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**Appendix One (Task Organization Utilization) To Tan Phuoc Khanh
Operation Summary**

	1 Jun	2 Jun	3 Jun	4 Jun	5 Jun
<u>External Gorden</u>					
1/26 Infantry	X	X	X	X	X
7th Co, 7th Regt ARVN	X	X	X	X	X
A Troop, 1/4 Cav (-)	X	X	X	X	X
1K Plat, 1/4 Cav	X	X	X		
<u>Internal Gorden</u>					
2/7 Infantry (-), ARVN		X	X		
<u>Search Force</u>					
262 RF Co		X	X	X	X
265 RF Co		X	X	X	
5th Reconnaissance Co		X	X		
Intel Plat, 2/7 Inf		X	X		
Intel Plat, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
RF Plat, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
VMTT Squad, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
Search Log Tms, III Corps		X	X	X	X
Tunnel Demo Tm, 266 CML Det. (U.S.)		X	X	X	X
<u>Hamlet Festival</u>					
PAT Plat, Cadre Group IV		X	X		
Plat, 775 RF Co.		X	X	X	
5th ARVN Band		X	X	X	X
RF-PF Band, Binh Ducng		X	X	X	X
Cultural Tm, 5th ARVN		X	X		
Cultural Tm, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
CA Tms, 5th ARVN		X	X		
Pre-war Tms, 5th ARVN		X	X		
VIS Tms, Binh Duong		X	X	X	X
Youth Services, Binh Duong		X	X		
Agricultural Service, BD		X	X		
MEDCAP, 5th ARVN		X	X		
MEDCAP, 1st Inf Div		X	X	X	X
Interrogations Tms, 1st Inf Div		X	X	X	X
Logistical Support Teams, 1st Inf Div		X	X	X	X

Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Con't)

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Appendix Two (Statistical Summary) to Tan Phuoc Khanh Operation Summary

The following totals have been obtained during the Tan Phuoc Khanh area operations from 011900 June 1966 to 051400 June 1966:

1. Personnel Statistics

VC KIA-2
VC WIA-4
VCC-19
VCS-89
Deserters-21
False ID's-4
Draft Dodgers-118
Former VC (Probation Violation)-13
Allied KIA-0
Allied WIA-9

2. Enemy Equipment and Material Losses

3 Carbines
1 Russian Rifle
1 .45 Cal Pistol
1 .45 Cal Revolver US Double Action
10 Grenades 7 US/2 CHICOM/1 Homemade
32 Rds .30 Cal Ammo
2 Russian Stocks
4 Magazines w/.30 & .45 Cal Rds
6 Ammo Pouches
6 Dry Batteries, Electrical Fuzes and Wiring
Medical Supplies
2 Web Belts w/Canteens
Documents: Sketches of Div Arty, Phu Loi, Binh Duong
indicating important installations.
VC tax collection receipts.
False ARVN discharge paper (issued by VC to a Guerrilla)
Sketches of US Signal equipment, PRC-6, PRC-8, and wire reel
Propaganda booklets.

3. Hamlet Festival

Teeth pulled-107 (2 days)
MEDCAP-2403 (2 days)
Meals Served-6800 (2 days)
Bags of Rice (2-kilo)-1388 (3 days)
Entertainment:
RF-Fr Band-3 days
VIS Combo-3 days
Province Cultural Teams-3 days
5th ARVN Band-1 day
1st Inf Div Band-1 day
5th ARVN Cultural Teams-1 day
Youth Service Team-3 days
Agricultural Service Demonstration-2 days-300 samples
Cadre Teams-2 days
Leaflets:

969	1,760,000
MEDCAP	88,000
Curfew	110,000
1st Inf Div Good Guy	50,000
Chieu Hoi	25,000
Scare	312,000

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Incl 12 Operational report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

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Appendix Three (Hamlet Festival Operation) to Tan Phuoc Khanh Operations Summary

I. HAMLET FESTIVAL ORGANIZATION

A. Organization of Hamlet Festival Activities

1. 969 - ID (Request for information and district issuance of special passes) stations are used in conjunction with each other. As civilians are required to process through the ID station this enables the intelligence people to choose those they wish to question. It is advisable to locate this station away from noisy activities such as the entertainment area. Since the civilians are apt to crowd this area to receive passes white engineer tape is used to block off the area and funnel them into the stations. One GP medium is sufficient for the ID teams while one small hex tent suffices for each interrogation team. Approximately 5 minutes are allowed for each 969 interview.
2. MEDCAP Station: This area is best located near the 969-ID station as civilians tend to congregate there. Medical teams should be adequate to handle 40% to 50% of the population. For high impact value include a dentist. One GP medium tent can handle 4 MEDCAP teams with supplies. A wash facility is set at the rear outside the tent. Each team includes a doctor, specialist, and interpreters. Follow-up visits to the same hamlet after one or two days are a must.
3. Entertainment Activities: This station attracts much attention continually thus it is imperative that it is run smoothly. A stake and platform trailer is used as a stage. Stairs and a public address system must be provided. Also, a cover for the stage is necessary for protection from the sun and rain. If possible stagger the arrival of the entertainment teams and pre-schedule their performances to alleviate initial confusion. This area is good for color. Great banners depicting SVN revolutionary themes and have all speeches by Vietnamese officials conducted here.
4. Youth Service Activity: This service is a function of the district and necessary to entertain and control the children at the festival. Games, singing and a candy hand-out are their primary capabilities. One GP medium for shelter is adequate. Movies provided by the Vietnamese Information Service and US military will help them control the children.
5. Vietnamese Information Service: This service is involved in a multitude of activities. They provide two entertainment groups; a jazz combo and a cultural team. Their speakers are used in conjunction with the US public address system in the entertainment area and they provide the equipment for movies. A GP medium is adequate for the movies. This service has also miscellaneous pamphlets and magazines for distribution.
6. Vietnamese Agricultural Service: This service can provide information to the elders about farming. This is an invaluable service as the villagers are most interested in knowing how SVN can help them in this area. As bulgar wheat is a food commodity not necessarily liked by most individuals; this team cooks bulgar over an open fire and distributes samples.

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7. PsyWar/CA Teams: The initial orientation stage requires crowd control. The Vietnamese teams work well here. At the beginning of the search phase they return to the Hamlet Festival for crowd control and mingle with the crowd to discuss GVN opportunities. The CA team is used initially to guide and control the civilians entering the festival area. During the festival they mingle with the crowd to find out what the people want and need and help the youth service control the children. They are helpful in handing out clothes, etc, to the civilians.

8. Internal Control Cadre: Groups used in this function have been the RF-PF Revolutionary Development cadre and PsyWar/CA teams. All have done a tremendous job, but the same group should be used continuously to prevent initial confusion as to their duties. There is a need for ushering the civilians from the assembly area to the festival, greeting them at the entrance, helping them find the various activities, providing control of various activities and serving luncheon lines.

9. Reception Center: A small tent is used for a control center to greet VIP personnel and to solve problems that arise in the festival area. A radio or telephone is located here.

10. Shelter Tents: An adequate number of tents should be provided for the population to protect them from the sun and rain. This feature helps control as it demonstrates interest in their welfare and keeps them at the festival. Tents also provide a good atmosphere for small discussion groups.

II. FUNCTIONING OF HAMLET FESTIVAL

Interest displayed by the Task Force's combined staff helped Hamlet Festival operations in Tan Phuoc Thanh and Hoa Sinh to become a significant success. Ample planning time and continuous coordination resulted in smooth assembly and deployment of the large Festival Task Force. Movement from the assembly area to the Hamlet Festival area was controlled by members of the 5th ARVN Division PsyOps teams. At the entrance the civilians were greeted by members of the Revolutionary Development cadre and then assembled at the entertainment area where the RF-PF Provincial band was playing. The district chief explained the reasons for our presence and the opportunities GVN would bring to them. Next, the sector G-5 spoke explaining the Hamlet Festival and its activities. Cadre members then reported the gathering into groups taking them to the various activities. Entertainment continued throughout the day. The 1st Infantry Division Band played, ending their program by marching through the hamlet streets. Other entertainment groups included the Provincial RF-PF Band, cultural teams and VIB jazz combos. 5th ARVN Division provided their band and cultural teams. Medical aid to include dental service for civilians and RF-PF families was given by elements of the 1st Inf Div Army and 5th ARVN medical teams. For the enjoyment of everyone the Vietnamese Information Service provided Western and Cultural movies for adults and children. The Vietnamese Youth Service organized the Hamlet children into singing troops and various ball games. In one instance the Province Chief played ball with the children to the delight of everyone. After cooking bulgar wheat over an open fire the Vietnamese Agricultural Service served samples to the hamlet population. As this commodity is sometimes discarded by the Vietnamese as an unfavorable food this helped convince them that when prepared properly it can be an appetizing dish. A "969" Volunteer Information Service interviewed many civilians in an attempt to gather Viet Cong intelligence. A 2-kilo bag of captured VC rice was given to all those interviewed.

10. Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

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Results of this service can be found in the 2-2/3 portion of this report. Coupled with the above activity the Province National Police ran an identification check and issued temporary passes for civilian control. At noon a luncheon consisting of hot dogs, potato salad or rice, milk, juice and all the extras was served to the people. Even though the people commented about the unusual and strange taste of the food they all returned for seconds and thirds. Mingling with the crowd throughout the day were elements of the 5th ARVN and Binh Duong province Psywar teams. They formed small discussion groups relating the facts of GVN opportunities. Many villagers were found to have little knowledge of the government of South Vietnam. During all Hamlet Festivals shelter is provided for the population. Without shelter from the sun or rain many women with small children and the elders desire to return home. Since apprehensions run high with the 15-45 year old age group of men gone every consideration is given to the families remaining. As this demonstrates interest in their welfare this is a step in convincing the people that GVN can meet their needs.

III. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Suggestion: More Hamlet Festival activities will bring more GVN opportunities to the people and establish greater rapport for their return.

Recommendation: More activities such as the Vietnamese Educational Service, Agricultural Service, MACO and Veterinarian Services should be called upon to place displays at the Hamlet Festival.

B. Suggestion: There is a need for extensive internal control. Someone is needed to lead the people from the assembly area to the festival, greet them when they enter and show them the various activities. These people would serve in the mess lines and station themselves at different activities to guide the civilians.

Recommendation: A special team consisting of Vietnamese personnel should be organized at Province level for use at the Hamlet Festival for internal control.

C. Suggestion: In that some villagers are ignorant of VC activity around them and others fully aware of it we would gain psychological advantage by showing what we find.

Recommendation: Prepare a weapons and equipment display for the people. The display would consist of things found in and around the village. Captured personnel could also be displayed by the Province or District Chief.


Incl. 1: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66 (Cont)

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B. Schematic of Festival Operations



* O Indicates Water Points

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

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

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
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PHOTOS OF CAPTURED WEAPONS


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

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














INCLOSURE 15
NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF LOC MINH PLANTATION

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Enclosure 15 Operational Report Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
Resume of Battle of LOC NINH Rubber Plantation

1st Bn, 29th Infantry
Loc Ninh, South Vietnam (XU7308)
12 June 66

RESULTS OF BATTLE OF LOC NINH RUBBER PLANTATION

The Battle of the Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation was conducted under the canopy of the gently rolling Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation two kilometers west and northwest of Loc Ninh, coord XU737097. Vegetation under the 50 ft. rubber trees was negligible. Weather for the operation was fair with the exception of heavy ground fog in the early morning. The fog delayed the heliborne portion of the operation from 0620H until 0815H when the fog dissipated sufficiently to allow the LTHB helicopters to make their lift of one CIDG platoon and one platoon from A Co into the LZ via coord XU702112. Touchdown was 110855H Jun 66 following a five minute gunship preparation in the area.

The ground blocking elements, two platoons from A Co, departed the Loc Ninh area at 0715H along Route Red and Route Blue, respectively. At 0735H these elements reported receiving S/A fire from approximately one platoon of VC via coord XU715095. A Co's 81mm mortars were fired into the area with unknown results. In the same vein, at 0810H, the blocking elements had three wounded by S/A fire from the VC positions at the top of Hill 150. The 81mm mortars from A Co were again called on the hilltop. Following the mortar barrage the two blocking platoons moved into positions to the south and east of the VC locations on Hill 150, via coord XU715095.

The heliborne elements after their initial landing, headed south toward their original objective of the Village Nr. 10 complex, centered at XU710100. At 0840H the blocking elements reported receiving VC fire from a bunker at vic coord XU717095. Upon receiving this information the CIDG-A Co elements altered their direction and moved south to assist against what was now estimated to be at least one VC platoon entrenched on top of Hill 150. A Co's platoon moved to the north of the VC positions tying in with the two blocking forces on the east and south, thus forming a U-shaped ring open to the NW. The CIDG platoon attempted to penetrate the VC positions from the NW, but were repulsed by heavy S/A and M fire coming from the well entrenched enemy. The CIDG elements then displaced, tying in with A Co's blocking elements on the south. 81mm mortars were immediately called in to the north, sealing off any VC route of withdrawal.

Due to the intensity of the fighting C Co was alerted at 0910H to be prepared to move on foot to assist A Co. At 0940H C Co was ordered to move in support of the elements around Hill 150. By 1030H A and C Co had linked up, C Co moving around toward coord XU713098. As C Co moved to affect tie in, A Co indicated that VC were moving to the NE toward Hill 177, via coord XU721111. C Co was then ordered by the Battalion Commander to move north to intercept and attack the VC in that vicinity.

Upon approaching coord XU720104 C Co ran into intense ground fire from at least one VC company firmly entrenched in bunkers with overhead cover in the vic of Hill 177. Artillery and 4.2" mortar fire was called on the VC positions and to the north to prevent the VC from escaping. At 1200H C Co requested ammunition resupply and further assistance to maneuver against the enemy force. In less than 15 minutes two helicopter loads of ammunition were air-dropped to C Co's front lines. The recon Platoon was immediately

Inclosure 15 Operational Report-1 1966, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
RESTATEMENT of BATTLE of LOC NINH HUI ER PLANTATION (CONT'D)

dispatched on foot from Loc Ninh with still additional ammunition and a mission of aiding the C Co attacking elements south of Hill 177.

The Recon element moved to A Co's CP location, via coord XU720092 and then proceeded north to assist C Co, killing three VC snipers along the way. At 1330H Recon and C Co linked up with Recon being placed on C Co left flank via coord XU717104. In preparation for an assault, more artillery was fired on the VC positions around Hill 177. The attack commenced at 1425H with C Co on line east to west and the Recon Platoon pinching in on VC trenchwork from the west along a ridgeline running north via coord XU715113.

At this point the VC concentrated their fire on Recon and C Co platoon on the left, hurling grenades and firing S/A from the trees. Simultaneously, the VC began hitting the Recon Platoon's left flank with intensified SA and M fire. The Recon in turn attempted to fall back to prevent the VC enveloping movement. While in the process of accomplishing this maneuver, the VC moved a machinegun into a trench occupied by the remaining Recon elements, resulting in the VC overrunning the positions. C Co immediately countered with its reserve platoon, eliminating the VC resistance, pushing the enemy off Hill 177 into the artillery volleys to the north and northwest, terminating this portion of the battle at around 111515H Jun 66.

Meanwhile, in the A Co area to the south, consecutive assaults from the north, south, and west failed to dislodge the VC from their entrenched positions. A CIDG company moving west on patrol was diverted into a blocking position via coord XU 700090. A Company's 81mm mortar continued to pound the VC positions, but to no apparent avail. The Bn Commander then decided to commit his final reserve, B Co, at 1430H, at the same time moving the CIDG company east to XU713090 into a more advantageous blocking and maneuvering location.

When B Co linked up with A Co at 1500H the A Co elements were repositioned to allow the artillery to fire a preparation all along Hill 150 prior to an assault by B Co. In the meantime the CIDG platoon attached to A Co and positioned via coord XU714093 retreated to the south after their interpreter had been killed by the VC, thus creating a gap in the A Co lines on the south. The CP advisor then joined A Co until the battle ended.

Following a sixteen volley artillery bombardment B Co assaulted Hill 150 at 1630H, completely overrunning the VC positions. The VC fled to the south and ran into a heavy volume of fire from the CIDG blocking force, causing the VC to scatter in complete disorganization.

After the final assault, consolidations were made in the Estab-
tation Zone of Action. Casualties were then evacuated, ammunition resupply was effected, and the battle area was policed of VC bodies and equipment with a thorough search of the entire area. The Bn then moved on foot back to base camp location around the Loc Ninh airstrip, final elements closing at 112100H Jun 66.

1. Casualty Figures:

US	VC
KIA - 33	KIA - 93 (BC)
MIA - 33	MIA - 1 (Captured)

Inclosure 15 Operational Report-lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 31 Jul 66
RESUME of BATTLE of LOC NINH RUBBER PLANTATION (CONT'D)

The enemy force was estimated to be from two to three main force VC companies. Because of the nature of resistance this estimation was never apparent until approximately 1200H.

2. Enemy Equipment Captured:

- a. 60mm mortar - 1ea complete w/ammunition
- b. SKS Russian Carbine - 1ea
- c. Panzerfaust - 1ea w/ammunition
- d. M2-42 Machinegun - 1ea
- e. VC Webgear
- f. VC medical Supply
- h. Numerous grenades, mines and S/A ammunition

3. Ammunition Expended:

- a. 81mm mortars - 400 HE, 14 Ill.
- b. 4.2" mortars - 95 HE, 5 WP
- c. 105mm Arty - 1143 HS
- d. Small Arms - Two basic loads

4. Air Sorties Flown:

Air was used to block VC route of escape to the west side of the battle area. Sixteen sorties were flown by F-100's, F-4C's and Navy A1H aircraft. Ordnance expended as follows: CDU, Napalm, 260 lb. fragmentation bombs, 20mm cannon.

- 3 Incl
1 RESUME OVERLAY
2 FRAG ORDER
3 OPERATION OVERLAY

/s/ Kyle W. Bowie
/s/ KYLE W. BOWIE
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

"A TRUE COPT"

William L. Ponder Jr.
WILLIAM L. PONDER JR
Major, Artillery

Copy Nr. _____ of _____ Copies
2nd Bn, 28th Inf, 1st Inf Div
Loc Ninh, South Vietnam (XU7308)
101600H Jun 66
KM

FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)

REFERENCE: MAP, SOUTH VIETNAM; 1:50,000 LOC NINH 6346 IV; LOC TRIEN
6346 III.

1. **MISSION:** A Co w/1 platoon CIDG conducts search of Village Nr. 10, Loc Ninh Rubber Plantation, via coord XU7209, to clear area of local VC.
2. **EXECUTION**
 - a. Concept of operations: A Co (-) w/CIDG platoon attached, at 110600H commences move by foot and HU1D helicopter to surround Village Nr. 10 and clear it of VC and VC sympathizers.
 - b. A Co: At 0600H two platoons follow Route Red and Route Blue to blocking positions east and south of Village Nr. 10. At 0630H one platoon from A Co w/one platoon of CIDG helilifted to LZ XU701112, move south, conduct search and clear of VC in Village Nr. 10.
 - c. B Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 20 min. alert.
 - d. C Co: Be prepared to reinforce A Co on 5 min. alert.
 - e. Heavy Mortar: GS, priority to A Co.
 - f. Recon: Reinforce on call.
 - g. AT: Demo support on call.
 - h. Coord. Instructions:
 - (1) A Co send one man to maintain constant coordination with CIDG.
 - (2) Gunship prep of LZ five minutes prior to landing.
 - (3) VC and VCS evacuated to Loc Ninh on foot.
 - (4) Evacuate casualties to rear on foot if possible. Dustoff on call. Dustoff freq: 45.7
 - (5) FAC freq: 43.6

ACKNOWLEDGE:

BOWIE
Lt Col

ANNEX: A

DISTRIBUTION: B

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
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(XU7308)

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ANNEX A (OPERATION OVERLAY) to PRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)



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
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Loc Ninh, South Vietnam (.U7308)
12 June 1966
KM

RESUME OVERLAY to FRAG ORDER (OPERATION EL PASO II)

NOT EXACT SCALE: APPROX 1:20,000 LOC NINH-XU7308



ASSIGNMENT: B

BOWIE
Lt Col

TINEL

1/1/66
12 JUN 1966

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INCLOSURE 16

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF SROK DONG AND HO ERIGOU

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NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF SEOK DONG 8 AUG 1966
30 JUN 1966

INTRODUCTION (U)

The 271st Viet Cong Main Force Regiment was defeated on 30 June 1966, near the village of SEOK DONG in one of the classic engagements of the Vietnam conflict. In continuing their efforts to repel the 1st Infantry Division from the EL PASO II area of operations, the VC attempted to ambush Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and Company C, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. As a consequence, the 271st Regiment suffered heavy losses and was soundly defeated.

BACKGROUND (U)

Operation EL PASO II commenced on 2 June 1966 when intelligence indicated that three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese regiments were poised to resume their "Monsoon Campaign" by attacking GVN and U.S. Special Forces compounds in MINH THANH, HON QUAN, LOC NINH, and SONG BE. Because of this threat, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, directed one infantry and one artillery battalion be deployed to LOC NINH to strengthen the defenses in this area. Subsequently, additional elements were deployed by CG 1st Div until by mid-June the majority of the division was operating throughout BINH LONG and PHUOC LONG Provinces. 1st Infantry Division troop dispositions as of 300600 June are indicated on attached map 1. Two significant engagements had been fought with the VC prior to 30 June. On 8 June, Troop A (+), 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry had spoiled an ambush on Route 13, set by the 272d VC Main Force Regiment while passing through THU O, an area between CHON THANH and HON QUAN. When the 4-hour engagement ended, the VC had lost 105 KIA (BC) with an additional 250 probably killed. The second significant engagement involved elements of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry and CLM forces in the Battle of LOC NINH Plantation on 11 June 1966. One battalion of the 273d Main Force Regiment was engaged in trenches and heavily fortified bunkers but after massive artillery and mortar fire and air strikes, the positions were overrun. VC losses were 98 KIA (BC) and 150 KIA (Probable).

For about two weeks the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) had the mission of securing the division base at BUU LOI and the HON QUAN airfield. From 8 June, the cavalry squadron had been performing reconnaissance to the east, south, southwest, and to the north limited by the destroyed bridge on Route 13 at XT 722973. In coordination with ARVN forces the banks of the stream were prepared to permit emplacement of an armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) just to the left of the one that had been damaged. An operation was planned in conjunction with the emplacement of the AVLB, to commence on 30 June. The squadron plan was submitted to Lt Col Herbert McChrystal, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, and was approved for operations in the area indicated on maps 2 and 3. The mission assigned to Lt Col Leonard Lewane, Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was actually threefold. First the squadron (-) was to cross Check Point GOLDEN GATE (AVLB) and proceed north along Route 13 conducting a reconnaissance in force. Troop C was to operate in area of operation BASEBALL while B Troop would initially operate in FOOTBALL and later in TENNIS. Second, B Troop, in conjunction with operations in TENNIS, would escort an engineer scoop loader from LOC NINH, back to Check Point GOLDEN GATE. Third, the operation was to deceive the enemy as to the actual area in which the division was planning to operate in the near future. Both troops were to close back into HON QUAN by 1930 on 30 June.

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Troop B would have one platoon of C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry attached, while the remainder of C Company would move with C Troop. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry maintained B Company on alert as the rapid reaction force. With final planning completed, the operation would begin on 30 June.

The vegetation in the area of the contact is wooded on both sides of the road. The only open areas are rice paddies, some stream lines, and small lakes. Even here, there is adequate concealment due to the chest-high grass. There are heavily forested areas as indicated on map 3 and the sketch maps, with the trees 150 - 200 feet high. Although movement in the grass is difficult to observe from the ground, it can be observed from the air except where the terrain is heavily forested. The chest-high grass comes up to the shoulders of the road. The weather at the time of contact was clear and hot.

THE BATTLE OF SROK DONG (J)

On 30 June, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with attached 1st Platoon, C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry and AVLB section departed the squadron perimeter at HON QUAN enroute to Check Point GOLDEN GATE. The column was located at the bridge site by 0859 hours. Troop C was to depart HON QUAN at 0730 with C Company (-). However, this column was delayed until Troop C could reorganize after the search operation conducted until 2400 hours the previous night. At 0910, the column crossed GOLDEN GATE with B Troop leading and proceeded north on Route 13 to the operational areas specified in the order. Upon arrival at Check Point 1, the 3d Platoon with the platoon of infantry turned east and conducted a reconnaissance to the ford at Check Point 2. Due to the depth of the ford, the platoon retraced the route to Check Point 1, turned north on Route 13, passed through the 1st Platoon, and continued north. Order of march was now 3d Platoon with attached infantry, Troop Command Group, 2d Platoon, and 1st Platoon.

Troop C turned west at Check Point 1 and proceeded to the first stream. Three mortar carriers, ten infantry-men, and the 3d Platoon remained at Check Point 1 and established a perimeter. The mortars were laid west to support the troop. As C Troop moved west, they flanked the road on both sides. After crossing the stream, the infantry dismounted and deployed.

At about 0930 hours when the lead personnel carrier of B Troop, moving north on Route 13 toward LOC NIEH, reached a point about midway across the rice paddy (sketch map 1), it began receiving mortar, small arms and recoilless rifle fire and appeared to be the only one engaged. 1st Lieutenant James P. Flores, B Troop Commander, could see the mortar rounds bursting from his position in the column about 800 meters to the rear of the lead vehicle. He immediately called Col Levane, who was over the area in an OH-13 helicopter. The 3d Platoon then reported receiving heavy fire from the north and north-west. A preplanned airstrike was currently in progress vicinity XT 7499, which Col Levane diverted to XU 721018 at Lt Flores' request. Lt Flores then called the 2d Platoon forward and deployed them around the 3d Platoon. The 2d Platoon brought their two tanks and one from the 1st Platoon forward. By this time all but one tank and a personnel carrier of the 3d Platoon had returned to Check Point 1 with wounded and to replenish ammunition. All platoons were now in contact on both sides of the road, with the heaviest volume of fire coming from the west.

The Viet Cong had set up the ambush in the shape of an "L", with a heavy security element crossing the road along the trail north of the paddy. The logs piled at road to the east of Check Point 3 afforded good protection and some of the recoilless rifles were probably located here. Mortars were reported by a forward air controller in the woods to the north of the village. The ambush extended for about 2000 meters, but with the exception of a security element to the northeast of Check Point 1, the eastern side of the road was lightly defended. The VC appeared to be lined up all along the west side of the road with the heavy weapons about 150 meters from the road in the heaviest vegetation. The VC were wearing a variety of khaki, black, and green uniforms. One strong point had been established by the VC in vicinity XU 722007. The recoilless rifles caused the most trouble, and were also the most difficult to locate. During the first 30 minutes of the contact, the enemy concentrated on knocking out the tanks. All four B Troop tanks were disabled from hits on the tank commander's cupola and subsequent wounding of the crew.

The 1st Platoon of B Troop was carrying the wounded to GOLDEN GATE with an intermediate aid station set up at Check Point 1. They also helped with the establishment of a strong point at Check Point 1. Because the incoming fire at Check Point 1 was so intense, Dust Off aircraft could not land so the squadron S-3 set-up the Dust Off LZ at GOLDEN GATE and wounded were collected at Check Point 1 and then moved south.

Troop B concentrated on laying down a heavy base of fire to the west. Airstrikes which had been continuous from the initial strike, were being placed to the north and west. Artillery was attacking targets on the east of Route 13 and armed UH-1B's and CH-47's were making firing passes north and south on the areas immediately adjacent to the road. When the 1st Platoon reported receiving fire at Check Point 1, it appeared to Lt Flores that the VC were attempting to cut him off from Check Point 1. An airstrike was immediately called in and the fire slackened at this location. The remaining elements at the head of the column were still receiving heavy fire from all types of weapons and Lt Flores called requesting C Troop come up and help.

When the first contact was reported, Captain Stephen Slattery, C Troop Commander, ordered the infantry to mount up and prepare to move back to Check Point 1, establish a strong point, and be prepared to assist B Troop. The 3d Platoon had been receiving some light fire at Check Point 1, but when the other platoons arrived at this location, the fire became more intense. Several of the infantry riding on the personnel carriers were hit as mortar rounds started falling into the area. Capt Slattery ordered the platoons to deploy and push out the perimeter, primarily to the north. The 3d Platoon was operating northwest of the crossroads, 1st Platoon east, and 2d Platoon west and southwest. The mortars had been re-laid to fire to the north. Check Point 1 was becoming very jammed with C Troop maneuvering and vehicles returning with B Troop wounded. Check Point 1 continued to receive heavy small arms fire with most of it coming from west of the road. Mortar and recoilless fire was being answered with a heavy volume of 50 caliber fire from the personnel carriers at the road junction. Col Lewane called and ordered C Troop to push north and relieve the pressure on B Troop. The 3d Platoon was finally able to start moving north with the tank from 2d Platoon. About 200 meters from Check Point 1, the tank was hit in the turret and the commander, Sergeant Allison, and the loader were seriously wounded. They were pulled from the tank and evacuated. The tank continued north. The

C Troop column consisted of the 2d Platoon, 1st Platoon, and Troop Command Group (sketch map 2). The 3d Platoon, C Company (-), and mortars remained at the crossroads. Intense fire was received all the way to B Troop's position, but a heavy base of fire was maintained by the personnel carriers and the tank. The brush was so thick and close on both sides of the road, grenades were just tossed over the sides of the vehicles. About 600 meters after the first hit, the tank was hit again, but the driver kept going even though the gunner, Sergeant Riddle was wounded and evacuated. When the Troop C column arrived at the tail of the B Troop position, Lt Flores said to go farther north and fire to the west. The 1st and 2d Platoons moved up and deployed as best as they could since they were confined to the area immediately left and right of the road. Fire was directed east and west with the heaviest volume to the west. Col Lewane ordered C Troop to hold at this point until B Troop could be extracted and move south. The C Troop tank went almost to the O1 grid line before it turned around and came back. Three men from the 2d Platoon joined Sergeant Wilson in the tank and although power to the turret was gone, they succeeded in getting the gun bearing to the north and northwest. Sixty rounds were fired before the ammunition was exhausted. The tank was then moved along side a disabled B Troop tank and the ammunition transferred. VC could be seen jumping around but didn't appear to be withdrawing. Artillery was firing north and east and airstrikes were being concentrated on the west, but appeared to be too far west. Captain Slattery asked Col Lewane to move them in closer and the next strike came in south to north with CDU which landed very close to the road.

With the arrival of C Troop, Lt Flores pulled all the remaining elements of B Troop back to Check Point 1, to regroup, rearm, and establish a block along the road west from Check Point 1. When the first lifts of A Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry were approaching the LZ, Lt Flores pulled back. Troop B remained at Check Point 1 for about 40 minutes to rearm and get the wounded and dead back to GOLDEN GATE. The next 30 minutes were taken to move the 1st and 2d Platoons down the road to block. The 3d Platoon handled the evacuation of wounded (sketch map 3).

Lieutenant Charles D Cole with the 3d Platoon of C Troop had been handling casualties between the forward elements and GOLDEN GATE. He loaded C Company on the personnel carriers and moved to the head of the column. After the infantry were dropped, the 3d Platoon deployed west of the road while the 2d Platoon moved off to the east in an attempt to push the VC out onto the LZ (sketch map 4). Lt Cole's platoon hit a VC strong point. He was hit in the chest and several others were wounded before they could pull back. The mechanized flame thrower with Lieutenant John K Lyon's 1st Platoon assisted in the extraction of 3d Platoon. As the infantry began to land on LZ 2 and C Company began to deploy, the fire slackened. Fire from the personnel carriers was directed more to the west. The VC started withdrawing and many were killed as they jumped to run through the high grass.

After a delay of about 30 minutes caused by enemy fire received from both sides of the road, B Troop was occupying their blocking position. Initially, the head of the column halted just west of the stream until information was received that a reinforced ARVN APC troop would assist. The block was then extended to about the 70 N-S grid line. From the blocking position, VC could be seen withdrawing along the trail that parallels the road and were taken under fire.

Troop C established a perimeter along Route 13 until the infantry started making the sweep. By 1530 contact along the road had practically ceased and the personnel moved into the brush to search for dead and wounded VC and weapons. The 3d Platoon, B Troop returned to the blocking position with the Aero Rifle Platoon of D Troop. By 1700 movement had ceased and the two troops remained in position the remainder of the day.

REACTION (U)

For a week prior to 30 June 1966, B Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been maintained on a 30 minute alert as a rapid reaction force and was in this posture at the time B Troop made contact. When it became obvious that both troops and the attached rifle company were heavily engaged, B Company was alerted for probable deployment. Two questions had to be answered first; how they would be employed and by what means of transportation. All helicopters were fully committed on other missions. Twelve 3/4 ton trucks were collected from the various units in the vicinity of the battalion command post at QUAN LOI, and B Company was prepared to move prior to their arrival. At 1026 hours the helicopters supporting the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry in the SONG BE area were diverted to QUAN LOI, but by 1040 hours had not arrived. Company B departed by vehicle for the squadron command post at HON QUAN, and at 1105 passed to control of Col Lewane.

Between 1015 and 1020 hours, A Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was alerted, pulled off the perimeter, and instructed to be on the airfield in the event helicopters became available. Company A was assembled on the airfield by 1100 hours. General DePuy called Col McChrystal to the division command post about 1040 hours to be briefed on what had happened in his battalion. General DePuy made the decision to divert 12 helicopters from SONG BE. All helicopters closed the QUAN LOI airfield at 1130 hours. Col Lewane was informed of the current status of Companies A and B and asked where and how he wished to deploy them. A command and control helicopter arrived for Col McChrystal and he and the battalion S-3 went forward for a reconnaissance.

Col Lewane had selected two landing zones; LZ 1 in the rice paddy on the east of Route 13 (XU 727012) and LZ 2 across the road. He decided on the latter with the direction of attack south. At 1145, Col Lewane was informed that the first lift of A Company was loaded. The company commander was briefed that he would land on LZ 2; he should operate his radio on the squadron frequency; and he was under control of the squadron commander. The LZ was prepared by air strikes and artillery and then was marked with smoke from Col McChrystal's aircraft. A Company closed in two lifts.

Company B proceeded north on Route 13 toward CP GOLDEN GATE. Upon arrival at that location, the company would be moved into the battle area by helicopters or personnel carriers. Major Taylor landed at the bridge and discovered there were a number of wounded requiring evacuation by Dust Off helicopters and the pick-up zone would become too congested with assault helicopters landing there also. An alternate pick-up zone was selected at XT 734967 and the road column of B Company was diverted to this location. Company B then made an airmobile assault into LZ 2 utilizing four lifts of five aircraft. A command group from the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry had been prepared for lift after B Company had closed the LZ. As one helicopter in the first lift of B Company landed, it apparently struck a dual CPU bombier. All personnel cleared the damaged ship

before it was consumed by fire. Col McChrystal landed with B Company, and assumed command of Companies A and B. Col Lavane was informed of this and that the battalion (-) was attacking in the direction he had specified.

As the companies started pushing south, B was west of Route 13 and A to their right (sketch map 5). Company A met resistance about 200 meters south of the LZ while B Company was mopping up the remaining elements of the enemy just to the west of Route 13. About 300 meters south of the LZ, B Company uncovered C Troop and C Company (-). At this time, Col McChrystal assumed command of these elements. Company C was ordered to reorganize and search the immediate area, while C Troop was to reorganize, recover disabled tanks and personnel carriers, and support from Route 13 as Company B continued sweeping south and A Company southwest. Company B ceased to meet resistance by the time they had progressed about 800 meters from the LZ. However, A Company met stiff resistance along the creek, vicinity XU 715005 (sketch map 6). The Viet Cong had established a strong combat outpost line east and west of the creek. Company A sustained a few wounded. Since no headway was being made, C Company was committed on the right flank of A Company. The link-up was made by 1615 and the strength of the two companies forced the VC out of their positions. Dust Off was completed and the sweep continued south to the blocking positions held by B Troop and the ARVN forces.

At 1500, Col Berry, 1st Brigade Commander, landed and directed the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry to assemble at LZ 2 and become the brigade reserve. The units returned to an assembly area just south of the LZ in the order B, A, and C Company, where the battalion remained overnight. The reconnaissance platoon, and mortar platoon of the battalion were flown in at 1700. Three ambush sites were established on the south, southwest, and the west, but no enemy activity was experienced during the night.

During the time the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was preparing for deployment, the 1st Brigade Commander was alerted at 1005 to move one infantry battalion and the brigade TAC CP in that order to QUAN LOI. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced the move at 1234 hours using C-123 and CV-2 aircraft. The brigade closed the airfield at QUAN LOI at 1530. At 1622, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced an airborne assault into LZ BLUE, (map 2) and by about 1715 had closed into the area and began sweeping eastward.

Shortly after the contact was reported, the BINH LONG Province Chief offered units immediately available to him for support of the 1st Infantry Division. The 3d Troop, 1st Cavalry, ARVN, with 20 APC's reinforced with the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, ARVN, were attached to the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. At 1100 hours the U.S. Advisor reported to the 1st Infantry Division G-3 for a mission. He was directed to immediately proceed north on Route 13 to link up with U.S. elements at Check Point 1. This was accomplished and the blocking position established at approximately 1300 hours (sketch map 5). The 9th Regiment had one other company immediately available for operations which moved to secure the bridge at Check Point GOLDEN GATE. The Regional Force companies were securing the road between the bridge and HOA QUAN. One company of the 9th Regiment was called back from an operation south of QUAN LOI as a possible escort for the move of an artillery battery north on Route 13.

At about 1100 hours, two CIDG companies were sent from LOC NINH and assumed blocking positions north of the battle area.

The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry was ordered at 10:00 hours to move from SONG BE to QUAN LOI. The battalion closed at QUAN LOI at 1620 and A Battery, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery moved by CH-47 from SONG BE, closing at 2245. This battery was moved to LZ BLUE (map 2) at 1115 hours, 1 July.

At 1420 hours, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to terminate its operation, return to LAI KHE and prepare for movement on order. At 1430 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was ordered to move one company from the 2d Brigade Base Camp to PHUOC VINH and the battalion (-) to LAI KHE. The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry closed into LAI KHE at 1715 and the last of C Company, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was on the way to PHUOC VINH in fixed wing aircraft by 1813.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry commenced moving from LAI KHE at 1600 hours utilizing C-123 and CV-2 aircraft. All elements of this battalion had closed into QUAN LOI at 1710.

1 - 2 JULY (U)

On 1 July, follow up action continued against remnants of the 271st VC Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry secured LZ BLUE as Battery A, 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery was lifted by CH-47 to support future operations. Company C remained to secure the LZ while the remainder of the battalion moved to seize the bridge at XT 683998; link up with the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-); and with B Troop proceed to Objective 1 (XT 698027). Troop C joined Company C, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry at LZ BLUE.

The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into LZ GREEN (XT 616995) at 1000 hours. The battalion moved to secure Objective BISSBALL (XT 623996); left one company in blocking positions; and proceeded to vicinity of XU 721021 to conduct a search of the battle area of the previous day. Light contact was made with small groups of VC.

The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry continued to search the battle area and uncovered numerous shallow graves and additional VC bodies. At 1600 hours, the battalion conducted an airmobile assault on LZ PINK (XU 592025) and occupied positions for the night as shown on Overlay 1. Company A made contact with the VC and Company C and Recon Platoon were sent to reinforce. Mortar and small arms fire was received until contact was broken at 2030 hours. At 0545 hours 2 July, the overnight positions of A Company, C Company, and Recon Platoon, were taken under fire by VC automatic weapons and mortars. The VC then launched a series of five assaults from all directions, but the attack was countered by fire support from artillery, gun ships, and fighter bombers. A total of 61 sorties were flown by USAF fighter bombers and included close air support by three flights using SKY SPOT (radar bombing) techniques. Company B was moved at 0730 hours to reinforce Companies A and C and contact was broken at 0900 hours. A body count of VC dead revealed that the attacking 3d Battalion, 273d VC Main Force Regiment suffered the loss of 78 killed.

At 0710 hours, the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry moved from overnight positions to support the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. Link-up was made at 0930 hours and both battalions searched the area around the defensive perimeter. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry then continued north toward LZ ROSE (XU 5904) but made no contact.

The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, minus C Company at the artillery base, assembled on Route 13 and was helilifted into LZ RED (XU 657050), closing at 1320 hours. This LZ and adjacent LZ WHITE (XU 657037) were secured by Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and attached ARVN AFG troop and rifle company.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was helilifted into LZ PINK and relieved the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry which returned to control of 1st Infantry Division at 1530. During the night the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry came under mortar attack which appeared later to have been a cover for the withdrawal of the VC to the southwest and northwest. A sweep of the area was made with only minor contact.

FIRE SUPPORT (U)

At the time B Troop made contact, a preplanned air strike was in progress vicinity XT 7499. The aircraft had commenced dropping CBU at the time Col Lewane notified the forward air controller (FAC) that the armored column was in contact. The pilot pulled out of his southeast to northwest direction of flight and brought his aircraft down the west side of Route 13, expending the remainder of his CBU, Napalm, and 20mm. A large group of VC were seen running east along the trail north of the rice paddy. The next flight concentrated on the logs at Check Point 3 and the trail. A second FAC arrived about 1030 and started working along the trail. Col Lewane requested the area along Route 13 about 300 meters from the road be hit, however, the troop commanders requested it be moved closer to the road. During the dash of Lt Cole's 3d Platoon forward with the infantry, a napalm strike was placed along side the west of the road assisting his movement. Col Lewane called for a preparation on LZ 2, but delayed the actual landing when he was notified that aircraft were on station with CBU. This strike was placed from the 00 grid line to the LZ. After the LZ preparation, air strikes were directed to the west to cover trails on which VC were withdrawing in groups of from 5 to 15. Napalm strikes were placed ahead of the advancing 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry.

From the initial preplanned strike, close air support was continuous and unlimited. A total of 88 sorties were flown as follows:

A4	- 24
F100	- 40
A1	- 10 (VNAF)
F5	- 6
F4	- 8

Ordinance expended included:

High Explosive	- 42.3 tons
Napalm	- 48 tons
CBU	- 11.5 tons
Rockets	- 160

There was a minimum of one FAC on station at all times. These FACs were in constant communication with either the squadron commander, S-3, or troop commanders.

Artillery direct support was provided by Battery B (155mm) and Battery D (8"), 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery located at HON QUAN (XT 762091). Battery B fired 548 rounds and Battery D fired 277 from the time contact was made until about 1900 hours.

Defensive concentrations had been plotted along the route which facilitated ground observers with the column to call for fire. However, most of the missions were adjusted by air observers. Within minutes after contact began, an air observer was over the battle area. Fire was most intense from the northeast and northwest and artillery was fired on the trail north of the rice paddy. These fires were shifted to the wooded area north of SROK DONG. Col Lewane then directed that artillery would fire to the east of Route 13. This was continued until such time as he directed that artillery be placed as a block along the streamline to the west. Artillery was also used in the preparation of LZ 2 and shifted prior to the landing to the woods on the north. Artillery continued to block along the streamline to the west after the infantry deployed. Groups of VC were seen to walk into the fire, lying down or getting in holes between volleys. By 1700, resistance had ended, but air and artillery continued to interdict likely assembly areas and routes of withdrawal. Interdiction continued throughout the night.

In addition to air and artillery, helicopter gunships supported the engaged units. At 0945 hours an armed CH-47, GO-GO 154, received an ambush reaction mission in support of the armored column. Contact was made with Col Lewane at 1000 hours. The pilot was briefed on the situation and made an immediate attack on the enemy forces 100 meters west of Route 13. The first attack was made at 1008 hours using 20mm and 50 caliber guns and 40mm grenades. After the first pass, Col Lewane requested that fire be moved to within 25 to 50 meters from the road and the second attack was made using the same weapons. A third pass was made using M-13 (7.62 Miniguns) and 50 caliber side and rear guns. The Miniguns appeared to have little suppressive affect and the aircraft received several hits. Transmission warning lights, oil pressure, and temperature gauges indicated heavy damage and an immediate landing was made in the rice paddy east of Route 13. A check indicated the aircraft was safe to fly and the aircraft returned to QUAN LOI to ascertain the extent of damage. At 1130 hours, WUNG TAU was contacted for a replacement aircraft which arrived at 1200 and continued attacks on enemy troops, evacuation routes, assembly areas, and close support of elements occupying blocking positions.

Operations with armed Chinooks ended at 2015 hours. Numerous sorties were flown by armed UH-1B's both as cover for the armed Chinooks and against targets selected by Col Lewane.

RESULTS (U)

Enemy losses included:

270 KIA (Army Count)
 300 KIA (Probable)
 7 VC Captives
 40 Small Arms
 25 Crew Served Weapons
 1633 Rounds of Ammunition

(C) Friendly losses are as follows:

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry

	KIA	WIA
Hq Troop		5
B Troop	7 (1 DOW)	32
C Troop	5 (2 DOW)	18
Total	12	55

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(C) 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry

	KIA	WIA
A Company	7	12
B Company	1	10
C Company	5 (1 DOW)	17
Total	7	39

Seven armored personnel carriers and four tanks were damaged. One personnel carrier and one UH-1D were destroyed.

CONCLUSION (U)

As the reaction forces continued to search the battle area, conclusive evidence was found that the 271st VC Regiment had been decisively defeated and again failed in its assigned mission to destroy U.S. armored forces along Route 13. The rout of 271st Regiment can be attributed to several significant facts:

From the first indication of contact until the VC withdrew in defeat, Lt Col Lewane was in complete command of the situation. At the time of contact, the squadron was under OPCON 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry. Because he had complete control of the situation, subordinate elements of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry were placed under his control when committed to the battle. Except for short periods of time when he returned to refuel, he was over the battle area. During his absence, he had his S-3 replace him to control the action and coordinate the fire support. Col Lewane was in constant communication with his troop commanders, artillery observers, forward air controllers, and gunships. He coordinated all the fires to insure that the maximum amount of uninterrupted firepower could be brought to bear on the enemy forces.

Lt Col McChrystal's plans for deployment of the rapid reaction force saved many valuable minutes, preventing a larger number of VC from withdrawing.

The decision of General DePuy to divert helicopters for the lift of 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, coupled with the movement of B Company by vehicle to the pickup zone cut to a minimum, the time between landing of the two companies.

Preplanned airstrikes were available for diversion to the area of contact and subsequent close air support was continuous. There was unlimited support with varying quantities and types of ordnance.

Medium and heavy caliber artillery was available within range of the battle area and rapidly responded to requests for fire by Col Lewane.

Troop C was not initially engaged and was available for immediate reinforcement on Col Lewane's order.

The tremendous base of fire laid down by the tanks and personnel carriers, coupled with the tenacity with which personnel fought and the outstanding leadership given the men, were instrumental in overcoming the numerically superior VC force. As squad and platoon leaders were wounded or killed, assistants immediately assumed command so that at no time were the troops lacking direction.


The time contact was made is particularly significant. The battle started at 0938 leaving ten hours of daylight for the battle to develop, a reaction force to be committed, and a search of the battle area to be conducted after contact was broken. This denied the enemy the capability to police the area.

Weather conditions did not limit the ability of the forward air controllers or artillery observers to place effective fire on the enemy.

Incl -- MAP 1 - 1st Inf Div Troop Dispositions
MAP 2 - Area of Operation 1:50,000
MAP 3 - PICTOMAP Area of Operation 1:25,000
Sketch Maps 1 - 6
Overlay - Battle of HO KRIGNOV

Prepared By:


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17th Military History Det
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345




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
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