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| Cooperation | Christmas 06/25/92 | <p>Christmas: In the area of archival research and in the area of documents provided, there is an area where we need help, where they can, in fact, provide a great deal more. Our investigators as they go out --</p> <p>Sen. McCain: What do you speculate is the reason they have not been more cooperative in that area?</p> <p>Christmas: Sir, I think it is a matter, as Gen. Vessey, I thought, pointed out very well; you may, at the central government level say, this is what we are going to do. But when it comes down to action at the district or province level, that may not -- it gets the slows -- whether or not that it is going to take place.</p> <p>The other one where we have difficulty is the trilateral agreements or trilateral talks and cross-border operations. That is at a standstill right now, Senator, and it's at a standstill for a number of reasons. both the Lao and the Cambodians have been very reluctant to trilateral talks. The Vietnamese based on the committee getting out there said, yes, you can go from Vietnam into Laos because, in some places, that is the only way you can get into where crash sites would have been. The Lao have disagreed with that and have said, no, we will not allow that. They have also disagreed with trilateral talks.</p> <p>So I think the point is, we are making measured progress. Can we make more? Sure we can. I think in Vietnam that progress will continue if we continue to accelerate our operations, continue to keep our folks in country face to face with the Vietnamese.</p> |
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| Cooperation | Christmas 06/25/92 | The key element of information is missing: the current location of the person or his remains. This is why we need Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to share whatever records they possess on American prisoners and the missing, and make available for interview former members of their military units. |
| Cooperation | Christmas 12/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: So I take it, it is your judgment that we are moving down the road...</p> <p>Christmas: It's certainly my judgment, sir. If you remember, we talked before about the agreements that were made between Le Mai and then Assistant Secretary Solomon -- five agreements: expanded operations, live sighting mechanism, archival research, and so forth. Of at least three of those, we have had substantial movement and substantial progress from the February of this year when those agreements were made. So there has been progress, and what we need to do, as the Admiral has said, is just keep pressing.</p> |
| Cooperation | Christmas 11/05/91 | The Pacific Command, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense, has moved quickly to capitalize on the favorable climate of cooperation in Vietnam. We plan to execute a comprehensive casualty resolution campaign on a scale which the Department of Defense has wanted to carry out since the signing of the Paris Accords in 1973, but could not because of Vietnam's intransigence. |
| Cooperation | Clapper 12/01/92 | If we are to have true resolution of these cases that so consume so many Americans, it is in the hands of the Vietnamese. |

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| Cooperation | DeStatte 12/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: Are we on the road to resolving this?</p> <p>DeStatte: Yes, sir. I'm quite confident. As I said earlier, I think we're getting the kind of cooperation -- I think that Vietnam's top leaders have made the decision to try to solve this issue. I think they issued the instruction to their bureaucracy to do so, and I believe that at the working level, where we are, at least the people that I've been working with, I believe we're getting the kind of cooperation, we're getting good cooperation.</p> <p>I do, however, believe that there's some distance to go, and I think that if there's an obstacle, that obstacle is at the mid-level. And I believe that Vietnam's leaders can solve that problem. I think that's the proper solution.</p> |
| Cooperation | Ford 12/04/92 | <p>...the fact is that in many cases it's clear that the Vietnamese don't always know what they have there and that they've got a lot of valuable information. We know it's valuable, but it wasn't necessarily valuable to them or they weren't quite sure what it was.</p> <p>Allowing us access into that is extremely important... We are just now getting into these archives and all of us are wanting to move forward as rapidly as we can.</p> |
| Cooperation | Ford 12/01/92 | <p>I frankly, in looking at that period, I think that I give the most credit to the Vietnamese. I think they sought us out.</p> |

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| Cooperation | Ford 12/01/92 | <p>...I would argue that the reason that we have been is because we have won most of the battles of being fair and firm with the Vietnamese. And when they produce results, we have delivered, State has delivered, Defense has delivered, NSC has delivered. We have no history that if we give something to the Vietnamese for nothing, that we get reciprocal benefit from it.</p> |
| Cooperation | Gadoury 11/06/91 | <p>Progress has, up to this point, however, been rather disappointing in terms of results. Despite Vietnamese claims of total freedom of travel to pursue first-hand live sightings, both captive and living free, our investigator has not yet been permitted by the Vietnamese to travel outside Hanoi to complete his investigations.</p> |
| Cooperation | Grassley 11/06/91 | <p>...I think they [the Vietnamese Government] ought to know that we would all welcome and would not hold past history against them at all if there was a dramatic change of practice on the part of the Vietnamese Government for total cooperation along the lines of our people could go any place that they want to go.</p> <p>If the Vietnamese Government came up with an American there who they previously said was not there, that we would not look at it as an opportunity for punitive action against the Vietnamese Government, but that we would look at it as an opportunity for a further opening of relations and normalization of relations.</p> |
| Cooperation | Griffiths 12/01/92 | <p>It was quite difficult in earlier years, and it evolved and got more effective and the priority began to be understood in the far reaches of the government. But it was not really an easy process, especially when you were building from zero.</p> |

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| Cooperation | Kerry 12/01/92 | And I would lay unfortunate odds that if we were to apply that standard to ourselves at this point in time about Vietnamese MIAs, we would be sorely wanting. |
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| Cooperation | Kerry 12/04/92 | <p>We kind of did a great, double-team effort here between General Vessey, the Committee, your efforts. But the distinction is that at that point in time the Politburo and the decisions had not been made.</p> <p>I sat with the General Secretary of Vietnam. I was the first United States citizen to meet with the leading official of Vietnam -- and it only happened a year and a half ago -- at which point he turns to me, and I have got to tell you I was stunned and the people with me were stunned, because he could not understand in 1991, what this issue meant, why it was real, or if we were serious.</p> <p>And he turned to me and he said: Senator, I do not understand this; when I was negotiating with Jimmy Carter in 1978 for normalization, nobody raised this issue with us.</p> <p>It was not on the table. So he had no sense that this was anything but an American trick in the 1980s and '90s to sort of find a different way to prosecute the war against Vietnam.</p> <p>So I went through this long explanation to him of what happened with the problems of Jimmy Carter's presidency and what happened in the desert in Iran and the sense of lack of power in the country, and along came Ronald Reagan and he made this a big issue, to his credit, and raised the consciousness, and then movies appeared and books appeared and Sly Stallone made a cult, and off we went, and it entered the American consciousness and body politic...</p> <p>We [sent them] a whole lot of articles and sent them information and tried to give them a sense of the reality of it....</p> <p>So finally they say: Hey, you know,</p> |
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| Cooperation continued | Kerry 12/04/92 | <p>with it.</p> <p>So if they have admitted, and you say, yes, they have admitted, and this high visibility Senate delegation arrives in Hanoi and I say to them, you know what really is going to make a difference to our going back to America and being able to say good things about you? Remains.</p> <p>And Ted Schweitzer spends 24 hours with them privately, using the respect and friendship he's built up, and he says: You know what you have got to give these guys? Remains. And as you heard him testify today under oath, he said: You know, their faces sank, and they sat in that room and they said: If the success of this mission or failure depends on remains, then it will fail.</p> |
| Cooperation | Larson 12/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: Now I ask you, Admiral, General, and General, is the process corrupt? Are these people not cooperating broadly, or do you feel there is this genuine commitment to getting this process to work? The Committee wants to know the truth, not some preordained answer.</p> <p>Larson: Mr. Chairman, I think their senior leadership in their central government has made a political decision to cooperate and to try to move forward. The level of that cooperation, I think we have a system in place that will test the level of that cooperation and put pressure on them to produce and evaluate how far they are willing to go.</p> <p>Right or wrong for what they've done for the last 20 years, I think they've made a political decision now, we've got to change and we've got to move forward, particularly in the archival research area.</p> |

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| Cooperation | Needham 12/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: General, can you speak now to the issue of the level of cooperation that you receive? Where are we? What kind of judgment can the committee make, based on your experience now, over this year, in Vietnam?</p> <p>Needham: Sir, in my opinion, in the last year the cooperation in Vietnam has been steadily improving since I assumed my position in January. Recently... there have been some dramatic improvements.</p> <p>I think the Vietnamese could still do more, but right now we see cooperation getting better and better every day at the central level. In the field level, cooperation is mixed... in the provinces, it's mixed.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: ...You have provinces in Vietnam that were very heavily bombed, and their support to the United States is less than others...</p> |
| Cooperation | Needham 12/04/92 | <p>Sir, I think it is going to produce results. I think we're starting to see a little bit in Hanoi. I think it's too early to tell exactly how much we're going to get, but I believe we're off to a positive start and I'm hoping that we can -- by the information requests that Mr. DeStatte has given them, that we can lead this archival research program a little bit more to the way we want to go, which is looking at supporting the work plan and supporting cases that we want to get answers to rather than just getting information for the sake of getting information.</p> |
| Cooperation | Perroots 08/12/92 | <p>Vietnam can easily account for hundreds of Americans that have not yet exercised their requisite will to do so.</p> |

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| Cooperation | Quinn 12/01/92 | Mr. Chairman, the vastly improved level of cooperation is a clear indication that our policy of both sides taking a series of commensurate steps is working. |
| Cooperation | Schweitzer 12/04/92 | <p>Following years of distrust among many of the parties trying to resolve this MIA issue, there have however now been new approaches which have taken place in Hanoi over the past few weeks and cooperation has reached a new level. But there still appear to me to be three basic questions which have remained unanswered up to this point.</p> <p>The first question concerns just how much information we can hope to learn about the Americans still unaccounted for in Vietnam.</p> <p>The second remaining question involves the source of this information. The third question concerns, it has taken 19 years for the U.S. and Vietnam to come to this starting point in addressing these questions.</p> |

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| Cooperation | Schweitzer 12/04/92 | <p>Well, the central government has made it clear to me that the key element in getting that material brought to Hanoi is in U.S. hands, not in their hands. They had -- the leadership of Vietnam cannot simply order 70 million Vietnamese citizens to bring this mountain of material to Hanoi.</p> <p>It has to be something that the Vietnamese, the common Vietnamese citizen, feels in his heart he wants to do for America. If he has a souvenir, war memorabilia, something that he picked up from a crash or a war site in the highlands in '67 or from a crash up in the mountains someplace, say a piece of an airplane that he's been using as a side of his house or a little package of things he picked up somehow, maybe the man who picked it up is even dead and his children have it and have no idea what it is even.</p> <p>But they're not going to make -- the common person of Vietnam just isn't going to come forward with all that mountain of information unless they really have the feeling in the heart that they want to do this for America. It can't be dictated from on high that you will bring forward everything that you possess on America. It just won't happen that way.</p> |
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| Cooperation | Schweitzer 12/04/92 | <p>Schweitzer: ...with the steps that have been taken so far, especially the last one involving AT&T, people are coming forward with more materials than they've ever come forward with before. I brought two examples with me.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: You see a significant shift now suddenly in the production of some of these documents?</p> <p>Schweitzer: I certainly do. And the more steps the United States takes to ease the hardships on Vietnam, the more warmth the common Vietnamese citizens will feel towards us and will come forward with materials.</p> |
| Cooperation | Sheetz 06/25/92 | <p>Mr. Sheetz: I'd like to underscore. There's something that Senator Smith and Senator Kerry, you could both, I think, help us with. I recognize you'll probably be making another trip to Southeast Asia before your committee completes its work. If you do, or if another opportunity presents itself -- I wish you would underscore to both the Laos Government and the Vietnamese Government the need for unfettered access on conducting live sighting investigations. Basically, not frustrating our officers when they're out there in the field trying to facilitate the process. We're making progress, it's getting better, but it's got to get a lot better before I'm going to be happy. And if there's anything this committee could do to underscore with those two governments.</p> |
| Cooperation | Sheridan 12/02/92 | <p>...To my way of thinking, the answers are in Hanoi and in Vientiane and in Cambodia, and it could be over with in a very short period of time if those governments would be forthcoming with the information that they have.</p> |

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| Cooperation | Vessey 12/04/92 | <p>However, when we look at the issue of Vietnamese cooperation, it would be a mistake to forget the progress in reuniting several hundred thousand separated Vietnamese family members, getting over 60,000 Amerasian children and family members out of Vietnam and getting the former South Vietnamese officers and Government officials out of the re-education camps and getting them and their families out of Vietnam if they wanted to go.</p> |
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| Cooperation | Vessey 06/25/92 | <p>My first instructions came from President Reagan in 1987... President Reagan started an effort in 1982 to bring more focus to this issue. Negotiations had been underway for about four years and they stalled in 1986, in late 1986, and I was asked to take on the job in early 1987.</p> <p>I was instructed by the President to conduct negotiations with the Vietnamese Government to attempt to get cooperation on a number of humanitarian issues, and the specific goals were as follows:</p> <p>The first goal, and the number one priority, was to get the cooperation required to achieve the fullest possible accounting for all Americans missing from the war in Vietnam.</p> <p>Within that goal of fullest possible accounting, as the first priority, was to go after the business of whether or not live American prisoners were continuing to be held by the Vietnamese Government. And if there were live Americans either in captivity or living freely, to seek their immediate return.</p> <p>Then the third point was to get Vietnamese cooperation and an expanded effort in the return of remains that had already been recovered, and in searching for and recovering and return those remains which had not yet been recovered.</p> |
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| Cooperation | Vessey 06/25/92 | <p>It is worth remembering that those instructions were given in light of conditions which existed in 1987. Vietnam's military forces were in Cambodia. We had no relations with the Government of Vietnam other than those preliminary talks I mentioned earlier. We had consistently said that the POW/MIA issue should be settled as a humanitarian issue. We had regularly told the Vietnamese that resolution of the POW/MIA issue was not a requirement for discussing normalization, but we'd also said consistently that pace and scope of cooperation on POW/MIA matters would affect the pace and scope of our talks on normalization.</p> |
| Cooperation | Vessey 06/25/92 | <p>... certainly, the one area of cooperation... is the business of archival research, is diligent. Both the prime minister and the foreign minister promised a complete and diligent search of their archives for all information about missing Americans. That's difficult to do. We need to work with them to guide them to do it. But at the same time, it can only be done with their cooperation and work. They have to do it. It's just tough work.</p> |
| Cooperation | Vessey 06/25/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: Within the last five or six months we have gotten different signals from both state and DoD regarding how cooperative the Vietnamese have been... State basically says they are being very cooperative or more cooperative and DoD says they are not being as cooperative as they should be, we need more information. Where do you see it?</p> <p>Vessey: The cooperation is far greater today. One of the problems with evaluating Vietnamese cooperation is we don't know how capable they are of cooperating.</p> |

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| Cooperation | Vessey 06/25/92 | In the area of POW/MIA, a lot of work has been done but the resolution of individual cases has been slow and plodding... We've had some preliminary talks trying to get investigations underway for cases of individuals lost in the border areas of Cambodia and Laos, that were then under the control of Vietnamese forces. In 1988 we agreed to joint field investigations in Vietnam with American and Vietnamese investigators participating. We are entering now into our 18th set of joint field investigations. |
| Declassification | Grassley 06/24/92 | Until these documents become declassified and tell the story themselves without the debunkers, without the conspirators, and the spin doctors, it is incumbent upon us, those of us on this committee and, of course, the media as well, to counter the misrepresentations that there is no evidence. |
| Declassification | Kerrey 09/21/92 | <p>...As said, it does not surprise me that the North Vietnamese would either lie to their people and to us, or withhold information from their people or from us.</p> <p>But it seems to me that it is reasonable for me to conclude that I should have a higher standard for our own government. And thus, the release of the information, redacted and carefully examined -- the decision by President Bush to release that information, pressured by this committee to do so, I think has performed a very valuable service even though we may never get, as I said, to the bottom of it...I must say that had that information been provided in 1973 -- had we just said to the American people, here are the facts, here is what we know and what we do not know, I think the outcome also would have been much different over the next 19 years.</p> |

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| Deserters | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | Deserters are excluded from the official DoD Southeast Asia casualty files. |
| Deserters | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: Mr. Trowbridge, are you saying that the Defense Intelligence Agency carries only 15 people as deserters in country?</p> <p>Trowbridge: Based on what we have been able to obtain from the services, that is correct, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Can you tell me why, then, this committee got a list from the Defense Department, the National Archives, which we were about to submit to the FBI of 1,284 deserter names last known with their units in Vietnam?</p> <p>Trowbridge: Sir, I cannot answer that. As I said, we had an analyst that went through the records ourselves in 1988. Again, if you have got a list -- you know, I do not know where these lists come and what the criteria was to make these lists.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Does that not say something to you? You are supposed to be analyzing live sighting reports. You have got a potential base of some 1,200 people who supposedly deserted in country. I am not suggesting -- this committee, incidentally, is not focusing on deserters. This committee is focused on POW's, military people who had been taken prisoner. But obviously there is a possibility that someone who is a deserter could be the source of a live sighting report.</p> <p>Trowbridge: That is absolutely correct.</p> |

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| Deserters | Vessey 11/05/91 | It is my understanding that none were classified as deserters. Now, there is some evidence in some very few cases that some might have been there under their own free will. Later on there was some evidence that came up, but the evidence is pretty scanty... I would not want to accuse any of these guys of being deserters... there is just not evidence to do that. |
| DIA - Clusters | Brooks 12/01/92 | Sen. McCain: ...General Perroots has previously testified that they did, and have used, this so-called cluster theory in part of their analysis on many occasions. Are you aware of that, Admiral? Brooks: No, I was not aware, Senator. |
| DIA - Critics | Brooks 12/01/92 | I was disappointed with the lack of rigor in the analytic process, I was disappointed, for example, with the way in which files were kept, I was disappointed with the lack of disciplined analytic techniques which I would anticipate to be used in any analytic process... |
| DIA - Critics | Brooks 12/01/92 | Senator, I would comment that when I first arrived there -- I was there for a period of almost four months, from June of 1985 until September of 1985, perhaps the beginning of October of 1985 -- I was surprised to see how few people were dedicated to analysis of the POW/MIA issue... |
| DIA - Critics | Brooks 12/01/92 | There was not adequate management of the analytic process to assure that the mindset to debunk did not color potentially valid reports as well as those which were apparently invalid. |

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| DIA - Critics | Brooks 12/01/92 | ...a certain degree of cynicism, I think, crept into our intelligence analysis. And it is human nature. We had been confronted with so many reports that were either deliberate fabrications or were grossly inaccurate that I think the analyst becomes cynical... there also is a category of people at work surrounding the POW/MIA issue which I will categorize as professional predators... |
| DIA - Critics | Brooks 12/01/92 | Bureaucratic ineptitude certainly characterized the situation in 1985. |
| DIA - Critics | Brooks 12/01/92 | ...yes, indeed, there were cases that I thought should have been reopened and should have been looked into in much more depth. |
| DIA - Critics | Brooks 12/01/92 | I think probably the desire to believe that we had accounted for the POWs perhaps accounted for some of the attitude. Also, of course, the fact that the returned POWs did in fact state that all of the POWs known to be in captivity to them, to them known to be in the official prison system, were accounted for perhaps led to the mindset that this was not as important a problem as it should have been... The case files had not been maintained properly, leads had not been followed up, the normal things that you would...do in trying to maintain continuity on a problem had not been done during that period 1973 to 1983. |
| DIA | Brooks 12/01/92 | My own experience with the analysts is that they were a very dedicated and very frustrated lot. There were too few of them... your observation about paucity of assets is accurate. |

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| DIA - Critics | Childress 12/01/92 | <p>...I know exactly what you're doing, you're really following it up -- by using such words you give the impression that you don't believe it's true at the outset, alleged or alleged with three other adjectives and this sort of thing. I got the impression in the period before the Reagan Administration that there was almost a fear to put in a report that wasn't hedged and guarded by enough adjectives.</p> <p>What we were trying to bring to them is don't fear it, say it objectively, drop the kind of adjectives, and so forth. Don't overdo it but be objective and we'll handle it, everybody will handle it when they get back.</p> |
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| DIA - Critics | Childress 12/01/92 | <p>By the time the Tighe Report had come out, the Vietnamese had released the largest number of remains in 1985 than at any time since the end of the war, and I think it was 26 at the time. They had also agreed that they wanted to work with us on a 2-year plan to try to resolve these major core issues of the POW/MIA issue within a 2-year plan. And we were -- had been negotiating and had several high-level trips.</p> <p>The Tighe Report popped in the middle of this, and they were obviously not up to date on negotiations, but that wasn't why they were there anyway, it was to look to DIA. So they were filling this document up with presumptions that I felt were years old that they had brought to the table. And I went over and briefed them on policy and, you know, our 10-point plan and the rest, on one occasion, but that was just to give them background. So I felt that they -- you know, they were good people and well committed and had their experience, but I wanted them to stay with the knitting that they were hired for.</p> |
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| DIA - Critics | Childress 12/01/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: What you said in your letter, and let me quote you: "There are several flat untruths in it, many distortions and inaccuracies, an abundance of speculation with no basis in fact, an obvious lack of understanding of the overall issue and judgments or perceptions of the Vietnamese mystery combined with popular mythology." Did all of those criticisms get addressed?</p> <p>Childress: Well, I was not in a position to -- I wasn't on the report. I was giving my impressions to General Perroots.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: I understand. But when the final report came out, did you hold those same conclusions about the report?</p> <p>Childress: Not as strongly, but I still saw some popular mythology in it.</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Childress 12/01/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: Mr. Childress, you made some criticisms of the Tighe Report which were really very strong...</p> <p>Childress: This was a first draft that they had done and it was full of policy things, not intelligence things. So General Perroots sent it over to me and said take a look at this, they're making policy recommendations. I was, needless to say, from reading that outraged that they were into policy things. And I also took the opportunity to make what I felt was the case that if you're going to talk about live prisoners, we're talking about last known alive, that's where I had put my focus. And a look of 16 or 18 reports, or 32 case files could not lead to those kinds of conclusions that I felt that they were heading towards.</p> |

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| DIA | Clapper 12/01/92 | <p>I have to say one other thing, Senator Kerry, in all due respect. We talked about who has been responsible for this over the years. The Congress, in all fairness, bears a certain amount of responsibility for this. Every year we, in intelligence, and the director of DIA as the manager of the General Defense Intelligence Program, gets very specific and very intrusive guidance from the Congress on what authorizations we will have and for what purpose.</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Clapper 12/01/92 | <p>...the criticisms arise from the simple and abundant frustration at our inability to resolve the ultimate fate of the POW/MIAs. And the reason is, and again Colonel Schlatter alluded to it, is that because intelligence, given its inherent limitations, simply on its own cannot resolve these issues.</p> |
| DIA | Clapper 08/04/92 | <p>...I have always been deeply concerned about accounting for the missing and will ensure that DIA's efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting will not waiver during my tenure as director...POW/MIA intelligence investigations, collection, and analysis comprise one of DIA's highest priorities...</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Gaines 12/01/92 | <p>The DIA analysts had no buffer between themselves and anybody else. In other words, they had no buffer between themselves and members of Congress. There is no buffer between themselves and outside interests... unofficial but powerful members, personnel such as Ann Mills Griffiths... had direct access, in fact, had direct access not only to files and intelligence information, but was allowed to task the analysts on her behest.</p> |

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| DIA - Critics | Gaines 12/01/92 | They were beset by so many outside tasks and so many outside similar-dissimilar influences, that they were constantly running from one crisis to another, and they did not have time to do the kind of hard, pick and spade work such as something like this, studies on, say, the prison system... |
| DIA | Grassley 10/15/92 | Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by stating that this issue is too important for us to rely on DIA's analysis exclusively for our judgment. This may be the only evidence that we find that possibly points to specific men. We need an independent assessment, not just a DIA assessment. Five different reports have raised the issue of DIA's mind set to debunk. The public is skeptical of DIA's continued debunking of evidence. No matter what DIA says, we need an independent evaluation of the evidence, as well. These photos may, in fact, show shadows. But I want an independent analysis to tell me that, not just DIA. |
| DIA - Critics | Hargis 12/01/92 | The conclusion or finding. DIA did release names and addresses of witnesses under the Freedom of Information Act, but the information released was mostly a compilation of documents which originated outside DIA. Not one of the names or addresses released was of a person who had had direct contact with DIA or had requested confidentiality. |

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| DIA - Critics | Hargis 12/01/92 | <p>The Office of the Inspector General, DIA, conducted an investigation in the Office of the Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, PW/MIA Division in the Directorate of Collection Management, between 20 November 1984 and 2 February 1985, at the direction of General Williams, who was the Director of DIA at that time...</p> <p>The next conclusion; these allegations of mistreatment were judged to be responses from individuals who had attempted to use the PW/MIA issue for their own purposes...</p> <p>There was no indication that DIA interviewers used any procedures that intentionally downgraded, humiliated, embarrassed or abused the witness.</p> <p>There was no evidence to suggest that any truly knowledgeable witness could be discouraged by DIA methods for making information known.</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Hargis 12/01/92 | Next conclusion; there can be no improvement to the worsening situation until the policy and public relations interface is inserted between the DIA and the rest of the world. |
| DIA - Critics | Hargis 12/01/92 | We had one other finding and one other recommendation. There was evidence that DIA had been and continued to be manipulated on the PW/MIA issue by entities outside the U.S. Government. |

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| DIA - Critics | Hrdlicka 12/03/92 | <p>...I would add that if you want to talk about fraud I would call the DIA one of the biggest perpetrators. I have spent 2 years trying to get answers out of those people on specifics. I had a meeting in July with Mr. Sheetz and Mr. Gray and they were going to get right back to me. Well I sit here today, and they have not gotten right back to me.</p> <p>I file a Freedom of Information; reports that I have don't even come through on the Freedom of Information. Now you want to call fraud, I call that fraud, and I feel like I've been the person that's had the fraud perpetrated on me. I can appreciate these other scams, but I have to tell you that if our Government had done their job in the first place, I wouldn't be in the situation where I could be a victim or Carol Collins be a victim.</p> |
| DIA | Kerry 06/25/92 | <p>...on 4 January of 1974, in fact, significant personnel reductions were proposed to take place in the POW/MIA section of DIA. And literally, the personnel within that section had to go to bat to explain to superiors why they were important to the resolution of the accountability process.</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Knecht 12/01/92 | <p>In defense of the senior management of DIA, I could not find any case where somebody had said we need to do this to fix this and they said don't do that.</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Knecht 12/01/92 | <p>Mindset to debunk: everybody's discussed it. I absolutely could not find anything on it. I absolutely disagree with it.</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Knecht 12/01/92 | <p>I agree with Colonel Peck where he criticized the fact that the special office was being used for tasks that were not appropriate for an intelligence activity.</p> |

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| DIA - Critics | Knecht 12/01/92 | <p>I am also saying that Colonel Peck basically recycled... the Gaines report to us, as if there had been no intervening change. And then when pressed for the details of those criticisms that he made, I could not find any specifics to support them. When I looked at those specific criticisms which I was then aware of in the intervening period, then I could not find those.</p> |
| DIA - Clusters | Maguire 08/04/92 | <p>Senate investigators called Dak Chung a cluster because of six hearsay reports that recounted the same story...But in depth analysis showed that all the reports were similar because one of the six sources had told the same story to the other five. What we are left with is not a cluster of six, but a cluster of one. And that one source admitted lying about his original story, so now we have no cluster...So DIA has concluded that Dak Chung is not a cluster, but we could only reach that conclusion by carefully reading and investigating each report.</p> |
| DIA - Clusters | Maguire 08/04/92 | <p>...there were some areas where the reporting tends to be heavier and gives a clustered appearance. Some members of the Senate Committee staff believe that the reports within some of these areas prove that a U.S. POW was held past Operation Homecoming. Our understanding is that Senate staffers used three criteria to reach that conclusion.</p> <p>These three criteria are shown here. However, to reach these conclusions about clusters, other types of intelligence were ignored and only a handful of the over 1,500 source reports were used.</p> |

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| DIA - Clusters | Nagy 12/01/92 | It was not with the process or the procedure of mapping reporting. That process is underway in DIA, has been underway in DIA, and is being used today in support of General Vessey and his activities. So I certainly cannot let the comment lie that it is not being done. That is not true. |
| DIA - Critics | Nagy 12/01/92 | I was asked to address circumstances of an early 1985 internal DIA examination of the analytic and collection tasking activities of DIA's POW/MIA office. The examination was somewhat unusual in that it was an analyst's critique of other analysts' activities. |

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| DIA - Critics | Nagy 12/01/92 | <p>I have reviewed the study group's report. In summary, it concluded that: One, the analytic effort was of high quality; two, analyst retention was likely to be a future problem unless the division's grade structure was increased; three, access to the DIA online ADP system should be improved, and additional terminals provided; four, the POW/MIA analysts should travel to both Hawaii and Thailand to meet and interact with counterpart analysts and collectors; five, a senior executive should be appointed to speak for the organization; six, the POW/MIA analysts should receive greater recognition.</p> <p>The details of the report included other comments... the suspicion that the analytic activities of the division were diminished by the need to respond to numerous outside requests... the implicit view that inordinate time was spent on a somewhat legalistic approach to evidence and analysis that was probably necessary, given the importance of and outside interest in the issue... it was felt that if this were a normal intelligence activity, some of the cases that were being held open could be closed... the possibility that human intelligence in the field could be improved by adding additional collectors...</p> |
| DIA | Nagy 12/01/92 | In the wake of the end of the Vietnamese conflict, in 1973 the intelligence community underwent a very severe contraction, 35 to 40 percent of the personnel, and this can be easily documented, were let go, moved out of the business... The POW/MIA analytic effort was certainly caught up in that set of reductions beginning in 1973. |

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| DIA - Critics | Nagy 12/01/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: The themes are repetitive that there was a diffusion of the mission, there was a lack of management, lack of guidance, not a direction of effort, and so forth. The politics that entered into it from outside influences, the analysis, itself.</p> <p>Nagy: It is my view that from 1973 until the issue from an administration's standpoint was revived in the early 1980's, that for all practical purposes you had three organizations struggling in the dark, without a great deal of policy support, that were working this issue for the United States Government. Those were the two that were based in Hawaii, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in CILHI, and the office in DIA...</p> <p>Beginning in 1983...DIA has added personnel to the effort, expanded the effort of the office, expanded the operations, as you are well aware, in Southeast Asia that were under DIA's direct control...</p> |
| DIA | Perot 08/11/92 | You need an organization who goes in every morning and says, here is a new shred of evidence. Let's really look at it objectively. Let's not try to debunk it. Let's not discredit the person who brought it in. Let's not spend all of our energy discrediting the person who brought it in. |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | Another criticism that I believe invalid, at least during my tenure, was that the DIA only responded to sanitized or selected queries...I remember coming under criticism from circles that I was paying too much attention to the Rambo faction. I can tell you that I responded to any query that was deemed appropriate. |

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| DIA - Critics | Perroots 08/12/92 | No one ever approached me to take on General Tighe. It was solely and exclusively my idea for good and honorable reasons... now, as to what influence I had over [the Tighe Commission Report] conclusions and recommendations. Well, the answer is absolutely none. |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | Another valid criticism was the lack of adequate and follow up effort within the intelligence community. The National Collection Priority for POW/MIA prior to 1985 ranged from priority 7 to priority 3. We raised it to priority 1... |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: ...there is just ample evidence of occasions where the Government just stumbles over itself in kind of defensiveness or inefficiency or something which has -- I think you would agree -- significantly contributed to people's anger and frustration. Is that correct?</p> <p>Perroots: Therein lies the problem.</p> |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 08/12/92 | I repeatedly asked General Tighe and the review group if they were getting the support they needed and never received anything but a positive answer. |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 08/12/92 | Never, never did he or any task force member mention that they had even a suspicion of any bugging of their facility...Also the statement by General Tighe that it was unanimous conclusion of all the task force members that the room was bugged is false...All of the comments implicitly accept the allegation that there was a bugging. Gentlemen, I do not believe there was. There is no evidence there was. |

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| DIA | Perroots 08/12/92 | President Reagan assumed office with a personal commitment to resolving the issue... the Administration was determined to pursue the issue as a matter of highest national priority... Frankly, a mess was inherited. |
| DIA - Clusters | Perroots 12/01/92 | In terms of that big evidence to support the existence of Americans being held against their will, it is nonsense. You have to take each report, factor the credibility of that report, determine what other reports you have... That is a rather simplistic approach to the analytical effort required to determine whether Americans are held against their will in Southeast Asia. |
| DIA - Clusters | Perroots 12/01/92 | Sen. McCain: General Perroots, let us get back again to the famous cluster theory. Now, this has been portrayed by the staff -- or some members of the staff of this committee -- as some kind of earth-shaking brand new idea, something that no one ever thought of before... What is your view of this cluster theory? Have you ever used it? What do you view the validity of it? Perroots: Well, let me first say that trend analyses, the clustering of reports is not only not new, but it has been done. I directly was involved as part of the preliminary for the Stony Beach operation. I said listen, I not only want to have a capability but I want to be able to move even on the basis of a lack of sufficient evidence, but if I say well, if we are going to do something, if we are going to put a team in, where would be the best place to put them in on the basis simply of where the most reports are, even if you assume that all of them are true. So we clustered and we clustered and we clustered. It was a continuing process. |

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| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | Another valid criticism, in my judgment, is that we not always adequately conducted timely follow up of reports. |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | I believe we implemented virtually all of the 30 or more recommendations of the Gaines Report and virtually all of the recommendations of the Tighe Report, save for one, as I recall, or perhaps two. |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | Another valid criticism that we ultimately fixed was the criticism that there was insufficient coordination among the intelligence agencies to ensure an effective database and integrated collection and analysis effort. |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | Of course, a major criticism that for the most part was invalid, from my view, was the alleged mindset to debunk. It is very easy for me to say that there was very little to debunk. There was no debunking. There was no calculated effort to debunk. I took whatever steps possible to make sure that there could be no debunking, as much as you can humanly possibly do that... We did that by establishing review boards. In retrospect, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe there was any calculated effort to debunk. |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | Another valid criticism: DIA was too involved in activities which detracted from its primary mission... |
| DIA - Critics | Perroots 12/01/92 | A major valid criticism was that insufficient resources were being expended to adequately do the collecting, analysis, and follow up mission... Now, this was especially true from '73 to '85... |

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| DIA - Critics | Schlatter 12/01/92 | In the case of the Tighe Report, we implemented every one of those that we could implement... There were certain of the Tighe recommendations that simply really did not apply to DIA... |
| DIA - Critics | Schlatter 12/01/92 | ...I do not believe the mindset to debunk exists... in terms of the Gaines Report, we adopted virtually every one of the recommendations. |
| DIA - Critics | Schlatter 12/01/92 | I was to find, and it took me a year to wake up and realize this, that the answers are simply not that simple and the answers were not that available... |
| DIA - Critics | Schlatter 12/01/92 | Another problem I found was one of confusion of management and analytic resources. |
| DIA - Critics | Schlatter 12/01/92 | There are two criticisms that I consider particularly invalid... I came into that office feeling that, number one, what we had was essentially an intelligence analytic problem. |
| DIA | Sheetz 12/04/92 | ...we at DIA recognize that the answers to the haunting questions surrounding our unaccounted for men are to be found in Southeast Asia. We clearly understand that our duty as intelligence officers is to provide timely support to those assigned the POW/MIA operational mission in Southeast Asia. |
| DIA | Sheetz 12/04/92 | ...DIA and the entire intelligence community recently collaborated in the development of a collection posture statement and overall collection strategy for the POW/MIA issue. This effort was a major undertaking which we believe goes a long way toward ensuring that all appropriate capabilities of the U.S. intelligence system continue to be brought to bear. |

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| DIA | Shields 06/25/92 | DIA as an intelligence gathering and interpreting body should be free and unconstrained in its own internal efforts to develop information about missing and captured Americans. I believe that [standard] provided a more effective and complete intelligence effort than forcing DIA to conform to service decisions about what happened to a man. |
| DIA | Shields 06/25/92 | Sen. Robb: In reviewing your testimony, I do not recall seeing any reference to any coordination with the CIA during the course of your testimony or analysis. I'm just curious, was there any that related to this particular matter, the whole question of POWs and MIAs? Shields: Well, there was, Senator. Most of that coordination was accomplished through the DIA and the intelligence areas. We asked that the CIA be included and they were included. |
| DIA - Critics | Tighe 06/24/92 | Trowbridge's people were besieged with the political... the pressure to examine, the challenges to reports, and so forth. And it became an almost impossible task and... I think I probably would have given up a long time before this. |
| DIA - Critics | Tighe 06/24/92 | Vice Chairman Smith: Did you ever have any indication that your work space was bugged during your work? Tighe: It was the conclusion, I believe unanimous conclusion, of each of our members that our room was bugged through the telephone system. |
| DIA | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | During the war, DIA's efforts were focused almost exclusively on trying to determine who was being held prisoner and where they were likely being held. |

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| DIA | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | CIA monitored and focused the worldwide POW/MIA intelligence efforts and expedited communication with the policy makers. |
| DIA | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | Today, the POW/MIA issue is looked at through the lens of 1992, which is a lot different than what they were in 1973. We've learned an awful lot since then. |
| DIA | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | ...intelligence analysis is not an exact science... We have to make the best judgement we can based on the information we have, and that is what we did. |
| DIA - Critics | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | ...we might find that report would correlate to several incidents. Duplicates of the source's debrief report would then be put in each man's file in the hope that subsequent information would then become available. |
| DIA | Trowbridge 06/24/92 | Hanoi's June 1966 announcement that our captured airman would be tried for war crimes drastically focused intelligence community attention on this issue. |
| DIA | Trowbridge 11/06/91 | Sen. Grassley: ...if you or any one of your colleagues in the organization has ever made even one mistake in analyzing live-sighting reports, it could mean that we have left someone over there against his will... Trowbridge: I think about it every day, sir. |

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| DIA - Critics | Wiand 12/01/92 | It was the general finding of the IG (Inspector General) team that the PW/MIA office was performing a unique function in the United States Government which was likely to continue for many years to come. The function was assessed as being overexposed to outside pressures and organized in a fashion that did allow for efficient operation. Intelligence analysis and morale suffered as a result. There was no evidence of illegal or improper activities. |
| DIA - Critics | Wiand 12/01/92 | However, as documented in a report at the time of inspection, analytical work in the PW/MIA office was being conducted on the assumption that some Americans were still held captive in Southeast Asia. |
| DIA - Critics | Wiand 12/01/92 | It is my recollection that the February '83 POW/MIA inspection was routinely scheduled as part of the overall 1983 inspection schedule. |
| DIA - Critics | Williams 12/01/92 | ...I don't choose to think that people were inept, but there was certainly a lot of bureaucratic fumbling around trying to figure out what next to do. |
| DIA | Williams 12/01/92 | ...as a former military officer having served in Vietnam and 31 year service, 28 years of those in intelligence, there was no mindset to debunk consciously and there was certainly no effort to cover up... we are darn sure going to pursue every lead as though it were a viable active lead. |
| DIA | Hargis 12/01/92 | My charter was to investigate these allegations to determine if inappropriate procedures were being used by personnel in the DIA PW/MIA office, when dealing with individuals coming forward with information concerning POWs and missing in action. |

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| DIA` | Schlatter 12/01/92 | ...the answers lie in Hanoi. |
| DIA` | Schlatter 12/01/92 | We found that while the office had fairly comprehensive collection requirements, they were not really being actively managed and upgraded... the special office [for POW/MIA] was too exposed to outside influences... there were not sufficient resources in the office to accomplish its mission. |
| DIA` | Wiand 12/01/92 | The inspection findings were treated seriously and the senior management of DIA focused on the problems documented and on taking corrective actions. |
| DoD | Usry 11/15/91 | <p>I am confident that the Administration... really wants to do the right thing. I do not necessarily believe they want to do the right thing because that is where their heart is. I believe they want to do the right thing now because it is a public issue and there is a committee here that is going to look at them and perform oversight to ensure that they are going to do the right thing...</p> <p>I do not believe that everything the Defense Department did was wrong. I believe in many instances they did good work, but in those instances when they were wrong, we are dealing with human life, or the possibility of a human life... the point of departure if I were looking at this would be the day these hearings started and everything before that should be reviewed.</p> |

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| Families | (Carr Collins) 12/03/92 | <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Did you ever see or hear of any live-sighting reports on your husband?</p> <p>Collins: Never, but I know that there are some now.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: There are some, and I don't know anything about the validity of them, so I don't mean to, you know, mislead you in that regard, but there are live-sighting reports, and you have not seen those. These are during the war.</p> <p>Collins: During that time, no, I did not. I saw some in 1991. I was sent them from Hawaii.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: There is a live-sighting report, one that I know of. This is during the war, not after, in which he was allegedly captured in Laos by North Vietnamese regulars.</p> <p>Again, I think this -- I bring this up because it's another example of the problem and the reason why the committee's here, and the reason why sometimes information that -- if this information were put out in the public domain, the opportunity for fraud would be less, I believe, because you could simply go to the documents, but when the documents are held secret and kept in secret files for reasons other than national security, in my opinion, that -- therein, you know, lies the problem.</p> <p>If your husband was the subject of a live-sighting report, you should have been told that, and you were not, and yet, even today, if you bring the witnesses up here tomorrow, they'll say -- the Government witnesses, they'll say, well the families are provided all information. Here's an example right here. You have not.</p> |
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| Families | Bardsley 11/06/91 | ...I feel like in my five days in Vietnam that I found out more about my father's case than I've learned from the Government in 25 years. |
| Families | Carr Collins 12/03/92 | ...you become obsessed. You cannot sleep, eat, work, because you would waltz with the devil to bring one man home. Sen. McCain: There is no possible way that I can express the sympathy that I and the people of this country feel for what you have been subjected to. I can only tell you that we will continue to honor Donald Carr's memory and appreciate his service and sacrifice to this Nation and to the cause of freedom. |
| Families | Carr Collins 12/03/92 | After the analysis had come out from Los Alamos and Dr. Charney I began to doubt my own view of the picture, which was there was a slight possibility there could be Don. I mean I just -- I did not know. But something that my son said to me sort of turned me around. He said mother, that picture is obviously an American. I mean he looks like an American to me. He said he's somebody's father, he's somebody's brother, husband, cousin. He said if there's a chance in a billion that it's my dad, I've got to do something. So with that, that's when I started. |
| Families | Collins 12/03/92 | I, as an MIA wife, was frustrated by knowing little, being left out of the loop, and it seemed at times being treated as the enemy, more feared by the administration and military intelligence than the North Vietnamese whom we should have been unified against. This was typical of the attitude of the government in those years. |

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| Families | Collins 12/03/92 | Most of us have been tempted at some point to participate in some form of POW rescue based on nothing more than questionable and circumstantial information at best, such as unverified photos, live sightings, and anonymous reports. If it sounds hooky and mystic, it probably is, and it almost always plays a very cruel hoax on the families by raising false hopes... I am very pleased to know this committee will take up these issues and problems in the near future, and hope this will eliminate once and for all the con artists, and clear the way for those who are credible and knowledgeable to resolve the long standing tragedy of our MIAs. The closed-door attitude of the government, which started and became ingrained in the early war years, has contributed greatly to making the families vulnerable and prey for the antiwar activists on the left and the con artists and mystics on the right. If the government was silent to their questions, then where were they to go for information and help? Some elements of both groups meant well, but their impact has been cruel to the families. |
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| Families | Collins 12/03/92 | <p>Had they brought us into the loop, telling us the things that we had a right to know from the onset, we would never find ourselves in this position today.</p> <p>Had they trusted us, brought us in the loop, talked to us, told us these things and said, hey, we need -- we are going to tell you this, but this is for family only. See, what they did was, they said you don't need to know this. Now, you know, if you were to let this out, this could cause his death. Now, you wouldn't want to do that, would you? I love that old hang that guilt trip on them.</p> |
| Families | Collins 12/03/92 | <p>...the old military cliché that wives and families should be told nothing and should know nothing was, and I presume to some degree is still the rule. This is an overreaction to legitimate military security needs, and has probably resulted in more inadvertent leaks through ignorance than if the spouses and families had been brought into the network in matters that concerned them.</p> |
| Families | Collins 12/03/92 | <p>I hope that never again will families of the missing will have to literally take to the street. This is an additional burden on them in this time of grief and hardship which should not be necessary. The MIA families have had to keep up this effort even until today.</p> |
| Families | Fleckenstein 11/06/91 | <p>...that isn't all of it either, because when I was looking to get fingerprints, I went to the Hall of Records in downtown Los Angeles. They had no birth certificate on my son, but they have on the other two of my sons. I went to Sacramento, they have no birth certificate on my son. DMV, the hospital records, there are no fingerprints to be had anywhere.</p> |

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| Families | Ford 11/15/91 | <p>Senator, the current practice, or the practice certainly in the past, has been to provide the families with information that has been correlated specifically with their loved ones -- as opposed to all the information that happened in that year, or that area in which their loved one was lost. Part of that was privacy concerns -- of giving information out about other families' cases, and partly it was [protecting] sources and methods.</p> <p>I think that over the years, the families have grown dissatisfied with that. They understand that there is more information that certainly is not associated directly with their loved one, but they would like to be able to look at it and see if we miss something... Quite frankly, we've got to find a way to satisfy that requirement. We have got to find a way to give the families more confidence that they're seeing everything that we've got.</p> <p>If there are some things that are so highly classified and sensitive that we can't show it to them directly, that they can have the committee or someone with a security clearance check it for them... We're going to find in the very short term some sort of an answer for information for the families.</p> |
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| Families | Ford 12/04/92 | <p>...we didn't lose our credibility with you, with the families, with the American people overnight and we're not going to gain that credibility back overnight. And I can sit here and I can tell you about what we're going to do and I can talk about it.</p> <p>The only thing that is going to persuade people is our actions and our results, and to prove over time that we are serious, that we do mean what we say, and that despite occasional setbacks, despite occasional human errors, we're going to demonstrate over the next months and weeks, years, that we can do it better than we have done it in the past. And that's our only commitment, to try. And if there are problems that this committee uncovers, we'll try to fix them.</p> <p>I hope that also when you find good things, particularly about the people in the field who, far from the limelight, far from the excitement of Washington, are on a daily basis out there slugging it out, oftentimes in very primitive conditions. And I hope that your visits to the region, your discussion with these people, you can also say some good things about them.</p> |
| Families | Griffiths 11/06/91 | <p>The vast majority of the POW/MIA families are realistic. We don't expect miracles. We expect seriousness by our own government, Executive and Legislative branches, rather than spontaneous reaction to the squeaky wheel or the latest editorial. We expect adherence to established policy and implementation with integrity, not comments from unnamed senior officials which dismiss facts and principle in the perceived interest of political or economic advantage.</p> |

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| Families | Hrdlicka 12/03/92 | <p>In 1977, the Air Force Casualty Office contacted me and advised me that they were going to review David's case, and unless I had any new evidence that he was alive, they were going to declare him dead. I then stated that I had no evidence since I was not allowed access to intelligence.</p> <p>Why is it that the burden of proof is always on the families?</p> |
| Families | Hrdlicka 12/03/92 | <p>If these men are not alive today, it's because they were either starved, executed, mistreated, or simply died of broken hearts in the last 20 years it has taken to go looking for them. They know where my husband is. I know this. My family will not rest until we find the fate of David.</p> |
| Families | Kerry 11/15/91 | <p>I think one of the most important things that could come out of the early days of these hearings is a new structure, and a new relationship process with the families.</p> |
| Families | O'Grady 11/06/91 | <p>Hundreds of families have stories just like mine. Yet there is not enough time for each of them to come forward and speak. Even when we appear before you, we must prove our loved ones are alive by a standard not required of the United States Government to prove them dead.</p> |
| Families - PFOD | Oksenber 06/25/92 | <p>The reclassification process had no impact upon our resolve to pursue this issue.</p> |

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| Families - PFOD | Oksenberg 06/25/92 | <p>Equally moving was a meeting with the wife of a missing American pilot whose plane had been shot down over North Vietnam. She told me she was desperate. She explained that she had lived in suspended animation for I think six or seven years. She wanted to know whether the United States Government thought her husband was alive or dead.</p> <p>She could ask the Pentagon what was known about her husband's fate which might lead to his being reclassified from being missing to being dead, but she told me that she was psychologically incapable of initiating such a review. She felt that in some sense her request for a review would be an abandonment of her loved one. She wanted to remain faithful to her husband as long as there was any hope and she would do nothing to destroy that hope. But if the Government informed her that her loved one were dead, she would then reluctantly seek to rebuild her life. That is what her husband would have wanted her to do especially for the sake of their son.</p> <p>She felt that the Government owed her its best judgment about her husband's fate without her having to do anything to ascertain what that judgment was. She requested that the Government change its policy and implement an automatic review of all cases including that of her husband.</p> |
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| Families - PFOD | Oksenberg 06/25/92 | <p>The Government owed it to the New Jersey soldier and others like him, as well as to their families and friends, to persist in a search for them as long as a straw of hope of their survival existed and to recover their remains if all hope had vanished.</p> <p>But we also had a responsibility not to arouse false hopes and unjustified expectations.</p> |
| Families | Otis 12/03/92 | <p>Sen. Reid: What more do you think we as a committee could do that we have not done?</p> <p>Otis: If you could even just -- what I've been wanting is for the public to really care. And I know it's been really too long, but the Government and the media didn't press this in the beginning. They just assumed everybody was dead. And we felt so abandoned because not only did our Government or the media care, but the public didn't seem to care.</p> |
| Families | Otis 12/03/92 | <p>Nor are we any longer in limbo, as are the families of the missing and of those known to have been alive in captivity. Ron Dodge finally came home, and credit goes in large part to the wives and parents and siblings who founded the National League of Families and to the families and concerned citizens who are still prodding and pleading and questioning.</p> |
| Families | Otis 12/03/92 | <p>Commander Dodge's status change hearing was in February 1979. The next of kin had to prove the missing serviceman alive. The Government, with all of their resources, did not have to prove him dead.</p> |

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| Families | Quast 11/06/91 | I have been promised at a very high policy level access to my father's file, but denied access by those people who have testified before this committee when I went to see the file. I'm asking, what is the policy and who actually runs the show for the POW policy? |
| Families | R. Smith 12/04/92 | By the late seventies, remaining MIAs under President Carter's administration were simply declared dead. One memorandum dated May 26, 1977, from the Secretary of Defense, stated that in the long run continuing to carry these personnel as missing in action would force us to make concessions to Hanoi. |
| Families | Reid 12/03/92 | ...I do hope that there can be some guidelines set that, if, in fact, something like this happens again, we do not have this on-going personal calamity in the lives of everyone connected with somebody that is shot down or is missing in some way. |
| Families | S. Morrissey 12/03/92 | I was invited to talk about the family liaison with the POW/MIA agencies. Simply put, the agencies of our Government responsible for the MIA issue do not provide us, of their own volition and in a timely manner, all information that they had about my father's fate, despite their often-repeated promise to do just that. |

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| Families | S. Stockdale 12/03/92 | When our National League incorporated in the District of Columbia, one of our stated goals was to achieve the fullest possible accounting of our men who were missing in action, and here you are, 27 years after that briefing for Carrier Air Group 16 wives, trying to untwist that braid of lies and deceptions that have indeed emotionally involved the American people and have brought shame and disgrace on our country. And I will be quick to point out we are not alone in our history of lies and deception about prisoners of war and the missing in action. It seems to me that the one consistent thing the North Vietnamese have done for all 27 years is lie about our American prisoners and missing. |
| Families | S. Stockdale 12/03/92 | Even though some of us wives knew we were being fed a steady diet of lies by our Government, we also knew that to publicly denounce our Government while it was engaged in war would be to play into the hands of the enemy and dishonor the very men for whom we sought humane treatment. |
| Families | S. Stockdale 12/03/92 | In order for you to put your findings into context, it's important that you understand the extent to which we wives and families were lied to and patronized by our own Government. The Johnson Administration gave us no help whatsoever when we wanted to organize ourselves. And it was in spite of them that we were able to have 2,000 telegrams on President Nixon's desk the day after his inauguration in January 1969. |

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| Families | S. Morrissey 12/03/92 | <p>I was 16 years old when my dad was shot down. Dad was 42. He was a big man with a good sense of humor and a big appetite for life. He liked sports cars, bagpipe music, Irish whiskey; he fished, he rode broncos in the Rodeo; he loved New Mexico and the Air Force.</p> <p>I remember him vividly, and miss him terribly. Nonetheless, I have long been resigned to the fact that he's almost certainly dead, and resigned to the fact that I will probably never know what happened to him, but that does not relieve me or you of the obligation to try to find out what did happen to him.</p> <p>I don't expect the impossible, only the confidence that the Government that ordered my father into combat is doing all that it can to determine his fate and that my family knows all that this Government knows.</p> |
| Families | Schlesinger 09/21/92 | <p>I have spent a large part of my life and put a lot of emotion into this, Shields said. It was such an enormous issue and we were dealing with human beings. I knew their wives, I knew their sisters, I knew their brothers. Though he is years away from direct involvement, Mr. Shields said he is still invited to weddings and the other family events by relatives of the missing.</p> |

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| Families | Smith 12/03/92 | <p>Vice Chairman Smith: When did you know, when were you told by the Vietnamese that your husband was alive? How long was he a prisoner before you knew?</p> <p>Collins: Tom was missing four years, two months, and two weeks, and I received a letter from him in Christmas of '69. Now, I knew before then, but not through anything the Government did. I found on my own that Tom was seen alive in Hanoi in 1966.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: How did you find that out?</p> <p>Collins: I cannot tell you that, sir.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: All right, that is fine.</p> <p>Collins: I cannot testify in an open hearing as to how I found this, sir. I was more fortunate than most family members. I had friends in high places.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Do you have any reason to believe that anybody in the United States Government knew he was alive and did not tell you?</p> <p>Collins: Oh, yes, I'm certain that they did. See, here we come back to the beginning.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: So people in the United States Government knew your husband was alive and they did not tell you.</p> <p>Collins: Yes.</p> |
| Fraud | Brooks 12/01/92 | <p>...there also is a category of people at work surrounding the POW/MIA issue which I will categorize as professional predators...</p> |

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| Fraud | Kerry 12/02/92 | Some people have seen fit to literally fabricate photographs and to distribute those photographs alleging that they represent the loved ones of families in this country. The hopes of families have been unfairly torn and tattered as a consequence of those actions. That is a predatory action. It is a disgrace. People who do it, I think, rank as low on the scale of measurement of human behavior as you can get. There are just no words strong enough to condemn the activities of people who will knowingly distribute a photograph alleging that they are today held when they know that photograph is a fabrication. |
| Fraud | McCain 12/02/92 | ...I and other members of this committee have urged the Justice Department to investigate allegations of POW/MIA fraud. I certainly hope such an investigation is by now well under way. The information which the committee's investigation yields should be of valuable assistance to the Justice Department in its efforts to prosecute those people that have used this issue to intentionally deceive decent people. |

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| Fraud | McCain 12/02/92 | <p>It will also come as no surprise to my colleagues that I am somewhat disappointed by the limits of time and scope placed on this hearing in our investigation. And this is not a criticism of you, Mr. Chairman... Nor is it a criticism of committee investigators, who in my view have done an exemplary job in a short amount of time and under difficult circumstances...</p> <p>I understand the committee had a great many subjects to address in the span of 1 year and not all subjects could receive the attention they deserved...</p> <p>My disappointment is mitigated, however, by the knowledge that standing committees of Congress will again have jurisdiction over all questions concerning our POW/MIAs after the Select Committee finishes its work. And thanks to this committee, Congress' awareness of this issue and its responsibilities to continue the work of this committee has been greatly heightened.</p> |
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| Fraud | Sheetz 12/01/92 | <p>Sen. McCain: How much of the effort that your organization is engaged in has been -- how much of your assets have had to be diverted to tracking down the bogus pictures and the hoaxers?</p> <p>Sheetz: At times, Senator, I would tell you that that process has literally precluded us from doing anything else. Because the political pressure has been so intense and the high interest among the people in the Government, this committee, the American public, to know what is the truth on those cases...It's an opportunity cost argument. Essentially, what you're doing is dropping the work that would probably have more payoff to chase after things that ultimately turn out to be useless exercises.</p> |
| Fraud | Sheridan 12/02/92 | <p>...I too know of a family that was defrauded of many thousands of dollars. Somehow, those people have to be recognized and they have to be dealt with. And they cannot be allowed to get back out on the street and do this the next time an issue comes along. I feel very strongly about that.</p> |

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| Fundraising | Albrecht 12/02/92 | <p>Sen. Reid: That is important. You say that 90 percent of the solicitations --</p> <p>Albrecht: Of this group that we have evaluated, better than 90 percent probably are spending --</p> <p>Sen. Reid: Meet the 60 percent standard?...</p> <p>Albrecht: That is significant, and I think it is important that we bear in mind that there is a lot that is right and good that is going on in this field, although we still are just as concerned, as we should always be, about misleading solicitations, about creative accounting, and about ineffective governance.</p> |
| Fundraising | Albrecht 12/02/92 | <p>...I first need to emphasize that these practices are far from universal, though they are spreading at a disturbing rate. In fact, 76 percent of all the national charities reviewed and evaluated by NCIB meet all nine of our standards, including those having to do with fundraising practices and fundraising reporting.</p> |
| Fundraising | Albrecht 12/02/92 | <p>There is a problem with creative accounting in the field, exactly. And there is a certain amount of it that goes on.</p> |
| Fundraising | Albrecht 12/02/92 | <p>Vice Chairman Smith: On 100-percent of expenses, what is the acceptable figure for fundraising expenses, out of that 100-percent? Did any of you say? You might have said it, and I may have missed it.</p> <p>Mr. Albrecht: We've taken a close look at 30 percent. By that we mean we get more information. Is the percentage going up? Is it coming down? Are they in an acquisition campaign? Are they a new organization?</p> |

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| Fundraising | Allen 12/02/92 | It's kind of like a consumer-beware kind of notion. And people being asked for the funds need to be very careful and ask a lot of questions. |
| Fundraising | Allen 12/02/92 | ...I think everyone wants to make it a level playing field, and one where the public can have the trust that it has long held in this sector. |
| Fundraising | Allen 12/02/92 | As a matter of federalism, I think it would be unrealistic to think of a Federal role that would take care of the problem. At the same time I think, personally, there is a role for the Federal Government, and probably a larger role it could play that could include prosecutions by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorneys more extensively than we now see based on larceny and based on fraud. |
| Fundraising | Canada 12/02/92 | Each one of these ideas are techniques, Senator. Techniques to convey to the prospective donor what Colonel Bailey had already related to us. Techniques used in direct mail fund raising to raise money for our client so that they go ahead and continue their programs. |
| Fundraising | Eberle 12/02/92 | Mr. Eberle: Senator, I still fail to see how that differs from when you have a speech inserted in the Congressional Record and then it is printed in the Congressional Record as if you gave the speech on the floor, how it's any different. Chairman Kerry: It is extremely different. Because all of our words we are responsible for here and everybody understands that. And the speech does not purport to be anything other than the speech. This purports to be something other than what it is. |

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| Fundraising | Eberle 12/02/92 | Chairman Kerry: You cannot say, please excuse the handwriting, but I am writing at a makeshift desk. He was not writing at a makeshift desk, was he? Mr. Eberle: No... |
| Fundraising | Eberle 12/02/92 | Senator, I will have to be honest. I have no idea whatsoever and I have no idea why there are quotes around there. I'm sort of reminded of that comment by Elizabeth Barrett Browning when she was asked, why did she write a particular thing in a verse and she said, when I wrote that only God and I knew and now only God knows. |
| Fundraising | Kerry 12/02/92 | ...you sit here and say to us, gee, I only got \$100,000, but that is really disingenuous, because the total fee produced by this which benefits you or your family or partners is significantly more than that. So you sit here and say you only got this amount of money when in fact the charity, quote, winds up with \$200,000 against \$1.9 million raised. I find that unconscionable and extraordinary. |

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| Fundraising | Kerry 12/02/92 | <p>What I'm saying to you is, there is a body of evidence out there that has never been in the public domain. It should have been in the public domain, and now that it is in the public domain, I think if you read it, and those in the press take the time to read it, you will find that there is a basis of evidence, a basis of information that provides a rationale or a reason for documents like that being written, as was the league document being written...</p> <p>There is a body of information like this throughout this government and some of it has never been disproved. Much of it has not -- much of it is bunk. A lot of it is bunk. A lot of it is garbage and it has been proven so. But a lot of it has not been disproved...</p> <p>But there is a distinction between that and a letter that goes out for six years saying, P.S., some of our captive Americans are in failing health. Now I guess they knew that in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, same letter. P.S., they are in failing health.</p> |
| Fundraising | Kerry 12/02/92 | <p>...I must tell you, I mean we have just found some bold-faced, non-accurate statements. Each of you suggest this is the information you are given and you had no reason to believe otherwise. I have no way of saying otherwise, obviously, so I accept that. But it leaves us in a terrible quandary. And you know what? It leaves a lot of families and a lot of American citizens sickened, sadden, victimized as a consequence. And we should not allow that to happen in this country.</p> |

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| Fundraising | Kerry 12/02/92 | <p>...As part of this arrangement she elicited from InfoCision an under-the-table rebate without her clients knowledge and characterized it as 3 percent rebate to her. She entered into a management consultant agreement with VVNW, and under this agreement she was to receive \$5,000 a month plus 10 percent of the net income of VVNW. And I would just read from a portion of that agreement: "expenses related to the performance of this agreement will be categorized as program expenditures on the clients financial statements and tax returns. Neither the existence nor the details of this agreement will be discussed by either party with any member of the press..."</p> <p>"The essential points would be that one of the letters, a solicitation letter, read as follows: Thanks to your support, Veterans of the Vietnam War have sent a delegation to Vietnam to negotiate for the release of our POWs. During these meetings in Vietnam, the Vietnamese leaders told our representatives that American POWs are still alive in Southeast Asia, exclamation point. Capital letters: THEY ADMITTED IT - FINALLY, exclamation point..."</p> <p>"Our representatives have been to Southeast Asia to meet with Government leaders to break the deadlock. Underlined: The Vietnamese have admitted that some of our men are still alive..."</p> |
| Fundraising | Reid 12/02/92 | <p>...a lot of the money that is raised is based upon people's fears, prejudice, sympathies, and sorrows, and there is no better illustration than some of the stuff that we have gone over today.</p> |

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| Fundraising | Reid 12/02/92 | ...the point that I was making is that we have your fees plus all these subsidiary companies, of which you said you don't receive remuneration from those, but your family does. I think it pretty well speaks for itself. |
| Fundraising | Salta 12/02/92 | To advocate a cause, to seek to disseminate information to the public, are important in a democratic, pluralistic society such as ours. That is why Congress has steadfastly provided for a relatively low-cost universal mail delivery system. Nonetheless, someone has to pay the postage, the printing, the paper, the envelopes, the copywriters, the graphic artists, the data processors, list owners, and other vendors that it takes to produce and mail a direct mail package. Plus, there needs to be some money left over for the charitable cause. Not every cause can find a sufficient number of citizens out there to foot the total bill. |
| Fundraising | Salta 12/02/92 | Mr. LeBoutillier being, again, a credible man, the advisory board that he had some of the more distinguished military people on it -- McDaniel, Graham, Colonel Hopper, Major General John K. Singlaub, many celebrities. We had to believe that information that Mr. LeBoutillier was giving us was correct and accurate. |
| Fundraising | Salta 12/02/92 | I don't know that it's legal, but if we got one out, it would certainly be a wonderful thing, I can assure you. |
| Fundraising | Salta 12/02/92 | As best we can determine at this late date, my company was paid approximately \$100,000 during the 6 years that we worked for Operation Rescue. This amounted to 10 percent of the total amount of funds raised. |

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| Fundraising | Salta 12/02/92 | Sen. McCain: ...Now, if I could direct your attention to number 5 there it says this guy is held out and then marked out, he survived the downing of his airplane but with a badly broken femur. He is guarded by the, the blacked out, in contact. Getting ready for some serious fun and games in this case. Now, in 1987, if my information is correct, this was sent out. Someone in your organization might have thought in the intervening years, since we have not gotten any of these claims corroborated in any way, no Americans came out, no additional corroborated information, et cetera, that maybe you ought to stop to evaluate whether you are sending out what clearly is an invalid message. On the middle one, it says remember, some of our captive Americans are in failing health. Did you ever ask them how they knew that some of our Americans were in failing health? Mr. Salta: No, I did not. Sen. McCain: ...Mr. LeBoutillier claimed that they suffered 65 casualties in their efforts, and you printed that. Did you ever ask to see or talk to any of these? Did any -- any -- of the allegations raised here, were any of them ever questioned by you and decided not to be sent out? Mr. Salta: By me personally? No. |
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| Fundraising | Stern 12/02/92 | Mr. Stern: With due respect, Senator Kerry, the highlighted statement -- what is the gross fraudulent text of it? Chairman Kerry: I read it to you, that as many as 650 of our men are still currently being held. And the inference that the Select Committee provided that information is a very clear writer's trick. You do not have to be a genius to understand what is happening there. |
| Garwood | Knecht 12/01/92 | The final area concerns the Garwood case. He had in his initial debriefings reported that he had not seen any Americans. But then in later interviews that were in the press and in interviews of DIA, he said that he had these sightings. DIA could not find the locations that would physically map where some of these things took place. |
| Garwood | Shields 06/25/92 | While Congressman Montgomery was in Hanoi being assured that no Americans were being held captive in Vietnam, Arlo Gay was being held at Son Tay prison and Tucker Gougelmann was being held in Chi Hoa prison in Saigon. Gay was later released but Gougelmann died in prison and only his remains returned home. |
| Garwood | Sieverts 06/25/92 | Sen. Brown: Are there other names like Garwood where we submitted and asked and they simply would not make a response? Sieverts: A great many. Just about everybody... we provided them with the entire MIA list. And then, shortly thereafter, the entire MIA and BNR lists... the MIAs and BNRs would simply be listed alphabetically without that faintly adverse indication that one is killed, BNR, the other is MIA. |

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| Garwood | Sieverts 06/25/92 | Sen. Brown: Did this Nation, during all those years, ever specifically ask the Government of North Vietnam if they held Bobby Garwood? Mr. Sieverts: The answer to that is, yes. Sen. Brown: And what was their response? Mr. Sieverts: No response at all. Sen. Brown: They did not say that he was not there, they simply did not respond? Mr. Sieverts: That's correct. |
| Garwood | Vessey 06/25/92 | Chairman Kerry: So a statement in 1973 that there is no indication that anyone was alive would simply be inaccurate, would it not? Vessey: I would say yes. You could say we have no firm evidence or something like that, but certainly, the discrepancy cases we have were clearly discrepancies that were unanswered at the time. |
| Government Policies and Actions | Burch 11/06/91 | The POW/MIA Interagency Group is said to be in charge of coordinating a policy on the highest national priority. What is remarkable about this group is the list of absentees. Neither the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, nor the Drug Enforcement Agency has membership on that committee. |
| Government Policies and Actions | Cheney 11/05/91 | I think the reaction of the Department will be set by me and by my presence here today. I think that I have indicated to everybody who works for me that we take this matter very seriously and that our mission is to cooperate with the committee, to benefit from whatever guidance and oversight you care to give us, that Congress has a very legitimate role to play in this area. |

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| Government Policies and Actions | Cheney 11/05/91 | Senator, I would be happy to see to it to the extent that I am able from the standpoint of the Department of Defense that there is no retribution against anyone who would provide information that is useful to the Committee and during the course of your inquiry. |
| Government Policies and Actions | Cheney 11/05/91 | With respect to how the Department operated in previous administrations over the years that set a tone or a stage where families of POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia believe the Department was less than truthful, I am simply not responsible for [that]; that was not on my watch. |
| Government Policies and Actions | Grassley 06/24/92 | ...the amount of stonewalling that went on, what a contrast to have a former communist open up documents of their government to members of our Government. |
| Government Policies and Actions | Kerry 11/15/91 | It is no fun, as a foreign officer, having your bona fides questioned. The committee is not questioning them in a way that I think some are. The Committee is trying to sort out who knows what... you are public officials and the system has come to a grinding gridlock of lack of credibility and we have got a requirement here to sweat it out. You understand that, but I just want you to know that I think there are a lot of extraordinarily dedicated people who are committed to this issue who are working day and night to try to find out if somebody is alive and to bring them home. Regrettably, we are where we are because there is a then and a now to this issue... To the degree we can sort out what happened in the past and understand it, we are going to help to understand this issue today. |

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| Government Policies and Actions | Sheridan 12/02/92 | The war in Southeast Asia was a very long war. Thousands upon hundreds of thousands were involved either fighting the battle or waiting at home. You could take each one of those individuals and you're going to get a different perspective of that war meant to them, depending on the time frame or the military service or what the person was doing at home. I would like to think that our Government has done everything that they've needed to do, but we hear from time to time that may not be the case. We do believe that the Government should be very forthcoming. |
| Government Policies and Actions | Smith 06/24/92 | Over the past 45 years, we have seen not only zealous but jealous guarding of information by the Executive Branch... it would be one heck of a lot easier if, in fact, the Executive Branch would cooperate with the legislative branch and get the truth out to the American people totally, unequivocally... That is what we have asked for. That is what the American people want... We would not have a investigation today on any of this if the information had been put out an given to the American people. So I expect cooperation. The cooperation thus far has been good... but it has not been total and it has not been easy getting all of the information. |

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| JFT-FA | Larson 12/04/92 | <p>Sen. Daschle: Let me just stop you. Did you say live sightings are number one.</p> <p>Larson: Live sightings.</p> <p>Sen. Daschle: Discrepancy cases, number two.</p> <p>Larson: Discrepancy cases.</p> <p>Sen. Daschle: And then surrounding cases that may be related to discrepancy, number three?</p> <p>Larson: Yes, sir.</p> |
| JFT-FA | Larson 12/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: ...Are you confident that you are, in fact, making progress and that you think that if we continue down this road we can get answers, or do you feel there is a significant something missing that the committee ought to know about and articulate so that we can change it?</p> <p>Larson: Mr. Chairman, I'm absolutely convinced that we have the proper command structure, organization, people, priorities, and approach in place to do the fullest possible accounting. I think the key to it is what will the Vietnamese do and what will the three countries over there do, particularly, the two countries of Laos and Vietnam.</p> <p>I think our system that's in place will allow us to evaluate that. I think for the first time I've got the resources to continue to push and to continue to press and to make them produce in the things they promised to produce and to evaluate what they give us. So I think the system is there. But I think the key to success is on the other side and what they are willing to do for us as this system goes forward.</p> |

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| JFT-FA | Larson 12/04/92 | <p>Sen. Daschle: I remember General Needham saying in Vientiane that you assess the time it will take to do a case and double it, because you just never know. With that caveat and completely appreciative of the unknowns out there, do you have any kind of a time frame within which you believe this entire effort can be completed?</p> <p>Larson: ...My original estimate was about two years, that at the two-year point we should have a good idea as to whether we could continue or how close we were to the fullest possible accounting. At the 1-year point we will be through phase 1 and will start into the geographic investigations. I would say by next summer we'll have a pretty good idea of where we are as we look at the geographic surveys through the country.</p> |
| JFT-FA | Smith 12/04/92 | <p>Some of the information that we are receiving on your work has been -- and some of the cable traffic and so forth -- has been somewhat critical about yourselves, as well as the Vietnamese.</p> <p>For example, in some of the things that I have looked at, there was a reference to your last field effort as one of the least successful in terms of a comparison with others. Another comment, the Vietnamese have shown no evidence of a serious effort to search records for information or to locate witnesses.</p> |

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| JTF-FA | Andrews 12/03/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: What is it in the structure, that we can anticipate, that you believe is going to eliminate the problems that have existed? Didn't you say this was a new operation.</p> <p>Secretary Cheney came in. We are gratified for his early testimony. He said we are going to change this. A lot of changes have been implemented, to his credit. He has followed through, he has put new people in, he has committed resources. Just a night and day difference between what this administration has done in the last year and where we have been the last 20 years.</p> <p>But what do we look for structurally, as a consequence of those decisions, that will change this?</p> <p>Andrews: Well, I think you've certainly made the point of having all these documents in one place where, so even if there is a turnover, certainly someone can come and see everything in their file. I think this is something that certainly CDO is working towards achieving.</p> <p>I do think the more that we get into the business of JTF-FA and DIA and the other agencies not seeing families but continuing to do what their job is and ensuring that that information gets to the casualty officers, we're going to eliminate some of the problems that we've had.</p> |
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| JTF-FA | Christmas 06/25/92 | <p>We are employing a two-track approach toward resolving cases in Vietnam. First our detachment in Hanoi, consisting of experts skilled in interview techniques, Vietnamese wartime records, and graves registration specialists are engaged in a day in and day out effort.</p> <p>Second, our Hawaii-based search teams are conducting intensive 30-day periods of investigations and remains recovery operations. Between these periods of intensive field activities, our detachment staff and Vietnamese officials accomplish a number of tasks essential for the success of these field operations.</p> |
| JTF-FA | Christmas 06/25/92 | <p>During the last completed period of field activities, our teams recovered or obtained from villagers fragmentary remains believed to be from seven loss incidents and involving 10 individuals... From the other last known alive individuals whose cases we investigated, we found no evidence which suggests they are alive. In some instances, we interviewed witnesses to the death and burial of Americans. Further efforts now are required to locate and to recover those remains.</p> |
| JTF-FA | Gadoury 11/06/91 | <p>Sir, I think we have the mechanism to conduct the investigations on our side, and all we're waiting for is that access and the ability to get to those places where we need to go.</p> |
| JTF-FA | Griffiths 11/06/91 | <p>What is being worked now, all that's missing, is greater responsiveness, not more effort.</p> |

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| JTF-FA | Kerry 11/15/91 | ...you are, in a sense, under siege here. You are going to have to come back with the Desert Storm mentality on this one in order to deal with that. I think you are beginning to see that and recognize that this is not, as I said at the outset of the hearing, something that anyone of us wished upon any one of us, or this committee, or the United States Senate. It exists because it has this tenacious life of its own, and the only way this committee can avoid becoming tarred by this process is to guarantee that we are opening it up... |
| JTF-FA | Kerry 11/06/91 | <p>Chairman Kerry: The public has no sense of what it's like to be out in the boonies sometimes, as you are, with a rucksack and living in pretty rough circumstances, day in and day out. I know what a pleasure it is to get back to Hanoi to be able to get a shower or something. And Hanoi is pretty rudimentary. So you are really, all of you, in Laos, in the jungle or wherever it is that you go, it is often at enormous risk and at continuous discomfort. I just want you to know that we are deeply appreciative of those efforts and very, very respectful of them. We wish you well as you continue this difficult quest. Thank you very, very much, gentlemen.</p> <p>Gadoury: Sir, I would submit that the risk we take is certainly not greater than the risk that the people that we're looking for took at one time.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: We appreciate that, and we appreciate your recognition of that also.</p> |

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| JTF-FA | Kerry 11/06/91 | ...legitimate heroes of this effort, Kerry called Bell, Gadoury, Cole. Their story is an important part of understanding the genuine, good-faith effort that people have been making and the type of commitment that individuals have made to this issue over the years. And any inquiry into the POW/MIA effort that is lacking in their testimony is an incomplete inquiry. |
| JTF-FA | Kerry 11/05/91 | ...I happen to believe that [U.S. investigators] are heroes in the best sense of the world. I think that Americans need to know how many years people have been out there in the field in some mighty dangerous, sweaty circumstances, jumping on helicopters that most of us would hold our breath going near, and going out into the jungle... |
| JTF-FA | Larson 12/04/92 | Our Joint Task Force has conducted five joint field activities in Vietnam in the last year, seven in Laos, and four in Cambodia, and we have ongoing operations right now out there in the field in Laos and Cambodia. We have done 294 joint field investigations. We have surveyed 149 crash sites or grave sites, and we have mounted 35 remains recovery operations. |
| JTF-FA | Larson 12/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: And how many people are on the ground in Vietnam and Laos?</p> <p>Larson: Our teams have varied in size from a low of about 28 to a high of about 63. It depends on how many teams we actually have. We shoot for about 70. We like to get five or six teams in the field at a time, particularly in Vietnam.</p> |

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| JTF-FA | Needham 12/04/92 | <p>One of my policies is that we be truly open. We do not classify any documents, and we allow our people to give us a candid assessment.</p> <p>We knew that we were having trouble with one of the teams in Vietnam last time. We brought it to the Vietnamese attention about half-way through the joint field activity. This was one of the ones I referred, kind of mixed cooperation, and in fact we did not accomplish all the cases in that area that we had hoped to last time.</p> |
| JTF-FA | Sheetz 11/06/91 | ...the Defense Department plans to investigate on the ground in Vietnam each and every lost -- every missing, unaccounted-for individual. |
| JTF-FA | Smith 06/25/92 | Vice Chairman Smith: General Christmas, on the 6th of May there was an AP report quoting both you and General Needham. General Needham said-- this is what he is attributed as having said: "There still is no reason to believe any missing Americans is alive in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, but every live sighting has to be checked out." |
| JTF-FA | Vessey 06/25/92 | I believe that the organizational and procedural framework is now in place to achieve our goal of fullest possible accounting. |
| JTF-FA | Vessey 12/04/92 | To take advantage of the increases in Vietnamese cooperation, the United States made some significant organizational changes in the POW/MIA area in the past two weeks. The Secretary of Defense established that task force subordinate to the Commander in Chief Pacific... And the Secretary also established the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs. I think there's plenty for both of those outfits to do. |

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| JTF-FA | Vessey 11/05/91 | I want to tell you that I have worked very closely with these people. They are all mortal human beings like you and me. I disagree with many of them many times, and we argue and battle. But I want to tell you that they are all dedicated people. If you could see the field work that has been done with these people traveling by old Soviet helicopters, by dug-out canoe, on foot, and into areas in Vietnam where no one has been since the battles were fought, trying to find evidence of what happened to our people, you too would have the same appreciation for their dedication that I have. |
| Laos | Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92 | <p>Sen. McCain: Now, you have acknowledged, however, that as to Laos you cannot be so certain.</p> <p>Stockdale: No, I know literally nothing about Laos.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: And I just want to be certain, when you say that you do not think that anybody was left behind, you mean Vietnam, correct? Not necessarily Laos?</p> <p>Stockdale: Yes.</p> |

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| Laos | Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92 | <p>Well, we know that, you know, it's strange that only nine military men who are now in freedom that were shot down in Laos -- and I asked Brace, what did they have in common? He said, well, there's only -- he laughed at my ignorance.</p> <p>He said, we were all captured by North Vietnamese soldiers and they brought us to Hanoi... I think of the Laotian people as kind of placid peasants and North Vietnamese soldiers as ferocious.</p> <p>But in this case, the only way you got to freedom was to get captured by the more organized army, which is North Vietnam...</p> |
| Laos | Bell 12/04/92 | <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Let me ask you straight up. Anybody alive in Laos after Operation Homecoming in 1973, American POWs?</p> <p>Bell: We had some reports there. The reports that I think are most worthy of consideration in Laos are those in the 1972 time frame.</p> |
| Laos | Brooks 12/01/92 | <p>My recollection is there were approximately a dozen, roughly a dozen names that either were put out on a Pathet Lao list at one time of people in captivity or names of people that we had reason to believe were alive when they fell into Laotian hands. I do not think it was more than a dozen, maybe 15...</p> |

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| Laos | Brown 12/03/92 | <p>We had very frank discussions with them and pushed them very hard on what happened to our aviators. And finally at one point with the deputy foreign minister we simply said flatly, look, we know there were a large number of American aviators shot down over your region of Laos. We know that a significant number of them were alive when they hit ground. We have reason to believe a significant number of them were alive when your forces took them into custody. We have no accounting for them; what happened to them?</p> <p>And after some pressure the government spokesman simply said look, we did not appreciate at the time how important this question would be and some of them were killed.</p> |
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| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Gadoury 12/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: What have you gleaned from those 6 years of living out in jungle, you know, and putting up with the heat, and the snakes, and the insects, and the leeches, and the difficulties and so forth? What would you share with this committee about the possibility of 200 people or 50 people being held in one place in Laos?</p> <p>Gadoury: Well, as I said earlier, I have talked to hundreds and probably thousands of refugees, Lao refugees predominately, in the camps and they include low land refugees, Hmong, hill tribes people from all over Laos, from North to South. I have not received any credible reports of live Americans after 1973 with the exception of Emmett Kay... the focus of our field activities with our teams is to go out and conduct excavations, but at the same time use that as the starting point, the jumping point, to get out and do investigations of these discrepancy cases. And the way they break down in Laos is, and what we're working on a priority basis, are three cases. There are three cases of people who were, at one time, POW. They're at the very top of our priority list.</p> <p>And then there's 44 cases -- below that 41 additional cases, priority cases, where the person was last -- or the people involved in that incident were last known alive. And then there's a number of other discrepancy cases where we feel that the Lao should or could have some information. So, we're addressing those on a priority basis.</p> |
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| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Gadoury 10/15/92 | <p>Since 1985, when I started making regular trips to refugee camps and villages along the Thai border in which many Lao live, I've encountered certainly thousands of Lao. And of those people, have interviewed hundreds with information related to unaccounted for Americans, mostly in Laos.</p> |
| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Gadoury 12/04/92 | <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Mr. Gadoury, you have been involved in the issue quite a while in Laos. What is your feeling, what is your assessment of the cooperation with the Lao? Are they serious? Obviously, they are not all that serious. What do we have to do to improve the situation there? What do we need to do?</p> <p>Gadoury: Well, Senator, as you know I work on the field level with the teams that go out in the field. And what I see in the field I think is a reflection of some of the changes or the considerations that are given at the policy level in terms of bilateral U.S.-Lao relation...</p> |

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| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Gadoury 12/04/92 | <p>But when you go out there with the team, we're living out there in the tents, we've got our military rations, we've got our cots, we've got our mosquito nets, and we have our team doctor to take care of us if we get sick. Even under those conditions, it's very difficult.</p> <p>Sometimes, laying in my cot there at night, I wonder, if I didn't have the cot, if I didn't have the mosquito net, and the military rations and all the things that we have out there, how long I could last.</p> <p>I look at the villagers who live out there. The average life span in those rural areas is not much over 40 years old. You don't see a lot of old people. Sometimes it makes you stop and think what you'd be able to do if you were out there in a situation where you didn't have a lot of control over where you were living and where you're going.</p> |
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| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Gadoury 12/04/92 | <p>...in February of 1986 we went on our first excavation in Savannakhet Province. And our team went into Savannakhet, the town of Savannakhet, and we had to spend overnight because the landing sight wasn't prepared. We were put up in a hotel. They put armed guards outside the door and they advised us not to go walking around.</p> |
| | | <p>More recently on the operation I just came back from a few weeks ago, we were given pretty much unlimited access in the area of Savannakhet Province to address the cases that we had agreed upon before going out to the field. The Lao were very cooperative. In fact, there was a dramatic departure on this last trip from anything that we had experienced in the past.</p> |
| | | <p>They were very efficient in terms of coordinating with local officials, sending their representatives with our excavation team, preparing witnesses or locating witnesses and preparing access with local officials for our teams, and then sending officials out with us to do the actual investigations and surveys.</p> |
| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Gadoury 12/04/92 | <p>...over the years that I have been involved in Laos, and starting in 1985, I personally have seen a dramatic change in the level of cooperation that we get in the field, which I think is a reflection of this higher level of cooperation.</p> |

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| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | After January, I think, of '73, if I remember it, I was frequently getting instructions to tell Souvannah Phouma, who was the Prime Minister of Laos -- a gallant, honest man -- tell him to do this or do that; ask him to do this or that, and give him assurances that we will resume bombing. We will do this and that if the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao do not agree. We knew darn well we could not resume the bombing, but I had to tell him that. It wasn't pleasant. |
| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | We were concerned, but there were no Americans held by the Pathet Lao, and were convinced that all Americans who fell into enemy hands in Laos were under North Vietnamese control. |
| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | One of the great problems that thoughtful Americans had in Vientiane -- members of the staff -- was that we were sacrificing little Lao to protect our men in South Vietnam; that sure, we would tell them darn near anything just to keep them fighting. It may not have been totally honorable, but we felt that was the role of American diplomats or military leaders at that time. |

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| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | <p>Godley: Really, I think the point we were making here was the bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Let's get the nine men back, and then look into it.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Let me assume that is true and not even second-guess it. The next question is you believed there were more, is that correct?</p> <p>Godley: Again, sir, later on, I think it was March 29 when we said we did not think there were any prisoners still in Laos. That, I think, reflects the further consideration and consultation with all elements of the American team in Laos.</p> <p>It's a blatant contradiction. I recognize that.</p> |
| Laos | Godley 08/11/92 | <p>You recommend a specific diplomatic track to gain accounting of the men held/missing, and you point out that we should hold them accountable for all POWs being held in Indochina, and you assert the following: "This initiative should forcefully and plainly assert that the U.S. will no longer play games with the POW issue in Laos. The LPF should be told that we know they hold U.S. prisoners and we demand their immediate release, as well as an accounting and information on all those who may have died."</p> <p>Sir, we had proof, as much as you can, that Americans were taken prisoner. Where they were held, and by whom they were held, there was a good deal of question. I personally was convinced that there were no Americans held by the Pathet Lao, and the Americans that were prisoners were prisoners of the North Vietnamese units in Laos or had been taken back to North Vietnam.</p> |

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| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | <p>Sen. Kerrey: Did you have a systematic method for debriefing the Hmong? Did you discuss some sort of development -- the development of a system that would have enabled you to debrief the Hmong about data that --</p> <p>Godley: The case officers with the Hmong would do what they could. We had no system for doing that.</p> <p>Sen. Kerrey: Why, if it was a top priority again, if they were our best source of intelligence?</p> <p>Godley: Senator, if you were in my shoes, what system would you establish to question?</p> <p>Sen. Kerrey: I suggest to you, sir, that if it was my top priority I would at least consider the development of a system.</p> |
| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | Anything that Le Duc Tho said about Laos would be law in Laos in the Pathet Lao areas. The North Vietnamese domination of everything Lao was complete. |
| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | The only reliable sources we had about MIAs or POWs were, of course, Air Force reports as to losses over Laos and Air America,... |
| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | I never accepted as iron-clad any Communist agreement... Communists in Indochina were well trained liars and their word was nothing. |

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| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | <p>Sen. Kerrey: What would your estimate have been of the possibility of actual victory and achieving a free Laos in 1971?</p> <p>Godley: They were our friends, but I never regarded the military operations in Northern Laos as victory. It was really a sideshow of the big war in Vietnam. We pursued it with all in our power because I felt -- I and my associates felt that we were holding down three first-rate North Vietnamese divisions, some artillery, even some armor. And those men were in Northern Laos, and they were not down in the Delta or South Vietnam. But I never saw a victory in that... My sense of it was I'd do my best to keep it from occurring.</p> |
| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | ...we did what we could vis-a-vis the Pathet Lao to obtain information concerning Americans captured or deceased in Laos. The discussions with the Pathet Lao representatives in Vientiane were fruitless and inconclusive. |
| Laos | Godley 09/24/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: Ambassador Godley, what priority for intelligence collection did you attach to the collection of information on POWs and MIAs in Laos?</p> <p>Godley: Top.</p> |

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| Laos | Haig 09/21/92 | <p>Vice Chairman Smith: I can understand Watergate, political pressures, protests, Congress voting to cut off the money. So, the President might say, let us sign it, let us cut, and maybe, this other agreement will be signed. We will get the prisoners back from Laos. Privately there was reference to prisoners in Laos, but publicly there was not. And, I think, families were misled by that. Maybe not deliberately, but I think they were misled by it. And that is my point.</p> <p>Haig: Well, you know, I can't act as an apologist for statements that were made after January, and I won't attempt to do that, but I will make some observations. The first is, I don't believe Dr. Kissinger, or President Nixon, or anyone involved in these negotiations ever took a position that in their intellectual anguish they did not believe was going to improve the prospects of getting our prisoners out rather than impede that process.</p> |
| Laos | Kerrey 09/24/92 | <p>What I have seen that is available to the committee thus far does not seem to me to represent a very systematic effort [to gather information about Laos]. Nor does it reflect the declaration that it was a top, number one priority of the embassy at the time. It just does not seem to connect.</p> |
| Laos | Kerrey 09/24/92 | <p>We had to accept an assurance that really was worthless. Accepting an offer by the North Vietnamese to do all they could was hardly an iron-clad guarantee, and made it difficult for us to truly get an accounting for our missing.</p> |

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| Laos | Kerrey 09/21/92 | <p>Sen. Kerrey: Mr. Secretary, let me first of all deal with your assertion that we, perhaps, are not being balanced enough in our regard to the North Vietnamese -- today, the Vietnamese Government. I have never suffered the delusion that they would tell the truth. I have never suffered under the illusion that, in fact, current negotiations with the Vietnamese Government would be terribly productive in getting a full accounting of remaining POWs and MIAs. I have never suffered under the illusion.</p> <p>In fact, I am rather surprised, in looking at the negotiations that occurred at the time, that a representation made by the North Vietnamese -- do not worry, we will take care of Laos -- was all that was required to get the Americans to say, OK, we will accept your representation that full accounting in Laos will occur as a side agreement.</p> |
| Laos | Kerry 09/24/92 | <p>If you are saying, we have an agreement that gets all of our prisoners back and we have got iron-clad guarantees, but all of a sudden in the middle of this thing you are poised with the problem of explaining, gee, we do not have them all back, you have to explain that you do not have iron-clad guarantees and you also have to explain something different to the American people, do you not?</p> |

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| Laos | Kerry 09/24/92 | <p>...the question was were there any surprises in the list of POWs in North Vietnam? Your response was it was pretty close to what we expected. We are hoping for 40 more on the list of those in Laos. That is your comment. I am simply trying to establish -- I know it was 20 years ago -- I am simply trying to establish, Admiral [Moorer], what the basis of that hope was. We have only six known prisoners in Laos, although we hope there may be 40 or 41. ...General Deane, had told you in a memo on March 21st that there were live prisoners in Laos in addition to those nine.</p> |
| Laos | Kerry 09/24/92 | <p>Now, one final important question. On March 22nd, 1973, you sent a cable to the Secretary of State stating -- and let me read this to you because it is important: "we believe that the LPF holds throughout Laos more prisoners than found on the DRV list. But we believe that for the time being we should concentrate our efforts on getting these nine men repatriated as soon as possible...we believe we should continue to press for the release of the nine acknowledged PW's within the time frame, but deal with the questions of accounting for MIAs and determining whether there are additional PW's to be repatriated within the time frame of this cease-fire and military protocol."</p> <p>There is a sort of ambivalence in that I am trying to understand, and it is important to us. You said we believe they hold throughout Laos more prisoners. And in fact, we carried people as prisoners. But at the end of the memo, "we need to determine whether there are additional POWs to be repatriated." What was your thinking, then? That they may have been killed, or that you did not know?</p> |

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| Laos | Kerry 09/24/92 | <p>I think it is very important that in the middle of the release period when you folks had high expectations... that you thought there were hundreds, but that you had six known prisoners in Laos and that you had a hope of some 40 or 41 more.</p> |
| Laos | Kissinger 09/22/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: ... we did have information that these prisoners were held in caves near Sam Neua... When we confronted the Prime Minister point blank on this subject of non-accountability, we got the same kind of 'this was history; this was part of the past; terrible things happened in war' -- the very kind of comments that Soubhan gave us. Only he had given them to us more directly, saying [downed pilots] were killed...</p> <p>Kissinger: I was surprised, and shocked even, by the small number of prisoners from Laos. If that is correct, ... then we never received any prisoner that was captured by the Pathet Lao and they might easily have done what the Khmer Rouge did, kill every prisoner.</p> |
| Laos | Kissinger 09/22/92 | <p>...statistically, the percentage of the missing unaccounted for in Laos was far smaller than in Vietnam.</p> |
| Laos | Kissinger 09/22/92 | <p>The North Vietnamese told us that all prisoners held in Laos -- they told us this in writing -- would be returned.</p> |
| Laos | Kissinger 09/22/92 | <p>Our perception of the Pathet Lao was that they were stooges of Hanoi, that they had no independence whatsoever, that they were totally controlled by the communists in Hanoi... But we were confident and we had never an example to the contrary, that the Pathet Lao would not disobey anything that Hanoi wanted them to do.</p> |

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| Laos | Kissinger 09/22/92 | I used these figures in my preparatory talks in Hanoi, and I might point out here that all of the figures in the Eagleburger and Richardson memoranda were familiar to us and had been raised with Hanoi before we received the memorandum on my February visit in Hanoi. |
| Laos | Kissinger 09/22/92 | Chairman Kerry: So here you are in May with Le Duc Tho saying not what happened to John Sparks, or what happened to so-and-so, we need an accounting, but saying, give us a sentence that says there's nobody alive in Laos, it will be helpful to us. Why would you have been satisfied with a sentence? Kissinger: I wasn't satisfied, Mr. Chairman. I was dealing here with a man who knew reality. I had no means of pressure left. |
| Laos | Laird 09/21/92 | Smith: When you were told or you had information either from the CIA or the DIA on your watch that there were prisoners in Laos and/or Vietnam, did you feel reasonably certain that information was accurate? Laird: I felt fairly reasonably certain as far as the North was concerned. I felt very good about the South. I had a better feeling about Cambodia. I did not have a strong feeling that the intelligence coming out of Laos was outstanding. That was run by the State Department and the CIA, and we did not have our own assets there, but I did quiz the CIA on a weekly basis about that type of information. |

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| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Larson 12/04/92 | Chairman Kerry: We haven't talked a lot about Laos. What is the level of cooperation in Laos? Larson: Mr. Chairman, I'd say the level of cooperation in Laos is mixed. It's sometimes a case of a step forward, two steps backward, two steps forward a step backwards, and in my honest assessment after being there and having some conversations and looking, I have great difficulty telling how much of it is bureaucratic ineptness and lack of cooperation in a very primitive government and how much of it is policy driven in that there's some resistance to cooperation. |
| Laos - JTF-FA Operations | Larson 12/04/92 | Chairman Kerry: Some people have... asserted to us that all you need to do is put the pressure on Vietnam and that will solve Laos, they control them. Do you agree with that? Larson: That's not my assessment, from what I've seen. I think it's much more complex than that. |
| Laos - Perot Trip | Martin 08/11/92 | The Chairman: And was there any question in your mind that these were prisoners who were alive and being held at that time that you were there, or had they been tracked earlier? Martin: No question in my mind. Chairman Kerry: They were alive at the time you were there. Martin: They were alive at that time. |
| Laos - Perot Trip | Meurer 08/11/92 | ...a lot of Americans, towards the end -- especially towards the end of the war, if they were caught, they were summarily executed and put in shallow graves...It was not Laotian policy, I recall, Senator. It was the villagers, individual villagers... |

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| Laos - Perot Trip | Meurer 08/11/92 | Chairman Kerry: Mr. Meurer remembers 27, Mr. Martin remembers 25, but the memory of both of you is specific as to mid-20's of American prisoners of war being held in the Sam Neua area in caves, is that accurate? Martin: That is correct. Meurer: Yes. |
| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | During the course of this period, the numbers were always shifting back and forth as we found out that a certain individual was dead or a certain individual had been released. There were -- the lists we had and the lists that were given by the North Vietnamese didn't exactly match. And I really can't answer your question as to why I had -- where I got irrefutable evidence that there were 40 people in Laos. |
| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | There is no doubt that the Pathet Lao was under the grip of the North Vietnamese army. |
| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | The decisions to send the message, the decision to cancel the message, were all generated by an overall management of the plan we had to coordinate the withdrawal of the few troops we had left with the withdrawal of the prisoners we had left. |
| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | Chairman Kerry: Did we have any photographs or evidence that showed that there were Americans in those caves? Moorer: I don't recall ever having seen it. |

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| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | ...a wounded Pathet Lao telephone lineman who was captured north of Vientiane. That prisoner located and described a cave complex in Sam Neua that reportedly had contained U.S. POWs at an earlier time. This was the first Pathet Lao prisoner or defector with up-to-date hard information on Sam Neua to arrive in Vientiane since 1971. He suggested that several U.S. POWs were still at Sam Neua in the late 1960's, more recently than the older reports that existed with respect to Hrdlicka and Shelton. And then the cease-fire in Laos in 1973 apparently effectively precluded any military-associated agent operations into Sam Neua due to the embassy's desire to avoid the possible compromise that such a covert operation would have on the impact of the cease-fire. So we never got in there afterwards to check. |
| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | [citing Moorer deposition] Question: Why did we complete our troop withdrawal without insisting the Pathet Lao give us our prisoners back? Your answer: When this started and the POWs came back and so on, there was a very euphoric reception and the President gave a party on the White House grounds and all the wives of POWs came and so on. And press release after press release were that we were withdrawing the troops at that point. No President could have said whoops, we are not going to withdraw the troops because these people will not agree with us. They are not carrying out their part. At that point in history, we did not have the stomach for doing what you are asking me why we did not do it. |

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| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | And when an effort was made by General Woodard to get the General Hoa, who was a North Vietnamese rep, to do something about the Laos POWs, his reply was that Laos did not participate in the negotiations and did not sign the agreement. |
| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | ...when I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not one message that involved movement of troops or aircraft attacks or anything of a military nature was originated by me. In every case, I had it initialed by the Secretary of Defense, or in many cases I had direct telephone calls from the President. |
| Laos | Moorer 09/24/92 | Now, in answer to your specific question, of course, that was supposed to be taken up with further negotiations with North Vietnam. In my opinion, and I don't know whether the Ambassador agrees with this, the North Vietnamese had an iron grip on the Pathet Lao. And the Pathet Lao did exactly what the North Vietnamese told them to. So, the pressure had to be put on the North Vietnamese. But, as I repeat, the only way you could verify these photographs and these DIA lists and so on is to go to Laos with an armed force and find out. And then of course we just lost all of our leverage. And, consequently, what happened was that we very quickly, by 1975, we had lost not only South Vietnam, but also Cambodia. |

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| Laos - Perot Trip | Murphy 08/11/92 | Chairman Kerry: Do you recall the number of 25 or 27 prisoners being held in caves in Sam Neua as having been briefed to them by the station chief [during 1969-70 trip to Laos with Perot]? Murphy: I do not recall that number. Chairman Kerry: Do you recall any number whatsoever? Murphy: ...I had in mind 18 in one report. Now, I don't know whether that was briefed to them or not... |
| Laos - Perot Trip | Perot 08/11/92 | Vice Chairman Smith: When you were there in 1970 and you had this meeting with the station chief and others, what types of indications did they give to you specifically about the existence of POWs in Laos during the war in 1970? Perot: ...They basically indicated that they had radio intercepts. They were able to track the prisoners on the ground. They knew where the prisoners were being held. The reason they had not tried to rescue the prisoners is the risk-reward ratio was not good. I certainly agreed with that. They probably would have gotten more people killed in a rescue than they rescued. But they seemed to have a great deal of knowledge about who they were, where they were held. And they told of specific cases of Sam Neua Province, which ties in with General Walters' testimony several years later. |

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| Laos - Perot Trip | Perot 08/11/92 | ...our people at the Paris Peace Conference were asked what about the people in Laos. And our people relied, oh, we'll get them back through Hanoi. Very quickly the Pathet Lao said oh, no, you will have to deal directly with us...We ransomed the people out of Hanoi. We ransomed our prisoners out of Hanoi. Senator McCain is able to sit right here today because we ransomed him out of Hanoi, but we never wrote the check. And that's what caused the people to be left in Laos. |
| Laos | Rodman 09/21/92 | <p>Sen. Daschle: Well, what rationale did you have amongst the negotiators with regard to the justification for signing an agreement that does not include the MIAs in Laos and Cambodia? How could we rationalize that, knowing that they were there?</p> <p>Rodman: Well we thought we had a commitment from the North Vietnamese in two or three different respects with respect to Laos. One was that we did expect to get a list, through their good offices, of the prisoners in Laos. They promised to try to get a -- help us get a cease-fire in Laos within a short period of time. So we were dealing with the party which clearly did call the shots to a great extent, and they were making some commitments to us which were not as formal as other commitments they made... So we thought that given that this was a Vietnam agreement, we thought we had achieved something of some value with respect to Laos and Cambodia.</p> |
| Laos | Schiff 08/04/92 | ...there are no compelling reason to believe that a substantial number of aviators were captured and retained by the Pathet Lao. The bottom line is that Laos is not the MIA/POW black hole it has been depicted to be. |

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| Laos | Schiff 08/04/92 | Others who say that Laos is a special case cite a second reason for their belief. They say that because the Lao Government did not sign the Paris Peace Agreements, it did not return prisoners at the time of Operation Homecoming. This belief is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of who controlled the territory where most of our losses in Laos occurred. [North Vietnam] |
| Laos | Schiff 08/04/92 | ...The Ho Chi Minh Trail network is shown by the black lines. Notice that most of the Trail is well within Laos. This area was totally controlled by the Vietnamese. Almost 85 percent of U.S. personnel lost in Laos were lost in this area. Our intelligence indicates that U.S. prisoners of war captured in areas of Laos remained under Hanoi's control... When looking at Laos on a case-by-case basis, we find that very few missing men would have become prisoners of the Pathet Lao. Almost everyone lost was lost in an area under North Vietnamese control.... |

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| Laos | Schiff 08/04/92 | <p>Chairman Kerry: ...is there not a group of aviators believed to have been unaccounted for the Laos at the time of Operation Homecoming?</p> <p>Schiff: Yes, sir, there is. They are among the priority cases...</p> <p>Sheetz: There are right now still 64 discrepancy cases for Laos...</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: So there are 64 question marks pertaining to Laos which would have been the body of that group about whom we had legitimate questions at the end of the war.</p> <p>Sheetz: Yes, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: So when you say it is not a black hole you are saying that notions that of the 500 plus airmen lost over Laos, the notion that many more than the 64 that we have questions about is improbable, is that accurate?</p> <p>Sheetz: Yes, sir...</p> |
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| Laos | Schiff 08/04/92 | <p>...I'd like to turn to Laos to clear up some commonly held misconceptions about the POW situation in that country. To begin with, I can tell you that Laos is not the black hole some believe it to be. People who think otherwise point to the difference between the small number of prisoners who returned from Laos, and the far greater number who returned from North Vietnam. But as I will show you, this is essentially comparing apples with oranges... A comparison of air losses is relevant because 90 percent of our losses in Laos in Laos were aviators... Laos and South Vietnam are very similar. A large portion of downed airmen were rescued in both countries. The small portion captured is relatively equal... North Vietnam is different because intense air defense made it very difficult to rescue downed air crews... Since fewer men could be rescued, more of our airmen were captured, and later more were returned from North Vietnam... because search and rescue operations in Laos and South Vietnam were more effective, more downed airmen were rescued and fewer became prisoners.</p> |
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| Laos | Schiff 12/04/92 | <p>Another thing that I had looked at is, how many Pathet Lao prisoners can we confirm? At this point, taking confirmation very strictly, and saying that I can confirm a prisoner if I have a photograph of that individual, or I have a report from a U.S. individual who was held with that person, then if those prisoners are confirmed, I have 16 confirmed prisoners captured by the Pathet Lao...</p> <p>There were 16 that were captured by the Pathet Lao. One of those was turned over to the NVA, and he was released during Operation Homecoming. The others were not released during Operation Homecoming, but some of them were released. There were six that were released.</p> |
| Laos | Schiff 12/04/92 | <p>Schiff: But of the 15 who were captured and held by the Pathet Lao, six of those were released, two escaped, and the rest are still unaccounted for.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: So of all the information so far on the black hole of Laos, there is only information as to 16 captured by the Pathet Lao.</p> <p>Schiff: Only confirmation.</p> |
| Laos | Schlesinger 09/21/92 | <p>It is evident, I think, that the Laotians gave no true accounting of the Americans that had been in Laos.</p> |
| Laos | Schlesinger 09/21/92 | <p>When overflights ceased, of course, our ability to gather information diminished, but up until the time of the ceasing of overflights we were able to stay in touch with a number of those who had been downed in Laos and that's what led to the disappointment with regard to the brevity of the list.</p> |

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| Laos | Schlesinger 09/21/92 | <p>...while the CIA was running the war in Laos, it was running the war, as it were, with military assets provided from the Department of Defense.</p> <p>The United States government was not directly involved in Laos. It was a CIA-directed operation, but the assets that were being directed were assets of the Department of Defense. The agency itself, aside from the operations in the West, had a very limited number of personnel in the country as compared to the Department of Defense.</p> <p>It was the responsibility, as it were, of the Director of Central Intelligence, yet the assets and most of the knowledge came from DOD. I hope that clarifies that.</p> |
| Laos | Schlesinger 09/21/92 | <p>I have a high probability assessment that people were left behind in Laos and a medium probability assessment with regard to Vietnam. I think that of the various parties, the North Vietnamese had the strongest incentive on the other side to be forthcoming, but I doubt that applied to the provisional government of Vietnam, and even the North Vietnamese were not enormously forthcoming.</p> |
| Laos | Schlesinger 09/21/92 | <p>We had been in communication after flights were knocked down over Laos with the people on the ground, and those people did not appear on the lists. So one must assume, either that the other side engaged in executions, or alternatively that the list was incomplete.</p> |

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| Laos | Secord 09/24/92 | <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Without casting any aspersions on anyone, let me just ask the question this way. In your professional assessment as an intelligence officer in 1973, were live American POWs remaining in Laos, for whatever reason, remaining in Laos after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, and after the American POWs, the last group of American POWs came home on March 28th.</p> <p>General Secord: I was an operational staff officer. But the answer to that question, obviously, is affirmative. I mean, that's why we drafted the memo we've been talking about here for some time.</p> |
| Laos | Secord 09/24/92 | <p>When you say POWs in Laos, a number, you are obviously referring to a larger number than the nine. And did all of those people come home that you were tracking?</p> <p>Secord: None of them, that I know of, have been located or even heard of since the Paris Accords. But we did know to, I think, a reasonable level of certitude, that there were more, hence the memorandum.</p> |
| Laos - EC-47 | Shields 06/25/92 | <p>The MIA category is specifically appropriate to cases where you do not know whether men are alive or dead. That is case of those men in the EC-47 in my own mind. I did not know.</p> |
| Laos | Shields 09/24/92 | <p>I think that the small number of men which returned, and the number of men which are missing would indicate that we should receive more information concerning our men in Laos. And I think it is foolish to try and say anything more than that.</p> |

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| Laos | Shields 09/24/92 | <p>Shields: In the memorandum which was written in May -- which you had in your possession, which discussed the EC-47, which DIA has discussed and Emmet Kaye's capture -- I said at the bottom of that page: With your concurrence, we will continue the position that we don't know whether men are prisoner or missing.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: I know what you said at the bottom of the page. But let me just say what you said at the top of the page. At the top of the page you said: In a DoD-sponsored press conference held April 12th, 1973, I made the statement that DoD had no specific knowledge indicating that any U.S. personnel were still alive and held prisoner in Southeast Asia. This statement has been the basis for all subsequent answers from DoD to questions concerning the possibility that Americans may still be held prisoner in Southeast Asia. You are saying it became Government policy.</p> |
| Laos | Smith 06/24/92 | <p>Laos is a black hole. We so not have any idea, with the exception of about 13 individuals, what happened to the people in Laos.</p> |
| Laos | Smith 09/24/92 | <p>We had information to conclude, even if not totally conclusive, but at least to assume, that people were alive in Laos and that we had this information. And that is my point.</p> |

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| Laos | Smith 09/24/92 | <p>What happened to those people? Nobody has explained that. We are talking about huge references to prisoners here. And this is intelligence data that you folks had. And nothing changed, as far as the testimony that we have received before this committee. Not a damn thing has changed that would indicate what happened to those people. Nobody said they were executed. Nobody said they were released. And nobody said they came home. So what happened to them, and do you folks have any information on that?</p> <p>Godley: I do not.</p> |
| Laos | Smith 09/24/92 | <p>CIA has said in this memorandum, "We studied other information to access activity in Houa Phan Province in general, and the Sam Neua area in particular, and we reached the following conclusions. An historical precedent exists for suggesting the presence of American POWs in the Sam Neua area. Photographs taken by a reconnaissance aircraft in October 1969 show what may be as many as 20 non-Asians, accompanied by Pathet Lao guards, near caves at Ban Nakai Tua, 20 kilometers east of the Sam Neua markings.</p> |
| Laos | Stockdale 12/03/92 | <p>Sen. Reid: But the only people that you know of that survived being shot down over Laos were people that were shot down and then captured by North Vietnamese military?</p> <p>Admiral Stockdale: Yes...</p> |

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| Laos | Trowbridge 06/25/92 | <p>...the Pathet Lao, over the years, they had a spokesman, Soth Petrasy, who made many statements relative to American POWs... As far as the intelligence reporting that we had, it wasn't supporting his statements. We have talked with him subsequent to that time and he has indicated to us that his statements about holding prisoners were for the purpose of propaganda.</p> |
| Laos | Vessey 12/04/92 | <p>The second thing is that Laos is not as homogenous a Nation as is Vietnam. It's tribal ethnic groups that are split up in various places, the communication during wartime was miserable, and I doubt that it's much better today.</p> |
| Laos | Vessey 06/25/92 | <p>Sen. McCain: What is your... best explanation, even if it is instinctive or intuitive, as to why there were so many not returned from Laos as opposed to Vietnam?</p> <p>Vessey: Well, Laos is a sparsely populated and rugged country... we lost physical things in Laos that we wanted to recover and couldn't find after they had been dropped from airplanes... just finding anything in remote regions of Laos is difficult.</p> <p>Additionally, Laos is a different sort of country. It is a tribal country with different ethnic groups. The central government under any regime in Laos has had very little control over many parts of Laos... We didn't have as much surveillance on what our own people did in Laos during the war. That is to say, airplanes were outside the radar coverage in Laos, where they were not necessarily in Vietnam.</p> |