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vic XU723995 where a reinforced squad stay-behind force was dropped off. C Company 1/16 Infantry (-) then moved to a RGN position vic XU729014. At 1350 hrs the stay-behind patrol spotted 2 VC squads moving along trail vic XU729995 and took them under fire hitting 3 VC. The VC fled with half of them fleeing east and about half fleeing west. 2 VC fled south. They carried their wounded with them. C Company 1/5 Infantry (-) moved down to assist the stay-behind patrol. C Company 1/16 Infantry swept through the area and attempted to regain contact with the VC but contact was lost. C Company 1/16 Infantry then returned to their RGN position vic XU728015. A platoon size ambush patrol returned to XU723995 at 1755 hrs. At 1955 hrs this patrol fired on 3 VC vic XU723995. One was wearing a blue and red neckerchief. The VC fled. The Brigade CP remained at LOC NINH.

On 19 June C Company 1/16 Infantry searched the area vic XT721905 where the stay-behind patrol had made contact the night before. The search revealed a body had obviously been laying throughout the night, a VC hut, VC sandals, pools of blood and evidence that a body had been dragged away. At 0300 hrs C Company 1/16 Infantry reported that civilians stated that this area vic XU725014 is used by the VC as a tax collection point. C Company 1/16 Infantry S&D from their RGN position northeast back into the battalion base closing at 1155 hrs with no further contact. The 2/18 Infantry continued to provide security to the division TAC CP and conduct local patrolling vic QUAN LOI. The 2/28 Infantry continued to provide security to the LOC NINH airfield and conduct local patrolling. At 1730 hrs B Company 2/28 Infantry moved to a RGN position vic XU730125 in order to be in position for the village cordon and search on 20 June. Also 1 CIDG Company departed LOC NINH at 1700 hours for a RGN position vic XU763130 in order to be in position for the village operation on 20 June. The Brigade CP remained vic LOC NINH. The 1/4 Cav (-) conducted route reconnaissance to the north and east of HON QUAN. At 0955 hrs B Troop 1/4 Cavalry received AW fire from XT743958 and XT746965. Fire was returned with unknown results. 1/4 Cavalry (-) remained at HON QUAN.

On 20 June the 2/28 Infantry and 1 CIDG Company conducted a cordon and search of the village vic XT7413. B Company 2/28 Infantry surrounded the southern half of the village by 0620 hrs and the CIDG Company surrounded the northern half by 0800 hrs. 1 platoon from A Company 2/28 Infantry moved up Hwy 13 at 0600 hrs and began to search the village at 0800 hrs. Psy/Ops and MEDCAP were used in the village. All villagers were searched and questioned. The VC who had been captured on 18 June near the village and four other CIDG men with masks on were used to identify VCS. A total of 34 VCS were taken to LOC NINH. The operation ended at 1400 hrs and all elements of 2/28 Infantry closed back into LOC NINH at 1605 hrs. The 2/18 Infantry with two companies and the 1/4 Cavalry (-) conducted an operation northwest of HON QUAN in conjunction with BINH LONG Province forces. At 0700 hrs C Troop 1/4 Cavalry and two RF Companies moved from HON QUAN to blocking position RED along Hwy 13 (XT725966 to XT737940). One RF Company and one ARVN cavalry troop moved to blocking position YELLOW (XT710928 to XT732928). A and B Companies 2/18 Infantry mounted on APC's of B Troop 1/4 Cavalry moved from HON QUAN to a drop-off point vic XT696928. A and B Companies 2/18 Infantry then moved on foot to get into position to sweep east with A Company on the north and B Company on the south. At 0710 hrs, 2/28 Inf (-) and C Troop 1/4 Arty moved to HON QUAN. B 1/4 Cav blocked on the southwest of the RF

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forces via XI7092. At 0920 hrs the RF forces reported finding evidence that a VC platoon had been in the vic of XI73793 but had departed. At 1530 hrs B Company 2/18 Infantry found a small old base camp via XI725947. The 2/18 Infantry (-) reached blocking position S&D at 1625 hrs and by 1730 hrs all forces began extracting. All forces closed by 1817 hrs with 1/4 Cavalry (-) at HON QUAN and 2/18 Infantry and C Battery 1/7 Artillery at QUAN LOI. The 1/16 Infantry conducted S&D operations southeast and northeast of LOC NINH. The recon platoon was told by a civilian via XU763042 that 100 VC were seen on about 18 June via XU7005 moving north. They were supposedly accompanied by 4 or 5 Chinese advisors. At 1220 hrs recon platoon found a small camp via XU790035 which was about 50 meters by 50 meters in size and contained 10 to 12 foxholes and several camp fires. It appeared to have been occupied 2 to 3 days before. The 3d Brigade CP remained at LOC NINH. 232

On 21 June the 3d Brigade TF continued Operation EL PASO II. The Brigade continued extensive patrolling and S&D operations via LOC NINH and HON QUAN. C Troop 1/4 Cavalry conducted a route recon from HON QUAN to MINH THANH closing into MINH THANH at 211545 hrs with negative contact. Upon closing, C Troop 1/4 Cavalry came under OPCON of 1st Brigade. 1/16 Infantry continued on standby for possible commitment via SONG BE. At 210800 June D Company 1/16 Infantry began to S&D southeast to via XU779047, then northeast to via XU786057, then northwest to via XU756077, then southwest to the battalion base area closing at 211400 June with negative contact. At 210330 June C Company 1/16 Infantry (-) began to S&D south to via XU742013, then northwest to XU731031, then northeast to the base area closing at 211300 June with negative contact. C Company 1/16 Infantry and C Battery 2/13 Artillery remained via XU740060. The 2/18 Infantry continued to provide security to the division forward CP and conducted local patrolling. The recon platoon 2/18 Infantry was attached to C Troop 1/4 Cavalry for their move to MINH THANH. 1 platoon from C Company 2/13 Infantry provided security for C Battery 1/7 Artillery which displaced to a position south of HON QUAN to support C Troop 1/4 Cavalry in their movement. One platoon of B Company 2/13 Infantry patrolled to the south of HON QUAN and returned at 221545 June with negative contact. C Battery 1/7 Artillery returned to QUAN LOI at 1600 hrs. 2/13 Infantry (minus recon platoon with C Troop 1/4 Cavalry at MINH THANH) and C Battery 1/7 Arty remained via QUAN LOI. The 2/28 Infantry continued to provide security for the Brigade CP and LOC NINH airfield and conducted local patrolling and S&D operations. A Company 2/28 Infantry began to S&D at 210730 hrs June to check the high ground to the north east of LOC NINH. A Company 2/28 Infantry moved to via XU772122 with negative contact and returned to the battalion base area. B Company 2/28 Infantry remained on alert for movement to the 1/16 Infantry area for the purpose of securing C Battery 2/13 Artillery if 1/16 Infantry was committed to the SONG BE area. 2/28 Infantry and 2/33 Artillery remained via LOC NINH airfield. D Troop 1/4 Cavalry returned to OPCON of 1/4 Cavalry from 3d Brigade at 201700 June. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry escorted C Battery 1/7 Artillery to a firing position via XI7933. Upon arrival B Troop 1/4 Cavalry conducted an area recon west and southwest of HON QUAN. At 210730 June, C Troop 1/4 Cavalry with recon platoon 2/18 Infantry attached moved from HON QUAN to MINH THANH to recon the route. C Troop 1/4 Cavalry had negative contact. Upon moving into MINH THANH C Troop came under OPCON of 1st Brigade.

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On 22 June at 0655 hrs the recon plt 1/16 Infantry which had been in a night ambush position via XT771073 returned to the battalion base at 220655 June with negative contact. A report was received that VC were stopping traffic via XT722995 trading and taking food. At 220300 June C Company 1/16 Infantry (-) moved south to via XT743938, then west to via XT7229 in an attempt to ambush the VC in the area. C Company 1/16 Infantry had negative contact. C Company 1/16 Infantry picked up an ADC camera team via XT719997 and proceeded north to the battalion base area closing at 221315 June with negative contact. At 0305 hours A Company 1/16 Infantry moved to via XT7560.

At 220630 June the 2/18 Infantry began to S&D north via XT836973. They discovered several documents and two uniforms which were evacuated. C Company 2/18 Infantry continued north to a RON position via XT838996 closing at 1000 hours 21 June with negative contact. The 2/18 Infantry (-) and C Battery 1/7 Arty remained via QUAN LOI airfield. The 2/28 Infantry continued to provide security for the Brigade CP and the LOC NINH airfield and conducted local patrolling and S&D operations via LOC NINH. At 1105 hrs C Company 2/28 Infantry found 4 RPG2 rocket launcher rounds and booster charge which were evacuated to Brigade Headquarters. C Company 2/28 Infantry continued S&D closing back in o the battalion base area at 1420 hrs. At 1300 hrs B Troop 1/4 Cavalry conducted a road reconnaissance along Hwy 13 to the south. B Troop (-) moved south as far as XT765610 clearing out four road blocks on Highway 13 via XT765735, XT765733, XT765730 and XT766635 with negative enemy contact. At 1352 hrs the helicopter gunteam supporting B Troop 1/4 Cavalry received SA fire from XT765530 and returned the fire with unknown results. 1 platoon B Troop 1/4 Cavalry performed MEDCAP activities in the village via XT7092. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry closed back into HON QUAN at 221630 June. 1/4 Cavalry (-) remained via HON QUAN.

On 23 June at 0640 hrs 1/16 Infantry began to move by foot to the LOC NINH airstrip. Because of a shortage of aircraft, 1/16 Infantry had to shuttle back to LAI KHE and PHUOC VINH by all available aircraft. 1/16 Infantry (-) moved to LAI KHE where they assumed the base camp security mission and C Company 1/16 Infantry moved to PHUOC VINH where they came under OPCON of the 1st Brigade. All elements of 1/16 Infantry had departed LOC NINH by 1415 hrs. The 2/18 Infantry continued to provide security for the division forward CP and the QUAN LOI airfield. The recon platoon 2/18 Infantry remained with C Troop 1/4 Cavalry at MINH THANH. B Company 2/18 Infantry (-) was attached to B Troop 1/4 Cavalry for a 40 day operation. C Company 2/18 Infantry and C Battery 1st Artillery remained via QUAN LOI. The 2/28 Infantry continued to provide security for the Brigade CP and LOC NINH airfield. At 0800 hours B Company 2/28 Infantry departed LOC NINH airfield and moved by foot to via XU7406 where they took up positions to provide security for C Battery 2/33 Artillery. Upon the departure of the 1/16 Infantry, the 2/28 Infantry (-) repositioned forces to cover the area vacated by B Company 2/28 Infantry and then conducted local patrolling via LOC NINH. 2/28 Infantry (-) continued with 2/33 Artillery (-) in the vicinity of LOC NINH airfield.

At 230645 June B Troop 1/4 Cav and B Company 2/18 Infantry (-) began to move along Highway 15 to provide security around the destroyed bridge via XT722972. Upon arrival at the bridge B Company 2/18 Infantry began to recon to the north of the bridge. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry sent a platoon to recon to the south and east of the bridge. The public works officials who were to repair the bridge never

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showed up. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry and 2/18 Infantry (-) returned to base camp area closing at 1410 hours. 1/4 Cavalry (-) remained via HON QUAN airfield. 237

On 24 June at 0730 hrs C Troop 1/4 Cavalry with the recon platoon of the 2/18 Infantry moved from MINH THAMNH to HON QUAN. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry and A Company 2/18 Infantry moved south from HON QUAN to CHON THAMNH to secure Highway 13 and to escort artillery elements to HON QUAN. A Company 2/18 Infantry made contact with a small group of VC via XT764726 at 0950 hrs and captured one Chiocn rifle, a quantity of SA ammunition and web gear. The 2/28 Infantry conducted local patrolling and S&D operations to the east and south of LOC MINH and picked up 1 VCS. The 3d Brigade CV remained via LOC MINH. 2/18 Infantry continued to provide security for the division forward CP. At 0745 hours one platoon of B Company 2/18 Infantry departed with C Battery 1/7 Artillery as a security force. C Dtry 1/7 Artillery displaced to via XT7633 in order to support the move of 1/4 Cavalry. A Company 2/18 Infantry was attached to B Troop 1/4 Cavalry for the clearing of Highway 13 south from HON QUAN to CHON THAMNH. One platoon of B Company 2/18 Inf conducted a S&D operation to the east to via XT0493 to confirm an agent report that 50 VC had been digging in at that location. The patrol found that the report was incorrect and returned to QUAN LOI at 1600 hours with negative contact. C Company 2/18 Infantry remained on standby as RRF for possible commitment to assist the 1/4 Cavalry. C Battery 1/7 Artillery and 1 platoon from B Company 2/18 Infantry returned to QUAN LOI at 221505 June. At 0305 hours B Company 2/28 Infantry picked up 1 VCS via their perimeter and evacuated him to the District officials for investigation. A Company 2/28 Infantry sent a patrol to via XT725091 and C Company 2/28 Infantry sent a patrol to vicinity XT760105. Both patrols had negative contact and returned to base camp by 1200 hours. 2/28 Infantry (-) and 2/33 Artillery (-) remained via LOC MINH airfield. At 0645 hours the 1/4 Cavalry picked up A Company 2/18 Infantry at QUAN LOI and escorted C Battery 1/7 Artillery and one platoon of B Company 2/18 Infantry to a position via XT7630. B Troop 1/4 Cav then proceeded south with B Company 2/18 Infantry to clear the road to CHON THAMNH. The 3 platoons of A Company 2/18 Infantry were dropped off at critical bridge sites along the way. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry then proceeded to CHON THAMNH to pick up C/6 Artillery (-) who was to be escorted back to HON QUAN. At 0925 hours B Troop 1/4 Cavalry received SA fire via XT755745 and placed artillery fire on this location with unknown results. At 0950 hrs B Troop 1/4 Cavalry with an element of A Company 2/18 Infantry received SA fire from vicinity XT764726. Artillery fire was called in immediately and a platoon from 2/18 Infantry was lifted into the area. A Company 2/18 Infantry found an old fort with a bunker in the northeast corner and a few 55 gallon drums filled with sand. A tunnel complex in the center of the fort was destroyed. On the east side of the fort an un-fired mine was destroyed. In the fort A Company 2/18 Infantry captured a Chiocn 56 rifle (S1614628) which had 1 round in the chamber and 2 in the magazine. A Company 2/18 Infantry found and destroyed in the fort the following items: One AT round, 31 M1 clips with ammunition, 6 BAR magazines with ammunition, 109 loose rounds of 30 cal ammunition, 2 pieces of Chiocn web gear and one Chiocn grenade. At 0950 hrs B Troop 1/4 Cav found a bunker complex via XT768726. Artillery fire was called in resulting in the destruction of several of the bunkers. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry arrived at CHON THAMNH at 0945 hours. At this time the platoon from A Troop 1/4 Cav departed for LAI KHE where it closed at 1505 hours. C Troop 1/4 Cavalry was released from OP-CC: 1st Rde at 0730 hours and departed MINH THAMNH for HON QUAN. C Troop 1/4 Cav

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235 arrived via XT7680 at 1400 hrs to act as BFP and await the return of B Troop 1/4 Cavalry, from QUAN THANH. B Troop departed with 8/6 Artillery (-) at 1535 hrs for NON QUAN. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry picked up the platoons of A Company 2/28 Infantry and together they closed into QUAN LOI at 1505 hrs. B Troop 1/4 Cavalry continued onto NON QUAN closing at 1608 hrs. C Troop 1/4 Cav closed on QUAN at 1625 hrs where the 1/4 Cavalry was located. A Troop 1/4 Cav remained at LOC KEB and B Troop remained at PHU LOI.

At 250025 June B Company 2/28 Infantry heard noises to their front and threw a grenade. It was believed that a VC was hit but a search of the area at first light proved different. At 0700 hrs B Company 2/18 Infantry and C Company 2/18 Infantry each conducted platoon size patrols to the north and south of QUAN LOI with negative contact. The 2/18 Infantry conducted range firing for new arrivals in the QUAN LOI area. 2/23 Infantry continued to provide security for the Brigade CP and the LOC NINH airstrip. B Company 2/28 Infantry provided security for C Btry 2/13 Artillery via XT7406. At 2103 hrs an ambush patrol from B Company 2/28 Infantry engaged 12 VC via XT743054 with SA. The patrol fired a claymore mine on the VC, moved back and called in mortar and artillery fire on the VC. The area was searched but no VC were found. At 250920 June A and B Companies 2/28 Infantry sent out patrols to the north and east of LOC NINH to recon the high ground. All patrols closed back into the base area with negative contact. At 1520 hrs B Company 2/28 Infantry detained 3 VCS via XT746055. The VC were turned over to district officials. At 1525 hrs A Company 2/28 Infantry dispatched a patrol to via XT723090. The French plantation supervisor stated that there were VC located there. A Company 2/28 Infantry patrol returned at 1720 hrs with 1 box of 7.9 MG ammunition, (approximately 250 rounds) and a pack containing a small quantity of medical supplies. B and C Troop 1/4 Cav continued to provide security for the NON QUAN airfield and conducted extensive care and maintenance of equipment.

On 26 June at 0005 hrs B Company 2/18 Infantry ambush patrol engaged an estimated company size VC force via XT703893. Contact was maintained for approximately 20 minutes until the VC fled to the east, southeast and south. A platoon from B Company 2/18 Infantry was dispatched immediately to reinforce the ambush patrol. While attempting to reach the patrol they encountered an unknown number of VC approximately 1000 meters west. Contact was maintained for 5 minutes. During this battle 3 VC were killed by body count. When the battlefield was policed the following items were found: 4 sets of web gear, 8 frag grenades, 5 Chiocam type grenades, 2 hammocks, 3 ponchos, 400 rds 7.62 ammunition, 4 AR 74 magazines with ammunition, 1 BAR magazine with ammunition, 1 Chiocam URM magazine with canvas bag, 2 empty Chiocam MG boxes, 1 first aid packet, 1 entrenching tool, and 200 feet of detonating cord. All items except the two weapons were destroyed. Friendly losses were 4 KIA and 5 MIA. At first light A Company 2/18 Infantry moved out in an attempt to catch the VC but had no contact. After completely policing the battlefield and surrounding areas a total of 5 VC KIA by count were found and it is estimated that there were another 21 VC KIA. A Company 2/18 Infantry closed QUAN LOI at 261250 June. The 2/18 Infantry, C Btry 1/7 Arty remained via QUAN LOI. The 2/28 Infantry continued to provide security for the BCo and the LOC NINH airstrip. At 261100 June 1 platoon from C Company 2/28 Infantry conducted a combat assault into an LZ via XT752072, with negative contact and S&D north to via XT770120. The platoon then moved southwest back to LOC NINH closing at 261450 June with negative contact. At 261500 June A Company 2/28 Inf was alerted for movement to SCNG RE.

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They began moving at 261700 June. They closed at 261915 June and were attached to 1/28 Infantry. 2/28 Inf remained via LOC NINH airfield. B Company 2/28 Inf remained via XU7504. At first light 1/4 Cav (-) moved to the east and south of QUAN LOI in conjunction with 2/28 Inf in an attempt to intercept the VC escaping from the 2/28 Inf. At 1345 hrs B Troop 1/4 Cav (-) and C Troop moved to the north to recon the route to the area around QUAN LOI as originally planned. 1 platoon from B and C Troop went north to the bridge via XT722972 in an attempt to find the crossing. ARVN forces moved south from LOC NINH with a bulldozer and began work on a ford on the south of the river. 1/4 Cav conducted MEDCAP activities in the village via XT7003 and XT7262. Elements of the 1/4 Cav closed HCN QUAN at 1823 hrs. 1/4 Cav (-) remained via HCN QUAN. 1 platoon of B and C Troop remained via bridge at XT722972. The 1/28 Infantry came under the OPCON of the 3d Bde upon closure of the 3d Bde TAC CP at SONG EE at 1850 hrs. The 3d Bde aviation section conducted starlight missions on route 13 from LAI KEE north to the Cambodian border from 2000 to 2130 hrs and detected no VC movement.

On 27 June the 2/18 Infantry plan was cancelled and the battalion conducted local patrolling via QUAN LOI airfield. The 1/28 Inf continued to provide security for the NUI BA RA airfield. At 1950 hrs an ambush patrol from A Company 1/28 Inf while leaving their RCN positions made contact with an estimated squad of VC via XU251093 resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 0355 hrs B Company 1/28 Inf destroyed 16 huts and shot 4 pigs via XU266096. At 0900 hrs B Company 1/28 Inf destroyed 3 river draft via XU310098. At 0935 hrs a fire team orbiting this area received SA fire from via XU254136. Fire was returned with unknown results. 1/28 Inf then began to SED to the west closing into RCN position at 1945 hrs. The 2/28 Inf began movement by air from LOC NINH to SONG EE. C Company 2/28 Inf along with elements of Headquarters 2/28 Inf remained via LOC NINH airstrip. 1/4 Cav upon cancellation of the originally scheduled operation for 27 June was released from CPOON 3d Bde at 1200 hrs. The 173d Avn Company moved 12 tons of rice captured by ARVN forces via XU9914 and distributed it to the local villagers. The 2/33 Artillery (-) moved from via LOC NINH airfield to via SONG EE.

On 28 June at 1540 hrs B Company 1/28 Infantry captured a British 9 mm stan submachinegun, 2 magazines of ammunition, a medical kit and medicine in a hut via XU237035. The 1/28 Inf continued to SED to the west of its RCN position reaching the SONG EE River via XU198090. An attempt was made to cross the river using ropes. The attempt was unsuccessful because the heavy rains caused the river to rise and the current to become very swift. The operation originally planned was then postponed and the 1/28 Inf moved north to the bridge via XU189110 where they crossed the river and were picked up by vehicle. The 1/28 Inf closed into NUI BA RA airfield at 281505 June 66. At 0900 hrs elements of the 2/28 Inf remaining at LOC NINH began movement of personnel and equipment to SONG EE by 0130. The last elements of 2/28 Inf closed into NUI BA RA airfield at 1730 hrs. At 0930 hrs A Company 2/28 Infantry conducted a combat assault in an LZ via XU185-095 to secure a base for C Btry 2/13 Arty. The planned operation was postponed and C Btry 2/13 Artillery did not move. A Company 2/28 Inf then conducted local patrolling via the LZ with negative contact. The 2/28 Infantry (-) remained via NUI BA RA airfield. G Company 2/28 Infantry remained via XU185035.

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On 29 June at 1051 hrs 1/23 Inf conducted a combat assault into LZ RED via YF197995. The 1/23 Inf had negative contact on landing and closed into the LZ by 1150 hrs. The 1/23 Inf then began S&D to the east with A Company on the north and B Company in the center and C Co on the south. At 1215 hrs C Co 1/23 Inf found an extensive tunnel network and 10 tons of rice stored in bins above the ground via 602971. All were well camouflaged. The rice was destroyed. At 1305 hrs C Co 1/23 Inf located a small VC base camp via YF199979. In the base camp was 200 lbs of rice, 2 bicycles, 4 bunkers, 1 tunnel 50 meters long and fresh foot prints leading to 7 bunkers. All were destroyed. At the same location C Co 1/23 Inf found a brief case of ammunition, documents and medical supplies which were evacuated. At 1630 hrs A Co 1/23 Inf made contact with 2 VC via KT203997. The VC were taken under fire with unknown results. At 1915 hrs 1/23 Inf closed into their RON position via YF204994 with no further contact. At 1010 hrs C Btry 2/13 Arty arrived in the area of A Company 2/28 Inf and A Co 2/28 Inf assumed responsibility for security of the Arty base. The 2/28 Inf (-) remained via NUI BA RA Airfield as Brigade reserve and security for the airfield. At 1500 hrs A Co 2/28 Inf had 3 MIA from a booby trapped grenade via YU200045. At 2050 hrs an A Co 2/28 Inf patrol made contact with about 20 VC via YU191041. A short fire fight developed. Gunships and artillery were called in on the VC with unknown results. The VC broke contact at 1910 hrs and fled to the north. The 2/28 Inf (-) remained via NUI BA RA Airfield. A Company 2/28 Inf and C Btry 2/13 Arty remained via KT203996. A Co 1/23 Inf picked up 1 VC who was evacuated for further investigation.

On 30 June at 1000 hrs 1/23 Inf conducted a combat assault from LZ RED into OBJ 1. Upon landing 1/23 Inf received scattered sniper fire. Patrols searched the area with negative contact. At 1020 hrs 1/23 Inf was ordered to QUAN LOI. 1/23 Inf (-) was on OBJ 1 and A Co 1/23 Inf was on LZ RED. Both elements were moved from their respective locations to NUI BA RA Airfield during at 1350 hrs. The last lift of C Co 1/23 Inf was lifted directly from OBJ 1 to QUAN LOI. 1/23 Inf (-) was then lifted from NUI BA RA Airfield to QUAN LOI. Upon closing QUAN LOI the 1/23 Inf came under attack of 1st Brigade. At 0900 hrs B Co 2/28 Inf conducted a combat assault via YU190134 and secured the area for arrival of B Btry 1/5 Arty by CH47. At 1500 hrs A Co 2/28 Inf patrol found several well camouflaged bunkers with overhead cover, several houses with underground tunnels and one bag of rice. All were destroyed. At 1510 hrs C Btry 2/13 Arty moved to NUI BA RA Airfield and at 1545 hrs A Co 2/28 Inf moved by foot from their RON position to NUI BA RA Airfield closing at 201745. 2/28 Inf (-) remained at NUI BA RA Airfield. B Co 2/28 Inf and B Btry remained via YU190134.

On 1 July 2/28 Inf (-) continued to provide security for the Brigade CP and NUI BA RA Airfield. Local patrolling was conducted with negative contact. 2/28 Inf remained via NUI BA RA Airfield and B Company 2/28 Inf and B Btry 1/5 Arty (-) remained via BASE 2.

On 2 July the 3d Brigade Task Force departed the SONG BE area and returned to the LOC NINH area and prepared for possible commitment in that area. 2/28 Inf moved from the NUI BA RA Airstrip to the LOC NINH Airstrip. The 1/16 Inf was alerted to be prepared to move from LAI KHE to the LOC NINH area. At 1135 hrs the Battalion was instructed to move load elements to the LAI KHE Airstrip. At 1215 hrs 1st lift departed LAI KHE. At 1735 hrs the 1st lift of the 1/16 Inf departed. The Brigade CP returned to LOC NINH.

On 3 July the 1/16 Inf remained on alert for possible commitment into LZ BLACK or to reinforce HAN QUAN or QUAN LOI. The 1/16 Inf continued to assist in the defense of the LOC MINH airfield. At 2030 hrs A Co 1/16 Inf began to S&D to the northeast via XU773111 and XU773140. At 0930 hrs the remaining elements of the 2/28 Inf closed LOC MINH area. At 0715 hrs C Co 2/28 Inf moved west from LOC MINH to via XU685066 in order to secure the area for C Btry 2/13 Arty. 2 platoons of B Co 2/28 Inf secured the road from LOC MINH to XU685066. At 1130 hrs C Btry 2/13 Arty moved by road to their location, closing at 1202 hrs. B 2/28 Inf (-) remained via LOC MINH Airfield. C Co 2/28 Inf and C Btry 2/13 Arty remained via XU685066.

On 4 July at 2030 hrs A Co 1/16 Inf began to move to the northeast from LOC MINH. At 0550 hrs A Co 1/16 Inf dropped off a platoon ambush via XU764092. A Co 1/16 Inf (-) continued to the north to via XU773140 arriving at 0600 hrs. A Co 2/16 Inf then returned to battalion area closing at 1320 hrs. At 1215 hrs B Co 1/16 Inf was placed on 30 minute alert for possible commitment to assist in protection of a downed CH47. B Co 1/16 Inf was taken off alert at 1315 hrs when A Co 2/28 Inf secured the downed CH47. The 1/16 Inf remained via LOC MINH Airfield. At 0735 hrs C Co 2/28 Inf moved to via XU589064 to secure a new area for C Btry 2/13 Arty. C Btry closed into the new area at 1302 hrs. At 0800 hrs A Co 2/28 Inf began to S&D to the northwest. At 1225 hrs A Co was ordered to move south to via XU697101 where the CH47 had gone down. A Co 2/28 Inf arrived at this location at 1315 hrs. A CIDG company arrived at about the same time and a perimeter was formed around the CH47 with A Co 2/28 Inf on the east and CIDG Co on the west. At 1715 hrs 2 men from B Co 2/28 Inf were injured by a short 81mm mortar round fired by C Co 2/28 Inf.

On 5 July the 1/16 Inf (-) continued to provide security for the LOC MINH Airfield. At 2015 hrs C Co 1/16 Inf began movement to a patrol base via XU 803057 where they closed at 0340 hrs. Upon closing C Co 1/16 Inf sent out 2 platoon size ambush patrols via XU614053 and XU812050. C Co 1/16 Inf continued patrolling via their patrol base until 1500 hrs when they moved to POSITION MIKE XU735040 to rest. At 2015 hrs they moved southwest to a patrol base via XU735097. At 0630 hrs one platoon of B Co 1/16 Inf conducted a combat assault into LZ BETTY (XU803123) they then moved southwest back to battalion base area closing at 1125 hrs with neg contact. At 0647 hrs one platoon of B Co 1/16 conducted a combat assault into LZ HARY (XU760334) and then moved back to battalion base closing at 1425 hrs with neg contact. The 1/16 Inf (-) remained via LOC MINH. A Co 2/28 Inf and one CIDG Co remained overnight via XU697055. C Co 2/28 Inf and one CIDG company continued to provide security for C Btry 2/13 Arty via XU689064. At 0600 hrs A Co 2/28 Inf began to S&D north to via XU700110 and then southwest to the battalion base area closing at 0915 hrs with negative contact. At 1318 hrs a platoon from B Co 2/28 Inf patrolled via XU715070 and returned at 1635 hrs with negative contact. The 2/28 Inf (-) remained via LOC MINH. C Co 2/28 Inf and C Btry 2/13 Arty remained via XU689064.

On 6 July at 2015 hours C Company 1/16 Infantry moved from POSITION MIKE (XU770040) to a patrol base via XT733994. At 0700 hours C Company 1/16 Infantry sent a platoon size patrol to recon Hwy 13 from XT720726 to XU723005. At 1035 hours

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Recon Platoon 1/16 Infantry was lifted into LZ YELLOW (XU725013) and moved south to black and recon the area around LZ YELLOW. The Recon Platoon 1/16 Inf then was ordered to move to the east of the stream via XU72013. C Company 1/16 Inf found 5 VC huts via XU725013 and 5 VC bodies via XU725013. It was believed that these bodies were from the battle of 20 June. The Recon Platoon also found the following equipment: 2 AT rockets, 5 Chieng Grenades, 5 Rifle grenades, 1 sixty mortar round, 23 rounds linked 30 cal ammunition, 30 rounds 30 cal M1 ammunition, 2 rounds Chieng 7.62 carbine ammunition, 1 gun cart and a T and B mechanism for 7.62 machinegun. C Company 1/16 Inf then moved to LZ YELLOW where they were extracted by UH1D at 061520 July 1966. The Recon platoon remained via LZ YELLOW and attempted to ambush any VC coming into the area. At 1600 hrs the recon platoon began to S&D south back to LOC MINH closing at 1745 hrs. At 1810 hrs one platoon of A Company 1/16 Inf conducted a combat assault into a LZ via XU330063 and began to S&D to the northeast. They were extracted from a PZ via XU319035 at 1910 hrs with negative contact. At 0655 hrs the recon platoon and the AT platoon 2/28 Inf began to S&D to the northwest via XU710125. There were approximately 100 emplacements and bunkers discovered via XU710119. 12 bunkers were destroyed. The recon platoon and AT platoon returned to LOC MINH closing at 1430 hrs with negative contact. B Company 2/28 Inf relieved C Company 2/28 Inf of the security mission around C Btry 2/13 Arty. The relief was complete at 0945 hrs and C Company 2/28 Inf moved to a patrol base via XU700109. A patrol was dispatched to the northwest and found a frequently used spring via XU712005. At 1330 hrs C 2/28 Inf found 3 huts and 3 observation post on hill 182 via XU693120. Arty was called into the area resulting in 4 secondary explosions. C Company 2/28 Inf departed the patrol base at 1515 hrs and closed back into the battalion base area at 1635 hrs. 2/28 Inf (-) continued to secure LOC MINH area. B Company 2/28 Inf remained with C Btry 2/13 Arty.

On 7 Jul at 2000 hrs B Company 1/16 Inf began to S&D east to via XU 773072, then north to XU775035, southwest to XU750020, and then northwest to the battalion base area closing at 1600 hrs with negative contact. At 0859 hrs the recon platoon 1/16 Inf conducted a combat assault into LZ MARY and S&D northwest to the battalion base area closing at 1330 hrs with negative contact. The 1/16 Inf remained via LOC MINH Airfield. At 0620 hrs A Company 2/28 Inf conducted a combat assault around the village via XU712152. A Company 2/28 Inf searched the village for VC and VCS and completed the search at 1040 hrs with negative results. At 1113 hrs a patrol from A Company 2/28 Inf made contact with 5 VC via XU707147. SA and arty fire was placed on the VC and it was estimated that 1 VC was killed and 1 wounded. The patrol pursued the VC but they fled. At 1430 hrs A Company 2/28 Inf found 3 huts and 2 foxholes via XU705146. VC propoganda was found in the huts and destroyed. A Company 2/28 Inf was extracted and closed the battalion base at 1610 hrs. B Company 2/28 Inf conducted extensive patrolling and continued to secure C Btry 2/13 Arty.

8 July 1/16 Inf commenced movement by CV2 air craft from LOC MINH to QUAN LOI. At 1430 hrs a UH1D began to shuttle the 1/16 Inf to QUAN LOI. The last element of 1/16 Inf departed LOC MINH at 1630 hrs and upon closure into QUAN LOI camp under CUSUM of the 1st Brigade. 2/28 Inf at 0730 began clearing the road from LOC MINH to XU691065 for movement of C Btry 2/13 Arty. By 0920 hrs B Company

2/28 Inf (-) had secured the western portion of the route and the recon platoon and AT platoon of 2/28 Inf had secured the eastern portion of the road. C 2/13 Arty then commenced their movement to LOC NINH clearing at 1310 hrs. B 2/28 Inf and the recon platoon along with the AT platoon closed LOC NINH at 1405 hrs with negative contact. The 2/28 Inf assumed responsibility for the sector vacated by 1/16 Inf. The 2/28 Inf remained vic LOC NINH.

On 9 July the 2/28 Inf continued to provide security for the LOC NINH Airfield and the Brigade CP. The 2/28 Inf dispatched 4 platoon size patrols. All patrols closed back into the battalion base area by 1320 hrs with negative contact. The 2/28 Inf and Brigade CP remained vic LOC NINH Airstrip.

At 0330 10 July 2/28 Inf (-) began to S&D to vic XU702100. A Company 2/28 Inf (-) returned to LOC NINH Airstrip at 0332 hrs with negative contact. At 0358 hrs one platoon from C Company 2/28 Inf S&D to vic XU765082. The Platoon returned to LOC NINH at 1135 hrs with negative contact. 2/28 Inf and Bde CP remained vic LOC NINH airfield.

On 11 July 1966 at 0755 hrs the recon platoon 2/28 Inf began S&D west to a patrol base vic XU692092 where they conducted extensive patrolling. The recon platoon returned at 1335 hours with negative contact. At 0800 hrs a platoon from B Company 2/28 Inf began to S&D southeast to vic XU765061. B Company 2/28 Inf closed back into LOC NINH at 1553 hrs with negative contact. At 0905 hrs one platoon from C Company 2/28 Inf began to S&D to vic XU765105 and returned to LOC NINH at 1300 hrs with negative contact. The 2/28 Inf remained vic LOC NINH Airstrip.

On 12 July 2/28 Inf continued to provide security for the Brigade CP and LOC NINH Airfield and conducted local security patrols. The 2/28 Infantry also conducted small unit training in hand and arm signals, immediate action drills and weapon zeroing. The battalion remained vic LOC NINH Airfield.

On 13 July at 0600 hrs B Company 2/28 Inf (-) S&D to vic XU692095. B Company 2/28 Inf destroyed one Chicom grenade, (booby trap) vic XU715104. B Company 2/28 Inf (-) returned to LOC NINH at 1512 hrs. The 2/28 Inf remained vic LOC NINH airstrip along with 3d Bde CP.

On 14 July the 2/28 Inf continued to provide security to the LOC NINH Airfield and conducted local security patrols around the LOC NINH area. A Company 2/28 Inf was on a one hr alert as RRF for the ARVN convoy between AN LOC and LOC NINH. The 3d Bde CP moved to LAI KHE at 141300 July. The Bde TAC CP remained vic LOC NINH Airfield. The 1/18 Infantry replaced the 2/28 and the 2d Brigade assumed responsibility for the LOC NINH area, thus ending Operation EL PASO II.

## 12. RESULTS

### c. Friendly Losses:

3 June	9 WIA, 2 KIA
4 June	10 WIA, 5 KIA
5 June	2 WIA

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8 June	16 KIA, 1 KIA
9 June	4 KIA
11 June	33 KIA, 33 KIA
12 June	1 KIA
14 June	1 KIA
15 June	1 KIA
18 June	5 KIA
24 June	2 KIA, 1 KIA
25 June	11 KIA
29 June	6 KIA
5 July	2 KIA
7 July	4 KIA, 2 KIA
9 July	41 KIA, 12 KIA
10 July	9 KIA, 3 KIA
13 July	3 KIA
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>165 KIA 59 KIA</b>

b. Enemy Losses:

5 June	1 KIA (DC), 17 VCS, 15 rounds 81mm mortar
6 June	1 VCS
8 June	105 KIA (DC), 100 KIA (Est), one 57 rr, 1 AK47
10 June	1 KIA (DC), 1 Chinese AKW rifle captured
11 June	108 KIA (DC), 1 VCS, 1 German 7.92 MG, 1 PRG-2, 1 Chinese carbine, 27 rounds 60mm mortar, 1 60 mortar
12 June	3 VCS
13 June	12 rounds 81mm mortar
14 June	1 VCS
17 June	2 VCS, 3 VCS, 1 US carbine, 1 rifle grenade launcher
18 June	250 lbs salt destroyed
20 June	34 VCS
22 June	4 PRG-2 rounds and 80 rounds 7.62 ammunition captured
24 June	1 VCS, 109 rounds 30 cal ammunition, 1 AT and 1 AP mine, miscellaneous equipment destroyed.
25 June	3 VCS, 3 rounds 60mm mortar
26 June	5 KIA (DC), 15 KIA (Est), 1 Russian carbine, 1 PRG-2 rocket launcher with 1 round, 400 rounds 7.62 ammunition
28 June	1 submachine gun
29 June	1 KIA (DC), 1 VCS, 1 M1 rifle, 10.5 tons rice, 2 bicycles
30 June	1 KIA (DC), 1 VCS
1 July	25 tons rice
2 July	1 VCS
4 July	2 KIA (DC), 1 (Est)
7 July	2 KIA (Est), 4 VCS
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>224 KIA (DC), 118 KIA (Est), 3 VCS, 52 VCS</b>

**13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:**

The logistical base for the 3d Brigade Task Force was located at the Brigade base camp in LAI KHE for the entire operation. The Brigade elements were resupplied daily by CV2 to the forward logistical base and from there to the forward bases by UH1D helicopter as required. Maintenance control teams were provided by the direct support unit, C Company 701st Maintenance Battalion. Equipment which could not be repaired or replaced on site was exchanged from the base camp. Medical service was provided by B Company 1st Medical Battalion. A&A surgery team attached, provided the medical facility with the capability of performing major surgery. Patients were evacuated as required. No major logistical problems were encountered.

**14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:**

a. The technique of cordon and search of a village was almost perfected in the operation by the 2/28 Infantry on 20 June. The essential points to be stressed are:

- (1) Cordoning the village without being detected.
- (2) Psy/Ops broadcasts to explain to the people what is happening and what they should do.
- (3) A ready airborne RRF to block escape of any personnel who slip the cordon.
- (4) A black list of known or suspected VC.
- (5) ARVN assistance and district assistance in searching and questioning.
- (6) A definite technique of questioning and identifying all personnel.
- (7) MECCA P and civic action activities.

b. The US Air Force MEDEVAC helicopters were used to evacuate wounded from dense rubber trees on 11 June 1966.

**15. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:**

Some lessons learned during Operation EL PASO II were:


- a. The VC attempted to fortify the high ground around LOC NINH in preparation for an attack on that town. Extensive patrolling not only detected these VC fortifications but decisively defeated a VC battalion and disrupted VC plans. The best defense is aggressive and continuous patrolling to insure the enemy cannot move in and build up for an attack.

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- b. Air traffic control was furnished by Pathfinders from the 1st Aviation Battalion. Recommend a Pathfinder team be attached to the 3d Brigade when it is necessary to support a fixed airfield. Minimum equipment necessary will include runway lights and radio communications with FM and UHF capabilities. Personnel should not be rotated throughout the operation without proper coordination with Brigade Headquarters.
- c. When Air Force aircraft are utilized to lift elements of this Brigade it is imperative that an air combat control team be established at both the point of embarkation and the point of deparcation. This is not only to have adequate control to prevent a serious accident but to be able to give instructions to the pilots as to make loading and unloading more efficient.
- d. The FAC's need a radio with the capability of covering the same frequency range as the ground troops. All command frequencies of units within the 3d Brigade except the Brigade Command Frequency are above 51.0 MC FM which puts them out of range of the present FAC radios. It is necessary for the FAC to be able to monitor the actions of the ground commanders in order to understand what is going on and enabling them to provide much better close air support with much greater assurances of troop safety.

  
SIDNEY M MARKS  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

Copies Furnished:

MACV J2  
MACT  
Commander 2d Air Division  
Commanding General 1st Inf Div

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ANNEX Q

AFTER ACTION REPORT DIVISION ARTILLERY

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HEADQUARTERS  
1st INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY  
APO US Forces 96345

23 September 1966

UNCLAS

TO: Command Operations After Action Report (LAW/RCS/J3/32)

FROM: Command Channels

TO: Commanding General  
1st Infantry Division  
ATTN: G3  
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) Operation EL PASO II/III - security, search and destroy.

2. (U) 2 June 1966 - 3 Sep 1966.

3. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Artillery Support

1st Inf Div Arty Col. Marlin W. Camp  
2/13 Arty (-) Lt. Col. Gerald E. Robinson  
DS 1st Bde (9 June-28 June) with  
C/2/33 Arty atchd (9 June-28 June)  
D/1/5 Arty atchd (13 June-27 June)  
B/8/6 Arty atchd (10 June-18 June) w/fires  
controlled by Div Arty

2/33 Arty (-) Lt. Col. Frank A. Sims (2  
June-15 July)  
DS 3d Bde (2 June-16 July) with Lt. Col. James K. Koenig  
C/2/13 Arty atchd (6 June-16 July) (15 July-16 July)  
C/1/7 Arty atchd (8 June-27 June)  
B/1/5 Arty atchd (27 June-16 July)

B/6 Arty (-) Lt. Col. John W. McGiffert  
DS (18 June-27 June)(6 July-17 July)  
DS 2/18 Inf (27 June-6 July) with  
C/1/7 Arty atchd (27 June-8 July) with  
B/1/5 Arty (-) (3-how) atchd (1 July-  
2 July)  
A/2/33 Arty atchd (30 June-4 July)  
1/LHAA (17 July-21 Aug)  
D/8/6 Arty atchd (27 June-3 Sep)  
B/8/6 Arty atchd (9 June-3 Sep)

1/5 Arty (-) Lt. Col. David C. Rogers  
DS 1st Bde (6 July-16 July) with  
A/1/5 Arty atchd (6 July-11 July)  
A/2/33 Arty atchd (6 July-11 July)  
C/1/7 Arty atchd (8 July-12 July)  
B/1/7 Arty atchd (13 July-16 July)

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1/7 Arty (-) Lt. Col. Carroll S. Neek  
 DS 2d Bde (17 July-16 Aug) with  
 B/1/7 Arty atchd (17 July-20 Aug)  
 A/1/5 Arty atchd (17 July-16 Aug)  
 B/2/33 Arty atchd (17 July-1 Aug)

b. Deployment: Artillery support was provided by assigning 105mm Bns in direct support of the Brigades. These artillery battalions varied in size from two to four batteries. For certain special operations a Battalion (-) or one battery was attached to a single infantry battalion. The deployment and fires of the direct support artillery units were controlled by the supported unit (for details see appropriate Brigade reports). General support and reinforcing artillery was provided by 155mm and 8 inch howitzers from the 8/6 Arty. The GS and GSA artillery batteries were positioned at various times in the AN LOC - QUAN LOI - CHON THANH base camp areas, or, for special one or two day operations, moved to forward field positions to provide support; such as from 7-11 July when the 8/6 Arty was located at "artillery position 1" and fired in support of 1st Bde convoy ambushed on 9 July. The GS artillery fires were controlled by the forward element of Division Artillery. For some special operations the 8/6 Arty was assigned a direct support mission.

c. Fire Support Coordination: Boundaries between AO's were established as fire coordination lines. The Div Arty Fire Support Element moved forward and was co-located with the Division TOC.

d. Army Aviation Support: Division Artillery Aviation Section, augmented with one C-1F aircraft from the 74th Aviation Company, provided aerial observation over convoys and Brigade areas of operation during daylight hours. Radio relay, artillery adjustment, recon and command liaison were performed as required. The aircraft were maintained and operated from Division Artillery field locations. Aircraft requiring major repair or intermediate maintenance and inspection were replaced with aircraft available at the RVN LOI base camp. Total hours flown on operation EL PASO II/III are as follows:

OH-13's	1008 hrs
C-1F	151 hrs
Total	1159 hrs

e. Artillery Warning to Aircraft: Artillery/mortar advisory was provided by each Brigade in their respective areas of operation. Each direct support battalion provided information to the Brigade advisory center. Advisory information for the QUAN LOI and AN LOC area was provided by the air traffic controllers from the 1st Avn Bn. This headquarters controlled all artillery in the QUAN LOI/AN LOC area and forwarded the advisory information to the air traffic controller. The system was considered to be adequate.

f. Artillery LNO's and FO's: Direct support artillery battalions provided LNO's and FO's to the supported unit. 8/6th Arty and Div Arty provided LNO's to ARVN.

g. Div Arty Base Organization and Security: CO HEB Div Arty was responsible for organization of the Div Arty base and coordination of security with the 2d Bn, 10th Infantry while in the forward base areas.

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h. Metro: Electronic net messages were received from the Div Arty net section at PHU LOI (until it became inoperable) and from PHUOC 11.4 and O' CHI. A visual flight team was available in the QUAN LOI area. This team corrected the electronic net messages with actual wind data at PHU LOI. This correction was not always accomplished due to the weather conditions on visual net observations. However, in most cases, the electronic net proved very satisfactory.

i. Control and Clearances of Fires: Div Arty and each direct support Bn cleared fires with the ARVN headquarters nearest their locations for their responsible units. Bde and Bn AO's were cleared as free fire areas prior to conduct of an operation.

j. Artillery Preparation Fires on LZ's: Preparations were planned and executed by direct support battalions and reinforced on-call by general support artillery. Units conducted registrations or fired check rounds in the vicinity of LZ's prior to firing preparations.

4. (U) EXECUTION: For narrative summary of operations see appropriate Brigade reports.

5. (U) Breakout of ammunition expenditures and artillery missions are included in Brigade reports. The 8/6 Arty while in a CS role fired 14,250 rounds HE, 344 rounds P and 284 rounds Illum of 155mm and 9,449 rounds of 8 inch during 4,282 missions. (87 registrations, 3,080 H&I, 371 anti-personnel, 270 anti-equipment and 474 others).

6. (C) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Participating Strength:

	<u>Start of Operation</u>	<u>End of Operation</u>	<u>Casualties</u>
Div Arty (-)	60	100	1 WIA
8/6th Arty (-)	299	264	0
2/33d Arty (-)	249	249	0
2/13th Arty (-)	318	316	2 WIA
1/5th Arty (-)	289	278	0
1/7th Arty (-)	220	214	0

b. Awards and Decorations: Div Arty personnel received 177 awards and decorations for actions during EL PASO II/III.

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE/CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Intelligence and Civil Affairs: 1st Infantry Division G2 and Brigade S2's provided the intelligence support before and during the operation. A great deal of low level intelligence information was received from the Special Forces camps at AN LOC, LOC NIMI and SONG BE and also some ARVN authorities at sector and village level.

b. Surveillance: Electronic surveillance equipment was not employed by Div Arty. Red Haze and SLAR flights provided targets which were fired on by artillery. Surveillance of target areas and suspect locations was accomplished by aerial observers during times of good visibility.

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8. (C) LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY:

a. General: Logistical support of the artillery elements during the operation (particularly during EL PASO II) was complicated by frequent cross attachment of batteries, both divisional and non-divisional, from their parent battalion to other battalions and by attachment to infantry elements. The frequent movement and change in assignment resulted in delays and misrouting of some supplies. This adverse condition was partially compensated for by having all artillery trains elements operate from LAI KHE and coordinate closely and directly on logistical support. The Div Arty S4 section acted as a clearing house and radio relay station in an effort to keep parts and supplies moving to the proper battery.

b. Ammunition was supplied by a combination of means. The basic requirement was fulfilled by Air Force C-123 or C-130 lift from BIEW HOA to the airstrip closest to each battery position. The ammunition was then shuttled to the battery by vehicle or helicopter. This system was supplemented by a large initial overland movement of ammunition from LONG BINH to CHON THANH when the GS battalion was committed. On two occasions ammunition was lifted from base stocks at LAI KHE directly to battery positions. This base stock was subsequently replaced by Air Force lift from BIEW HOA. Movement of ammunitions to and from the LZ's by helicopter became more effective and less time consuming as K 22 containers and slings became available. At the close of EL PASO II, the Div Arty S-4 could move 1000 rounds of prepackaged ammunition to any position within one hour.

c. Other supplies: The operation of a single logistical base and the responsiveness of the S&T element there resulted in excellent support of the forward elements. The only problem concerning these supplies was caused by the frequent movement and cross attachment as discussed above.

d. Maintenance: Company C, 701st Maintenance Battalion provided outstanding direct support maintenance and back-up organizational maintenance for the forward elements.

e. Medical: Medical support of artillery units was provided by organic medical sections. Medical evacuation was to the nearest clearing location or to a specific medical facility in special cases. Non-emergency cases were evacuated routinely by resupply aircraft.

f. Transportation: Sufficient ground transportation means were introduced into the operational area to satisfy artillery requirements and, to a large extent, fulfill the short haul requirements of various infantry and support elements. Aerial resupply worked well despite bad weather and soft airstrips.

g. Summary: Logistical support of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery in this rapidly moving operation was adequate.

9. (C) COMMUNICATIONS: The RC-292 antenna was elevated an additional 24 feet by using a mast kit (AB 235/C) and stakes (GP-2). This helped overcome the effect of heavy vegetation and dampness and provided a good readable signal to about 50 miles. A system of mounting radios in the CP tent without the use of remotes was employed and proved very effective.

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10. (C) MEDICAL:

a. Outpatients: During the operation of the Div Arty medical aid section in the forward area from 9 June to 26 July a total of 202 patients were treated as follows:

(1) URI	57
(2) Skin disease	34
(3) Gastro intestinal	14
(4) VD	5
(5) Possible malaria	1
(6) Insect bite	3
(7) Injuries	61
(8) Other	20
(9) Vietnamese Nationals	7

Of the injuries, there were only five that were injured from hostile actions.

b. Field Sanitation: Sanitation and mess facilities were generally adequate but required constant attention.

11. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusion: Artillery adequately and continuously supported the operation.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Combined artillery-air operations can be conducted simultaneously in the same area. Detailed pre-planning to include the establishment of safe air corridors allowed the continuation of artillery preparations during airmobile operations. The establishment of fire coordination lines with artillery employed on one side and air on the other enhanced this continuous fire support capability.

(2) Infantry and armored cavalry platoon sergeants and platoon leaders must be thoroughly trained in artillery adjustment and observer procedure. This is essential so that they can call for artillery fires when their assigned artillery forward observer is wounded or out of action.

(3) Use of airborne artillery observers proved effective. They were able to rapidly report ground activity not detectable by personnel on the ground and provided accurate and timely observed artillery support to the ground gaining arms.

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(4) Habitual association of units should be maintained in the interest of unity of effort and timely response to orders. Only in cases of tactical necessity should batteries be attached to other than their parent unit.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Thomas M. Bowes  
/t/THOMAS M. BOWES  
Major, Artillery  
Adjutant

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*William L. Ponder Jr.*  
WILLIAM L. PONDER JR.  
Major, Artillery

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