


THE COUNTRY TEAM



An Illustrated Profile of Our American Missions Abroad

DEPARTMENT OF STATE




*In Peru, as in some 115
other countries, the United
States Ambassador . . .*




. . . directs a group of skilled, dedicated Americans who make up his Country Team. Each country has its unique problems, but all people have basic interests in common: their desire for peace, for self-government, for economic and social progress. It is the business of every Ambassador and Country Team to work toward these goals and, where requested, to use the best available combination of American resources and skills to help the host country in its own efforts to achieve them.

In performing the work of our Country Team in Peru a political officer will discuss politics with a priest . . .



... a commercial attaché will work out an import problem ... an information officer will spend his evenings showing films ... an agriculture specialist will advise a farmer ... a Peace Corps man will listen to the peasants. ...



... a Foreign Service officer will spend his Sunday helping the Ambassador prepare for ... a Monday meeting with the Foreign Minister ... a Marine guard will end the day checking embassy security ... a consul will swear in visa applicants ...



... the AID mission will bring in machines to push roads into the wilderness . . . a Foreign Service wife will make her own special contribution. Is the future of young people in countries like Peru worth all that effort? The American people think so. That is why we have a Country Team.



THE COUNTRY TEAM

An Illustrated Profile of Our American Missions Abroad


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CONTENTS

THE EMBASSY	1
House of many skills	
THE TEAM	5
The Ambassador sets the pace	
THE AMBASSADORS	11
Khrushchev tramped on Thompson's foot	
POLITICAL AFFAIRS	19
Provincial reporter learns politics of terror	
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS	27
Texas machine parlays peanuts to pearls	
NATION BUILDING	33
The chiefs came to trust the woman in the jeep	
PUBLIC AFFAIRS	43
Cold war battle in book margins	
MILITARY AFFAIRS	49
Colonel takes busman's holiday	
CONSULAR AFFAIRS	55
Tragic, comic parade through U.S. consulate	
ADMINISTRATION	61
900 Americans in the frozen Kush; after ice, the deluge!	



THE EMBASSY

House of many skills

Friday morning, 10 o'clock. In the seventh floor conference room of the United States Embassy, 14 men chat quietly and take their turns at the steaming coffee urn in the corner. From seven stories below, assorted sounds of a lively Latin American city penetrate the room. A few steps down the hall is the shattered men's room where a local critic recently exploded a plastic bomb.

As the Ambassador enters, the 14 men rise, then reseal themselves around the 16-foot conference table. The door is secured, and the secretary's pencil is poised above a fresh notebook.

"Well, gentlemen," the Ambassador looks around the table with a faint smile, "does anyone have problems today?"

The twice-monthly meeting of the Country Team is under way.

Most of the men present speak fluent Spanish; some have served more than one tour in this Latin American country; all are well grounded in local and regional affairs; and all are professionals in their respective skills. Most are officers of the U.S. Foreign Service.

Their job is to carry out our foreign policy in a representative Latin American country. The combined talents of the 14 men sitting at this one table include solid experience in agricultural science, journalism, education, retail business, political science, labor affairs, naval administration, banking, military science, and the social sciences. These men have served in a score of countries around the world, but two-thirds of their combined foreign experience is in Latin America. Their language capability, besides Spanish, includes German, French, Portuguese, Italian, Slavic languages, Persian, Dutch, Gaelic, and Polynesian.

Two of the men present grew up on the Arizona desert; one came out of the Italian district of Philadelphia; one is from a well-to-do New York family; others grew up in Montana, Arkansas, California, Texas, Oklahoma, and Massachusetts. They attended

universities from Hawaii and UCLA to Columbia and Georgetown. Several studied abroad.

Nearly all are family men whose wives and children have accompanied them to make a new home in South America. Neither "Ugly Americans" nor "Quiet Americans," these are the people who make up the Ambassador's Country Team.

The Country Team meeting brings together program heads and other senior advisers of the Ambassador. It is called periodically to assure that all the available U.S. resources are mobilized and brought to bear on the problems at hand.

The agenda for this Country Team meeting—an actual meeting, as recorded at the time—reflects, in thumbnail form, the scope of the modern operations of United States missions in many countries:

(1) *Approval of the Alliance for Progress technical assistance program for the coming fiscal year.*

(2) *Proposed U.S. cultural center adjacent to the university to work with students.*

(3) *Progress of training of new group of Peace Corps volunteers to work in community development in the "barrios" (districts or wards, usually poor).*

(4) *Request from the host country for assistance in special training in methods of combating Communist terrorism.*

The meeting begins. The AID representative reviews his proposed technical assistance program for the coming year. Questions are asked and details discussed. At one point, the Peace Corps representative asks if the proposed work of the AID education specialists in secondary education would dovetail with what the Peace Corps was doing in this field. It is agreed that it would. The chief of the U.S. Army mission asks hopefully if the program could be stretched to help the local army's civic action (social development) activities, but is informed that the funds will not reach that far.

Summing up, the deputy chief of mission

advises the Ambassador that the proposed program is in accordance with policy guidelines and that all elements of the team have been consulted and recommend it.

The Ambassador approves the program for transmission to Washington.

The public affairs counselor brings up the proposed new cultural center. This is to be established by the U.S. Information Service (USIS) directly across the Plaza from the politically turbulent University—"a stone's throw away," as he remarks with a wry smile. He describes the need for such a facility, centrally located and equipped for research, study, and the presentation of cultural events and political debates.

"It's a calculated risk," he observes, "but with an attractive building, offering high school and university students a convenient place to go for study and free entertainment, we will be able to work more closely with the influential young people of this country."

The Peace Corps representative and the political counselor strongly agree.

All members favor proceeding with the center.

The Peace Corps training report is brief and satisfactory, and the Country Team takes up the most pressing problem on the agenda—political terrorism. What initially appeared to be an isolated group of back-country bandits is now showing distinct signs of outside direction, organization, and financing.

The pattern is all too familiar. It resembles in many details the growth of such revolutionary organizations as the "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN) in Venezuela. Every member of the Country Team is familiar with the headline-grabbing operations of the FALN.

For 2 years prior to the 1963 elections in Venezuela, the FALN, a small Castroite band of terrorists, managed to capture headlines with scare tactics.

Hardly a week went by that some U.S.-owned company was not visited by FALN youths bent on sabotage. Venezuelan-owned

firms were hit just as frequently. To publicize their cause, the FALN also pulled off such spectacular stunts as the highjacking of the Venezuelan steamer *Anzoategui* and the kidnaping of the deputy chief of the U.S. Army mission, Col. James K. Chenault.

U.S. personnel in Venezuela were harassed by telephoned threats of kidnaping and death, bombs were wired under the hoods of their cars, and their homes were pillaged; for a time, guards had to be stationed outside some of their homes.

The terror was brutal and purposeful: the FALN hoped to disrupt the nation and force the military to oust the elected civil administration and call off the pending election. This, they hoped, would discredit democratic government and force the people to choose between military dictatorship and communism.

The Venezuelan authorities and police proved equal to the challenge. The elections were held, and the Administration of President Betancourt achieved the distinction of being the first elected civil government in Venezuela's history to complete its term in office. Afterward, FALN activity fell off, but the terrorists never renounced their aims—as the subsequent discovery of a complete back-country arms factory by Venezuelan police indicated.

The Country Team wants no such problem here.

The Ambassador asks for an estimate of current armed Castroite strength in this area.

The senior defense attaché—a Navy captain—reports that numerically the guerrillas are not yet impressive, but are growing. In the past 2 years their forces have doubled—from an estimated 300 to 600 men. They are receiving little help from the *campesinos*—the country people—but there seems to be a growing trend among students to join the movement and spend adventurous weekends in the country “playing Robin Hood.” More ominously, there is evidence that in recent months the guerrillas received large amounts of money and new weapons from

abroad. They now claim to be a popular uprising.

The Captain says the guerrilla force is not now a substantial threat to the stability of the country, but has a dangerous potential. The host country is asking assistance, including:

□ Training for officers and noncommissioned officers in the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School run by the U.S. Armed Forces in the Canal Zone.

□ Temporary assignment of U.S. personnel to help set up local counterinsurgency training.

The Ambassador asks if there will be any political objections to either of these moves.

“Only from the Communists,” replies the political counselor.


The public affairs officer agrees, and advises that public information efforts, in cooperation with the local authorities, stress the initiative and control of these projects by the host government, as well as the reasons for the training program. The *campesinos* must understand that the U.S. military aid is being given to contribute to their protection and will not be used against them.

A long discussion follows. The basic problem is how best to mobilize not merely military expertise, but equally the educational, economic, and social resources of the American mission, to help the host country get the job done. The real job over the long haul is not the defeat of 600 guerrillas, but the improvement of the lives of the millions of poor people of the country.

This long-term effort in international cooperation is a continuing theme of every meeting of this Country Team. Once again, the team members turn to it with a will.

It is 11:15 a.m. when the meeting of the Country Team is adjourned.

ED. NOTE: The foregoing is an eyewitness account of an actual Country Team meeting. In this and several other sections of this booklet, names and places have been omitted to permit greater latitude in reporting details which might otherwise be classified.



THE TEAM

The Ambassador sets the pace

The Country Team concept represents an evolutionary rather than revolutionary development in American diplomacy. It evolved, in the years since World War II, to meet the needs of a world in which scores of new countries were emerging from colonial rule, in which hungry peoples are clamoring for rapid change, and in which the security of nations around the world is threatened by the ambitions of communism.

In response to these pressing needs, the international bureaus of our Government increased in number and expanded rapidly. New agencies were organized in Washington; new embassies established in the many new nations; existing embassies enlarged to carry on new programs; and special U.S. missions dispatched around the world. Before World War II, there were only 700 career U.S. Foreign Service officers serving in Washington and abroad; today there are about 4,500. In addition, there are tens of thousands of employees of government and private organizations working on foreign problems in many agencies which either did not exist or were almost entirely concerned with domestic affairs 20 years ago.

This growth called for new and creative approaches to management, both at home and at the posts abroad. The overseas missions were no longer small, homogeneous groups of diplomatic specialists. The traditional diplomatic and consular units were being surrounded and often dwarfed by new arms of the nation overseas—aid missions, military advisory groups, information services, scientists, and many more. Each new arm had its own program, its own chief, its own expertise, its own agency in Washington to report to. Often its field headquarters were remote from the other elements of the mission.

In these circumstances, the need for coordination, cooperation, and unified overall direction—in a word, teamwork—was critical, if the United States interests abroad were to be pursued effectively. The Country Team idea came to stand for that kind of teamwork.

In its broadest sense, the team is all the elements—and all the men and women—of the American mission in a foreign country. More narrowly, it is a management tool—a council of senior officers, heads of the various sections of the mission, working together under the Ambassador's direction to pool their skills, resources, and problems in the national interest.

As John D. Jernegan, Ambassador to Algeria, has pointed out, the Country Team is not mentioned by name in any legal document. It has no legal standing, nor are its composition or functions laid down anywhere in a formal document. It is essentially what the Ambassador makes it.

In practice, the makeup of the Country Team varies widely, depending not only on the Ambassador but also on the country situation, the number of American programs there, and the qualities of the senior officers of the different agencies attached to the diplomatic mission. In some posts, there may be no defined membership: the "team" changes its composition according to the kind of problem being considered. Typical membership at large posts usually includes the deputy chief of the diplomatic mission, the chiefs of the political and economic sections of the embassy, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the Agency for International Development mission, and the United States Information Service. It also includes one or more of the military attachés, the agricultural attaché, and, of course, the Ambassador.

Like their memberships, the methods of operation of different Country Teams vary according to the personalities concerned and the local situation. Day-to-day consultation is usually informal and frequent, on an individual basis. But during the crisis in Lebanon in the summer of 1958, the full Country Team met every day, wherever most convenient. When the crisis diminished, meetings

became less frequent. Similarly, during the critical situation in Laos in 1961, the team sometimes met twice a day, and urgent telegrams of information and recommendations to Washington were frequently drafted by the Ambassador on the spot.

In a post not subject to continual crises, the normal schedule might call for a formal meeting once a week or less.

The types of problems considered by the full team vary widely, too. In some posts, the group may confine its collective attention to such major questions as proposing or reviewing the annual military and economic aid programs, the country information program for the year, and other basic matters. Elsewhere, the need for coordinated decisions and actions might call for Country Team consultation on all sorts of day-to-day questions.

The Ambassador is sole head of the team. The President has given him this authority, and it is backed by policy directives. As the leader, it is the Ambassador's job to use his team as an instrument for pulling together the best information, ideas, and judgment of all American representatives in the country and to produce effective action to reach our objectives. He must mold the entire American staff into a cohesive unit, with a common sense of purpose and direction.

As the leader, the Ambassador also has to keep in perspective all of our interests and activities in the country, to insure that the recommendations of the Country Team or of its individual members are balanced, that the woods are not being overlooked for the trees, that the enthusiasms of individuals for their own programs do not carry them away. He must know all the implications of proposed courses of action and be prepared to decide what is best for American interests as a whole.

The habit of close teamwork is critical when the pressure is on. During some of the worst times in Laos, for example, officials of all

Country Team meeting at U.S. Embassy in Caracas.



agencies worked together at all levels, at whatever task most needed doing. Military men conducted political discussions when they had the best opportunities or contacts; the military and civilian aid staffs joined the information service to support vital radio broadcasts; AID and USIS men traveled together as teams through the hinterlands; military-section aircraft were used to meet the most pressing needs of all agencies. The Ambassador to Laos at that time, Winthrop Brown, has recalled:

“The attitude of mind of the members of the Country Team and the heads of the different agency groups in Laos was such that it became quite natural for their subordinates to pool resources in this fashion, and the kind of cooperation which went on in the Country Team itself also found expression down the line in the respective agencies.”



Most of the U.S. Country Team in Burundi can sit on one motor scooter. Ambassador Donald A. Dumont, former Ambassador to Burundi (left), and his Deputy Chief of Mission, Ernest L. Stanger, prepare to leave the Embassy. A political officer and an administrative officer make up rest of the Country Team.

In Tunisia, 200,000 unemployed were put to work with U.S. Country Team assistance. Project chiefly involved labor, political, economic, and AID officers. Workers received U.S. food as part of their wages. Projects such as these help reduce political and economic instability in developing nations.



The formal Country Team can be an advisory body, a forum for consultation, and a means of instilling a spirit of coordinated effort. It is also an executive organ which, under the Ambassador's leadership, divides the tasks to be done and sees to it that they get done. One of its most useful functions is to see that jobs are assigned to those agencies which can best carry them out. It is a planning body, too, which analyzes the situation in the country and draws up plans to meet it. Inseparable from this function is that of recommending policy to Washington.

But the best cooperation among agency representatives in U.S. missions abroad will not produce desired results unless it is matched by similar coordination among the respective agencies in Washington. For this reason, a counterpart of the Country Team system is developing in the Department of State under the new Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG) created by President Johnson early in 1966. These interagency groups operate under the direction of the Secretary of State to administer and execute broad U.S. overseas programs. Each regional Assistant Secretary of State heads an interdepartmental team, the IRG, which assists him exactly as the Country Team assists the Ambassador in the field. At a still higher level, the Senior Interdepartmental Group is headed by the Under Secretary of State.

Thus, at each end of the foreign policy line there is a group of specialists capable of providing professional judgment on the many technical problems that inevitably occur and of working together on general programming under the leadership of a senior diplomat with the authority to make decisions. This new "bifocal" Country Team system makes possible rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field, and effective execution by U.S. missions abroad of programs and policies developed in Washington.

In the last analysis, however, the quality of America's performance in foreign affairs depends primarily on the caliber of the people who make up the Country Team. On this theme President Johnson has said:

"First, we will work to make the greatness of our institutions match the grandeur of our intentions. I intend to do even more to attract the best minds and the most brilliant talents to our foreign operations, regardless of background, race, or party."

Here we tell a small part of the story of the Country Team—the men and women serving the United States abroad—of the problems they face, and the manner in which they represent the Government and people of the United States to the nations of the world.

Composition of a U.S. mission

The personnel of an American diplomatic mission may range in number from six, as in Rwanda, to several hundred as in Viet-Nam. The example used below is Venezuela, an important South American country where there is a broad range of official U.S. activities. In addition to the Embassy with its executive, political, economic, consular, and administrative sections, the U.S. mission in Venezuela includes military attachés, agricultural attachés from the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the Department of Agriculture, Peace Corps representatives, United States Information Service officers, Agency for International Development staff, and two consular posts outside the capital city.

In the two consular posts at Maracaibo and Puerto La Cruz, there are seven consuls and vice consuls. Also at Maracaibo is a public affairs officer directing a branch USIS office. In addition, there are American and local secretarial and clerical employees, translators, maintenance men, security personnel, librarians, and other support staff.

Executive Section

Ambassador
Deputy Chief of Mission
Executive Assistant

Political Section

Counselor for Political Affairs
Two Political Officers
Labor Attaché

Economic Section

Counselor for Economic Affairs
Three Economic Officers
Four Commercial Officers
Transportation and Communications Attaché
Petroleum Attaché

Consular Section

Consul General
Four Consular Officers
Visa Assistant

Administrative Section

Counselor for Administration
Administrative Officer
Two Security Officers
Budget Management Officer
General Services Officer
Disbursing Specialist
Communications and Records Supervisor
Personnel Assistant
General Services Assistant

General Assignment

Foreign Service Officer (a junior officer on first tour of duty abroad)

Military Attachés

Army Attaché
Assistant Army Attaché
Naval Attaché
Assistant Naval Attaché
Air Attaché
Assistant Air Attaché

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)

Agricultural Attaché
Assistant Agricultural Attaché

Agency for International Development (AID)

AID Representative
Controller
Training Officer
Programs Analysis Officer
Public Safety Adviser
Manpower Adviser
Agriculture Credit Adviser
Industrial Officer
Resources Development Officer
Sociologist
Education Adviser
Reports Officer

Peace Corps

Peace Corps Representative
Deputy Representative
Physician

United States Information Service (USIS)

Counselor for Public Affairs
Information Officer
Cultural Affairs Officer
Executive Officer



THE AMBASSADORS

Khrushchev tramped on Thompson's foot

July 1958. The Sixth Fleet deploys off the coast of Lebanon. U.S. Marines land under cover of fleet airpower and take over Beirut airport.

The American forces had been dispatched by President Eisenhower, at the request of Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, to stabilize an explosive situation in the Middle East.

As the Marine units roll toward Beirut, word comes to Ambassador Robert McClintock that a dissident group of Lebanese junior officers, with a dozen tanks, have established a roadblock on the only route into the capital, with orders to fire if challenged.

McClintock recognizes that one shot from a Lebanese tank could inflame the entire Middle East. He quickly contacts the Marine commander who agrees to a 1-hour delay, though his orders are to proceed immediately into Beirut. McClintock then reaches the Lebanese Army chief, General Fuad Chehab, and American Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., and persuades them both to drive with him to the roadblock in the Embassy car, flying Lebanese and American flags. General Chehab gives orders on the spot to hold fire, and what might have been a tragic episode is narrowly averted. With the time McClintock has gained, the operation is successful.

The incident is described by Robert Murphy, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in his book, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, as an example of the Ambassador's exercise of initiative and diplomacy.

McClintock's crisis had at least the advantage of a quick end. Some Ambassadors live with crises year after year. Llewellyn Thompson, a cool-headed Coloradan, began his first ambassadorial assignment in Moscow in 1957 when the world was outraged by the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. His tenure there spanned the Lebanese crisis, the "kitchen debate" between Vice President Richard Nixon and Premier Nikita

Donald A. Dumont, formerly U.S. Ambassador to Burundi, shows youngsters in a refugee camp how to take their medicine.



Khrushchev, the U-2 incident, the exploded Paris conference, and the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Without compromising the United States stand against the advance of communism, Thompson patiently continued his efforts to keep the Soviet leaders talking. "Given our different approaches to every sort of question," he said, "enormous misunderstandings are bound to exist. We should constantly try to reduce the misunderstandings by normal diplomatic dialogue."

How difficult that dialogue can be was shown months after pilot Gary Powers was shot down in a U-2 reconnaissance plane. Talking with Thompson and his wife at a Kremlin reception, Chairman Khrushchev tramped on Thompson's foot, saying: "If I do that to you, I ought to apologize. Your government ought to have apologized."

The Soviet Union, Thompson replied, spied without apology on the United States.

By this time, other guests were gathering around. Anastas Mikoyan intervened: "Maybe it was Mrs. Thompson's fault—women are always starting something," he said, facetiously.

"Yes, it was all my fault," Mrs. Thompson willingly agreed, "and let's not talk about it anymore."

Nevertheless, it was during this same period of injured feelings and misunderstandings that the United States and the Soviet Union reached the first of a series of agreements for cultural exchange. As a result of Ambassador Thompson's work, the two countries kept talking, not only on diplomatic subjects, but about the worlds of the arts, industry, agriculture, and the sciences. These conversations laid the foundation for the later agreement to ban atmospheric nuclear tests.

As in both cases above, it is the traditional role of the Ambassador not to jar history loose on its hinges, but to keep the hinges oiled.

Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown joins Koreans in rice-planting celebration at Yong Dong Po.



Ambassador Geoffrey W. Lewis takes leave of Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Daddah after presentation of credentials in 1965.



Historically, the function of the Ambassador was unique in that he traditionally represented the *person* of his king, not the government. This association affected early American opinion, and the United States Congress for 100 years refused to allow an American to carry the title of Ambassador. In our young Republic, the titles of royalty were anathema, and the title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary seemed to belong more to the world of "His Britannic Majesty" from which we had parted than to the world of "Mr. President."

During this period, our diplomatic business abroad was conducted largely by ministers, who ranked by protocol below Ambassadors. As a result, for a century, United States ministers waited in the anterooms of the world until Ambassadors finished their business.

The first American to carry the title of Ambassador was Thomas Bayard, former Secretary of State under President Grover Cleveland. In 1893 Bayard was appointed



Sharing a light with a member of the Peuhl tribe in Mali is Ambassador William J. Handley during a 1964 visit to Diafarabe to take part in the traditional "passage of the herds" of cattle across the Niger River.



Sharavathi hydroelectric project is inspected by Ambassador Chester Bowles and India's late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. The project, largest in South Asia, has received \$102 million in U.S. aid and will ultimately produce 1.2 million kilowatts.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James. Even today that exalted title has the sound of distant kettledrums and cymbals, and the exchange of exotic gifts at the foot of the throne. The truth is, of course, that the United States Ambassador is likely to arrive at his post with no more than a quiet handshake at the airport from the foreign minister or his representative. Presentation of his credentials to the chief of state is usually a brief and simple affair.

For many years Ambassadorships went primarily to the wealthy, for the very practical reason that no one else could afford the honor with all of its incumbent expenses. Today, however, the man who steps off the jetliner with the traditional letter from the President may be of any social or economic background.

Before World War I, the authority of the U.S. Ambassador was accepted without question throughout the American mission. His staff was likely to be a small group of people employed by the Department of State. In the

1920's and 1930's, the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior established their own foreign services, with attachés assigned to our embassies but reporting to their own Departments. With World War II, a host of special agencies were created, which sent their own special missions overseas. As a result, the Ambassador sometimes found himself on the outside looking in when important negotiations between these agencies and foreign governments were in progress.

It was a period of transition. With a decade of experience in the new American style of diplomacy, our Foreign Service inevitably began to reintegrate. The authority of the Ambassador was reaffirmed by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, and the Country Team concept gradually emerged. The Ambassador once again assumed his traditional role as head of the American mission, now much expanded and diversified. As the nature of the American mission changed, so did the function of the Ambassador. He is no longer a diplomatic technician; while remain-