

Is such a peace possible?

With all my heart I believe it is. We are not there yet. We have a long way to journey. But the foundations for such a peace in Asia are being laid tonight as never before. They must be built on these essentials:

First is the determination of the United States to meet our obligations in Asia as a Pacific power.

You have heard arguments the other way. They are built on the old belief that “East is East and West is West and never the twin shall meet.”

- that we have no business but business interests in Asia;
- that Europe, not the Far East, is really our proper sphere of interest;
- that our commitments in Asia are not worth the resources they require;
- that the ocean is vast, the cultures alien, the languages strange, and the races different;
- that these really are not our kind of people.

But all of these arguments have been thoroughly tested. All of them, I think, really have been found wanting.

They do not stand the test of geography: Because we are bounded not by one, but by two oceans. Whether by aircraft or ship, by satellite or missile, the Pacific is as crossable as the Atlantic.

They do not stand the test of common sense. The economic network of this shrinking globe is too intertwined—the basic hopes of men are too interrelated—the possibility of common disaster is too real for us to ever ignore threats to peace in Asia.

They do not stand the test of human concern, either. The people of Asia do matter. We share with them many things in common. We are all persons. We are all human beings.

<sup>1</sup> White House press release dated July 12, 1966.

And they do not stand the test of reality, either. Asia is no longer sitting outside the door of the 20th Century. She is here, in the same world with all of us, to be either our partner or our problem.

Americans entered this century believing that our own security had no foundation outside our own continent. Twice we mistook our sheltered position for safety. Twice we were dead wrong.

If we are wise now, we will not repeat our mistakes of the past. We will not retreat from the obligations of freedom and security in Asia.

The second essential for peace in Asia is this: to prove to aggressive nations that the use of force to conquer others is a losing game.

There is no more difficult task, really, in a world of revolutionary change—where the rewards of conquest tempt ambitious appetites.

As long as the leaders of North Vietnam really believe that they can take over the people of South Vietnam by force, we must not let them succeed.

We must stand across their path and say: "You will not prevail; but turn from the use of force and peace will follow."

Every American must know exactly what it is that we are trying to do in Vietnam. Our greatest resource, really, in this conflict—our greatest support for the men who are fighting out there—is your understanding. It is your willingness to carry—perhaps for a long time—the heavy burden of a confusing and costly war.

We are not trying to wipe out North Vietnam.

We are not trying to change their government.

We are not trying to establish permanent bases in South Vietnam.

And we are not trying to gain one inch of new territory for America.

Then, you say, "Why are we there?" Why?

We are there because we are trying to make the Communists of North Vietnam stop shooting at their neighbors:

- because we are trying to make this Communist aggression unprofitable;

- because we are trying to demonstrate that guerrilla warfare, inspired by one nation against another nation, can never succeed. Once that lesson is learned, a shadow that hangs over all of Asia tonight will begin, I think, to recede.

"Well," you say, "when will that day come?" I am sorry. I cannot tell you; only the men in Hanoi can give you that answer.

We are fighting a war of determination. It may last a long time. But we must keep on until the Communists in North Vietnam realize the price of aggression is too high—and either agree to a peaceful settlement or to stop their fighting.

However long it takes, I want the Communists in Hanoi to know where we stand.

First, victory for your armies is impossible. You cannot drive us from South Vietnam by your force. Do not mistake our firm stand for false optimism. As long as you persist in aggression, we are going to resist.

Second, the minute you realize that a military victory is out of the question and turn from the use of force, you will find us ready and willing to reciprocate. We want to end the fighting. We want to bring our men back home. We want an honorable peace in Vietnam. In your hands is the key to that peace. You have only to turn it.

The third essential is the building of political and economic strength among the nations of free Asia.

For years they have been working at that task. And the untold story of 1966 is the story of what free Asians have done for themselves, and with the help of others, while South Vietnam and her allies have been busy holding aggression at bay.

Many of you can recall our faith in the future of Europe at the end of World War II when we began the Marshall Plan. We backed that faith with all the aid and compassion we could master.

Our faith in Asia at this time is just as great. And that faith is backed by judgment and reason. For if we stand firm in Vietnam against military conquest, we truly believe the emerging order of hope and progress in Asia will continue to grow, and to grow.

Our very able Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, has just returned from a trip through the Far East. He told me yesterday afternoon of many of the heartening signs he saw as the people of Asia continue to work toward common goals.

And these are just some of them. In the last year:

- Japan and Korea have settled their long-standing disputes and established normal relations with promise for closer cooperation;

- One country after another has achieved rates of economic growth that are far beyond the most optimistic hopes we had a few years ago;

- Indonesia and its more than 100 million people have already pulled back from the brink of communism and economic collapse;

- Our friends in India and Pakistan—600 million strong—have ended a tragic conflict and have returned to the immense work of peace;

- Japan has become a dramatic example of economic progress through political and social freedom and has begun to help others;

- Communist China's policy of aggression by proxy is failing;

- Nine Pacific nations—allies and neutrals, white and colored—came together on their own initiative to form an Asian and Pacific Council;

- New and constructive groupings for economic cooperation are under discussion in Southeast Asia;

- The billion dollar Asian Development Bank which I first mentioned in Baltimore in my televised speech a few months ago is already moving forward in Manila with the participation of more than 31 nations;

- and the development of the Lower Mekong River Basin is going forward despite the war.

Throughout free Asia you can hear the echo of progress. As one Malaysian leader said:

Whatever our ethical, cultural, or religious background, the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia must pull together in the same broad sweep of history. We must create with our own hands and minds a new perspective and a new framework. And we must do it ourselves.

For this is the new Asia, and this is the new spirit we see taking shape behind our defense of South Vietnam. Because we have been firm—because we have committed ourselves to the defense of one small country—others have taken new heart.

And I want to assure them tonight that we never intend to let you down. America's word will always be good.

There is a fourth essential for peace in Asia which may seem the most difficult of all: reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies.

A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia.

A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation.

For lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.

We have learned in our relations with other such states that the weakness of neighbors is a temptation, and only firmness, backed by power, can really deter power that is backed by ambition. But we have also learned that the greatest force for opening closed minds and closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods.

For many years, now, the United States has attempted in vain to persuade the Chinese Communists to agree to an exchange of newsmen as one of the first steps to increased understanding between our people.

More recently, we have taken steps to permit American scholars, experts in medicine and public health, and other specialists to travel to Communist China. Only today we have here in the Government cleared a passport for a leading American businessman to exchange knowledge with Chinese mainland leaders in Red China.

All of these initiatives have been rejected, except the action today, by Communist China.

We persist because we know that hunger and disease, ignorance and poverty, recognize no boundaries of either creed or class or country.

We persist because we believe that even the most rigid societies will one day awaken to the rich possibilities of a diverse world.

And we continue because we believe that cooperation, not hostility, is really the way of the future in the 20th Century.

That day is not yet here. It may be long in coming, but I tell you it is clearly on its way, because come it must.

Earlier this year the Foreign Minister of Singapore said that if the nations of the world could learn to build a truly world civilization in the Pacific through cooperation and peaceful competition, then—as our great President Theodore Roosevelt once remarked—this may be the greatest of all human eras—the Pacific era.

As a Pacific power, we must help achieve that outcome.

Because it is a goal worthy of our American dreams and it is a goal that is worthy of the deeds of our brave men who are dying for us tonight.

So I say to you and I pledge to all those who are counting on us: You can depend upon us, because all Americans will do their part.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG,  
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED  
NATIONS, IN THE PLENARY SESSION IN GENERAL  
DEBATE, SEPTEMBER 22, 1966 [Excerpts] <sup>1</sup>

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The conflict in Vietnam is first of all an Asian issue, whose tragedy and suffering fall most heavily on the peoples directly involved. But its repercussions are world wide. It diverts much of the energies of many nations, including my own, from urgent and constructive endeavours. It is, as the Secretary General said in his statement of September 1—

a source of grave concern and is bound to be a source of even greater anxiety, not only to the parties directly involved and to the major powers but also to other Members of the Organization.

My Government remains determined to exercise every restraint to limit the war and to exert every effort to bring the conflict to the earliest possible end. The essential facts of the Vietnam conflict can be stated briefly:

Vietnam today remains divided along the demarcation line agreed upon in Geneva in 1954. To the north and south of that line are North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Provisional though they may be, pending a decision on the peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the process of self-determination, they are none the less political realities in the international community.

The Geneva Accord which established the demarcation line is so thorough in its prohibition of the use of force that it forbids military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other. It even forbids civilians to cross the demilitarized zone. In 1962, at the Geneva Conference held that year, military infiltration through Laos was also forbidden. Yet, despite those provisions, South Vietnam is under an attack, already several years old, by forces directed and supplied from the North and reinforced by regular units—currently some seventeen identified regiments—of the North Vietnamese Army. The manifest purpose of this attack is to force upon the people of South Vietnam a system which they have not chosen by any peaceful process.

Let it be noted that this attack by North Vietnam contravenes not only the United Nations Charter, but also the terms of General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), adopted unanimously only last December and entitled "Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty."

That resolution declares, among other things, that—

no State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.

It further declares that—

... no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow ... of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.

It would be hard to write a more precise description of what North Vietnam is doing and has been doing for years in South Vietnam.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. mission to the United Nations press release No. 4917 dated Sept. 22, 1966.

Certainly, the prohibition of the use of force and subversion—both by this resolution and by the Charter itself—must apply with full vigor to international demarcation lines that have been established by solemn international agreements. This is true not only in Vietnam but also in all divided States, where the recourse to force between the divided parts can have far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, solemn international agreements, specifically the Geneva accord, explicitly prohibit recourse to force as a means of reunifying Vietnam.

It is because of the attempt to upset by violence the situation in Vietnam, and its far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the United States and other countries have responded to appeals from South Vietnam for military assistance.

Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly limited.

We are not engaged in a "holy war" against communism.

We do not seek to establish an American empire or a sphere of influence in Asia.

We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, and no permanent American presence of any kind in South Vietnam.

We do not seek to impose a policy of alignment on South Vietnam.

We do not seek to overthrow the Government of North Vietnam.

We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.

We do not ask of North Vietnam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it.

Nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

Let me state affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.

We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject the idea that North Vietnam has the right to impose a military solution.

We seek to assure for the people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination—to decide its own political destiny, free of force—that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.

And we believe that reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.

These, then, are our affirmative aims. We are well aware of the stated position of Hanoi on these issues. But no differences can be resolved without contact, discussion or negotiations. For our part, we have long been—and remain today—ready to negotiate without prior conditions. We are prepared to discuss Hanoi's four points, together with any points which other parties may wish to raise. We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, which observance was called for in the communique recently issued by the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest. We will support a reconvening of the Geneva Conference or an Asian conference or any other generally acceptable forum.

At the same time, we have also been soberly considering whether the lack of agreement on peace aims has been the sole barrier to the beginning of negotiations. We are aware that some perceive other obstacles, and I wish to make here today three proposals with respect to them:

First, it is said that one obstacle is the United States bombing of North Vietnam. Let it be recalled that there was no bombing of North Vietnam for five years during which there was steadily increasing infiltration from North Vietnam in violation of the Geneva accords; during which there were no United States combat forces in Vietnam; and during which strenuous efforts were made to achieve a peaceful settlement. Let it be further recalled that twice before we have suspended our bombing, once for thirty-seven days, without any reciprocal act of de-escalation from the other side and without any sign from them of a willingness to negotiate.

Nonetheless, let me say that in this matter the United States is willing once again to take the first step. We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side. We therefore urge before this august Assembly that the Government in Hanoi be asked the following question, to which we would be prepared to receive either a private or public response.

Would it, in the interest of peace, and in response to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing in North Vietnam, take corresponding and timely steps to reduce or bring to an end its own military activities against South Vietnam?

Another obstacle is said to be North Vietnam's conviction or fear that the United States intends to establish a permanent military presence in Vietnam. There is no basis for such a fear. The United States stands ready to withdraw its forces as others withdraw theirs so that peace can be restored in South Vietnam, and favors international machinery—either of the United Nations or other machinery—to ensure effective supervision of the withdrawal.

We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the following question also: Would North Vietnam be willing to agree to a time schedule for supervised phased withdrawal from South Vietnam of all external forces, those of North Vietnam as well as those of the United States and other countries aiding South Vietnam?

A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over the place of the Viet Cong in the negotiations. Some argue that regardless of different views on who controls the Viet Cong, it is a combatant force and, as such, should take part in the negotiations. Our view on this matter was stated some time ago by President Johnson, who made clear that, as far as we are concerned, this question would not be "an insurmountable problem." We therefore invite the authorities in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiations may not be more imaginary than real.

We offer these proposals today in the interests of peace in Southeast Asia. There may be other proposals. We have not been and we are not now inflexible in our position. But we do believe that whatever approach finally succeeds, it will not be one which simply decries what is happening in Vietnam and appeals to one side to stop while encouraging the other. Such an approach can only further delay the peace which we all desire and fervently hope for.

The only workable formula for a settlement will be one which is just to the basic interests of all who are involved. In this spirit, we welcome discussion of this question either in the Security Council,

where the United States itself has raised the matter, or here in the General Assembly, and we are fully prepared to take part in any such discussion. We earnestly solicit the further initiative of any organ, including the Secretary General, or any Member of the United Nations whose influence can help in this cause. Every Member has a responsibility to exercise its power and influence for peace; and the greater its power and influence, the greater is this responsibility.

Now I turn to another problem related in part to the first: the problem of how to foster a constructive relationship between the mainland of China, with its 700 million people, and the outside world. The misdirection of so much of the energies of this vast, industrious and gifted people into xenophobic displays, such as the extraordinary, difficult to understand and alarming activities of the Red Guards; and the official policy and doctrine of promoting revolution and subversion throughout the world—these are among the most disturbing phenomena of our age. Surely among the essentials of peace in Asia are “reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies” and, specifically, “a peaceful mainland China”.

Let me say to this Assembly categorically that it is not the policy of the United States to isolate Communist China from the world. On the contrary, we have sought to limit the areas of hostility and to pave the way for the restoration of our historically friendly relations with the great people of China. Our efforts to this end have taken many forms. Since 1955, United States representatives have held 131 bilateral diplomatic meetings in Geneva, and later in Warsaw, with emissaries from Peking. We have sought without success to open numerous unofficial channels of communication with mainland China. We have made it crystal clear that we do not intend to attack, invade or attempt to overthrow the existing regime in Peking. And we have expressed our hope to see representatives of Peking join us and others in meaningful negotiations on disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and a ban on the further spread of nuclear weapons.

But the international community, if it is faithful to the Charter and to our resolutions, cannot countenance Peking's doctrine and policy of intervening by violence and subversion in other nations, whether under the guise of so-called wars of national liberation against independent countries, or under any other guise. Such intervention can find no place in the United Nations Charter nor in the resolutions of the General Assembly. Yet dozens of nations represented in this hall have had direct experience of these illegal activities. It is in the light of these facts and of our ardent desire for a better atmosphere that the United States has carefully considered the issues arising from the absence of representatives of Peking from the United Nations.

Two facts bear on this issue and on the attitude of my country towards any attempted solution. First, the Republic of China on Taiwan is a founding Member of the United Nations and its rights are clear. The United States will vigorously oppose any effort to exclude the representatives of the Republic of China from the United Nations in order to put representatives of Communist China in their place. The second fact is that Communist China, unlike anyone else in the history of this Organization, has put forward special and extraordinary terms for consenting to enter the United Nations. In addition

to the expulsion of the Republic of China, there are also demands to transform and pervert this Organization from its Charter purposes—some of them put forward as recently as yesterday.

What can be the cause of this attitude? We cannot be sure, but we do know that it comes from a leadership whose stated program is to transform the world by violence. It comes from a leadership which openly proclaims that it is opposed to any discussion of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. It would almost seem that these leaders wish to isolate their country from a world, and from a United Nations, that they cannot transform or control. Indeed, they have brought their country to a degree of isolation that is unique in the world today, an isolation not only from the United States and its allies, but from most of the non-aligned world, and even from most of the Communist nations. Many, not only the United States, have sought improved relations and have been rebuffed.

At this moment in history, therefore, the basic question about the relation between Communist China and the United Nations is a question to which only the leaders in Peking can give the answer. And I put the question: Will they refrain from putting forward clearly unacceptable terms; and are they prepared to assume the obligations of the United Nations Charter, in particular the basic Charter obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State?

The world—and my Government—will listen most attentively for a helpful response to these questions. We hope it will come soon—the sooner the better. Like many other Members here, the United States has the friendliest historic feelings toward the great Chinese people. We look forward to the occasion when they will once again enrich, rather than endanger, the fabric of the world community, and, accept the spirit of the Charter which enjoins all peoples “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors”.

Mr. President, I have dwelt on these great and thorny issues of Asia because they are of more, far more, than regional importance. Progress towards their solution would visibly brighten the atmosphere of international relations all over the world. It would enable the United Nations to turn a new corner, to apply itself with renewed energy to the great tasks of reconciliation and peaceful construction which lie before us in every part of the globe.

Surely, peaceful construction is needed—above all in the less developed areas. It is needed in Southeast Asia, today a region of conflict but also a region of vast under developed resources, where my country is prepared to make a most substantial contribution to the development of the whole region, including North Vietnam. It is needed in the Western Hemisphere where, under the bold ideals of the Alliance for Progress, the states of Latin America are already carrying out a far-reaching, peaceful process of economic and social development.

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## TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ON PEACE AND PROGRESS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ISSUED AT THE MANILA CONFERENCE<sup>1</sup>

We, the leaders of the Seven Nations gathered in Manila;  
Desiring peace and progress in the Asian-Pacific region;  
Having faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations  
which call for the suppression of acts of aggression and respect for  
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;  
Determined that aggression should not be rewarded;  
Respecting the right of all peoples to choose and maintain their  
own forms of government;  
Seeking a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam; and  
Being greatly encouraged by the growing regional understanding  
and regional cooperation among the free nations of Asia and the  
Pacific

Hereby proclaim this declaration of principles on which we base  
our hopes for future peace and progress in the Asian and Pacific  
region;

### I. AGGRESSION MUST NOT SUCCEED

The peace and security of Asia and the Pacific and, indeed, of the  
entire world, are indivisible. The nations of the Asian and Pacific  
region shall enjoy their independence and sovereignty free from  
aggression, outside interference, or the domination of any nation.  
Accepting the hard-won lessons of history that successful aggression  
anywhere endangers the peace, we are determined to fulfill our several  
commitments under the United Nations Charter and various mutual  
security treaties so that aggression in the region of Asia and the  
Pacific shall not succeed.

### II. WE MUST BREAK THE BONDS OF POVERTY, ILLITERACY, AND DISEASE

In the region of Asia and the Pacific, where there is a rich heritage  
of the intrinsic worth and dignity of every man, we recognize the  
responsibility of every nation to join in an expanding offensive against  
poverty, illiteracy and disease. For these bind men to lives of hope-  
lessness and despair; these are the roots of violence and war. It is  
when men know that progress is possible and is being achieved, when  
they are convinced that their children will lead better, fuller, richer  
lives, that men lift up their heads in hope and pride. Only thus can  
there be lasting national stability and international order.

### III. WE MUST STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION

Together with our other partners of Asia and the Pacific, we will  
develop the institutions and practice of regional cooperation. Through  
sustained effort we aim to build in this vast area, where almost two-  
thirds of humanity live, a region of security and order and progress,  
realizing its common destiny in the light of its own traditions and  
aspirations. The peoples of this region have the right as well as the  
primary responsibility to deal with their own problems and to shape

their own future in terms of their own wisdom and experience. Eco-  
nomic and cultural cooperation for regional development should be  
open to all countries in the region, irrespective of creed or ideology,  
which genuinely follow a policy of peace and harmony among all  
nations. Nations outside the region will be welcomed as partners  
working for the common benefit and their cooperation will be sought  
in forms consonant with the independence and dignity of the Asian  
and Pacific nations.

A peaceful and progressive Asia, in which nations are able to work  
together for the common good, will be a major factor in establishing  
peace and prosperity throughout the world and improving the pros-  
pects of international cooperation and a better life for all mankind.

### IV. WE MUST SEEK RECONCILIATION AND PEACE THROUGHOUT ASIA

We do not threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of our  
neighbors, whatever their ideological alignment. We ask only that  
this be reciprocated. The quarrels and ambitions of ideology and the  
painful frictions arising from national fears and grievances should  
belong to the past. Aggression rooted in them must not succeed. We  
shall play our full part in creating an environment in which recon-  
ciliation becomes possible, for in the modern world men and nations  
have no choice but to learn to live together as brothers.

## TEXT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE MA- NILA SUMMIT CONFERENCE, MANILA, THE PHILIPPINES<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

1. In response to an invitation from the President of the Republic  
of the Philippines, after consultations with the President of the Repub-  
lic of Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Republic of  
Vietnam, the leaders of seven nations in the Asian and Pacific region  
held a summit conference in Manila on October 24 and 25, 1966, to  
consider the conflict in South Vietnam and to review their wider pur-  
poses in Asia and the Pacific. The participants were Prime Minister  
Harold Holt of Australia, President Park Chung Hee of the Republic  
of Korea, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President  
Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, Prime Minister Thanom  
Kittikachorn of Thailand, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United  
States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime  
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam.

### BASIC POLICY

2. The nations represented at this conference are united in their  
determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured, in their  
resolve for peace, and in their deep concern for the future of Asia and  
the Pacific. Some of us are now close to the actual danger, while others  
have learned to know its significance through bitter past experience.  
This conference symbolizes our common purposes and high hopes.

<sup>1</sup> White House press release dated Oct. 25, 1966.

<sup>1</sup> White House press release dated Oct. 25, 1966.

3. We are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government. We shall continue our military and all other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among ourselves until the aggression is ended.

4. At the same time our united purpose is peace—peace in South Vietnam and in the rest of Asia and the Pacific. Our common commitment is to the defense of the South Vietnamese people. Our sole demand on the leaders of North Vietnam is that they abandon their aggression. We are prepared to pursue any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence.

5. We are united in looking to a peaceful and prosperous future for all of Asia and the Pacific. We have therefore set forth in a separate declaration a statement of the principles that guide our common actions in this wider sphere.

6. Actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated shall be in accordance with our respective constitutional processes.

#### PROGRESS AND PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE MILITARY EFFORT

7. The Government of Vietnam described the significant military progress being made against aggression. It noted with particular gratitude the substantial contribution being made by free world forces.

8. Nonetheless, the leaders noted that the movement of forces from North Vietnam continues at a high rate and that firm military action and free world support continue to be required to meet the threat. The necessity for such military action and support must depend for its size and duration on the intensity and duration of the Communist aggression itself.

9. In their discussion, the leaders reviewed the problem of prisoners of war. The participants observed that Hanoi has consistently refused to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the application of the Geneva Conventions, and called on Hanoi to do so. They reaffirmed their determination to comply fully with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and welcomed the resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies on October 8, 1966, calling for compliance with the Geneva Conventions in the Vietnam conflict, full support for the International Committee of the Red Cross, and immediate action to repatriate seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war. They agreed to work toward the fulfillment of this resolution, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, and indicated their willingness to meet under the auspices of the ICRC or in any appropriate forum to discuss the immediate exchange of prisoners.

#### PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTION DEVELOPMENT

10. The participating governments concentrated particular attention on the accelerating efforts of the Government of Vietnam to forge a social revolution of hope and progress. Even as the conflict continues, the effort goes forward to overcome the tyranny of poverty, disease, illiteracy and social injustice.

11. The Vietnamese leaders stated their intent to train and assign a substantial share of the armed forces to clear-and-hold actions in order to provide a shield behind which a new society can be built.

12. In the field of Revolutionary Development, measures along the lines developed in the past year and a half will be expanded and intensified. The training of Revolutionary Development cadres will be improved. More electricity and good water will be provided. More and better schools will be built and staffed. Refugees will be taught new skills. Health and medical facilities will be expanded.

13. The Vietnamese Government declared that it is working out a series of measures to modernize agriculture and to assure the cultivator the fruits of his labors. Land reform and tenure provisions will be granted top priority. Agricultural credit will be expanded. Crops will be improved and diversified.

14. The Vietnamese leaders emphasized that underlying these measures to build confidence and cooperation among the people there must be popular conviction that honesty, efficiency and social justice form solid cornerstones of the Vietnamese Government's programs.

15. This is a program each of the conferring governments has reason to applaud recognizing that it opens a brighter hope for the people of Vietnam. Each pledged its continuing assistance according to its means, whether in funds or skilled technicians or equipment. They noted also the help in non-military fields being given by other countries and expressed the hope that this help will be substantially increased.

#### ECONOMIC STABILITY AND PROGRESS

16. The Conference was told of the success of the Government of Vietnam in controlling the inflation which, if unchecked, could undercut all efforts to bring a more fulfilling life to the Vietnamese people. However, the Vietnamese leaders reaffirmed that only by constant effort could inflation be kept under control. They described their intention to enforce a vigorous stabilization program, to control spending, increase revenues, and seek to promote savings in order to hold the 1967 inflationary gap to the minimum practicable level. They also plan to take further measures to insure maximum utilization of the Port of Saigon, so that imports urgently needed to fuel the military effort and buttress the civil economy can flow rapidly into Vietnam.

17. Looking to the long-term future of their richly endowed country, the Vietnamese representatives described their views and plans for the building of an expanded postwar economy.

18. Military installations where appropriate will be converted to this purpose, and plans for this will be included.

19. The conferring nations reaffirmed their continuing support for Vietnamese efforts to achieve economic stability and progress. Thailand specifically noted its readiness to extend substantial new credit assistance for the purchase of rice and the other nations present reported a number of plans for the supply of food or other actions related to the economic situation. At the same time the participants agreed to appeal to other nations and to international organizations committed to the full and free development of every nation, for further assistance to the Republic of Vietnam.

## POLITICAL EVOLUTION

20. The representatives of Vietnam noted that, even as the Conference met, steps were being taken to establish a new constitutional system for the Republic of Vietnam through the work of the Constituent Assembly, chosen by so large a proportion of the electorate last month.

21. The Vietnamese representatives stated their expectation that work on the Constitution would go forward rapidly and could be completed before the deadline of March 1967. The Constitution will then be promulgated and elections will be held within six months to select a representative government.

22. The Vietnamese Government believes that the democratic process must be strengthened at the local as well as the national level. The Government of Vietnam announced that to this end it will begin holding village and hamlet elections at the beginning of 1967.

23. The Government of Vietnam announced that it is preparing a program of National Reconciliation. It declared its determination to open all doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot with the Viet Cong. The Government seeks to bring them back to participate as free men in national life under amnesty and other measures. Former enemies are asked only to lay down their weapons and bring their skills to the service of the South Vietnamese people.

24. The other participating nations welcomed the stated expectation of the Vietnamese representatives that work on the Constitution will proceed on schedule, and concurred in the conviction of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam that building representative, constitutional government and opening the way for national reconciliation are indispensable to the future of a free Vietnam.

## THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

25. The participants devoted a major share of their deliberations to peace objectives and the search for a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam. They reviewed in detail the many efforts for peace that have been undertaken, by themselves and other nations, and the actions of the United Nations and of His Holiness the Pope. It was clearly understood that the settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together a just and reasonable solution. They noted that Hanoi still showed no sign of taking any step toward peace, either by action or by entering into discussions or negotiations. Nevertheless, the participants agreed that the search for peace must continue.

26. The Government of the Republic of Vietnam declared that the Vietnamese people, having suffered the ravages of war for more than two decades, were second to none in their desire for peace. It welcomes any initiative that will lead to an end to hostilities, preserves the independence of South Vietnam and protects the right to choose their own way of life.

27. So that their aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and friends everywhere, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of peace in Vietnam:

(1) *Cessation of aggression.*—At issue in Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values which people everywhere have cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom of individuals. The people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more.

(2) *Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam.*—The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peaceful means. While sympathizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country.

(3) *Reunification of Vietnam.*—The Government and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and South. But this partition brought about by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 however unfortunate and regrettable, will be respected until, by the free choice of all Vietnamese, reunification is achieved.

(4) *Resolution of internal problems.*—The people of South Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. When the aggression has stopped, the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and will move forward, through the democratic process, toward human dignity, prosperity and lasting peace.

(5) *Removal of allied military forces.*—The people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate their installations as the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides.

(6) *Effective guarantees.*—The people of South Vietnam, mindful of their experience since 1954 insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international guarantees. They are openminded as such guarantees can be applied and made effective.

28. The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.

29. In particular, they declared that Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

## CONTINUING CONSULTATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING NATIONS

30. All the participants agreed that the value of a meeting among the seven nations had been abundantly demonstrated by the candid and thorough discussions held. It was further agreed that, in addition to the close consultation already maintained through diplomatic channels, there should be regular meetings among their Ambassadors in Saigon in association with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Meetings of their Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government will also be held as required.

31. At the close of the meeting, all the visiting participants expressed their deep gratitude to President Marcos and to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for offering Manila as the conference site, and expressed their appreciation for the highly efficient arrangements.

**TEXT OF THE LETTER DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR  
ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL,  
DECEMBER 19, 1966<sup>1</sup>**

His Excellency U THANT,  
*Secretary General of the United Nations,  
New York.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: Two world leaders who command the respect of the entire international community have recently voiced the desire for a ceasefire in Vietnam. On December 8, Pope Paul VI noted the temporary Christmas truce arranged in Vietnam and beseeched all concerned to transform this temporary truce into a cessation of hostilities which would become the occasion for sincere negotiations. And you, Mr. Secretary General, expressed the sincere hope on the same day that the parties directly concerned would heed the Pope's appeal.

In the fourteen points my Government has put forward as elements of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, you will recall, the United States has explicitly stated: A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions. I herewith reaffirm our commitment to that proposal—a proposal which is in keeping with the appeal of the Pope as endorsed by you. Our objective remains the end of all fighting, of all hostilities and of all violence in Vietnam—and an honorable and lasting settlement there, for which, as we have repeatedly said, the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 would be a satisfactory basis.

President Johnson has time and again stressed his desire for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Other United States leaders have spoken in a similar vein. In speaking before the General Assembly on behalf of my Government on September 22, I noted there are differences between our aims as to the basis for such a settlement and the stated position of North Vietnam. I went on to say that: “. . . no differences can be resolved without contact, discussion or negotiations”. This holds equally true with regard to arrangements for a mutual cessation of hostilities.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. mission to the United Nations press release No. 5035 dated Jan. 5, 1966.

We turn to you, therefore, with the hope and the request that you will take whatever steps you consider necessary to bring about the necessary discussions which could lead to such a cease-fire. I can assure you that the Government of the United States will cooperate fully with you in getting such discussions started promptly and in bringing them to a successful completion.

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

**EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS JOHNSON  
AND HO CHI MINH<sup>1</sup>**

**LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO HO CHI MINH**

*His Excellency Ho Chi Minh,  
President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Vietnam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy toll—in lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a danger in indirect communication.

There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by representatives of your Government suggesting that you would be prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representatives of the U.S. Government, provided that we ceased “unconditionally” and permanently our bombing operations against your country and all military actions against it. In the last day, serious and responsible parties have assured us indirectly that this is in fact your proposal.

Let me frankly state that I see two great difficulties with this proposal. In view of your public position, such action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide speculation that discussions were under way and would impair the privacy and secrecy of those discussions.

<sup>1</sup> “Vietnam: Search for Peace,” Department of State, 1967.

Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our part whether your Government would make use of such action by us to improve its military position.

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace.

I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Vietnam. If you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Vietnam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce.

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South Vietnam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

FEBRUARY 8, 1967.

**LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM HO CHI MINH**

To His Excellency Mr. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,  
*President, United States of America*

**YOUR EXCELLENCY:** On February 10, 1967, I received your message. This is my reply.

Vietnam is thousands of miles away from the United States. The Vietnamese people have never done any harm to the United States. But contrary to the pledges made by its representative at the 1954 Geneva conference, the U.S. Government has ceaselessly intervened in Vietnam, it has unleashed and intensified the war of aggression in South Vietnam with a view to prolonging the partition of Vietnam and turning South Vietnam into a neo-colony and a military base of the United States. For over two years now, the U.S. Government has, with its air and naval forces, carried the war to the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country.

The U.S. Government has committed war crimes, crimes against peace and against mankind. In South Vietnam, half a million U.S. and satellite troops have resorted to the most inhuman weapons and the most barbarous methods of warfare, such as napalm, toxic chemicals and gases, to massacre our compatriots, destroy crops, and raze villages to the ground. In North Vietnam, thousands of U.S. aircraft

have dropped hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs, destroying towns, villages, factories, schools. In your message, you apparently deplore the sufferings and destruction in Vietnam. May I ask you: Who has perpetrated these monstrous crimes? It is the United States and satellite troops. The U.S. Government is entirely responsible for the extremely serious situation in Vietnam.

The U.S. war of aggression against the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat to the national independence movement, and a serious danger to peace in Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, freedom and peace. But in the face of the U.S. aggression, they have risen up, united as one man, fearless of sacrifices and hardships. They are determined to carry on their resistance until they have won genuine independence and freedom and true peace. Our just cause enjoys strong sympathy and support from the peoples of the whole world, including broad sections of the American people.

The U.S. Government has unleashed the war of aggression in Vietnam. It must cease this aggression. That is the only way to the restoration of peace. The U.S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U.S. and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs. Such is the basis (sic) content of the five-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which embodies the essential principles and provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, it is the basic (sic) of a correct political solution to the Vietnam problem.

In your message, you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. If the U.S. Government really wants these talks, it must first of all stop unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States could enter into talks and discuss questions concerning the two sides.

The Vietnamese people will never submit to force, they will never accept talks under the threat of bombs.

Our cause is absolutely just. It is to be hoped that the U.S. Government will act in accordance with reason.

Sincerely,

HO CHI MINH.

FEBRUARY 15, 1967.

**SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 9'  
1967<sup>1</sup>**

Secretary RUSK. There has been a good deal of discussion in recent days about the prospects for peace in Viet-Nam. President Johnson has pressed for peace in Southeast Asia in capitals all over the world, over and over again. He has demonstrated that he is prepared to meet the

<sup>1</sup> Department of State press release 27 dated Feb. 9, 1967.

other side more than half way. He has urged a conference, unconditional discussions, or private and discreet contacts in order to move ahead with talks which might open the way to peace. He has responded affirmatively to the efforts of 17 non-aligned nations, of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, of Asian Nations, of the British Co-Chairman, of members of the International Control Commission, of leading personalities.

The United States has made it clear that Hanoi's Four Points could be discussed along with points which others might wish to propose or that we would engage in preliminary discussions to attempt to find an agreed set of points as a basis for negotiation. We have made it clear that we want no bases in Southeast Asia and do not wish to retain United States troops in Viet-Nam after peace is assured. At Manila, the allies stated that they would withdraw their forces not later than six months after the other side "withdraws its forces to the North, ceases its infiltration and the level of violence thus subsidies." We have affirmed our full support for free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice and have stated that we believe that the question of reunification should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision. We have emphasized that we would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia, rather than war, and that peace could permit North Viet-Nam to participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars.

On the military side, we have on two occasions stopped the bombing of North Viet-Nam to discover whether there might be some constructive reaction from the other side. In May 1965, a pause was limited to five and a half days because it was rejected by the principal Communist capitals during the first three days. At the beginning of 1966, there was a cessation for 37 days—a period much longer than had been indicated might produce some constructive result. It elicited no response other than the continuation of the movement of men and arms into the South, and an assertion that Viet-Nam must be settled on Communist terms. We have emphasized that we would be prepared to discuss steps of mutual de-escalation or would indeed take note of any de-escalation on the ground and would respond accordingly.

But for some time now there has been evident a systematic campaign by the Communist side to bring about an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam without any corresponding military action on their side in exchange for the possibility of talks—talks which are thus far formless and without content. We cannot accept a situation in which men and arms move, without interruption by us, to across the 17th Parallel and attack allied armed forces and Vietnamese civilians in the south. We must know the military consequences of such a military action on our part. They must not expect us to stop our military action by bombing while they continue their military action by invasion. No one has been able or willing to give us any information on this subject.

It is entirely within the resources of the quiet diplomacy of both sides to talk about peace and to discuss mutual steps to reduce the violence. We have been trying in every way known to us to invite and to engage in such talks. Unfortunately I cannot report to you today any tangible forward movement in this direction. All channels remain open and are being utilized.

As the President said yesterday in his letter to His Holiness the Pope:

We are prepared to talk at any time and place, in any forum, with the object of bringing peace to Viet-Nam. However, I know you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the other side is willing to do likewise.

We are prepared—

the President said—

to discuss the balanced reduction in military activity, the cessation of hostilities, or any practical arrangements which could lead to these results.

Our objective in Viet-Nam is and always has been a limited one—a South Viet-Nam able to determine its own future without external interference. I need hardly repeat that this and this alone is our objective, but for the benefit of members of the press who may not be fully familiar with all our statements, I am today making available points we made last year under 14 different headings—annotated to reflect developments in 1966. These are, and remain, not in any sense pre-conditions for discussions, but rather statements of the elements that we believe could produce peace in Viet-Nam.

Let me say quietly and sincerely to all capitals on the other side:

Let good sense take charge for all of us in this situation. Recognize the necessity for elementary reciprocity. Join with us in a common search for peace. Let us make use of the means available to us to exchange views and to search for those common interests upon which peace can be built. Let us relieve all the peoples concerned of the burdens of this struggle. Let us turn our hand to the urgent unfinished business of assuring a more decent future for those who have been caught up in this violence for so long.

I am now ready for your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the fourteen points that were put out a year ago. Would you say that the atmosphere or the climate for peace negotiations has improved in any way since that time, particularly since the conflict in China has become so intense?*

A. It is hard to judge atmosphere, because what we really must count upon is specific, tangible indications of a readiness to move towards peace.

We are exploring in every way that we know what those possibilities might be.

The President has said that we would meet the other side more than half way.

So what the atmosphere really will amount to turns upon whether we can in fact engage the other side at points where we and they together can move this matter towards the conference table or toward a peaceful settlement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some idea of the rate of infiltration these days? Is it significantly lower now than it was last year?*

A. There is some time lag in our current information on exact numbers.

We know that the infiltration continues. We see the trucks moving south, we see the men moving south. We have other sources of information.

We do get from prisoners, from captured documents and from other sources of information rather accurate figures, after a bit of time, on what happens in a particular period.

But I do not know of any information indicating that the infiltration has stopped, or that they have themselves undertaken a level of infiltration that bears with it political consequences.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have talked about the need to recognize the principle of elementary reciprocity.*

Since so much of the current discussion seems to hang on this, sir, could you give us some idea of whether by this you mean a specific promise to negotiate if we stop the bombing or specific military action?

A. Well, I have pointed out in my statement that we cannot stop our military actions involving the bombing while they continue their military actions of invasion.

Now, let me illustrate the question of reciprocity just for a moment, because that element has dropped out of a good deal of public discussion of this subject.

If we were to say that we would not talk unless all violence stops in the south while our bombing continues in the north, everyone would say—"Well, that is absurd."

Now, why is it absurd for us and reasonable for the other side?

We have had no indication that they will adopt corresponding or reciprocal military moves if we stop the bombing of North Vietnam.

We have some operational questions. Those trucks just north of the 17th parallel headed south with men and arms—are we to say that they are free to come to the gates with impunity, safety, and then suddenly unload themselves and have those men attack our Marines just across the 17th parallel while we pick this ammunition out of our men, instead of dealing with those trucks as a part of the battle where we find them?

I think some elementary reciprocity is required and common fairness would require that if there is an interest towards peace, that both sides help move toward it, because you cannot stop this war simply by stopping a half of it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it is being frequently said these days that—in the two Burchett interviews and in what Mr. Kosygin said yesterday—that the position of North Viet-Nam has been changed; that instead of asserting four pre-conditions, there is only now one pre-condition, and it is therefore concluded that there is movement in their position.*

*Do you accept the fact of movement in their position?*

A. Well, these are matters which can be fully explored through existing channels, with existing contacts, with the help of other governments, if that seems desirable, in order to find out whether there in fact is a basis of peace.

But what has not been said by the Foreign Minister of North Viet-Nam or by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union is what the military consequences would be if we stopped the bombing—what would the other side do. That is a point which has been ignored, that is a point on which we have had no response. And we need some response on that.

Now, let me make it clear.

We do not consider that any action in the military field need be a pre-condition for discussions. We are prepared today to have talks with those on the other side, to talk about either the prospects for peace or to talk about the mutual steps which the two sides can take to reduce the violence and move this closer toward peace.

We are prepared to talk about any point, any handle which can be grasped, which might make a difference in this situation.

For example, the demilitarization of the demilitarized zone along the 17th Parallel; assistance to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, in assuring the neutrality and the territorial integrity of his country; the exchange of prisoners—we are prepared to talk about any point which could indicate some constructive step forward.

Now, if we are faced with a major condition on the military side as a pre-condition for discussion, then we are prepared to enter into preliminary discussions with the other side about what action can and should be taken by the two sides in the military field.

But there needs to be some correspondence, some reciprocity in these matters, if in fact we are to move this towards a peaceful solution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the absence of these discussions, if the decreased infiltration has not reached what you call a "politically significant level" how do we measure mutual de-escalation steps on their part? What techniques do we have for determining that this has happened?*

A. Well, I think we would know rather soon in the field whether there was a cessation of activity in and just north of the de-militarized zone. There are many ways in which we could get impressions as to the intentions of the other side.

Now, one matter that bears upon the question of intentions. As you know, we are now in the middle of a Tet Cease-Fire. It's a four-day Cease-Fire, as far as we are concerned. There have been a disturbing number of violations of that Cease-Fire, and we have seen large numbers of boats and other vessels dashing south along the coast of North Viet-Nam to resupply their forces in the southern part of North Viet-Nam and in the de-militarized zone.

Now, this indicates that it is their intention to continue the operations, and the large number of incidents indicates that they are not particularly interested in an actual cease-fire.

So, we have to weigh these things in trying to assess the intentions and the motives of the other side.

*Q. May I ask you another question, Mr. Secretary. Are there any contacts or discussions of any kind going on to extend that four-day cease-fire to the seven-day cease-fire they say they are going to honor?*

A. Well, Prime Minister Ky has indicated some time ago that he would be prepared to discuss with the North Vietnamese authorities the question of an extension of that cease-fire. This is something which can be discussed, which can be looked into. But I could not give you any details today as to whether or not there are discussions pointing in that direction. There are some difficult operational questions about that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Administration's good faith, in trying to reach discussions while bombing and other military activities still go on, has been cast in to some doubt by stories about the bombing that occurred in mid December, and arrangements, supposedly, had been made for a meeting in Warsaw. And I think Prime Minister Wilson referred to this in Parliament this week and called it a "misunderstanding" on both sides.*

*Could you elucidate what that misunderstanding was?*

A. No, because to do so would, in my judgment, get in the way of the possibilities of using existing channels to try to move this matter toward peace. It is not for me to talk about reports of particular channels that might have existed at one time or another, or were

speculated about. When the full story comes out someday it will be rather different than some of the things you have heard.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you accept his implication that part of the blame lies on the United States?*

A. I am not accepting or rejecting anything at the moment. I am saying I am not getting into the question of a particular channel that somebody said might have existed.

Yes?

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do we know a great deal about the character and life of Ho Chi Minh which seems to be relevant now? Mr. Salisbury said he thought he had been a waiter for two years in New York City, which might explain—[Laughter.]*

A. Yes, we have had a good deal of biographic information on Mr. Ho Chi Minh. We, quite frankly, at the moment are more interested in his future than his past. [Laughter.] And we would like to have that future be a peaceful one, and that he would work with us to make some peace in Southeast Asia.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago you recall we offered to maintain our bombing pause if the other side would only come and talk. In fact, we sent envoys around the world looking for some signal from Hanoi of a willingness to talk. Why is it that now we are unwilling to make such an offer during the current pause?*

A. Well, let me point out that the other side is not talking about a pause. The other side is demanding an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing. Now, that is a very significant military step for us to take. And unless it is accompanied by military action on their part, it would create a situation in which they would be safe and secure and comfortable, while sending their men and their arms down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and across the 17th Parallel to attack South Viet-Nam. So they have put this matter into a somewhat different context.

As you recall, during the last pause in the bombing, on the 34th day instead of coming back with counter proposals or counter suggestions, they simply publicly required that we accept the notion that the Liberation Front should be the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people, that we accept their four points and get out of South Viet-Nam. Now, that was obviously impossible.

*Q. In other words, sir, it is the shift in position on Hanoi's side on the terms for a bombing cessation that has caused a shift in our position?*

A. Well, there is no shift in our position in the sense that we are prepared to take up political questions through political channels. We are prepared to deal with military matters as military matters, and we are prepared to discuss with the other side what actions each side might take of a military character that would move this matter toward peace.

Now, that has been true—this was in the 14 points at the beginning of last year. We would be prepared to discuss the question of mutual de-escalation, that we would be prepared to stop the bombing as a step toward peace, but we can't stop the bombing simply as a step toward closing off one-half of the war while the rest of it goes on full force.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what did you think of Senator Kennedy's proposals last night for a new policy toward Red China?*

A. Well, I saw his speech. I think if one thinks of these problems over a very long run, that he had some interesting things to say. And

I commented on some of these matters myself before the Zablocki Committee. He did not get into the question which is the central question in the shortrun, namely, are you prepared to surrender Taiwan? Because in all of our contacts with Peiping and since I have been Secretary of State they have insisted that unless we are prepared to surrender Taiwan there is nothing to discuss. And so many of the efforts which we have made to open up exchanges and to find some means to improve relations with Mainland China, to re-establish contacts with the great Chinese people, on that Mainland, have not been of any avail because we cannot, of course, surrender these 13 or 14 million people on Taiwan to the Mainland.

*Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.*

A. Thank you.

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AT A SPECIAL CONVOCATION AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C., FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1967 [Excerpts]<sup>1</sup>

Our effort to open the door to peace in Vietnam has been continuous. In recent weeks public attention has been focussed on this effort by an unusual number of statements, reports and events: pronouncements by the governments involved, appeals by world leaders including Pope Paul and Secretary General Thant, new stories and interviews with various personalities—and the perplexing events in Mainland China. Right now we are in the midst of another pause in the fighting, the Lunar New Year Truce. Thus this may be a good moment to assess the present status of our efforts for peace.

In such an assessment, a responsible official, must in all that he says in public, avoid damaging the hopes for progress through private diplomacy. But in a free society he must also accept the inescapable responsibility to keep the public adequately informed. It is difficult to deal on both levels at once but it is essential to do so as well as we can.

Let me begin, then, by recalling the basic American peace aims in Vietnam. These aims have been stated many times by President Johnson and other responsible spokesmen of the United States. They have been stated over a span of two years, but the ebb and flow of the military situation during that time has not made them any less valid as guidelines for peace negotiations. We do not subscribe to the false notion that a strong military position obviates the desirability of seeking peace through negotiations. Today, therefore, I wish to review the essence of these American aims.

The United States seeks a political solution in Vietnam. We do not seek the unconditional surrender of our adversaries. We seek a settlement whose terms will result not from dictation, but from genuine negotiations—a settlement whose terms will not sacrifice the vital interest of any party. In the words of the Manila Communique: "The settlement of the war in Vietnam depends on the readiness and willingness of the parties concerned to explore and work out together a just and reasonable solution." As President Johnson said a week

<sup>1</sup> U.S. mission to the United Nations press release No. 13, dated Feb. 10, 1967.

ago here in Washington: Such a solution "will involve . . . concessions on both parts."

We are not engaged in a "holy war" against communism. We do not seek an American sphere of influence in Asia; nor a permanent American "presence" of any kind—military or otherwise—in Vietnam; nor the imposition of a military alliance on South Vietnam.

We do not seek to do any injury to Mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.

We seek to assure to the people of South Vietnam the affirmative exercise of the right of self-determination—the right to decide their own political destiny free of external interference and force and through democratic processes. In keeping with the announced South Vietnamese Government's policy of national reconciliation, we do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future. We are prepared to accept the results of that decision whatever it may be. We support the early consummation of a democratic constitutional system in South Vietnam, and welcome the progress being made to this end.

As regards North Vietnam, we have no designs on its territory, and we do not seek to overthrow its government whatever its ideology. We are prepared fully to respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enter into specific undertakings to that end.

We believe the reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and the South without any outside interference; and the results of that choice also will have our full support.

Finally, when peace is restored we are willing to make a major commitment of money, talent and resources to a multilateral cooperative effort to bring to all of Southeast Asia, including North Vietnam, the benefits of economic and social reconstruction and development which that area so sorely needs.

These, then, are the peace aims of the United States. They parallel the objectives stated by the South Vietnamese Government at Manila. Our aims are strictly limited and we sincerely believe they contain nothing inconsistent with the interests of any party. Our public pronouncements of them—both in Washington and at the United Nations—are solemn commitments by the United States.

Our adversaries—have also placed their aims and objectives on the public record over the past two years. The major statement of these aims is the well-known four points of Hanoi, which I will summarize without departing too much from their own terminology.

The first point calls for recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. It also calls for the cessation of all acts of war against the North; the ending of United States intervention in the South; the withdrawal of all United States troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, the dismantling of American bases and the cancellation of what they term the United States "Military Alliance" with South Vietnam.

The United States would not find any essential difficulty with a reasonable interpretation of any of the terms included in this point. Our chief concern is what it does not include: namely, that North Vietnam also cease its intervention in the South, end all of its acts of war against the South, and withdraw its forces from the South.

Such a requirement is obviously essential to the "peace" to which this first point refers.

The second point relates to the military clauses of the Geneva agreements. It provides that, pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, both the North and the South must refrain from joining any military alliance; and that there should be no foreign bases, troops of military personnel in their respective territories.

Here again, the only real difficulty is the omission of any obligation on the North to withdraw its military forces from the South—although the Geneva Accords which established the demarcation line in Vietnam forbids military interference of any sort by one side in the affairs of the other, and even goes so far as to forbid civilians to cross the demilitarized zone.

The third point calls for the settlement of the South's internal affairs "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam." This point, of course, was not a part of the Geneva Accords at all. It introduces a new element which I shall discuss later in this analysis.

The fourth point calls for the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, to be settled by the people of both zones without any foreign interference. We have no difficulty with this point as was indicated in my speech to the General Assembly on September 22.

There has apparently been added a fifth point—put forward and repeatedly endorsed by both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front since the enunciation of the four points in April 1965. This fifth point was stated by Ho Chi Minh in January 1966 when he said that if the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the National Liberation Front as the "sole genuine representative" of the people of South Vietnam, and engage in negotiation with it. This, like the third of the "Four Points," introduces a new element which was not part of the Geneva Accords.

Now, from this brief summation of our aims and those declared by Hanoi, it is clear that there are areas of agreement and areas of disagreement. Recent public statements by Hanoi have been helpful in certain aspects, but how great the disagreements are is still uncertain because the stated aims of Hanoi still contain a number of ambiguities. I would like to discuss some of these ambiguities because they relate to very consequential matters.

There is ambiguity, for example, on the role of the National Liberation Front in peace negotiations. I have already noted the statement of Ho Chi Minh and other spokesmen for our adversaries who have said that we must recognize the Front as "the sole genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, and negotiate with it." If this means that we are asked to cease our recognition of the Government in Saigon and deal only with the Front, insistence on this point would imperil the search for peace. For the Front has not been chosen by any democratic process to represent the people of South Vietnam. Nor has the Front been recognized by the world community. It is pertinent to recall that more than 60 nations recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, whereas none recognizes the National Liberation Front as a government.

On the other hand, some public statements seem to call for the National Liberation Front to be given a place or voice at the negotiating table. If this were the position of our adversaries, the prospects

would be brighter; for President Johnson, as long ago as July 1965, said that "the Viet Cong would not have difficulty in being represented and in having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides that it wants to cease aggression." He added that this did not seem to him to be "an insurmountable problem," and that "I think that could be worked out."

A further ambiguity relates to the role of the National Liberation Front in the future political life of South Vietnam. Hanoi asks that the affairs of South Vietnam be settled "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front." Our adversaries, in their various comments on this point, take no notice of the internationally recognized Government of South Vietnam or of the steps which the South Vietnamese leaders have taken, and have currently under way, and the institutions they are now creating, for the purpose of providing their country with a constitutional and representative government.

Nor would their statements seem to leave any place for the South Vietnamese who have participated in and promoted such steps. Such an interpretation would pose serious obstacles to a settlement.

However, some claim that what the National Liberation Front really seeks is no more than the opportunity to advance its program peacefully along with other elements and groupings in the South in a free political environment.

We have already made it clear that we do not wish to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future and that we support a policy of national reconciliation endorsed by the South Vietnamese Government in the Manila Communiqué. Indeed, as Secretary Rusk said in an interview last week, if the Viet Cong were to lay down their arms, ways could be found to permit them to take part in the normal political processes in South Vietnam.

Further ambiguities arise concerning the question of foreign troops in South Vietnam. What does Hanoi mean by "foreign troops"? They clearly include in this term the forces of the United States and other countries aiding the South, but they have never admitted the presence of their own forces in the South. Of course, a one-sided withdrawal by our side would not lead to an acceptable peace. All external forces must withdraw, those of Hanoi as well as ours, if peace is to be achieved.

There is ambiguity also in Hanoi's position on the timing of the withdrawal of external forces. Do our adversaries consider withdrawal of forces as a precondition to negotiations, as some of their statements imply? If so, this again would raise a serious obstacle to progress. But if they look on withdrawal of forces as a provision to be incorporated in a settlement this clearly could be worked out. The United States and its allies are already on record in the Manila Communiqué that their forces "will be withdrawn . . . as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled." Further, we have indicated our willingness to join in a phased and supervised withdrawal of forces by both sides.

Next, there is ambiguity in Hanoi's position on the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. At times their public statements have demanded that the bombing be ended unconditionally, without any

reference to a possible response from their side. On the other hand quite recently a spokesman of Hanoi said that "if, after the definitive and unconditional cessation of the bombardments, the American Government proposes to enter into contact with the [North Vietnamese] Government, . . . this proposal will be examined and studied." And just this week we have seen a further statement, in an interview by the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, that cessation of the bombings "could lead to talks between North Vietnam and the U.S." Many of their statements, insisting that the bombing cease have also contained other expressions, such as that the American military presence in South Vietnam be completely withdrawn and that the "Four Points" of Hanoi must be recognized and accepted as "the" basis—or possibly as "a" basis—for settlement of the conflict. This creates an additional ambiguity as to whether Hanoi means to add still other prenegotiating conditions.

The position of the United States on this bombing question has been stated by a number of Administration spokesmen, including me at the United Nations. The United States remains prepared to take the first step and order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a tangible response toward peace from North Vietnam. In his letter of February 8 to His Holiness, Pope Paul, President Johnson said:

. . . I know you would not expect us to reduce military action unless the other side is willing to do likewise. We are prepared to discuss the balanced reduction in military activity, the cessation of hostilities or any practical arrangements which could lead to these results. We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful and honorable settlement until they are crowned with success.

Some analysts contend that our terms of settlement should be more precisely defined. But it is very difficult to be more precise in advance of negotiation and particularly in light of the substantive ambiguities on the other side. But whatever questions may be raised, they should and can best be resolved in discussions between the parties who have the power to resolve them. For our part, we stand ready to negotiate in good faith unconditionally to resolve all outstanding questions.

The United States approach to negotiations is flexible. We and our allies do not ask our adversaries to accept, as a pre-condition to discussions or negotiations, any point of ours to which they may have objections. Nor do we rule out the discussion of any points of theirs, however difficult they might appear to us. We are willing to discuss and negotiate not only our own points but Hanoi's four points and points emanating from any other source, including the Secretary General of the United Nations.

It remains to be seen whether our adversaries share this concept of negotiations. As I have already pointed out, their various public declarations of peace aims have often been coupled with statements that the goals they put forward must, for example, be "accepted" or "recognized" as the "sole basis" or "the most correct basis" or "the only sound basis" or "the basis for the most correct political solution."

Such statements contain still further ambiguity—in one sense the most fundamental of all, since it relates to the concept of negotiation itself. Do these statements mean that Hanoi is willing to enter negotiations only if there is an assurance in advance that the outcome

will be on their terms and will, in effect, simply ratify the goals they have already stated? Such an attitude would not be conducive to peace and would make the outlook for a settlement bleak indeed.

If, on the other hand, North Vietnam were to say that their points are not pre-conditions to discussions or negotiations, then the prospects should be more promising.

Our negotiating approach would permit each side to seek clarification of the other side's position. It does not require the acceptance in advance of any points, least of all those whose meaning may be in need of clarification. We do not ask that of Hanoi—and progress toward a settlement will be facilitated if Hanoi does not ask it of us.

In this situation, how can we best move toward a settlement?

One essential early step is to analyze the positions of all parties in order to ascertain whether there is some element or some kernel common to all. Many students of the subject have pointed to one fact which may prove to be such a kernel—namely, the fact that both sides have pointed to the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 as an acceptable basis for a peaceful settlement.

But I must add quickly that this does not necessarily indicate a real meeting of the minds, because of doubts that all sides interpret the Geneva Agreements in the same light. Hanoi has said that the essence of the Geneva Agreements is contained in its "four points." But the four points would not put Hanoi under any restraint or obligations in its hostile activities against the South, which the Geneva Accords explicitly prohibit. Besides, as I already pointed out, these points insist that the South's future be regulated in accordance with the program of a group which was not referred to in the Geneva Accords and did not even exist when they were written. And in any case, if the Geneva Accords were to serve as a basis for settlement, it would obviously be necessary to revitalize the international machinery which they provided for supervision—which is presently operating under severe limitations; to incorporate effective international guarantees; and to update other provisions of the Accords which on their face are clearly out of date.

Despite these problems of interpretation, it can be said that if the meaning of the Geneva Agreements were accepted as a matter for genuine negotiations, then the constant reference to these agreements by both sides would be more than a verbal similarity; it would be a significant and hopeful sign of the prospects for settlement.

From all this analysis, there emerges one basic and practical question, and it is this: How are all these apparent obstacles to a settlement to be overcome?

The first and essential pre-requisite is the will to resolve them—not by unconditional surrender or by the dictation of terms, but through a process of mutual accommodation whereby nobody's vital interests are injured, which would be a political solution. Speaking for the United States Government, I affirm without reservation the willingness of the United States to seek and find a political solution.

The next question, then, is by what procedure such a political settlement can be reached. One well-tested and time-proven way is the conference table. President Johnson has repeatedly stated our readiness to join in a conference in Geneva, in Asia, or in any other suitable place. We remain prepared today to go to the conference table as soon as, and wherever, our adversaries are prepared to join us.

There is also a second procedure by which to pursue a political settlement: namely, private negotiations—either by direct contact or through an intermediary. There is much to be said for this private method, for in a situation as grave as this, with its complex historical background and its present political cross currents, it would be exceedingly difficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl.

I therefore affirm that the United States Government stands ready to take this route also toward a political settlement. And we give our assurance that the secrecy and security of such private explorations would be safeguarded on our side. Of course we do not and should not ask that freedom of expression be curtailed in the slightest degree. Nevertheless—as that conspicuous champion of free expression, Dr. Erwin D. Canham, recently reminded us—no one's credibility ought to suffer because of what is better left unsaid under such circumstances.

Let me quickly add that at this juncture I do not want to raise any false hopes by this remark. I am simply stating a principle which is inherent in the concept of the secrecy and security of private explorations.

Such then is my analysis of the problems involved and the methods to be employed in seeking a negotiated solution of the Vietnamese conflict. Nor should we overlook the possibility that negotiations, private or public, might be preceded or facilitated by the process of mutual de-escalation or a scaling down of the conflict without a formally negotiated ceasefire. This, of course, would be welcome on our part.

It is altogether possible, too, that there will be no negotiations culminating in a formal agreement; that our adversaries will sooner or later find the burden of the war too exhausting and that the conflict will gradually come to an end.

Perhaps this will indeed prove to be the outcome. But our most respected military authorities have cautioned us not to expect that this will happen quickly, and that we must face the possibility of a long struggle. Surely, if there is any contribution that diplomacy can make to hastening a just and honorable end of this struggle, we cannot in all conscience spare any effort or any labor, day or night, to make that contribution—no matter how difficult and frustrating the effort may be, or how many false starts and failures and new beginnings it may entail.

As students of history know, one obstacle to a negotiated end of any war can be psychological. The frame of mind appropriate to fighting and the frame of mind appropriate to peacemaking are by nature very different. And yet a stage inevitably comes when both these seemingly contradictory efforts must go on side by side.

Many citizens, viewing this complex dual process, are likely to be confused and distressed by what seems like an inconsistency in their leaders' policies. Some complain that the talk of peace suggests a weakening of our resolve and of our will to win. Simultaneously others complain that the continued military effort suggests an attempt to bring the adversary to his knees, to break his will—and thus casts doubt on the sincerity of our will to peace.

The great difficulty of achieving peace should serve to remind us that there are substantial conflicting interests at stake which stubbornly resist solution; that peace cannot be bought at any price, nor can real conflicts of purpose be waved away with a magic wand. By

the same token, the ferocity of war should not be an incitement to hatred but rather a stern discipline—a reminder of the imperative duty to define responsibly the limited interests for which our soldiers fight and which a peace settlement must protect.

The effort to make such a responsible definition, and to carry it through the process of peace negotiations, is “piled high with difficulty.” A genuine meeting of the minds may never be wholly achieved. It is unlikely that terms of settlement for this stubborn conflict can be found which would be wholly pleasing to either side. But it is in our highest national interest that an acceptable, livable solution should be found.

Let no one suppose that patriotism, which is so inspiringly displayed on the battlefield, is not also present at the negotiating table. All our recent Presidents have testified to our country’s dedication to negotiation as a means of peacefully bridging differences.

President Eisenhower said in 1955, on the eve of the first Summit Conference with the Soviet leadership:

We shall work with all others so that peaceful and reasonable negotiations may replace the clash of the battlefield.

President Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address, said:

Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

And President Johnson has summed up the true value of negotiation as follows:

To negotiate is not to admit failure. It is to show good sense. We believe that collective bargaining is working as long as parties stay in negotiation. Only when bargaining breaks off do we speak of failure. And so also in foreign policy. There, too, the rule of law and the resort to the bargaining table are the hallmarks of success.

And to these words the President added specifically:

This rule applies without qualification to Viet Nam. We shall count it a mark of success when all the parties to that dispute are around a conference table. We Americans are experienced in bargaining; we have nothing to fear from negotiation. And we Americans know the nature of a fair bargain; none need fear negotiating with us.

I am sure all three of these Presidents would agree today that the effort to discover through negotiation, the common ground on which to build a just and honorable peace, is worthy of our most sincere and dedicated efforts.

#### **THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM: The President’s Letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, Dated March 1, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: In further reference to our discussions at dinner on the evening of the 18th concerning the reasons for and effects of bombing, I wish to review for you the following.

We are bombing North Viet-Nam because it is violating two solemn international agreements. In 1954 Hanoi agreed that North Viet-Nam would not be “used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.”

In 1962 Hanoi agreed to withdraw all its military forces from Laos; to refrain from reintroducing such forces; and not to use the territory of Laos to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

Let me quote to you the recommendation made by General Maxwell Taylor to President Kennedy in his report of November 3, 1961, after Hanoi had violated the Geneva Declaration of 1954 but before the Geneva Declaration of 1962 was finally negotiated.

While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Viet-Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. \* \* \*

It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Khrushchev’s “wars of liberation” which are really para-wars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous Communist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses.

While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south.

Not for one day after the Geneva Declaration of 1962 was signed did Hanoi meet its commitment or honor its earlier commitment of 1954. Aggression against South Viet-Nam was continued throughout 1962, 1963, and 1964. Its forces were never withdrawn from Laos and Laos was violated in order to attack South Viet-Nam.

When I became President and surveyed the problem faced by our nation, I reserved judgment on the decision which General Taylor forecast in 1961 we might have to make. But the fact was that the North Vietnamese continued illegally to infiltrate arms and men across international frontiers. And in 1964 they radically expanded this course of action. The trails became roads. Bands of infiltrators became regular military units.

Neither of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference—Great Britain and the Soviet Union—proved able to stop this violation; nor did the three members of the International Control Commission—India, Canada, and Poland.

With the failure of the international machinery designed to enforce the Geneva agreements we were thrown back, therefore, on our treaty responsibilities. Under the SEATO Treaty, presented to the Senate by President Eisenhower and ratified overwhelmingly, we had agreed that in the face of “armed attack in the treaty area” we would “act to meet the common danger.”

By February 1965 it was unmistakably clear there was armed attack in the most literal sense: South Viet-Nam was almost lost to that armed attack. And in that month, on the recommendation of the National Security Council, I decided that we had to “meet the common danger” by bringing our air power to bear against the source of the aggression.

We never believed aerial attack on North Viet-Nam would, alone, end the war. We did, however, have three objectives.

The first was to back our fighting men and our fighting allies by demonstrating that the aggressor could not illegally bring hostile arms and men to bear against them from the security of a sanctuary.

<sup>1</sup> Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Public Information Series, released Mar. 2, 1967.

Second, we sought to impose on North Viet-Nam a cost for violating its international agreements.

Third, we sought to limit or raise the cost of bringing men and supplies to bear against the South.

All three of these important objectives have been achieved.

First, you should note that the military leaders now responsible for the safety and morale of our men in the field, without exception, back our bombing of the North. The same is true of the military and political leaders of those fighting side by side with us; that is to say, the leaders of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet-Nam. They all know that it is right and necessary for us to refuse to accept North Viet-Nam as a sanctuary at a time when the government in Hanoi is explicitly violating its international commitments and conducting aggression across international borders.

Second, we are, with remarkably limited cost in civilian lives, imposing a major cost on North Viet-Nam for its violation of international agreements.

Our attacks on military targets in North Viet-Nam have diverted about half a million men to cope with effects of our attacks. They are repairing the lines of supply and are engaged in anti-aircraft and coastal defense. This figure approximates the total number of men we now have fighting in Southeast Asia. It is not much less than the number of men South Viet-Nam has had to mobilize to deal with the guerrilla attack in the South.

At the cost of about 500 gallant American airmen killed, captured, or missing, we are bringing to bear on North Viet-Nam a burden roughly equivalent to that which the Communists are imposing through guerrilla warfare on the South—and we are doing it with far fewer civilian casualties in the North.

Finally, the bombing of North Viet-Nam has raised the cost of bringing an armed man or a ton of supplies illegally across the border from the North to the South. Substantial casualties are inflicted on infiltrators and substantial tonnages of supplies are destroyed en route. Those who now reach the South arrive after harassment which lowers their effectiveness as reinforcements.

The bombing in the North is an action undertaken by your Government only after the most careful reflection. It is a response to a serious and systematic and protracted violation of international agreements. It is having significant consequences for those who chose to violate the agreements. It is an integral part of our total policy which aims not to destroy North Viet-Nam but to force Hanoi to end its aggression so that the people of South Viet-Nam can determine their own future without coercion.

Both the reasons for—and the results of—the bombing of North Viet-Nam make it imperative that we continue to use this instrument of support for our men and our allies. It will end when the other side is willing to take equivalent action as part of a serious effort to end this war and bring peace to the people of Southeast Asia.

I take no satisfaction from the number of infiltrators killed on their way to South Viet-Nam, from the number of trucks or of boats or of railroad cars destroyed or the tons of supplies destroyed. I take no satisfaction from the suffering of the people of North Viet-Nam. I take no satisfaction from the fact that they have had to abandon their plans for economic and social development. I repeat what I said

in Baltimore in April 1965—I look forward to the day when the government and people of North Viet-Nam can join, in peace, their fellows in Southeast Asia in developing and modernizing that region so full of energy and resources and promise. And on that day they will have—if they wish—the support of the United States in providing for their people an environment of progress. But right now I wish friend and neutral and adversary to know that we shall persist with our operations in the South—we shall persist with our operations in the North—until those who launched this aggression are prepared to move seriously to reinstall the agreements whose violation has brought the scourge of war to Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

#### REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE, MARCH 15, 1967<sup>1</sup>

Lieutenant Governor Durell, Speaker Cummings, Governor Ellington, distinguished members of the Legislature, and my friends, it is always a very special privilege and pleasure for me to visit Tennessee.

For a Texan, it is like homecoming, because much of the courage and hard work that went into the building of the Southwest came from the hills and the fields of Tennessee. It strengthened the sinews of thousands of men—at the Alamo, at San Jacinto, and at the homes of our pioneer people.

This morning, I visited the Hermitage, the historic home of Andrew Jackson. Two centuries have passed since that most American of all Americans was born. The world has changed a great deal since his day. But the qualities which sustain men and nations in positions of leadership have not changed.

In our time, as in Andrew Jackson's, freedom has its price.

In our time, as in his, history conspires to test the American will.

In our time, as in Jackson's time, courage and vision, and the willingness to sacrifice, will sustain the cause of freedom.

This generation of Americans is making its imprint on history. It is making it in the fierce hills and the sweltering jungles of Vietnam. I think most of our citizens—after a very penetrating debate which is our democratic heritage—have reached a common understanding on the meaning and on the objectives of that struggle.

Before I discuss the specific questions that remain at issue, I should like to review the points of widespread agreement.

It was two years ago that we were forced to choose, forced to make a decision between major commitments in defense of South Vietnam or retreat—the evacuation of more than 25,000 of our troops, the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in the face of subversion and external assault.

Andrew Jackson would never have been surprised at the choice we made.

We chose a course in keeping with American tradition, in keeping with the foreign policy of at least three administrations, with the expressed will of the Congress of the United States, with our solemn obligations under the Southeast Asian Treaty, and with the interest

<sup>1</sup> White House press release dated Mar. 15, 1967.

of 16 million South Vietnamese who had no wish to live under communist domination.

As our commitment in Vietnam required more men and more equipment, some voices were raised in opposition. The Administration was urged to disengage, to find an excuse to abandon the effort.

These cries came despite growing evidence that the defense of Vietnam held the key to the political and economic future of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle grew correspondingly.

It became clear that if we were prepared to stay the course in Vietnam, we could help to lay the cornerstone for a diverse and independent Asia, full of promise and resolute in the cause of peaceful economic development for her long-suffering peoples.

But if we faltered, the forces of chaos would scent victory and decades of strife and aggression would stretch endlessly before us.

The choice was clear. We would stay the course. We shall stay the course.

I think most Americans support this fundamental decision. Most of us remember the fearful cost of ignoring aggression. Most of us have cast aside the illusion that we can live in an affluent fortress while the world slides into chaos.

I think we have all reached broad agreement on our basic objectives in Vietnam.

First, an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.

Second, a Southeast Asia in which all countries—including a peaceful North Vietnam—apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people: combating hunger, ignorance, and diseases.

I have said many, many times, that nothing would give us greater pleasure than to invest our own resources in the constructive works of peace rather than in the futile destruction of war.

Third, a concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.

There is, I think, a general agreement among Americans on the things that we do not want in Vietnam.

We do not want permanent bases. We will begin with the withdrawal of our troops on a reasonable schedule whenever reciprocal concessions are forthcoming from our adversary.

We do not seek to impose our political beliefs upon South Vietnam. Our republic rests upon a brisk commerce in ideas. We will be happy to see free competition in the intellectual marketplace whenever North Vietnam is willing to shift the conflict from the battle field to the ballot box.

So, these are the broad principles on which most Americans agree.

On a less general level, however, the events and frustrations of these past few difficult weeks have inspired a number of questions about our Vietnam policy in the minds and hearts of a good many of our citizens. Today, here in this historical chamber, I want to deal with some of those questions that figure most prominently in the press and in some of the letters which reach a President's desk.

Many Americans are confused by the barrage of information about military engagements. They long for the capsule summary which has kept tabs on our previous wars, a line on the map that divides friend from foe.

Precisely what, they ask, is our military situation, and what are the prospects of victory?

The first answer is that Vietnam is aggression in a new guise, as far removed from trench warfare as the rifle from the longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of subversion, of ambush. Pitched battles are very rare, and even more rarely are they decisive.

Today, more than 1 million men from the Republic of Vietnam and its six allies are engaged in the order of battle.

Despite continuing increases in North Vietnam infiltration, this strengthening of allied forces in 1966 under the brilliant leadership of General Westmoreland, was instrumental in reversing the whole course of this war.

—We estimate that 55,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were killed in 1966, compared with 35,000 the previous year. More were wounded, and more than 20,000 defected.

—By contrast, 9,500 South Vietnamese, more than 5,000 Americans, and 600 from other allied forces were killed in action.

—The Vietnamese Army achieved a 1966 average of two weapons captured from the Viet Cong to every one lost, a dramatic turn around from the previous two years.

—Allied forces have made several successful sweeps through territories that were formerly considered Viet Cong sanctuaries only a short time ago. These operations not only cost the enemy large numbers of men and weapons, but are very damaging to his morale.

What does all of this mean? Will the North Vietnamese change their tactics? Will there be less infiltration of main units? Will there be more of guerrilla warfare?

The actual truth is we just don't know.

What we do know is that General Westmoreland's strategy is producing results, that our military situation has substantially improved, that our military success has permitted the groundwork to be laid for a pacification program which is the longrun key to an independent South Vietnam.

Since February, 1965, our military operations have included selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. Our purposes are three.

—To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary;

—To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962;

—To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and materiel from North Vietnam.

Our intelligence confirms that we have been successful.

Yet, some of our people object strongly to this aspect of our policy. Must we bomb, many people will ask. Does it do any military good? Is it consistent with America's limited objectives? Is it an inhuman act that is aimed at civilians?

On the question of military utility, I can only report the firm belief of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, General Westmoreland and our commanders in the field, and all the sources of information and advice available to the Commander-in-Chief and that is that the bombing is causing serious disruption and is bringing about added burdens to the North Vietnamese infiltration effort.

We know, for example, that half a million people are kept busy just repairing damage to bridges, roads, railroads, and other strategic facilities, and in air and coastal defense and repair of power plants.

I also want to say categorically that it is not the position of the American Government that the bombing will be decisive in getting Hanoi to abandon aggression. It has, however, created very serious problems for them. The best indication of how substantial is the fact that they are working so hard every day with all their friends throughout the world to try to get us to stop.

The bombing is entirely consistent with America's limited objectives in South Vietnam. The strength of communist main-force units in the South is clearly based on their infiltration from the North. I think it is simply unfair to our American soldiers, sailors, and marines and our Vietnamese allies to ask them to face increased enemy personnel and fire power without making an effort to try to reduce that infiltration.

As to bombing civilians, I would simply say that we are making an effort that is unprecedented in the history of warfare to be sure that we do not. It is our policy to bomb military targets only.

We have never deliberately bombed cities, nor attacked any target with the purpose of inflicting civilian casualties.

We hasten to add, however, that we recognize, and we regret, that some people, even after warning, are living and working in the vicinity of military targets and they have suffered.

We are also too aware that men and machines are not infallible, and that some mistakes do occur.

But our record on this account is, in my opinion, highly defensible.

Look for a moment at the record of the other side.

Any civilian casualties that result from our operations are inadvertent, in stark contrast to the calculated Viet Cong policy of systematic terror.

Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese civilians have been killed, tortured, and kidnapped by the Viet Cong. There is no doubt about the deliberate nature of the Viet Cong program. One need only note the frequency with which Viet Cong victims are village leaders, teachers, health workers, and others who are trying to carry out constructive programs for their people.

Yet, the deeds of the Viet Cong go largely unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral double bookkeeping which makes us get sometimes very weary of our critics.

But there is another question that we should answer: Why don't we stop bombing to make it easier to begin negotiations?

The answer is a simple one:

—We stopped for five days and 20 hours in May 1965. Representatives of Hanoi simply returned our message in a plain envelope.

—We stopped bombing for 36 days and 15 hours in December 1965 and January 1966. Hanoi only replied: "A political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be envisaged only when the United States Government has accepted the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, has proved this by actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

—Only last month we stopped bombing for five days and 18 hours, after many prior weeks in which we had communicated to them several possible routes to peace, any one of which America was prepared to take. Their response, as you know, delivered to His Holiness the Pope, was this: The United States "must put an end to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

That is where we stand today.

They have three times rejected a bombing pause as a means to open the way to ending the war, and go together to the negotiating table.

The tragedy of South Vietnam is not limited to casualty lists.

There is much tragedy in the story of a nation at war for nearly a generation. It is the story of economic stagnation. It is the story of a generation of young men—the flower of the labor force—pressed into military service by one side or the other.

No one denies that the survival of South Vietnam is heavily dependent upon early economic progress.

My most recent and my most hopeful report of progress in this area came from an old friend of Tennessee, of the Tennessee Valley Authority—David Lilienthal, who recently went as my representative to Vietnam to begin to work with the Vietnamese people on economic planning for that area.

He reported—and with some surprise, I might add—that he discovered an extraordinary air of confidence among the farmers, village leaders, trade unionists, and the industrialists. He concluded that their economic behavior suggests "that they think they know how all of this is going to come out."

Mr. Lilienthal also said that the South Vietnamese were among the hardest working people that he had seen in developing countries around the world, that "to have been through 20 years of war and still have this amount of 'zip' almost ensures their long-term economic development."

Mr. Lilienthal will be going with me to Guam Saturday night to talk with our new leaders about the plans he will try to institute there.

Our AID programs are supporting the drive toward this sound economy.

But none of these economic accomplishments will be decisive by itself. And no economic achievement can substitute for a strong and free political structure.

We cannot build such a structure—because only the Vietnamese can do that.

I think they are building it. As I am talking to you here, a freely elected constituent assembly in Saigon is now wrestling with the last details of a new constitution, one which will bring the Republic of Vietnam to full membership among the democratic nations of the world.

We expect that constitution to be completed this month.

In the midst of war, they have been building for peace and justice. That is a remarkable accomplishment in the annals of mankind.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who has served us with such great distinction, is coming to the end of his second distinguished tour of duty in Saigon.

To replace him, I am drafting as our Ambassador to the Government of Vietnam, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker—able and devoted, full of wisdom and experience acquired on five continents over many years.

As his Deputy, I am nominating and recalling from Pakistan, Mr. Eugene Locke, our young and very vigorous Ambassador to Pakistan.

To drive forward with a sense of urgency the work in pacification in Vietnam, I am sending Presidential Assistant Robert Komer.

To strengthen General Westmoreland in the intensive operations that he will be conducting in the months ahead, I am assigning to him additional top-flight military personnel, the best that the country has been able to provide.

So you can be confident that in the months ahead we shall have at work in Saigon the ablest, the wisest, the most tenacious, and the most experienced team that the United States of America can mount.

In view of these decisions and in view of the meetings that will take place this weekend, I thought it wise to invite the leaders of South Vietnam to join us in Guam for a part of our discussions, if it were convenient for them. I am gratified to be informed that they have accepted our invitation.

I should also like for you to know that the representatives of all the countries that are contributing troops in Vietnam will be coming to Washington for April 20 and 21 meetings for a general appraisal of the situation that exists.

This brings me to my final point, the peaceful and just world that we all seek.

We have just lived through another flurry of rumors of "peace feelers."

Our years of dealing with this problem have taught us that peace will not come easily.

The problem is a very simple one: it takes two to negotiate at a peace table and Hanoi has just simply refused to consider coming to a peace table.

I don't believe that our own position on peace negotiations can be stated any more clearly than I have stated it many times in the past—or that the distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, or Ambassador Goldberg, or any number of other officials have stated it in every forum that we could find.

I do want to repeat to you this afternoon—and through you to the people of America—the essentials now, lest there be any doubts.

—United States representatives are ready at any time for discussions of the Vietnam problem or any related matter, with any government or governments, if there is any reason to believe that these discussions will in any way seriously advance the cause of peace.

—We are prepared to go more than halfway and to use any avenue possible to encourage such discussions. And we have done that at every opportunity.

We believe that the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 could serve as the central elements of a peaceful settlement. These accords provide, in essence that both South and North Vietnam should be free from external interference, while at the same time they would be free independently to determine their positions on the question of reunification.

We also stand ready to advance toward a reduction of hostilities, without prior agreement. The road to peace could go from deeds to discussions, or it could start with discussions and go to deeds.

We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move on both of them.

Reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to violate the trust that we undertake when we ask a man to risk his life for his country.

We will negotiate a reduction of the bombing whenever the Government of North Vietnam is ready and there are almost innumerable avenues of communication by which the Government of North Vietnam can make their readiness known.

To this date and this hour, there has been no sign of that readiness.

Yet, we must—and we will—keep trying.

As I speak to you today, Secretary Rusk and our representatives throughout the world are on a constant alert. Hundreds and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversations, free from the glare of front-page headlines, or of klieg lights, are being held and they will be held on the possibilities of bringing peace to Vietnam.

Governor Averell Harriman, with 25 years of experience of troubleshooting on the most difficult international problems that America has ever had, is carrying out my instructions that every possible lead, however slight it may first appear, from any source, public or private, shall be followed up.

Let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that it were within my power to assure that all those in Hanoi could hear one simple message—America is committed to the defense of South Vietnam until an honorable peace can be negotiated.

If this one communication gets through and its rational implications are drawn, we should be at the table tomorrow. It would be none too soon for us. Then hundreds of thousands of Americans—as brave as any who ever took the field for their country—could come back home.

And the man who could lead them back is the man whom you trained and sent from here, our own beloved, brilliant General "Westy" Westmoreland. As these heroes came back to their homes, millions of Vietnamese could begin to make a decent life for themselves and their families without fear of terrorism, without fear of war, or without fear of communist enslavement.

That is what we are working and fighting for. We must not—we shall not—and we will not—fail.

Thank you.

**PUBLIC LAW 90-5, 90TH CONGRESS, S. 665, MARCH 16, 1967**  
**(Excerpts)**

AN ACT To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1967 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

\* \* \* \* \*

**TITLE IV—STATEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL POLICY**

SEC. 401. The Congress hereby declares—

(1) its firm intentions to provide all necessary support for members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in Vietnam;

(2) its support of efforts being made by the President of the United States and other men of good will throughout the world to prevent an expansion of the war in Vietnam and to bring that conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement which will preserve the honor of the United States, protect the vital interests of this country, and allow the people of South Vietnam to determine the affairs of that nation in their own way; and

(3) its support for the convening of the nations that participated in the Geneva Conferences or any other meeting of nations similarly involved and interested as soon as possible for the purpose of pursuing the general principles of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 and for formulating plans for bringing the conflict to an honorable conclusion.

Approved March 16, 1967.

**LEGISLATIVE HISTORY**

House reports: No. 29 accompanying H.R. 4515 (Committee on Armed Services and No. 73 (committee of conference).

Senate Report No. 58 (Committee on Armed Services).

Congressional Record, volume 113 (1967):

February 23, 24, 27, 28, considered in Senate.

March 1, considered and passed Senate.

March 2, considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 4515.

March 8, House and Senate agreed to conference report.

**JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON GUAM CONFERENCE,**  
**MARCH 21, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam completed their discussions in Guam. These talks have demonstrated again their joint determination with their allies, to defend freedom in South Viet-Nam and at the same time to continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.

President Johnson took this occasion to present to Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and their party the new leadership of the US Mission in Saigon. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker will take up from

Ambassador Lodge the maintenance and strengthening of close relations with the Government of Viet-Nam. He will be working with that Government in its struggle to preserve the nation's freedom, in its steady progress toward economic and social development, and in the new political chapter now opening of constitutional and representative government under elected leaders. President Johnson introduced Ambassador Eugene Locke, who will take Ambassador Porter's place as Deputy Chief of the US Mission, and he also explained that his Special Assistant, Mr. Robert Komer, would be in Saigon giving his attention to Pacification/RD matters.

Meeting with their advisors, President Johnson and Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky reviewed the encouraging progress on the various programs of the Vietnamese Government which had been discussed at Honolulu early in 1966 and were outlined in the Communiqué of the Seven Allied Nations meeting in Manila last October.

Discussion covered the military front, where the initiative lies increasingly with the allied forces and where the leaders of North Viet-Nam must recognize the futility of their effort to seize control of South Viet-Nam by force.

The meeting also reviewed those programs of the Vietnamese Government to which the United States is providing assistance. They found that, a solid foundation having been laid, the pacification and revolutionary development program was now beginning to show encouraging results, despite Viet Cong efforts to disrupt it by terror and intimidation. They noted the successful maintenance of financial stability while recognizing the need for continued vigilance on this front. They heard from Dr. Vu Quoc Thuc and Mr. David Lilienthal of the long-range economic planning now getting underway. Plans for continued efforts in the fields of national reconciliation and reform of land policies and tenure provisions were described by the Vietnamese leaders.

They also outlined the provisions of the Constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly elected last September 11 and agreed by the Assembly and approved by the Directorate in the last few days. This instrument provides for the principal organs of a representative government and assures to the people civil and economic rights and social justice. The Constitution offers full civil rights to those who respect its provisions and the world looks forward to the day when the Viet Cong will take advantage of this offer, abandon the course of terror and violence and join in making a free, modern society in South Viet-Nam.

It was also announced that elections for a president will be held under the constitution within 4 to 5 months and the elections for a legislature shortly thereafter. Meanwhile a major forward step will be made toward the restoration of democratic local government when village hamlet elections take place, starting in April.

The numerous and varied efforts made in recent months to bring about a peaceful settlement were reviewed by the heads of both delegations. Thus far, they noted regretfully, North Viet-Nam has failed to respond to all such efforts. However, Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and President Johnson reaffirmed their undertakings at Manila and Honolulu and pledged themselves anew to the diligent pursuit of peace. Continuing consultations about the search for peace will be maintained among the nations whose forces are now fighting against aggression in South Viet-Nam.

<sup>1</sup> White House press release dated Mar. 21, 1967.

The Vietnamese and American leaders also took note of the forthcoming meetings in Washington of SEATO on April 18-20 and of the Foreign Ministers of nations having troops in Viet-Nam on April 20-21. The latter will bring together again the Governments which met at Manila last October and provide an opportunity for them to review progress and programs in Viet-Nam and consult on future courses of action.

The Vietnamese leaders are leaving Guam for Saigon this morning and President Johnson is expected to depart at the end of the day.

**ADDRESS BY GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER, U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, BEFORE A JOINT MEETING OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE, APRIL 28, 1967<sup>1</sup>**

General WESTMORELAND. Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress, I am deeply honored to address the Congress of the United States. I stand in the shadow of military men who have been here before me, but none of them could have had more pride than is mine in representing the gallant American fighting men in Vietnam today. These service men and women are sensitive to their mission and, as the record shows, they are unbeatable in carrying out that mission.

As their commander in the field, I have seen many of you in Vietnam during the last 3 years.

Without exception you gentlemen have shown interest, responsibility and concern for the commitment which we have undertaken and for the welfare of our troops.

The Republic of Vietnam is fighting to build a strong nation while aggression—organized, directed and supported from without—attempts to engulf it. This is an unprecedented challenge for a small nation. But it is a challenge which will confront any nation that is marked as a target for the Communist strategem called "war of national liberation." I can assure you here and now that militarily this strategem will not succeed in Vietnam.

In 3 years of close study and daily observation, I have seen no evidence that this is an internal insurrection. I have seen much evidence to the contrary—documented by the enemy himself—that it is aggression from the north.

Since 1954, when the Geneva accords were signed, the North Vietnamese have been sending leaders, political organizers, technicians and experts on terrorism and sabotage into the south. Clandestinely directed from the north, they and their Hanoi-trained southern counterparts have controlled the entire course of the attack against the Republic of South Vietnam.

More than 2 years ago, North Vietnamese divisions began to arrive, and the control was no longer clandestine. Since then, the buildup of enemy forces has been formidable. During the last 22 months, the number of enemy combat battalions in the south has increased significantly, and nearly half of them are North Vietnamese. In the same period, overall enemy strength has nearly doubled in spite of large combat losses.

Enemy commanders are skilled professionals. In general, their troops are indoctrinated, well trained, aggressive, and under tight control.

The enemy's logistic system is primitive in many ways. Forced to transport most of his supplies down through southeastern Laos, he uses a combination of trucks, bicycles, men, and animals. But he does this with surprising effectiveness. In South Vietnam, the system is also well organized. Many of the caches we have found and destroyed have been stocked with enough supplies and equipment to support months of future operations.

The enemy emphasizes what he calls strategic mobility although his tactics are based on foot mobility, relatively modest firepower, and often primitive means of communications. However, his operational planning is meticulous. He gathers intelligence, makes careful plans, assigns specific objectives in detail and then rehearses the plan of attack until he believes it cannot fail.

Local peasants are forced to provide food, shelter, and porters to carry supplies and equipment for combat units, and to evacuate the dead and wounded from the battlefield.

When all is ready he moves his large military formations covertly from concealed bases into the operational area. His intent is to launch a surprise attack designed to achieve quick victory by shock action. This tactic has failed because of our courageous men, our firepower, and our spoiling attacks.

For months now we have been successful in destroying a number of main force units. We will continue to seek out the enemy, catch him off guard, and punish him at every opportunity.

But success against his main forces alone is not enough to insure a swift and decisive end to the conflict.

This enemy also uses terror—murder, mutilation, abduction and the deliberate shelling of innocent men, women, and children—to exercise control through fear. Terror, which he employs daily, is much harder to counter than his best conventional moves.

A typical day in Vietnam was last Sunday. Terrorists near Saigon assassinated a 39-year-old village chief. The same day in the delta, they kidnaped 26 civilians assisting in arranging for local elections. The next day the Vietcong attacked a group of Revolutionary Development workers, killing one and wounding 12 with grenades and machinegun fire in one area, and in another they opened fire on a small civilian bus and killed three and wounded four of its passengers. These are cases of calculated enemy attack on civilians to extend by fear that which they cannot gain by persuasion.

One hears little of this brutality here at home. What we do hear about is our own aerial bombings against North Vietnam, and I would like to address this for a moment.

For years the enemy has been blowing bridges, interrupting traffic, cutting roads, sabotaging power stations, blocking canals and attacking airfields in the south, and he continues to do so.

This is a daily occurrence. Bombing in the north has been centered on precisely these same kinds of targets and for the same military purposes—to reduce the supply, interdict the movement and impair the effectiveness of enemy military forces.

Within his capabilities the enemy in Vietnam is waging total war all day—every day—everywhere. He believes in force; and his intensi-

<sup>1</sup> Congressional Record, Apr. 28, 1967, pp. H4831-H4831.

fication of violence is limited only by his resources and not by any moral inhibitions.

To us, a cease fire means "cease fire." Our observance of past truces has been open and subject to public scrutiny. The enemy permits no such observation in the north or the south. He traditionally has exploited cease-fire periods when the bombing has been suspended to increase his resupply and infiltration activity.

This is the enemy—this has been the challenge. The only strategy which can defeat such an organization is one of unrelenting military, political and psychological pressure on his whole structure—at all levels.

From his capabilities and his recent activities, I believe the enemy's probable course in the months ahead can be forecast.

In order to carry out his battlefield doctrine, I foresee that he will continue his buildup across the demilitarized zone and through Laos, and he will attack us when he believes he has a chance for a dramatic blow. He will not return exclusively to guerrilla warfare, although he certainly will continue to intensify his guerrilla activities.

I expect the enemy to continue to increase his mortar, artillery, rocket and recoilless rifle attacks on our installations. At the same time he will step up his attacks on villages and district towns to intimidate the people, and to thwart the democratic processes now underway in South Vietnam.

Given the nature of the enemy, it seems to me that the strategy we are following at this time is the proper one, and that it is producing results. While he obviously is far from quitting, there are signs that his morale and his military structure are beginning to deteriorate. Their rate of decline will be in proportion to the pressure directed against him.

Faced with this prospect, it is gratifying to note that our forces and those of the other free world allies have grown in strength and profited from experience. In this connection it is well to remember that Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines all have military forces fighting and working with the Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam. It also is worthy of note that 30 other nations are providing noncombat support. All of these free world forces are doing well, whether in combat or in support of nation building. Their exploits deserve recognition, not only for their direct contributions to the overall effort, but for their symbolic reminder that the whole of free Asia opposes Communist expansion.

As the focal point of this struggle in Asia, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces merit special mention.

In 1954 South Vietnam had literally no armed forces in being. There was no tradition of military leadership. The requirement to build an army, navy and air force in the face of enemy attack and political subversion seems, in retrospect, almost an impossible task. Yet, in their determination to resist the Communists, the Vietnamese have built an effective military force.

What I see now in Vietnam is a military force that performs with growing professional skill. During the last 6 months, Vietnamese troops have scored repeated successes against some of the best Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army units.

Perhaps more important in this total effort is the support given by the Vietnamese military to the government's nation building or

revolutionary development program. Nearly half of the Vietnamese Army now is engaged in or training for this vital program which will improve the lot of the people. This is a difficult role for a military force. Vietnamese soldiers are not only defending villages and hamlets, but with spirit and energy they have turned to the task of nation building as well.

In 1952 there were some who doubted that the Republic of Korea would ever have a first-rate fighting force. I wish those doubters could see the Korean units in Vietnam today. They rank with the best fighters and the most effective civic action workers in Vietnam. When I hear criticism of the Vietnamese armed forces, I am reminded of that example.

As you know we are fighting a war with no frontlines since the enemy hides among the people, in the jungles and mountains, and uses covertly border areas of neutral countries. Therefore, one cannot measure the progress of battle by lines on a map. We therefore have to use other means to chart progress. Several indices clearly point to steady and encouraging success:

As an example, 2 years ago the Republic of Vietnam had fewer than 30 combat-ready battalions. Today it has 154.

Then there were three jet-capable runways in South Vietnam. Today there are 14.

In April 1965 there were 15 airfields that could take C-130 transport aircraft. We now have 89.

Then there was one deepwater port for seagoing ships. Now there are seven.

In 1965 ships had to wait weeks to unload. Now we turn them around in as little as 1 week.

A year ago there was no long-haul highway transport. Last month alone 161,000 tons of supplies were moved over the highways. During the last year the mileage of essential highways open for our use has risen from about 52 percent to 80 percent.

During 1965 the Republic of Vietnam armed forces and its allies killed 36,000 of the enemy and lost approximately 12,000 friendly killed, and 90 percent of these were Vietnamese. During recent months this 3-to-1 ratio in favor of the allies has risen significantly and in some weeks has been as high as 10-or 20-to-1.

In 1965, 11,000 Vietcong rallied to the side of the Government. In 1966 there were 20,000. In the first 3 months of 1967 there have been nearly 11,000 ralliers, a figure that equals all of 1965 and more than half of all of 1966.

In 1964 and the first part of 1965 the ratio of weapons captured was 2-to-1 in favor of the enemy. The ratio for 1966 and the first 3 months of this year is 2½-to-1 in favor of the Republic of Vietnam and its allies.

Our President and the representatives of the people of the United States, the Congress, have seen to it that our troops in the field have been well supplied and equipped. When a field commander does not have to look over his shoulder to see whether he is being supported, he can concentrate on the battlefield with much greater assurance of success. I speak for my troops, when I say we are thankful for this unprecedented material support.





The aggressors and traitors have set up the most dictatorial and cruel rule in Vietnam's history; they repress and persecute all democratic and patriotic movement, and abolish all human liberties. They monopolize all branches of the economy, strangle industry, agriculture, and trade, and ruthlessly exploit all strata of people. They use every device of mind poisoning, obscurantism, and depravation in an attempt to quell the patriotism of our people. They feverishly increase their military forces, build military bases, use the army as a tool for repression of the people and war preparation in accordance with the U.S. imperialists' policy.

For more than 6 years countless crimes have been perpetrated by the U.S.-Diem dictatorial and cruel rule: terrorizing gunshots have never ceased to resound throughout South Vietnam; tens of thousands of patriots have been shot down, beheaded, and disemboweled with liver plucked out; hundreds of thousands of people tortured, thrown into jail where they slowly perished; countless people have been victims of arson, forcible house removal, usurpation of land, and drafted for forced labor or press-ganged; countless families are distressed and disunited as a result of the policy of concentrating people in "prosperity zones" and "resettlement centers" (disguised concentration camps), of exacting rents and taxes, terror, arrest, plunder, ransom, unemployment, and poverty which are seriously threatening the life of all strata of people.

There must be peace. There must be independence. There must be democracy. There must be a life of plenty. There must be peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

This is our most earnest and pressing aspiration. It has become an iron will and a marvelous strength promoting our people to unite and resolutely rise up to overthrow the cruel rule of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges for national salvation. In view of the supreme interests of the fatherland, with the firmness to struggle to the end for the people's legitimate aspirations and in accordance with the progressive trend in the world, the NFLSV comes into being.

The NFLSV undertakes to unite people of all walks of life, all social classes, nationalities, political parties, organizations, religious communities, and patriotic personages in South Vietnam, without distinction of their political tendencies, in order to struggle and overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, and realize independence, democracy, life improvement, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

The program of the NFLSV includes the following 10 points:

1. To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists and the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem administration, lackey of the United States, and to form a national democratic coalition administration.

The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial regime of the U.S. imperialists. The South Vietnamese administration is a lackey which has been carrying out the U.S. imperialists political lines. This regime and administration must be overthrown, and a broad national democratic coalition administration formed to include representatives of all strata of the people, nationalities, political parties, religious communities, and patriotic personages; to wrest back the people's economic, political, social, and cultural interests; to realize

independence and democracy; to improve the people's living conditions; and to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

2. To bring into being a broad and progressive democracy.

(a) To abolish the current constitution of the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorial administration, lackey of the United States, and to elect a new National Assembly through universal suffrage.

(b) To promulgate all democratic freedoms: Freedom of expression, of the press, of assembly, of association of movement . . . (ellipsis as received); to guarantee freedom of belief with no discrimination toward any religion on the part of the state; and to grant freedom of action to the patriotic political parties and mass organizations, irrespective of political tendencies.

(c) To grant general amnesty to all political detainees, dissolve all concentration camps under any form whatsoever, abolish the fascist law 10-59 and other antidemocratic laws; and to grant the right of repatriation to all those who had to flee abroad due to the U.S.-Diem regime.

(d) To strictly ban all illegal arrests and imprisonments and tortures, and to punish unrepenting cruel murderers of the people.

3. To build an independent and sovereign economy, and improve the people's living conditions.

(a) To abolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen; to build an independent and sovereign economy and finance, beneficial to the nation and people; and to confiscate and nationalize the property of the U.S. imperialists and the ruling clique, their stooges.

(b) To help the industrialists and trades people rehabilitate and develop industry both large and small, and to encourage industrial development; and to actively protect homemade products by abolishing production taxes, restricting or ending the import of those goods which can be produced in the country, and reducing taxes of import of raw materials and machinery.

(c) To rehabilitate agriculture, and to modernize planting, fishing, and animal husbandry; to help peasants reclaim waste land and develop production; and to protect crops and insure the consumption of agricultural products.

(d) To encourage and accelerate the economic interflow between the town and the countryside, between plains and mountainous areas; and to develop trade with foreign countries without distinction of political regimes and on the principle of equality and mutual benefit.

(e) To apply an equitable and rational system to abolish arbitrary fines.

(f) To promulgate labor regulations, that is: to prohibit dismissals, wage cuts, fines and ill-treatment of workers; to improve the life of workers and office employees; and to fix wages and guarantees for the health of teenage apprentices.

(g) To organize social relief: Jobs for unemployed; protection of orphans, elders, and the disabled; assistance to those who have become disabled or lost their relatives in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its stooges; and relief to localities suffering crop failures, fire, and natural calamities.

(h) To help northern compatriots who had been forced or enticed by the reactionaries to go south after the restoration of

peace to return to their native places if they so desire, and to provide jobs to those who decide to remain in the south.

(i) To strictly prohibit forcible house removals, arson, usurpation of land, and the herding of the people into concentration centers; and to insure the country folk and urban working people of the opportunity to earn their living in security.

4. To carry out land rent reduction in preparation for the settlement of the agrarian problem so as to insure land to the tillers.

(a) To carry out land rent reduction; to guarantee the peasants' right to till their present plots of land and insure the right of ownership for those who have reclaimed wasteland; and to protect the legitimate right of ownership by peasants of the plots of land distributed to them during the resistance war.

(b) To abolish the "prosperity zones" and the policy of herding the people into "resettlement centers" and to grant the right of those forcibly herded into "prosperity zones" or "resettlement centers" (disguised concentration camps) (parentheses as received) to return home freely and earn their living on their own plots of land.

(c) To confiscate the land usurped by the U.S. imperialists and their agents and distribute it to landless and land-poor peasants; and to redistribute communal land in an equitable and rational way.

(d) Through negotiations, the state will purchase from land-owners at equitable and rational prices all land held by them in excess of a given area, fixed in accordance with the concrete situation in each locality, and distribute it to landless and land-poor peasants. This land will be distributed free and will be free of any conditions.

5. To build a national and democratic education and culture.

(a) To eliminate the enslaving and gangster-style American culture and education; and to build a rational, progressive culture and education serving the fatherland and the people.

(b) To wipe out illiteracy; to build sufficient general education schools for the youth and children; to expand universities and professional schools; to use the Vietnamese language in teaching; to reduce school fees or exempt fees for poor pupils and students; and to reform the examination system.

(c) To develop science and technology and the national literature and art; and to encourage and help intellectuals, cultural, and art workers to develop their abilities in service of national construction.

(d) To develop medical service in order to look after the people's health; and to expand the gymnastic and sports movement.

6. To build an army to defend the motherland and the people.

(a) To build a national army defending the fatherland and the people; and to cancel the system of U.S. military advisers.

(b) To abolish the press-ganging regime; to improve the material life of the army men and insure their political rights; to prohibit the ill-treatment of soldiers; and to apply a policy of assistance to families of poor army men.

(c) To remunerate and give worthy jobs to those officers and soldiers who have rendered meritorious services in the struggle against the domination of the U.S. imperialist and their henchmen; and to observe leniency toward those who had before

collaborated with the U.S.-Diem clique and committed crimes against the people, but have now repented and serve the people.

(d) To abolish all the military bases of foreign countries in South Vietnam.

7. To guarantee the right of equality between nationalities and between men and women; to protect the legitimate rights of foreign residents and oversea Vietnamese.

(a) To insure the right of autonomy of the national minorities; to set up, within the framework of the great family of the Vietnamese people, autonomous regions or areas inhabited by minority peoples; to insure equal rights among different nationalities allowing all nationalities to have the right to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or change their customs and habits; to abolish the U.S.-Diem clique's present policy of ill-treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities; and to help the minority peoples to catch up with the common level of the people by developing the economy and culture in the areas inhabited by them, by training skilled personnel from people of minority origin.

(b) To insure the right of equality between men and women, so women can enjoy the same rights as men in all fields: political, economic, cultural, and social.

(c) To protect the legitimate rights of foreigners residing in Vietnam; and to defend and care for Vietnamese nationals abroad.

8. To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.

(a) To cancel all unequal treaties signed with foreign countries by the U.S. henchmen which violate national sovereignty.

(b) To establish diplomatic relations with all countries irrespective of political regime, in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence as put forth at the Bandung Conference.

(c) To unite closely with the peace-loving and neutral countries; and to expand friendly relations with Asian and African countries, first of all, with neighboring Cambodia and Laos.

(d) To refrain from joining any bloc or military alliance or forming a military alliance with any country.

(e) To receive economic aid from any country ready to assist Vietnam without conditions attached.

9. To establish normal relations between North and South Vietnam as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country.

The urgent demand of our people throughout the country is to reunify the country by peaceful means. The NFLSV undertakes the gradual reunification of the country by peaceful means, on the principle of negotiations and discussions between the two zones of all forms and measures beneficial to the people and fatherland. Pending the national reunification, the governments of the two zones will negotiate and undertake not to spread propaganda to divide the peoples or favor war, nor to use military forces against each other; to carry out economic and cultural exchanges between the two zones; and to insure for people of both zones freedom of movement, of livelihood, and the right of mutual visits and correspondence.

10. To oppose aggressive war and actively defend world peace.

(a) To oppose aggressive war and all forms of enslavement by the imperialists; and to support the national liberation struggles of peoples in various countries.

(b) To oppose war propaganda; and to demand general disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and demand the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

(c) To support the movements for peace, democracy, and social progress in the world; and to actively contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

Compatriots throughout the country! All Vietnamese patriots! In nearly a century of struggle and 9 years of resistance, our people have made tremendous sacrifices. We decidedly cannot return to the life of slavery again! For the peace, independence, freedom, and unity of our fatherland, for the destiny of our people, for the sake of our life, of our future, and the future of our descendants, let all of us rise up! Let all of us unite! Let us close our ranks and march forward to fight under the banner of the NFLSV to overthrow the cruel domination of the U.S. imperialists and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, their henchmen, in order to save the country and our own families!

We will surely win because the forces of solidarity of our people are invincible and because justice belongs to us and obsolete colonialism is now disintegrating and heading toward its total collapse. In the world, the movement for peace, democracy, and national independence is expanding widely and strongly and is winning more and more successes. This situation is very favorable to our cause of national salvation.

The U.S. imperialists and the clique of their henchmen will surely be defeated! The cause of national liberation in South Vietnam will surely be victorious! Let us unite, be confident, and struggle heroically! Let us go forward and win a glorious victory for our people and fatherland!

#### PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG ON POSITION OF NORTH VIETNAM, APRIL 13, 1965

Pham Van Dong, premier of the DRV, elucidated the unswerving stand of the Government of the DRV on the Vietnam question in his report on Government work made at the second session of the Third National Assembly. The VNA issued the text of the report today. Premier Pham Van Dong said that it is the unswerving policy of the Government of the DRV to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people—peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Vietnam U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and cancel its "military alliance" with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be

strictly respected—the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, there must be no foreign military bases, or military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

Pham Van Dong said that the above-mentioned stand of the DRV Government unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world. The Government of the DRV is of the view that the stand expounded above is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam.

The Government of the DRV declares that any approach contrary to the above-mentioned stand is inappropriate, any approach tending to secure a United Nations intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

#### EXTRACT OF SPEECH BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO ON THE OCCASION OF THE "DAY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID," JUNE 22, 1965

For many years, South Vietnam has been plunged into a war imposed on it by the Communists. It has been able to preserve the integrity of its territory and freedom only because of the courage of its sons and the friendly countries of the free world, which have not spared either their friendship or their generous assistance.

To the representatives of those countries present at this ceremony, I express, in the name of the Republic and people of South Vietnam, our profound gratitude, which I ask them to convey to their Government.

It is also my duty to tell them what we are doing with their assistance. Some is used to relieve the misery and suffering of our people as a result of the war, to rebuild on our ruins, and to reconstruct our nation; some to help us defend ourselves against the Communist aggression. I say "defend ourselves" advisedly, for our primary objective continues to be the search for peace and not the spread or prolongation of the war. We do, certainly, want peace, but not peace at any price. If it is to be a just and enduring peace, the following conditions must be met:

1. Since the war now in progress in Vietnam was provoked by Communist aggression and subversion, it is essential, first of all, that these subversive and military activities undertaken, directed, and supported from abroad against the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam cease, and that the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two zones, a principle that was laid down in the 1954 Geneva agreement and in international law, be

respected. Consequently, the Communist regime of Hanoi must dissolve all these front organizations and agencies it has created in South Vietnam under the title the "Front for the Liberation of the South," "Liberation Radio Station," and "People's Revolutionary Party," and, it must remove from South Vietnam the troops and the political and military leaders it has sent there illegally.

2. The internal affairs of the South Vietnamese people must be left to the discretion of those people in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever source. That will be feasible, obviously, only when the aggression by the Communist regime of Hanoi and its campaign of intimidation to which the people of South Vietnam have been subjected have been terminated.

3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the nations that come to its aid will be able to suspend the military measures in the territory of South Vietnam and beyond its boundaries that are now necessary to defend that territory against Communist aggression. Moreover, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to ask friendly nations then to remove their military forces from South Vietnam. It reserves the right, however, to take whatever measures are necessary to see that law and order are respected throughout the territory of South Vietnam and to insure the safety of the South Vietnamese people, as well as the right to appeal again for foreign assistance in the case of further aggression or threat of aggression.

4. Lastly, the independence and freedom of the people of South Vietnam must be effectively guaranteed.

If the Communist regime in Hanoi sincerely wants peace, if it puts the interests of the nation above those of an ideology or a party, if it wants the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of southeast Asia to live in peace instead of war, prosperity instead of poverty, freedom instead of slavery, it has only to put an end to aggression.

This is the only path that we believe can lead to peace if the South Vietnamese people are to be able to enjoy the full benefits of the aid that the friendly nations have so generously lavished upon it.

#### TEXT OF STATEMENT ON VIETNAM WAR MADE IN HANOI INTERVIEW BY PREMIER DONG<sup>1</sup>

*HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, January 6.—Following is the transcript of Premier Pham Van Dong's statement made last Monday to The New York Times. The text has been checked by the Foreign Ministry for translation errors. The Premier spoke in Vietnamese and the conversation was translated into English by interpreters. The text does not include the informal discussion of the Vietnamese situation that followed the general statement.*

First we will talk about the war and proceed from that to talk about a settlement—do you agree?

Maybe about the war your viewpoint and mine might be different—that's why we must talk. Because if we don't have correct under-

<sup>1</sup> From the New York Times, Jan. 8, 1967.

standing of the war, any question relating to the war may not be understood.

The fundamental question is the origin of the war. The main questions are: Who started the war? Who was the cause of the war? Concerning this question our point of view is very clear, and in this we have the agreement of so many people in the world. Have you read the statement of de Gaulle on the occasion of New Year's? De Gaulle says this war was caused by the Americans. He says the war is an unjust, despicable war and he draws the conclusion that the Americans should withdraw.

What do you think?

If you agree, later on the Government, sooner or later, must arrive at that conclusion, and if not now they must agree next year and if this party does not agree another party must agree. If American responsible authorities don't agree with this, then they may commit more errors.

Sometime they must arrive at this conclusion—do you agree?

I think politics is the main thing. I think you are right in expressing doubts. It is a very big problem relating to us and to you. You and individuals like yourself must make a contribution to solving it.

Sooner or later American ruling circles must realize the truth—it is becoming clearer and clearer and binds people to accept it.

I want to trace with you the cause of the war in South Vietnam and over the whole country.

You remember how the United States intervened in South Vietnam after the Geneva Accords? How they undermined the elections? How they helped then Diem Government to rule over South Vietnam? How the situation in South Vietnam became explosive in spite of everything in the years 1958 to 1960? Nineteen sixty-one was the year Johnson paid a visit to Diem and made some agreements with Diem.

From 1962 on the Americans put a military command into South Vietnam. They sent in more advisers. Then it was the Taylor plan, thinking that they would be able to pacify Vietnam in 18 months. Of course that plan failed. Then there was the assassination of Diem and Nhu, and the fighting in Vietnam became very explosive, both militarily and politically. It was at that time that in South Vietnam heavy fighting took place, and that was also the time of the burning of Buddhist monks and priests.

After the overthrow of the Diem Government, the situation in South Vietnam became even more complicated. The Americans had at that time begun to admit that they faced a tunnel, and a man like Kennedy had to admit that at the end of the tunnel there was no light.

That was the situation at the end of 1964. The military then started a new phase. The American Government was confronted with new escalation, which was very serious. They saw that it was very difficult for them to win the war in South Vietnam and they thought that if, perhaps, they struck at the North, they might save the situation in the South.

The military are rather short-sighted, and if you will pardon my saying so, very stupid, and now they have to pay for their stupidity. They had thought that after some months we would have to kneel before them, and if we had to succumb it would be very easy for them to solve the question in South Vietnam.

How the situation in North Vietnam has developed I will tell you later on. But what is clear is that between February and April in 1965, we did not capitulate. President Johnson delivered on April 7 his Baltimore speech, and he started sending an expeditionary corps to South Vietnam. Now then, the Pentagon generals had a very short-sighted calculation. The generals thought that, sending an army of 150,000 to 200,000, they would be masters in South Vietnam. By the end of 1965 they had something like 160,000 to 170,000 in South Vietnam and a very large arsenal of armor, tanks, guns, planes and navy.

But how did the situation evolve?

At the start of the first dry season, the Americans thought they would be victorious. You remember the four points of General Westmoreland? But the first dry season passed and the arms of General Westmoreland were not materialized and the expeditionary corps of the United States grew continuously, and also the number of mercenary troops from satellite countries. This is not to include the South Vietnam puppet troops numbering half a million. In spite of all that, the Liberation Army scored victories after victories, and its strength was further increased.

After the dry season came the rainy season. Because of the defeat in the dry season, they continued to increase the size of the expeditionary corps in the rainy season. Still the strength of the Liberation Army also grew, and the Liberation Army's strength was shown in very heavy victories in main-force engagements and in guerrilla war.

Now we are in the second dry season. How is the situation? It is clear that the situation is very bad for the expeditionary corps of the United States. This is not clear to everybody. Perhaps it is known to the Americans in Saigon and Washington. As for us, we know it very well. The situation is very bad—worse than ever before. And they are now facing an impasse.

What are they bound to do? Increase their strength in South Vietnam? How much? Where will they fight? And how to win victories? These are problems which are unsolved by the United States military, and if ever you meet General Westmoreland and put the question to him, I don't think he would be able to answer it.

You agree that he might once have thought he had the answer, but now he does not. Shall I repeat to you his four-point program? First to smash the force of the Liberation Army—its battle force; secondly, pacification; thirdly, consolidation of the puppet administration and army; fourthly, cut the lines between North and South.

It is now clear that these points cannot be achieved. But Americans will not admit that. They even say the first point could be achieved—that they would be able to crush the battle corps of the Liberation Army. They will not be able to do that. On the contrary, the strength of the Liberation Army is growing stronger and stronger—and stronger than the Americans think.

On the second point, the Americans have been defeated.

On the third point, they do not like to admit the truth, but they must admit collapse of the puppet army and administration.

On the fourth point, they are not able to put it into effect.

In a word, the whole Westmoreland plan has collapsed. Moreover, there is no possibility in the future for him to succeed. In South Vietnam the Americans find themselves in an impasse.

We should talk at length about these points. So many think that the material superiority of the Americans will finally win the war in South Vietnam. However, it is very dangerous to think this way, particularly for the Americans to think that way—that by new escalations they will be victorious due to material strength. They increase the first time to bring victory. Then a second time. Then a third step and even after the third step a fourth step. Is it necessary to think that after the fifth step they will be victorious? I affirm to you that they will not be able to win.

I would like to tell you about the nature of the war because this is a crucial point. I take this opportunity to talk about the question which you raised for General Giap. You would like to know how we compare American and French generals, American and French troops. The problem does lie in that the problem involves what kind of war it is for the Americans.

We can say it is an unjust war, carried on for no reason, a kind of war in which the Americans have no advantage. From our point of view it is a sacred war for independence, freedom, life. It stands for everything. This war, for this generation and for future generations.

That is why we are determined to fight this war and win this war. Our victory stems from this very resoluteness. That is the key to a solution of all our problems. I think that this is something very difficult for you to understand. Not only for you; I say this to lots of our friends in Europe. They do not understand. They are afraid of American strength. They do not see how we resist an expeditionary corps of 400,000 well-equipped with weapons, and the nearby Seventh Fleet. And they are concerned that we could not win the war. But now we are being victorious and we are telling them that, finally, we will win. They admit that truth, but they do not understand it.

I have no hope of convincing you, but I must tell you because it is very important.

Concerning the generals and troops, I will tell you that in South Vietnam there are puppet generals and half a million troops well equipped. But what could they do? The Liberation Army is not so numerically strong and their weapons are not so good, but they are winning. All are Vietnamese, but why on the other side are they so bad and on our side so talented, so supremely talented—talented without precedent? I think in history there has never been such a people's war fought with so much talent, and the Americans have to admit that.

Why? Because we are fighting a just war. That is clear and that is the explanation of our victory. We have won because of that. We are winning because of that. And if necessary we will win next year because of that. And if necessary the war may last many years and we will win because of that.

I want to tell you something which is very important. Military men of the United States found that raising their force to 400,000 troops was not helping to solve the problem. They think with half a million they can solve it. Some even speak six hundred thousand. Some say they may increase even more.

I have told you the crucial problem does not lie in numbers. I want to tell you another important point. The more American troops are put into South Vietnam, the more complicated problems they create, something which even cannot be foreseen. Politically speaking, this is something very dangerous for the American troops. If up to now the

puppet administration is able to deceive some people, in the future it will not be able to deceive anyone.

The Vietnamese people in South Vietnam are seeing for themselves that the United States is fighting a colonial war, the most brutal in history. Do you agree? The expeditionary corps is entirely upsetting the economy of South Vietnam. There is increasing inflation. People cannot live.

And another thing. There is bad effect on social and cultural life. You have heard it said that Saigon is now a very huge brothel. Even girls of the upper classes are prostitutes to American officers.

From these three points we may say that the more American troops we put into South Vietnam, the more hatred it will cause among the Vietnam people.

And from this there arises a very new situation in Saigon—a movement in the cities, a struggle in the cities. You have heard of the dockers' strike. The movement in the cities will grow stronger and wider. It will embrace all strata of the population of the laboring classes, the bourgeoisie, even the upper classes, intellectuals, religious sects. It is a political development that you would never think of, that is a very very important political development that will evolve according to the military situation and collapse the puppet regime.

These are things which should be admitted by the Americans. There may be some clear-sighted Americans who admit them. What will you obtain by introducing more and more troops? The puppets are collapsing. These are fundamental points in South Vietnam politics.

We will consider these points, you and I.

As far as the North is concerned, you have been visiting in the North the last few days. You have seen what it is. The most important thing is that the air war of the Americans is a defeat. World opinion admits it is a defeat, because it has not been able to force us to capitulate. It has had no influence on the situation in South Vietnam.

On the contrary the situation is better for the National Liberation Front and more and more dangerous for the Americans.

That is why we are preparing for a long war. How many years? Ten, 20—what do you think about 20?

What I used to tell our friends is that the younger generation will fight better than we—even kids so high. They are preparing themselves. That is the situation. I am not telling that to impress anyone. It's the truth. That is a logical consequence of the situation. Our Vietnam nation is a very proud nation. Our history is one of a very proud nation. Mongol invaders came. They were defeated the first time, the second time and the third time. Now how many times does the Pentagon want to fight? So how many years the war goes on depends on you not on us.

That is the first point.

Now the second point—the question about a settlement.

Of course, you are interested in a settlement, I fully understand I agree to talk with you about this, but to have good talk we must start with the origin of the war that we were just talking about.

For us a settlement is a very simple question. As far as we are concerned, is a war of aggression a colonial war, an unjust war.

So a settlement is to stop it.

This kind of logic is flawless and irrefutable. Do you agree?

We must live with this world. But we must have our point of view and fight for what is sound and sacred. Our struggle is a sacred struggle for our independence and freedom, no more and no less, and any settlement must stem from this and lead to this point. For us that is something that cannot be compromised.

Now for the best solution is that the American stop their war of aggression. The whole problem lies in that. So long as the Americans do not think that way, there will be no solution to the war. They will continue to fight against us and we will continue to oppose them.

As far as we are concerned, we have achieved a few more things. First, our defense potential is increasing very clearly. This is something very fortunate, Our antiaircraft defense is on the increase and, generally speaking, our armed forces are growing stronger and steadily. We have passed the most difficult stages. Now it is time for us to expand widely and rapidly. What counts most is that we have very important and courageous strength in our youth. You may have heard of the very courageous potentials of our youth. In this war we have seen very clearly the immense courage and potential of our youth—three million stand ready and proved their capability in every respect.

Secondly, in the economic aspects. First, the ravages caused by the air war—of course they exist. But there is a second aspect. We have sought in every way to develop economic potential in keeping with wartime conditions and so as to avoid the ravages caused by the American bombers. We can draw some conclusions. We have built what we could and what we can defend in agriculture, in industry, in communications and in all other fields. On this basis we are in a position to expand our economic potential for the war and to prepare for a protracted war.

Now we come to the big question—the prospects of the war. How long will the war last? In this connection we are preparing for a long war because a people's war must be a long war. A war against an aggressor has to be a long war. Nobody knows how long it is to be. It lasts until there will be no aggressors any longer. We are preparing for that kind of war. Every citizen thinks like that.

I do not think you have much time left here to talk with our citizens. How long will the war last?—this is the kind of question which foreigners often put to us because they do not understand. That kind of question surprises us, and any Vietnamese. How can we decide how long the war will be and how can we decide when aggression will stop, when aggressors will stop sending troops to crush us?

Is there any way to make them understand? That is your business, and people like you must shoulder the responsibility. People sometimes say something which is not very correct and speak about the honor of America. Where lies the honor of the United States? The legitimate honor of the United States consists in not fighting an unjust war, and if the United States has fought an unjust war, it would be better for them not to speak of honor any longer. There is no other war. Am I correct in saying this? I think that I am. There is a precedent in history—the French in Algeria. Why could not America do the same?

As far as we are concerned, we must fight the patriotic war. We do not think of humiliating the United States. The United States is a big power. America respects its own honor. But we also respect our

honor, and the moment the United States rulers put an end to the war, we will respect each other and settle every question. Why don't you think that way? We have our point of view and we have put forward four points which constitute a basis for settlement of the Vietnam question. These should not be considered "conditions."

They are merely truths. The most simple thing is to recognize our sovereignty and our independence. It involves only recognizing points in the Geneva agreements. The ruling circles of the United States do not like to accept our four points, and particularly the third point. That means that they are still clinging to South Vietnam, that means they are still introducing themselves into the tunnel. Now what can you do about that? We must come to solution on the basis of the four points. Whichever way you go around, finally you must come to the four points.

Besides the four points we have also put another point. That is to demand that the United States put, unconditionally and for good, an end to bombing and all hostile activity against the North. This point has its own logic, and the reaction and support of the world testifies to its importance. It is crystal clear that throughout the world people demand it—General de Gaulle and even U Thant.

What is the reason? It is not necessary to elaborate because I think you are of the same opinion. But the ruling circles and the Pentagon do not agree with this. Of course, it is still very difficult for them to agree. As far as we are concerned, our position is very clear and simple because the truth is always simple. It is composed of our four-point stand and the point I have just mentioned. Concerning South Vietnam, we have the third of four points.

Now here is something else. Up to now there has not been a bit of goodwill from the United States Government side. In such a complicated war, if there is a lack of goodwill, nothing can be settled. We will never be deceived. We know that while speaking of peace the United States ruling circles and the Pentagon are continuing their war. So we are not to be cheated. As far as world opinion is concerned, maybe at first it was deceived, but slowly it came to understand, as experience showed, that each time the American want to escalate, it is always accompanied by a peace move, from the Baltimore speech to the present.

Of course, I understand this better than you because there are many things I cannot tell you. That does not bring any good to the United States. If you really want a settlement, the first thing is to have goodwill.

That is all that I want to tell you about a settlement. Now I want to talk to you about South Vietnam and the reunification problem. Concerning South Vietnam, we think the political program of the N. L. F. is a very sound program—for independence, democracy, peace, neutrality.

We think that it is a very clear-sighted and intelligent program, fully conforming to the situation in South Vietnam. It has won the warm support of the South Vietnam people. It has become more and more the objective of the South Vietnam people—the whole people.

That is the demand of the situation. Since the National Front is the clear-sighted leader of the struggle of the people, it has won warm support, it is now the only genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. I must say the American ruling circles are very short-sighted in not admitting the situation. Whom are they fighting

against? The N.L.F. They do not recognize the N.L.F. That is impossible. With whom will they settle? Of course, they must recognize the Front and talk with it. Surely the situation will evolve that way.

If the American ruling circles persist in not recognizing the truth, they will come up against bitter surprises.

I must tell you about the relationship of the Front and us. Vietnam is one country, one nation. But there are the Geneva accords. There is the present situation, and in South Vietnam there is the N.L.F., which is the leader of the struggle. We are fellow countrymen; we love and respect our fellow compatriots in the South. We respect their hard and courageous struggle. We respect their program of the N.L.F. The problem of the war in South Vietnam is to be settled with the N.L.F. in the present and in the future.

That is one of our main policies and a very important policy. So how will reunification occur?

We have made public many times our position. So did the N.L.F. We must be reunified. There is no force in the world which can divide us. Because we are a united nation. I myself am from the South.

How will reunification happen? On the basis of independence and democracy. By peaceful means. The two parts of the country will have to discuss together as between brothers what is the best way by which means and through which stages reunification has to be carried out. There are many misunderstandings. People say we will annex the South. We are not doing this stupid, criminal act. We deeply respect the feelings of our brothers in South Vietnam. That is why we are supporting each other and uniting our strength in the fight against the common enemy.

You know what a strong reaction there was in South Vietnam when Hanoi was bombed. The motto was, if the American do any damage to Hanoi, our compatriots in South Vietnam will fight 10 times harder. That is not something we are boasting about. Our compatriots in the South say that Hanoi is the heart of the country and that is true. That is why we say we must be reunified, but we will settle this among ourselves. We will consider the situation, what is the most convenient means, and there is no haste in doing it. There are not many new things about reunifications, so I do not want to elaborate.

Now the last point I would like to make. We are an independent country. We have our independent and sovereign policy. We are the masters of our country, our affairs, our policy, our major and minor policies. This is very clear. If we have no independence, we could not wage such a war as we are now waging. We are independent and sovereign in all our foreign policy. This is the situation so far. And it will be the same in the future. I have to tell you this because in America there has been so much misunderstanding on this point. They are wrong. We do not want that they miscalculate on this. Because if there is miscalculation by the United States rulers, the situation is not good.

Among your questions there is another question. You ask when we will accept volunteers. I answer you that this depends on the situation. We have made preparations. Volunteers are not lacking—volunteers for the armed forces and civilians. If we need them, many will come. This is an important point on which we rely. This point also shows the independence of our policy.

I think that I have explained in the main all the points. Now let us talk. On what do you disagree and have you any suggestions? I said at the beginning that I would speak frankly because I am talking with a good-willed American. That is the basis of this talk.

#### WRITER GIVES PLANS OF HANOI AND VIETCONG FOR FUTURE VIETNAM<sup>1</sup>

The Associated Press asked Wilfred Burchett, an Australian Communist writer, to report the strategy of Hanoi and the Vietcong as he had been able to discern it in his trips to Vietnam. Burchett has often been a Communist spokesman in Korea, Vietnam and Germany.

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Feb. 10 (AP)—How Hanoi and the Vietcong view a future Vietnam which might emerge out of any negotiated settlement was revealed in a series of talks I recently had with top Vietnamese leaders of North Vietnam plus Liberation Front (Vietcong) representatives in Hanoi and talks last August with the Front's president, Nguyen Huu Tho, whom I met for the fourth time in his jungle headquarters in South Vietnam.

The general idea is that Vietnam as such must be an independent country without any foreign presence. Reunification is a long-range project realizable only in the far distant future, which Vietnamese leaders in the North and Liberation Front leaders in the South privately agree may be 10 or 20 years away.

Meantime, the North would remain a Socialist country and a member of the Socialist world but without military alliances or foreign military bases, militarily but not politically neutral. The South would be non-Socialist and neutral militarily, politically and diplomatically.

The seeds for all this are provided for in North Vietnam's four-point plan enunciated by Premier Pham Van Dong in April, 1965, and acceptance of which until very recently had been thought in Washington to be a precondition for talks.

But in Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's replies to my questions, in which he said talks could start if bombings stopped, it was made clear that acceptance of the four points was not posed as a precondition, and far less was withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam made a prior condition, as seems to have been thought over a long period in Washington.

The formula used by Foreign Minister Trinh was that the "four-point stand and correct attitude the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam enjoy were sure of even stronger approval and support from all peace—and justice—loving peoples and governments the world."

That this is not being posed as a precondition is one of the most important of the clarifications in the Foreign Minister's statement.

But if Washington took a long, hard look at the four points one top Vietnamese official said, it would find they entail important concessions compared to the Geneva agreements.

The latter provided reunification by 1956, with the assumption that the pro-Communist Vietminh would rule over the whole country.

<sup>1</sup> From the Washington Post, by Wilfred Burchett, Feb. 11, 1967.

The four points, which neatly dovetail into the five-point plan of the National Liberation Front, were specifically formulated, according to the same official, to facilitate American disengagement. While the plan contains nothing contrary to the Geneva agreements, it makes an important concession the indefinite postponement of reunification, halts the spread of communism south of the 17th Parallel, and accepts certain restrictions on the sovereignty of the North.

[The Geneva agreements of July 21, 1954, which partitioned Vietnam along the 17th Parallel, provided for unification elections by July 20, 1956. However, the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam spurned any such vote.

[The Geneva pact barred any military buildup or foreign interference, but made no specific reference as to what post-1956 Vietnam was to be like.

[Pham Van Dong's four points of April, 1965, included: (1) Withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam and an end to all acts of war against the North; (2) No foreign military alliances for either North or South; (3) Settlements of South Vietnam's internal affairs in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front; (4) peaceful reunification without foreign interference.]

What type of regime could the North and the Liberation Front accept in the South? The Liberation Front considers it is in a strong enough position militarily and politically to have a "decisive place and voice" in any settlement of the Southern half of the problem.

In fact, as the Front's President Nguyen Huu Tho told me last August, he envisages that a "broad coalition government of national union" could be formed which, while excluding personalities like Generals Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van Thieu, the present Premier and President respectively, would not exclude some members of their cabinet or others who served in previous Saigon governments far back, even including that of Diem.

Such a government must be irrevocably committed to an autonomous South Vietnam, independent and neutral. But explicit in the Liberation Front and the North's five and four points is that independence means withdrawal of all U.S. forces and the dismantling of bases.

[U.S. officials in Washington examined with interest the Communist viewpoint as reported by Burchett, John Hightower of the Associated Press reported.

[The officials said Communist acceptance of the idea of a long-term, non-Communist regime in the South was an interesting indication of flexibility, Hightower reported.

[The plan for a coalition government in the South was also viewed with interest, but the United States was pictured as being unwilling to accept any such coalition that included "a decisive place and voice" for the National Liberation Front. The U.S. view is said to be that participation in South Vietnamese political life by individual Vietcong leaders who would be loyal to an independent government would be acceptable, but not participation by the NLF as an organization.]

The Front's leaders, including those of the Marxist Revolutionary Party, insist that although they would carry out the distribution of land—this has already been done in areas administered by the Front—they do not intend the collectivization of land or the socialization of industry and commerce. They would accept aid from the West and East, protect existing foreign interests, and would accept foreign

investments to help rebuild and develop the country when this did not infringe national sovereignty.

In this connection it is interesting to note that Nhan Dan (The People)—which is North Vietnam's Pravda—commenting on the Foreign Minister's statement on the possibilities of talks, seven times mentioned the term "peace and independence" as defining the Vietnamese main aims, but not a single mention of socialism. This fact is noted by foreign diplomats in Hanoi. This certainly does not imply any intention of abandoning socialism in the North, but does mean that the emphasis is on national aims, which do not foresee a Socialist regime for the South. And "socialism for the north, Democracy in the South" was the title of speech by Le Duan, secretary of the North's Communist Party, early in January.

A few months ago a bureau of the National Liberation Front was established in Hanoi—housed in the repainted, refurbished former American consulate.

Unlike other diplomatic missions it is not accredited to the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but in careful political distinctions is called the "representation of the National front for the liberation of South Vietnam in North Vietnam."

The desired implication of this, as carefully explained by gray-haired NLF central committee member Nguyen Van Tien, who has the "representation," is that it is a "concrete image of reunification" with the clear implication of South and North enjoying equal status.

When I asked if there was not a contradiction between the North's stated aims of "defending the North, liberating the South and reunifying the country," the Front's program of independence and neutrality, and his own statement that reunification is nearing, he said "no" and then gave the clearest exposition of how the North and South—as represented by the Liberation Front—viewed the future of North and South relations if the war ended and the Front was the dominant element of a government in the South.

His views are summed up as follows:

North and South Vietnam remain autonomous in internal and foreign affairs. The North would remain Socialist and a member of the Socialist bloc. The South would be neutral, unallied to any blocs. Each would have its own foreign ministries and own diplomatic representatives abroad. The Front already has over a dozen de facto embassies abroad.

For regulating North-South relations, there would be a type of general assembly, presumably nominated by the respective parliaments to handle questions important to both zones such as trade, post and telegraphs, interzonal travel, including sports and cultural exchanges. The assembly in fact would have some resemblance to the inter-German council, an idea being toyed with by the West German Social Democrats as a means to handle current practical problems between East and West Germany.

The question of negotiations between Hanoi and the Ky government in Saigon is seen as an impossibility. The latter is considered as representing no national interests or any section of the population and would die a natural death the moment serious negotiations started.

It is assumed Ky and a handful of his top supporters would make suitable dispositions, as so many of their predecessors did, for a comfortable exile. But it is also considered that national reconciliation is entirely possible with personalities and groups less engaged, if they

are prepared to take a clear stand on the question of complete national independence. On that belief everyone is adamant. Ho Chi Minh told a group, including myself, "the United States is offering us the choice of colonial slavery or victory. Obviously we fight till the end."

Another personality, in replying to a question whether North Vietnam is prepared to offer anything in exchange for an American withdrawal, shrugged his shoulders, laughed and said:

"What do they want?"

"Do they want us to invite into the North 400,000 Chinese, 40,000 North Koreans and a few thousand Cubans and then propose their withdrawal as a counterpart for withdrawal of the United States and her Allies from the South? Is that what they are after?"

## DRAFT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION (Unofficial Translation)<sup>1</sup>

### PREAMBLE

Confident that the patriotism, indomitable will, and unyielding traditions of the people will assure a radiant future for our country;

Conscious that after many years of foreign domination, followed by the division of our territory, dictatorship and war, the people of Viet-Nam must take responsibility before history, to perpetuate those hardy traditions and at the same time to welcome progressive ideas in order to establish a republican form of government of the people, by the people, and for the people whose purpose is to unite the nation, unite the territory and assure independence, freedom, and democracy with justice and altruism for the present and future generations;

We, 117 deputies of the National Constituent Assembly, representing the people of Viet-Nam, after debate, approve this Constitution.

### CHAPTER I. BASIC PROVISIONS

#### Article 1

1. Viet-Nam is a territorially indivisible, unified and independent republic.
2. Sovereignty resides in the People.

#### Article 2

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the basic rights of all citizens.
2. The State advocates equality of all citizens without discrimination as to sex, religion, race or political party.
3. It is the duty of every citizen to serve the national interests.

#### Article 3

The functions and powers of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches must be clearly delineated. The activities of these three branches must be coordinated and harmonized to realize public order and prosperity on the basis of freedom, democracy and social justice.

#### Article 4

1. The Republic of Viet-Nam will comply with those provisions of international law which are not contrary to its national sovereignty and the principle of equality between nations.

<sup>1</sup> Department of State press release dated Mar. 18, 1967.

2. The Republic of Viet-Nam is determined to oppose all forms of aggression and strives to contribute to the building of international peace and security.

*Article 5*

1. The Republic of Viet-Nam opposes communism in every form.
2. Every activity designed to propagandize or carry out communism is prohibited.

CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

*Article 6*

1. The State respects human dignity.
2. The State will protect freedom, the lives, property and honor of every citizen.

*Article 7*

1. The State respects and protects the security of each individual and the right of every citizen to plead his case before a court of law.
2. No one can be arrested or detained without a legal order issued by an agency which has judicial powers conferred upon it by law except in cases of flagrant violation of the law.
3. The accused and his next of kin must be informed of the accusation against him within the time limit prescribed by law. Detentions must be controlled by an agency of the judiciary.
4. No citizen can be tortured, threatened or forced to confess. A confession obtained by torture, threat or coercion will not be considered as valid evidence.
5. A defendant is entitled to a speedy and public trial.
6. A defendant has the right to a defense lawyer for counsel in every phase of the interrogation, including the preliminary investigation.
7. Any person accused of a minor offense who doesn't have a record of more than three months imprisonment for an intentional crime may be released pending trial provided he (or she) is employed and has a fixed residence. Women pregnant more than three months accused of minor offenses who are employed and have a fixed residence may be released pending trial.
8. Accused persons will be considered innocent until sentence recognizing his guilt is handed down. In event of doubt, the court will rule in favor of the accused.
9. If unjustly detained, a citizen has the right to demand compensation for damages after his release, in accordance with the provisions of the law.
10. No one can be detained for indebtedness.

*Article 8*

1. The private life, home, and correspondence of every citizen will be respected.
2. No one can enter, search or confiscate a person's property unless in possession of orders from a court or when necessary to the defense of security and public order according to the spirit of the law.
3. Privacy of correspondence will be protected by law. Any restriction imposed on this right must be determined by law.

*Article 9*

1. The State will respect and guarantee freedom of religious belief and freedom to preach and practice religion of every citizen as long as it does not violate the national interest and is not harmful to public safety and order or contrary to good morals.
2. No religion will be recognized as the State religion. The State will be impartial in the development of various religions.

*Article 10*

1. The State recognizes freedom of education.
2. Basic education is compulsory and free of charge.
3. University education will be autonomous.
4. Talented persons who do not have means will be given aid and support to continue their studies.
5. The State encourages and supports research and creative work by citizens in the fields of science, letters and the arts.

*Article 11*

1. Culture and education must be considered matters of national policy, on a national, scientific, and humanistic basis.
2. An appropriate budget must be reserved for the development of culture and education.

*Article 12*

1. The State respects freedom of thought, speech, press and publishing, as long as it does not harm personal honor, national security, or good morals.
2. Censorship will be abolished except for motion pictures and plays.
3. Press regulations will be prescribed by law.

*Article 13*

1. Every citizen has the right to meet and form associations in accordance with conditions and procedures prescribed by law.
2. Every citizen has the right to vote, run for office and participate in public affairs on an equal basis and in accordance with conditions and procedures prescribed by law.
3. The State recognizes the political rights of every citizen including the right to petition freely and engage in overt, non-violent and legal opposition.

*Article 14*

Every citizen will enjoy freedom to choose his place of residence and freedom of movement including the right to go and return from abroad. These freedoms can be restricted by law only for reasons of public health, security or defense.

*Article 15*

1. Every citizen has the right and duty to work and receive fair remuneration enabling him and his family to live in dignity.
2. The State will endeavor to create employment for all citizens.

*Article 16*

Freedom to join labor unions and to strike will be respected within the framework and regulations prescribed by law.

*Article 17*

1. The State recognizes the family as the foundation of society. The State will encourage and facilitate the formation of families and will assist expectant mothers and infants.

2. Marriage must be based on mutual consent, equality and cooperation.

3. The State will encourage family cohesion.

*Article 18*

1. The State will endeavor to establish a system of social security.

2. It is the duty of the State to establish a system of social welfare and public health.

3. It is the duty of the State to support the nation's warriors both spiritually and materially, as well as to support and raise the nation's orphans.

*Article 19*

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the freedom of private property.

2. The State will advocate a policy of making the people property owners.

3. Expropriation or requisition by the State for the common good must be accompanied by speedy and just compensation at price levels existing at time of expropriation or requisition.

*Article 20*

1. Freedom of trade and competition will be recognized but it cannot be exercised to secure monopoly or control of the market.

2. The State will encourage and assist economic cooperation which has the nature of mutual economic assistance.

3. The State will give special support to those elements of society which have a low standard of living.

*Article 21*

The State advocates raising the standard of living of rural citizens, and especially helping farmers to have farmland.

*Article 22*

On the basis of equality between duties and rights, workers have the right to choose representatives to participate in the management of business enterprises particularly with respect to matters concerning wages and conditions of work within the framework and procedures prescribed by law.

*Article 23*

1. Military personnel elected to public office or serving in positions in central government must be demobilized or take leave of absence without salary, according to their choice.

2. Military personnel on active duty are not permitted to engage in political party activity.

*Article 24*

1. The State recognizes the presence of minorities in the Vietnamese community.

2. The State respects the habits and customs of the minority compatriots. Customary courts will be established to pronounce

judgments on some disputes involving habits and customs of minority compatriots.

3. A law will prescribe special rights in order to assist minority compatriots.

*Article 25*

Every citizen has the duty to defend the country and the republic.

*Article 26*

Every citizen has the duty to defend the constitution and respect the law.

*Article 27*

Every citizen has the duty to fulfill his military obligations as prescribed by law.

*Article 28*

Every citizen has the duty to pay taxes in accordance with the provisions of law.

*Article 29*

Any restriction upon the basic rights of the citizens must be prescribed by law and the time and place within which such a restriction is in force must be clearly specified. In any event the essence of all basic freedoms cannot be violated.

## CHAPTER III. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

*Article 30*

1. Legislative authority is vested by the people in the National Assembly.

2. The National Assembly includes two houses, the Lower House and the Upper House.

*Article 31*

1. The Lower House includes from 100 to 200 representatives.

2. Representatives are elected by universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot. Candidates run as individuals from separate constituencies no larger than province.

3. Representatives serve for four years. They may be reelected.

4. The election for a new Lower House will be completed at least one month prior to the completion of the term of the old Upper House.

*Article 32*

Citizens meeting the following qualifications may run for the Lower House:

1. Vietnamese citizenship at birth, or having held Vietnamese citizenship at least seven years, or recovered Vietnamese citizenship for at least five years, counting from the day of election;

2. At least 25 years old on the day of the election;

3. Enjoying full rights of citizenship;

4. Having draft status in order;

5. Meeting other conditions specified in the electoral law.

*Article 33*

1. The Upper House will include from 30 to 60 members.

2. Senators are elected at-large by universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot. The election will be by list voting and on basis of plu-