


INCLOSURE 5
LIGHT ASSAULT ARTILLERY BATTERY

48

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LIGHT ASSAULT FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY, INFANTRY DIVISION



MISSION. To provide direct support artillery to maneuver elements of the division.

ASSIGNMENT. Assigned to the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery.

CAPABILITIES. a. Furnishes one or two air mobile six gun firing platoons in direct support of division maneuver elements.

b. Personnel and equipment are provided from division assets.

c. This unit is dependent on Hq and Hq Battery, Division Artillery for all survey and radio repair support.

d. This unit is capable of participating in the defense of its firing positions.

MOBILITY. a. Assault elements of this unit are airmobile by UH-1 aircraft.

b. The entire unit is mobile by vehicle or CH-47 aircraft.

STRENGTH. 5 Officers, 139 Enlisted Men

Inclosure 5 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Light Assault Artillery Battery (Con't)

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT.

Truck, Utility $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 6
Truck, Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	- 18
Truck, Platform Utility $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 2
Trailer, Cargo $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 6
Trailer, Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	- 6
Mortar, 4.2 Inch	- 12
Radio Set, AN/VRC-46 mtd in $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 3
Radio Set, AN/VRC-47 mtd in $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	- 6
Radio Set, AN/VRC-47 mtd in $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	- 3
Radio Set, AN/FRC-25	- 6

INCLOSURE 6
COMMANDERS NOTES 43

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #3 - The Rifle Squad

1. The basic fighting element in an infantry division is the rifle squad. Although on the one hand, it is the smallest tactical unit; it is on the other hand in many respects, the most difficult and challenging to command properly.

2. The division commander deals with brigades and battalions; the brigade commander with battalions and companies; the company commander with platoons and squads, platoon commander with squads; but the squad leader deals almost directly with individuals. It is much easier to deal with organizations than with individuals and it is for this reason that squads are divided into fire teams so that the squad leader, also, will have an organizational framework with which to operate.

3. When a squad is well organized and team leaders are strong, and when every member of the squad understands fully the fact that the two teams constantly support one another, then the squad will operate well. However, if the squad is not well organized and tightly controlled, it tends to break down into six, eight, or ten individuals and loses its integrity. It is a constant struggle in combat to maintain integrity. There are many forces and factors which tend to make the soldier think of himself as an individual instead of as a member of a team or of a squad. Fatigue, hunger, thirst and fear are the greatest enemies of squad integrity. When the time comes that the individual members of the squad are preoccupied with any, or all, of these factors, and they are no longer thinking in terms of mutually supporting fire teams, the squad, at that point in time, ceases to exist as a military organization. When the squads cease to exist, neither the platoon, company, battalion, brigade or division can operate or function properly. Therefore, of all the problems in an infantry division, the first and most important problem is to maintain the organizational integrity of the rifle squads while in combat.

4. Because the impact of hunger, thirst, fatigue and fear are persistent and great, they can only be overcome by repetitious training, indoctrination and practice. The individual soldier must be reminded daily of his place and duties in the fire team and the role of the two fire teams as they relate to the support of one another. As in baseball, there is a requirement for a constant flow of instructions from squad leaders to their teams, and from team leaders to their men. To the extent that such instructions continuously flow, to that same extent is the squad an integrated team. To the extent that the instructions do not flow, to that same extent the team begins to disintegrate. If a squad is left on the field of battle under fire for ten minutes without instructions or orders, chances are it will disintegrate into individual soldiers each one of whom will consider the odds against him to be great. However, under a steady barrage of orders and instructions, the individual soldier knows that he is not alone on the battlefield, but rather continues to be a member of a functioning military unit.

5. Relatively speaking, those military units which serve a piece of equipment such as a tank, a howitzer, a helicopter or a ship at sea, have the great advantage of a machine of war around which to organize their effort. By the very presence of the howitzer on the field of battle, each artilleryman knows 24 hours a day how his contribution leads to the accomplishment of the mission. In the rifle squad, however, there is no single piece of equipment around which all activity is centered and to which all thought is devoted. Instead, the rifle squad exists only when

INCLOSURE 6 Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
(Cont)

all the members of the squad understand what it is the squad is doing and how it proposes to accomplish its mission. The squad leader, therefore, has the greatest command challenge of any infantry leader.

6. The turnover in squad and team leaders is great and thus a simple system must be adopted which can be easily taught, and readily understood.

7. The key concept which can be expressed in one word is "OVERWATCH". Within a rifle squad, it is the duty of the two teams always to support one another. It is important that the A Team understand that it must always come to the aid of the B Team and vice versa. In the defense this is clear and simple as long as each individual soldier has selected a proper position, with cover and concealment and preferably with both.

8. However, when the squad is advancing or moving, the relationship of mutual support becomes even more important. When the leading team is advancing, whether in the attack, in movement to contact, on patrol, or on its way to a base-of-fire position, the following team must understand at all times that it is in an OVERWATCHING position -- that is, it follows the lead team, prepared to support it with fire or with maneuver. The normal formation for a rifle squad is with one team leading and the other following. Only when the platoon as a whole is in the assault, or after the second team has maneuvered, should we find the two teams on line.

9. When a squad is simply moving from point A to point B as an interior unit - that is, it is not the leading element, or a flanking element, or an independent element - it is in a travelling formation in which one team follows the other at close interval with the individual soldiers 5 meters apart to reduce their vulnerability to mortar fire and recoilless weapons, as well as claymores and booby traps. Unless there is some reason to be moving single file while passing through a defile or through thick jungle where trail breaking is necessary, each team should normally be a 'V' formation with the team leader leading at the apex of the 'V'. The distance between teams in a squad which is in the travelling formation is again only 5 meters. However, when the squad is the leading element or a flanking element or on patrol, or on its way incidentally to an OVERWATCHING fire position (a base of fire), it moves either in a Travelling or in a Bounding OVERWATCH.

10. TRAVELLING OVERWATCH. The TRAVELLING OVERWATCH formation simply means that the second team drops back 25, 50, 100 or in open country 200 to 300 meters so that it is not engaged by the same fire which may be directed upon the leading team. This will permit it to maneuver and to employ OVERWATCHING fires in support of the leading team. This formation permits the squad leader to act as a military commander to influence the battle, to take initiative and avoid bringing the entire squad under the same fire at a time and place selected solely by the VC. Naturally, the teams rotate so that one team is not always leading. This rotation is taken care of by the desire of the soldiers to share the dangers of the leading element by alternating the teams. The TRAVELLING OVERWATCH is useful when the squad must move out with some speed or when contact with the enemy is either not imminent or the enemy situation is unknown.

11. BOUNDING OVERWATCH. When contact with the enemy is imminent or when light sniper fire has already been received or when crossing dangerous areas, the squad should resort to the BOUNDING OVERWATCH. This technique simply means that one team is in firing position to cover the movement of the other team and then in a leap-frogging manner, the teams alternate

ENCLOSURE 6 Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
(Con't)

between advancing and OVERWATCHING from stationary positions. The distance involved in each bound is entirely dependent upon the terrain and the judgment of the squad leader. As in the TRAVELLING OVERWATCH, movement by bounds should prevent the entire squad from being surprised or from being caught in the open or should prevent both teams from being engaged by the same small group of enemy forces.

12. The techniques at platoon level are the same as at squad level in that a platoon leader moving forward without expecting imminent contact, will always place one squad sufficiently far in advance so that the platoon does not come into the beaten zone of fire directed at the leading squad. The squads leading or flanking the platoon will use either the TRAVELLING or BOUNDING OVERWATCH, or if they are back in the column, will move in a TRAVELLING formation. Platoon leaders moving in areas in which contact is imminent will not only advance a squad to a forward OVERWATCH position to the front, but on many occasions will advance squads to flanking OVERWATCH positions with the understanding that as the platoon passes through the area and the OVERWATCH position is no longer useful, the squad leader without further orders will rejoin the platoon column. Thus, the platoon leader is able to walk across the countryside from squad position to squad position, and at all times at least one of his three major maneuver elements is in a stationary OVERWATCH, prepared to place fire in support of his advance, or to repel any enemy movement within his area.

13. If the squads and platoons of the Division will master and employ these tactics, the effectiveness of the infantry element will be increased by several hundred percent. Furthermore, because each squad and platoon leader understands exactly the tactics being followed by all others, the control of the infantry elements will be simplified and units will be able to work together with greater effectiveness. Commanders at all times will be able to visualize the formation of the infantry unit on the ground, the amount of terrain covered by them and the techniques by which they are advancing or attacking. The BOUNDING OVERWATCH does not change in concept when the firing starts - when contact is made - the tactics are identical. The only difference is that the movement from one stationary OVERWATCHING position to the next will be done with greater care and more attention to the selection of routes of advance. Whereas, prior to the fire fight, teams and squads will advance to forward OVERWATCH positions at a walk, taking advantage of cover and concealment as available; once the fire fight starts, these forward movements will usually be accomplished by running or crawling. The distances between the successive OVERWATCHING positions will be less. Once a squad leader or platoon leader has moved his elements toward the enemy, always endeavoring to maneuver around the flank, and all his units are engaged, he will endeavor to advance his line by crawling. The next higher commander will automatically make a wider envelopment.

14. All commanders will establish battle runs and will repeatedly exercise their teams, squads and platoons until they have achieved a high level of effectiveness. Training will be continuous and also will be conducted by reserve elements on operations.

ENCLOSURE 7
SUPPLY AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

55

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities

1. Supply: The average strength supported during the reporting period was slightly under 21,500 troops. The supply levels for the division as of 31 July 1966 were as follows:

a. Class I.

TYPE RATION	DAYS OF SUPPLY	
	OBJECTIVE	ON HAND
(1) RCI		
(a) Forward battalions and separate companies	5	5
(b) DI AN battalions and separate companies	1	1
(c) Brigade and division artillery	5	6 (Avg)
(d) Division reserve (S&T Bn)	5	4.1
(2) "B" Rations.		
(a) Brigades and division artillery	15	12.4 (Avg)
(b) At DLM battalions and separate companies	3	3
(c) Division reserve	15	15
(3) "A" Rations.	3	0*

*Note "A" Ration supplements are on hand for issue with "B" Rations.

b. Class III.

TYPE FUEL/COMMODITY	DAYS OF SUPPLY	
	OBJECTIVE	ON HAND
(1) At Base Areas		
(a) JP-4	5	5
(b) AVGAS	5	5
(c) MCGAS	5	5
(d) Diesel	5	5
(2) Division Reserve		
(a) JP-4	5	5
(b) AVGAS	5	5

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Enclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

SUPPLY CATEGORY	DAYS OF SUPPLY	
	ON HAND	ON ORDER
(c) MDELS	5	5
(d) Diesel	5	5
(3) Package Lubes and Oils		
(a) Base Areas	15	15
(b) Division Reserve	15	15

c. Class II & IV (less repair parts). The following items are in short supply and may be critically required in the division in the near future:

- (1) Batteries - BA50, BA61, BA261, and BA1309.
- (2) Replacement radios for combat losses. (New family, AN/VRC-12 radios.)
- (3) Tentage and poles.
- (4) Underwear and socks.
- (5) Quick release straps.
- (6) Canteen collapsible, 2 qt.
- (7) Survival kit.
- (8) Armor (atrovax).
- (9) Tropical clothing.
- (10) Generators.
- (11) Insulated food containers.
- (12) Suspenders, paper plates, steel wool, scouring powder.
- (13) Components of demolitions sets.
- (14) Compresses.
- (15) Watches, non-maintainable.
- (16) Tools - M&S (2 ea).
- (17) M16 rifles and magazines.
- (18) M16 plotting boards.
- (19) Office furniture.
- (20) Oxygen and acetylene (gas and bottles).

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Enclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Cont)

- (21) Trailer, water.
- (22) Insignia.
- (23) Decorations.
- (24) Aviators gloves and sunglasses.
- (25) Petroleum handling equipment, i.e., miniports, light weight pumps, and 10,000 gallon tanks.
- (26) Typewriters.
- (27) Folding chairs.
- (28) Camouflage covers for steel helmets.
- (29) Water cans (plastic).
- (30) Mortar sight, M.
- (31) Pump for water purification equipment 1500 gal.
- (32) 600 gal water purification sets.
- (33) M-1937 fire units.

c. Class II & IV (Repair Parts). Parts for the new series radios are in short supply. The short and long antennas for the AN/RC-25 radios are in critical short supply.

(1) The following is a summary of repair parts and assemblies received and shipped by the Technical Supply Activities of the 701st Maintenance Battalion for the 2d Quarter, 1966:

(a) Hq & Company A, 701st Maintenance Battalion

Received - 560.5 tons
Shipped - 461.0 tons

(b) Company B, 701st Maintenance Battalion

Received - 610.9 tons
Shipped - 430.9 tons

(2) The following is a summary of requisitions handled by the Technical Supply Activities of the 701st Maintenance Battalion for the 2d Quarter, 1966:

COMPANY	REQ & PROC	ISSUED	PLSSED
Hq & Co A	37,918	18,926	7,593
Co B	6,544	1,934	2,863
Co C	8,477	3,234	3,531
Co D	10,276	5,275	7,128
Co E	8,936	2,551	4,979
Totals	72,151	32,919	25,094

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Inclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

(3) The supply portion of the maintenance program has remained critical. Due-outs established by the 701st Maintenance Battalion continued to increase throughout the 2d Quarter of 1966. Sufficient quantities of repair parts were not received to fill the requisitions that are generated within the division.

e. Procurement. The following items/services were procured by 1st Logistical Command to support divisional requirements during the reporting period.

	QUANTITY	QUALITY
(1) Potable and non-potable ice.	48,003 (blocks)	Satisfactory
(2) Hood pallets.	575 (each)	Excellent
(3) Bread.	50,000 (loaves)	Excellent

2. Combat Service Support Activities:

a. Medical Evacuation. The following number of personnel were treated during the reporting period:

CATEGORY	TOTAL	DISEASE	NON-BATTLE INJ	INJ RECEIVED HOSTILE ACTION
Admissions direct	2,926	2,056	358	510
Disposition to duty	1,474	1,212	129	133
Disposition by transfer	1,560	902	238	420
Deaths	123		4	119

b. Transportation.

(1) The following quantities of supplies and equipment were moved during the reporting period:

- (a) By surface - 33,477.7 short tons
- (b) By air - 10,705.4 short tons

(2) A total of nine supply and troop convoys were made.

(3) The slow responsiveness in obtaining USAF logistical lift continues to hamper resupply operations. Bad weather also contributed to airlift problems. In spite of these areas of concern, airlift was obtained to meet the majority of logistical requirements. In at least four instances during Operation EL PASO II (conducted in June and July 1966), resupply requirements were not met by USAF airlift due to bad weather. Required support was obtained, however, by using Army airlift (CH-47 and CV-2 aircraft) to meet emergency requirements. Prolonged use of Army airlift could not be achieved due to the prohibitive tonnages required, the distances involved, and the number of available aircraft.

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Inclosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

c. Services.

(1) Maintenance.

(a) Support of M107/M110 Artillery: The float M110 of the 23d Artillery Group was converted to a M107. Engineer support for 23d Artillery Group units has been assigned to the LONE BLM area. The entire support of the group will soon be assigned to LONE BLM, but no date has been announced.

(b) Repair Parts for M1997 Ranges: Those repair parts are extremely critical to the division. Some parts were received at the end of May; however, no appreciable quantity has been received since then. These parts are essential for proper food preparation and the shortage is of concern to the Division Food Service Advisor. A message has been sent to 1st Logistical Command for assistance in obtaining these parts.

(c) Combat Vehicle Parts: Combat vehicles are being used extensively on all combat operations in the division. Due to this fact repair parts must be on hand to support these vehicles during these combat operations. Major assemblies for M245 tanks and M113 personnel carriers are most critical. Also, other piece-parts for these vehicles are either critically low stockage or at zero balance. Every effort is being taken to procure these items from all available sources. Without these combat vehicles the tactical mission of this division would be seriously hampered. A plan is needed for phase-out of these vehicles and to replace them with rebuilt vehicles.

(d) Cleaning Equipment for M16 Rifles: Cleaning rods, chamber brushes and bore brushes for M16 rifles are not on hand in sufficient quantity to properly maintain these weapons. Without them, stoppages occur and the combat effectiveness of a fighting unit is impaired. A message was sent to 1st Logistical Command to initiate expeditious action in obtaining these items for combat units. A test was made to determine why so many stoppages occurred when a full magazine was used. Normally the second round failed to feed. It was determined this was caused by dirty chambers, thereby increasing the force required to extract the spent cartridge. The bolt would not retract far enough to the rear to properly feed the next round and a failure to feed would result. This can only be resolved by having the proper tools to keep these weapons clean.

(e) Cracked Truck Frames: A number of vehicles have had cracked frames with relatively low mileage. MR's were submitted and an answer has been received. A new frame is presently undergoing extensive testing to provide a stronger frame for these vehicles.

(f) Calibration Team: A calibration team started calibrating all test equipment in the maintenance battalion. Equipment was last tested and calibrated in February 1966.

(g) A draft regulation on Operation, Maintenance and Care of Engineer Generators was written and published. USKMG Generator Instructor team conducted classes in LAI WHE, EAR CAT and HBU LOI to 1st Division units in each area. These classes consisted of organizational maintenance and operation of generators at unit level. Classes of this type have now been conducted in all base areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

Inlosure 7 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

(h) A liaison visit was made to the 1st Cavalry Division for the purpose of obtaining RLL data plus data pertaining to loading methods, use of special types of equipment and problem areas they have encountered on construction equipment. The visit was successful.

(i) All TD-21 tractor repair parts have been turned-in and no new parts for this tractor are being requisitioned.

(j) Repair parts for HOOE1 scoop loaders and 250 GPM Joy Air Compressors were in short supply. Some assemblies for scoop loaders have been received, but quantities of other required parts were not received.

(k) Requisitions for end items required for construction equipment maintenance float have not been filled. Follow-up action has been accomplished with negative results. Due to the amount of time required to requisition and receive construction equipment repair parts it is imperative that the units have float assets of this type stock.

(l) Aircraft Maintenance: Back up support continued to be a problem due to the many mission and flying hours required during the last quarter. The problems are restricted to the 1st Aviation Battalion and 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, as these are the units which participate in all missions required by the 1st Infantry Division. These problems will continue as the aircraft are rapidly approaching the flying hour time when engine changes, transmission changes and general overhauls are required.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 8
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6

62

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

19 July 1966

TRAINING CIRCULAR
NUMBER 20-6

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Replacement Training Program

1. **PURPOSE:** This training circular prescribes policy and provides guidance for commanders in establishing a training program for replacement personnel.

2. **OBJECTIVE:** To insure that each individual replacement receives, as a minimum, 40 hours of instruction prior to his participation in combat operations in Vietnam. This training is required of all personnel assigned to the division since all combat support and service units must be capable of conducting combat patrols, defending base camps and actively engaging in close combat when required.

3. **GENERAL:** Individual replacements arriving in Vietnam directly from CONUS training centers are well-trained but lack unit experience. Transition training emphasizing teamwork, the combined arms team, and adjustment to a new environment is required to prepare them for combat.

4. **RESPONSIBILITY:**

a. The ACoS, G3, has staff responsibility for the program and will monitor training of replacements.

b. The Adjutant General will establish a briefing program for officers and senior NCO's in grades E7 through E9 in accordance with the proposed briefing program at Inclosure 1 and guide sequence of events at Inclosure 2 for all incoming personnel that will include as a minimum the following subjects:

(1) Orientation to Vietnam

- (a) Unit history, organization and mission
- (b) Personal security measures
- (c) Unit security plan
- (d) Issue, handling of firearms and ammunition
- (e) Local off-limits areas

63

TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6 , HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, 19 July 1966

- (f) Uniform regulations
 - (g) Safety program
 - (h) Leaves and passes
 - (i) Guidelines to good relations in Vietnam
- (2) Character guidance
 - (3) Medical orientation
 - (4) Law and order

c. Major subordinate (base) commanders will establish training programs in accordance with the proposed training program at Inclosure 5 for all replacements to include as a minimum, the following subjects:

- (1) M-16 Training
 - (a) Characteristics
 - (b) Assembly and disassembly
 - (c) Zeroing, care and cleaning
 - (d) Qualification
- (2) Mines and booby traps
- (3) Squad tactics, battle drill and immediate action drills
- (4) Patrolling
 - (a) Combat patrols and raids
 - (b) Recon patrols
- (5) Hand grenades
- (6) Demolitions with emphasis on tunnel operations
- (7) Fundamentals of air mobile operations
- (8) Personal hygiene and field sanitation in Vietnam
- (9) Combat Intelligence in Vietnam

TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6, HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, 19 July 1966

5. IMPLEMENTING PUBLICATIONS: Two copies of all POI's, lesson plans and implementing publications will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVID-T not later than 15 August 1966.

6. REFERENCES:

a. USARV Training Circular #1 dated 27 April 1966, Subject: Command Information.

b. USARV Training Circular #2 dated 7 May 1966, Subject: Replacement Training.

c. USARV Regulation 360-2, dated 5 November 1965, Subject: Command Orientation.

d. USMACV Circular 612-2, dated 10 January 1966, Subject: Orientation Briefing.

(AVID-T)
FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

W. M. GLASGOW JR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

George P. Reynolds
GEORGE P. REYNOLDS
Major, AGC
Asst AG

5 Incls-

1-Proposed Officer and Senior NCO
Briefing Program for 1st Inf Div
Replacement Detachment

65


TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-6, HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRUNNEN DIVISION 19 July 66

- 2-Sequence of Events for the Processing of Incoming Officers and Senior NCO's at 1st Inf Div Replacement Detachment
- 3-Proposed Replacement Training Program for 1st Inf Div Replacement Detachment
- 4-Sequence of Events for the Processing of Incoming Personnel at 1st Inf Div Replacement Detachment
- 5-Proposed Replacement Training Program for Major Commands

DISTRIBUTION: B and D
Plus 25 G-3

INCLOSURE 9
PSYOPS LEAFLETS


74



PEOPLE OF LONG-THANH

THE VC OFTEN TELL YOU THAT THEY WILL COME AND LIBERATE YOU. WHY DO THEY MORTAR AND KILL THE INNOCENT CHILDREN. THE VC TELL YOU THEY ARE FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE, YET THEY KILL THE LITTLE CHILDREN.

GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED FORCES ARE HERE TO HELP THE PEOPLE. WE WANT TO GET THE VC WHO KILL INNOCENT CHILDREN. TELL US WHERE THE VC ARE. IF ANYONE KNOWS WHERE THE VC ARE THAT KILLED YOUR CHILDREN. TELL US. TELL THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OR NEAREST ALLIED FORCES. HELP TO CAPTURE THE EVIL VC.




"Attention Citizens:

You are in an area protected by GVN and the 1st Infantry Division. In order to protect you from the VC, the 1st Infantry Division must fire small arms, artillery, and drop bombs. We do not wish to hurt those loyal to the GVN. If you are loyal to the GVN, do not enter this area after today. If you are caught in this area, you will be considered VC, and will be turned over to the District Chief".

1st Inf. Div
#81

76




SOLDIERS OF THE 9TH DIV.

YOU ARE IN THE OPERATING AREA OF THE POWERFUL 1ST U.S. INF. DIV. WE
KNOW YOU ARE SOUTH EAST OF MINH-THANH.

MORE UNITS OF THE 1ST INF. DIV. WILL BE UPON YOU. SURRENDER OR DIE.
IF YOU WANT TO SURRENDER REMOVE YOUR SHIRTS. SLING YOUR WEAPONS MUZZLE DOWN,
AND PUT YOUR HANDS BEHIND YOUR NECK. THEN REPORT TO THE FIRST SOLDIER YOU
SEE.


SURRENDER NOW OR DIE UNDER THE POWER OF THE 1ST INF. DIV.

CHÍNH PHỦ VIỆT NAM CÔNG HÒA GIÚP ĐỠ ĐỒNG BÀO, ĐỒNG
BÀO HÃY KÊU GỌI VC Ở TRONG LÃNG CỦA ĐỒNG BÀO VỀ
QUÍ CHÁNH VỚI CHÁNH NGHĨA ĐỘ QUỐC GIA.



FRONT: The government of Republic Vietnam helps the people. The people who remain in the villages appeal to the VC to rally with the National Government now.

BACK: To the people who Love Peace. We know that the people are very afraid of the fighting going on around their villages. As long as the VC are there, the government will have operations to destroy them. The government will use its airplanes, tanks, artillery and superior firepower to stop all VC terrorist action. By letting the VC hide in your village, it will become a battle field. Rally to the National government and they will help you construct a new and better village. Then you can live in peace without fear.



QUÂN CỘI CÔNG MINH PHỤC VỤ VI LỢI ÍCH CỦA NHÂN DÂN.

FRONT: (CAPTION) "THE ALLIED FORCES WORK FOR THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE"

BACK: (TEXT)

THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ASSISTS THE GVN IN MANY WAYS. IN ADDITION TO ACTUALLY FIGHTING THE VC, THE SOLDIERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AID IN MANY CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS IN SUCH FIELDS AS SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND MEDICAL HELP. ONE OF THE PROJECTS THEY ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON IN THE TAY-NINH AREA IS ROAD IMPROVEMENT.

ENGINEERS OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION HAVE IMPROVED THESE ROADS TO EASE TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA AND TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR FARMERS TO GET THEIR PRODUCE TO MARKET.

IN VC CONTROLLED AREAS THE PEOPLE GET FALSE PROMISE AND TERRORISM WHILE IN GVN AREAS THE GOVERNMENT IS CONSTANTLY BUILDING TOWARD A BETTER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE.

110

INCLOSURE 10
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES

70

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Enclosure 10 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Statistical Analysis of 4160 Battle Casualties as of
31 July 1966

A statistical analysis of the 4160 battle casualties sustained
as of 31 July 1966 by the 1st Infantry Division reveals the following:

a. The 4160 battle casualties were distributed as follows:

UNIT	KHA	WHA	UNIT	KHA	WHA
Hq Co 1st Inf Div	1	2	1st Bn 28th Inf	53	273
1st Admin Co	1	7	Hq Co 2d Bde	0	10
Hq Co & Band Spt Cnd	1	12	2d Bn 16th Inf	74	329
1st S & T Bn	0	15	1st Bn 13th Inf	28	191
701st Maint Bn	2	4	2d Bn 18th Inf	71	347
1st Med Bn	1	1	Hq Co 3d Bde	1	2
1st Avn Bn	6	6	2d Bn 2d Inf	94	418
1st MP Co	3	7	1st Bn 16th Inf	42	252
1st Sqdn 4th Cav	74	434	2d Bn 28th Inf	80	348
1st Engr Bn	15	138	Hq Btry Div Arty	0	21
121st Sig Bn	0	16	1st Bn 5th Arty	8	49
Hq Co 1st Bde	0	3	8th Bn 6th Arty	7	38
1st Bn 26th Inf	49	275	1st Bn 7th Arty	1	27
1st Bn 2d Inf	47	186	2d Bn 33d Arty	7	80
242d Chem Det	0	0	256th Chem Plt	0	3
17th Mil Hist Det	0	0	234th Arty Det	0	0

b. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by hour:

HOURL	CASUALTIES	KHA	WHA	HOURL	CASUALTIES	KHA	WHA
0100	48	7	41	1300	335	61	274
0200	43	7	36	1400	365	95	270
0300	30	4	26	1500	355	46	309
0400	70	10	60	1600	223	26	197
0500	52	4	48	1700	204	30	174
0600	76	10	66	1800	296	55	241
0700	193	37	156	1900	179	24	155
0800	163	31	132	2000	62	8	54
0900	208	19	189	2100	113	16	97
1000	302	66	236	2200	79	5	74
1100	330	56	274	2300	108	11	97
1200	308	36	272	2400	18	2	16

c. The five most critical days for battle casualties were:

- (1) 5 Dec 65 - 170
- (2) 9 Jul 66 - 159
- (3) 12 Nov 65 - 134
- (4) 24 Feb 66 - 129
- (5) 11 Apr 66 - 125

d. The prevalent location of wounds:

(1)	TYPE	KHA	WHA	TOTAL	% OF CASUALTIES
(1)	Leg	55	1088	1143	27.4
(2)	Arm	21	787	808	19.4
(3)	Head	229	379	608	14.6
(4)	Chest	174	164	338	8.1
(5)	Back	36	227	257	6.1
(6)	Stomach	46	81	127	3.3
(7)	Other	111	768	879	21.1

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Enclosure 10 Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
 Statistical Analysis of 4160 Battle Casualties as of
 31 July 1966 (Cont)

e. The source of wounds is broken out as follows:

	SOURCE	KHA	WHA	TOTAL	% OF CASUALTIES
(1)	Mortar	182	1011	1193	28.6
(2)	Mines	133	746	879	21.1
(3)	Small Arms	232	568	820	19.7
(4)	Booby Trap	20	370	390	9.4
(5)	Sniper	46	341	387	9.3
(6)	Other	55	438	491	11.8

f. Grades of casualties are broken out as follows:

GRADE	AUTH	CAS	% OF		GRADE	AUTH	CAS	% OF	
			AUTH	CAS				AUTH	CAS
Lt Col	41	4	9.7	.09	E-8	183	78	9.3	.43
Maj	112	11	9.8	.26	E-7	358	78	21.7	1.87
Capt	338	55	16.2	1.32	E-6	1158	429	37.0	10.31
Lt	446	163	36.5	3.91	E-5	2005	720	25.6	17.30
WO	166	11	6.6	.26	E-4	4881	864	17.7	20.75
E-9	37	6	16.2	.14	E-3-1	4650	1801	37.1	43.29

g. The majority of the battle casualties were sustained by individuals possessing the following MOS:

MOS	TITLE	AUTH	CAS	% OF AUTH	% OF CAS
11	Infantry and Armor	6284	3244	51.6	77.98
12	Combat Engineer	507	94	18.5	2.25
13	Artillery	1252	177	14.1	4.25
91	Medical	611	129	21.1	3.10

h. A break out of the 4160 battle casualties by situation is as follows:

		KHA	WHA	TOTAL
(1)	S & D	493	2392	2885
(2)	Defense	61	406	467
(3)	Convoy	42	288	330
(4)	Patrol	41	177	218
(5)	Base Area	5	98	101
(6)	In Flight	10	46	56
(7)	Occupy Ambush Site	6	22	28
(8)	Admin Mvt	0	27	27
(9)	Attack	5	21	26
(10)	Other	5	17	22

i. The following is a breakout of non-battle casualties by month during the past six months:

	MONTH	NBD	NBM	TOTAL
(1)	Feb	2	10	20
(2)	Mar	5	19	24
(3)	Apr	6	31	37
(4)	May	4	40	44
(5)	Jun	3	23	26
(6)	Jul	4	44	48

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Inclosure 10 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Statistical Analysis of 4160 Battle Casualties as of
31 July 1966 (Cont)

j. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month during the past six months:

	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(1)	Feb	79	483	562
(2)	Mar	60	244	304
(3)	Apr	94	356	450
(4)	May	41	367	408
(5)	Jun	85	348	433
(6)	Jul	82	378	460

k. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by month and by source of wounds:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MINES</u>	<u>SMALL ARMS</u>	<u>MORTAR</u>	<u>BOOBY TRAP</u>	<u>SNIPER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Feb	122	123	192	48	53	24	562
Mar	55	52	91	37	16	53	304
Apr	80	109	136	58	34	33	450
May	115	33	70	49	24	117	408
Jun	64	111	107	43	27	81	430
Jul	32	71	172	42	11	132	460

l. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by situation and source of wounds:

<u>SITUATION</u>	<u>MINES</u>	<u>SMALL ARMS</u>	<u>MORTAR</u>	<u>BOOBY TRAP</u>	<u>SNIPER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
S & D	540	619	841	323	231	331	2685
Defense	37	65	210	15	59	81	467
Convoy	192	36	51	28	18	5	330
Patrol	79	42	21	19	14	43	218
Base Area	7	10	55	2	18	9	101
In Flight	0	25	0	0	14	17	56
Occupy Ambush Site	14	4	3	0	6	1	28
Admin Hvt	1	2	2	0	22	0	27
Attack	4	11	7	0	4	0	26
Other	5	6	3	3	1	4	22

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INCLOSURE 11
OUT-OF-COUNTRY VISITORS

84

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Enclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country

1 May 66 - 31 May 66

1 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE I. FORSYTHE, USAF/PAC, G-3
General orientation visit, with emphasis on tactical operations and
Force Development.

7 May 1966

COLONEL L.C. JONES
COLONEL F.H. BUCH
MR. G.C. DALLAPA, GS-15
MR. C.E. DUCWIG, GS-14
(U.S. Army Aviation Command Liaison Team)
Determine aviation supply and maintenance needs and help to improve
requisitioning, packaging and replacement flow of cargo.

12 May 1966

HONORABLE HOWARD E. CALLAWAY, Congressman (R-Ca)
HONORABLE DONALD FINNFIELD, Congressman (R-Ill)
MR. HERBERT ROHLACH
(Staff administration, Congressional Subcommittee on Military
Operations) To obtain first hand observation of U.S. Forces at
lowest possible level. Orientation visit.

19 May 1966

BRIGADIER GENERAL HILL D. MCCOMB, USA, Director Vietnam Support Expediting
Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
COLONEL J.R. HOEHLER
LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM STORV III, USMC,
To discuss current and future resource support problems and discuss
civilian casualties.

24 May 1966

GENERAL DWIGHT E. BEACH, Commanding General, US Command Korea and
Commanding General, 8th U.S. Army
MAJOR GENERAL J.H. SKELDON, Chief Army Advisory Group, Korea
COLONEL A.J. CASTAGNA, Chief Marine Advisory Group, Korea
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J.L. LEIGHTY, Aide-De-Camp, General Beach
Orientation visit.

25 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL, THE HONORABLE, WILES FRANCIS FITZGERALD HOWARD, CBE, MC,
Director of Management and Support of Intelligence Ministry of
Defense, United Kingdom.
CAPTAIN T.B. HORMAN, British Royal Navy
Orientation visit.

26 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL U.R. PETERS, SACCA, JCS
COLONEL H.R. AMON, USA, Office of SACCA, JCS
CAPTAIN J.H. BOWELL, USA, Office of SACCA, JCS
Orientation visit. To observe PsyOps, Political Warfare and Civic
Action operation in the 1st Infantry Division.

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85 11-1

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Inclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

30 May 1966

MAJOR GENERAL BRUCE E. KENDALL, Deputy Commanding General Designate,
USARTIS
COLONEL PAUL A. FISHER
CAPTAIN R.V. HEALY
SERGEANT MAJOR GLENN C. ROBERTS
Orientation visit for newly assigned DCG Designate for USARTIS
with emphasis on G-4 aspects.

31 May 1966

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT A. CROOK, Representing the Commandant of the
U.S. Army Infantry School. To identify, through personal contacts
and on-the-scene observations, the current needs, of USASIS students
who are being trained for duty in Vietnam.

MAJOR GENERAL CARL C. TURNER, Provost Marshal General, DA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY H. TUFTS, DA Escort
MAJOR JACK G. JENNETT, DA
To identify requirements for DA support of Provost Marshal activities,
control of blackmarketeering, and handling of POW's.

1 June 1966 - 30 June 1966

13 June 1966

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. POLK, ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL D.L. GELBERT, Office of ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R.N. ARCHERMAN, Office of ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL T.S. FLYNN, Office of ACSforDA
LIEUTENANT COLONEL W.H. HENRY JR., Office of ACSforDA
MAJOR R.E. BUCHALTER, Office of ACSforDA
Furtherance of Army support of operational requirements, particularly
in the areas of airmobile operations, logistic units, Army Aviation,
operational and organizational concepts of TOE.

MR. A.J. DELAGERS, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Far and South-
eastern Affairs, United Kingdom.
MR. SMITH, UNITED KINGDOM Ambassador to Vietnam
Briefing on G-5 activities in TET DAU LOT area and visit major ARVN
units.

15 June 1966

GENERAL J.P. COLLINS, (Ret) President American Red Cross
MR. ROBERT C. LEWIS, GS-17, Vice-President American Red Cross
MR. HARRY McCOLLONS, Director AEC, Southeast Asia
Receive orientation of Red Cross activities in the 1st Infantry
Division.

17 June 1966

MR. ARTHUR L. CHAITT, Executive Secretary of the Society of the 1st
Infantry Division.
To discuss ways the Society can assist members of the 1st Infantry
Division to complete plans now under way by the Society to honor
personnel who are fighting in Vietnam.

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Enclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Cont.)

18 June 1966

MR. ROBERT H. MUEBBOUGH, Ohio candidate for U.S. House of Representatives,
Visit U.S. Forces to obtain first hand information and meet constituents.

COLONEL B.L. JOHNSON JR., USAF, USSTRICOM
COLONEL WILLIAM PESSPICK, USAF, USSTRICOM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL R.W. HANEY, USA, USSTRICOM
MAJOR P.J. OPITY, USA, USSTRICOM
Study on airlift data (ALOC) and characteristics of on load and off load of aircraft and problem areas.

20 June 1966

REVEREND CALVIN THELMAH, Minister of Montreat Presbyterian Church,
Montreat, N.C.
REVEREND FATHER DANIEL LYONS, S.J., Professor, Gonzaga University,
Spokane, Wash
CAPTAIN LOYD V. YOUNG, USN, Office Secretary of Defense
Visit Military Civic Action Activities in the 1st Infantry Division area.

24 June 1966

MR. COLLIER, Special Assistant to the President on Pacification
To see LAM SON II operation and talk to action people.

27 June 1966

MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR S. COLLINS JR., CG, 4th Infantry Division
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MITCHELL, 4th Infantry Division Staff
LIEUTENANT COLONEL BEZICK, 4th Infantry Division Staff
LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRADY, 4th Infantry Division Staff
To gain first hand information of current situation.

28 June 1966

BRIGADIER GENERAL G.V. TOBIAS, CG, Philippine, FMARF
COLONEL BANZON, DCO, Philippine, FMARF
LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAGALA, Construction Group Service Officer
MAJOR DIZON, Engineer
MAJOR ZEMADAN, Engineer
CAPTAIN MAGNO, Aide-De-Camp
COLONEL LOONEY, JUSMAG, Philippines
CAPTAIN EHLINGER, FMARF, Philippines
LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENIC, Asst JUSMAG, Philippines
MAJOR COY, FMARF and Korean LNO
Receive orientation briefing from 1st Infantry Division and ROK construction group. Discuss with HIFFORGEV, G-3 the procedures for coordination of fire support, area security, and other tactical procedures in III Corps Tactical Zone.

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87

11-3

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Inclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

1 July 1966 - 31 July 1966

3 July 1966

MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL S. DAVISON, Commandant, USMACVCC (Designate)
To observe operations and conduct discussion with Field Commanders relative to the responsibilities of the Commandant, US Army CGCC and CG, Combined Arms Group, CAG.

8 July 1966

REPRESENTATIVE ROMAN C. PUCINSKI, (D-111)
REPRESENTATIVE LEO RONCALIO, (D-110)
Visit, briefing and tour 1st Division area. See civic action and aid programs. Talk to troops and meet constituents.

COLONEL JACK T. PINE, Director of Army Education and Morale Support Directorate, Department of the Army
MAJOR DONALD W. CHRISTENSON, Plans and Requirements Officer
MISS AGNES F. CHAFFORD, GS-14, Chief Librarian
MISS ESTER WALSH, GS-12, Assistant Service Club Director
MISS MAXINE TRITZEL, GS-12, Assistant Director Crafts Branch
Department of the Army Special Service Team conduct a survey of the Special Service Facilities, programs, and recreational activities in the Republic of Vietnam.

10 July 1966

MR. CARL ORLANDO, US Army Electronics Command, New Material Introductory Team
MR. THOMAS PATTERSON, Team Member
MR. JOHN GAGEL, Team Member
CWO RAYMOND WILSON, Team Member
Present briefing on the AN/TSC-43 (Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility).

19 July 1966

MR. YOZO KATO, Former Minister of Defense, Japan
To observe Civic Action programs.
COLONEL JAMES K. TERRY, USACDC, Combined Arms Group
COLONEL E.C. CAMPBELL, LNO, USARPAC from CDC
To discuss doctrinal matters and to coordinate collection of operational data required by HQ, USACDC.

21 July 1966

PROFESSOR HENRY KISSINGER, Special Assistant to the President
To discuss international affairs as they pertain to Vietnam.

23 July 1966

GENERAL JOHN K. MATERS, CINCUSARPAC
LIEUTENANT COLONEL B.S. TUTTCHILL, ADC
SERGEANT MAJOR F.H. WICKHAM, Command Sergeant Major
COLONEL D.R. BART (Sr Escort)
LIEUTENANT COLONEL F.J. EGAN (USARPAC LNO)
Receive an up-to-date briefing covering events since his last briefing in March 1966.

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88

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Inclosure 11 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
List of Official Visitors from out-of-country (Con't)

30 July 1966

SERGEANT MAJOR T.L. DOBOL

Making the presentation of the Dobol award.

31 July 1966

77th Bomber Wing
LIEUTENANT COLONEL W.G. COOME
MAJOR L. TATUM
MAJOR H.C. STOVAL
CAPTAIN S.ETH
CAPTAIN HARRIGEN
MASTER SERGEANT HERRILL

284th Bomber Wing
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVIS
MAJOR DUPONT
CAPTAIN CAUSEMAN
CAPTAIN KIDD
CAPTAIN HIGGS
MASTER SERGEANT SMITH

To more closely identify the contribution made by ARCLIGHT Strikes
to the total U.S. effort in RVN.

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89

INCLOSURE 12

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION LAM SON II

12

40

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US Forces 96345

SUBJECT: After-action Report-Phu Loi Pacification Task Force-
Hamlet Development Program

TO: See Distribution

1. Reference: 1st Infantry Division OPLAN 10-66 (Lanson II)

2. The Phu Loi Pacification Task Force conducted its first "County Fair" and hamlet search operation beginning 260300 May 66. By 1600 hrs the Task Force had completed a comprehensive effort to attack VC infrastructure while attaining a psychological initiative with the population. While the two hamlets were being searched, the villagers were collected near the center of the hamlets. Here they were screened, and moved to the Hamlet Fair area. While all males between the ages of 15-45 were taken to the National Police Hqs. for further records check. The approximately 2000 people remaining in the hamlet were moved into a Hamlet Fair area. Here 16 teams, plus the village, District and Province Chiefs were used to explain the purposes of the operation, feed and control the crowd, and obtain intelligence information.

3. Extensive measures were taken to allay the fears of the people and explain the reasons for the search operation, entertainment and psy activities, official speeches, rice distribution, medical assistance, intelligence interrogations, records checks, VC apprehensions and feeding and on the spot compensation for damage. All these contributed to impressing the hamlet residents that government forces, assisted by the US, were determined to conduct a strong but fair campaign to permanently destroy VC influence in the Binh Khu-Binh Phuoc area. After several initial control problems were solved on the spot, this portion of the operation proceeded satisfactorily.

4. The primary accomplishment was the demonstration of an effective technique to bring the government, including necessary force to initiate law and order, to a contested hamlet. Without the cordon and search the operation would have been merely a festival. Without the "Hamlet Fair" the operation would have been another "police action". Together, the effort was a useful means of beginning a pacification drive. All participants, US and ARVN, were impressed with the demonstrated potential. In addition to the efforts of police to speed necessary checks, other gestures of concern had a visible effect on the crowd as the day progressed. People relaxed, ate, and began to talk among themselves, and left in a generally friendly mood.

5. Problems areas encountered by the Task Force and assorted civil and military units were defined at several critiques attended by all RVN, ARVN and US staff and command elements involved. A detailed listing of these problems and solutions is attached Appendix 1. Emphasis is centered primarily on US/Vietnamese coordination and the lack of understanding of functions and relationships within the

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66

CONFIDENTIAL

91
72-1

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operation. In addition, several essential items of equipment and operating techniques were identified. The experience gained in this operation provides the basis for positive improvements in the next Hamlet Fair.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Wellington J Strickfaden
/t/ WELLINGTON J. STRICKFADEN
Major Artillery
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Special
5 - 5th ARVN
5 - Binh Duong Sector

"A TRUE COPY"

William L Ponder Jr.
WILLIAM L PONDER JR
Major, Artillery

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92 12-2

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APPENDIX 1 TO "HAMLET FAIR" AFTER ACTION - PROBLEM AREAS AND STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. The following problem areas in the conduct of the pacification operation were identified by Binh Duong Province, 5th ARVN Division, MACV Advisory, and Pacification Task Force personnel and a combined critique conducted at Binh Duong Sector Headquarters.

a. Planning Phase:

(1) Problem: Difficulty in identifying and orienting all individuals, both US and Vietnamese, who were to be actually involved in accomplishing the planning and execution of the operations.

b. Search Phase:

(1) Problem: Insufficient number of search dogs to accompany search teams.

Solution: The number of dog teams available will be dependent on the number of search areas in a particular hamlet. As a general rule two (2) dog teams should be assigned directly to each group of 5 - 10 search teams.

(2) Problem: Lack of flashlights for inspecting tunnels.

Solution: It will be the responsibility of the search element chain of command to insure that a flashlight is assigned to each search team prior to the operation.

(3) Problem: Search CP operation was hampered by overflow and area congestion from Hamlet Development Fair site and inadequate communications.

(a) Solution: The search command post will be placed in a location so congestion is not caused by vehicles, civilians, or VC suspects being processed or interrogated.

(b) The Search CP will have adequate communications with all search leaders as well as Fair officials.

(c) Sector will provide PRC-6's to net with search control headquarters.

(4) Problem: Search teams were not trained in search team techniques.

Solutions:

(a) It will be the responsibility of the National Police to instruct all personnel of the search teams in proper methods of searching.

(b) Rehearsals will be scheduled on local houses to insure search teams are aware of their responsibilities.

(c) A check list will be available for each house to insure that all areas of the search have been conducted. It will be the responsibility of the area team chief to personally inspect the check list at each house, (Checklist attached) as each house is

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

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searched, it will be given a number applicable to a number system on a master overlay to the search command post. Each search team chief will insure marking material is available.

(d) It will be the responsibility of each search team leader to know his exact location at all times in accordance with the master overlay.

c. Assembly Area Phase.

(1) Problem: Adequate control of the population.

(a) It will be the responsibility of the National Police to establish screening teams in the assembly area for those men being evacuated to the National Police and those being taken to the Fair. Loudspeakers will be available from police units to assist in this control.

(b) National Police units will also insure that control is present for movements of the population from the assembly area to the Fair.

(c) Engineer tape should be used to encircle the entire assembly area as well as the County Fair.

(d) RF/FF forces should secure area.

(e) Loudspeakers should be used to explain to civilians why the men between 15-45 are being taken to National Police Headquarters. They should state that they will return as soon as possible.

2. Problem: Air and ground loudspeakers did not broadcast the same text.

Solution: Since a sufficient number of ground units are available, ground elements only will be used.

d. Hamlet Fair Phase.

(1) Problem: Fair operations require an OIC.

Solution: District Chief is in charge of the search and Fair operation; the Sector S-3 will be directly responsible for the Fair operations. A parallel US chain of command will be formed.

(2) Problem: A requirement exists for better control and coordination of the hamlet fair area.

Solutions:

(a) A fair coordination and control point will be established and manned by the ARVN OIC and US representatives to coordinate the over all activities and to facilitate immediate reaction to problems.

(b) Each station within the hamlet fair area should have ARVN and US representatives in charge responsible to the ARVN and US OIC for control and coordination.

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

CONFIDENTIAL

94 12-4

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- (c) All personnel in the hamlet fair area must initially be briefed in detail by the ARVN OIC as to the procedures to be followed and activities available in the fair area.
- (d) A program will be prepared covering the schedule of fair activities.
- (e) Engineer tape and rope will be used to assist in controlling movement between stations.
- (f) When the people are released to the fair area they will be sub-divided into initial groups.
- (3) Problem: Tendency of people to leave the fair area prior to completion of the search.
- (4) Problem: The ID and 969 area tends to distract the people from the rest of the activities in the hamlet fair area.

Solutions:

- (a) Detailed explanation of the 969 and ID area should be accomplished by the District Chief in the Assembly Area.
- (b) The 969 and ID area should be cordoned off from the rest of the Hamlet Fair stations with adequate ARVN guard and control personnel present.
- (c) A segment of the people in the assembly area should be designated for the 969 and ID card stations. The remainder of the people will be free to take part in the other activities in the Hamlet fair area until such time as they are required to enter the 969-ID area.
- (5) Problem: Insufficient number and type of stations in the hamlet fair area.

Solutions: The ARVN/US staff should increase the number and type stations for each activity dependent on the population density.

- (6) Problem: Overcrowding of the entertainment area by ARVN and US soldiers and National Police.

Solutions:

- (a) It will be the responsibility of the OIC (US) of the Hamlet Fair area to insure that US soldiers stay away from the Hamlet Fair area and particularly the entertainment stations unless absolutely necessary.
- (b) The OIC (ARVN) of the Hamlet Fair area will insure that ARVN soldiers not mingle with the villagers within the fair area unless absolutely necessary.
- (c) National Police officials will insure that members of National Police search teams stay within their areas of responsibility and out of the Hamlet Fair area. Those National Police assigned to the fair perimeter guard will not leave their posts to mingle with the villagers unless called for by the Hamlet Fair Officials.

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

CONFIDENTIAL

95

12-5

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) All troops will be briefed on this problem prior to movement to the target area.

(7) Problem: There is a need for a clearly defined relief area.

Solution: Two latrine screens for male and female will be located adjacent to the Hamlet Fair area and appropriately marked.

e. Miscellaneous.

(1) Problem: Vehicles loaded with perishable market goods were detained in the hamlet area resulting in spoilage.

Solution:

(a) After the hamlet area is sealed, all vehicles trying to enter the area should not be allowed to enter.

(b) Personnel with perishable goods on hand could be given priority to process through the 969 van and temporary ID card stations and allowed to depart the area.

(c) The District Chief did pay compensation for those items that spoiled during the day of the Hamlet Fair. He will continue to pay villagers for this spoilage.

(2) Problem: ARVN and US vehicles blocked the road along the Hamlet Fair area.

Solution: Parkings area should be specified for ARVN and US vehicles and should be located away from the Hamlet Fair area. Only vehicles essential for the hamlet Fair operations will be allowed to remain in the area.

2. STATISTICAL SUMMARY:

a. National Police.

(1) Total screened 294

(2) VC Cadre captured 2

(3) ARVN deserters 3

(4) Tunnel 2

b. 969 Van Interviewed 420

c. MISCAP 750

d. Materials Distributed.

(1) Rice (kilo) 1000

(2) Candy (cans) 8

(3) Milk (cans) 620

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

CONFIDENTIAL

96 12-6

CONFIDENTIAL

e. Psychological Operations.

(1) Leaflets (total 76,000-969)

- (a) Airdropped in operation area 55,000.
- (b) Hand Distributed (including routes) 40,000.

(2) Other printed material.

- (a) "Support ARVN" posters 500.
- (b) "Why your men are in the Army" 300.
- (c) "Why fight the VC" 300.
- (d) "Defeat the VC" booklet 300.
- (e) G/N song book 300.
- (f) Honolulu Conference 300

(3) Audio Communications.

(a) Face to face: 2,000 people, continuous operations 8 hours 40 minutes, alternating 8 PsyWar and entertainment units.

(b) Loudspeaker ships: 5 hamlets in A, B, C areas OPLAN 10-66 2 hours, 20 minutes; Curfew regulations.

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Con't)

CONFIDENTIAL

97

12-7

CONFIDENTIAL

Appmdix 2 (Checklist for House Search) to AFTER ACTION REPORT

CHECKLIST FOR HOUSE SEARCH _____

HOUSE NUMBER _____

SEARCH PARTY NUMBER _____

- 1. House checked inside? Yes No
- 2. House checked outside? Yes No
- 3. Garage or storage area checked? Yes No
- 4. Outside wooded area checked? Yes No
- 5. Pro-Government in house or surrounding area? Yes No
- 6. Pro-VC indications in house or surroundings? Yes No
- 7. Tunnels
 - 1. Depth of tunnel or cave? 0m 1m 3m 5m more
 - 2. Number of side passages? 1 2 3 more
 - 3. Checked? Yes No
 - 4. Requires Dog Team check? Yes No
- 8. Mine Pits or Water Barrels
 - 1. False bottoms checked? Yes No
 - 2. Requires mine-detector check? Yes No
- 9. Waterholes
 - 1. Number of waterholes checked? 0 1 2 3 4
 - 2. All water-hole bottoms checked? Yes No
 - 3. Requires Mine-detector check? Yes No

SEARCH TEAM CHIEF _____

FOLLOW-UP CHECK

ARMY TEAM CHIEF _____

Incl 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Con't)

CONFIDENTIAL

98 12-8

INCLOSURE 13

TAN PHUOC KHANH - OPERATION SUMMARY

13

94

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
PHU LOI PACIFICATION TASK FORCE
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US Forces 96345

11 June 1966

SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary

TO: See Distribution

1. GENERAL: The second major hamlet seal and search operation conducted by the Phu Loi Pacification Task Force centered on the Tan Phuoc Khanh hamlet complex, XT84168. Initial skepticism concerning the effectiveness of search operations was dispelled during the TF's first operation in Binh Chuan, XT867144. Combined US-ARVN planning for the second operation went extremely well, and at the decision briefing given to the commander, 5th ARVN Division and the A.C., 1st Inf Div, the combined task force was given all the support and forces required. As a consequence, the task organization expanded to include, in addition to 1/26 Inf, A/1/4th Cav (+) and 1st Inf Div MDCMF and support troops, and the 2/7 Inf, 5th Recon Co, Psywar, Civic Action, and cultural teams, and the Division Band, all from 5th ARVN Division. In addition, numerous Binh Duong sector forces were committed to include: 262 RF Co; 265 RF Co; Plat. 775 RF Co; Sector Intel Platoon; National Police Platoon; RF-PF Band; Chieu Hoi Squad; Sector Cultural Team and the Province Youth and Agricultural Services. Six search dog teams were furnished by the III Corps Adv Gp. Two interrogation teams were furnished by MACV. Task organization utilization is depicted in appendix one.

2. SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS:

a. The operation commenced at 011845H June when elements of the 1/26 Inf (-), with attached A/1/4 Cav (+) and the 7th Co, 7th ARVN Regt initiated movement to surround Tan Phuoc Khanh, XT 84168. A, B and C 1/26 conducted airmobile assaults into LE's north, east, and south of the target area, while the remaining elements moved by ground. The rapid movement to seal the village, accomplished by 2010 hours, 1 Jun 66, was essential in order to off-set the loss of strategic surprise occasioned by the publicity given to the previous operation. In order to cut off possible VC escape routes north, a night airmobile assault was conducted, landing A/1/25 Inf in blocking positions vic XT883190 at 012220H June 1966.

b. At 020605 June the 2/7 Inf (-), ARVN entered Tan Phuoc Khanh hamlet complex, population approximately 9000, and established cordon lines dividing the hamlet into three sections. Binh Duong Province search forces followed, and after they had deployed throughout the village, all men ages 15-45 were assembled, with search force assistance and moved to the National Police headquarters at Phu Cuong for screening. Of the total of 740 men screened, interim reports from the National Police show: 29-VC suspects, 9-deserters, 4 with false ID cards, 13-former VC (probation violation), and 62-draft dodgers. All the above are being detained at National Police headquarters.

Incl 13 Operational Report-Lessons Learned. 1st Inf Div. 31 Jul 66

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation January

11 June 1966

c. After the men had departed the hamlet, internal cordon elements changed to divide the hamlet complex in half. All search forces (three companies (+)) were concentrated in the northern and eastern portion of the hamlet and the residents of that area were moved to the hamlet festival area. After search of the first half of the village had been completed search forces were re-deployed to the western half of the hamlet where they searched until 1700 hours. The search forces in conjunction with both internal and external cordon elements, were successful in apprehending an additional twenty five (25) suspects, to include three women carrying medical supplies, and ten men hiding in haystacks and wooded areas. Two tunnels were found by attached scout dogs.

d. At 020030 June the Binh Duong Province Band sounded the start of the Hamlet Festival. Hamlet residents began arriving in the area by 0900 hours and were greeted by members of the Binh Duong Revolutionary Development Cadre Team V. After the 5th ARVN Band played the Vietnamese National Anthem, cultural teams from 5th ARVN Division and province presented traditional dances and pantomimes. The Province Chief, Lt Col Na, and District Chief, Capt Phuc, spoke to the people explaining the government's program and urging them to the GVN cause. The Province Chief was present throughout the day, talking to elders, heads of households, and on one occasion taking over the Youth Services Session. Detailed layout and function of the Hamlet Festival are depicted in Appendix Three.

e. At the MEDCAP station 1,087 men, women and children were treated by medical and dental teams from Div Arty and 5th ARVN division. 3600 meals of hotdogs, potato salad, and cold milk were served by Task Force elements - the people responded favorable to the change in their menu. The response to the agricultural team's demonstration of bulgar wheat preparation was equally impressive. Six 969 interrogation tents were utilized. Of the 325 individuals interrogated, two were on the blacklist and turned over to National Police authorities. One of these was allegedly the VC village secretary. Also of note is the fact that a sketch of Phu Loi was found on the body of one VC KIA. The majority of the persons questioned in 969 facilities were cooperative and in numerous cases information concerning VC tax collection, guerrillas, and cadre was offered. This information will be exploited. In the late afternoon, VIS representatives showed movies to a sizable collection of adults and children. The Hamlet Festival was concluded at 1530 hours by the 1st Infantry Division Band marching through the town. After search forces had completed their assigned sectors in the eastern half of the hamlet they were moved to the western portion of the hamlet where they searched until 1700 hours. By 1730 all elements of the Hamlet Festival, and three elements of the search forces, the 262 RF Co, 265 RF Co, and 5th ARVN Recon Co, had cleared the hamlet. Tents remaining in the Hamlet Festival were secured by the 2/7 Inf and the Task Force CP area was secured by the Sector Intel Platoon.

f. During the night of 2 June the 1/26 Inf (+) continued to seal the village area. The following morning search forces re-entered Tan Phuoc Khanh at 0615 hours and deployed throughout the western portion of the hamlet to once again search that area while residents from that half of the village assembled for the second day of the Hamlet Festival. The search showed remarkable success - during the day 48 VCS were located in various hiding places throughout the village, from haystacks and tunnels to woodpiles and watch towers.

Incl 13 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

CONFIDENTIAL

101
13-2

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary

11 June 1966

The cooperation of the villagers in assisting search forces was heartening. At the mobile interrogation facility, one individual volunteered information concerning a VC hiding in a pottery factory; as a consequence, National Police were successful in apprehending 10 VCS. Another villager indicated that 4 VC hiding near their house and search teams were able to capture the men. VC captured included two female nurses, one intelligence specialist, two finance and economy cadre, and one cell leader.

g. By the end of two days, activities of the hamlet festival elements had succeeded in softening and changing the attitudes of individuals hostile to the government. Over 2000 people had gone through either the MEDCAP or dental facility, a two day total of 6800 meals had been served, and 1200 bags of rice had been distributed. The cadre team was extremely effective in controlling the movement of people within the area as well as influencing their attitudes. By introducing the teams via the hamlet festival, the transition from primarily a military presence to the civilian aspects of revolutionary development is facilitated. Late in the afternoon, the Province Chief stopped the festival in order to show the people a number of captured VC and weapons. The psychological impact of this presentation was impressive.

h. By the close of the second day of searching through Tan Phuoc Khanh, there was still a substantial amount of intelligence, relating to VC yet hiding in the village, which had not been exploited. As a consequence, it was decided to extend the operation further. At 040630 June search forces consisting of an R company, an intelligence platoon, and a National Police platoon returned to the hamlet to conduct searches in select locations. A total of 19 persons to include 2 females, were apprehended in the village area. One VC suspect was brought to the TF HQ by villagers who found him hiding in a wooded area. A confirmed VC led an intelligence platoon to a VC weapons cache consisting of one US M-1 Carbine, one CHICOM Carbine, 35 rounds of .30 cal ammunition, web equipment, and VC tax collection statistics.

i. During the third day of operations, 4 June, a total of 92 civilians were screened within the 969 interrogation tents. One woman who had volunteered information leading to the apprehension of a VC suspect hiding in a coffin was given 200 NVN. All villagers appeared to be very cooperative and sincere about their answers. Very few men volunteered to furnish information in order to obtain a sack of rice and the women questioned generally did not know information concerning VC installations. Many women did, however, furnish numerous names of VC sympathizers in the Tan Phuoc Khanh area. These names were added to existing "blacklists".

j. As the day's operation closed, it was evident that the civilian population truly wanted to assist friendly units securing their village. Many individuals spoke of VC harassing tactics in the village and stated that, if they had sufficient security, many more people would come to live there.

k. The Phu Loi Pacification Task Force completed seal and search operations in the Tan Phuoc Khanh area on 5 June with a search of Hoa Nhut hamlet, XT685176. At 0400 hours, elements of 1/26 Inf (+) and 7th Co, 7th Regt ARVN moved from night patrol bases to seal off the hamlet area. One platoon, 1/26 Inf, was kept aloft in helicopters should VCs be seen leaving the area. At 0610 hours, search forces elements from Binh Duong entered the hamlet, assembled the men for

Incl 13 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary

11 June 1966

transport to the National Police Headquarters at Phu Cuong and, once the women and children had left their dwellings for the hamlet festival area, commenced searching of the area. The search was completed by 1200 hours, and from the meagre results, it was clear that the Viet Cong living in the area had departed while the Task Force was operating in Tan Phuoc Khanh proper. A number of women questioned at the 969 tents indicated that small groups of VC (2-3) had passed through the village headed north when Tan Phuoc Khanh was surrounded.

1. The Tan Phuoc Khanh operation was concluded at 1700 hours on 5 June when the last elements of search and hamlet festival forces had cleared the area. As the results cited above and the statistics noted in Appendix Two indicate, the operation was a significant success. A VC review of the operation estimated a 50% loss to their capability and a two month period required for recuperation.

3. CONCLUSION:

a. Varying the time for surrounding the village area enabled the Task Force to gain tactical surprise.

b. Internal cordon forces as used in this operation must be closely supervised to be effective. There was a tendency for internal cordon elements to permit flow of traffic and women between the two halves of the village.

c. Search forces must be carefully instructed on their duties. A number of search teams performed their assigned tasks in an exemplary manner; others however forgot flashlights and search checklists and did not report the locations of houses in which VCS were found. With the prolonged search period of three days, this disadvantage was overcome.

d. Interrogation of the VCS within the Task Force CP location often was hampered by unauthorized spectators and occasionally by improper techniques. Prisoners were not isolated from their cohorts when interrogated, and in addition, the flow of information between the National Police HQ's, the 969 vans, and the IPW area was not as rapid as is desirable.

e. The recording and display of information within the Task Force and search headquarters lagged the actual operation considerably. Though this did not hamper the execution of plans, it did cause delay in the changing of instructions. Closer coordination within the combined staff should overcome this difficulty.

f. Introduction of the cadre to the people via the hamlet festival facilitates the transition from a primarily military presence to the civilian aspects of the pacification program.

g. Displaying VC weapons and captives at the Hamlet Festival is an effective psychological technique for alienating the Viet Cong from the populace.

Inc 12 Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Con't)

CONFIDENTIAL

113

13-4

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: TAN PHUOC KHANH Operation Summary

11 June 66

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Appendices:

One - Utilization of Task Organization
Two - Results
Three - Hamlet Festival

/s/Wellington J Strickfaden
/t/WELLINGTON J. STRICKFADEN
Major Artillery
Adjutant

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104
13-5