

CHAMPION, JAMES (1742): TEAM CAME UNDER FIRE AFTER BEING INSERTED INTO A HOT LANDING ZONE. UNDER SIEGE BY ENEMY FORCES, CHAMPION WAS LAST SEEN ON THE SECOND DAY WHEN HE MOVED FROM THE AREA TO SEEK WATER. ANOTHER AMERICAN CAPTURED DURING THIS INCIDENT REPORTED UPON HIS RELEASE THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF CHAMPION. CONSISTENT WITH THE MIA STATUS ASSIGNED, THERE IS NO FIRM INDICATION AS TO WHETHER CHAMPION SURVIVED THIS INCIDENT.

CHESTNUT, JOSEPH (1666): WHILE ON ORIENTATION MISSION, AIRCRAFT CRASHED FROM UNKNOWN CAUSES ON THE CREST OF A HILL. GROUND PARTY REACHED THE SITE THREE DAYS LATER, FOUND AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE, BUT NO SIGN OF PILOT. SEARCH PARTY NOTED THAT SEVERAL PIECES OF WRECKAGE WERE BOOBY-TRAPPED. WHILE SOME INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WOULD INDICATE THAT THE SRV SHOULD HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS CASE, THERE IS NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF CAPTURE, OR OF ANY SIGHTING OF CHESTNUT AFTER THE WAR.

CLARKE, FRED (1340): INCIDENT INVOLVED A MID-AIR COLLISION OF TWO AIRCRAFT. THE PILOT OF THE C123 WAS RESCUED SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT. HE REPORTED THAT DURING HIS DESCENT, HE SAW ANOTHER PARACHUTE BELOW HIM BUT HE DID NOT KNOW FROM WHICH AIRCRAFT THE CHUTE MAY HAVE COME. AIR AND GROUND SAR EFFORTS FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF SURVIVORS.

COADY, ROBERT (1363): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. RETURNEE DEBRIEF MENTIONED A "BILL COTE" OR "BILL CODY" MERELY AS A NAME ON A LIST. NO FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF COADY IN THE PRISON SYSTEM. NO OTHER RETURNEE MENTIONED COADY. CRASH SITE ASSOCIATED WITH COADY INVESTIGATED BY JTF-FA, NO EVIDENCE THAT PILOT EXITED AIRCRAFT PRIOR TO CRASH.

COLLAMORE, ALLAN (0590): NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE COLLAMORE SURVIVED INCIDENT. RETURNEE REPORTED RECEIVING COLLAMORE'S NAME VIA TAP CODE IN HOA LO PRISON. NO OTHER RETURNEE REPORTED COLLAMORE AS BEING IN THE PRISON SYSTEM. IT TAKES TWO TO TAP.

COOK, DWIGHT (1926): THERE IS NO SIGINT INTERCEPT THAT CORRELATES TO THIS INCIDENT THAT INDICATES CAPTURE. HIT BY AAA AND CRASHED; NO BEEPER; NO PARACHUTE.

CORNWELL, LEROY (1771): NO REPORT OF CORNWELL BY ANY RETURNEE. SAR TEAM LOCATED WRECKAGE AND STATED THE AIRCRAFT BROKE UP UPON IMPACT WITH THE GROUND. NO EVIDENCE THE CREW COULD HAVE SURVIVED.

CRAMER, DONALD (1689): RETURNEE MEMORIZED THE CRAMER NAME BASED ON NOTE PASSED TO HIM BY ANOTHER POW IN FEB 72. HE WAS SURE THE SPELLING HE RECEIVED BEGAN WITH "C" NOT WITH "K." ANOTHER POW REPORTED THE NAME "CRAMER" AS PART OF A MEMORY BANK. NO OTHER RETURNEES REPORT ON CRAMER. CRAMER'S CREWMEMBER'S BODY WASHED ASHORE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INDICATING THE AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED AT SEA. WHILE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRAMER'S LOSS ARE NOT ABSOLUTE, THERE IS NO SOUND ANALYTICAL REASON TO BELIEVE HE SURVIVED. EVEN THOUGH THE RETURNEE WAS CERTAIN THE SPELLING OF "CRAMER" HE RECEIVED BEGAN WITH "C," THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THE NOTE WAS ACCURATELY RENDERED. GALAND KRAMER, A RETURNEE, WAS HELD IN THE NORTH VIETNAM PRISON SYSTEM.

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CRESSMAN, PETER (1983): THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ANALYZED BY THE SAR TEAM AT THE CRASHSITE INDICATES THAT THE AIRCRAFT SUFFERED A MASSIVE AND SUDDEN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE IN FLIGHT, CRASHED TO THE GROUND IMMEDIATELY, BOUNCED ONCE AND LANDED UPSIDE DOWN. THE SAR TEAM ALSO WITNESSED AT LEAST 3 BODIES AT THE SITE. A RECENT VISIT TO THE SITE INDICATES THAT THE FATE OF ADDITIONAL CREWMEN MAY SOON BE DETERMINED. GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE INDICATIONS OF CREW SURVIVAL, AND THE PHYSICAL DATA COLLECTED AT THE CRASH SITE, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE CREW SURVIVED THE LOSS INCIDENT. RADIO INTERCEPTS, MISTAKENLY THOUGHT BY SOME TO REFER TO THE BARON 52 INCIDENT, DO NOT PERTAIN.

CROCKETT, WILLIAM (1913): INFORMATION IN THE INTERCEPTED MESSAGE INDICATES THE CREW DIED IN THIS INCIDENT. AIRCRAFT LOST WING, HIT GROUND, SKIPPED INTO RIVER, NO PARACHUTES, NO BEEPERS.

CUSHMAN, CLIFTON (0471): ONE RETURNEE REPORTS HEARSAY THAT CUSHMAN'S NAME SEEN ON LIST OF POWS EITHER SEEN, TALKED TO, OR LIVED WITH. ANOTHER RETURNEE IDENTIFIED AS HAVING INFORMATION ON CUSHMAN REPORTS NO KNOWLEDGE OF HIM. JOINT INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT INDICATES CUSHMAN WAS KILLED IN CRASH OF AIRCRAFT.

DAVIES, JOSEPH (1182): MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD ENTRY LISTS DAVIES AND HIS CREWMEMBER AS DEAD. NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION, OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA OBSERVED GROUND EXPLOSION.

DAVIDSON, DAVID (1663): THIS SIGINT DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. TWO AMERICANS WERE ON A JOINT VIETNAMESE-AMERICAN RECONNAISSANCE PATROL IN LAOS. ONE AMERICAN RADIOED TO U.S. AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR THAT THE OTHER AMERICAN HAD BEEN HIT AND HAD FALLEN OFF A CLIFF. HE THEN REPORTED "I'VE BEEN HIT AND IN THE WORST WAY." THERE WERE SEVERAL GROANS AND THEN THE RADIO WENT DEAD. TWO INDIGENOUS TEAM MEMBERS WHO EVADED CAPTURE CONFIRMED BOTH MEMBERS HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY, PERHAPS MORTALLY, WOUNDED.

DAVIS, EDGAR (1279): THE AIRCRAFT WAS STRUCK BY ENEMY GROUND FIRE AND BEGAN BREAKING UP MIDAIR. THE PILOT INITIATED EJECTION AND WAS RESCUED A SHORT TIME LATER. HE DID NOT KNOW IF DAVIS, THE NAVIGATOR, SURVIVED THE EJECTION. A BEEPER WAS BRIEFLY HEARD BY SAR FORCES, HOWEVER, NEITHER DAVIS NOR THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE WAS LOCATED. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT DAVIS SURVIVED THE CRASH.

DICKSON, EDWARD (0053): WARTIME PHOTO RECEIVED SHOWING DICKSON'S DEAD BODY BEING PULLED FROM THE SEA.

DINAN, DAVID (1408): SAR TEAM LOCATED DINAN'S DEAD BODY HANGING IN THE TREES; UNABLE TO RECOVER DUE TO APPROACHING ENEMY.

DONAHUE, MORGAN (1340): NO EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE DONAHUE SURVIVED MIDAIR COLLISION. ALL SIGHTING REPORTS PURPORTED TO BE DONAHUE HAVE BEEN IN RESPONSE TO FLYERS AND REWARD OFFERS POSTED BY THE FAMILY. NO REPORTS CONTAINED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION SUBJECT TO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION.

DOOLEY, JAMES (0872): RETURNEE MENTIONED AS HAVING FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE SAYS HE DOES NOT. DOOLEY CRASHED IN COASTAL WATERS OFF NORTH VIETNAM. IMPROBABLE HE SURVIVED INCIDENT.

EDWARDS, HARRY (0500): EDWARDS NO SHOW IN PRISON SYSTEM. ALL EVIDENCE INDICATES EDWARDS DIED IN INCIDENT.

ELLISON, JOHN (0629): DIA BELIEVES RETURNEE SAW PHOTO OF "HANOI PARADE" IN WHICH HE CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN ELLISON. ALL INDIVIDUALS FROM HANOI PARADE ARE ACCOUNTED FOR. CHINESE GOVERNMENT QUESTIONED BUT PROVIDED NO ANSWER.

FOULKS, RALPH (0968): RETURNEE REPORTED HEARSAY NAME "FOX." VIETNAMESE REPATRIATED REMAINS ASSOCIATED WITH FOULKS. THE REMAINS INDICATE HIGH IMPACT CRASH. QUANTITY INSUFFICIENT TO CORRELATE TO FOULKS. ANALYSIS CONTINUING.

FRYAR, BRUCE (1542): PARARESCUEMAN REPORTED SEEING FRYAR'S DEAD BODY HANGING LIMPLY IN A PARACHUTE IN THE TREES. APPROACHING ENEMIES MADE RETRIEVAL OF REMAINS IMPOSSIBLE.

GASSMAN, FRED (1663): THIS SIGINT DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. TWO AMERICANS WERE ON A JOINT VIETNAMESE-AMERICAN RECONNAISSANCE PATROL IN LAOS. ONE AMERICAN RADIOED TO U.S. AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR THAT THE OTHER AMERICAN HAD BEEN HIT AND HAD FALLEN OFF A CLIFF. HE THEN REPORTED "I'VE BEEN HIT AND IN THE WORST WAY." THERE WERE SEVERAL GROANS AND THEN THE RADIO WENT DEAD. TWO INDIGENOUS TEAM MEMBERS WHO EVADED CAPTURE CONFIRMED BOTH MEMBERS HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY, PERHAPS MORTALLY, WOUNDED.

GERSTEL, DONALD (1920): AIRCRAFT HIT BY LIGHTNING OVERWATER. NO VISUAL, RADIO, OR RADAR CONTACT EVER MADE WITH AIRCRAFT. SIGINT CORRELATED TO THIS INCIDENT IDENTIFIES THE UNIT THAT MAY HAVE SHOT DOWN GERSTEL. IT DOES NOT INDICATE THE STATUS OF THE CREW.

GLASSON, WILLIAM (0299): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. POW RETURNEE PHILLIP SMITH CLAIMED TO HAVE HEARD ON PEKING RADIO, AND READ IN A PEKING BULLETIN, THAT AN A-3B HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BETWEEN HAINAN AND CHINA. THE CREW WAS REPORTEDLY CAPTURED. UPON SMITH'S RELEASE, HE QUESTIONED HIS CAPTORS ABOUT THE REPORT, THEY DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE INCIDENT. SMITH HAD NO FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF ANY CREWMEMBER. GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. HOWEVER, THE SOURCE DID NOT MENTION FATE OF CREW. THREE CREWMEMBERS ARE MISSING AND ONE CREWMEMBER'S REMAINS WERE RETURNED BY CHINA.

GOULD, FRANK (1959): GOULD'S NAME WAS NOT REPORTED ON ANY LIST BY A RETURNEE. THE RETURNEE WHO MENTIONED GOULD'S NAME WAS INFORMED OF GOULD'S STATUS PRIOR TO BEING SHOT DOWN HIMSELF. HE DID NOT HEAR ABOUT GOULD IN THE PRISON SYSTEM.

GRACE, JAMES (1455): DURING SAR EFFORTS, GRACE FELL OFF A JUNGLE PENETRATOR FROM A HEIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY 300 FEET INTO TRIPLE CANOPY JUNGLE. NO FURTHER CONTACT WAS MADE WITH HIM. THE PHOTO, #77, CLAIMED TO BE GRACE BY HIS WIFE, WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED IN THE SUMMER 1990 AS BEING RETURNEE MARKHAM GARTLEY.

GREEN, FRANK (1895): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. INTERCEPT IS OF SHOOT DOWN; NO CHUTE OR CAPTURE CITED. DIA DIAGREES WITH CORRELATION TO THIS INCIDENT; INTERCEPT CORRELATES TO INCIDENT 1897. DURING THE MISSION, GREEN'S WINGMAN REPORTED OBSERVING THE LEAD AIRCRAFT CRASH AND AN ENSUING LARGE FIREBALL; NO BEEPER, NO PARACHUTE SEEN.

HARRIS, JEFFREY (1848): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY A MIG-19 AND CREW DID NOT RESPOND TO RADIO CALLS. NO PARACHUTES SEEN OR BEEPERS HEARD. INTERCEPT CITED LIKELY CORRELATES TO DIFFERENT AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN ON THE SAME DAY; CREWMEMBER FROM THIS INCIDENT RETURNED IN 1973.

HARRIS, REUBEN (0299): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. POW RETURNEE PHILLIP SMITH CLAIMED TO HAVE HEARD ON PEKING RADIO, AND READ IN A PEKING BULLETIN, THAT AN A-3B HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BETWEEN HAINAN AND CHINA. THE CREW WAS REPORTEDLY CAPTURED. UPON SMITH'S RELEASE, HE QUESTIONED HIS CAPTORS ABOUT THE REPORT, THEY DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE INCIDENT. SMITH HAD NO FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF ANY CREWMEMBER. GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. HOWEVER, THE SOURCE DID NOT MENTION FATE OF CREW. THREE CREWMEMBERS ARE MISSING AND ONE CREWMEMBER'S REMAINS WERE RETURNED BY CHINA.

HARRISON, DONALD (1314): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. POW RETURNEE WESLEY RUMBLE BELIEVED HARRISON NFI WAS IDENTIFIED TO HIM IN LATE 1967. INCIDENT DATE FOR HARRISON, DONALD L. IS 681029.

HELWIG, ROGER (1488): WITNESSES SAW AIRCRAFT HIT THE GROUND WITH THE CANOPY IN PLACE; NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD OR PARACHUTES DEPLOYED. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE KILLED-IN-ACTION/BODY NOT RECOVERED STATUS ASSIGNED TO THIS CREWMAN. DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO SUPPORT CREW ALIVE ON GROUND.

HENTZ, RICHARD (1715): INTERCEPTS OF VIETNAMESE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS INDICATE ALL CREWMEMBERS IN THIS INCIDENT WERE KILLED. FIVE CREWMEMBERS ON NIGHTTIME MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED EXPLOSION IN MIDAIR. NO SIGN OF CRASHSITE OR CREW EVER DISCOVERED. TOW OF THREE MESSAGES INDICATE ALL CREWMEMBERS KILLED. THIRD MESSAGE DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD INDICATES ALL FIVE CREWMEMBERS KILLED.

HEROLD, RICHARD (1917): BEFORE THE OIF IN THIS INCIDENT CRASHED OVER LAOS, ONE PARACHUTE WAS SEEN DEPLOYED BUT NO ELECTRONIC BEACON SIGNALS WERE HEARD. THE CRASH SITE WAS FOUND BUT THERE WERE NO TRACES OF CAPT. HEROLD. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL.

HESS, FREDERICK (1418): OTHER CREWMEMBER OF F4D SAW HESS EJECT BUT DID NOT SEE ANOTHER PARACHUTE DEPLOY. HE WAS UNABLE TO MAKE ANY CONTACT WITH HESS BEFORE HE WAS RECOVERED. SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS HAD TO BE SUPENDED BECAUSE OF HOSTILE ACTIVITY IN AREA.

HICKS, TERRIN (1248): COPILOT SHANAHAN SAW HICKS' PARACHUTE COLLAPSE AFTER EJECTION BUT HE COULD NOT GET TO HIM OF HEAVY GROUND FIRE. MR4 HAS RECORD OF SHOOTDOWN AND BURIAL OF HICKS' REMAINS.

HOLLEY, TILDEN (0998): DURING A NIGHT MISSION, HOLLEY WAS FLYING LEAD DROPPING FLARES OVER TARGET. HIS WINGMAN SAW HIM DROP BACK TO CHECK THE FLARES, SAW A "STREAK OF ORANGE GLOW" AND HEARD A WEAK ELECTRONIC SIGNAL. WEATHER AND TIME OF DAY PROHIBITED AN EXTENSIVE SEARCH. TWO RETURNEES REPORTED HEARING HOLLEY'S NAME IN PW SYSTEM BUT THERE WAS NO FIRSTHAND CONTACT.

HOLMES, FREDERICK (1793): HOLMES AND HIS CO-PILOT WERE HIT BY ENEMY FIRE OVER COASTAL NVN WATERS. BOTH MEN WERE SEEN BY SAR HELICOPTER IN THEIR PARACHUTES. THE CO-PILOT WAS RESCUED. HOLMES' LIFE RAFT WAS LATER FOUND ATTACHED TO THE EJECTION SEAT BUT HIS PARACHUTE WAS MISSING. NO EVIDENCE OF HOLMES WAS SEEN. NO OTHER RETURNEES REPORTED HOLMES' NAME IN THE PRISON COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.

HUBERTH, ERIC (1619): WINGMAN SAW THE PLANE CRASH ON BOMBING MISSION AND WITNESSED SECONDARY EXPLOSION. SAR TEAMS ON GROUND SAW WRECKAGE SPREAD OUT OVER 700 METERS. BASED ON REPORTS OF WINGMAN, AND THE SAR TEAM, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT PERSONNEL SURVIVED THIS INCIDENT.

JACKSON, PAUL (1967): GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE THAT ONE PILOT WAS CAPTURED. INCIDENT 1967 WAS NOT SHOT DOWN. AN O-1A, REFNO 1967, WAS INVOLVED IN A MID-AIR COLLISION WITH AN A-7, REFNO 1968. THE PILOT OF THE A-7 SURVIVED AND WAS CAPTURED. DIA ESTIMATES THAT THE RELIABLE SOURCE IS REFERRING TO ASSOCIATED REFNO 1968, A RETURNEE.

JEWELL, EUGENE (0135): THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO SUPPORT CREW SURVIVAL OF THIS INCIDENT. JEWELL WAS ABOARD AN F4C ON A STRIKE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM ON 4 SEPTEMBER 1965. WINGMEN SAW THE AIRCRAFT TAKING GROUND FIRE AND THEN EXPLODE ON IMPACT WITH THE GROUND. NO PARACHUTES WERE SIGHTED. THE JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATION OF THIS AIRCRAFT CRASH SITE HAS UNCOVERED REMAINS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY IN THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS. AS THE DEBRIEFS CONTAIN ONLY HEARSAY ABOUT INDIVIDUAL, THEY ARE NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A SUPPOSITION OF SURVIVAL.

JOHNSTON, STEVEN (1977): AFTER EJECTING FROM THEIR F4D, PILOT SAID HE SAW JOHNSTON PINNED UNDER A TREE LIMB; HIS NECK WAS BROKEN, HE WAS BLEEDING PROFUSELY AND HE WAS UNCONSCIOUS. PILOT COULD NOT FEEL ANY PULSE AFTER 15 MINUTES. HE HAD TO LEAVE THE AREA SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO AVOID CAPTURE. LOCAL WITNESSES LATER SAID THEY BURIED A PILOT THEY FOUND IN THE AREA.

JONES, BOBBY (1949): PASSENGER IN F4D SHOT DOWN. NAME MENTIONED BY SOME RETURNEES INCLUDING SOME FIRSTHAND SIGHTINGS. PROBABLY CORRESPOND TO ANOTHER RETURNEE SHOT DOWN IN AN F4 NAMED ROBERT JONES.

JORDAN, LARRY (0299): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. POW RETURNEE PHILLIP SMITH CLAIMED TO HAVE HEARD ON PEKING RADIO, AND READ IN A PEKING BULLETIN, THAT AN A-3B HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BETWEEN HAINAN AND CHINA. THE CREW WAS REPORTEDLY CAPTURED. UPON SMITH'S RELEASE, HE QUESTIONED HIS CAPTORS ABOUT THE REPORT, THEY DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE INCIDENT. SMITH HAD NO FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF ANY CREWMEMBER. GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN. HOWEVER, THE SOURCE DID NOT MENTION FATE OF CREW. THREE CREWMEMBERS ARE MISSING AND ONE CREWMEMBER'S REMAINS WERE RETURNED BY CHINA.

KENNEDY, JOHN (1768): THE INTERCEPT MESSAGE CITED DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. KENNEDY DISAPPEARED WHILE ON A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER SOUTH VIETNAM. SAR EFFORTS WERE INITIATED BUT NO TRACE OF KENNEDY WAS LOCATED; NO BEEPERS, NO PARACHUTE.

KETCHIE, SCOTT (1824): THE SIGINT MESSAGE CONFIRMS SHOOTDOWN BUT PROVIDED NO INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE CREW. A6A ON STRIKE MISSION OVER LAOS. AIRCRAFT HIT BY AAA. OTHER CREWMEMBER, WHO WAS RESCUED, SAID HE COULD NOT VERIFY KETCHIE HAD EJECTED AND NEVER SAW HIM OR CAME IN CONTACT WITH HIM AFTER HIS OWN EJECTION. NO INDICATION OF SURVIVAL.

KIER, LARRY (1613): THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT KIER SURVIVED HIS LOSS INCIDENT. PFC KIER WAS LOST IN A GROUND INCIDENT WHEN HIS POSITION LOCATED NEAR AN AMMO DUMP WAS HIT WITH AN RPG; THE RESULTING EXPLOSION TRIGGERED A SECOND EXPLOSION AND A SUBSEQUENT FIRE. A TWO DAY SEARCH OF THE AREA DID NOT PRODUCE ANY TRACE OF KIER.

KNUTSON, RICHARD (1978): KNUTSON WAS PART OF THE CREW OF A UH1H THAT WAS HIT BY AAA AND 2 SA-7S. THE HELICOPTER BROKE INTO TWO PIECES. BECAUSE OF HOSTILE GROUND FIRE AN AERIAL SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. THERE WERE TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS NAMED KNUTSEN/KNUTSON LISTED AS MISSING; ONE WAS DECLARED DEAD, BODY NOT RECOVERED AND ONE WAS A RETURNEE.

KRYSZAK, THEODORE (0354): THE CREW WAS GIVEN ORDERS TO BAIL OUT OF THE BURNING AIRCRAFT, BUT NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN BY OBSERVERS. NO INTELLIGENCE HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO CLARIFY THE FATE OF THE MEN IN THIS CRASH OR TO SUGGEST ANY WERE EVER CAPTURED. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO INDICATE SURVIVAL.

KUBLEY, ROY (0587): OBSERVERS OF THIS HELICOPTER INCIDENT INDICATED THAT NO ONE COULD HAVE SURVIVED. NO EVIDENCE, THEN OR SINCE, HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO CONTRADICT THE FINDING THAT ALL CREWMEN WERE KIA/BNR.

LAWRENCE, BRUCE (1222): LAWRENCE'S WINGMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SQUADRON SAW HIS AIRCRAFT TAKE A DIRECT HIT WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSION. THE WINGMAN THEN ALL HE SAW WAS A FIREBALL. NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD AND NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN. ANOTHER F4 WAS SHOT DOWN THE SAME DAY IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA AND THE PILOTS WERE CAPTURED WHICH MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE APPARENT DISCREPANCY IN THE REPORTS.

LEESER, LEONARD (1552): THE RESCUE HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN BY A MIG WHILE IN A HOLDING PATTERN AWAITING CLEARANCE TO INITIATE THE RESCUE. THE HELO EXPLODED IN THE AIR BEFORE PLUMMETING TO THE GROUND. NO CHUTES WERE SEEN, BUT A BEEPER SIGNAL WAS HEARD FOR ABOUT TWO SECONDS. ALL SIX PERSONS ABOARD ARE POOR CANDIDATES FOR SURVIVAL.

LEMON, JEFFREY (1743): PILOTS ON THE SAME MISSION SAW LEMON'S F4 CRASH AND BURN. THE INTERCEPT MESSAGE CITED DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THIS INCIDENT. THEIR AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND A WINGMAN OBSERVED THE BURNING WRECKAGE. NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD NOR WERE ANY PARACHUTES SEEN.

LERNER, IRWIN (1955): B-52 HIT BY SAM, BURST INTO FIREBALL AND CRASHED. SURVIVOR HEARD EXPLOSION DOWNSTAIRS PRIOR TO HIS EJECTION. TWO OF THE CREWMEMBERS WERE CAPTURED IMMEDIATELY, OTHER FOUR CREW WERE LISTED AS MIA. SURVIVING CREW ARE LIKELY SOURCES OF THE NAME WITHIN THE PW SYSTEM.

LESTER, RODERICK (1912): A6E WAS LOST OVER NORTH VIETNAM IN MIDST OF HEAVY AAA AND BAD WEATHER. THE TIME, DATE, AND LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE INFORMATION IN THE INTERCEPTED MESSAGE. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL.

LEWANDOWSKI, LEONARD (0497): LEWANDOWSKI WENT SWIMMING WITH TWO OTHER MARINES NEAR THE MOUTH OF THE CUA VIET RIVER. NONE OF THE BODIES WERE RECOVERED.

LONG, JOHN (0496): LONG WAS LOST OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. NO EVIDENCE THAT HE SURVIVED HIS INCIDENT. RETURNEE STEPHEN G. LONG WAS HELD WITH THE "LAO GROUP" AND WAS HELD IN THE CITADEL. ANOTHER CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY.

LULL, HOWARD (1819): RETURNEES HAVE NO FIRSTHAND INFORMATION THAT DEMONSTRATES LULL WAS CAPTURED. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RETURNEES SHEDS NO LIGHT ON THE FATE OF LULL EXCEPT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT LULL WAS NOT KNOWN BY THEM TO BE CAPTURED AND THAT HE DID NOT SHOW UP IN THE COSVN PRISON SYSTEM. OTHER INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, HOWEVER, INDICATES THAT LULL WAS CAPTURED AND SUBSEQUENTLY KILLED IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL ESCAPE ATTEMPT.

LUNDY, ALBRO (1685): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. OUT OF AIRCRAFT WITHOUT PARACHUTE APPROXIMATELY 1500 FEET ABOVE GROUND. FAMILY IDENTIFICATION NOTWITHSTANDING, "PHOTO OF THREE" HAS BEEN CONCLUSIVELY PROVEN TO BE DOCTORED VERSION OF A 1923 SOVIET PHOTO THAT WAS REPRINTED IN KHMER LANGUAGE MAGAZINE.

MARIK, CHARLES (0374): PILOT LOST CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AFTER IT RECEIVED A DIRECT HIT FROM COASTAL ARTILLERY. PILOT SAID NAVIGATOR (MARIK) EJECTED ONE NAUTICAL MILE OFF THE COAST. PILOT EJECTED FURTHER OUT AND WAS RESCUED. SAR EFFORTS DISCONTINUED AFTER SEARCH OF EJECTION AREA AND SHORELINE.

MARKER, MICHAEL (1715): FIVE CREWMEMBERS ON NIGHTTIME MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED EXPLOSION IN MIDAIR. NO SIGN OF CRASHSITE OR CREW EVER DISCOVERED. TOW OF THREE MESSAGES INDICATE ALL CREWMEMBERS KILLED. THIRD MESSAGE DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD INDICATES ALL FIVE CREWMEMBERS KILLED.

MARTIN, RUSSELL (0354): CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSING-IN-ACTION STATUS ASSIGNED TO THESE CREWMEN, THERE IS NO FIRM INDICATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY SURVIVED THE CRASH OF THEIR AIRCRAFT. THE ORDER TO BAIL OUT OF THE BURNING AIRCRAFT WAS GIVEN, BUT NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN BY OBSERVERS. A PATHET LAO PROPAGANDA BROADCAST INDICATED THEY HAD LATER ACCESSED THE SITE AND HAD IDENTIFICATION MEDIA OF ONE INDIVIDUAL. NO INTELLIGENCE HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO CLARIFY THE FATE OF THE MEN IN THIS CRASH OR TO SUGGEST ANY WERE EVER CAPTURED.

MATEJOV, JOSEPH (1983): PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AT CRASH SITE INDICATES THAT NONE OF THE CREW SURVIVED THE INCIDENT. THE AIRCRAFT SUFFERED A MASSIVE AND SUDDEN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE IN FLIGHT, CRASHED TO THE GROUND IMMEDIATELY, BOUNCED ONCE AND LANDED UPSIDE DOWN. THE SAR TEAM ALSO WITNESSED AT LEAST 3 BODIES AT THE SITE. A RECENT VISIT TO THE SITE INDICATES THAT THE FATE OF ADDITIONAL CREWMEN MAY SOON BE DETERMINED. GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE INDICATIONS OF CREW SURVIVAL, AND THE PHYSICAL DATA COLLECTED AT THE CRASH SITE, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE CREW SURVIVED THE LOSS INCIDENT. RADIO INTERCEPTS, MISTAKENLY THOUGHT BY SOME TO REFER TO THE BARON 52 INCIDENT, DO NOT PERTAIN.

MCCRARY, JACK (0954): AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN VERY ISOLATED AREA AND CRASH SITE BURST INTO FLAME. DURING 1992 JOINT INVESTIGATION, WITNESSES SAID THE CREW WERE KILLED BY FIRE. EIGHT SETS OF REMAINS AND ONE SET OF ID MEDIA (FOR 9 CREWMEMBERS) TURNED OVER TO JOINT TEAM.

MCDONALD, JOSEPH (1842): RETURNEE'S IDENTIFICATION OF "MCDONALD" DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THIS INDIVIDUAL; THE PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION PROVIDED DO NOT MATCH JOSEPH MCDONALD AT ALL. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL.

MCELVAIN, JAMES (1952): F111 LOST OVER WATER ACCORDING TO 7TH AIR FORCE RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER. SAR EFFORTS DISCONTINUED AFTER 4 DAYS.

MCPHERSON, EVERETT (0279): RETURNEE THOUGHT HE HEARD THIS NAME BUT IT WAS NOT MENTIONED BY ANYONE ELSE IN THE PRISON SYTEM. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WAS A PW.

MELTON, TODD (1983): THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ANALYZED BY THE SAR TEAM AT THE CRASHSITE INDICATES THAT THE AIRCRAFT SUFFERED A MASSIVE AND SUDDEN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE IN FLIGHT, CRASHED TO THE GROUND IMMEDIATELY, BOUNCING ONCE AND LANDED UPSIDE DOWN. THE SAR TEAM ALSO WITNESSED AT LEAST 3 BODIES AT THE SITE. A RECENT VISIT TO THE SITE INDICATES THAT THE FATE OF ADDITIONAL CREWMEN MAY SOON BE DETERMINED. GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE INDICATIONS OF CREW SURVIVAL, AND THE PHYSICAL DATA COLLECTED AT THE CRASH SITE, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE CREW SURVIVED THE LOSS INCIDENT. RADIO INTERCEPTS, MISTAKENLY THOUGHT BY SOME TO REFER TO THE BARON 52 INCIDENT, DO NOT PERTAIN.

MITCHELL, HARRY (2053): DID NOT REPORT FOR DUTY ON SHIP DOCKED IN GULF OF TONKIN, WHICH WAS NEVER CLOSER THAN 25 NM TO SHORE. CLASSIFIED AS NONBATTLE CASUALTY. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL.

MIYAZAKI, RONALD (0587): OBSERVERS OF THIS HELICOPTER INCIDENT INDICATED THAT NO ONE COULD HAVE SURVIVED. NO EVIDENCE, THEN OR SINCE, HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO CONTRADICT THE FINDING THAT ALL CREWMEN WERE KIA/BNR.

MORELAND, JAMES (1040): FOLLOWING MORTAR ATTACK ON A BASE CAMP, THREE PERSONNEL WERE CAPTURED AND FIVE WERE LISTED AS MISSING. THE MISSING PERSONNEL WERE IN SEPARATE FIGHTING POSITIONS AROUND THE BASE CAMP. CAPTURED PERSONNEL WERE INITIALLY HELD SEPARATELY AND THEN BROUGHT TOGETHER FOR MOVEMENT TO NORTH VIETNAM. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL OF MISSING PERSONNEL.

MORRISSEY, ROBERT (1945): AIRCRAFT DISAPPEARED EN ROUTE TO A NIGHTTIME BOMBING TARGET. VISUAL AND ELECTRONIC SEARCH WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. SRV MILITARY REGION 4 SHOOTDOWN LOG CONTAINS ENTRY WHICH CORRELATES TO THIS INCIDENT AND INDICATES CREWMEN KILLED. ON-SITE INVESTIGATION BY JOINT TEAM HAS DEDUCED THAT CREW CAPSULE DID NOT SEPARATE FROM AIRCRAFT PRIOR TO THE CRASH. SIGNAL INTERCEPTS ALLEGING CAPTURE DO NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. MORRISSEY IS A POOR CANDIDATE FOR SURVIVAL.

MOSSMAN, HARRY (1912): A6E WAS LOST OVER NORTH VIETNAM IN MIDST OF HEAVY AAA AND BAD WEATHER. THE TIME, DATE, AND LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE INFORMATION IN THE INTERCEPTED MESSAGE. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL.

MULLINS, HAROLD (0354): THE CREW WAS GIVEN ORDERS TO BAIL OUT OF THE BURNING AIRCRAFT, BUT NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN BY OBSERVERS. NO INTELLIGENCE HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO CLARIFY THE FATE OF THE MEN IN THIS CRASH OR TO SUGGEST ANY WERE EVER CAPTURED. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO INDICATE SURVIVAL.

NICHOLS, HUBERT (0443): A1E HIT BY AAA, CRASHED AND BURNED. NO PARACHUTE SEEN AND NO BEEPER HEARD. CORRELATION IN DEBRIEFS RELATES TO RETURNEE WITH SAME LAST NAME.

OSBORNE, RODNEY (1715): FIVE CREWMEMBERS ON NIGHTTIME MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED EXPLOSION IN MIDAIR. NO SIGN OF CRASHSITE OR CREW EVER DISCOVERED. TOW OF THREE MESSAGES INDICATE ALL CREWMEMBERS KILLED. THIRD MESSAGE DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD INDICATES ALL FIVE CREWMEMBERS KILLED.

PARKER, WOODROW (1141): WINGMAN SAW PARKER'S F4D IMPACT ON THE GROUND. NO PARACHUTE WAS SEEN AND NO BEEPER WAS HEARD. ONLY ONE RETURNEE THOUGHT HE MIGHT HAVE HAD INDIRECT CONTACT WITH PARKER; NO OTHER RETURNEES HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HIM. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL. MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD STATES BOTH CREWMEMBERS KILLED. WITNESSES INTERVIEWED DURING JOINT INVESTIGATIONS ALSO INDICATED THE PILOTS DIED.

PARSLEY, EDWARD (0248): CREWMEMBER OF A C-123 ON A RESUPPLY/SHUTTLE MISSION. THERE WAS NO CONTACT WITH ANY OF THE CREW AFTER TAKEOFF. NOTHING WAS SEEN OR HEARD DURING SEARCH ALONG FLIGHT PATH. DURING DEBRIEFING, RETURNEE SAID HE HAD A VAGUE RECOLLECTION OF THE NAME. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL.

PASCHALL, RONALD (1812): PASCHALL CRAWLED AWAY FROM HIS CRASHED HELICOPTER JUST AS THE VC FIRED INTO THE WRECKAGE, SETTING OFF AN EXPLOSION AND FIRE. THE OTHER THREE CREWMEMBERS WERE STILL ABOARD THE CRASHED HELICOPTER AT THE TIME AND ARE EXTREMELY POOR CANDIDATES FOR SURVIVAL.

PENDER, ORLAND (1910): INCIDENT INVESTIGATED DURING 15TH JOINT INVESTIGATION. OTHER AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT, AND WITNESSES ON THE GROUND, HEARD EXPLOSION OF SAM AND SECOND EXPLOSION WHEN MISSILE HIT THE AIRCRAFT. PROVINCIAL SHOOTDOWN RECORD INDICATES NO TRACE OF CREW FOUND. WITNESSES SAID THEY SAW REMAINS AROUND CRASH SITE.

PERRY, RANDOLPH (1955): B-52 HIT BY SAM, BURST INTO FIREBALL AND CRASHED. SURVIVOR HEARD EXPLOSION DOWNSTAIRS (WHERE PERRY WAS LIKELY SITTING) PRIOR TO HIS EJECTION. TWO OF THE CREWMEMBERS WERE CAPTURED IMMEDIATELY, OTHER FOUR CREW WERE LISTED AS MIA. SURVIVING CREW ARE LIKELY SOURCES OF THE NAME WITHIN THE PW SYSTEM.

PHILLIPS, DANIEL (1040): FOLLOWING MORTAR ATTACK ON A BASE CAMP, THREE PERSONNEL WERE CAPTURED AND FIVE WERE LISTED AS MISSING. THE MISSING PERSONNEL WERE IN SEPARATE FIGHTING POSITIONS AROUND THE BASE CAMP. CAPTURED PERSONNEL WERE INITIALLY HELD SEPARATELY AND THEN BROUGHT TOGETHER FOR MOVEMENT TO NORTH VIETNAM. NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO INDICATE SURVIVAL OF MISSING PERSONNEL.

PIERSON, WILLIAM (1425): PIERSON WAS THE COPILOT OF A AH-1G THAT BURST INTO FLAME IN MIDAIR DURING A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. THE PILOT'S COMPARTMENT EXPLODED BEFORE FALLING TO THE GROUND. A RETURNEE SAID HE THOUGHT THE NAME SOUNDED FAMILIAR BUT THERE WERE FOUR MIAS WITH LAST NAME "PIERSON/PEARSON". THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT PROVIDE ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONFIRM SURVIVAL.

PIKE, DENNIS (1803): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. LAST TRANSMISSION FROM HIM INDICATED HE WAS PLANNING TO EJECT. NOT OUT OF AIRCRAFT AS SMITH LIST SUGGESTS. INTERCEPTED ENEMY RECAP OF SHOOTDOWNS WITHIN FIVE DAYS OF PIKE'S SHOOTDOWN DATE MENTIONS THAT THE PILOT FROM ONE SHOOTDOWN INCIDENT PARACHUTED, BUT NO MENTION IS MADE OF HIS FATE. THE PILOT FROM ANOTHER SHOOTDOWN INCIDENT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE NOT BEEN RESCUED BY NIGHTFALL.

PITTMANN, ALLAN (0524): AIRCRAFT LOST SEVEN MILES OFFSHORE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. SAR EFFORTS UNSUCCESSFUL IN LOCATING WRECKAGE; NO BEEPERS HEARD; NO PARACHUTES OBSERVED.

POGREBA, DEAN (0162): ALL RETURNEES REPORT HEARSAY INFORMATION THAT POGREBA WAS LOST OVER CHINA AND MAY HAVE BEEN CAPTURED OR KILLED; NO FIRSTHAND INFORMATION AVAILABLE. PEKING RADIO CLAIMED THEY SHOT DOWN AN AIRCRAFT ON THE DAY POGREBA'S AIRCRAFT WAS LOST; NO INDICATION OF THE STATUS OF THE CREW. POGREBA'S FLIGHT PLAN WOULD HAVE TAKEN HIM NO CLOSER THAN 30NM OF THE CHINESE BORDER ON EGRESS. NO ANALYTICAL EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT POGREBA SURVIVED HIS LOSS INCIDENT. DIA HAS NOT HAD ACCESS TO ANY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE DISPOSITIONS; NO KNOWLEDGE OF REFERENCES TO POGREBA.

PRESTON, JAMES (0339): DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE. AIRCRAFT DISAPPEARED OVER LAOS. PATHET LAO RADIO BROADCAST NOTED SHOOTDOWN, IDENTIFYING BOTH DATE AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. BROADCAST REPORTED ALL CREWMEMBERS DEAD. NAME WAS MENTIONED BY SEVERAL RETURNEES IN THEIR INITIAL DEBRIEFS. HYATT, RISNER, RIVERS, RUTLEDGE, AND SHUMAKER SAID THEY HEARD THE NAME PHONETICALLY SPELLED ON THE VOICE OF VIETNAM OR THE CAMP RADIO

PRUETT, WILLIAM (1552): A CREWMEMBER ON A SAR HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED TO EARTH AFTER BEING STRUCK BY A MISSILE FROM A MIG AIRCRAFT. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, ALL REPORTING INDICATED NO BEEPER OR PARACHUTES WERE OBSERVED OR INTERCEPTED. MULTIPLE EYEWITNESSES SAW THE INCIDENT IN BROAD DAYLIGHT AND SAW THE HELO FALL 7000 FEET. ONLY A 1976 PAPER INDICATES THAT A BEEPER WAS HEARD FOR A FEW SECONDS. THERE IS NO INDICATION WHERE THAT INFORMATION CAME FROM OR OF ITS ACCURACY. A BEEPER EVEN FROM ON THE GROUND, WOULD NOT BE CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF CAPTURE. ADDITIONALLY, THE VIETNAMESE TURNED OVER THE MR4 SHOOTDOWN DOCUMENT WHICH INDICATES ALL FIVE PERSONNEL WERE DEAD AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT. OVERALL THE INFORMATION STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT ALL CREW MEMBERS PERISHED IN THE INCIDENT. SEE ALSO HOLLY, BILL/LEESER, LEONARD/PRUETT, WILLIAM/ANDERSON, GREGORY/SUTTON, WILLIAM.

PUNTES, MANUEL (1736): PUNTES WAS ONE OF FOUR LEFT BEHIND WHEN HIS PATROL WAS FORCED TO WITHDRAW FOLLOWING AN AMBUSH. HE WAS LAST SEEN WOUNDED BUT MOVING UNDER HIS OWN POWER SEEKING COVER. HE WAS NEVER SEEN AGAIN. CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSING-IN-ACTION STATUS ASSIGNED, THERE WAS NO FIRM INDICATION THAT PUNTES SURVIVED THIS INCIDENT.

RANSBOTTOM, FREDERICK (1171): THE RETURNEE, JULIUS LONG, WHO NAMED RANSBOTTOM SAID HE WAS ON AN OPERATION AT THE ADJACENT BASE. HE DID NOT INDICATE THAT RANSBOTTOM WAS CAPTURED OR HELD WITH LONG. ADDITIONALLY, IN HIS DEBRIEF, LONG GIVES NO INFORMATION INDICATING THAT RANSBOTTOM WAS ALIVE AFTER THE LOSS INCIDENT.

RAYMOND, PAUL (0829): RAYMOND WAS IN AN F4D FLYING TRAIL IN A NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. WHEN THE LEAD AIRCRAFT TURNED IN ON THE TARGET, THE PILOT SAW A LARGE FIREBALL DESCENDING; HE WAS UNABLE TO MAKE ANY CONTACT WITH RAYMOND'S PLANE. THE LEAD F4 CIRCLED THE AREA SEARCHING FOR THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT BUT NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN AND NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD. RAYMOND'S NAME WAS MENTIONED IN THE PRISON SYSTEM BUT NO ONE EVER REPORTED ANY DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIM.

REED, JAMES (1650): WHILE ON AN ARMED, NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE MISSION, CAPT REED RADIOED THAT HE HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE TARGET MARKERS ON HIS FIRST PASS AND REQUESTED TO MAKE ANOTHER PASS. NO FURTHER RADIO TRANSMISSIONS FROM CAPT REED'S F4 AIRCRAFT WERE RECEIVED. OTHER FLIGHT AIRCRAFT REPORTED SEEING A LARGE EXPLOSION NEAR THE TARGET. ALL ATTEMPTED RADIO CONTACT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

ROSE, LUTHER (0354): CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSING-IN-ACTION STATUS ASSIGNED TO THESE CREWMEN, THERE IS NO FIRM INDICATION THEY SURVIVED THE CRASH OF THEIR AIRCRAFT. THE ORDER TO BAIL OUT OF THE BURNING AIRCRAFT WAS GIVEN, BUT NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN BY OBSERVERS. A PATHET LAO PROPAGANDA BROADCAST INDICATED THEY HAD LATER ACCESSED THE SITE AND HAD IDENTIFICATION MEDIA OF ONE INDIVIDUAL. NO INTELLIGENCE HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO CONFIRM THE FATE OF THE MEN IN THIS CRASH OR TO SUGGEST ANY WERE EVER CAPTURED.

ROSS, JOSEPH (1243): ROSS AND ONE CREWMEMBER WERE ON A NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. ANOTHER CREW SAW A LARGE FIREBALL ON THE GROUND NEAR THE INTENDED TARGET, THEN COULD NOT RAISE THEM ON THE RADIO. NO PARACHUTES OR BEEPERS WERE NOTED. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONCLUDE EITHER CREWMAN SURVIVED. THE NAME "ROSS," SEEN ON A WALL AT "HEARTBREAK" (HOA LO PRISON), LIKELY RELATES TO ROSS R. TERRY, WHO WAS CAPTURED IN 1966 AND HELD EXTENSIVELY AT HOA LO BEFORE HIS RELEASE IN 1973.

ROWLEY, CHARLES (1600): RETURNEE SHOWN PRE-CAPTURE PHOTO OF ROWLEY; STATED HE "THOUGHT" HE RECOGNIZED THE PHOTO AS BEING OF SOMEONE IN A GROUP PROPAGANDA PHOTO. NO OTHER RETURNEE (IN THAT PHOTO) REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF ROWLEY IN THE PRISON SYSTEM. NO EVIDENCE THAT ROWLEY SURVIVED INCIDENT.

SCHULTZ, SHELDON (0967): HELICOPTER WITH CREW OF FOUR AND ONE PASSENGER WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE AT 3,000 FEET ELEVATION. THE AIRCRAFT ENTERED INTO A VERTICAL DIVE, CRASHED, AND BURST IMMEDIATELY INTO 10-20 FOOT FLAMES. THERE WAS NO RADIO CONTACT DURING OR AFTER DESCENT, AND NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD. THE WRECKAGE WAS DESCRIBED AS A MASS OF BURNED METAL. NO SIGN OF LIFE WAS SEEN IN THE AREA. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONCLUDE ANY OF THE CREW SURVIVED THE CRASH.

SCHUMANN, JOHN (0099): KNOWN DIED IN CAPTIVITY BASED ON REPORTING BY OTHER U.S. POWS.

SEREX, HENRY (1811): INFORMATION CITED WHICH INDICATES CAPTURE CORRELATES TO A SEPARATE INCIDENT (REFNO 1812).

SHAFFER, PHILLIP (1132): ONLY INDICATION OF CAPTURE IS A RADIO BROADCAST BY AN AMERICAN WHO WAS ORIGINALLY BELIEVED TO BE SHAFER. SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS COUPLED WITH SUBSEQUENT BROADCASTS INDICATE THE BROADCASTS WERE MADE BY ANOTHER U.S. POW (KAVANAUGH-RR). AN INVESTIGATION IN JUN 1992 OF THE CRASH SITE TURNED UP PERSONNEL AFFECTS BELONGING TO SHAFER. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS EQUATING SHAFER WITH THE BROADCAST, THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THAT SHAFER SURVIVED OR WAS CAPTURED.

SHARK, EARL (1277): LISTED ON THE OFFICIAL DRVDIED IN CAPTIVITY LIST. MULTIPLE SOURCES DURING THE WAR PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH CORRELATED TO THIS CASE AND INDICATED THAT SHARK DIED FROM HIS WOUNDS SHORTLY AFTER BEING CAPTURED AND CARED FOR A FIELD HOSPITAL. ADDITIONALLY, EYEWITNESSES TO HIS LOSS INCIDENT INDICATED A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT HE WAS MORTALLY WOUNDED BECAUSE HE WAS SHOT AT LEAST TWICE AFTER HIS INITIAL INJURY AND THEN A FRAGMENTATION GRENADE TOSSED BY HIS PLATOON LEADER ACCIDENTALLY LANDED NEAR HIM. THE GRENADE WENT OFF CLOSE ENOUGH TO HIM TO SET OFF THE SMOKE GRENADES ON HIS WEB BUILT. THIS INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR LAST KNOWN ALIVE.

SHINN, WILLIAM (1552): A CREWMEMBER ON A SAR HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED TO EARTH AFTER BEING STRUCK BY A MISSILE FROM A MIG AIRCRAFT. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, ALL REPORTING INDICATED NO BEEPER OR PARACHUTES WERE OBSERVED OR INTERCEPTED. MULTIPLE EYEWITNESSES SAW THE INCIDENT IN BROAD DAYLIGHT AND SAW THE HELO FALL 7000 FEET. THE REPORT THAT A BEEPER MAY HAVE BEEN HEARD FOR A FEW SECONDS CAME SEVERAL YEARS AFTER THE INCIDENT AND HAS NOT BEEN CORROBORATED BY ANY OTHER SOURCE. A BEEPER EVEN FROM ON THE GROUND, WOULD NOT BE CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF CAPTURE. ADDITIONALLY, THE VIETNAMESE TURNED OVER THE MR4 SHOOTDOWN DOCUMENT WHICH INDICATES ALL FIVE PERSONNEL WERE DEAD AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT. OVERALL THE INFORMATION STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT ALL CREW MEMBERS PERISHED IN THE INCIDENT. SEE ALSO HOLLY, BILL/LEESER, LEONARD/PRUETT, WILLIAM/ANDERSON, GREGORY/SUTTON, WILLIAM.

SIGAFOOS, WALTER (1743): THE OTHER PILOTS ON THIS MISSION SAW SIGAFOOS' F4D CRASH AND BURN. NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD NOR WERE ANY PARACHUTES SEEN. THE INTERCEPT CITED DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THIS INCIDENT.

SINGLETON, DANIEL (1366): F4 AIRCRAFT WITH CREW OF TWO ON MISSION OVER LAOS; CRASHED FOUR SECONDS AFTER LAST RADIO TRANSMISSION. UNABLE TO ESTABLISH RADIO CONTACT; NO PARACHUTES, NO BEEPERS. SAR FOUND NO TRACE OF CREW. THE CITED INTERCEPT, WHICH INDICATED A PILOT WAS CAPTURED, IS INDISTINCT AS TO DATE, TIME, LOCATION, AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT AND CANNOT BE CORRELATED TO ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT; THE ONLY CERTAIN JUDGEMENT WHICH CAN BE MADE IS THAT THE ITEM DOES NOT RELATE TO SINGLETON'S AIRCRAFT, IN THAT IT INVOLVED A NORTH VIETNAMESE PROVINCIAL UNIT FAR REMOVED FROM THE SINGLETON LOSS IN LAOS. ANOTHER INTERCEPT, WHICH DOES CLEARLY RELATE TO THIS AIRCRAFT, INDICATES ONE AVIATOR WAS FOUND DEAD AT THE CRASHSITE. ENEMY FORCES REVEALED NOTHING ABOUT THE SECOND AVIATOR AND EVIDENTLY WERE UNAWARE A SECOND MAN WAS INVOLVED. THE PLANE WAS DESCRIBED AS "BURNED COMPLETELY." THE MEMORIZED NAME "LARRY SINGLETON," BASED ON HEARSAY INFORMATION TO AN EARLY RELEASEE "MEMORY BANK," LIKELY RELATES TO JERRY SINGLETON, A POW HELD IN THE NORTHERN PRISON SYSTEM. THERE IS NO ONE MISSING NAMED LARRY SINGLETON. THERE IS NO BASIS TO RELATE THIS INFORMATION TO DANIEL SINGLETON.

SMITH, HARDING (0354): CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSING-IN-ACTION STATUS ASSIGNED TO THESE CREWMEN, THERE IS NO FIRM INDICATION THEY SURVIVED THE CRASH OF THEIR AIRCRAFT. THE ORDER TO BAIL OUT OF THE BURNING AIRCRAFT WAS GIVEN, BUT NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN BY OBSERVERS. A PATHET LAO PROPAGANDA BROADCAST INDICATED THEY HAD LATER ACCESSED THE SITE AND HAD IDENTIFICATION MEDIA OF ONE INDIVIDUAL. NO INTELLIGENCE HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO CLARIFY THE FATE OF THE MEN IN THIS CRASH OR TO SUGGEST ANY WERE EVER CAPTURED.

SPINELLI, DOMENICK (1294): A-6 WITH CREW OF TWO HIT BY SAM AND DOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM. NO EJECTION OR PARACHUTES SEEN. HANOI RADIO BROADCAST REPORTED SHOOTDOWN BUT CLAIMED NO CREDIT FOR CAPTURING ANY AVIATORS. MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD NOTES BOTH CREWMEMBERS DIED IN THE INCIDENT. THE REMAINS OF THE OTHER CREWMEMBER HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED. AS CITED, POW RELEASEE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED PHOTO OF SPINELLI; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT CLAIM TO HAVE SEEN SPINELLI IN THE PRISON SYSTEM, BUT RATHER AS A FELLOW AVIATOR HE HAD KNOWN AT NAVAL AIR STATION SANFORD. NEITHER THIS RELEASEE OR ANYONE ELSE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF SPINELLI OR HIS CREWMAN IN CAPTIVITY.

STEVENS, LARRY (1383): AIRCRAFT DISABLED AND CRASHED OF UNKNOWN CAUSES OVER LAOS, SOON AFTER CRASH OF WINGMAN; NO EVIDENCE OF SURVIVAL. FAMILY IDENTIFICATION NOTWITHSTANDING, "PHOTO OF THREE" CONCLUSIVELY DEMONSTRATED TO BE DOCTORED VERSION OF 1923 PHOTO OF SOVIETS THAT APPEARED IN KHMER LANGUAGE MAGAZINE.

STEWART, PETER (0274): PHOTO ALLEGED BY FAMILY MEMBER TO BE STEWART WAS IDENTIFIED AS CDR HUGH STAFFORD IN 1975. CDR STAFFORD HAS CONFIRMED THIS IDENTIFICATION.

STEWART, VIRGIL (1444): STEWART SURVIVED HIS EJECTION BUT WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND SURROUNDED BY THE ENEMY. A PARARESCUEMAN WAS ABLE TO LOCATE STEWART BUT REPORTED HE WAS DEAD. THE BODY COULD NOT BE RECOVERED AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT DUE TO APPROACHING ENEMY TROOPS.

STRAWN, JOHN (1715): FIVE CREWMEMBERS ON NIGHTTIME MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED EXPLOSION IN MIDAIR. NO SIGN OF CRASHSITE OR CREW EVER DISCOVERED. TOW OF THREE MESSAGES INDICATE ALL CREWMEMBERS KILLED. THIRD MESSAGE DOES NOT CORRELATE TO THIS INCIDENT. MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD INDICATES ALL FIVE CREWMEMBERS KILLED.

SUTTON, WILLIAM (1552): A CREWMEMBER ON A SAR HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED TO EARTH AFTER BEING STRUCK BY A MISSILE FROM A MIG AIRCRAFT. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, ALL REPORTING INDICATED NO BEEPER OR PARACHUTES WERE OBSERVED OR INTERCEPTED. MULTIPLE EYEWITNESSES SAW THE INCIDENT IN BROAD DAYLIGHT AND SAW THE HELO FALL 7000 FEET. THE REPORT THAT A BEEPER MAY HAVE BEEN HEARD FOR A FEW SECONDS CAME SEVERAL YEARS AFTER THE INCIDENT AND HAS NOT BEEN CORROBORATED BY ANY OTHER SOURCE. A BEEPER EVEN FROM ON THE GROUND, WOULD NOT BE CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF CAPTURE. ADDITIONALLY, THE VIETNAMESE TURNED OVER THE MR4 SHOOTDOWN DOCUMENT WHICH INDICATES ALL FIVE PERSONNEL WERE DEAD AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT. OVERALL THE INFORMATION STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT ALL CREW MEMBERS PERISHED IN THE INCIDENT. SEE ALSO HOLLY, BILL/LEESER, LEONARD/PRUETT, WILLIAM/ANDERSON, GREGORY/SUTTON, WILLIAM.

THOMPSON, WILLIAM (1243): THOMPSON AND ONE CREWMEMBER WERE ON A NIGHT ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM. ANOTHER CREW SAW A LARGE FIREBALL ON THE GROUND NEAR THE INTENDED TARGET, THEN COULD NOT RAISE THEM ON THE RADIO. NO PARACHUTES OR BEEPERS WERE NOTED. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONCLUDE EITHER CREWMAN SURVIVED. THE "MAJOR THOMPSON" REFERRED TO IN PRISON TAP-CODE COMMUNICATION WAS LIKELY MAJOR FRED THOMPSON, WHO WAS SHOT DOWN FOUR MONTHS BEFORE THE REFNO 1243 INCIDENT.

TIGNER, LEE (1913): INFORMATION IN THE INTERCEPTED MESSAGE INDICATES THE CREW DIED IN THIS INCIDENT. AIRCRAFT LOST A WING, HIT THE GROUND, AND SKIDDED INTO RIVER. NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN AND NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD.

TOWNSEND, FRANCIS (1908): BASED ON OPERATIONAL REPORTING FROM TOWNSEND'S CREWMEMBER (RETURNEE), TOWNSEND WAS EJECTED FROM THE AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, THE RETURNEE REPORTED TOWNSEND SHOULD HAVE LANDED BEHIND HIM ON THE GROUND BUT HE DID NOT. ADDITIONALLY, THE RETURNEE WAS TOLD BY A NVN CAPTOR THAT TOWNSEND DIED IN THE AIRCRAFT. NO ANALYTICAL EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST TOWNSEND SURVIVED HIS INCIDENT.

TRENT, ALAN (1619): WINGMAN SAW THE PLANE CRASH ON BOMBING MISSION AND WITNESSED SECONDARY EXPLOSION. SAR TEAMS ON GROUND SAW WRECKAGE SPREAD OUT OVER 700 METERS. BASED ON REPORTS OF WINGMAN, AND THE SAR TEAM, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT PERSONNEL SURVIVED THIS INCIDENT.

UTLEY, RUSSEL (1366): F4 AIRCRAFT WITH CREW OF TWO ON MISSION OVER LAOS; CRASHED FOUR SECONDS AFTER LAST RADIO TRANSMISSION. UNABLE TO ESTABLISH RADIO CONTACT; NO PARACHUTES, NO BEEPERS. SAR FOUND NO TRACE OF CREW. THE CITED INTERCEPT, WHICH INDICATED A PILOT WAS CAPTURED, IS INDISTINCT AS TO DATE, TIME, LOCATION, AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT AND CANNOT BE CORRELATED TO ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT; THE ONLY CERTAIN JUDGEMENT WHICH CAN BE MADE IS THAT THE ITEM DOES NOT RELATE TO UTLEY'S AIRCRAFT, IN THAT IT INVOLVED A NORTH VIETNAMESE PROVINCIAL UNIT FAR REMOVED FROM THE UTLEY LOSS IN LAOS. ANOTHER INTERCEPT, WHICH DOES CLEARLY RELATE TO THIS AIRCRAFT, INDICATES ONE AVIATOR WAS FOUND DEAD AT THE CRASHSITE. ENEMY FORCES REVEALED NOTHING ABOUT THE SECOND AVIATOR AND WERE APPARENTLY UNAWARE A SECOND MAN WAS INVOLVED. THE PLANE WAS DESCRIBED AS "BURNED COMPLETELY."

WALKER, LLOYD (0587): OBSERVERS OF THIS HELICOPTER INCIDENT INDICATED THAT NO ONE COULD HAVE SURVIVED. NO EVIDENCE, THEN OR SINCE, HAS BEEN ACQUIRED TO CONTRADICT THE FINDING THAT ALL CREWMEN WERE KIA/BNR.

WALKER, SAMUEL (1340): INCIDENT INVOLVED A MID-AIR COLLISION OF TWO AIRCRAFT. THE PILOT OF THE C123 WAS RESCUED SHORTLY AFTER THE INCIDENT. HE REPORTED THAT DURING HIS DESCENT, HE SAW ANOTHER PARACHUTE BELOW HIM BUT HE DID NOT KNOW FROM WHICH AIRCRAFT THE CHUTE MAY HAVE COME. AIR AND GROUND SAR EFFORTS FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF SURVIVORS.

WALTON, LEWIS (1745): WALTON AND TWO OTHERS WERE MEMBERS OF A LONG RANGE RECON PATROL WHICH WAS INSERTED BY HELICOPTER IN WESTERN SOUTH VIETNAM AND NEVER SEEN AGAIN. MARKER PANELS LATER SEEN BY RESCUE FORCES MAY HAVE BEEN PLACED BY ENEMY FORCES AS A LURE. A RETURNEE PURPORTEDLY INDICATED IN AN EARLY POST-RELEASE DEBRIEF THAT HE HAD HEARD ABOUT AN ARMY CAPTAIN NAMED "WATON" WHO WAS A POW. SPECIFICALLY, HE WAS TOLD BY SOMEONE, NOT IDENTIFIED, THAT AN ENEMY MESSAGE ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING CAPTIVES WATON AND ENTRICAN, AND THAT THEY WERE IN TURN TOLD TO TAKE THEM NORTH TO HANOI AND TO KILL ALL FUTURE CAPTIVES. THERE IS NO MENTION OF THIS IN THE RELEASEE'S EXTENSIVE DEBRIEF AND IT EXISTS ONLY AS AN ABRIDGED DATA-BASE ENTRY OF A PRELIMINARY DEBRIEF. THERE IS REASON TO SUSPECT THAT ENTRICAN WAS CAPTURED BY HOSTILE FORCES; HE IS ON THE "LAST KNOWN ALIVE" PRIORITY CASE LIST. THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT BASIS TO BELIEVE WALTON (A STAFF SERGEANT, NOT A CAPTAIN) WAS CAPTURED BY HOSTILE FORCES.

WARREN, ERVIN (0354): CONSISTENT WITH THE MISSING-IN-ACTION STATUS ASSIGNED TO THESE CREWMEN, THERE IS NO FIRM INDICATION THEY SURVIVED THE CRASH OF THEIR AIRCRAFT. THE ORDER TO BAIL OUT OF THE BURNING AIRCRAFT WAS GIVEN, BUT NO PARACHUTES WERE SEEN BY OBSERVERS. A PATHET LAO PROPAGANDA BROADCAST INDICATED THEY HAD LATER ACCESSED THE SITE AND HAD IDENTIFICATION MEDIA OF ONE INDIVIDUAL. NO INTELLIGENCE HAS EVER BEEN ACQUIRED TO SUGGEST ANY WERE EVER CAPTURED.

WARREN, GRAY (1505): AIRCRAFT MADE A STRAFING PASS AGAINST A GROUND TARGET, FAILED TO PULL UP, AND WAS OBSERVED BY A FAC TO IMPACT THE GROUND APPROXIMATELY 100 METERS BEYOND THE TARGET. NO CHUTES OBSERVED BY FAC, NO BEEPER HEARD. TWO-HOUR VISUAL AND ELECTRONIC SEARCH CONDUCTED WITHOUT SUCCESS. NOT A GOOD CANDIDATE FOR SURVIVAL.

WILKINS, GEORGE (0391): MR4 SHOOTDOWN RECORD ENTRY CORRELATES TO WILKINS' INCIDENT. ENTRY REPORTS SHOOTDOWN AND DEATH OF PILOT. WITNESSES INTERVIEWED DURING RECENT JOINT FIELD INVESTIGATION DESCRIBE OBSERVING REMAINS OF PILOT NEXT TO CRASH ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INCIDENT. DIA HAS NO REPORTS FROM THAI RETURNEES CONCERNING WILKINS.

WILLIAMS, ROBERT (1855): WILLIAMS AND HIS CREWMEMBER WERE SHOT DOWN IN THEIR HELICOPTER. WINGMAN OPINED THERE WAS VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF SURVIVAL. NO PHOTO IN FILE. DIA HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY VIETNAMESE MAGAZINE WITH A PURPORTED PHOTO OF WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMSON, JAMES (0967): HELICOPTER WITH CREW OF FOUR AND ONE PASSENGER WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE AT 3,000 FEET ELEVATION. THE AIRCRAFT ENTERED INTO A VERTICAL DIVE, CRASHED, AND BURST IMMEDIATELY INTO 10-20 FOOT FLAMES. THERE WAS NO RADIO CONTACT DURING OR AFTER DESCENT, AND NO BEEPERS WERE HEARD. THE WRECKAGE WAS DESCRIBED AS A MASS OF BURNED METAL. NO SIGN OF LIFE WAS SEEN IN THE AREA. THERE IS NO ANALYTICAL BASIS TO CONCLUDE ANY OF THE CREW SURVIVED THE CRASH. A RELEASEE SAW THE NAME "JAMES P. WILLIAMSON" SIGNED ON AN ANTI-WAR LETTER, BUT OPINED THAT THE NAME WAS A "PEN NAME, FOR (THE POWS) WERE ALWAYS BEING PIGEONED INTO USING PEN NAMES." OTHER RELEASEES REPORTED HAVING SEEN THE NAME "WILLIAMSON" ON A STATEMENT, EACH IN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES (SHOWN BY INTERROGATOR DURING INTERROGATION); NONE OF THEM EVER SAW OR HEARD OF WILLIAMSON, NOR DID ANYONE ELSE IN THE PRISON SYSTEM.

WRIGHT, DAVID (1675): AIRCRAFT WAS HIT WHILE ON A LOW-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. WINGMAN SAW INITIAL EXPLOSION IN THE AIR AND THEN AN "ALL-CONSUMING EXPLOSION ON THE GROUND." HE SAW NO CHUTES AND HEARD NO BEEPERS. BASED ON WINGMAN'S REPORT, BOTH CREWMEN DECLARED KIA/BNR. THE SIGINT REPORT REFERRED TO DOES NOT RELATE TO THIS CASE, BUT TO AN RLAF T-28 DOWN THE SAME DAY.

ZICH, LARRY (1814): RETURNEE LAWRENCE STARK, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT MAKE A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION, BELIEVED THAT THE PHOTO HE WAS SHOWN OF LARRY ZICH MATCHED SOMEONE HE HAD SEEN, POSSIBLY IN A PROPAGANDA PICTURE OR AMONG THE "LAO GROUP" (I.E., POWS CAPTURED IN LAOS) WHILE WATCHING A PROPAGANDA FILM. HAD LARRY ZICH BEEN PRESENT AT ANY GATHERING OF POWS, HE WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN EXTENSIVELY CORROBORATED AS A POW BY OTHER RETURNEES; NONE KNEW OF HIM. HE DEFINITELY WAS NOT AMONG THE SO-CALLED "LAO GROUP" AT HOA LO. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHO STARK SAW, BUT HIS IDENTIFICATION OF ZICH IS TENUOUS AND NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE.

TAB D

NAMES OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN USG PRIORITY CASES
WHO APPEAR ON THE 324-NAME LIST
PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF SENATOR BOB SMITH

ACOSTA-ROSARIO, HUMBERTO (1258)

ANDERSON, ROBERT (1934)

ARD, RANDOLPH (1719)

ASHLOCK, CARLOS (0678)

BABULA, ROBERT (0439)

BACKUS, KENNETH (0706)

BAKER, ARTHUR (0070)

BODENSCHATZ, JOHN (0439)

BORAH, DANIEL (1927)

BORTON, ROBERT (0439)

BRAM, RICHARD (0108)

BRASHEAR, WILLIAM (1437)

BRENNAN, HERBERT (0928)

BROWN, GEORGE (1108)

BROWN, HARRY (1046)

BROWNLEE, CHARLES (1347)

BRUCHER, JOHN (1388)

BUCKLEY, LOUIS (0344)

BURNETT, SHELDON (1719)

CARLOCK, RALPH (0606)

CARTER, DENNIS (0439)

CICHON, WALTER (1112)

CLARK, RICHARD (0873) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

CLARKE, GEORGE (0892)

COHRON, JAMES (0984)

CONDIT, DOUGLAS (0926)

COOK, KELLY (0904)

CREED, BARTON (1724)

CREW, JAMES (0904)

CRISTMAN, FREDERICK (173D)

CUTHBERT, BRADLEY (1327)

DAHILL, DOUGLAS (1428)

DALE, CHARLES (0094)

DANIELSON, BENJAMIN (1535)

DEBRUIN, EUGENE (0018)

DELONG, JOE (0689) DIED IN CAPTIVITY.

DEMMON, DAVID (0094)

DEXTER, BENNIE (0333)

DINGWALL, JOHN (0108)

DODGE, EDWARD (0052)

DUCKETT, THOMAS (1683)

DUNLOP, THOMAS (1816)

DUNN, MICHAEL (1004)

EGAN, JAMES (0235)

EIDSMOE, NORMAN (1004)

ELLIOT, ROBERT (1049)

ELLIS, WILLIAM (0372)

ENTRICAN, DANNY (1748) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

ESTOCIN, MICHAEL (0656)

FALLON, PATRICK (1463)

FINLEY, DICKIE (1308)

FISCHER, RICHARD (0977)

FITZGERALD, JOSEPH (0715)

FITZGERALD, PAUL (0867)

FORS, GARY (0947)

FOWLER, DONALD (1244)

FRANCISCO, SAN D. (1329)

GAGE, ROBERT (0381)

GALBRAITH, RUSSELL (1339)

GALLANT, HENRY (0109)

GARCIA, RICARDO (1730)

GATES, JAMES (0297)]

GRAF, JOHN (1523)

GREENLEAF, JOSEPH (2044)

GREENWOOD, ROBERT (1918)

GREILING, DAVID (1234)

GROTH, WADE (1046)

GUNN, ALAN (1046)

HAMILTON, JOHN (0644)

HAMILTON, ROGER (0647)

HAMM, JAMES (1086)

HARGROVE, OLIN (0867)

HASENBECK, PAUL (0646)

HASTINGS, STEVEN (1244)

HELD, JOHN (1131)

HESFORD, PETER (1100)

HESTLE, ROOSEVELT (0386)

HODGSON, CECIL (0242)

HOLLAND, MELVIN (0242)

HOLMES, DAVID (0275)

HRDLICKA, DAVID (0084)

HUNT, ROBERT (1065)

HUNTER, RUSSELL (0250)

HUSTON, CHARLES (1108)

IBANEZ, DI REYES (0723)

JAKOVAC, JOHN (0715)

JEFFS, CLIVE (1723)

JOHNSON, BRUCE (0096)

JOHNSON, WILLIAM (0997)

KIEFFEL, ERNEST (0250)

KOSKO, WALTER (0114) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

LAFAYETTE, JOHN (0297)

LANE, CHARLES (0805)

LEE, LEONARD (0952)

LEWIS, JAMES (0070)

LUNA, CARTER (1405)

MALONE, JIMMY (0326)

MANGINO, THOMAS (0646)

MASSUCCI, MARTIN (0158)

MAUTERER, OSCAR (0253)

MCCARTY, JAMES (1882) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

MCDONALD, KURT (0052)

MCDONNELL, JOHN (1402)

MCGAR, BRIAN (0715)

MCINTIRE, SCOTT (1782)

MCLEAN, JAMES (0054)

MELLOR, FREDERIC (0124) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

MILIUS, PAUL (1062)

MILLNER, MICHAEL (0930)

MIMS, GEORGE (0213)

MORGAN, JAMES (0903)

MORRIS, GEORGE (1981)

MORROW, LARRY (1868)

MULLEN, WILLIAM (0323)

MUNDT, HENRY (1437)

NETHERLAND, ROGER (0677)

NEWTON, CHARLES (1428)

NEWTON, DONALD (0258)

NIDDS, DANIEL (0646)

O'GRADY, JOHN (0641) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

PATTERSON, JAMES (0691) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

PERRINE, ELTON (0706)

PETERSON, DELBERT (0267)

PETERSON, MARK (1981)

PHILLIPS, ROBERT (1639)

PLASSMEYER, BERNARD (1660) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

PLATT, ROBERT (0728)

PLUMADOR, KENNETH (0839)

PREVEDEL, CHARLES (1428)

PRICE, BUNYAN (1610)

PRIDEMORE, DALLAS (1274)

PUGH, DENNIS (1573)

REHE, RICHARD (0976) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN

HIS INCIDENT.

RICHARDSON, DALE (0610)

ROBERTSON, JOHN (0459) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

ROE, JERRY (1046)

ROZO, JAMES (1639)

RUSSELL, PETER (1244)

SCHARF, CHARLES (0158)

SCHMIDT, WALTER (1205)

SCULL, GARY (1572)

SEYMOUR, LEO (0750)

SHELTON, CHARLES (0079)

SHRIVER, JERRY (1431)

SITTNER, RONALD (0805)

SKINNER, OWEN (1683)

SMALL, BURT (0607)

SMITH, WARREN (0370)

SOYLAND, DAVID (1747)

SPARKS, DONALD (1456)

SPARKS, JON (1730)

STEEN, MARTIN (0314) BASED ON JOINT INVESTIGATION, DETERMINED TO HAVE DIED IN HIS INCIDENT.

STRAIT, DOUGLAS (1668)

STROHLEIN, MADISON (1756)

TATUM, LAWRENCE (0453)

TAYLOR, FRED (0109)

TROMP, WILLIAM (0304)

WALKER, BRUCE (1598)

WHEELER, EUGENE (1598)

WHITE, CHARLES (1006)

WINTERS, DAVID (0646)

WORTH, JAMES (1810)

WOOD, DON (0233)

WOOD, WILLIAM (1918)

WRIGHT, THOMAS (1063)

WROBLESKI, WALTER (0703)

Prior Investigations

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs began its work in October 1991 fully recognizing that the POW/MIA issue had been examined and investigated by Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) many times over the last twenty years. The Select Committee was determined to learn as much as possible from those previous investigations, particularly in the early stages of our work, but was equally determined to avoid the methodological mistakes and issue-area omissions of those previous investigations. Most importantly, we did not accept the findings or methodology of previous investigations as valid for the purposes of our investigation, nor did we limit the scope of our investigation as many prior Congressional and Executive Branch investigations had.

In reviewing previous Congressional investigations of the POW/MIA issue, we attempted to identify previous areas of inquiry and omission. As a result we were able to focus the Committee's efforts and resources on investigating topics which previous investigations had been unable to reach as well as identifying witnesses which the Committee wished to interview.

Our investigation has had several distinct advantages over previous Congressional investigations. First, we were provided substantial time (fifteen months) and resources (\$2 million) to conduct our investigation. Second, we have had better access to documents, both classified and unclassified, than any previous investigation. Third, we have enjoyed the advantage of a changing international climate which has increased the level of cooperation from Southeast Asia and the former Soviet Union. Fourth, we have been able to interview and take oral depositions from individuals who have never been called to testify before Congress on this issue. Fifth, we have included every conceivable aspect of the POW/MIA issue in our investigation.

Below is a brief review of the scope, depth and general findings or areas of inquiry of major previous Congressional and Executive Branch investigations or oversight of POW/MIA matters. This brief synopsis of those inquiries should help distinguish this committee's work from past Congressional involvement with the POW/MIA issue. Accompanying each investigation summary is a critique of its strengths and weaknesses as seen with the benefit of years of hindsight and the additional information available to, or wider perspective obtained from, our own investigation.

Appendix 3

Prior Investigations

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
Subcommittee on National Security Policy
and Scientific Developments

HEARINGS ON AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-73

Background

During the later stages of the war in Vietnam, Congress began taking an interest in the issue of American POWs in Southeast Asia. This interest was due both to the high profile the Nixon Administration gave the issue at that time and the efforts of relatives and family members of many of the hundreds of servicemen being held.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically its Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, which was chaired by Rep. Thomas E. Morgan (D-PA) held a total of 22 days of hearings during the 1969-1973 time period solely on the issue of American POWs from the Vietnam War. Over 75 witnesses testified in person while many more submitted statements for the record. The written record of these hearings is contained in seven volumes containing about 1,500 pages of oral and written testimony.

1969

Hearings held on November 13 & 14, 1969, focused on two House Concurrent Resolutions concerning the inhumane treatment American POWs were receiving at the hands of their North Vietnamese captors. American Red Cross officials testified to their unsuccessful efforts to secure decent treatment and accounting for U.S. prisoners of war held in Southeast Asia. Several Nixon Administration officials, including Charles E. Havens from DoD, and Frank A. Sieverts and William H. Sullivan, from the State Department, testified that North Vietnam was a signatory of the Geneva Conference on the humane treatment of prisoners of war.

The debate noted that there were 944 servicemen known to have been taken prisoner by the North Koreans or Chinese during the Korean war about which nothing was ever learned.¹ These

¹ American Prisoners of War In Vietnam, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, November 13, 14, 1969, p.61.

hearings resulted, in part, from the publicity generated after the May 1969 decision by the Department of Defense to "go public" with the brutal treatment of U.S. POWs by North Vietnam.²

At the time of the hearings there were 413 U.S. servicemen believed captured in Southeast Asia (South Vietnam 70, North Vietnam 341, Laos 2) and 926 missing in action in the three countries.³ The House and Senate eventually passed unanimously House Concurrent Resolution 454, during the 91st Congress, Second Session.

1970

In 1970, the Subcommittee held hearings on April 29 and May 1 and 6. State and Defense Department officials testified as to the efforts the Nixon Administration to obtain humane treatment for and the eventual release of American POWs. May 1, 1970 was designated as a Prisoner of War Day and a bipartisan Congressional rally was held at Constitution Hall. The family members of several missing servicemen testified to the emotional impact of not having any information on their loved ones. H. Ross Perot testified as to the importance of world opinion on the Vietnamese and the pros and cons of issuing North Vietnam an ultimatum regarding accounting for and providing humane treatment for U.S. POWs.

The issue of whether Americans captured in Laos and Cambodia were being turned over to North Vietnam was raised and William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said he was aware of at least one such case but stated that the evidence indicates that "most Americans captured by Communist forces in Laos remain in Laos,"⁴

1971

Hearings held by the Subcommittee in 1971 were far more extensive than either of the previous two years. Between March and September, eleven days of hearings were held with 51 individuals testifying and dozens more submitting memorandums or

²April 20, 1971, p.392.

³Ibid. p.29.

⁴April 29, May 1& 6, 1970 Hearings, p. 100.

statements for the record. Several former prisoners of the North Vietnamese testified as to the brutal nature of their confinement.

On March 23rd officials of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia testified regarding their efforts to secure the release of Americans. Col Norris Overly a former POW in Vietnam testified about his brutal treatment at the hands of the North Vietnamese. He testified that the release of three POWs in February 1968, three more in August 1969, and three more in August 1969 was an attempt by Hanoi to improve its world image.⁵ It was also noted that three U.S. POWs were released by the Vietcong on January 1, 1969 following battlefield meetings between U.S. and Viet Cong representatives near Tay Ninh in South Vietnam.⁶

On March 24th, officials of the American Red Cross testified to the standard of treatment prisoners should be accorded under the Geneva Convention. On March 25th, 30th and April 1st, several Congressmen expressed their outrage over the treatment of American POWs and testified to the positive impact which demands for humane treatment of POWs in the U.S. and elsewhere were having on the treatment of POWs still held by North Vietnam. There was general agreement that world public opinion was the greatest weapon the U.S. had in ensuring humane treatment for the POWs, as well as their ultimate release.

On March 31, several individuals who were against the war in Vietnam testified as to their successful efforts to obtain mail privileges for POWs. Some who had been able to visit with POWs in Hanoi testified that they were receiving decent and humane treatment by their captors. On April 20th, several veterans of the Vietnam War testified regarding torture and brutalities committed by U.S. and ARVN forces against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers.

The Administration witnesses, Frank A. Sieverts, William H. Sullivan and Warren G. Nutter, testified on April 6th as to developments in the area of mail privileges, an accurate list of POWs from Hanoi, and the linkage of the POW issue to the Paris Peace talks.

The number of missing and captured U.S. personnel as of February 28, 1971 was listed in the appendix to the hearings by service and year. Also listed was the number of U.S. personnel North Vietnam, the Vietcong and Laos have admitted holding either

⁵March 23, 1971, p. 24.

⁶April 6, 1971, p.349.

by permitting mail or through propaganda broadcasts.⁷

Hearings held on June 29th, August 3rd and September 28th, 1971 resulted in another unanimous House Concurrent Resolution (379) being passed on October 4, 1971 which called for humane treatment and release of American POWs.⁸ Several Veteran's Groups were invited to testify on June 29th. They testified as to options available to the U.S. to force Vietnam to treat humanely and repatriate U.S. POWs.

On August 3, 1971, several former POWs testified to the brutality of their Vietnamese captors. On September 28th, 1971, officials from the National League of Families testified regarding the procedure by which a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces should be linked to the repatriation of American POWs. As of September 3, 1971, 465 personnel were listed as captured and 1,134 were listed as missing.⁹

1972

Two days of hearings were held by the Subcommittee on February 3 and March 16, 1972. Witnesses included representatives from the Department of State (Hon. William Sullivan) and the Department of Defense (Hon. G. Warren Nutter and Dr. Roger E. Shields). Mr. Nutter inserted into the record the circumstances of 14 airmen whose fate should be known by the North Vietnamese.¹⁰ A fact sheet listing separately as of March 11, 1972, the number of missing and captured by service, country of loss, and year of loss was also presented. Mr. Nutter also explained the functioning of the DoD POW/MIA Action Task Group established in 1971.¹¹

⁷Ibid. p. 528.

⁸Ibid., Part 2, p. iii.

⁹Ibid. p. 89.

¹⁰American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1972, February 3, 1972, pp. 27-28.

¹¹Ibid., p.29.

1973

In late May 1973, the Subcommittee held additional hearings in light of the return of 591 American POWs in February and March, 1973. At that time the Committee was still concerned with the fate of 1,284 servicemen missing in action as of May 26, 1973.¹² There were also an additional 1,100 or so men who were declared dead by their respective services but whose bodies had not been recovered. A list of the names of 1,321 military personnel unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as of 5 May 1973 was submitted for the record.¹³

Several returned POWs testified on May 23rd regarding whether they thought any POWs had been held behind by the North Vietnamese. Most said probably not, although they thought it was unlikely that those who were amputees or who developed serious mental problems were ever going to be released alive.¹⁴ A Colonel Kenneth W. North, testified on May 23, 1971 that he saw four Americans during his imprisonment that did not return at Operation Homecoming. These men had mental and physical problems as a result of their imprisonment and he was not surprised that they never returned. He is not sure if they died or were executed or what.¹⁵

On May 30, officials of the National League of Families presented several discrepancy cases where the Vietnamese should have definite knowledge of the fate of a missing American. Dr. Shields from DoD and Frank Sieverts from the State Department testified on May 31 regarding efforts by the U.S. to obtain Vietnamese compliance with the terms of the Paris Peace Accords. A copy of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was submitted for the record.¹⁶ Also submitted for the record was an alphabetical listing of 1,321 military personnel who were unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as of 5 May 1973.¹⁷

The Committee took additional testimony on December 5, 1973 regarding the 1,300 Americans still listed as missing in action

¹²American Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, 1973 Part 4, May 23, 1973, p. 59.

¹³Ibid. pp. 151-183.

¹⁴Ibid., p.9.

¹⁵Ibid., part 4, p.9.

¹⁶Ibid., Part 4, p.141-150.

¹⁷Ibid., Part 4, pp.151-183.

and nineteen House Resolutions which were introduced as a result. Officials of the National League of Families, several members of Congress, and Siverts and Shields, from State and DoD, testified regarding the efforts to implement the POW/MIA accounting provision of the Paris Peace Accords.

A chronology of U.S. Efforts Through the Four Party Joint Military Team Toward Obtaining Information About Americans and Third Country Nationals Who Are Listed as Deceased and Completing Arrangements for Repatriation of Remains was submitted for the record along with a Chronology of U.S. Efforts Through the Four Party Joint Military Team Toward Obtaining Information About Americans and Third Country Nationals Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia.¹⁸ It is interesting that the additional 1,100 KIA with body-not-recovered were not considered as MIA. They were addressed only in the hope that some of their bodies could be returned.

Scope of Investigation

The Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was the primary Congressional body conducting oversight of the POW/MIA issue during the Vietnam War years of 1969-1973. The subcommittee held extensive hearings with dozens of witnesses from the Nixon administration, former POWs, veterans groups, family members, and anti-war groups, yet it was not an investigative body by any means. Only official policymakers testified, and no closed sessions were held to receive classified information or material. No independent investigative authority existed to review POW/MIA classification policy or POW captivity intelligence information.

Furthermore, although the committee was effective in bringing attention to the POW/MIA issue, much of the committee's efforts during the war years was designed to ensure humane treatment of U.S. POWs. Less attention was placed on accounting for missing Americans until after the Paris Peace Accords in early 1973 when the number of unaccounted for Americans became clear.

The Committee issued no interim or final report, and made no conclusions or recommendations. The extensive hearings merely served as a public forum for parties with a stake in the issue to express their experiences and concerns.

¹⁸Hearings, December 5, 1973, pp. 16-18.

FINAL REPORT of the HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
"MONTGOMERY REPORT"

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

BACKGROUND

The House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia chaired by G.V. "Sonny" Montgomery was formed on September 11, 1975 pursuant to House Resolution 335 and tasked with conducting:

"a full and complete investigation and study of (1) the problem United States servicemen still identified as missing in action, as well as those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered, as a result of military operations in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and the problem of United States civilians identified as missing or unaccounted for, as well as those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; (2) the need for additional international inspection teams to determine whether there are servicemen still held as prisoners of war or civilians held captive or unwillingly detained in the aforementioned areas."¹

The Committee's investigation lasted fifteen (15) months and resulted in a 266-page Final Report issued on December 13, 1976. Supporting the Final Report were five published volumes containing the open testimony of witnesses called before the Committee.

The Committee consisted of 10 members with a non-partisan staff of four (4) professionals and three (3) administrative personnel. The Committee's Staff Director was J. Angus MacDonald. The overall budget for the investigation was \$350,000.00 of which nearly one-half was returned unspent, despite an unexpected extension of nearly four months in the lifespan of the Committee.

The Committee viewed its primary objectives as (1) identifying whether any missing Americans remain alive and determining if their constitutional rights are fully protected. (2) helping to create an international climate where meaningful talks can be conducted with those who can provide important information on MIAs, (3) evaluating U.S. government treatment of the POW/MIA issue during and after the Vietnam War, and (4) establishing POW/MIA guidelines for future conflicts.²

The Select Committee used three distinct methods to conduct its investigation. First, almost 50 witnesses testified in hearings before the Select Committee. An additional 20 executive sessions were held to receive sensitive information. Second, high-level direct talks were held with key government officials from Vietnam and Laos,³ and other relevant international officials such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Third, the Committee staff conducted independent investigation including contacting over 150 individuals who might contribute information. The Committee staff also submitted over 100 requests for information to the Department of Defense (DoD). There was little doubt as to the principle focus of the investigation. According to the Committee's Final Report, "top priority was placed on seeking evidence to determine whether any live Americans were still being held captive."⁴

Over 200 individual POW/MIA case files were examined including all the cases listed as POW and a "cross section" of other MIA cases.⁵ The Committee staff reviewed over 100 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports mentioning the downing of American planes and/or the capture of American pilots in Southeast Asia.⁶ Committee members and staff visited the Defense Intelligence Agency, the primary agency responsible for collecting intelligence on POW/MIAs. The committee also reviewed returned POW debriefs and visited the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).

In their efforts to obtain information on the POW/MIA issue Committee members met with President Gerald Ford, and Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger (twice). Four members of the Committee, including Chairman Montgomery, traveled to Hanoi in December 1975 for discussions with Communist Vietnamese officials where the Committee members received the remains of three American pilots from the Vietnamese. Chairman Montgomery also attended an international diplomatic conference on human rights in Europe in April 1976, where Vietnamese officials were present in order to press the Vietnamese for further information on

³Over 80 direct communications were made with senior officials in Southeast Asia.

⁴Final Report p.5.

⁵Final Report, p.3, p.45.

⁶Final Report p.53.

¹Final Report p.II.

²Final Report, p.2.

possible American POW/MIAs.

Four Committee members, including Chairman Montgomery, also met with Pathet Lao officials in Vientiane in December 1975 and six Committee members met with Lao officials in New York in August 1976. The Committee also undertook a comprehensive examination of the experiences of French POWs from the First Indochina War and the experiences of American POWs in both World War II and the Korean War.

Additionally, the Committee investigated the likelihood and probability of injury or death resulting from ejection from aircraft and parachute landing, as well as the difficulties of infection, starvation, illness, climate and hostile forces if the individual survived the ejection and parachute landing. The Committee also investigated and analyzed the extensive network of fabricators and hoaxes being perpetrated on POW/MIA families.

LIMITS OF THE INVESTIGATION

Although the Committee did extensive research and contacted numerous valuable sources of information, as in any other investigation with time and resource limitations there were some important areas that were not addressed and some sources of information that were not accessed.

First, although the Committee was successful in arranging discussions with Lao and Vietnamese officials, it had absolutely no success whatsoever in contacting Cambodian officials despite numerous and varied attempts.⁷ Additionally, although the Committee's extensive direct discussions and negotiations with the Lao and the Vietnamese were well intentioned and even effective in convincing the Indochinese governments of the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to achieving an accounting for our missing, it is clear from the record of those discussions that the Vietnamese were far more concerned at that time with obtaining from the U.S. the economic reconstruction aid package promised to them under Article 21 of the Paris Peace Accords and cited in President Nixon's February 1, 1973 letter to premier Pham Van Dong.⁸ The disparity in negotiation objectives between Committee members and the Vietnamese is evident in the Final Report:

"That searching for information on missing Americans

⁷Final Report p.15.

⁸The letter cited a figure of \$3.25 billion in economic reconstruction aid. Final Report p.11.

would not have top priority for the Vietnamese is understandable; they were rebuilding their country after a war and laying plans for the reunification of Vietnam."⁹

One subsequent source of valuable information which the Committee, as well as the Department of Defense, was unable to benefit from at the time the Committee conducted its investigation was current refugee information. The dramatic increase in the flow of Vietnamese refugees with potentially valuable information on American POW/MIAs in the months and years immediately after the Select Committee completed its work, has provide a vast amount of valuable information but regrettably has not resulted in the return of a single live American.¹⁰

The Report's Conclusions

The most significant conclusion of the Committee read as follows:

"That the results of the investigations and information gathered during its 15-month tenure have led this committee to the belief that no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina."¹¹

It must be noted that this statement applied to Americans held alive as prisoners, an important semantic distinction which is often overlooked in discussions about the Montgomery Report.

Although the Committee's conclusion that there were no living POWs left has been pilloried by many since the return of Marine PFC Robert Garwood from Vietnam in 1979, it must be noted that the Committee clearly acknowledged the likelihood of non-POW Americans still alive in Vietnam when it stated:

"[t]hat at least one deserter and one defector, the latter currently listed as a POW, were alive, in Indochina in the early 1970's and may still be alive, and that a small number of other deserters and civilians may still reside in South

⁹Final Report p.132.

¹⁰Get statistics on the number of Vietnamese leaving Vietnam since 1975.

¹¹Final Report p. vii.

Vietnam."¹²

The possibility of a few live Americans remaining in Vietnam or elsewhere in Southeast Asia voluntarily was not ruled out by the Committee's conclusion that no live prisoner's were still being held.

After examining case files the Committee concluded that of the 33 American servicemen still listed as POW at the time of the Commission, 6 of those were improperly classified as POWs at the time of their loss and no evidence of ever being taken prisoner existed for an additional 16 individuals. As a result, there were actually at least 11 confirmed American POWs who have not been accounted for by the Vietnamese.¹³

The Committee also concluded:

(1) "That, because of the nature and circumstances in which many Americans were lost in combat in Indochina, a total accounting by the Indochinese Governments is not possible and should not be expected."¹⁴

(2) "That a partial accounting by the Indochinese Governments is possible, and that the Department of Defense has the capability to assess, within reasonable limits, the nature and extent of any accounting that may be forthcoming."¹⁵

3) "The Committee did not find any dereliction or malfeasance of duty on the part of Government officials as those duties relate to the POW/MIA issue. Instead, the officials queried were knowledgeable and cooperative."¹⁶

4) "That the military security classification system figured prominently in the difficulties experienced by some MIA families and contributed to unnecessary confusion, bitterness, and rancor."¹⁷

¹²Final Report, pp.238-239.

¹³Final Report p.238.

¹⁴Final Report, p.vii.

¹⁵Final Report, p. vii.

¹⁶Final Report, p.104.

¹⁷Final Report p.241

5) "...the Department of Defense sometimes concealed actual loss sites during the "secret war in Laos" and that this information later contributed to the mistrust expressed by some next of kin. . . showing next of kin individual MIA case files . . . was an important factor in stimulating distrust among MIA families. Differences were evident between service case files and those maintained by the JCRC owing to the different purposes of these files."¹⁸

Recommendations

Among the more significant recommendations proposed by the Committee were that:

1) "the military secretaries should immediately begin individual case reviews in the manner prescribed by public law."

2) "that the Department of State promptly engage the governments of Indochina in direct discussions aimed at gaining the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans."

3) "that the House of Representatives maintain a POW/MIA oversight capability in the International Relations Committee to monitor any direct talks that may take place with Indochinese governments."¹⁹

4) "that the Department of Defense develop and promulgate regulations and instructions for more rapid declassification of intelligence information as it pertains to casualty information, to insure that such information is available as soon as possible in original or extract form in the individuals case file maintained by the parent service."²⁰

5) the military services ensure that a realistic assessment of the individual's case include a communication to the family of the slight probability of the individual's survival if that is the case, and that no encouragement of the belief that the missing man be made without a factual

¹⁸Final Report pp.240-241.

¹⁹Final Report, p.vii.

²⁰Final Report, p. 243.

basis for that encouragement.²¹

Dissenting Opinions and Critiques

Of the ten Committee Members, several filed dissenting or additional views. Congressmen Moakley filed an additional view which were subsequently joined by Congressman Ottinger. Congressman Moakley believed the Committee had no evidence to reach a conclusion that there were no Americans alive in Indochina. He also objected strenuously to the Committee's recommendation that DoD conduct a status review of all case files because such a recommendation clearly exceeded the Committee's jurisdiction. Finally he was concerned with the invocation of "executive privilege" regarding the February 1973 Nixon letter to the Vietnamese government which promised the Vietnamese a specific dollar amount in reparations.²²

Congressmen Gilman and Guyer filed "separate views" in which they disagreed with the Committee's conclusion that "the governments of Indochina may be capable of returning the remains of more than 150 Americans" saying that such a statement with a numerical limit implied was premature and unwarranted. They also disagreed with the recommendation that the moratorium on individual case reviews by the military secretaries should be lifted. To facilitate the transfer of information on POW/MIAs from the Indochinese governments the U.S. should undertake some "constructive and positive gesture." Finally they believed the Committee should not assume that all POW/MIAs were dead until the U.S. has received as full and exhaustive an accounting as is possible.²³

On February 18, 1977, The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia issued a 25-page critique of the House Select Committee's Final Report, criticizing, among other things, the limited resources and circumscribed methodology of the Committee. At pages five and six of their critique, the League claims that Congressmen Guyer and Gilman disagreed with the report's primary conclusion that "no Americans are being held alive as prisoners in Indochina." In fact, what the two Congressmen said was that the Committee

²¹Final Report, p.244.

²²Final Report, p.255.

²³Final Report, pp.257-258.

"should not consider that all POW/MIAs are dead until the United States has received as full and exhaustive an accounting as possible." The Committee's Final Report did not maintain that all POW/MIAs were dead, in fact as mentioned earlier the Committee concluded that a small number might be alive in Southeast Asia voluntarily. To conclude, as the League does, that five of the ten Congressmen opposed the primary conclusion of the investigation is a dubious one at best.

The National League of Families did, however, raise some legitimate questions as to the lack of extended debate and a formal vote on the adoption of the final report and the extensive reliance of the committee on government provided data and information. The League also believed that the Committee staff selected testimony and witnesses "to support their personal belief that no one was alive."²⁴ The League also urged further investigation of the Nixon offer of \$3.25 billion in reconstruction aid for North Vietnam and to obtain sworn testimony of Secretary Kissinger on this issue.²⁵

²⁴Analysis of the Final Report of the House Select Committee on missing Persons in Southeast Asia by the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, February 18, 1977, p.12.

²⁵League Report, p.16.

MEMORANDUM of INSPECTION
OFFICE of PRISONERS of WAR/MISSING in ACTION
Defense Intelligence Agency Inspector General's Office
24 March 1983

AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. POLICY
TOWARD POW/MIAS

U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
MINORITY STAFF

Background

In February 1983, the Defense Intelligence Agency's Inspector General's (IG) Office conducted a review of the Special Office for POW/MIA. The ten-day investigation was carried out between 15-25 February 1983, by a 5-person team. The stated purpose of the investigation was, "for the identification of issues, situations, or circumstances which affect mission performance, for the determination of the state of the economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, and for compliance with" various DoD regulations and Executive Orders dealing with Intelligence Activities.

The eight-page IG report, which is classified at the Secret level by DIA, outlined the recent history of the office, highlighted several problem areas and made several recommendations. The report concluded that the Office was operating under the assumption that POW/MIAs might still be alive in Southeast Asia and found "no evidence of illegal or improper activities."

Several of the deficiencies and recommendations noted by the IG Team were classified in the report. Among those unclassified deficiencies noted were: a heavy backlog of unresolved POW/MIA reports (1,050) a high degree of analyst exposure to political pressures, and a dire need for additional manpower. Several additional recommendations focused on DIA's role in the Interagency Group (IAG).

The IG's memo requested a reply from the POW/MIA Office to several "action items" mentioned in the report. The response, including corrective actions taken or exceptions noted, was due by 22 April 1983. [we need to get a copy of this reply]

In summary, the March 23, 1983 DIA IG inspection was apparently the first formal inspection of the POW/MIA Office. Although they found no impropriety in the office they did observe several personnel and organizational problems which needed to be addressed.

There was no evidence as to how long the investigation took to complete. The only known period of time ascertainable is from the hiring of the Chief Investigator by Senator Grassley sometime in 1989 (p.221 of 11/15 hearing) to investigate the POW issue to the publication of the Interim Report (October 29, 1990), and finally to the publication of the Final Report (May 23, 1991). The report itself consisted of 56 pages.

The investigative body was composed of three minority staffers of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and two designees of certain Republican senators, who helped the effort.

The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether the agencies of the U.S. government responsible for POW/MIA affairs were aggressively pursuing their mission of finding any live POW/MIAs.

Scope

The scope of the investigation did not include an intention to search for individual POW/MIAs. As originally proposed, the investigation was to focus on the problem of POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War and what, specifically, was being done by the U.S. government to account for these personnel.

As more information became available, however, it was felt that the evidence was clearly pointing to our government's being more interested in manipulating and managing the issue than in finding living POWs listed as missing. As stated in the report, "[A]s the investigation proceeded, the weight of the evidence of failure--a failure of the U.S. Government to meet its sacred trust--became overpowering." (p.i of Examination). Because the actions of our government bore too great a similarity to its actions in earlier wars of this century to be purely coincidental, it was considered necessary to broaden the scope of the investigation to study historical precedents in our dealings with the Communists in post-war situations. As a result, the report examined the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs in the hands of the Bolshevik regime after World War I, the Soviet regime after World War II, the North Korean regime after the Korean War, as well as

the primary examination of the Vietnamese regime after the Vietnam War.

Limits

The study is said to be based upon the examination of hundreds of once-classified cables, instructions, and memoranda now in the National Archives and the files of the various agencies. The report is surprisingly comprehensive in view of the limited personnel, finances, and time allotted to the task. If a substantive weakness exists, it could well be in the area of credibility. This is not to say that the conclusions reached in the report, painting an historical picture of Communist intransigence in all matters relating to U.S. POW/MIAs, are inaccurate. Rather, because of the instances of one-sided reporting and omissions revealed by Senator McCain during his questioning of the Chief Investigator of the report, a feeling that the evidence was skewed to compel the reader to reach certain conclusions persisted.

For example, at the November 15, 1991, hearing by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Senator McCain asked the Chief Investigator of the report questions relating to the case of LCDR J.E. Dooley, USN, shot down in 1967, and that of LT. J.M. Hickerson, USN, shot down in the same general area two months later. A North Vietnamese refugee had recently provided information indicating that he had witnessed the shoot down of one of these pilots. DoD's evaluation was that the refugee had witnessed the plight of Hickerson (p.6-3 of Examination). The Chief Investigator brought up various reasons in the report why the pilot more likely could have been Dooley and that DoD refused to see the truth (p.167-171; 187-196 of 11/15 hearing). Senator McCain addressed each detail of the report with the Chief Investigator and implied that the latter's thinking was colored by his attempt to find the government guilty of being less than forthright in its handling of these two cases.

Senator McCain also focused on that part of the report which stated that a repatriated POW said he "saw Dooley's name written on the wall of a prison cell in Hanoi." The Senator knew the facts surrounding this statement and submitted that the witness's official statement was to the effect he had seen Dooley's name on the prison wall or had heard the name from someone else (p.165 of 11/15 hearing). The Chief Investigator had omitted a most important and vital aspect of the evidence.

Last but not least, the report stated that two Thai special forces soldiers released from North Vietnamese custody in 1973 identified Dooley's photograph as a fellow inmate (p.6-3 of Examination). What was omitted was the fact that these two soldiers identified hundreds of other POW photographs, not only that of Dooley, and that in many cases they were correct and in numerous others they may have been mistaken because nothing

further was heard from those POWs so identified (p.161-164 of 11/15 hearing). Dooley fit into the latter category.

Conclusions

The conclusion of the report was succinctly stated:

"In each case [of the U.S. postwar dealings with the Communists on the issue of POW/MIAs in this century], the same dismaying scenario appears: On the Communist side, the regimes denied holding U.S. prisoners, contrary to many credible reports, while in fact they were holding the U.S. POW/MIAs as slave laborers and as reserve bargaining chips to get diplomatic recognition and financial assistance. On the U.S. side, our government downplayed or denied the reports of POW/MIAs, and failed to take adequate steps to prove or disprove the reports, while elements in our government pursued policies intended to make diplomatic recognition and financial support of the revolutionary regimes possible." (p.2 of Dear Colleague)

Recommendation

The report recommended that more time and more resources were needed to investigate U.S. Policy toward POW/MIA matters. In this regard, it asked for the establishment of a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, which in fact was done on August 2, 1991, by way of S.Res.82.

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON AMERICANS MISSING AND
UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
"WOODCOCK COMMISSION REPORT"

BACKGROUND

The Presidential Commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia chaired by Mr. Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers, was announced by the Department of State on February 25, 1977. The other members of the five member Commission included: former Senator Mike Mansfield, former Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Congressman G.V. Montgomery and Mrs. Marian Wright Edelman, Director of the Childrens' Defense Fund.¹

The Commission lasted about one month and included a trip to Vietnam and Laos March 16-20, 1977. The Commission prepared a twenty-two page Report on Trip to Vietnam and Laos March 16-20, 1977, and briefed President Carter to on March 23, 1977. Two members of the Commission, Mr. Woodcock and Congressman Montgomery, also testified on April 1, 1977 before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The Commission's goal was to help the President obtain an accounting of missing Americans in Southeast Asia. It was directed to go to Vietnam and Laos and meet with representatives of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic to seek information on our missing personnel, including the return of recoverable remains. The Commission was also instructed to receive these governments' views on matters affecting our mutual relations.²

The Commission was not a diplomatic mission in the usual sense, as it was not empowered to negotiate on behalf of the U.S. Government on matters involving relations between the U.S. and Vietnam and Laos. It was, however, given authority to reach agreement with Vietnamese and Lao authorities on matters pertaining to the question of our missing personnel in order to obtain information and recover remains.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

¹Report on Trip to Vietnam and Laos, p. 1.

²Report, p.1.

The Departments of State and Defense provided briefing material to the Commission on the background and history of the MIA issue, including details on missing individuals and on past efforts to obtain information on them, as well as a review of U.S. relations with the countries of Indochina. The first formal meeting and briefing session was at the Department of State on March 7, 1977. Dr. Henry Kenny, former staff member of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia described that Committee's 1975 trip to Hanoi and Vientiane. Mr. James D. Rosenthal, Chief of the Commission's staff, attended a meeting with Vietnamese representatives in Paris in preparation for its visit to Southeast Asia.

The Commission also met with non-governmental organizations and individuals who were concerned with the MIA problem and other matters pertinent to its mission.³ On March 7, 1977, the Commission met with representatives of the National League of Families of Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. The League said that they recognized an accounting for all the missing was impossible but some men still missing were known to be alive at one time and the American people were entitled to know what happened to them.⁴ A meeting was held on March 11th with representatives of the American Friends Service Committee, who briefed the Commission on their recent visit to Vietnam and urged consideration of humanitarian aid to that country. Mr. Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, who had been captured and released during the war in Cambodia, urged the Commission to approach Cambodia on the MIA issue, particularly in regard to the 25 international journalists missing in that county, four of whom were Americans.

Commission members also met or talked individually with persons and groups with a specific interest in the Commission's mission, such as MIA family members.

All Commission members thoroughly read the final report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, published December 13, 1976. They were told later by SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien that he had also read it. What degree of influence this Final Report had on the Commission and/or members of the Vietnamese government poses an interesting question.

On Saturday, March 12, the Commission met with President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The Commission was directed not to apologize for past relations, but to emphasize the President's desire for a new beginning with these governments on the basis of equality and mutual respect. It was instructed to seek all available MIA information and to obtain all recoverable remains from the Vietnamese and Lao and to listen

³Report, p. 2.

⁴Report, p. 3.

carefully to the concerns of these governments on other matters of mutual interest.⁵ Mr. Woodcock was asked by President Carter to deliver personal letters from him to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and to Lao President Souphanouvong.

The following day, the Commission flew to Hawaii, where it received briefings by the Department of Defense, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL).

The Commission departed Hawaii on March 13th for the Philippines where they were briefed by U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan, who gave Commission members advice based on his many years of experience in negotiating with the Vietnamese.

The Commission spent approximately 2 1/2 days in Hanoi (March 16-19) where they met with top Vietnamese government officials including Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. The atmosphere was cordial and there was no harsh rhetoric on the part of Vietnamese officials.

The highlight of the Commission's talks in Hanoi was the SRV's formal undertaking to give the U.S. immediately all available information on our missing men and to return remains as they are recovered and exhumed. The remains of 12 U.S. airmen were turned over to the Commission. The Vietnamese stated that all living U.S. military POWs had been returned and all U.S. civilians remaining in South Vietnam after April 30, 1975, who registered with the Vietnamese authorities had left the country.

The Commission was informed that the SRV had established a specialized office to seek information on missing Americans and to recover remains. The Vietnamese said they would welcome information, documents and materials to assist in the search efforts.

In a brief meeting following the final dinner, the Commission was told that American citizen Tucker Gogleman, who had stayed in Saigon after 1975, had died in Saigon in June 1976, and that his remains would be returned as soon as they could be hygienically exhumed.⁶

The Vietnamese made it clear that the subject of MIAs, normalization and aid were interrelated, but that none of these three points should be considered as pre-conditions to the other two. Vietnamese officials also expressed a strong desire to move toward normal relations with the U.S. and stated that they were prepared to establish diplomatic relations with us.

In meetings with the Commission, the Vietnamese emphasized their strong interest in receiving aid from the United States. This aid was expressed as an American "responsibility" and "obligation" from the war. Aid was generally categorized as

⁵Report, p. 3.

⁶Report, p. 8

something the United States "should" do.⁷ The Vietnamese suggested they were performing a humanitarian act in working to alleviate the suffering of the MIA families, that in fairness, the U.S. should be willing to act humanely to repair some of the destruction caused during the war. The issues of refugees, family reunification and internal Vietnamese social problems were discussed.

The Commission then flew to Vientiane early on March 19. Formal talks were held with Lao high government officials including Lao Peoples Democratic Republic President Souphanouvong.

The Lao expressed their sympathy with the MIA families and their wish to relieve the latter's suffering. They noted, however, the great difficulty of finding MIA information and remains in the rugged terrain of Laos, given the nation's small population and lack of basic material means. The Lao did assure the Commission that there were no Americans who had been captured and were alive in Laos, and all Americans captured during the war had been returned to the U.S.⁸

The Lao made clear to the Commission that they connected the MIA problem with that of U.S. assistance to "heal the wounds of war" and rebuild their country. They expressed their view that the two problems should be resolved together, since both resulted from the war.

They expressed particular concern at what they claimed was Thai support for anti-Lao Peoples Democratic Republic elements both within Laos and in Thailand.

LIMITS OF THE INVESTIGATION

Although the Commission contacted numerous valuable sources of information, as in any other Commission or investigation, with time limitations there were some important areas that were not addressed and some sources of information that were not accessed for various reasons.

The fact that the Commission was not a diplomatic mission in the usual sense, in that it was not empowered to negotiate on behalf of the U.S. Government on matters involving relations between the U.S. and Vietnam or Laos, may have encumbered the Commission mission or sent an incorrect signal to Vietnam and Laos.

Congressman G.V. Montgomery's presence on the Commission may have influenced the Commission's objectivity because he chaired

⁷Report, p. 10.

⁸Report, p. 14.

the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia that completed its fifteen month investigation on December 13, 1976. It should be noted that all Commission members thoroughly read the final report of Montgomery's Committee Report.

Due to a lack of communication between the U.S. and the Cambodian Government, and the apparent unsettled situation in Phnom Penh, the Commission decided it was best not to try to go to Cambodia. The Commission decided to attempt to arrange a contact with an Ambassador of Cambodia at a location in Southeast Asia. A representative of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing delivered a formal request for such a meeting to the Cambodian Embassy. On March 19, Radio Phnom Penh carried the text of a press communique issued by the Cambodian Foreign Ministry refusing the request and hurling back invective at the U.S. The Commission was unable to meet with any representatives of the Cambodian government and therefore no further information was obtained about missing or killed Americans in that country.

THE REPORT'S CONCLUSION

The Commission concluded that it would be best to approach the Vietnamese in a humanitarian spirit of mutual cooperation, looking to the future and not the past which seemed to always focus on war. The treatment of the Commission by the Vietnamese leadership indicated the importance they placed on the visit and its genuine desire for a new and improved relationship with the United States. Furthermore, the Vietnamese made it clear that the issues of normalization of relations, aid and POW/MIA were all "interrelated" but none of these three points should be considered as a precondition to the other two. The Commission also concluded from its visit to Laos that the Lao probably had considerably less information on MIAs than the Vietnamese, and were less able to develop additional information or locate remains.⁹

The Commission's visit appeared to create a new and favorable climate for improved relations with both Vietnam and Laos.

The Commission specifically concluded:

1. There is no evidence to indicate that any American POWs from the Indochina conflict remain alive.
2. Americans who stayed in Vietnam after April 30, 1975, who registered with the Foreign Ministry and wished to leave have probably all been allowed to depart the country.

⁹Report, p. 15.

3. Although there continue to be occasional rumors of deserters or defectors still living in Indochina, the Commission found no evidence to support this conjecture.
4. The Vietnamese have not given us all the information they probably have, in part because of their concentration on the return of remains. The Commission believes it succeeded in making clear to the Vietnamese the importance we attach to receiving all kinds of information, however slight or fragmentary it may be.
5. The Vietnamese gave a clear formal assurance that they would look for MIA information and remains and that they would provide such information and remains to the U.S. They did not make this specifically contingent on our provision of aid, but they do see action on MIAs as related to resolution of other issues of concern to them.
6. For reasons of terrain, climate, circumstances of loss, and passage of time, it is probable that no accounting will ever be possible for most of the Americans lost in Indochina. Even where information may once have been available, it may no longer be recoverable due to the ravages of time and physical changes.
7. A new procedure has been established for the continuing exchange of MIA information between the U.S. and the SRV. The U.S. will use this mechanism to furnish additional information and materials to assist MIA searches.
8. The Lao authorities called attention to the difficulty of MIA search efforts in view of the difficult terrain in their country, but undertook to provide information and remains as they were found.
9. The Commission was unable to meet with representatives of the Cambodian Government. That government has repeatedly denied that it holds any foreign prisoners, and the Commission considers it unlikely that additional MIA information will be forthcoming from that country.¹⁰

¹⁰Report, p. 19.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Among the more significant recommendations proposed by the Commission were that:

1. The Commission believes that resumption of talks in Paris between representatives of the U.S. and Vietnamese governments would be a most useful way of continuing the dialogue begun during its mission to Hanoi.
2. The Commission believes that normalization of relations affords the best prospect for obtaining a fuller accounting for our missing personnel and recommends that the normalization process be pursued vigorously for this as well as other reasons.
3. The Commission believes it most important to continue the technical exchanges with the Vietnamese Agency on Accounting for MIAs which were initiated in Hanoi.
4. In addition to talks in Paris, consideration should be given to proposing that a U.S. representative personally bring such information to Hanoi, and to inviting Vietnamese representatives to visit the U.S. Central Identification Laboratory in Honolulu.
5. In view of the Vietnamese statements that they could be glad to receive material assistance to aid their search for U.S. remains, the Commission recommends that this subject be considered promptly within the U.S. Government with a view to quickly providing whatever assistance is appropriate.
6. Consideration should also be given to offering technical advice and assistance on defusing unexploded ordnance, which the Commission understands continues to be a serious problem in some areas. An international agency such as UNHCR could be helpful in arrangements for providing such information.
7. Another possible action would be to encourage private American groups to increase humanitarian aid programs for Indochina, in such areas as food and medical supplies, including prosthetic equipment.¹¹

¹¹Report, pp. 21-22.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

The report does not contain any dissenting opinions.

HEARINGS

A hearing was held April 1, 1977, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations chaired by Senator John Sparkman. Mr. Leonard Woodcock and Congressman G.V. Montgomery read prepared statements and answered questions from various Senators. The hearing lasted one hour and eight minutes and produced a twenty-five page report. It was a general discussion of the Commission's trip, impressions, conclusions and recommendations. Mr. Woodcock stated in response to Senator Griffin, "They say no Americans are held alive against their will. I add to that just good common sense and the passage of time. Why would they be holding Americans against their will?"¹²

¹²Hearing, p. 16.

REPORT ON THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
JANUARY 13-21, 1986 AND HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ON
"LIVE SIGHTING" REPORTS OF AMERICANS LISTED AS MISSING
IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

BACKGROUND

In mid-January, 1986, a bipartisan delegation of the Senate and House of Representatives traveled to Thailand, Vietnam and Laos to improve Congress' knowledge of the status of America's missing in action servicemen still unaccounted for more than thirteen years after the Vietnam War. The members of the four person delegation were: Senator Frank H. Murkowski, Senator Dennis DeConcini, Representative Bob McEwen and Representative Michael Bilirakis. The trip lasted eight days, and a thirty-seven page report was published in July 1986 concerning the trip.

The delegation's report stated that an atmosphere conducive to MIA discussions with the Vietnamese and Lao had not existed until May 1981, when technical meetings between the United States and Vietnam began a productive dialogue. The U.S. delegation underlined the fact that the American people and the administration gave the highest priority to resolution of the MIA issue. Furthermore, the American people were concerned about allegations of Americans remaining in Southeast Asia via reports of live sightings and that the United States and Vietnam should consider jointly following up on these reports.

Deputy Foreign Minister Son commented that all American prisoners of war had been handed over and that Vietnam was not holding any live prisoners. Son said if any Americans were living in Vietnam, the Vietnamese Government had no knowledge of them nor were they under Vietnamese control.¹ Members of the delegation asked Son if the Vietnamese would have any objections to an independent, international organization, such as the Red Cross, aiding in the investigation of live sightings. The U.S. delegation stressed that such an organization, with free access to the Vietnamese countryside would have credibility with many countries. However, the Deputy Foreign Minister rejected this proposal, stating that such an organization or any outside group

¹Report of the Congressional Delegation Visit to Southeast Asia, p. 15.

would violate Vietnam's sovereignty and would interfere with Vietnam's internal affairs.

The U.S. delegation met with Ambassadors from Great Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium while in Hanoi. Each of the Ambassadors stated that they had access to most of the country and at no time had they or their staffs been aware of any Americans living either in captivity or of their own volition in Vietnam. They stressed their degree of access and were very candid in their assessment that the Vietnamese were not holding Americans against their will. However, they did indicate that it was highly probable that Americans were in Vietnam of their own volition.

A detailed chronology of U.S./SRV POW/MIA activities from May, 1981 to June, 1986 is included in the report.

The United States Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs held hearings on January 28 and 30, 1986; February 27, 1986; May 1, 1986; June 25, 1986; July 16, 1986; and August 12, 1986 on live sightings of American servicemen in Southeast Asia. There were also two executive sessions held during the hearings. The hearings were chaired by Senator Frank H. Murkowski. The Committee was comprised of twelve Senators and Mr. Anthony J. Principi was Chief Counsel/Staff Director.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The Committee conducted seven open hearings from January-August 1986, over 35 witnesses provided testimony and numerous documents were received. In addition, two executive sessions were held to receive highly classified information.

These hearings are contained in two volumes covering 780 pages of testimony and documents. Both private citizens and members of various governmental agencies were called to testify.

Senator Murkowski stated that it was the position of the Administration and one he wholeheartedly endorsed that it must be assumed that there are American servicemen living in conditions unknown to us in Southeast Asia.²

Congressman Mike Bilirakis and Congressman Bob McEwen were part of a joint Congressional team to visit Southeast Asia in January, 1986 and were extended an invitation to sit with the Committee during these hearings. The Congressional delegation was informed by Vietnamese officials during their visit in mid-

²Hearing, Volume 1, p.1.

January, 1986, that there were no Americans under their government's control. It was also indicated that the Vietnamese wanted to resolve this matter within two years.

President Reagan had declared that a resolution of this issue is of the highest national priority.

"When this Nation assumes the responsibility of sending its very best men into battle, it must also assume the responsibility of making every effort to bring them home again. If they have fallen in battle and cannot be found, then the Government is no less obligated to provide to their families and fellow citizens the fullest possible accounting for those lives given on behalf of America."³

Ms. Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director, National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, said that there had been an apathetic noneffort for about eight years, but that now a serious conscientious effort was being made. She said she knew there was no conspiracy or coverup.

Members of the national veterans group testified and urged more de-classification of information for the public and the family members.

Major Mark Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.), SFC Melvin C. McIntire, U.S. Army (Ret.) and Mr. Scott T. Barnes testified about living Americans in Southeast Asia, the disinterest of U.S. governmental officials in this issue, as well as the Col. Bo Gritz mission to rescue prisoners.

Mr. Richard F. Hebert, President of the Center for POW/MIA Accountability, Inc. said that there were individuals of the "Rambo" persuasion that pursue this matter for their own self-serving interests. Most often it is for personal financial benefit at the expense of family members and a naive public, or to gain recognition that was somehow never earned.⁴

Col. Earl P. Hopper, U.S. Army (Ret.), stated that American prisoners of war were left behind in Southeast Asia knowingly by the U.S. Government, and that some are still being held against their will. He entered two CIA documents to support his point of view. One great weakness was the failure of the U.S. intelligence agencies to develop a covert, on the ground, human intelligence capability to locate our POWs.

Colonel Hopper testified that there was a history of

³Hearing, Vol. 1, p.3.

⁴Hearing, Vol. 1, p. 81.

Communist governments keeping POWs behind. The Soviets did it to the Germans after World War II, the Vietnamese did it to the French and the North Koreans and Chinese did it to the U.S. after Korea.

Colonel Hopper thought there may have been an arrangement between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho and that for some reason, Le Duc Tho held prisoners back as bargaining pawns, not trusting Kissinger to uphold his pledge of \$3.25 billion in reconstruction aid.⁵ He was also critical of U.S. intelligence being so compartmented and that so many reports were left undecided after so many years.

Mrs. Patricia B. Skelly, Chairman of Task Force Omega, Inc., was concerned about so many DIA errors and the rhetoric of government officials with so few results.

Senator Denton said the most undeniable feature of the POW/MIA issue was and still is emotionalism. He stressed that the Vietnamese cooperation with our effort depends on what leverage we have to bring to bear against them.

Congressman Gerald B.H. Solomon stated that the idea of a coverup is absurd on its face. Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman also testified on this issue.

Lt. Col. Robert L. Howard, U.S. Army, volunteered his testimony in support of statements made by Major Mark Smith and Sergeant First Class McIntire.

Dr. Larry Ward, Founder/President Emeritus of the Food for the Hungry International, had been to Vietnam 26 or 27 times in the last six and a half years. He noted a change in the Vietnamese attitude and felt strongly that they should be given two years to resolve this issue. Dr. Ward felt there were live Americans being held against their will somewhere in Indochina and certainly there are live ones there, probably a large number of defectors.⁶

The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, said that the live sighting issue has been the U.S.' highest priority within the whole issue of Americans missing in action. He claimed that this Administration had increased the resources and manning of all aspects of the issue at DIA, JCRC, CIL, OSD and the LNO office in Bangkok. The Administration has changed the priority devoted to this issue in terms of intelligence to one of highest national

⁵Hearing, Vol. 1, p. 100.

⁶Hearing, Vol. 1, p. 143.

priority.⁷

Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, U.S. Air Force, Director, DIA, stated that the DIA office that handles POW affairs has increased fivefold in personnel since Lt. Gen. Tighe was Director of DIA. There have been many both internal and external investigations of DIA concerning coverups and abuse of witnesses. These investigations concluded that the allegations had no basis in fact. He also refuted the statements of Major Smith and SFC McIntire on DIA involvement with the Gritz operations to rescue prisoners and other statements they made about intelligence they gave DIA. He denied Mr. Scott Barnes' statement that his mission had U.S. government approval. There has not been any suppression of information by DIA, General Perroots testified.

According to Gen. Perroots, Vietnam's reluctance to allow international groups into their country could be based on several things. No one can underestimate the sovereign concerns of the Vietnamese. A history of Vietnam over the last 1300 years would indicate that nationalism is the thing foremost on their mind at all times. There could also be a reluctance to show the world what has not taken place in the sense of progress after the fall of Saigon.

Gen. Perroots testified that most of the reports turned over to DIA concerning live sightings are from refugees from Vietnam. He said it was important to treat refugees correctly or a most valuable source will not be willing to talk. General Perroots said the abuse of witnesses charges stem from a small number of people who as dissatisfied with the results.

Mr. Trowbridge of DIA testified that Pvt. Robert Garwood's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court had been denied in December 1985 and that DIA had interviewed him one time, on February 26, 1986. The information provided was over ten years old.

Another witness, Major General Moore had staff responsibility for and cognizance of the Special Forces Detachment Korea that Major Mark Smith had commanded. It was a small detachment of nine personnel with a primary mission of supporting the ROK special forces by providing special operations, technical and trade craft training. They did not have a mission to do the kind of activities that Major Smith described in his affidavits and testimony. Major Smith had no mission given to him by Pacific Command with regard to POW/MIA activities in Thailand.⁸

Major General Lauer stated that he did not recall Lt. Col. Howard's report "Possibility of POWs in Laos" ever being given to him or to ever having been briefed on this report.

DIA did receive and analyze information provided by Major Smith and SFC McIntire to the 501st MI Group Korea. The DIA analysis of these three reports determined that: (a) Smith's source was relaying unsubstantiated, hearsay information about Americans; (b) that DIA had previously received the artifacts from other sources; and (c) that the third report relayed information about an individual not missing in Southeast Asia, and an Army officer that had died in captivity in 1961. DIA interviewed SFC McIntire in 1985 and confirmed that the information in the three reports was the extent of POW-related information in his and Smith's possession.⁹

During the hearings conducted on May 1, 1986, Senator Murkowski said that the purpose of these hearings was to obtain the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing as a result of the Vietnam War.¹⁰ The Vietnamese announced that they intended to suspend the continuation of technical talks with the U.S., because of the U.S. action against Libya. Senator Murkowski went to New York for discussions with the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations on entering into a bilateral agreement to reflect the commitment and responsibilities of both nations to obtain the fullest possible accounting within the two-year time frame.

It should be noted that because Major Smith and SFC McIntire had not provided the Committee with requested information, answers to letters or returned telephone calls, it voted to exercise its power of subpoena to require Major Smith and SFC McIntire to appear. Furthermore, a subpoena was also voted to be issued to Mr. Richard Childress.

Mr. Everett Alvarez, Jr., a former POW, told the Committee about his experience as a POW for eight and a half years. His experience related only to flight crews, as with few exceptions, those were the only POWs inside his camp. The end of 1969 marked the beginning of improved conditions for POWs. By the latter part of 1972 they were living in model POW conditions because the North Vietnamese realized that a POW release would be part of any negotiatory settlement and efforts on behalf of the families of the POWs began to emerge and have an impact on public opinion both in the U.S. and abroad.¹¹ The Vietnamese have a very high

⁷Hearing, Vol. 1, p. 156.

⁸Hearing, Vol. 1, p. 231.

⁹Hearing, Vol. 1, p. 458.

¹⁰Hearing, Vol. II, p. 1.

¹¹Hearing, Vol. II, p. 18.

regard for world opinion. He could not think of any reason why the Vietnamese Government might be holding prisoners against their will.

Lt. Col. Paul Mather, USAF of the JCRC Liaison Office in Bangkok, stated that he did not compromise, in January 1984, a Thai intelligence source as claimed by Lt. Col. Howard in his affidavit, and subsequent closed session testimony.

The JCRC's most important and time-consuming task is to assist in collecting any and all information pertaining to the POW/MIA issue. Their biggest source of new information is the stream of Indochinese refugees fleeing from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. He stated that interviews of these people resulted in the submission of 900 reports containing an entire spectrum of POW/MIA information. These reports were forwarded to JCRC Headquarters in Hawaii and to DIA for review and analysis. JCRC also are involved with crash site survey and excavation activities in both Vietnam and Laos, and the repatriation of U.S. remains.

Lt. Col. Mather has worked on this issue for over ten years. He has seen lots of photographs over the years, but they are either unidentifiable or have been proven to be fraudulent. He stated that the refugees can be easily intimidated and if JCRC were to mistreat, harass or in any way turn them off, our flow of information would stop. He said JCRC would never do anything to prevent the information from flowing. Lt. Col. Mather stated he had nothing to do with Bo Gritz' rescue mission, had never given Mr. Barnes a package, or ever made the statement, "It would be in the best interest of the United States if no live POW came back," as Mr. Barnes had testified.¹²

Another hearing was held on June 25, 1986, and Senator Murkowski said that even though the committee had provided an opportunity for people to come forward to offer information relative to those missing in action, that the committee had not been provided indisputable evidence that Americans were being held against their will in Southeast Asia. The Chairman said the evidence must be more than wishful thinking or speculation as the committee needs hard facts that will satisfy the people who really need to know the truth, and those are the families of those missing in action.

Major Mark Smith was to appear before the Committee according to his attorney's letter of June 20, 1986, but did not show. Senator Murkowski asked the U.S. Marshals to locate and serve the outstanding subpoena on Major Smith and Sergeant McIntire.

¹²Hearing, Vol. II, p. 33.

Dr. William R. Maples, Curator of Physical Anthropology, Florida State Museum, University of Florida, told the Committee that a three member team which included Dr. Ellis Kerley, Dr. Lowell Levine and himself was asked by the Army to go to the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii and evaluate its procedure and staff. He discussed the Pakse crash and the remains, stating that it was quite different in its overall nature from everything else that seems to go to the Laboratory. In this case the Laboratory did a poor job, but on the whole, they do a good job. One of the advantages is the total lack of training in Vietnam. They do not know what we do in terms of identification, so they can not play games with us.¹³ In the Pakse case, they were wrong in reaching a conclusion when the remains were unidentifiable.

The committee met again on July 16, 1986, to hear testimony from Major Mark Smith and Sergeant First Class Melvin McIntire. The two had appeared before the committee on January 28, 1986, and indicated their willingness to share information and the evidence they had which would prove American servicemen had been held in captivity in Southeast Asia in 1984. They said they had photographs, maps, documents, etc. that would prove live prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. They also testified about the alleged existence of a videotape which depicts Caucasians in captivity in October 1985. Mr. Smith claimed to have viewed the 248 minutes of the tape while Mr. McIntire did not.¹⁴

Major Smith provided copies of photos which contain a total of three Americans. The photographs were provided to him by a source in Thailand who he considers reliable, showing Americans who were left in Southeast Asia at the conclusion of the Vietnam war.

As to the film in question, a letter was written to the White House and hand carried by Congressman Bill Hendon. Major Smith and Mr. Waple were to show up in Singapore with \$4.2 million in cash for Mr. Obassy to obtain the film.¹⁵

Mr. James P. Coyne, a writer appeared before the committee and said that he had been investigating the possibility of live American prisoners of war captured during the war in Vietnam still being alive. He was in Thailand for over three years as a foreign correspondent for Soldier of Fortune magazine. He feels that there are those who would trade on the POW/MIA issue for nothing more than financial gain. Some have appeared before the

¹³Hearing, Vol. II, p. 69.

¹⁴Hearing, Vol. II, p. 106.

¹⁵Hearing, Vol. II, p. 135.

committee, but the most flagrant, the most venal, have not. They remain in Thailand or elsewhere, ready to victimize those vulnerable with grief or misguided by zeal.¹⁶ He would not consider Mr. Gregson a reliable source; furthermore, Mr. Gregson is a very persecuted individual. Coyne's problem with Major Smith and SFC McIntire was their methodology in arriving at their conclusion regarding live Americans. Coyle stated that he just does not believe it.

The last and final hearing was held August 12, 1986, before the Committee. Mr. Thomas Ashworth, a private citizen, who was a Marine officer and helicopter pilot during Vietnam and was released from active duty in 1971. He claimed to have information on live Americans but testified that DIA would not talk with him when he called DIA's Carol Bates with follow-up information. He claimed he had a friend named Pau Tung Her, who told him that a friend had seen over a hundred Americans in Sam Neun Province before he escaped.¹⁷

Mr. John M. Nevin accused Dr. Henry Kissinger and Mr. Vernon Walters of lying in testimony given to a Congressional committee and Mr. Armitage and Mr. Wolfowitz of withholding information from the committee. He claimed there was a coverup and said he had reams of evidence that was already in the hands of the U.S. government.

It was pointed out by Committee members that the problem with much of the testimony was that it relied on second and third hand stories, and not hard, concrete facts.

Major Mark Smith appeared again before the committee and stated that seven U.S. Congressmen have reached the same conclusion that American POWs remain captive in Southeast Asia. He provided the committee with what he considered to be strong circumstantial evidence that Americans may be alive and in captivity in Southeast Asia.¹⁸ He tried to talk to one of the individuals in the picture in 1981, but the man refused to talk.

Major Smith requested Mr. Obassy to make a film in mid-1985 of mining and timber operations in Laos using slave labor, but Mr. Obassy would not turn over the film to him. He has seen the film and the weaponry displayed in it makes it post-1975. Mr. Waple has seen one-third of the film twice. Arrangements for \$4.2 million in the Bank of America to obtain the film were provided by Lt. Gen. Perroots of DIA.

¹⁶Hearing, Vol. II, p. 148.

¹⁷Hearing, Vol. II, p. 175.

¹⁸Hearing, Vol. II, p. 199.

Brig. General James W. Shufelt, U.S. Army, Deputy Director of DIA, told the committee that the POW/MIA shop had doubled to 28 personnel from a year ago. DIA had analyzed the materials provided to the committee by Major Smith on July 16, 1986, and concluded that the entire package contained absolutely no proof of live American prisoners being held in Southeast Asia.¹⁹ Shufelt testified that the U.S. Government had stated repeatedly it would not pay for information and that the U.S. Government was not providing \$4.2 million for the film. There is no intelligence from the three pictures as the location of where they were taken can not be determined. There was not a coverup at DIA. Intelligence is somewhat a subjective game and, whether you are dealing with POWs or the number of T-80 tanks the Soviets have and are producing, there are always going to be analytical differences based with the information available between analysts and between intelligence agencies that deal on the production of intelligence.²⁰ He testified DIA had only received four photos and no POW names from Major Smith-SFC McIntire. DIA had met with Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Nevin, both of whom had been witnesses before the Committee, and the problem was that DIA did not reach the conclusion that they would like DIA to reach and that caused conflict.

There was an interesting exchange of letters between Senator Murkowski and Congressman Hendon in the Appendix.²¹

LIMITS OF THE HEARINGS

It is interesting to note that at the first of the seven hearings held, Senator Murkowski stated that it was important to note at the start that the committee would not necessarily reach any conclusions. The committee did not publish a final report, so it appears that they, in fact, did not reach any conclusion or have any recommendations on this most important subject matter.

The Committee received many mixed signals from the various witnesses. Several witnesses claimed to have proof that American POWs were alive in Southeast Asia, but were unable throughout the hearing to establish hard facts to support this conclusion. Some of the witnesses contended that various government officials and agencies had lied, withheld information, or were involved in a coverup. The agencies denied that there was a coverup and disputed the testimony of those that leveled the allegations.

¹⁹Hearing, Vol. II, p. 225.

²⁰Hearing, Vol. II, p. 230.

²¹Hearing, Vol. II, p. 251.

The charges and denials are far apart - where or where is the truth?

The Administration said that the resolution of Americans missing in action was a matter of the highest national priorities. It has been over six years since these hearings were concluded, and while some progress has been made, this issue lingers on and on and is the core of great frustration for the families as well as the Administration.

Vietnam asked for two years to settle this issue. It has now been six - how much longer will it take.

The Committee heard very dedicated witnesses who testified concerning their particular beliefs with regard to the MIA/POW issue and the allegations of a coverup but in essence ended up facing a catch-22 situation. The Committee pleaded for individuals to come forward or to meet with them individually to establish the plain fact that there were Americans being held in Southeast Asia - but none, in the eyes of the Committee, did so.

Appendix 4

Witnesses

APPENDIX 4

Witnesses

Ken Albrecht: Mr. Albrecht is the President of the National Charities Information Bureau, Inc., a non-profit organization that sets standards and monitors other charitable organizations. George H. Aldrich: Mr. Aldrich was a legal advisor to the State Department (1965-81).

George Aldrich: Former legal advisor to the Department of State and was involved in the Paris Peace Accord negotiations. Author of The Interpretation of the Paris Peace Accords.

Dolores Alfond: Mrs. Alfond is the National Chairperson of the National Families Alliance. Her brother is listed as Missing in Action.

Joseph E. Andry: Mr. Andry is a former Commander of the Disabled American Veterans (1990-91).

Richard Armitage: Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1982.

Thomas Ashworth: Mr. Ashworth is a Marine Corps combat veteran of the war in Vietnam, an author and speaker, and an expert in the archival resources pertaining to POWs and the missing from World War II, Korea and Indochina.

Jack Bailey: Retired Lt. Col, US Air Force. Involved in POW/MIA matters as the head of Operation Rescue.

Howard Baker: Former senator and Majority Leader from Tennessee and Chief of Staff at the White House under Pres. Reagan.

Garnett Bell: Special assistant for negotiations on POW/MIAs for commander, JTF-FA. Testified before the Committee in 11/91. Employed by JTF-FA. Currently stationed in Bangkok, Thailand.

Errol Bond: Mr. Bond was Vice-President of Support Our POW/MIAs, Inc., a tax-exempt organization that laundered money that went to support the Laotian Resistance.

Tim Brockman: Former Army Security Agency Crypto operator in 1974. Related to Lippert deposition.

RADM Thomas Brooks: (USN, Ret.) Former supervisor of the POW/MIA office at DIA. Author of Brooks Memorandum critical of DIA published in September 1985.

John Brown: John M. G. Brown is an infantry combat veteran of the

war in Vietnam, an author and a researcher who has extensive knowledge of the sources of information pertaining to American and Allied POWs and MIAs from World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Col., USAF, DoD Central Documentation Office.

Ed Brown: Mr. Brown is the Public Charities Director for the Office of the Secretary of State of South Carolina. He is responsible for all public charities registration and compliance within the state.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: Mr. Brzezinski was a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council (1966-68), Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1977-81), and a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (1987-91).

Dennis Buckner: Mr. Buckner contributed approximately \$3000 to the failed "Team Falcon" POW rescue mission.

Larry Budge: Army General (Ret.), who was a Major during the Four Party Joint Commission.

Linda Canada: Ms. Canada is an account representative for Eberle & Associates, a professional fundraising company. Ms. Canada was responsible for the Jack Bailey/Operation Rescue account.

James Cannon: Former Assistant to former White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker.

Frank Carlucci: Former Secretary of Defense during Reagan Administration.

CPT Cynthia A. Chambers: Captain Chambers is currently an Intelligence Officer, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing In Action, DIA.

COL Richard T. Childress (USA, Ret.): Mr. Childress served as General Staff Officer for Asian Affairs, Department of the Army (1978-81), and as NSC Director of Asian Affairs and Political Military Affairs (1981-1989).

MG George R. Christmas: Major General Christmas is the Director for Operations, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (1991-Present).

LG James R. Clapper, Jr.: Lieutenant General Clapper has served as Director for Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, and Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. He is currently Director of the DIA.

William Clements: Mr. Clements served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1973-76).

COL John M. Cole: Colonel Cole is the Chief of the STONY BEACH

Team (DIA), Bangkok, Thailand (1990-present) whose mission is to collect information on POWs and MIAs in Indochina.
Marvin Connor: NSA Specialist - SEA Analyst. Familiar with SIGINT collection on POW/MIAs.

Jim Coyne: Mr. Coyne is a reporter formerly associated with Soldier of Fortune magazine. He has spent many years in Southeast Asia reporting on POW/MIA developments and POW/MIA hunters.

Daul:

Steve Davis: Civilian employee of electric company that maintained US military communication systems in Saigon in 1975.

LTC John R. Deane (USA, Ret): General Deane (USA, Ret.) is a distinguished airborne infantry officer with extensive combat experience who was briefly the Director at the Defense Intelligence Agency in 1973.

Michael Deaver: Special Assistant to President, 1981.

Dieter Dengler: Mr. Dengler was a U.S. Navy aviator who was shot down in Laos and held prisoner there. He escaped after months of captivity and was rescued.

Robert DeStatte: Mr. DeStatte is a Senior Analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Lawrence Devlin: Former intelligence person in Laos, 1970-73.

Robert Dussault: Joint Staff SERA, Ft. Belvoir with information regarding documents transmitted to Committee.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Mr. Eagleburger served as Executive Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1969), Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Operations (1973), and Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State (1975-77).

Bruce Eberle: Mr. Eberle is the President of Eberle & Associates, Inc., a professional fundraising company that prepared direct mail solicitations for Jack Bailey's Operation Rescue, and other charitable organizations.

Martha Eddy: Ms. Eddy is a live POW activist and the President of the Michigan POW/MIA Committee.

David Elder: Mr. Elder is Co-Director of American Friends Service Committee, and is responsible for programs in Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam.

Larry Feldman: Mr. Feldman was connected with the dissemination of

the Donald Carr photographs and was present when Red McDaniel's representatives attempted to raise money for the purchase of weapons for Vang Pao.

John Fisher: Mr. Fisher is the Chairman of the Board of the American Security Counsel Foundation, a conservative organization that donated money through Support Our POW/MIA's, Inc. believing it was for a government sanctioned operation.

Jerry Friedheim: Mr. Friedheim served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (1969-73) and Assistant Secretary of Defense (1973-75).

Robert Garwood: Mr. Garwood was a U.S. Marine enlisted man who was captured by the Viet Cong near Danang in 1965. After years of privation in primitive camps in the south, he was moved north and employed by the North Vietnamese as a mechanic. He was repatriated in 1979 and convicted by a General Court Martial for collaboration with the enemy.

Hamilton Gayden: Judge Gayden is the author of To Circle the Cross, a fictional account of an American POW imprisoned in Southeast Asia fifteen years after the signing Paris Peace Treaty.

Tim Geraghty: Retired military officer with information related to POW/MIAs.

Alisa Getzinger: Ms. Getzinger is an Account Representative for a telemarketing firm known as Infocision Management Corp. Ms. Getzinger is responsible for the Veteran of the Vietnam War, Inc. account.

Judy Gin: Translator during Garwood Trial.

G. McMurtie Godley: Mr. Godley served as U.S. Ambassador to Laos (1969-1973), and was designated Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs.

Don Gordan: Retired Army Special Operations Officer with information on Nhom Morrat.

Daniel Warren Gray: Mr. Gray is currently Chief of the Current Operations Branch, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, DIA.

Ann Griffiths: Mrs. Griffiths is the Executive Director of the National League of POW/MIA families. Her brother is listed as Missing in Action. She is also the only civilian member of the Interagency Group ("IAG").

James "Bo" Gritz: LTC Gritz is a highly decorated former Special

Forces officer who ran failed POW rescue missions known as Operation Velvet Hammer, Operation Lazarus and Operation Grand Eagle. Mr. Gritz ran for President in 1992 on the Populist ticket.

GEN Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (USA, Ret.): General Haig served as Senior Military Advisor to Dr. Henry Kissinger (1969-73), Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, White House Chief of Staff (1973-74), and Secretary of State (1981-82).

N. Hieu:

Trong Hieu: A Vietnamese refugee from North Vietnam.

Richard Holbrooke: Mr. Holbrooke served as Staff Assistant to the American Ambassador to Saigon (1965-66), on the White House Staff, Office of the Assistant to the President for Vietnam (1966-67), and as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks (1968-69).

John Holdridge: Mr. Holdridge served in the State Department as Deputy Director and Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1966-68), and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific.

Eugene Hollis: Deputy Chief of JCRC in 1974.

Thach Hon:

J. Hugh:

Burt Hurlbut: Mr. Hurlbut is a Texas oil executive that helped raise money for Support Our POW/MIAs, Inc., a tax-exempt organization that laundered money that went to support the Laotian Resistance.

Pat Hurt: Former DIA POW/MIA Analyst, has information on Nhom Morrat.

ADM Bobby R. Inman (USN, Ret.): Admiral Inman served as Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy ((1974-76), Vice Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (1976-77), and Director of the National Security Agency (1977-81).

Bobby Inman: Retired Navy Admiral, Former Deputy Director CIA

H. Isham:

Monika Jensen-Stevenson: Mrs. Stevenson is co-author of Kiss the Boys Goodbye. The book, about American POW's in Vietnam, grew out of a story she produced in 1985 for a television news show.

Stephen T. Johnson: Mr. Johnson has served in the Department of

State as a Political Officer in Saigon, Nha Trang, and Vientiane, as Vietnam Desk Officer, and as an Analyst for Indochina, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Helen Johnson: Former Army Security Crypto operator in 1974. Related to Lippert deposition.

Ivan Kalister: Mr. Kalister is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent that investigated John LeBoutillier's purchase of ten handguns intended for export to Southeast Asia.

Oleg Kalugin: Retired General of the KGB who testified before the Committee that certain KGB agents had interrogated 3 American POWs after 1973 in Vietnam.

Emmet Kay: A civilian employee of Air America who was shot down over Laos in 1973 and was a POW for over a year.

Richard Thomas Kennedy: Mr. Kennedy served as Director, Staff Planning and Coordination, NSC (1971-72) and Deputy Assistant to the President for NSC Planning (1973-75).

Patrick Khamvongsa: A former member of the Royal Lao Air Force who has been active in the Lao resistance.

GEN Robert Kingston (USA, Ret.): General Kingston is a distinguished infantry and Special Forces officer who served as the Commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (1973-74).

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger: Dr. Kissinger served as National Security Advisor to President Nixon (1969), negotiating the Paris Peace Accords settlement in January, 1973. He served as Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977.

Thomas Lacy: Retired Brigadier General with information on POW/MIA.

Melvin R. Laird: Mr. Laird was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives before becoming Secretary of Defense (1969-73), and Counsellor to the President for Domestic Affairs (1973-74).

Steve Lippert: Former Army Security Agency crypto operator with information on intercepts in 1974.

Winston Lord: Mr. Lord was a member of the NSC staff (1969-73), Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1970-73), and Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1973-77).

LT Paul K. Maguire: Lieutenant Maguire currently serves as a Multi-Sensor Fusion Analyst, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, DIA.

C. Murphy Martin: Mr. Martin was President of United We Stand and travelled to Vietnam to publicize the plight of American POW's.

Murphy Martin: An employee of Ross Perot.

Michael Martin:

Ronald Martin: Mr. Martin was helped to coordinate, but later disassociated himself from the failed "Team Falcon" POW rescue mission.

Bud Matthews: Lt. Col. in the U.S. Air Force attached to CDO with information regarding documents transmitted to Committee.

Bud Matthews: Already discussed. Continuation of deposition.

O. Matthews:

Robert McFarland: Former National Security Advisor in mid-80s.

Ted McGarry: Mr. McGarry coordinated the communications in the United States for the failed "Team Falcon" POW rescue mission, and was responsible for the "welcome home" when live POWs were to return.

Harry McKillop: An associate of Mr. Perot, Mr. McKillop has travelled to Vietnam on several occasions in an effort to obtain information regarding American POW/MIA's.

John McMahon: Former DDO/CIA in the early 80s with information on Nhom Morrat.

Edwin Meese: Former Attorney General of the United States under President Ronald Reagan.

Thomas Meurer: Mr. Meurer was President of United We Stand and has travelled to Vietnam seeking information on American POW/MIA's.

Paul Miles: Was a Major in Vietnam during the Four Party Joint Commission.

Karen Miller: Ms. Miller is the 1st cousin of MIA Donald Carr. She is knowledgeable about the dissemination of the photographs of Gunther Deitrick which were held out to be Donald Carr.

Charles Mills: DoD Central Documentation Office civilian employee with information regarding documents transmitted to Committee.

Terry Minarcin: Former army cryptanalyst testified before the Committee on message traffic that he allegedly saw in early 70s.

Jerry Mooney: Former Air Force cryptanalyst currently living in Montana testified before the Committee that he decyphered several messages of movement of US POWs in early 70s.

ADM Thomas Moorer (USN, Ret.): Admiral Moorer served as Chief of Naval Operations (1967-70) and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1970-74).

Mortician: The ethnic Chinese North Vietnamese who prepared several remains and testified before Congress that they were stored in Hanoi. Currently living in Atlanta, GA and recently spent 2-3 days at CIL-HI looking over and trying to identify remains.

ADM Daniel J. Murphy (USN, Ret.): Admiral Murphy served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence (1976-77).

John D. Negroponte: Mr. Negroponte was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks (1968-69) and served on the NSC Staff (1970-73).

Richard M. Nixon: President Nixon served two terms as Vice-President under Eisenhower, and won presidential elections in 1968 and 1972. He resigned the Presidency in August, 1974.

Nouvaprosite:

Edward O'Connor: Retired Major General, US Army, who was a Major during the Four Party Joint Commission.

John T. Odell: Retired NSA SEA Group Chief.

Russell Ogan: Retired USAF General, Former Director of POW/MIA Task Force 1972/1973.

Michael Oksenberg: Mr. Oksenberg served as a member of the National Security Council Staff (1976-78).

Patricia O'Grady: Dr. O'Grady has sat on the Board of Directors of the National League of Families and has written and researched extensively on the POW/MIA subject. Her father is listed as Prisoner of War.

H. Ross Perot: Mr. Perot worked for several years to improve the treatment of American POW's held in North Vietnam. He has remained very active in the POW/MIA issue, and has travelled to Southeast Asia on several occasions.

LG Leonard Perroots: Lieutenant General Perroots was Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (1985-88).

Steven Pittendrigh: Mr. Pittendrigh is a Vice President of a

telemarketing firm known as Infocision Management Corp. His clients include Veterans of the Vietnam War, Inc. and John LeBoutillier/Skyhook II.

GEN Colin L. Powell: General Powell served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1987-89) and as Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He is currently serving his second term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Marilyn Price: Ms. Price is President of a professional fundraising company known as The Creative Advantage. Ms. Price's clients include Veterans of the Vietnam War, Inc.

Mark S. Pratt: Mr. Pratt served in the State Department as a Political/Military Officer in Vientiane and Laos (1963-68), on the Interagency Ad Hoc Group on Indochina (1968-73), and as a member of the U.S. delegation to the International Conference on Vietnam.

Richard Rand: Consul of US Embassy, Laos, 1973.

Elliot Richardson: Mr. Richardson served as Secretary of Defense (January - May 1973) among other positions he held in the government, such as Attorney General of the U.S.

John Robinson: Mr. Robinson is the General Manager of the Washington Intelligence Bureau, a company which provides caging and mailing services to fundraising organizations including Operation Rescue and Veterans of the Vietnam War, Inc.

COL Lawrence Robson (USAF, Ret.): Colonel Robson served as Personnel Plans Officer for POW/MIA, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and as Deputy Chief, POW Subcommittee, Four Party Joint Military Commission.

Lawrence Robson: Retired Col., US Air Force, was a Lt. Col. and the Deputy US Delegate to the PW Subcommittee of the Four Party Joint Commission. Was the individual who received the nine POWs from Laos in Hanoi on March 28, 1973.

Jeff Rock:

Peter W. Rodman: Mr. Rodman was a member of the NSC staff (1969-77) and special assistant to Dr. Henry Kissinger and then Brent Scowcroft.

William P. Rogers: Mr. Rogers served as Secretary of State (1969-1973)

Kenneth Rush: Mr. Rush served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1972-73) and Deputy Secretary of State (1973-74).

B.H. Russell: Retired Col., US Army, head of Four Party Joint

Commission, PW subcommission.

MG Michael Ryan: Major General Ryan is Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff (1991-Present).

Joseph Salta: Mr. Salta is President of Response Development Corp., a professional fundraising company. Mr. Salta's clients include John LeBoutillier/Skyhook II.

Ted Sampley: Mr. Sampley is a combat veteran of the Vietnam War who was the Deputy Coordinator of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition. He is currently Chairman of the Homecoming II Project.

Kong Sautey:

MAJ Jeannie H. Schiff: Major Schiff is Deputy Chief, Current Operations Branch, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, DIA.

James R. Schlesinger: Mr. Schlesinger has served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (1973) and Secretary of Defense (1973-74).

James Schlesinger: Former Director of CIA and Sec. of Defense, 1973-1975.

Schworz:

Brent Scowcroft: Mr. Scowcroft served as Military Assistant to the President (1973-75), and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1978-81).

MG Richard V. Secord (USAF, Ret.): Major General Secord served in Vietnam (1962) and Laos (1966-69), spending much of the latter period detailed to the CIA. He later headed the Southeast Asia Branch, East Asia and Pacific Region, OSD (1972).

Robert R. Sheetz: Mr. Sheetz is currently Chief of the DIA's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

Patricia Sheridan: Mrs. Sheridan is the Executive Director of the Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association in Derby, Kansas, a non-profit organization that provides scholarships to children of POW/MIA/KIA servicemen.

Michael Sherwood:

Roger E. Shields: Mr. Shields served in the Defense Department as Deputy Assistant Director for International Economic and POW/MIA Affairs (1971-77).

Roger Shields: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sea

Affairs, Employee of the Department of Defense who was in charge of the POW/MIA task force-- office heavily involved with the POW/MIA issue.

Al Shinkle: A retired USAF intelligence officer who has been involved with POW/MIA Affairs and worked for John LaBoutier for Skyhook II. Mr. Shinkle currently lives in Thailand.

Khambang Sibounheuang: Mr. Sibounheuang, a Laotian American, is an assistant to Judge Hamilton Gayden in Nashville, TN. He has been responsible for disseminating a great deal of erroneous POW/MIA information in the U.S. He has also served as an interpreter on several failed POW/MIA rescue missions.

Frank Sieverts: Mr. Sieverts is the Special Assistant for POW/MIA Affairs, Department of State (1966-78).

Frank Sieverts: Worked for the Department of State with POW/MIA public affairs.

Mark Smith: Former green beret who was involved in the circulation of a tape purported to show live POWs.

John F. Sommer: Mr. Sommer is the Executive Director of the Washington Office of The American Legion.

Harold Sprague: DoD Central Documentation Office employee with information regarding documents transmitted to Committee.

John Stein: Retired former DDO/CIA in mid 80s.

Curtis Stern: Mr. Stern is an Account Representative for a telemarketing firm known as Infocision Management Corp. Mr. Stern is responsible for the John LeBoutillier/Skyhook II account.

William Stevenson: Correspondent and co-author of Kiss the Boys Goodbye, Mr. Stevenson won the release of a Canadian pilot from the Chinese (1957) and discovered French prisoners in Indochina several years after Dien Bien Phu.

William H. Sullivan: Mr. Sullivan served as U.S. Ambassador to Laos (1964-68), Chief of U.S. Mission to Laos (1968-69), and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1969-73).

Robert Sungenis: Mr. Sungenis is Chief of the Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports, Office of the Secretary of Defense (1973-92).

Robert Sungenis: A civil service employee of the Department of Defense who was in charge of casualty records. Appeared before the Committee, but barely testified.

Gary Sydow: Mr. Sydow is currently Chief of the Analysis Branch, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, DIA.

Charley Taylor: Mr. Taylor travelled to Thailand to coordinate the communications for the failed "Team Falcon" POW rescue mission.

LG Eugene Tighe: Lieutenant General Tighe was CINCPAC Chief of Intelligence (1972-73), Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977-81), and director of the commission that produced the critique of DIA's handling of the POW/MIA issue called "The Tighe Report."

Eugene Tighe: Retired Lt. General U.S. Air Force, and former director of the DIA from 1977-1981-- has testified before the Committee. Also headed up the Tighe Commission which issued the Tighe report.

Bui Tin: Colonel Tin took the surrender of the South Vietnamese government in the presidential palace (30 April, 1975). He later served as editor of the Communist party newspaper Nhan Dan, but has since been expelled from the party for his criticism of the government.

Barry Toll: Former US Army enlisted person who worked at the Air Borne command post who allegedly saw certain messages on POWs in Laos and also the transfer of US POWs to East Germany.

Hugh Tovar: Former Intelligence person in Laos.

Charles Trowbridge: Mr. Trowbridge is Deputy Director of the Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency (1971-92).

Charles Trowbridge: Retired Navy Commander, for many years was Deputy Director at the DIA in their POW/MIA branch. Has testified before the Committee.

Jerry Tuttle: Admiral who was Deputy Director of DIA under General Tighe, 1979-1981.

Richard Upavong:

GEN John W. Vessey, Jr.: General Vessey served two terms as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1982-85). He is currently the Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs (1987-Present).

Captain Raymond Vohden: A former Navy POW who was in charge of the DoD POW/MIA branch in 1973.

Robert E. Wallace: Mr. Wallace served as Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (1991-92). Director of the CIA (1972-76).

Vernon Walters: Retired General, US Army. Attache to Paris who arranged Dr. Kissinger's secret meetings with the North Vietnamese, Former US Ambassador to the Attorney General.

Chuck Wells: Legislative liaison for CDO with information regarding documents transmitted to Committee.

Charles Whitehouse: DCM to Ambassador Bunker in South Vietnam in 1972-73. In late 1973, became Ambassador to Laos.

GEN John A. Wickham, Jr. (USA Ret.): General Wickham was Deputy Chief Negotiator of the U.S. Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Commission, Republic of Vietnam (1973), and Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (1973-76) and Chief of Staff, United States Army.

General John A. Wickam: Retired Former Chief of Staff, US Army. The Deputy US Delegate to the Four Party Joint Commission.

Appendix 5

Excerpts from Selected Documents

A. Kissinger...that the United States will use its maximum influence to secure the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam..."

Regarding Laos and Cambodia - Message in the Name of the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, October 21, 1972...(b)...the Americans captured in Laos will be promptly released, before December 30, 1972...(c) ...The DRV side has been clearly informed that there is no American captive in Cambodia..."

"Message from the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Dated October 22, 1972:

The President notes with appreciation the message from the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which satisfies all his points with respect to Laos and Cambodia as well as U.S. prisoners."

01/29/73 WASAG meeting (hoping for 40-41 POWs from Laos)

WASAG meeting takes place at White House. Dr. Kissinger and another NSC official are both advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department that they are "hoping" for "40-41" American prisoners of war in Laos...

02/01/73 Nixon's letter on war reparations

The North Vietnamese provide a list...which is represented as the list of American POWs captured in Laos. The list is exchanged simultaneously with a private communication to North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong from President Richard Nixon.

The letter from President Nixon reads:

"1. The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions. 2. Preliminary U.S. studies indicate that the appropriate programs for the U.S. contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of 3.25 billion of grant aid over 5 years... 3. The U.S. will propose to the DRV the formation of a Joint Economic Commission... (4.) to develop programs for the U.S. contribution to reconstruction of North Vietnam..."

02/02/73 Nixon to North Vietnam PM (Laos list is unsatisfactory)

...the following message is delivered to the North Vietnamese Prime Minister from President Nixon...:

"The list of American prisoners held in Laos which was presented in Paris on February 1st is unsatisfactory. U.S. record show...317

American military men unaccounted for in Laos and it is inconceivable that only ten of these men would be held prisoner in Laos...implementation of any American undertaking is related to the satisfactory resolution of this problem..."

02/01/73 DIA Analysis of Enemy Lists and List of 82

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense.

1.The enclosure provides a summary of the number of U.S. prisoners reportedly alive and/or deceased...in terms of the Defense Intelligence Agency status. The figures presented vary slightly with official Service casualty statistics.

2.Figures provided are the result of analysis of prisoner files provided...by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong representatives on 27 January 1973.

Analysis of Enemy Lists on U.S. Personnel* - U.S. Personnel Listed as PW by DIA Who are not on Either the Alive or Dead Lists:

USA - 21; USN - 27; USAF - 22; USMC - 3; Civilian - 14; Total 87.

02/06/73 DIA Memo to Kissinger (talking points)

"There are approximately 350 U.S. military and civilians listed as missing or captured in Laos. Of this total, approximately 215 men were lost under such circumstances that the enemy probably has information regarding their fate."

"The PLF list of 10 personnel captured in Laos (provided by DRV on 1 February 1973)...the list consisted of personnel captured by the North Vietnamese in Laos rather than the Pathet Lao... The PLF list did not state whether these men were dead or alive, or whether that are to be released. The PLF list is incomplete..."

"There are approximately 300 crash sites in Laos...Because of the presence of North Vietnamese forces, it can be reasonably assumed that the North Vietnamese would have some knowledge on the fate of missing/captured personnel in these areas."

"There is evidence that the Pathet Lao have information on captured/missing U.S. personnel and should be able to provide a list of alive U.S. PW's and information on the fate of many others."

"The North Vietnamese, because of their presence in parts of Laos, should have more information than provided to date on captured/missing U.S. personnel..."

02/14/73 Joint Communique (creating joint economic commission)

The United States and North Vietnam issue a joint communique to create a joint economic commission to oversee rebuilding Vietnam

with U.S. dollars...The communique is a result of Dr. Kissinger's Hanoi visit.

02/21/73 Peace Agreement with Laos

The "Agreement on Restoring Peace and Achieving National Concord in Laos" is signed...Chapter II, Article 5...provides for the release of "all persons, regardless of nationality, who have been captured and detained"...within 60 days after the setting up of the Provisional National Union Government...After all those who were captured have been returned, each side has the duty to gather information on those missing during the war and report the information to the other side."

03/13/73 WASAG Minutes (Laos POW concerns)

WASAG Meeting takes place at White House.

State: "You won't complete the withdrawal until the Lao prisoners are released?"

Kissinger: "Yes, that's right."

Defense: "How many are there in Laos?"

NSC Staff: "They've told us they hold more American prisoners than the eight on the list we received from North Vietnam."

State: "We've had contact with the Pathet Lao several times."

Kissinger: "And they have admitted they hold more?"

State: "Yes."

Kissinger: "I didn't know that. How many more?"

State: "They haven't said. They've been giving us the runaround on the details..."

03/14/73 Kissinger Memo to Nixon (recommending bombing Laos)

On March 14th, President Nixon approves a request from Henry Kissinger to plan "for a 2-3 day series of intensive U.S. air strikes against the trail area of Southern Laos to be conducted immediately after release of the third increment of POWs is completed on March 16th"...The purpose of the bombing is described... as a "response to continued North Vietnamese infiltration and logistics activity in the South."

03/21 and 03/22/73 DIA to Moorer on POWs and Moorer Cables

"...The U.S. will complete the withdrawal of its military forces ...in accordance with the terms of the agreement..with the released of all, repeat all American prisoners held throughout Indochina."
"Do not commence withdrawal of the fourth increment until the following two conditions are met: (1) U.S. has been provided with a complete list of all U.S. PW's including those held by the Pathet Lao; as well as the time and place of release..." "If difficulties arise during the process of release, then cease all withdrawals until otherwise instructed."

"...Our basic concern is the release of the prisoners and we do not object to the PLF playing the central role as long as the men are returned to us. We need precise information and understanding on the times and place of release of the prisoners on the list provided 1 February...For your information only, the purpose of the above is to try to get things back on track and moving again."

03/22/73 Godley to State (Embassy believes LPF hold POWs)

U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Mac Godley, sends cable to Secretary of State stating Embassy belief that the Lao Patriotic Front holds more U.S. POWs throughout Laos than those names which appeared on the DRV February 1st list. Embassy states, however, that they should concentrate first on getting the 9 POWs back who were on the North Vietnamese list.

03/22/73 Embassy Demarche to Pathet Lao

On the same day, U.S. Embassy in Laos sends demarche to Pathet Lao stating they expect back more U.S. POWs than those on the February 1st list.

03/22/73 Nixon Tapes

March 22, 1973, from 9:11 to 10:35 A.M.

"...Haldeman: The question, uh, with the Congress, if you go on, I mean, Tuesday may be too soon -- from, from the Vietnam viewpoint. If they pull the prisoners, the prisoners, where, and, and the troops out (unintelligible)

President: (Unintelligible).

Haldeman: Better wait and see (unintelligible)

President: The prisoners, oh, the prisoners (unintelligible)..."

03/23/73 Eagleburger Memo

"...the U.S. is prepared to accept release of the ten men on the 1 February list along with the other U.S. personnel being held in NVN as the final condition for complete U.S. troop withdrawal. However, there has been no accounting of U.S. personnel MIA in Laos other than the 1 February list of ten who were probably all captured in Laos by the NVA rather than the Pathet Lao. Hence, assuming all the prisoners currently being held in NVN are released by 28 March, we still have the Laos MIA question remaining unresolved..."

"...there appears to be need for a well-orchestrated plan for solving the problem of our Laos POWs and MIAs. Therefore, I am recommending below a series of diplomatic moves aimed at gaining a

proper accounting of our men lost in Laos..."

A. "After the recovery of the last prisoners from NVN, Hanoi should be advised unequivocally that we still hold them responsible for the return of all POWs being held in Indochina..."

B. "...a strong demarche should be made to the ranking LPF representative in Vientiane... This initiative should plainly and forcefully assert that the U.S. will no longer play games with the POW issue in Laos... we demand their immediate release as well as an accounting and information on all those who may have died. Finally, the LPF should be advised that failure to provide a satisfactory answer could result in appropriate United States actions..."

D. "Shortly after 28 March, assuming the LPF have not responded favorably, intensive and obvious tactical air reconnaissance of North and South Laos should commence. Additionally, the movement of a new carrier task force into the waters off Vietnam should be publicly announced..."

"...the evidence indicates that the NVN/Pathet Lao forces have capture U.S. personnel since 1964, and the LPF have provided no prisoner or casualty data at all other than the ten names listed on 1 February..."

03/27/73 Nixon Tapes

Transcript of a recording of a meeting among the President, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Ronald Ziegler on March 27, 1973 from 11:10 A.M. to 1:30 P.M.

"Ehrlichman: This story and, uh, this one, uh, this, this Watergate thing is potentially very debilitating around, but we have to devote a large part of our time to keeping people busy in, uh..."

President: I know..."

President: ...I don't believe that I should go out on national television like tonight or tomorrow and go out on the Watergate Commission and then come on the next day on national television on Vietnam... My view would be to, get the Vietnam out of the way, and maybe get this right if you could. I think that gives you time..."

04/03/73 Richardson note to Rogers (questions, but on to MIAs)

Secretary of Defense Richardson sends a note to Secretary of State Rogers stating, "While there is still some question on whether any of our men are still held, particularly in Laos, our attention must now be focused primarily on the difficult task of accounting for the missing in action."

04/05/73 Godley Cable to Rogers

U.S. Ambassador... Godley, sends cable to Secretary of State Rogers stating they were reluctantly approaching the conclusion that the Pathet Lao did not hold additional prisoners, and that it was time to change the focus to accounting for MIAs as opposed to searching for POWs.

04/06/73 Memo of Senator Brooke meeting with Soth Petrosy

"Senator Brooke's meeting with LPF representative Soth Phetrasy on April 6, : Latter formally stated that LPF holds no more American prisoners in Laos. Soth said only prisoners LPF held were the nine who were returned to USG in Hanoi on March 28..."

04/12/73 Shields Press Conference

The Defense Department sponsors a press conference... in which Roger Shields states, "We have no indication at this moment that there are any Americans alive in Indochina..." Dr. Shields further states that with interviews of returning POWs almost complete, none of the MIAs have been changed to POW status.

Rumors that U.S. servicemen were still held in Laos "do the families a disservice," says Shields.

Prior to the DoD news conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements states to Dr. Shields, in reference to remaining POW/MIAs, "You didn't hear me, they're all dead."

04/14/73 Bunker to State outlining priorities

U.S. Ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker, sends message to Secretary of State... Bunker references "informal Washington instructions" that first priority will be recovery of remains of those personnel listed as died in captivity on the 27 January 1973 list. Second priority is described as "seeking information from the other side on specific MIA persons who, according to U.S. records, were believed captured alive... DIA has provided folders on 80 persons in this category. Bunker lists the third priority as negotiating a process for air and ground search of crash sites.

05/01/73 Richardson Memo (phasing out POW/MIA Task Force)

Secretary of Defense Richardson signs the memorandum proposed by ASD Eagleburger on April 25th to phase out the POW/MIA Task Force.

05/23/73 Kissinger meeting with Le Duc Tho

Kissinger asks Le Duc Tho to have an understanding with the U.S. to "not contradict" any U.S. public statements that article 8(b) of the Paris accords applies to all of Indochina.

He then states... "Now we should still like a sentence from you which I don't understand why you can't give us -- which says that the DRV has been informed that there are no U.S. prisoners being held in Laos -- that all the prisoners held in Laos have been released. It would be very important for us." Le Duc Tho responds, "I have acknowledged to you that all of them have been released." Kissinger asks, "Then why can't you write it down?"

05/24/73 Shields to Hill

"In a DoD sponsored press conference held April 12, 1973, I made the statement that DoD had no specific knowledge indicating that any U.S. personnel were still alive and held prisoner in Southeast Asia... It was a totally accurate and factual statement at the time it was made..."

"In light of more recent events, I believe that answer is no longer fully satisfactory..."

"...it should be noted that only 10 persons, nine of whom were U.S. were released by the other side as Laos prisoners. Over 300 U.S. personnel remain unaccounted for in Laos."

"...I believe that the DoD position regarding the possibility of men still being held prisoner in SEA should be altered slightly..."

06/13/73 Kissinger Press Conference

"...We are specifically concerned about the following points:

- One, the inadequate implementation of the cease-fire.
- Secondly, the continued infiltration into South Viet-Nam and the continued utilization of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for that infiltration.
- Three, we were concerned about the inadequate accounting for the missing in action.
- Fourth, we were concerned about the violations of the demilitarized zone.
- Fifth, we were concerned about the inadequate cooperation with the International Control Commission and the slow staffing of the Two-Party Military Commission.
- Sixth, we were concerned about the violations of article 20 requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia..."

"...Under the provisions for missing in action, all sides have pledged that they would make major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indochina, and this is a matter which is of great concern to the United States..."

06/05/73 Hill to Clements (status changes)

Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Hill advises Deputy Secretary

of Defense William Clements that "As you requested, I have prepared for your signature a memorandum directing that all status changes from missing in action to prisoner of war be cleared by you."

07/17/73 Clements on Status Determinations

"I am concerned that the process for equitably determining status of the missing in Southeast Asia may be unduly influenced by emotional factors rather than the law governing such determinations and the facts bearing on each individual case..."

"The Department of Defense is currently following guidance that finding in which an individual is presumed to be dead will not be made at this time unless the incident occurred over water... It is not our intent to write off our missing men prematurely, but at the same time we cannot condone building undue hope for the family members without justification."

"...the decision to change status should not be unalterably tied to the inspection of combat sites, the recovery of remains, or the personal desires of family members. The decision should be based solely on a thorough study of the available information and a qualitative judgement by the Service Secretaries... Therefore, in the continued absence of progress in accounting for the missing, the Military Services intend to proceed now with a status change in those cases where it is warranted by available information."

09/07/73 Kissinger testimony to Senate on MIAs

Dr. Henry Kissinger, at confirmation hearings... for Secretary of State, is asked by Senator Church the question of how many of the 1,300 MIAs have been accounted for to date.

Kissinger responds -- "I do not believe any of them have been accounted for adequately. It has been one of the unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of the agreement... In Laos, actually we have more reason for concern, because the ratio of prisoners to those that we have reason to believe parachuted is smaller than it is in any other part of this area... we are extremely dissatisfied with the results of the implementation of that part of the agreement, and that is one of the reasons why we cannot proceed in certain other areas such as economic aid negotiations."

09/14/73 Laos Protocols signed

Protocols to the Laos February 21st Cease-Fire Agreement are signed... Article 18 of the Protocols states: "Within 15 to 30 days after the date of the signing of this protocol, each side will inform the Central Joint Commission for the Implementation of the Agreement of the number of the persons captured and detained, and state clearly the nationality of each person, ... as well as the list of the captured persons who died during the period of detention."

05/08/76 State to Vietnam (begin new negotiations)

The Department of State sends diplomatic note to Vietnam... "the selective application of past agreements would not be fruitful... the United States believes it would be more useful to discuss issues affecting future relations between our two countries. The humanitarian concern of a full accounting of our missing men will be one of the primary issues of the United States in such discussions. Until this issue is substantially resolved, there can be no real progress toward normalization of relations."

06/19/76 Vietnam to U.S. protest (linking aid to MIA resolution)

Vietnam responds with diplomatic note stating that the "unilateral U.S. denunciation of the Paris agreement is aimed at evading the pledges it has solemnly undertaken... On the other hand, the U.S. demands that Vietnam implement Article 8(b) of the agreement... Obviously it wants to renege on its obligations under the Paris agreement on Vietnam while demanding that the other side implement another article of the same agreement..."

08/02/76 Habib Letter to Montgomery (Kissinger denial of offer)

Under Secretary of State for political Affairs, Philip Habib, sends a letter to the Montgomery Commission... In reference to the February 1st Nixon letter to the North Vietnamese on reconstruction aid... Habib states: "The President's message did not contain any pledges of promises of aid... the letter did not specifically pledge to seek any particular sum of money."

11/13/76 Habib to Kissinger (Vietnam is linking aid to MIAs)

Under Secretary of State Philip Habib reports to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, on the November 12th meeting with the Vietnamese... he states that the core of the Vietnamese argument is that Vietnam is "prepared to fulfill fully, and I repeat, fully, our obligations" under the Paris Agreement to account for the MIAs, but that the U.S. should fulfill its "obligation to contribute to binding up the wounds of war and the reconstruction of Vietnam and to accomplish that which was agreed on in 1973 in the Joint Economic Commission."

12/13/76 Montgomery Commission Report (Vietnam is linking issues)

The Report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons is filed. The major conclusion reads, "No Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina..." "lack of direct discussions" has "prevented the closing of this chapter... The U.S. wishes and serves an accounting for the missing... The U.S. insists on an accounting as a precondition to normal relations. The Indochinese, particularly the Vietnamese, state that reconstruction aid must

precede their accounting for our missing."

09/25/85 Brooks Report

In a memorandum to General Shufelt, Commodore Thomas Brooks wrote,

1. "I was not at all pleased with the situation I found when I took over responsibility for the POW/MIA issue. The deeper I looked, the less professional the operation appeared... I found the following to be particular problems:

a. Case files were incomplete, sloppy... and generally unprofessional.

b. There were no action logs in the cases or where there were logs, entries had not been made in a long time.

c. Follow-up actions had not been pursued... obvious follow-up actions were called for but were never taken and years had passed.

d. There was no tickler system to ensure that we followed up on our own tasking...

4. I am not persuaded that enough assets are being dedicated to this problem if it is the top priority problem we claim it is. In particular, I wonder is JCRC is adequately manned...

6. I see the most important thing we must do right now is to be cementing relationships on the Hill... It is clear that Congressman Hendon will be using our files to discredit us... We need to ensure that we have formed the necessary alliances...

7. I am afraid we are in for some troubled times... we will not withstand scrutiny very well... We must make all preparations to minimize the criticism this scrutiny will bring."

03/18/86 Gaines Report

Memo to Director from Kimball Gaines, Chief, Director's PW/MIA Task Force. The memo states, "...the 'Task Force Charter was to conduct a hardnosed objective examination of PW/MIA substantive issues and procedures and to report findings and recommendations to the Director within thirty days... The Task Force review revealed serious shortcomings in every important area... Findings are as follows:

1. Unhealthy attitudes.
2. Almost total lack of management - working hard but not working smart.
3. Haphazard approach to problems and functions.
4. Too much direct exposure of the working level analysts.
5. Inadequate planning, internal communication, and written

guidance.

6. Data base is a wasteland.
7. Working files unprofessional, sloppy, incomplete, no standard procedures.
8. No disciplined, coherent, collection management effort.
9. Too much detective work, not enough analysis.
10. Not nearly enough administrative and intelligence technician support.
11. Significant ADP deficiencies...

05/27/86 Tighe Report

Report from General Eugene Tighe to General Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In the report summary, General Tighe states, "We judge there is no cover-up by the U.S. Government, the intelligence community, nor the Defense Intelligence Agency... There is information, even in our limited sample, which establishes the strong possibility of American prisoners of war being held in Laos and Vietnam. This judgement is based a category of eyewitness reports... allegations by defectors and escapees... and "signals" in the refugee community probably originating with the Vietnamese intelligence services..."

"A longstanding lapse in diligent intelligence work has produced serious gaps in our knowledge about Vietnam's and others' behavior relative to prisoners of war."

He continues in his conclusions that,

1. "We have found no evidence of "cover-up" by DIA.
2. It is self-evident that a large number of MIAs may never be properly accounted for. Therefore, false hope should not be offered to those seeking a total accounting of PW/MIA's.
3. DIA holds information that established the strong possibility of American prisoners of war being held in Laos and Vietnam...
5. ...major improvements in procedures and resources are required for the DIA PW/MIA center to evaluate information properly...
12. The DIA PW/MIA center is organizationally misplaced and probably will perform better directly under the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
13. The JCRC forward field organization is woefully undermanned.
14. The government handling of the PW/MIA issue is constantly harassed by phonies and profiteers..."

03/23/87 Bush to Perot Letter

Letter from then Vice President George Bush to Ross Perot in reference to Perot's decision to get out of the POW/MIA issue and turn over all materials and information he has to the administration. Excerpts include: "The President determined that Howard Baker would call you the other day, ... I am sorry you feel you have had less than full cooperation; but I do understand your

decision, ... to "get out of it" and convey whatever information you have to the new negotiator..."

"...The administration... will continue to keep this issue on the front burner. We can do no less. We owe it to those who served."

04/08/87 Perot to Reagan Letter

Letter from Ross Perot to then President, Ronald Reagan regarding the POW/MIA issue. He discusses his findings.

1. We left POWs behind at the end of the war in Vietnam.
2. We knew we were leaving men behind.
3. The men left behind were held in Laos.
4. The evidence that men were held in Laos is substantial...
7. In April, 1973, the Defense Department publicly declared -- that there were no more living Americans being held in Southeast Asia... this was done at a time when we knew we had left men in Laos (and probably in Cambodia and Vietnam)...
9. It is unrealistic to attempt a military rescue of these -- men...
11. There is only one realistic way to gain the release of the -- men -- through negotiation.
12. Several months ago, I recommended appointing a Presidential -- negotiator... General Vessey is an excellent choice...

25. The principal obstacle in obtaining the release of these men -- since the end of the war has been a lack of diligence and follow-through by our government. Choosing a man of General Vessey's stature, giving him a broad mission, supporting him with whatever resources he needs, and having him report directly to you is the strongest possible approach to gaining the release of these men.

Message 91922, 13 Mar 67, from Lieutenant General Wade, Air Force Chief of Staff/

AF personnel will be reported as killed if conclusive evidence of death exists, even though the remains are not recovered, and consist "... of evidence so strong and so convincing as to overbear any possibility of survival... If no such overwhelming proof exists, the member is reported as missing in action and is carried in this status unless and until conclusive evidence of death becomes available... If any possibility exists... that a member could have survived an accident, he must be reported as missing in action."

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Hearing: Administration's Overview

Tuesday, November 5, 1991 at 9:30 a.m.
Room 216, Hart Senate Building

Appendix 6

Selected Excerpts from Hearing Testimony

- PANEL 1: **Paul Wolfowitz**
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- PANEL 2: **Gen. John W. Vessey**, U.S. Army (Retired)
Special Presidential Emissary to Vietnam for POW/MIA Matters
- PANEL 3: **Duane P. Andrews**
Assistant Defense Secretary for
Command, Communications, Control, and Intelligence
- PANEL 4: **Ken Quinn**
Chairman of the POW/MIA Interagency Group and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- PANEL 5: **Carl W. Ford, Jr.**, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
- Major General Michael E. Ryan**, U.S. Air Force,
Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), The Joint Staff
- Major General George R. Christmas**, U.S. Marine Corps,
Director of Operations (J-3), Pacific Command
- PANEL 6: **Dennis Nagy**, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Robert Sheetz**, Chief of the Special Office
for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action,
Defense Intelligence Agency
- Charles F. Trowbridge, Jr.**, Deputy, Special Office
for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action,
Defense Intelligence Agency

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Hearing: U.S. Efforts to Find Missing Soldiers

Wednesday, November 6, 1991 at 10 a.m.
Room 216, Hart Senate Building

PANEL 1: Operations on the Ground

Garnett E. Bell, Chief, U.S. Office for POW/MIA, Hanoi

William R. Gadoury, Jr., U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution -
Laos, Joint Casualty Resolution Center

Col. John Cole, Director, Stoney Beach, Thailand
Defense Intelligence Agency

PANEL 2: Families' Perspectives

Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director,
National League of Families

Dolores Apodaca Alfond, National Chairperson,
National Alliance of Families

Dr. Patricia O'Grady and Robert Apodaca,
Vessey Discrepancy Cases

PANEL 3: Veterans' Perspectives

Robert E. Wallace, National Commander,
Veterans of Foreign Wars

John F. Sommer, Jr., Executive Director,
American Legion

Joseph E. Andry, former National Commander,
Disabled American Veterans

Bill Duker, Chairman, POW/MIA Committee,
Vietnam Veterans of America

J. Thomas Burch, Chairman,
National Vietnam Veterans Coalition

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Hearing: Critics' Perspectives

Thursday, November 7, 1991 at 9:30 a.m.
Room 216, Hart Senate Building

PANEL 1: Bui Tin, Vietnamese Defector and
former Communist Party member and editor

PANEL 2: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Staff
Report on U.S. Policy toward POWs and MIAs

PANEL 2: Gen. Eugene Tighe, U.S. Army (Retired) [tentative]
Former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Col. Millard Peck, U.S. Army (Retired) [tentative]
Former Chief of the Special Office for POW/MIA at
the Defense Intelligence Agency

PANEL 3: Monica Jensen-Stevenson, author, Kiss the Boys Goodbye

Nigel Cawthorne, author, The Bamboo Cage

PANEL 4: Jeff Donahue, author, POW/MIA Timeline
and MIA relative

Ted Sampley, Homecoming II Project
U.S. Veterans News

PANEL 5: Recently Publicized Photos

Jack Bailey (Carr case)

Hamilton Gayden (Borah case)

Albro L. Lundy III, Barbara Robertson,
Gladys Fleckenstein (Lundy/Robertson/Stevens case)

PANEL 6: Administration response

[After the conclusion of testimony from the final panel,
the Administration will have an opportunity to respond to
Senators' questions. The Department of Defense team will
be led by Carl Ford].

Select Committee on

POW / MIA Affairs

John F. Kerry, Massachusetts, Chairman
Bob Smith, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director
Alan C. Plak, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, General Counsel

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

June 24, 1992

United States Senate

Washington, DC 20510-6500

(202) 224-2306

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
January 15, 1992

CONTACT: Deborah DeYoung

FORMER U.S. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS TO TESTIFY JAN. 22

ABOUT POWs ALLEGEDLY HELD AFTER THE VIETNAM WAR

WASHINGTON -- The Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs will hear charges that American POWs were held after the Vietnam War ended, Chairman John F. Kerry, D-Mass., and Vice Chairman Bob Smith, R-NH, announced today.

The hearing on Wednesday, Jan. 22 begins at 11:30 a.m. in Room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Two former National Security Agency analysts will testify about tracing American POWs in Southeast Asia -- and possibly to the USSR -- after the Vietnam War. The witnesses are Jerry Mooney, of Wolf Point, Montana, and Terrell Minarcin, of Tacoma, Washington.

The former KGB head of foreign counterespionage, Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, has said that Soviets interrogated American POWs in Vietnam as late as 1978 -- five years after the war ended. Kalugin will testify Tuesday, Jan. 21 at 2:30 p.m. in Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building.

At the Committee's first round of hearings in November, Bui Tin, a former top North Vietnamese official testified that Soviets interrogated U.S. servicemen in Vietnam during the war. The Pentagon contends that no American POWs who returned at Operation Homecoming reported being interrogated by Soviets.

Panel 1: An Overview of Wartime Casualty Accounting 1961-73

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office
for POW/MIA Affairs, 1971-1992

Senior Service Casualty Officers
Col. Michael Spinello, U.S. Army
Brig. Gen. Michael McGinty, U.S. Air Force
Capt. Peggy Debien, U.S. Navy
Col. A.A. Quebodeaux, U.S. Marine Corps

Representative, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Panel 2: Accounting Efforts During Operation Homecoming, January - June, 1973

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office
for POW/MIA Affairs, 1971-1992

Admiral Thomas Moorer (USN, Ret.), Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff 1971-1975

Lt. General Eugene Tighe, Director
Defense Intelligence Agency 1977-1981, and
Chief of Intelligence at CINCPAC, 1972-1973

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

June 25, 1992

Panel 1: POW/MIA Accounting 1973-1992

Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Economic and POW/MIA Affairs,
Defense Department 1971-1977

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office
for POW/MIA Affairs, 1971-1992

Frank Sieverts, Special Assistant for POW/MIA Matters,
Department of State, 1966-1978

Gen. Robert Kingston (USA Ret.), Commander,
Joint Casualty Resolution Center, 1973-1974

Michael Oksenberg, Staff
National Security Council, 1976-1978

Panel 2: Status of Current Efforts to Account for POW/MIAs

Gen. John Vessey, (USA, Ret.)
President's Special Emissary to Hanoi on POW/MIA Affairs;
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1982-1986

Maj. Gen. George R. Christmas (USMC), Director
of Operations, U.S. Pacific Command

Bob Sheetz, Chief
Defense Intelligence Agency,
Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Senior Service Casualty Officers

AUGUST 11, 1992

PANEL 1: H. Ross Perot

PANEL 2: Harry McKillop,
Perot Associate (1969-present)

Murphy Martin,
Perot Associate (1969-1973)

Thomas Meurer,
Perot Associate (1969-1973)

PANEL 3: McMurtrie Godley,
US Ambassador to Laos, 1969-1973

James Murphy,
Aide to Ambassador Godley

PANEL 4: Closed Session
CIA Station Chief in Laos

AUGUST 12, 1992

PANEL 1: LTG Leonard Perroots,
DIA Director, 1985-1988

Richard Childress,
Nat'l Security Council
(Reagan Administration)

Richard Armitage,
Defense Department
(Reagan Administration)

PANEL 2: Sen. Howard Baker,
White House Chief of Staff 1987-1989

James Cannon,
Deputy to Baker 1987

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

September 21, 1992 - 8:30 a.m.
Paris Peace Accords: Negotiations for POW/MIAs

Panel 1: Central Intelligence Agency's Input

James R. Schlesinger
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1973
Secretary of Defense, 1973-1974

Panel 2: State and Defense Departments' Input

Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense, 1969-1973

William P. Rogers
Secretary of State, 1969-1973

Panel 3: U.S. Negotiating Team

Winston Lord
National Security Council, 1969-1973
Special Assistant to National Security Adviser, 1970-1973
Director of Policy Planning at State Department, 1973-1977

George H. Aldrich
Legal Adviser to State Department, 1965-1981

Peter W. Rodman
Staff, National Security Council, 1969-1977

Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1972-1976

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador to Laos, 1964-1968
Chief of U.S. Mission to Laos, 1968-1969
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1969-73

Panel 4: National Security Council/DoD Efforts through 1973

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (USA, Ret.)
Assistant to National Security Adviser, 1969-1973
White House Chief of Staff, 1973-1974

Paris Peace Accords: Negotiations for POW/MIAs
September 22, 1992 - 9:00 a.m.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
National Security Adviser, 1969-1975
Secretary of State, 1973-1977

Expectations about POWs in Laos
and Questions after Operation Homecoming
September 24, 1992 - 9:30 a.m.

Panel 1: Expectations about POWs in Laos

Admiral Thomas Moorer (USN, Ret.)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1970-1974

G. McMurtrie Godley
Ambassador to Laos, 1969-1973

John H. Holdridge
Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia and the Pacific 19__-1983
China Specialist, State Department 1948-1985

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (Ret., USN) (Thursday, Panel 1)
Dep. Director for Intelligence Community, CIA, 1977-1980

Panel 2: Laos Questions

Maj. Gen. Richard Secord
Laos Chief of Air, Central Intelligence Agency, 1966-1968
Laos Desk Officer, Defense Department, 1972-1975

Elliot L. Richardson
Secretary of Defense, 1973

**Panel 3: Four-Party Joint Military Commission;
Questions Remaining after Operation Homecoming**

Gov. William Clements
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1973-1976

Dr. Roger E. Shields
Deputy Asst. Secretary for Internat'l Economic & POW/MIA Affairs,
Defense Department 1971-1977

Col. Lawrence Robson (USAF, Ret.)
POW Subcommittee of Four-Party Joint Military Commission