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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED } TO 31  
JUL 66

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
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

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OPERATIONAL REPORT

LESSONS LEARNED  
for period ending  
31 JULY 1966

(RCS CSFOR - 65)

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15 August 1966

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## I Significant Organization and Unit Activities

### 1. Introduction:

During the period covered by the previous Operational Report-Lessons Learned (1 Jan - 30 Apr 66), the 1st Infantry Division began to conduct major operations outside the assigned tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) to extend U.S. and GVN influence into previously uncontacted areas. The period covered by this report was marked by even deeper penetrations into areas considered as VC dominated territory. Operations were characterized by rapid reaction to intelligence information and deployment of the bulk of division forces over vast areas of the III Corps Tactical Zone. There has been a significant increase in the integration of ARVN combat forces into 1st Infantry Division operations. The division initiated its first major pacification operation and results to date have been very encouraging. Operations were also conducted within base camp TAORs to locate and destroy remaining VC forces and installations. Three main Force Viet Cong regiments were engaged in five major battles and in each the enemy forces were decisively defeated. The elite 272d VC Regiment was engaged in battle on two separate occasions, one of which occurred on the 49th Anniversary of the formation of the Big Red One, 3 July 1917.

Sergeant Major William Woodrigo departed the 1st Infantry Division on 9 July to assume his duties as the newly created Sergeant Major of the Army.

The numerous and varied projects initiated under the Civic Action program have continued to have a high priority. During this period, the scope of the program was enlarged to encompass assistance to ARVN Forces through construction, training, and medical care for dependents.

### 2. Organization:

The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy five major base camps at SI AN, PHU LOI, LAI KHE, PHUOC VINH and BEAR CAT. In a ceremony on 4 July 1966, the 2d Brigade base camp at BEAR CAT was officially renamed CAMP COX in honor of Sergeant Martin Cox, Company B, 1st Engineer Battalion. Sergeant Cox was killed in action during Operation ABLEONE.

The 35th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) arrived in-country 16 June and was attached to the 1st Infantry Division by U.S. Army Vietnam General Order 4079 (Incl 4). The entire platoon was further attached to the 2d Brigade for centralized control until training that was incomplete upon deployment from COMUS and refresher training could be completed.

In accordance with guidance from the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, a provisional light assault artillery battery (4.2 inch mortar) was formed in July (Incl 5). Assets of three infantry battalion heavy mortar platoons were transferred to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery. One battalion from each brigade base camp provided the assets, thereby retaining the integrity of the transferred platoons and facilitating the formation of the battery. This plan also enabled each base camp commander to adjust the remaining heavy mortar platoons defending the camp with little or no difficulty. Mortar platoons of the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry (PHUOC VINH), 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (LAI KHE), and 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry (CAMP COX) were transferred

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and provided the nucleus to train and organize the battery. The battery, commanded by a major, is assigned to the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery (155mm/8") and has a total strength of 144 personnel. The light assault artillery battery makes available to the division fire power that can be rapidly deployed by UH-1B helicopters when medium helicopters are not available to move a 105mm battery.

In February 1966 modification tables of organization and equipment were submitted for units of the division. Changes from the current organization are necessitated by the counterinsurgency environment; location of division units at five base camps, separated, in some cases by insecure LOC's; and TOE deficiencies which degrade units' ability to perform their missions. Since submission of the original MTOE's, additional modifications have been required by the development of new tactics and issue of new equipment. These additional changes include the establishment of a long range reconnaissance patrol platoon organic to the air cavalry troop; re-authorization of the armored vehicle launched bridge platoon whose deletion was directed prior to deployment from COMUS; and modification of the general support artillery battalion, engineer battalion, and maintenance battalion required by the impending issue of self-propelled 155mm howitzers and additional engineer equipment. Submission of revised MTOE's to incorporate the above changes will be completed in early August 1966.

Requested modifications have been kept to a minimum consistent with the division's mission. Those requested are necessary to meet the operator and maintenance requirements of new equipment and to effectively operate in the Vietnam environment. Pending approval of division MTOE's, the requested modifications have been accomplished in part through the reassignment of excess personnel to requested personnel spaces and temporary authorization of excess equipment, when available. Although this provides a temporary and partial solution to accomplishment of the required changes, it does not provide the complete and permanent modifications required.

Preparation of division MTOE's did not include consideration of reorganization of infantry battalions. The six company organization recommended as a result of the ARCOV Study will significantly enhance the fighting capabilities of the division.

The mechanized flame throwers have been transferred to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Very good results of combat support have been received during contact with the Viet Cong.

Division organization is shown at Inclosure 2.

### 3. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Order of Battle: Enemy units, reinforcements, location and units in contact with 1st Infantry Division.

(1) Enemy units in III Corps Tactical Zone include two division headquarters, eleven infantry regiments, one artillery regiment and 46 battalions, 36 of which are subordinate to regiments. Five others are heavy weapons battalions subordinate to the artillery regiment. There are also 40 separate companies and 28 separate platoons. Minimum troop strength is 36,300 of which 26,850 are combat troops and 9,450 are support troops. Additionally, there are 17,650 militia.

(2) Immediate reinforcements from II CTZ include two main force battalions and one heavy weapons battalion. Reinforcements available in IV CTZ include one main force regiment (DONG THAI I) and four local force battalions.

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(3) The accepted location of the confirmed enemy units are:

5th VC Div	Northeast PHUOC TUY
274 Regt	West Central PHUOC TUY (BAT DICH)
275 Regt	Northeast PHUOC TUY
9th VC Div	Northeastern War Zone "C"
271 Regt	War Zone "C"
272 Regt	Western BINH DUONG (LONG NGUYEN)
273 Regt	Southern BINH DUONG (LONG NGUYEN)
101 NVA Regt	Western BINH LONG
141 NVA Regt	Northern War Zone "D"
250 NVA Regt	Southern War Zone "D"
70 Regt	Northern TAY NINH
165A Regt	Northeastern BINH DUONG (HO DO)
DONG THAP II Regt	Western HAU NGHIA
USO Artillery Regt	Northern TAY NINH
235 Arty Bn	Northeastern TAY NINH
237 Arty Bn	TAY NINH
239 Arty Bn	PHUOC TUY
241 Arty Bn	BINH DUONG
243 Arty Bn	TAY NINH
PHU LOI Bn	Southeastern BINH DUONG
C320 Bn	Southern TAY NINH
506 Bn	Southern HAU NGHIA
860 Bn	Southern PHUOC TUY
2d Independent Bn	Central LONG AN

(4) During the reporting period, 1st Infantry Division made contact with the 271, 272, and 273 Regiments of the 9th VC Division; elements of the 165A Regiment, the 70th Regiment, the USO Artillery Regiment and the PHU LOI and C320 Battalions.

b. The VC Main Force Regiments reversed their actions of the previous quarter in which they avoided large scale contact with U.S. forces by engaging in four regimental size battles with U.S. forces in BINH LONG Province as part of their "Ironsoon Offensive". Each engagement resulted in a sound defeat for the VC forces and inflicted heavy losses of personnel and equipment on his units. Notwithstanding these defeats there are no indications that the VC are any less determined to seek a victory or that they will cease to attack at a time and place of their choice.

c. VC Losses for the quarter include:

- 1062 KIA (body count)
- 1302 KIA (probable)
- 93 VCC
- 46 Crew served weapons
- 257 Small arms
- 1906 Tons of rice
- 58 Tons of salt

d. VC Capabilities:

(1) Attack ARVN posts and U.S. positions in BINH LONG Province with up to four regiments. Priority areas of attack:

- (a) LOC NINH
- (b) AN LOC (include CAN LE Bridge XT 7297)
- (c) MINH THANH

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(d) QUAN LOI

(e) CHON THANH

(2) Attack ARVN posts in PHUOC LONG Province with up to three regiments. Priority areas of attack:

(a) TAU O (XT 7673)

(b) SROC DONG (XU 6303)

(c) BAU LONG (XT 7955)

(3) Increase terrorist activity in vicinity 1st Infantry Division base camps and conduct mortar and recoilless rifle attacks on ARVN - U.S. garrisons.

4. Combat Operations:

a. General. The 1st Infantry Division conducted military operations over a large portion of III Corps Tactical Zone to find and destroy Viet Cong forces and installations. Operations varied in size from squad ambushes to multi-battalion search and destroy missions and were characterized by a rapid response to intelligence.

b. May. During the month of May, the 1st Infantry Division continued extensive operations to find and destroy VC forces, installations and supplies. Operation BIRMINGHAM (Incl 20), initiated on 24 April 1966, continued in close coordination and cooperation with III ARVN Corps Forces and represented the deepest penetration of friendly forces into War Zone C since 1961. This operation deprived the Viet Cong of numerous logistical installations and base camps and unprecedented quantities of supplies. Operation EL PASO I (Incl 19) was conducted in response to a request from 5th ARVN Division based on intelligence indicating the possible presence of up to four VC regiments in the LOU HINH (XU 7310) area. Operation LAM SON II, was initiated jointly by the 1st Infantry Division and 5th ARVN Division in the vicinity of PHU LOI (XT 8975) with the mission to clear, hold, and pacify the area. In the RENG SAT Special Zone, GVN and Free World Ground Forces influence was extended over the villages and mangrove swamps as a result of the joint participation of 1st Infantry Division, ARVN, and naval authorities in Operation LEXINGTON III. A total of ten separate military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against Viet Cong forces by the division.

(1) Operation BIRMINGHAM, a division operation of two reinforced brigades, continued through 17 May. During the course of the operation, all division units participated with the exception of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry which was deployed on Operation LAM SON II. ARVN participation in Operation BIRMINGHAM included three Ranger battalions and one infantry battalion of the 25th Division and three battalions from the ARVN Airborne Division. CIDG forces from TAY BINH Province participated under control of U.S. Special Forces advisors and were supported by artillery and cavalry elements of the division.

Some of the largest supply caches of the Vietnamese conflict were found and destroyed. As the operational area was shifted westward to the CAU BAC River, the border between Vietnam and Cambodia, large amounts of material confirmed reports of many installations along the Cambodian Border. Locations of installations in this area were attributed to the

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relative freedom available to transport supplies within Cambodia, the use of the CAI BAC River and its tributaries as transport routes, and the fact that B-52 strikes have been offset at least 700 meters from the river. Installations uncovered confirmed that the area is used for recuperation, training, and supply. COSVN logistics bases near the Cambodian Border were hard hit as indicated by the losses enumerated in paragraph 9b, Inclosure 20.

From 2 - 7 May, the operation shifted from the Cambodian Border to the plantation area southeast of TAY NINH City (AY 3250). During this phase the brigades conducted search and destroy operations to the south and east of the plantation, but made no significant contacts with the VC. On 8 May, Task Force HOLLINGSWORTH, consisting of Headquarters 3d Brigade, four U.S. infantry battalions, and one ARVN infantry battalion commenced a massive airborne raid against the suspected location of COSVN Headquarters. However, because of low ceilings and poor visibility the hoist of artillery and artillery ammunition for subsequent LZ preparations was delayed. With weather deteriorating to the extent that both surprise and speed were lost and the lack of assurance that the operation could be supported by air, the operation was cancelled.

The final phase of Operation BIRMINGHAM began on 9 May with emphasis shifting to the MICHALIN Plantation - LONG NGUYEN area, the traditional home of the 272d VC Regiment and the 1st LCI Battalion. Previous intelligence reports had indicated the 271st and 273d VC Regiments had left War Zone D enroute to War Zone C for rest and training and could possibly be in the MICHALIN Plantation - LONG NGUYEN area. Brigade search and destroy operations around the Plantation, across the LONG NGUYEN area to Route 13, and along the SAIGON River to the southeast resulted in no significant enemy contact. However, additional VC supplies were found and destroyed adding to the tremendous losses previously inflicted on the enemy. A significant discovery was made on 13 - 14 May when a regimental size base camp was found and destroyed. The operation terminated on 17 May.

The most significant aspect of Operation BIRMINGHAM was the destruction of vast quantities of VC supplies and facilities including 2,103 tons of rice, 130 small arms, 323 tons of salt, 1,240 gallons of cooking oil, 1,382 gallons of motor oil, 13,949 shirts, 8,603 pairs of pants, and 163 boats and sampans. The impact of this operation will have a long term effect on the VC ability to shelter, feed and equip large numbers of personnel and had immediate effects on his "Monsoon Campaign". Notwithstanding the material losses, the loss of prestige and control in an area formerly considered a safe haven is expected to result in a demoralizing blow to VC stability and influence in TAY NINH Province. It was unfortunate that the weather precluded the penetration of the COSVN Headquarters by Task Force HOLLINGSWORTH. Completion of this raid would have further lessened VC prestige and security within this area.

(2) Operation LEXINGTON III originally scheduled to commence on 4 May was postponed until 21 May when the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry was alerted for Operation BIRMINGHAM. Phase III of Operation LEXINGTON (Incl 16) commenced at 0900 on 21 May. This airborne and amphibious operation was conducted jointly with U.S. Naval elements and ARVN III Corps Forces. The success of this operation was due to the manner in which the battalion conducted its ambush operations. The U.S. Forces simply worked longer and harder than the VC in the type of swamp fighting peculiar to the RUNG SAT. Men of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry moved with considerable skill through the swamps and enjoyed increasing success in ambushing the VC who utilized sampans for transportation.

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(3) In early May, a VC Lieutenant was killed about five kilometers southeast of LCC NINH District Town. He had in his possession a plan for the attack on LCC NINH and the Special Forces camp. This event marked the beginning of the Campaign along National Route 13 (Incl 17). In response to this intelligence and at the request of ARVN forces, the 3d Brigade Task Force comprised of three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion commenced Operation EL PASO I (Incl 19) on 19 May. No major forces were contacted, but the rapid deployment of the brigade discouraged a highly probable VC attack in the area.

(4) Operation LAM SON II was initiated by headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Artillery and 5th ARVN Division on 23 May 1966. Planning and execution of this operation, revealed the closest of association and team work between U.S. and ARVN Forces. The PMU LOI Pacification Task Force is made up of a combined U.S. - ARVN staff. The successes of the operation are the result of the extremely close cooperation and coordination between the ARVN, Sector, and U.S. Forces.

This specialized operation conducted in the PMU LOI (XT 8115) area has as its aim the clearing and securing of the operational area to be followed by progressive pacification activities in selected areas. Techniques used in attaining this goal include saturation patrolling, village cordon and search, and the utilization of civil affairs and psychological warfare teams, interrogators, interpreters, engineers, and medical personnel. The phasing of this operation commenced with intensive saturation patrolling followed by the cordon and search of the hamlets. Inhabitants at this time are processed by intelligence and police personnel, are exposed to the CHIEU HOI (Open Arms) program and are processed through MEDCAP and other personal service teams. Emphasis is then placed on having the hamlet develop its own defenses against the Viet Cong. As this is achieved, civic developmental projects such as school and road construction are introduced, thereby improving living conditions and winning hamlet support for the Government of Vietnam. The PMU LOI Pacification Task Force consisting of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, one battery of the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion, elements of the 5th ARVN Division, PLM DUONG Province and District Official, National Police, and ARVN reconnaissance and psychological warfare elements, conducted its first hamlet operation with the surrounding of BINH PHU/BINH PHUOC complex (XT 836144) at 260300 May 1966. Extremely encouraging results were obtained from the first try. Initial screening yielded one VC, two VC political cadre, seven personnel with false ID cards, 11 ARVN deserters, and 34 men of drift age who were turned over to GVN custody for further interrogation. The first captive offered to show where mines and booby traps were located. During the "County Fair" (Hamlet Festival) portion of the operation, MEDCAP teams treated 750 patients and intelligence personnel screened 521 adults. Three thousand lunches were served and entertainment was provided by two Vietnamese cultural teams and the 1st Infantry Division Band. Upon attainment of desired military and political goals, similar operations will be shifted to adjacent areas in the LAM SON TWR. After action report for the first hamlet search and festival is attached in enclosure 12.

(5) During May, 83,236 rounds (2,744 tons) of artillery were fired during a total of 19,318 missions in support of operations. Close air support sorties for the 1st Infantry Division totaled 967. Air delivered ordnance consisted of 461.3 tons of high explosive, 224.4 tons of napalm, 60.9 tons of fragmentation bombs, 19.5 tons of white phosphorus, 425 rockets, and 133 canisters of CBU.

e. June. Throughout the month of June, forces of the 1st Infantry Division operated in BINH HOA, LONG KHANH, PHUOC TRAM, BINH DUONG,

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TAY NINH, BINH LONG, and PHUOC LONG Provinces. Eight separate military operations of battalion size or larger continued and/or were initiated against Viet Cong Forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone. All resulted in contact.

(1) Operation EL PASO II was initiated on 2 June 1966, in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division and III ARVN Corps Forces. Intelligence indicated the 9th VC Division had positioned three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese Army regiments in preparation for attacks against the LOC BINH HON QUAN - BINH THUAN - SONG BE area. Responding to this change in the intelligence situation and the request from the Commanding General, 5th ARVN Division, the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division ordered one infantry battalion (2d Battalion, 28th Infantry) and one artillery battalion minus (2d Battalion, 33d Artillery (-)) to LOC BINH immediately with the mission to participate in the defense of the Special Forces camp at LOC BINH. On 4 June, the perimeter at LOC BINH received mortar fire and the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was then ordered to LOC BINH on 6 June to reinforce the Tank Force at that location.

Three significant contacts occurred with the enemy who made a determined effort to repel this major introduction of U.S. Forces into the area. Additional reinforcements were planned and the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry were ordered to HON QUAN on 8 June. The plan called for Troop A to move up Route 13 and the infantry battalion to move from CAMP GOX by helicopter to LAI KHE initially and then to HON QUAN subsequent to the passage of the road column through LAI KHE. In this manner, the infantry would be in an excellent position to react to any contact made by the road column. At 1440 hours the column engaged the 272d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through AP TAU O, an area between CHON THUANH (XT 766616) and HON QUAN (XT 755391). During the four-hour battle, combined firepower from the tanks and A/Cs, artillery, and air strikes inflicted losses on the enemy force that included 93 KIA (BC) and 250 KIA (Prob). The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry swept south from their location at HON QUAN. The division deployed the 1st Brigade with 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry to BINH THUANH.

The second major engagement, the Battle of LOC BINH Plantation (Incl 15), commenced on 11 June 1966 at 1010 hours. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry and CIDG Forces made contact with a battalion of the 273d VC Main Force Regiment located in heavily fortified bunkers. By 1730 the enemy positions were overrun by the infantry after massive artillery, mortar, and air strikes. VC losses were 93 KIA (BC) and 150 KIA (Prob).

The third engagement occurred on 30 June when elements of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry engaged and decisively defeated the 271st VC Regiment in the vicinity of SROK DONG (XU 7201). The 5th ARVN Division and III ARVN Corps Forces participated by occupying blocking positions both north and south of the battle area. In addition to the organic weapons of the infantry and cavalry units, massive artillery and close air support was skillfully employed against the enemy resulting in 270 KIA (BC) and 300 KIA (Prob). Twenty-three automatic weapons and forty-nine small arms were captured (Incl 14). The narrative of the Battle of SROK DONG is attached Inclosure 16.

With an increase in the VC threat against the SONG BE Special Forces Camp (XU 1507), 3d Brigade elements were airlifted to the area on 20 June. On 26 June 1966, 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry made contact with an estimated VC battalion, inflicting 7 KIA (BC) and 21 KIA (Prob) on the enemy force.

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Based on excellent intelligence, a highly successful one battalion airmobile raid was conducted on a suspected rice and supply storage area northwest of HAU TIENG (XT 447537) on 21 June. During the raid, 1506 tons of rice and 5400 sheets of tin were discovered. From this discovery and other supply caches and base camps located, it became evident the area contained major VC supply storage and distribution points. Because of the large quantity of material discovered a second battalion was airlifted into the area as reinforcements. The caches were destroyed by ground troops and by air and chemical attacks.

(2) Operation LAI SON II, the highly specialized pacification operation, continued with emphasis on developing local self defense capabilities and developmental projects. The Joint PFM LDI Pacification Task Force, consisting primarily of 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 5th ARVN Division elements, and BINH DUONG Sector personnel, conducted clearing and saturation operations in designated areas of BINH DUONG Province. Efforts were devoted to locating and destroying main force and guerrilla units, thus permitting and/or stimulating progressive pacification activities in selected areas. Offensive operations by the U.S. and ARVN Forces consisted of platoon size search and clear operations, squad size ambush patrols, and hamlet seal operations. During the month, 391 platoon search and clear operations were conducted with 16.5 percent making contact and 496 ambush patrols were conducted with approximately three percent making contact. By the end of the month, the effectiveness of operations was showing a sharp improvement as a result of increased knowledge of the terrain and the local enemy, as well as the gradual refinement of techniques.

During June, the pacification Task Force efforts expanded to significant proportions. Initial ARVN skepticism concerning effectiveness of operations was dispelled during the task force's first operation, 27 May, in the village of BINH CHUAN. Combined ARVN-U.S. planning for the second operation went extremely well, and the combined task force was given all the support and forces required.

The second major hamlet seal and search operation centered on the TAN PHUOC KHANH hamlet complex (XT 682163), 1 - 4 June (incl 13). This operation exemplified the general success of the search technique as evidenced by the return to GVN control of a VC security chief, VC hamlet chief, 118 draft dodgers, 21 deserters, 13 former VC parole violators, and 89 VC suspects. The core of the VC infrastructure was severely damaged if not destroyed by the return to GVN control and capture of those personnel. A VC review of the operation estimated a 50% loss of their capability and a two month period required for recuperation. The people generally cooperated while visiting the 969 interrogation vans for interview, stating they were happy to have Revolutionary Development Cadre and U.S. soldiers present in the village. For example, one girl indicated where ten VC were hiding.

In addition to the TAN PHUOC KHANH operation, seven other hamlet seal operations were conducted. Total results of all operations for June included eight VC KIA (BC), 33 VCC, 424 VCS broken down as follows: former VC - 23; individuals on Blacklist - 31; false ID cards - 8; deserters (ARVN) - 38; draft dodgers - 175; and uncategorized - 209. In all instances of seal and search activities, the results have been encouraging, especially in the villages. More the cooperation given to the 969 program and Cadre Teams has been better than in the hamlets.

The Hamlet Festival (County Fair), which normally accompanies the hamlet search, has been continuously successful. Military and civilian agencies which were at first reluctant to participate, have been increasingly more active in the Hamlet Festival and rural construction activities.

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Conversations with villagers at festivals and follow-up activities indicate an upward trend in their interest in the GVN. Use of ARVN Paywar Teams and their vehicles proved imperative for successful face-to-face communication. However, Vietnamese officers and NCO's in charge seem unwilling to use these teams to their fullest capability. The U.S. Paywar officer has continually assisted these teams, accounting for improvements in their techniques. Use of Rural Construction Cadre for internal crowd control during the Hamlet Festival proved advantageous. This assisted the cadre in establishing rapport with the population and subsequently permitted them to more easily initiate their development activities in the hamlet.

(3) Operation LEXINGTON III (Incl 18) was terminated 9 June 1966. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry operation, conducted jointly with U.S. Naval elements and ARVN III Corps Forces, significantly reduced the VC capability to move freely throughout the HUNG SAT Special Zone. The many rivers and canals interlacing the nearly level marsh were interdicted through the use of helicopters and landing craft, thereby denying the VC the important link in their supply system for traffic between SAIGON and VUNG TAU.

(4) Operations ADELAIDE I & II. These 1st Brigade operations were conducted during the respective periods 30 May - 9 June and 31 May - 8 June in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division elements to destroy VC forces and bases.

During Operation ADELAIDE I, search and destroy operations were conducted along interprovincial Route 16 north of TAN UYEN. Security was provided for 1st Engineer Battalion elements improving Route 16 to Class 60 from TAN UYEN to PHUOC VINH. In addition a long term project was initiated aimed at the complete penetration and reduction of the ONG DOONG Jungle (XT 9027). This dense area has traditionally been a VC safe haven and operating base. The area is to be defoliated and systematically sliced into checkerboard squares by bulldozers to provide pioneer roads for 1st Infantry Division and ARVN forces to rapidly move into the area, encircle, and eliminate VC forces.

Operation ADELAIDE II was conducted in coordination with PHU GIA District Forces. Search and destroy operations were conducted to eliminate major base areas areas and minor supply installations in the area. Cordon and search operations were conducted around three known VC villages in the area.

(5) Artillery units fired 69,031 rounds in support of operations during June. Close air support sorties totaled 1,151 and expended the following ordnance: 493 5 tons of high explosive; 221.8 tons of napalm; 55.9 tons of fragmentation; 180 canisters of CSU; and 112 pods of rockets.

d. July. During the month of July, the 1st Infantry Division employed forces on four major operations in BINH LONG, LONG THANH, and BINH DUONG Provinces. All major operations resulted in contact with Viet Cong Forces. Two contacts were made with identified VC Main Force units and in each instance the enemy was soundly defeated.

(1) Operation EL PASO II/III, initiated on 2 June, continued in the LOC NINH - HON QUAN area of BINH LONG Province in conjunction with 5th ARVN Division forces. This large scale operation continued to have excellent results as information gained from interrogation of VC captives was exploited. This intelligence revealed that the VC regiments operating in the area had been given the mission of destroying U.S. and GVN forces operating along National Route 13.

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The first significant engagement occurred on 1 - 2 July between the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and elements of the 273d VC Regiment (Incl 16). Subsequent to the Battle of SROK JONG on 30 June in which the 271st VC Regiment was decisively defeated, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was helilifted to positions west of the battle area, approximately three kilometers from the Cambodian border (XU 591024). This area was selected to seal escape routes the 271st Regiment might use and to interdict infiltration routes coming into Vietnam from Cambodia. Shortly after the airlift at 1600 hours, 1 July, Company A made contact with an unknown size VC force approximately 1400 meters south of the battalion C and G Company location. Contact continued and became more intensive and A Company was reinforced by C Company and the Recon Platoon by 1800 hours. During the early evening, all of these units received mortar and automatic weapons fire. Contact was broken at 2020 hours but resumed at 0545 hours on 2 July. Five assaults were made against the perimeter by the VC before contact was finally broken at 0900 hours. Artillery and fighter bomber strikes, brought in under a 200 foot ceiling, assisted in repulsing the assaults. During the battle, the 3d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment suffered the loss of 79 KIA (BC). Three additional battalions were committed, but only minor contact was made. All forces were withdrawn from operational areas on 4 July for rest, resupply, and maintenance.

Based on two previous successful armor operations, the 1st Brigade positioned forces on 8 July in preparation for a ROAD RUNNER reconnaissance in force from NON QUAN to BINH THANH. An additional infantry battalion was infiltrated to BINH THANH and another to a position approximately eight kilometers southwest of NON QUAN. Two forward artillery bases were established south of NON QUAN. The brigade plan included an overlay designating all landing zones that could possibly be used for the reaction forces to be helilifted into the battle area once contact was made and the disposition of VC forces or the withdrawal routes were known. In addition to the infantry battalion and helicopters prepositioned southwest of NON QUAN, an infantry battalion was standing by at the QUAN LOI airfield for commitment. The two battalions at BINH THANH were positioned primarily to the east and northeast of the rubber plantation to permit a rapid reaction if needed. Artillery and airstrikes were planned along the route of march. A deception plan was released that indicated a troop (-) would be making the reconnaissance, but the actual column consisted of Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry with one attached rifle company. On 9 July, in the vicinity XT 6774, the column received heavy fire from mortars, automatic weapons, and recoilless rifles. The two battalions at BINH THANH moved immediately by foot to strike the VC from the south (rear). Two battalions were moved by helicopter to the northeast and north. One battalion attacked south while the second blocked withdrawal routes to the northwest. The major contact was broken after one hour and 45 minutes and only small skirmishes occurred as the VC infiltrated across the SAIGON River. The 272d VC Regiment's losses for the battle included 238 KIA (BC) and 300 KIA (Prob).

Because of the defeats suffered by the VC, the pressure was relieved on the LOC NINH - BINH THANH - NON QUAN area. The 1st and 3d Brigades were extracted to PHUOC VINH and LAI KHE on 13 and 14 July. The 2d Brigade replaced them and Phase III of Operation EL PASO was initiated. Local patrolling, search and destroy operations, and village cordon and search operations continued for the remainder of July.

(2) The PHU LOI Pacification Task Force continued Operation LAI SON II with clearing and saturation patrolling operations in key areas of BINH DUONG Province. On 16 July, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry as the major U.S. element of the combined task force. In addition to supporting national construction plans, the operation also provided essential tactical security to the PHU LOI base complex.

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Offensive operations by the U.S. and 5th ARVN Division forces consisted of platoon size search and clear operations, squad size ambush patrols, and hamlet seal operations. During July, 127 platoon search and clear operations were conducted, ten percent of which made contact with the VC. Six percent of the 257 ambush patrols made contact. Effectiveness increased as personnel became more familiar with terrain and the local enemy and techniques were refined.

Task force hamlet seal operations continued with emphasis on Revolutionary Development. Excellent cooperation was given by all parties during combined ARVN - U.S. planning. The hamlet seal operation conducted in PHU CHANH (XT 859234), 13 July, exemplified the continuing general success of operational techniques. A VC cell leader, four guerrillas, 20 draft dodgers, and four deserters were captured. An arms cache was uncovered that contained 11 Mauser rifles, two U.S. shotguns, one Thompson submachinegun, and several thousand rounds of assorted small arms ammunition. The people were cooperative and volunteered the names of 14 VC guerrillas. Total results of all operations for the month included four confirmed VC KIA; 17 confirmed VC captured; 21 false ID cards; 25 deserters; 147 draft evaders; and 46 uncategorized suspects.

(3) The 1st Brigade initiated Operation CEDAR RAPIDS I at 0740 hours, 17 July. Two battalions conducted search and destroy operations in ADs adjacent to Interprovincial Route 16 in conjunction with resupply convoys between DI AN and PHUOC VINH. All convoys were conducted without incident and contact with ADs was limited to skirmishes with small groups of VC and mines and booby traps. On 23 July the plan to reduce the VC safe haven in the ONG DONC Jungle was resumed. The 1st Brigade attacked to isolate, seize and destroy VC forces, base camps, and fortified positions in the western sector of the ONG DONC Jungle. Three battalions (1/2 Inf, 1/16 Inf, 1/26 Inf) attacked south while the fourth (2/2 Inf detached from LAI SON II) blocked on the west. Contact with VC forces was limited to no larger than platoon size elements. However, several base camps, bunkers, and tunnels were discovered and destroyed along with the caches of ammunition and supplies stored in them. One large bunker contained 12 - .45 caliber submachineguns and about 2000 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. Fourteen sorties of Navy aircraft employed 1000 and 2000 pound bombs against trenches, foxholes, bunkers, and tunnels. Operation CEDAR RAPIDS II terminated at 1300 hours 21 July.

(4) Operation SPRINGFIELD II was initiated by 3d Brigade to exploit intelligence of VC activity within the TAOB. A rallier gave information on 23 January 1966 which indicated a base camp and headquarters facility for the PHU LOI Battalion and 3d Battalion, 169A Regiment was located in the northeastern section of the 3d Brigade TAOB. Read out by imagery interpreters also indicated the possible existence of these facilities and a trail network. Two long range reconnaissance patrols operating in the area on 23 - 24 July confirmed the presence of two battalion size VC units and two large base camps. Both patrols were discovered and had to be extracted. On 27 July, the 3d Brigade initiated Operation SPRINGFIELD II by clearing National Route 13 from LAI NHE to AN BAN BANG with two battalions and establishing an artillery base at BAN BANG. Following two B-52 strikes on 28 July, one battalion moved into blocking positions while two battalions conducted airborne assaults into the objective area. Numerous base camps, fortifications, and supply caches were discovered, but enemy contact was minor. During the nights of 29 and 30 July, the VC probed the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry perimeter around the artillery base at BAN BANG. MI fires by air and artillery were placed in the area and the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was moved into a blocking position. Although an attack by one or more VC regiments appeared imminent, the VC backed off either because of the fire or the rapid deployment of the infantry battalion. Operation SPRINGFIELD II continued into August.

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(5) There were 79,472 rounds (2,863.3 tons) of artillery fired and 1,731 fighter bomber sorties flown in support of the division during July.

5. Training: The status of training in the division is excellent. Since the key to success in the type of combat experienced in the counterinsurgency environment is the proper use of squad and platoon size elements, intensified combat training programs were conducted by squads and platoons rotating to base camps from operational areas. Emphasis was placed on squad and platoon battle drills, designed to correct mistakes observed during operations and integrate replacements into effective fighting teams. The training program includes defensive fires, artillery adjustment, patrolling and small unit fire and movement. The effectiveness of units improved with the initiation of live fire and quick fire reaction courses. Combat training was conducted with emphasis on the OVERWATCH principle of fire and movement (incl 5).

Because of the large number of replacements received in the months of June and July, emphasis has been placed on indoctrination and training of these personnel prior to participation in combat operations. Training in primary MOS duties is being accomplished on the job. To insure that each individual replacement receives a minimum of 40 hours of instruction prior to participation in combat operations, 1st Infantry Division Training Circular Number 20-6 was published 19 July 1966 (incl 5). This training is required for all replacements since all units must be capable of participating in tactical operations or base camp defense. Training in airborne assault techniques continues to insure smoother execution. Many of the problems involving airlift have been resolved through habitual association between maneuver elements and airborne companies.

The 1st Infantry Division Mobile Training Team to the Philippines Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) completed the final details of their training program in preparation for departure to Fort Magsaysay in early August. The team, consisting of two officers and three NCO's, will conduct the tactical training and complements the engineer and medical teams that will accompany the 1st Infantry Division team to the Philippine Islands. While operating in-country under the control of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, the team will provide: an accelerated orientation in general subjects for PHILCAG non-combatants; and an intensive training program for the PHILCAG security battalions. The latter group will receive instruction on defensive and counter-guerrilla tactics, application of the older family of weapons to the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, M-16 Rifle, and communist weapons and materiel identification and employment. The training program in-country is expected to require a minimum of 30 days for completion.

Training continues throughout the division to cope with the problem of VC tunnel exploitation, destruction, and denial. The Division Chemical Officer, with attached chemical units, is presently constructing a tunnel system to be used in conjunction with the tunnel operations training program.

The 35th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) has been conducting a training program since its attachment to the division on 16 June 1966. The platoon deployed from COMUS prior to completion of their training cycle and have been completing this training in-country. In addition to the program for untrained dogs, refresher training is being conducted for the older dogs and handlers. Plans are being made to coordinate future training at the ARVN Scout Dog Training Center since the facilities there are more adequate.

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6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action: The intensified use of PsyOp during the reporting period has proven to be of great value in supporting combat operations. The Division Civic Action Program continues to grow and is constantly supporting the 1966 MILCAP in close coordination with district and province officials.

a. Psychological Operations.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division installed and commenced operating a 1250W Multilith press on 21 June 1966. The availability of this press has proven to be an asset to the Division PsyOp Program. Situations have developed where immediate reaction, in the form of a leaflet, has given the friendly forces a distinct advantage and had a definite bearing on the effectiveness of the VC soldier. Though the support rendered by supporting PsyOp company and JUSPAO has been satisfactory, the responsiveness of a division operated press has provided the tool with which the G5 can produce highly effective and timely PsyOp media. The delivery time for a fast reaction leaflet has been as little as six hours. This includes the development of the text, making of the plate, printing, cutting, boxing and delivery on target. During the reporting period 21 June to 31 July 1966, the division press has produced approximately 3,500,000 leaflets. Attached as inclosures 9 are samples of some of the leaflets published by the division. The utilization of the press has not restricted the necessity for support from the 246th PsyOp Company and JUSPAO. In addition to leaflets printed by the division, over 30,000,000 were obtained from another source and delivered by various means, e.g., C-47, HC-13, U-10, and OH-13 aircraft. Some leaflets were distributed by U.S. military and ARVN personnel while participating in operations.

(2) Tapes and Loudspeakers. The availability of 1000 watt loud speaker sets, in each brigade, has provided the means of exploiting Chieu Hoi, captured VC, and ralliers. The immediate use of intelligence information gained from these individuals has proven most effective. Approximately 500 flying hours were spent in support of loudspeaker missions. This includes time provided by the 5th Air Command Squadron's C-47 and U-10 aircraft. Loudspeaker support is provided for during all operations within the division. In addition to aircraft, vehicular and backpack sets are utilized. The attachment of ARVN CA/PsyOp Teams to the division has provided additional support particularly in the LAM SON Operational Area.

b. Civic Action.

(1) The fund provided under AICV Directive 37-13 has provided the division with a readily available source of funds to assist in the Division Civic Action Program. The fund was placed into operation on 2 July 1966. The procedures in administering the fund are relatively simple and is not a burden on the controlling officer. The 200,000 piasters per month (July only) was sufficient to meet the requirements of the division. Projects that have benefited from the fund are:

(a) Renovation of THE DUC grade school: 44,100 piasters. Assistance was provided by the division engineer battalion and local Vietnamese participated in the construction.

(b) Purchase of athletic suits, educational supplies and personal hygiene equipment, 75,000 piasters. Expenditures were utilized in the LAM SON II area.

(c) Newspaper subscriptions for DI AN High School, one year subscription 2,200 piasters.

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(d) HULK program in two base camps to supplement local health projects, 12,200 piasters.

(e) Construction of wells in LAI SON II area. Local Vietnamese were utilized as labor and paid through this fund 7,000 piasters.

(f) AN LOC Orphanage supported with 20,000 piasters to refurbish the building.

(2) MEDCAP: The Division MEDCAP Program has expanded to support the dependents of the ARVN 5th Division. The MEDCAP activities conducted in conjunction with the LAI SON Operation can account for the treatment of over 27,000 patients of the 59,000 total for the division. The large increase over the previous report is primarily due to the introduction of LAI SON II. MEDCAP continues to be conducted in conjunction with all division operations plus the normal treatment around base camp areas.

(3) Civic Action projects consist of support rendered to orphanages, refugee camps, Boy Scouts, construction of wells and latrines, repairs to existing facilities, churches, schools, and dispensaries. Donations to support orphanages, leprosariums, churches, hospitals and schools were collected through Division Chaplain sources. \$2,055.42 and 172,548 piasters were donated. The division conducted a drive to contribute funds for the III Corp DONG HAI Orphanage, and in excess of \$5,000 was donated.

7. Aviation: The 1st Aviation Battalion continued to support the division through planning and conducting airborne operations, aerial resupply, providing aerial command and control, providing aviation support of division administrative operations, and conducting medical evacuations. The battalion operates and controls the division's instrumented airfield at PHU LOI. In addition to the normal operations support, Division Artillery was supported with personnel and equipment in the Area Pacification Operation LAI SON II. The general support mission was limited somewhat in July by the weather conditions prevalent during the monsoon season. Navigational facilities are not available to permit instrument flight and consequently some missions were delayed or cancelled.

During the period the battalion flew six combat assaults/ extractions. Rotary wing aircraft flew 17,004 sorties and 6,923 combat hours. Fixed wing aircraft flew 1,856 missions and 745 combat hours. A total of 13,000 passengers and 460 tons of cargo was transported during the period.

8. Logistics:

a. General. During the period 1 May to 31 July 1966 the 1st Infantry Division continued tactical operations in assigned TAOs and forward operational areas. Logistical support was provided to divisional units from five base camps and four forward logistical base areas. All tactical operations were adequately supported logistically despite difficulties in obtaining required amounts of airlift which was curtailed in many instances due to adverse weather conditions. With the exception of airlift, no major logistical problems were encountered.

b. Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Incl 7).

c. Construction. Overall construction throughout the division continued to be at a minimum due to the ever increasing requirements for Engineer Combat Support. Emphasis has been placed on completing base camp improvement, particularly the defensive perimeter at Camp Cox and replacing unserviceable tents with temporary buildings.

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(1) Horizontal Construction.

Location	Percentage Completed
DI AN (less air strip)	92%
PHUOC VIENG	32%
LAI KHE	52%
PHU LOI	64%
BEAR CAT	37%

(2) Vertical Construction.

DI AN	62%
PHUOC VIENG	24%
LAI KHE	42%
PHU LOI	62%
BEAR CAT	69%

(3) Construction of the airfield at DI AN is 24% complete.

9. Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) There was a marked improvement in the division strength during this period. Assigned strength as of 31 July was 114% of the authorized strength. This is an increase of 4% over the previous report period. The present for duty strength compared to authorized strength is 107%. This is an increase of 6% over the previous period. Casualties, both battle and non-battle, took their toll. As of 1 May, the division sustained 213 KIA, 1077 WIA, 12 non-battle dead, and 107 non-battle injured, for a total of 1409 casualties. The total casualties the division has sustained numbered 4543 as of 31 July 1966. Losses due to rotation, MIS, administrative discharge and reassignment within Vietnam were 2979 during the period. Division gains during the quarter totaled 3693. The command remains critically short of personnel in two enlisted MOS's; 94B20 (cook), and 96C20 (interrogator). A number replacements from CONUS arrived with Class 3 profile. As a result, these personnel cannot be utilized in their infantry MOS field. A replacement short fall has developed in the M5, M6, infantry MOS field as a result.

(b) Division strength as of 31 July 1966 is:

	OFF	MO	MI	AGG
AUTH:	943	166	12249	15375
ASGD:	1190	133	16270	17593
PDY:	1138	123	15150	16411

(c) Casualties (by month)

1. May:

	OFF	MO	MI	AGG
KIA:	2	0	39	41
WIA:	13	0	339	352
Missing:	1	0	1	2
Non-battle dead:	0	1	3	4
Non-battle inj:	1	1	40	42

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2. June:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EO</u>	<u>EL</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KIA:	3	0	101	104
MIA:	31	3	435	469
Missing:	0	C	0	0
Non-battle dead:	0	C	2	2
Non-battle inj:	0	0	23	23

3. July:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EO</u>	<u>EL</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KIA:	0	0	66	66
MIA:	16	5	290	311
Missing:	0	0	0	0
Non-battle dead:	0	0	2	2
Non-battle inj:	2	0	40	42

4. Statistical analysis of battle casualties attached as Incl 10.

(2) Civilian Personnel:

(a) An additional 163 positions were approved by the Industrial Relations Office, Saigon, for hire. The command now has 936 positions established and filled 714 of the authorized 1000 spaces allocated. This is an increase of 232 positions filled since the previous quarter. Skilled labor continues to be short and 200 spaces were reclassified from skilled to unskilled. An additional 1200 spaces will be requested in the next quarter to meet the needs of the 2d and 3d Brigades.

(b) On 1 April 1966 the 1st Infantry Division Temporary Hire Program was authorized 11,907,000\$VN for the period 1 April 1966 to 30 June 1966. The division hired a daily average of 1333 local nationals during that period. On 1 July 1966 the division was authorized 19,136,000\$VN for the period 1 July - 30 September 1966. The daily average of local nationals increased to 2600 during the month of July. It is anticipated that the division will operate at the current level for the next quarter.

b. Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) The discipline in the division has been excellent the past quarter. No stragglers were apprehended. No personnel assigned to the division were apprehended as stragglers. There were 91 reported AMOLs and 16 serious incidents reported during the three month period.

(2) During the report period the Court-Martial rate increased from an average of 42 per month to 52 per month. Discipline rates within the division continue to be excellent.

(3) The Division IG handled 156 complaints and requests for assistance during the period. This is a marked increase over the previous period. However, the majority of the cases were due to adjustment of DESROS dates and requests for curtailment.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The state of morale within the division remains excellent as a result of continued emphasis on improving services and facilities.

(2) Finance: The 3.2% across the board pay raise was paid to all members of the division during the month of July. A monthly Finance Newsletter has been initiated to keep members of the division currently informed

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on pay changes and procedures. The Finance Courier Teams initiated a new program of conducting pay clinics at the units to resolve individual finance problems and to insure improved services.

(3) Chaplain: On 20 June 1966, the Reverend Calvin Thielman, White House Chaplain, visited the 1st Infantry Division. On 10 July 1966, the 3d Brigade Chapel was dedicated. During the quarter the Chaplains conducted 1244 religious services and had a combined attendance of 34,471 personnel.

(4) Special Services: Out-of-country R&R quotas increased from 2714 at the end of the last period to 5372 on 31 July 1966. This was a gain of 3158 quotas. In-country quotas increased from 1800 to 2720. This is a gain of 920 quotas. In July the in-country R&R quota was increased from 12 every 3 days to 25 for every 3 days.

(5) Red Cross: There was an increase of 12% in the total number of services rendered in comparison to the previous period. A total of 2957 new and re-opened cases were handled during the period.

(6) Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 3235 awards given for valor and meritorious service during this period as follows:

Silver Star	27
Legion of Merit	11
Distinguished Flying Cross	34
Soldier's Medal	15
Air Medal - V	42
Bronze Star - V	442
Bronze Star - II	425
Army Commendation Medal - V	100
Army Commendation Medal - II	367
Air Medal	1157
Purple Heart	665

During the report period 84 members of the division were honored by the Vietnamese Government. Awards given are as follows:

National Legion of Honor 5th Class	2
Cross of Gallantry with Palm	3
Cross of Gallantry with Gold Star	21
Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star	53

(7) Burials and Graves Registration: During this period the Graves Registration Platoon processed and evacuated 173 remains. Nine of these were non-divisional.

10. Chemical Operations: The Division Chemical Section developed and field tested two expedient type CS munitions. The first of these munitions was a 55 gallon shipping drum of CS-1 fitted with a burster and fuse. These drums were dropped from both fixed and rotary wing aircraft and functioned with excellent results in so far as height of burst and target coverage was concerned. Effects on enemy forces have not been determined. This munition has been used extensively during operations conducted by the division. The chemical section also tested a 105mm base ejection shell filled with CS-1. There was no significant contamination in the target area, and the project was discontinued.

The Division Chemical Section and the attached 206th Chemical Platoon and 242d Chemical Detachment continued to support the tunnel exploitation

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program throughout the division. Those personnel are presently constructing a tunnel system at DI AX to assist in the training of personnel in the exploitation, denial, and destruction of tunnel systems.

The division was issued twelve Chemical Impact Personnel Detectors, in June with a total of thirty Detectors to be eventually issued throughout the division. A training area has been selected in vicinity Camp Cox, and a training package has been prepared. Dates have not been set for the course because troops needed to secure the area are currently not available due to other operational commitments. Day and night tests of the detector were conducted by the 266th Chemical Platoon to determine its effectiveness and the requirements of the training program.

Six requests were prepared and submitted for defoliation missions and one has been approved as of 31 July 1966. The 266th Chemical Platoon has accomplished both herbicide and insecticide operations throughout the division forward and rear areas.

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II Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

1. Observations (Lessons Learned):

PERSONNEL

Replacements

Item: Replacement pool.

Discussion: Providing a steady flow of personnel to units without holding a reserve at the replacement detachment has proved to be a problem when units are in contact and sustain large numbers of serious casualties.

Observation: By pooling personnel at the replacement detachment, a ready reserve is on hand, giving the necessary flexibility to react and provide mass replacements for units when needed.

Replacements

Item: Replacement of casualties.

Discussion: Replacements have been requested for casualties that were hospitalized for short periods of time (2 to 4 days).

Observation: Casualties should be carefully screened to preclude requesting of replacements for personnel who will be returned to duty within 2 or 3 days.

FINANCE

Item: Resolution of pay problems.

Discussion: Many man-hours are lost and the individual soldiers are inconvenienced if they are referred to the Division Finance Officer to resolve pay complaints.

Observation: A form has been developed to permit the soldier to communicate his pay problem and receive an immediate answer without personally visiting the finance office. In addition Finance Courier Teams conduct clinics and provide better service at unit level.

OPERATIONS

Combined Artillery/Air Operations

Item: Artillery and air operations can be conducted simultaneously in the same area.

Discussion: Detailed pre-planning to include the establishment of safe air corridors will allow for the continuation of artillery preparations during airborne operations without risk to friendly aircraft and personnel. An effective means of simultaneous employment of artillery/airstrikes incorporates the use of fire coordination lines with artillery employed on one side and air on the other.

Observation: All tactical plans, to include employment of reaction forces, must provide for uninterrupted simultaneous employment of artillery and airstrikes. Cease fire of artillery should not be imposed during airborne operations or airstrikes except in extreme emergencies.

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Airmobile Operations

Item: Aircraft scheduling for airmobile operations.

Discussion: The number of aircraft originally allocated for a given airmobile operation habitually decreases as the operation progresses because of maintenance problems and/or combat losses.

Observation: A realistic and comprehensive schedule of aircraft allocations for airmobile operations should be established utilizing an experience factor for aircraft attrition.

Artillery Observers

Item: Use of aerial observers during heavy contact.

Discussion: Engagements with Viet Cong forces assembled in ambush positions along roads provide exceptionally good targets for artillery. Aerial observers contribute to the success of these engagements in the following ways:

1. Provide aerial observation posts with a rapid reaction time in reporting ground activity not detectable by personnel on the ground.
2. Provide accurate and timely observed artillery support to the maneuver elements.
3. Pin-point concentrations of enemy troops during the confusion of battle.
4. Observe and report routes of escape when the enemy breaks contact.
5. Provide battle field surveillance during mopping-up action.

Observation: Provision of aerial observers and aircraft for sustained operations must be included in all tactical plans for maneuver of forces or convoy operations.

Noise Discipline

Item: Reduction of inner-perimeter noise during enemy activity.

Discussion: Generators and vehicular noises are distracting to personnel manning perimeters and interfere with their ability to detect enemy movement.

Observation: Vehicle batteries may be used as a power source for short periods of time. Generators should have a back-up battery power source for use in emergencies.

Map Reading

Item: Map inspected coordinates.

Discussion: Units occupying unfamiliar terrain, terrain that is devoid of prominent terrain features, or heavily forested areas have difficulty inspecting their positions from maps. Misjudgment of the actual location through erroneous map inspection may result in injury to personnel by friendly artillery.

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**Observation:** Map inspected coordinates should be verified by an air-borne observer whenever possible.

### Map Reading

**Item:** Points of origin.

**Discussion:** Points of origin provide a fast means of locating friendly forces without compromising their positions. They also provide an accurate and simple encoding system for passing target information.

**Observation:** There are several things that should be considered when a point of origin system is established:

1. The system should be published at the highest level necessary to insure all interested agencies will have access. It should be published for use both during field operations and at base camps, and changed periodically to cover compromise.
2. Points should originate at random 1000 meter grid intersections to facilitate artillery targeting.
3. The system should incorporate the use of broad categories (cars/colors) for quick reference (Ford, Chevy/Red, Blue).

### Employment of Artillery

**Item:** Standard 105mm battery package of airlift.

**Discussion:** A standard package for CH-47 airlift of a 105mm howitzer battery can be established as follows:

	<u>Firing Btry.</u>	<u>Ho Btry</u>
Personnel	90	60
Howitzers	6	-
105mm Ammo	600	-
1/2 Trk	1	1
1/4 Trk	-	1
3/4 Trk	2	4
Total Lift (Ch-47)	12	7

**Observation:** Like artillery units should establish a standard column configuration to facilitate computation of airlift requirements and rapid deployment of units.

### Employment of Artillery

**Item:** Tactical tailoring of artillery batteries.

**Discussion:** Tactical planning frequently requires tailoring of artillery when batteries are attached to other headquarters. Although this serves the purpose of providing the artillery support necessary to accomplish the particular mission, it also creates a greater need for early planning and liaison between units.

**Observation:** In the interest of unity of effort and timely response to orders, the tactical tailoring of units based on habitual association is desirable when practicable. When it is not feasible, adequate time for planning and liaison between unfamiliar units is necessary.

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M10 Howitzer

**Item:** Repeated firing of the M10 3 inch self-propelled howitzer after the weapon has settled deeply into the soft ground may result in damage to the weapon.

**Discussion:** Although the M10 has proven its capability to operate over soft terrain, damage to weapons has resulted from their settling into the mud while firing. As long as the hull bottom remains clear of the ground, the lockout suspension system provides proper support. However, continuous firing in soft terrain causes the tracks and grade to sink in the mud until the weight of the weapon is resting on the hull rather than the suspension system with the eventual result of structural damage to the piece. This is probably the major cause of ruptured fuel tanks, since the tanks are an integral part of the hull. It is also probable that damage to hydraulic lines, structural members, and drive shafts may be attributed to "bottoming".

**Observation:** Firing battery personnel must be continually alert for evidence of "bottoming" when firing in soft ground. When this condition is detected, the howitzer should be moved and relaid immediately.

Helicopter Hazards

**Item:** Helicopter damage caused by radio antennas.

**Discussion:** Due to extensive use of helicopters in transporting troops and supplies, a continuing hazard exists for unknowledgeable individuals that approach a helicopter while the blade is turning. Individuals have been known to drive vehicles with radio antennas too close to the blades, resulting in severed antennas, damage rotor blades, and flying debris dangerous to bystanders and helicopters. Back pack radios with long antennas constitute an equal hazard.

**Observation:** Personnel involved in operations around aircraft must be indoctrinated on the possible hazards of rotating blades. Control of vehicular movement around airfields and landing zones must be rigidly enforced.

Aerial Artillery Observation

**Item:** Aircraft proximity to exploding projectiles.

**Discussion:** Due to restricted visibility during rain showers, aerial observers will have to fly closer to the target to observe the bursts. Consideration must be given in these cases to erratic fuse action and possibility of shrapnel travelling greater distances than the normal bursting radius of the projectile.

**Observation:** Aerial observers must be aware of the possibility of being too close to the point of impact and advise pilots of the hazards involved.

C Tactics

**Item:** VC fire discipline.

**Discussion:** During instances where convoys have been ambushed, the convoy has been preceded by an observer in O1 aircraft. The ambush areas were easily crossed at approximately 50 foot altitude. The VC did not fire at the aircraft, but held the fire until the vehicles were in the ambush area.

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Observation: Personnel must be made aware of the fact that VC are well trained in fire/camouflage discipline and that negative sightings do not necessarily indicate there are no VC present and continuous alertness must be maintained at all times.

MMI Fires

Item: CVT and time fuze MMI fires.

Discussion: A great number of mines and booby traps are emplaced on roads at night. Curfew regulations prohibit civilian travel at night.

Observation: CVT and time fuze MMI fires over likely areas the VC may emplace mines and booby traps on highways and roads will discourage this practice.

Saturation Patrolling

Item: Saturation patrolling is effective.

Discussion: Saturation patrolling can contribute as an effective measure to severely hinder VC activities in populated areas. VC main forces are forced to withdraw because of the difficulty in pinpointing the friendly main force location by infiltration. Populated areas regain a sense of security achieved from the everpresent network of patrols about the area. Integration of ARVN forces in the saturation patrol plan instill in the people a loyalty to the GVN and activates increased participation of the people in the Revolutionary Development Program.

Observation: Saturation patrolling should be a prime consideration in establishing security in populated areas designated for Revolutionary Development Programs.

Combined ARVN - US Pacification Operations

Item: Combined ARVN - US pacification operations are necessary and workable.

Discussion: To win the cooperation of the people in outlying areas, security against VC terrorism is essential. The people must see stability and the capability of the GVN to maintain peaceful and improving conditions. When a mutual understanding of the goals and the characteristics of ARVN and US personnel exists, combined pacification operations will work. Patience and willingness to cooperate are necessary components that both sides must possess. Pacification operations conducted as a combined ARVN - US effort have been productive and these factors are the basic reasons for the definite continued success.

Observation: Combined ARVN - US pacification operations should be employed against the VC operating in the populated outlying areas. Understanding of the goals and a mutual willingness for cooperation and patience must be present.

Revolutionary Development

Item: Dissemination of propaganda material in areas undergoing pacification.

Discussion: House-to-house dissemination of propaganda literature has been the most effective method to insure maximum coverage. Airborne dissemination requires saturation coverage to be effective, a practice that is wasteful and tends to antagonize some villagers. House-to-house

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dissemination eliminates waste and guarantees adequate population coverage, especially when the activity is supported by a loudspeaker.

Observation: Avoid aerial dissemination of propaganda literature in semi-secure areas whenever possible. When security conditions permit, an attempt should be made to distribute literature by house-to-house canvass, supported by loudspeakers. This method allows the villagers to become accustomed to US presence.

Revolutionary Development

Item: Introduction of Revolutionary Development Cadre at hamlet festivals.

Discussion: The Revolutionary Development Cadre members can be used during hamlet festival activities as guides in establishing and maintaining crowd control. This has proved to be a very effective technique since the cadre are trained to work with people and do an excellent job in providing crowd control and general assistance. This is one of the best methods to introduce the cadre into the pacification program. Introduction in this manner establishes rapport and enlightens the people to the fact of their existence.

Observation: Crowd control at hamlet festivals is essential and Revolutionary Development Cadre are best utilized for this purpose. This will not only take advantage of their training, but is an excellent introduction of the teams into the program.

Army Aviation

Item: Flight following.

Discussion: Due to the number of aircraft involved in combat operations and administrative flights, a system of flight following is required. This procedure is necessary for the safety of aircraft travelling in congested areas, and through areas in which artillery is firing, rapid search and rescue of downed aircraft, and redirection or recall of aircraft from one mission to another of higher priority with a minimum of delay.

Observation: Aviation battalion operations centers should improve flight following techniques and procedures for organic aircraft operating within the TAOR. The battalion should be augmented with air traffic control personnel for control of non-organic aircraft operating within the TAOR.

Military Police Operations

Item: VC collecting points.

Discussion: On many occasions the division TIC CP will be collocated with a brigade CP, or units will be operating under division control. It is not feasible for each unit to establish separate VC collecting points.

Observation: VC collecting points should be collocated when two or more headquarters are operating in close proximity to each other. This will not only economize on security forces, but will facilitate processing and interrogation and dissemination of intelligence.

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TRAINING

Artillery Observation

Item: Infantry and armored cavalry should be trained in artillery adjustment procedures.

Discussion: During contact with enemy forces, artillery ground observers with infantry and armored cavalry units will be killed or wounded and require evacuation.

Observation: Infantry and armored cavalry platoon and squad leaders should be thoroughly trained in observer procedures to take over in the absence of an observer from the supporting artillery unit.

INTELLIGENCE

Mobile Interrogation Vans

Item: Effectiveness of mobile interrogation teams.

Discussion: The use of mobile interrogation teams during seal and search operations has caused the indigenous population to volunteer significant information concerning VC activity in the area. Once the seal and search of the village is complete, mobile interrogation teams should re-enter the area in an effort to gain voluntary information from civilians. During these interviews, IPM teams should attempt the first phase of the recruitment of informers. It has been effective to reward all persons entering the van on a voluntary basis an appropriate gift. If significant information can be confirmed, the person is rewarded substantially.

Observation: Mobile interrogation teams should be utilized to gain information from sympathetic civilians. They should be interviewed rather than interrogated. The teams should be combined Vietnamese and US and the number of teams should be tailored to the population figures.

National Police Screening

Item: National Police screening is effective in population control.

Discussion: Detailed screening of all draft age men can contribute greatly to the population control of a particular hamlet or village. Not only does effective screening filter out those men avoiding the draft, but the National Police are successful in apprehending deserters, holders of false ID cards, and VC suspects indicated on the "blacklist". The National Police are also able to exert their influence on the local population, after which, plans can be made for the introduction of permanent police forces in the hamlet for purposes of security and population and resources control.

Observation: Detailed screening of all draft age males by the National Police should be a prime consideration when planning for a hamlet seal and search operation.

VC Tactics

Item: VC use route of attack as initial route of withdrawal.

Discussion: Several VC captives have stated during interrogation that the initial route of withdrawal from an objective area or ambush site was the same that was used in moving to the attack. This makes it easier for

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the soldier to find his way back to assembly areas. In three regimental size attacks against division convoys the VC never attacked through the column. Their withdrawal was always in the direction from which they attacked.

Observation: When VC routes of attack are known, they should be covered with blocking artillery fire or airstrikes when it appears the VC are attempting to break contact and withdraw.

### VC Strength

Item: VC have shown ability to recuperate rapidly after heavy losses.

Discussion: On 8 June two battalions of the 272d VC Main Force Regiment were badly mauled when they attacked a US column on National Route 13 and lost an estimated 340 personnel. On 9 July, the same regiment attacked another column with three battalions. Captives from this battle stated up to 800 NVA replacements had joined the regiment on 7 July. On 30 July a returnee from the 271st VC Main Force Regiment stated his regiment had lost approximately 570 men on 30 June when it attacked a US column of Route 13. All NVA replacements were trained soldiers and gave the VC regiments the capability to regain combat effectiveness in short order.

Observation: Enemy units that are badly defeated cannot be considered deleted from enemy order of battle. The VC have the capability to replace battle losses with trained personnel quickly and because a unit is defeated in one battle it should not be eliminated as a threat. The intelligence effort should continue to determine its location.

### Integrated Intelligence

Item: An integrated intelligence effort will result in a clearer picture of the enemy situation.

Discussion: Many sources of information are available to intelligence gathering agencies. Some of these sources are ralliers, aerial photography and imagery interpretation, airborne sensory devices (infra red and side looking airborne radar), long range reconnaissance patrols, and captured VC and documents.

Observation: All efforts at gathering intelligence must be integrated to form the complete enemy situation if the enemy is to be located and destroyed.

## COMMUNICATIONS

### RC-292 Antenna

Item: Elevating the RC-292 antenna.

Discussion: Heavy vegetation and dampness in Vietnam decreases the effectiveness of the ground wave in HF communications which in turn decreases range.

Observation: To overcome this difficulty, and to get the maximum use of the RC-292 antenna, it can be elevated higher than the mast sections provided for in the issued kit. This can be done by using one each kit mast AB 235/G with stakes GP-2 (E: GS7-27) which will provide an antenna height of 60 feet (24 feet higher than maximum height of the conventional RC-292).

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This additional height increases the range of the VRC-12 series radios from 30 miles to approximately 50 miles. There is little variation of readability or signal strength during adverse weather conditions.

AM/PRC-25

Item: AM/PRC-25 transmitting difficulties.

Discussion: Difficulties has been experienced while transmitting in heavy jungle, especially rubber plantations, while utilizing the short whip antenna.

Observation: When difficulty in transmitting with the whip antenna exists, the long antenna should be tried. If this does not clear up the problem, an airborne relay station should be established.

Radio Exposure

Item: Retransmit R/U and audio connectors are susceptible to moisture.

Discussion: During the rainy season in Vietnam, moisture collects in the audio connectors on the face of the radio set, which causes the set to automatically key when in operation.

Observation: Use of canvas covers will help prevent moisture from getting on the face of radio sets. The AM/PRC-25 is provided with rubber audio connector caps secured to the set by a nylon cord. These same caps also fit the RT-524. Precautions should be taken to secure the cap to the set to prevent loss.

Rectifier RA-91

Item: The Rectifier, RA-91, can be utilized as a power supply for AM/VRC-12 series radios.

Discussion: During short duration tactical operations where radios are mounted in vehicles, it is practical to remove radios into the tents. This is not so when operations are to be set up in one place for extended periods of time. Extended idling of engines to keep batteries charged causes the engine to carbon up. If the engine is not used to charge the batteries, a separate generator for each radio in operation will have to be used. This shortens battery life and causes excess wear on generators. Removing of radios also ties down a vehicle that could be used for other purposes, requires extra gasoline for generators, and a higher consumption of batteries for remote units.

Observation: Radios can be removed from the vehicles and placed in a tent. The power source consists of two 50 Amp, 12 volt batteries (in series) which are charged by a 15 Amp RA-91 rectifier, powered by a 120 volt 60 cycle 5 kw generator. The rectifier has the capability of a constant control of amperage output, eliminating the erratic output common to dc generators which is harmful to all radios.

AM/RC-69

Item: Overheating of equipment in the AM/RC-69 causes tube failure.

Discussion: The high temperatures experienced in Vietnam combined with the normal amount of heat generated through operation of the equipment, causes the components of the AM/RC-69 to overheat with subsequent tube failure.

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Observation: The most assured way to reduce the temperature within the AN/ARC-69 is through the use of air conditioners. The following expedient methods are recommended for use in the absence of air conditioners:

1. Keep exhaust fans in continuous operations, keeping the air path clear.
2. Leave the shelter door open for circulation of air.
3. Pull equipment components slightly from recesses to allow the heat to escape.
4. Paint the top of all shelters white to reflect the heat from the sun. Sandbagging the entire structure will give some relief from the sun and also protection from enemy fire.

Base Camp Communications

Item: The AN/ATC-3 and the AN/ATC-1 is inadequate for division main base camp communications.

Discussion: As the division became more firmly established, and base camp facilities began to expand, it became evident that an AN/ATC-3 switchboard at Support Command and an AN/ATC-1 at Division Main would be totally inadequate to handle either the internal base camp communications or the growing demand for trunking facilities. Because of this ever expanding requirement and the large number of calls being placed, it was necessary to install a second AN/ATC-1. Three AN/ATC-1 switchboards are now in use in the Division Main Base Camp, one for Division Main locals, one for Support Command locals and one for all trunking facilities. This last change over took place in 5 June 1966. Each of the three switchboards has trunk lines interconnecting it with the remaining two switchboards in the base camp.

Observation: Even though all of the telephone requirements of the division, are being filled at the present time the point has been reached where it would be definitely advantageous to replace the three existing AN/ATC-1 switchboards with one AN/ATC-9. This change is necessary for two reasons. First, the local and trunking needs of the division are ever increasing and second, the use of one switchboard and one frame (AN/ATC-9) as opposed to three switchboards and frames (AN/ATC-1) would increase capabilities and operating efficiency while at the same time greatly reducing the number of personnel needed to operate the board.

Wire Communication


Item: Utilizing a wirehead to allow a "Clean Patch" state in the patch panel.

Discussion: The 121st Signal Battalion has developed wireheads to be utilized in conjunction with the patch panel in each base camp signal complex. The wirehead has provided more efficient and effective circuit control in base camp installations where temporary tactical and permanent administrative circuits are integrated.

The wirehead at Division Main was built inside a standard Conex container. The interior was framed and lined with 3/4 inch plywood. Junction boxes J-1077 and JB-2317 were installed to terminate 25 pair cables from the patch panel and commercial cable from local subscribers. Jumper wire was used to connect appropriate circuits to the switchboard frame. Common trunk circuits between Danger Main and Danger LD switchboards were wired directly between frames, by-passing the wirehead. This was done primarily to conserve jumper wire.

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The principle advantage of the wirehead is that it takes advantage of the "normal through" characteristic of the patch panel. The resulting clean patch feature reduces considerable congestion in the limited space available within the SB-611 patch panel. As a result, the fallibility of the patch cords due to handling, heat, dirt and moisture is eliminated. Additionally, most of the patches in base camp signal center are of a permanent nature. The only exception to the "clean patch" occurs when temporary tactical circuits are established to forward areas by patching as necessary in the patch panel. Permanent circuits which are interrupted, pre-empted or re-routed as a result of circuit outage or installation of temporary tactical circuits, are quickly restored by pulling the patch cord and reverting back to the normal through characteristic of the patch panel and the original patch found in the wirehead.

The wirehead necessitates additional circuit records. Tagged or color coded jumper wire is a necessity with the wirehead.

**Observation:** In permanent or semi-permanent signal center, the advantages of a wirehead outweigh the disadvantages. In effect, permanent patches are made in the wirehead resulting in a normally uncluttered patch panel board. Circuit outages as a result of patch cord failures are thereby eliminated. Temporary circuits and re-routes are accomplished with patches in the patch panel. Circuit testing and restoration is expedited significantly as a result of the clean patch.

#### Airlift of S-144 Shelters

**Item:** Equipment Shelters S-144 are structurally unsound for airlift.

**Discussion:** The 121st Signal Battalion has experienced an increasing requirement to provide highly mobile and flexible communication support to the infantry brigades. Due to difficulties experienced in highway movement, brigades are normally airlifted to and from areas of operations. The Forward Signal Platoons must also displace by air. As a result of the last five Division sized air assault operations, the S-144 Shelters have been proved to be structurally unsound for sling load airlift. Two AN/RC-69 shelters have been dropped from altitudes of 250 feet and 2000 feet while being carried by OH-47 Chinooks. On at least two other S-144 Shelters, the lifting points have been examined closely and have been found to be pulling loose from the frame of the shelter.

Air safety standards require a minimum of six feet of nylon strap on each leg of load sling sets. Inherent vibrations and oscillations in rotary winged aircraft are believed to be the cause for lifting point failures. The lifting points are inadequate for anything except lifting

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the shelter on and off vehicles. Examination of lifting points after an airlift has revealed that the shelter frame is not durable enough to carry the strain applied to the upper shelter corners during lift-off, varying air currents in level flight, and rotary winged vibrations.

**Observation:** In order to support an infantry division under current concepts of tactical deployment in the Republic of Vietnam, signal equipment must be air transportable. Signal shelters (2 1/2 ton truck variety) are structurally unsound and unsafe in meeting the demands imposed by airlift. If the S-144 shelters are to be used in this manner, reinforcement of the shelter and lifting points is necessary. An alternate solution is to discontinue lifting the shelter and remove the equipment for installation in other suitable shelters. This solution has been adopted in this unit. One stack (radio and carrier equipment) has been removed and mounted in a 3/4 ton trailer. This presents a package similar to the new AN/ARC-111 Radio Relay Terminal. The trailer mounted package can be loaded internally into C-47 Chinooks.

### Camera Expenditure

**Item:** Need for cameras with water-proof housings.

**Discussion:** The TOC cameras for still photography utilized by the division photographic section are not suitable for combat photography in this environment. The extremes of rain, dust, and heat have caused an inordinate number of malfunctions. Further, the rough handling of cameras is unavoidable when the combat photographer is photographing friendly forces engaged in ground operations against a hostile force.

**Observation:** There is available a relatively inexpensive, extremely sturdy, 35mm camera which is enclosed in a water-proof housing. Three of these cameras (by Nikkos) have been requisitioned (over authorized allowance).

### CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYOPS

#### Civil Affairs Planning

**Item:** Preparing and planning CA projects in pacified areas.

**Discussion:** One important phase of any pacification plan is the development of CA projects. Prior to initiating and completing a project, coordination must be effected with sub-sector officials and their advisors. Coordination informs these officials of projects being developed in their area and will preclude any duplication of effort.

**Observation:** Planning of CA projects (all of which are of the self-help variety) must include utilization of village help. Coordination with village officials will assist in enlisting village help. Projects become meaningless, no matter how imposing or important it may be, unless the villagers associate themselves with it by actual participation.

#### PsyOps Leaflet Printing

**Item:** Use of a multilith press at division level.

**Discussion:** The availability of a multilith printing press at the division level, provides the G5 with a capability to produce highly effective and timely PsyOp media. Immediate exploitation of combat situations gives US forces a definite advantage in the PsyOp area.

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Observation: The availability of the press at division level increases the capability of the division to employ printed PerOps media rapidly. The time from initiation of request for a leaflet has been reduced from 2 or 3 days to generally 12 to 24 hours.

#### MEDICAL

##### Helicopter Evacuation

Item: Army air ambulances equipped with "Forest Penetrators" and "Stokes Litter".

Discussion: In many instances wounded personnel must be evacuated from landing zones where clearance is less than the minimum required for Army air ambulances. In these instances Air Force helicopters equipped with the "Forest Penetrator" capability have been called.

Observation: Army air ambulances equipped with the modified "Forest Penetrator" and "Stokes Litter" would decrease the time lag that now exists between request for evacuation and determination that Air Force assistance will be required.

##### Helicopter Evacuation

Item: Standby "Dust Off" air ambulances.

Discussion: As operations have penetrated deeper into northern provinces, the flying distance from forward areas to medical facilities has increased. This requires more time for "Dust Off" aircraft to make the circuit from their base and back to the medical facility.

Observation: "Dust Off" aircraft have been centrally located in or near the area of operations. This has reduced the distance of the first leg and gets the casualty to the medical facility much sooner.

##### Superficial Wounds

Item: Superficial cuts and wounds should be given immediate treatment.

Discussion: Superficial cuts and wounds are being neglected, especially those associated with bamboo. Wounds of this type often lead to boils and skin infections which require treatment with antibiotics.

Observation: Personnel must be made aware of the seriousness involved in neglecting these type wounds and that immediate first aid measures must be taken when personnel receive a cut or wound.

#### CHEMICAL

##### Tunnel Support

Item: Chemical Section Tunnel Team.

Discussion: Numerous spider holes, walls and clay mines are found during division operations and are mistaken for tunnel systems. On several occasions the Chemical Section Tunnel Team was called only to find out that they were not needed.

Observation: There is a requirement to have trained tunnel teams in the infantry battalions able to exploit, deny and/or destroy Viet Cong tunnels. A training program has been set up by the Division Chemical Section to provide these personnel and a training facility is under construction.

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Field Expedient Munitions (CS)

Item: Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-1.

Discussion: Fifty-five gallon drums of CS-1 can be successfully constructed into field expedient munitions and employed against suspected or known enemy targets.

1. The downwind area of effectiveness may be as much as nine kilometers.
2. The application of agent CS should be about thirty drums (2400 lbs) per square kilometer of target area, when area is to be exploited by ground forces, and ninety drums (7200 lbs) for temporary denial.
3. CS strikes should always be followed by air and artillery preparation and then, when possible, exploited by ground forces.

Observation: Massive CS attacks on suspected or known enemy concentrations are feasible and practical.

Power Driven Decon Apparatus

Item: Power Driven Decon Apparatus, truck mounted 400 gallon, #9.

Discussion: The use of defoliants in the US PDDA has caused damage and leaks to the connection and discharge valve after prolonged use.

1. Hose reel group: Deterioration of rubber gasket at hose connection.
2. Gun group: Deterioration of gaskets and packing.
3. Discharge and pipe systems: Deterioration of joint and pipe sealants.
4. Drive assembly and clutch: Clutch and drive assembly become coated with defoliant causing friction and deterioration of belts and clutch disc.

Observation: After continuous use of herbicide, orange, purple, and blue, extensive repairs on the above listed items had to be performed. Shortage of spare parts for the PDDA in this command resulted in a high deadline rate of those items.

40 GPH Insecticide Sprayer

Item: 40 GPH Insecticide Sprayer.

Discussion: The use of "orange" defoliants in the 40 GPH Sprayer causes deterioration to the O-Rings and cluttering of the strainer.

1. Deterioration of O-Ring in the flow control gage.
2. Coats and stops flow of liquid through suction strainer line.
3. Coats and blocks flow of agent through line strainers.

Observation: The entire flow system must be flushed immediately after use and all strainers must be removed and cleaned with solvent.

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Tunnel Destruction

**Item:** Acetylene Tunnel Destruction Device.

**Discussion:** This device has been employed several times around the perimeter of the 1st Infantry Division Base Camp on tunnels that were found in the area. Listed below are the findings of personnel who have been exploiting tunnels for the Division Chemical Section during the past year.

1. The Acetylene Destruction Device systems demonstrated are extremely bulky when compared to the combination of explosives and CS-1 presently being satisfactorily utilized by the division.
2. The situation for satisfactory use of the device requires a certain size air opening, a certain size tunnel passage and some room compartment in the tunnel. When this device was tested on the tunnels in the division area the tunnels were not collapsed but were just flashed through by the explosion yielding little if any tunnel collapse. These tunnels tested by the division, though typical, were too straight or had openings too wide, or had too much overburden for the device.
3. The item required liquid oxygen to obtain any destruction in the tunnel. The liquid oxygen dispenser provided had to be recharged every forty-eight hours. The only supply of liquid oxygen for this division is at the two main air bases near SAIGON and it is impractical to reach these areas while on combat operations.

4. The concept of not exploring the tunnel before it is blown is impractical. The tunnel direction must be known for safety of personnel above ground when the device is exploded. These tunnels run in zig-zag patterns and, therefore making exploration a mandatory precaution.

**Observation:** The Acetylene Destruction Device has very limited application in this area of Vietnam and because of its limited application it should only be stocked in limited quantities at division level.

2. Recommendations:

a. Organization:

- (1) Recommend approval of the 1st Infantry Division Modification Tables of Organization at the earliest practicable date in order that the changes can be implemented in the near future.
- (2) Recommend an increase in the support capability of Air Traffic Control Teams. A major problem in air safety exists during operations due to the lack of control teams and facilities available for control of the very large number of fixed and rotary wing aircraft involved in logistical and administrative flights and assault helicopters operating out of the same airfield. Provisional control teams, primarily staffed with pathfinder personnel are being utilized by the division, but do not have the capability nor the equipment to cope with the situation. It is further recommended that the control teams be provided with the following items:
  - (a) A reliable navigation beacon to aid C-130 aircraft in locating forward airfields.
  - (b) A lightweight GCA radar for use during periods of marginal weather.

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(c) Sufficient runway lights for lighting a minimum of 3000 feet to facilitate the landing of USAF aircraft.

b. Equipment:

(1) Recommend a suitable camera with water proof casing be procured. The camera currently issued for combat photography is not water proof and as a result requires constant repair. Requests have been submitted for the purchase of an interim camera, however, the need exists for the development of a water proof camera for combat photography.

(2) Recommend a new type of ration using other than tin cans be developed to replace the present "C" Ration. "C" Rations are too bulky and heavy and create a disposal problem in the field.

(3) Recommend a lightweight poncho be developed, designed both for an individual outer raincoat and shelter.

(4) Recommend that a sufficient amount of the canister round for the .79 Grenade Launcher be issued for training of all personnel. Initial tests conducted with the rounds indicated different sighting characteristics from those of the standard round.

(5) Recommend a standard fuzing system be developed for dissemination of C3-1 by aerial delivery. The expedient methods currently being used create a wide variance in height of burst. A device is needed to obtain a height of burst from 25 - 50 feet to reduce downward loss of agent from the target area.

(6) Recommend additional tests be conducted in-country with experimental fuze X:595 (jungle penetration fuze). The previous tests were inconclusive because the canopy was not greater than 20 meters.

c. Personnel:

(1) Recommend that enlisted personnel records be screened more closely to insure replacements with Class 3 profiles affecting duties in a combat MOS are not assigned to fill these allocations. This problem is being coordinated with U.S. Army Vietnam, but arises with the individual at the time he receives overseas orders.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:



F.G. RETTIE  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

W.H. GLASGOW JR  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - ACGFORDA  
1 - CINCUSARPAC  
3 - CG USARV  
1 - CG IFFV  
1 - G-3

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III INCLOSURES

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INCLOSURE 1  
ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

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Inclosure 1 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66  
Key Officer Personnel

UNIT	POSITION	NAME, GRADE, SN	DATES
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CG	DEPUY, WILLIAM E. MAJ GEN, 032710	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ADC-A	ZAIS, MELVIN BRIG GEN, 033471	1 May - 18 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ADC-B	DEMBE, JOHN R. JR. BRIG GEN, 024805	27 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	Cofs	HOLLINGSWORTH, JAMES BRIG GEN, 034155	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G1	GEASCON, WILLIAM N. JR. COL, 025905	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G2	OVERALL, JESSE V. III LTC, 046630	1 May - 2 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G3	STARR, ROBERT N. LTC, 060351	2 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G4	LEORO, WILLIAM E. LTC, 067837	1 May
Hq, 1st Inf Div	ACofS G5	WALKER, SAM S. LTC, 028197	1 May - 24 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CO	HAG, ALEXANDER H. LTC, 050790	24 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CO	D'AMBROSIO, EUGENE LTC, 073783	1 May - 14 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CO	SWYDER, IRA W. JR. LTC, 050759	14 Jul
Hq, 1st Inf Div	CO	HAUSMAN, CONRAD K. MAJ, 081453	1 May
Support Command	CO	GRWILING, FREDIE W. COL, 062115	1 May
1st S&T Bn	CO	SMITH, HERBERT F. LTC, 01597930	1 May
701st Maint Bn	CO	KOLANKIEWICZ, CHARLES LTC, 079830	1 May
1st Med Bn	CO	BAILLY, RICHARD H. LTC, 094938	1 May - 30 Jul
1st Avn Bn	CO	HUYCKE, EDWARD J. LTC, 075214	30 Jul
1st Cav	CO	KEEBAUGH, HAROLD G. LTC, 069705	1 May - 14 Jun
1st Engr Bn	CO	HULPHERYS, JOHN H. MAJ, 01913459	14 Jun - 20 Jul
121st Sig Bn	CO	BUTLER, OLIVA B. LTC, 050507	20 Jul
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	LEWANS, LEONARD L. LTC, 061744	1 May
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	SARGENT, HOWARD L. LTC, 050586	1 May - 16 Jul
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	KIERMAN, JOSEPH M. JR. LTC, 057075	16 Jul
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	CURINGTON, RUSSELL LTC, 056170	1 May
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	GLOTZBACH, EDGAR H. COL, 027011	1 May - 24 May
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	FISHER, PAUL H. LTC, 080759	24 May - 9 Jun
Hq, 1st Bde	CO	BERRY, STONEY B. JR. COL, 057233	9 Jun

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Inclosure 1 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66  
Key Officer Personnel (Con't)

UNIT	POSITION	NAME, GRADE, SN	DATES
Hq, 1/2d Inf	CO	PHILLAMUN, RICHARD LTC, 066073	1 May
Hq, 1/26th Inf	CO	SMITH, IREKINE LTC, 027747	1 May - 30 May
		WERESYNSKI, HENRY J. MAJ, 095739	30 May - 11 Jun
Hq, 1/28th Inf	CO	GORIAN, PAUL F. LTC, 062379	11 Jun
Hq, 2d Bde	CO	HELDANE, ROBERT LTC, 050742	1 May
		NILLOY, ALBERT E. COL, 035289	1 May - 4 Jul
		SMITH, JEWITT C. JR. COL, 030187	4 Jul - 14 Jul
		McCRYSTAL, HERBERT LTC, 027327	14 Jul - 24 Jul
Hq, 2/16th Inf	CO	WALKER, SAM S. LTC, 023197	24 Jul
Hq, 1/18th Inf	CO	METHAWAY, WILLIAM S. LTC, 060588	1 May
		MORTON, EARL R. LTC, 089112	1 May - 19 May
		BARD, JOHN C. MAJ, 070602	19 May - 14 Jul
Hq, 2/18th Inf	CO	GOODWIN, WARNER S. JR. LTC, 064322	14 Jul
		McCRYSTAL, HERBERT LTC, 027327	1 May - 20 Jul
Hq, 3d Bde	CO	BAUMANN, LEWIS R. LTC, 062803	20 Jul
		BRODBECK, WILLIAM D. COL, 034565	1 May - 27 Jul
		WALLACE, GEORGE H. III LTC, 027556	27 Jul
Hq, 2/2d Inf	CO	CONN, JACK L. LTC, 066143	1 May
Hq, 1/16th Inf	CO	HENRY, LEE S. LTC, 063337	1 May - 20 Jun
		LAZZELL, RUFUS G. LTC, 064634	20 Jun - 9 Jul
Hq, 2/28th Inf	CO	WALLACE, GEORGE H. III LTC, 027556	9 Jul
		BOWIE, KYLE W. LTC, 023559	1 May - 14 Jul
1st Div Arty	CO	JONES, THOMAS H. LTC, 065059	14 Jul
Hq, 1/5th Arty	CO	CAMP, MARLIN W. COL, 035999	1 May
Hq, 8/6th Arty	CO	ROGERS, DAVID C. LTC, 02030416	1 May
		McGIFFERT, JOHN R. LTC, 058972	1 May

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
Inclosure 1 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66  
Key Officer Personnel (Cont)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME, GRADE, SN</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Hq, 1/7th Arty	CO	FYE, JOHN H. III	1 May - 27 May
		LTC, 037715	
		BIRDSEYE, ERNEST H.	27 May - 2 Jul
Hq, 2/33d Arty	CO	MAJ, 064024	
		NEEK, CARROLL S.	2 Jul
		LTC, 059274	
		TEMS, FRANK R.	1 May - 15 Jul
		LTC, 01046301	
		KOENIG, JAMES R.	15 Jul
		LTC, 059475	

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INCLOSURE 2  
ORGANIZATION CHART

Inclosure 2 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66  
 Organization Chart



CONFIDENTIAL

\* Duty Station Fort Riley, Kansas  
 Organic  
 Attached

CONFIDENTIAL

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INCLOSURE 3  
SWITCHBOARD DESIGNATORS

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Inlosure 3 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66

1st Infantry Division Switchboard Designators  
(Effective 1 July 1966)

1st Infantry Division	DANGER
1st Brigade	DEVIL
1st Battalion, 2d Infantry	BRIGADA
1st Battalion, 26th Infantry	DOGOL
1st Battalion, 28th Infantry	DEFLANT
2d Brigade	DAGGER
2d Battalion, 16th Infantry	DAMAGE
1st Battalion, 18th Infantry	DUCKLESS
2d Battalion, 18th Infantry	D-WHNESS
3d Brigade	DUTY
2d Battalion, 2d Infantry	DECOY
1st Battalion, 16th Infantry	DEVOUR
2d Battalion, 23th Infantry	DAUNTLESS
Division Artillery	ORIG FIRE
1st Battalion, 5th Artillery	DESTROYER
8th Battalion, 6th Artillery	DEPARTS
1st Battalion, 7th Artillery	DEPARTS
2d Battalion, 33d Artillery	DUNSDON
1st Aviation Battalion	DART
1st Engineer Battalion	DIABLO
1st Medical Battalion	DOCTOR
1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry	DRAGON
121st Signal Battalion	DEMO
1st Military Police Company	DEPUTY
Support Command	DURABLE
1st Supply and Transportation Battalion	DELIVER
701st Maintenance Battalion	DELIGHT
1st Administrative Company	DE ON
11th Radio Research Unit	DECAL
1st Air Pacification Task Force	HELPER

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INCLOSURE 4  
USARV GO 4079

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96307

GENERAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 4079

22 June 1966

REASSIGNMENT OF UNIT . . . . . SECTION I  
DETACHMENT OF UNITS . . . . . SECTION II  
ATTACHMENT OF UNITS . . . . . SECTION III

SECTION III

3. TO O15. For units ATTACHMENT dir as indic.

35TH INF BATTAL PLATOON (SQUAD 403)  
Atch to: 1st Infantry Division  
Eff date: 15 June 1966  
Auth: TOCG date cfm  
Sp instr: NA

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

RICHARD J. SEITZ  
Brigadier General, US Army  
Chief of Staff

/s/ K. D. Hamilton  
/t/ K. D. HAMILTON  
Lt Colonel, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

"A TRUE COPY"

*William L. Ponder Jr.*  
WILLIAM L. PONDER JR  
Major, Artillery

Inclosure & Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66