

Laos	Vessey 12/04/92	But secondly, there's another reason, that the accounting will not be as good from Laos as it was or as it is likely to be from Vietnam. You've flown over the area. It's very rugged terrain.
Leaks	Kerry 09/24/92	...as Chairman, I feel very, very strongly that I do not want this Committee's efforts to be sullied by personal agenda, or by people who want to be reckless with partial facts.
Leaks	Kissinger 09/22/92	Mr. Chairman, this is the record. Yet leaks from this inquiry have been suggesting: That those who had refused to abandon America's Vietnamese allies, supposedly abandoned American prisoners; that those who struggled to husband the leverage necessary to bring about the release of American prisoners were insufficiently attentive to the fates of remaining MIAs; and that those who were prepared to use force to compel Hanoi's compliance were guilty of not doing enough to enforce the agreements.
Leaks	Smith 09/24/92	After reading the column and communicating with Senator Kerry, I wondered whether I was at the same meeting.
Left Behind - Shields Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	Lieutenant Commander Vincent D. Monroe, downed in Ne On Province, North Vietnam, May 18th, 1968. Emergency radio signals were received from Lieutenant Commander Monroe and his crew member, whose status as a prisoner has been acknowledged by North Vietnam. Radio Hanoi announced the capture of two pilots at the time and the place of Lieutenant Commander Monroe's loss. Now you called him a prisoner. They acknowledged his as a prisoner. You stood up and said he was a prisoner. He did not come home, and then you say there are no indications anybody is alive.

Left Behind	Sieverts continued 06/25/92	against their will in captivity -- the lengths they would go, one way or another, to let us know of this. It bears on the photographs, for example. The idea of Americans cheerfully being photographed and not using that opportunity to somehow convey who they are and what the circumstances are is beyond my imagination.
Lists	Kerry 09/21/92	Getting the list before the agreement...the idea would be compare the lists and make some detailed man-by-man attempt to determine whether or not their list tracked with our list. That was not done...it was agreed in 1971 that it would not be done. And all of the testimony that we heard earlier from Secretary Laird saying I was at Henry all the time trying to get him to make sure it did not happen, that deal was cut in 1971. There was no effort, apparently, from the meeting in 1972, no effort to say to the North Vietnamese, this is unacceptable. It was accepted as a condition because it had been prenegotiated in 1971.

Lists	Kissinger 09/22/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: Your response to that was, we could exchange lists of the prisoners that we hold and then start exchanging prisoners and not haggle about who is or is not a prisoner.</p> <p>Kissinger: So this phrase of not haggling was -- had only to do with the technical problem. Do we present our list first and wait, or do we see what they give us and then complain about it.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: ...in effect, you moved the haggling. Instead of haggling name for name before the signing, you left yourself haggling name for name until 20 years later and we are haggling name for name today.</p> <p>Kissinger: Senator, we would have been delighted to get their lists before the signing. That was something that they were never prepared to do, and we, therefore, had to make the best arrangement possible.</p>
Lists	Laird 09/21/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: It was your gut feeling that the lists were not complete, is that what you are saying?</p> <p>Laird: It was my gut feeling that there were more. When I left, I think that we felt at that time -- I think the last figures that we had were that the list of POWs probably would contain quite a few more names than that. We were disappointed with the list because I hoped that there would be more on the list.</p>
Lists	Laird 09/21/92	<p>We weren't -- by the way, I wasn't being critical of the Kennedy list or the Cora Weiss list. We were glad to get that information, but it was not complete information and we knew of the existence of other POWs when those lists were delivered to us...</p>

Lists	Laird 09/21/92	<p>We were not getting much information from the Vietnamese at that particular time. The Vietnamese, of course, made the Kennedy list, the North Vietnamese. The source of that list was the North Vietnamese and the Cora Weiss list was also from the North Vietnamese. And they were confirmations of POWs.</p>
Lists	Laird 09/21/92	<p>We had several lists given to us. There was the early list that was given by Cora Weiss, which I think you are familiar with, who was a peace activist. Then the Kennedy list came, and there was a discrepancy between the Cora Weiss list and the Kennedy list. It was about five difference in those two lists. I felt that those lists were inadequate. We had firm letter confirmations of at least 26 or 27 people that we knew of confirmed by letters that were alive at that particular time.</p>
Lists	Lord 09/21/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: ...It appears to me... that we had agreed on the 16th of August 1971 that there was only, in regard to POW, going to be an exchange of lists at the moment that we all signed the agreements. And the question that I have got is were you aware that the Secretary of Defense and others in the defense agencies were arguing that we should get a preliminary release, and if so, why was it not more forcefully presented at this meeting?</p> <p>Lord: ...we did whittle down our positions, no question about it. I didn't recall the precise date and meeting until I read this document. As I say, I do not recall others pressing us to get the lists ahead of time, but it would be a natural objective that you would to have certainly be better than getting it the day of the agreement.</p>

Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	My testimony, sir, is that I had a list of Americans who were captured alive in enemy hands with our knowledge of the specific units of those enemies down to battalion, division or regiment, or up to division or higher than division, and that the last information was that they were alive and well in enemy hands... there were approximately 305 on the list. At Homecoming I, about five percent of those were returned. That brought the list down to about 293, 294. Now, what I have recovered of the names that were on that original list is approximately 140 or maybe 120 names...
Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	...looking back on it... we should have known better, and maybe if we would have pushed a little harder when we had the power and authority, we might have been able to do something. But in '73, we should have at least insisted on getting that original list of 15 or 16 names up in print, which we had flagged kiddingly as the Kissinger list.
Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	. . . the political requirements of the Vietnamese were higher than the tactical and strategic. They wanted warm bodies to jack up the numbers to appease Kissinger.
Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	My boss... told me to my face... that if you're going to put it on a list, we want to be able to sign it, and we want to be able for the policy-makers to be able to do something with it. So keep it tight... If I hadn't kept it tight, per his instruction, my list could probably have been another 60 to 70 names.
Lists	Shields 06/25/92	Another significant list is the one passed by the DRV to representatives of the U.S. Government in Paris in January, 1973 as required by the Paris Peace Accords.

Lists	Shields 06/25/92	This list was not accepted by us as a complete accounting for those held prisoner or for those who died in captivity. First, that list did not include the names of those prisoners missing in Laos. It also omitted the names of men we knew to have been in captivity at one time.
Lists	Shields 06/25/92	We knew immediately upon receiving this list of those said to have died in captivity, that men whom we knew had, at one time, been alive and in captivity were omitted from the list altogether. After briefing those who returned, we knew also that the names of some men who may have died in captivity were also not on the lists.
Lists	Smith 09/24/92	for several weeks before the signing of the accords in January of 1973, General Eugene Tighe...was asked by the Joint Chiefs to make a list of American POWs that we could reasonably expect to be repatriated both from Laos and Vietnam. The list contained some 900 to 1,000 names yet...
Lists	Tighe 06/24/92	I certainly remember the shock and sadness at the paucity of the lists of names we received versus what we expected.
Lists	Walters 09/21/92	Sen. Grassley: General Walters, do you ever recall it being discussed that we should exchange lists prior to the signing of any agreement?  Walters: Yes, I believe there was a discussion to that... But it seems to me that was discussed and they, of course, knew this is one of the principal leverages they had with us. They knew that our desire to get those prisoners of war back was inordinate compared to theirs... but what I suspected is that they wouldn't have carried out the agreement and my suspicions were not totally ill-founded.

Live Americans	Andrews 10/15/92	I acknowledge that there have been isolated reports POWs being held in some areas in Laos, including Sam Neua. But after giving these reports, most of which come from refugee sources, a full and complete evaluation, the Department has been unable to develop convincing evidence that U.S. POWs are being held in Sam Neua today, nor do we have any evidence that they were being held there in 1988.
Live Americans	Armitage 08/12/92	I think what I'd say is I believe there are Americans in Indochina.
Live Sighting	Bell 12/04/92	Bell: Sir, could I make one point on the underground facility there?  Chairman Kerry: Yes, sir.  Bell: The Bai Nim Conference Hall sits across from the Mausoleum as you know from being there. And they have the meetings there of the Politburo and the Central Committee. Also the Party Congress is held there. And you have high level dignitaries there. They would have to have some type of underground facility in the area to contain all of those people in the event of an emergency...
Live Americans	Brooks 12/01/92	...I found no compelling evidence of alive POWs held in the official prison system of the North Vietnamese... I was persuaded that there was, indeed, compelling evidence that in 1973... to cause me to believe that there probably were people alive in 1973 in Laos.
Live Americans	Cawthorne 11/07/91	I think if one looks at the evidence, piece by piece, one doesn't get anywhere. You don't see the wood for the trees... it's a seamless, carpet of evidence that comes from during the war and beyond.

Live Americans	Chagnon 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: At any rate, in your years, no one has ever come to you with a secret key and offered or whispered to you that up here there are some Americans. You have never hear that. Nobody has ever --  Chagnon: Only the incidents that Roger [Rumpf] mentioned in Vientiane, which were very much second-hand stories and which we turned over all information to the U.S. Embassy. And those did not prove to be valid.
Live Americans	Childress 08/12/92	...I believe there's a possibility of Americans in Southeast Asia in some category that is not defined.

Live Americans	Christmas 06/25/92	<p>Sen. Reid: Do any of you know of any American servicemen in Southeast Asia, like Garwood, who are still there?</p> <p>Sheetz: I do not. And when I met with Vietnamese officials last summer I asked the same question, as does Vessey, as does Christmas, and I'll let him speak for himself.</p> <p>Christmas: I have no personal knowledge, sir, that we have any there.</p> <p>Sen. Reid: You have no personal knowledge. Do you have any reports, any hearsay information that they are there?</p> <p>Christmas: Sir, we have live-sighting reports that we continue to pursue. But we have, at this time, no sufficient information to say that we have a live American in Vietnam or anyplace.</p> <p>However, and I would be the first to tell you this, we don't have sufficient information yet to say that there isn't, and that's why we will pursue any continue to pursue these live-sighting investigations, the last known discrepancy cases, and through our efforts expand throughout those three countries.</p>
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Live Americans	Christmas 06/25/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ... with the job that you have to do and the importance of the job that you have to do, it seems to me to be somewhat like going to a baseball player and saying now, Smith, you are going out and you are going to play first base -- which I used to do -- and you will be batting third. Now Smith goes out and plays first base. He does not bring his glove because he is not going to get any ground balls and he does not take his bat up to the plate because he is not going to get a pitch...</p> <p>I think the fact that there are live-sighting reports out there, whether you believe them or not, but the fact that they are there indicates that they have to be pursued...</p> <p>Christmas: It does not mean that I don't believe that live-sighting report, and we pursue each and every one of those live-sighting reports. Unfortunately, all of them to this point in time have shown that -- at this time, we have not been able to determine that there have been live Americans.</p>
Live Americans	Christmas 11/05/91	<p>If we find out the location of Captain Carr or anybody else, there is no doubt in my mind ...we'll go get him. If he can't get out, we'll go get him.</p>
Live Americans	Christmas 12/04/92	<p>I would echo that, sir. I would also state, however, that as you've indicated, Senator, we pursue every lead. We do not leave any stone unturned, and we have in position the operational plans to recover Americans if, in fact, we should find one.</p>

Live Americans	DeStatte, Deeter, Bell 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: Mr. Gadoury, as to Laos. Do you currently operate with any intelligence or evaluation that suggests to you that someone is alive? Is there any credible evidence that says so?</p> <p>Gadoury: Not that I have seen, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: As to Indochina?</p> <p>DeStatte: That's correct, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: And you say no.</p> <p>DeStatte: No.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Mr. Deeter, Sergeant Deeter?</p> <p>Deeter: No, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Mr. Bell?</p> <p>Bell: No, sir.</p>
Live Americans	DeStatte 08/05/92	<p>We shouldn't forget that those 300-plus sources who accurately described Robert Garwood, encounters with Robert Garwood there, also said that they had no knowledge, personal or hearsay, of any other Americans living or being detained in that area, and if these folks were acknowledged reporting accurate on that, why should we question their accuracy on the other?</p>
Live Americans	Gadoury 10/15/92	<p>After eight years of searching neither I, nor... personnel from various other military units... have found proof that any of our missing survived after the prisoner release from Hanoi in 1973.</p> <p>Yet, as long as the possibility exists that there could have been or could still be, we must continue the search.</p>

Live Americans	Grassley 06/24/92	<p>Evidence exists, and the next time that someone in the Administration says that there is no evidence that we left people behind, it is clear that he or she is not reading the same documents that the members of this Committee and our respective staffs are reading.</p>
Live Americans	Jensen-Stevenson 11/07/91	<p>There is an amazing amount of credible evidence, [that Americans are alive in Southeast Asia].</p>
Live Americans	Kerry 06/25/92	<p>The evidence, to me, is still as likely that there might be fraud as that there is evidence of a prisoner.</p>
Live Americans	Kingston 06/25/92	<p>The JCRC work did not include investigating the possibility that live Americans remaining in captivity against their will in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming.</p>
Live Americans	Kissinger 09/22/92	<p>. . . why they would hold prisoners that they don't acknowledge, for that I have great difficulty understanding it.</p>
Live Americans	Kissinger 09/22/92	<p>I think it's improbable that any are alive today. I honestly did not think there were any alive in Vietnam when the war ended. I have always kept open the possibility in my mind that there were some -- that there were some in Laos.</p>
Live Americans	Larson 12/04/92	<p>Mr. Chairman, I have seen no piece of evidence at this point that would indicate anyone is alive from any of our researches, investigations, surveys, or any of the data that we have available.</p>

Live Americans	Larson 12/04/92	Admiral Larson: ...in this last year, we have resolved 143 live-sighting cases.  Chairman Kerry: Has any one of those live sighting cases given an indication of either a live American, or that there was a live American there?  Larson: No, sir...
Live Americans	Maguire 08/04/92	We conclude with the following assessment. After years of post-war searching, thousands of reports evaluated, and every available means of intelligence collection employed, no single report or combination of reports has ever been able to confirm that American prisoners of war remained in captivity after Operation Homecoming in 1973.
Live Americans	Needham 12/04/92	Sir, I agree. I would add, it is our number 1 mission, looking for live sightings in support of the DIA effort. We react to every single one of them.
Live Americans	Rumpf/ Chagnon 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: ...what do you believe is the possibility that somebody is being held?  Mr. Rumpf: ...if they were living as local people were living, life would be very difficult...A 10-year period would be very difficult.  Chairman Kerry: Do you agree with that, Ms. Chagnon?  Ms. Chagnon: Yes...

Live Americans	Rumpf 10/15/92	Mr. Rumpf: I talked to a very few people about the issue of live POWs being held by the Government. And in each occasion people said there were no Americans being held in Laos. But it was not an issue that came up regularly. People did not raise the issue until late in our stay there in 1989 and '90 when people started coming to our house in Vientiane claiming they had tapes, fingerprints, bringing us sometimes those kinds of materials, expecting some money in return. And that's the only time people really came up to us.  Chairman Kerry: Did they ask you for money, specifically?  Mr. Rumpf: Yeah, it was implied in the discussion that they expected something from it. We only said we'd take it and give it to the U.S. Embassy.
Live Americans	Schiff 08/04/92	...the U.S. Government position is, while there is no information to confirm that Americans are still detained in Southeast Asia, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Because the U.S. Government cannot rule out the possibility, the Department of Defense continues to aggressively investigate this issue...
Live Americans	Schlatter 12/01/92	Sir, the evidence that I saw over, again, the period of time I worked in the office leads me to two conclusions. I think the evidence supports the contention that if you were an American prisoner of war and you were alive in the spring of 1973, the time of Operation Homecoming, you came home. The second conclusion I have to reach is that only the Vietnamese know for sure.

Live Americans	Schlesinger 09/21/92	I believe those prospects would be very slim, Mr. Chairman, as of now. But it's conceivable that one or two may have survived. One or two, or a handful.
Live Americans	Schweitzer 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: But we do have people come to people. I mean, we have the reports. We have got them laid out. These guys spend hours analyzing them. They go through them. You are aware of that, correct?</p> <p>Schweitzer: Yes, and that has to be done. That is a valuable process, and for the American people that must be done. And it is the work of the analysts and the investigators, and it is a valuable process that must be gone through. And I do not in any way want to detract from the dedication and the hard work all of these men do.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Well, what makes you come to that judgment? What is sort of the basis of your judgment nobody is alive?</p> <p>Schweitzer: Well, I have never seen any evidence or heard any evidence that anyone is alive in Vietnam.</p>

Live Americans	Schweitzer 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: ...you are speaking from archival experience, and a reality base that a lot of people do not have. ... you have drawn a conclusion here that is pretty solid in your mind, and you have laid it out to the committee that you think this concept of focus on live people is a waste of time, in your estimation.</p> <p>What gives you this basis that you draw this notion that nobody is alive? Is that a fair statement of your notion? You think this concept of anybody being alive is wrong, is that correct?</p> <p>Schweitzer: Sir, I've seen no evidence that there are live Americans in Vietnam.</p>
Live Americans	Sheetz 08/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: Do you interpret any of the live-sighting reports that you have in front of you today as evidence that an American is alive inside Southeast Asia today?</p> <p>Mr. Sheetz: That kind of clear-cut statement I cannot make, and I don't think there's a Member on this committee who can make such a statement. We have 110 reports. It was 109 when I last briefed you and there's been a new one come in. We have 110 reports right now that are in active inventory, and as we go into the areas where those 110 reports are located, we take a look at other reporting that's in that same geographic area.</p> <p>Until we run those to ground, I can't tell you. That's not a cop-out. I cannot tell you...</p>

Live Americans	Smith	I might say in some respectful disagreement with the Chairman, there is information and evidence before the Committee on specific individuals. The question is, is that information valid, and that is what we are trying to determine.
Live Americans	Smith 10/15/92	In view of the information put forward at our September hearings that we had expected more POWs/MIAs to come home in 1973, it is incumbent upon the Committee to treat the information before us today, I believe, with the assumption that American pilots from the war could still be alive and held against their will somewhere in communist hands in Laos and Vietnam.
Live Americans	Sydow 08/05/92	Chairman Kerry: ...Out of those several thousand, apart from Bob Garwood and apart from the Caucasians who were not American POWs, are there reports in which you place credibility of American POWs being held?  Mr. Sydow: No sir. There is no evidence of POWs being held in this system.

Live Americans	Sydow, Sheetz, Cole 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Now, let me ask each of you the relevant question as to your countries or areas. Mr. Sydow, Laos.  Sydow: No, sir, Vietnam.  Chairman Kerry: Just Vietnam. Do you have any credible evidence today, which you are operating on or working with, that someone is alive in Vietnam, a prisoner?  Sydow: No, sir.  Chairman Kerry: Mr. Sheetz?  Sheetz: No, sir.  Chairman Kerry: Colonel Cole?  Cole: No, sir.
Live Americans	Tin 11/07/91	About this issue, I can say that I know as well as any top leader in Vietnam and, in my opinion, I state categorically that there is not any American prisoner alive in Vietnam.
Live Americans	Vessey 12/04/92	It is almost beyond the realm of comprehension for me to figure out how the Vietnamese leadership can say after X number of years that they have no one and then say now we do and we'll do it for X million or billion or whatever it happens to be.
Live Americans	Vessey 12/04/92	Now, I will tell you that based on what we've learned over the five years I've been involved, I think the probability of anyone being alive is far lower than I would have given that probability five years ago. But I'm not going to say I don't believe there's not anyone alive. I think the probability is very, very low, but certainly it exists. The probability exists.

Live Americans -Offers	Vessey 06/25/92	<p>Sen. McCain: You have never heard of any offer on the part of anyone in authority in Vietnam to return Americans in return for money or assistance?</p> <p>Vessey: Absolutely not. In fact, just the contrary. The Vietnamese officials with whom I've dealt have said we cannot so it, whatever you were to offer. We cannot do it because we do not have any [Americans].</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Bell 12/04/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: Are you not talking about the area around the Mausoleum, Mr. Bell?</p> <p>Bell: I'm talking about the Bai Nim Conference Hall, right across the street from the Mausoleum, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: It is actually about 500 yards away, is it not? It is not right across the street. There is a huge expanse.</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Bell 12/04/92	<p>The two morticians or technical specialists that the ambassador referred to, I believe in early last year was reduced down to one person. He resided in the house across from the Mausoleum on the corner of Chuma Ho Street next to the compound of the Soviet GRU.</p> <p>In May of 1991, this gentleman was soaked with gasoline on the streets of Hanoi and burned to death. And the only facility or information about that facility that I have heard was that it was built on the same order of Lenin's Tomb and there is an elevator that goes down one floor beneath the mausoleum. And the advisors that came there, they used the same plan to construct Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum.</p> <p>Concerning any tunnels in the citadel area or the military compound, previous reporting indicates that there was or probably still is a tunnel which went from Cua Dum Street under Ly Nam De and inside of the Ly Nam De compound. And this tunnel was constructed back during the French era.</p>
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Live-Sighting Reports	Chambers 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: OK. How many of these are firsthand up here? How many of those flags are first-hand [reports]?... what you have is 920 -- 928 minus about 200 that you say are fabrications. That leaves you 728. You have 225 that are first-hand, leaving you with about 500 that are hearsay. 225 firsthand.</p> <p>Chambers: And the hearsay is probably where the heart of this issue is at. And the reason that there is what we find is a problem with this is that in addition to the use of --</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: 700 hearsay total. OK, go ahead.</p> <p>Chambers: -- Some basic geographic flaws in the map where some of the reports were plotted in the wrong area, and I think we went through this in closed session and again in open session earlier.</p> <p>There's a misunderstanding about the nature and the use of hearsay reporting. Hearsay reporting goes from accurate renditions of what actually happened that someone told their brother or their sister and they repeated and it's very accurate to something that you heard, someone else said it to someone, and by the time it is repeated to one of the investigators you can't figure out what it is that they were really talking about. And it's marketplace trivia that people pass back and forth amongst themselves.</p>
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Live-Sighting Reports	DeStatte 12/04/92	<p>There's one other point that I'd like to bring out. In the statement released here on the 1st December, there was a quote of the Russian ambassador, and I quote from that one December statement: "We have also heard from the Russian ambassador that there is a restricted underground area beneath the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum."</p>
		<p>This quotation is taken out of its original context. The original context was a partial transcript of a briefing by Russian ambassador Rashid Camadolin to two journalists in Hanoi on 15 August, 1992. The following is an accurate text of the ambassador's statement in context:</p>
		<p>"There is an underground area beneath the mausoleum. It is restricted. There is a lot of equipment, a cooling device. When we built that, we put in a triple generator system in case of an electricity black-out."</p>
		<p>Now, the ambassador also stated that Russian experts helped build the Mausoleum, and that two Russian experts are at the Mausoleum at the request of the Vietnamese Government to preserve the body of Ho Chi Minh. He said these Russian experts would have known if any U.S. POWs were detained at the Mausoleum.</p>
		<p>The ambassador said he's never heard of any prisoners at the Mausoleum. In fact, he scoffed at the idea that anyone could imagine Vietnam could hold prisoners here. He said he has spoken with many Americans about this subject, and he noted, and I quote, "those who are serious, who are not playing politics, who are not playing on the emotions of the families, they know these stories are not true..."</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	DeStatte 12/04/92	...a BBC radio interview with Ambassador Camadolin in which the ambassador stated he was, quote, sure there is no so-called underground prison here in the center of the city, and above all, beneath the Mausoleum, close quote.
Live-Sighting Reports	Gadoury 10/15/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: And have any of them given you a lead that you have been able to follow that you have considered real or found to be real with respect to an American being alive?</p> <p>Mr. Gadoury: In my recollection, in all the people that I talked to, there were three people who provided information, first-hand live sighting information, of what they said were American prisoners or people being held against their will. In two of those cases, I participated in follow up interviews and even polygraph exams, and neither of the first two individuals were determined to be presenting truthful information. In fact, there was indications of -- ...Deception in each case. In the third case, the Stony Beach office followed up, and I understand that in that case it was determined that there was no substance to the individual's report.</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Haig 09/21/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...we get into these definitions of hard evidence, and iron-clad evidence, and evidence... we have got hundreds of live-sighting reports that have not been all debunked. We have got some other types of intelligence which we will be getting into in a couple of weeks...</p> <p>...where is the proof that the men we did know were alive are dead? Where is that proof? Why do you not put the same burden on that?... where are they?</p> <p>Haig: Well, the same suspicion I have put on another foot. And that is that the enemy that we fought cared nothing about the lives of human beings, including their own. And I saw it on the battlefield, as you did.</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Maguire 08/04/92	<p>...So far, the largest body of post-war intelligence about missing Americans is refugee source reporting...Over 15,000 source reports have been received since 1975, and that number grows every day...To date, we have received almost 1,600 first-hand reports. DIA evaluates these reports and our results are reviewed by an independent channel made up of representatives from other U.S. intelligence agencies.</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Maguire 08/04/92	<p>...As of today, over 100 reports are still under active investigation, as we've just discussed...In Vietnam, hearsay reports account for about half of all live-sighting reports, and they tend to echo the details and descriptions of actual firsthand reports. However, in Laos, hearsay reports account for almost 80 percent of the live-sighting reports, and in many instances they are vague in detail.</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Mooney 01/22/92	Sighting reports, stand-alone sighting reports are essentially worthless unless they are cumulative. They beggar more questions and you can argue about them all day long.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	<p>...In 1979, we received information from a source who said he saw 50 U.S. prisoners of war between 1973 and '78, while he was held in Quyet Tien re-education camp near the Chinese border.</p> <p>Reports like this one, where sources describe seeing POWs with their own eyes, are categorized as first-hand live sightings. They receive our highest priority for investigation. We used all-source analysis to investigate this report. We looked at photography to locate the camp in the area the source described, and we found it.</p> <p>However, the photography showed that during the time the source said he saw U.S. POWs in this camp, the gates were wide open... However, to be certain that no POWs had ever been held in this camp, we located some former inmates to ask if they knew of any Americans held there. These people all denied that any Americans had ever been held in this camp...</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	<p>Each of the former inmates that we had located from the camp provided accurate sketches, one of which you see here. In fact, the only person whose sketch of the camp was not accurate was the original source who claimed that he saw 50 U.S. prisoners of war in the camp.</p> <p>The moral of the story is this. Relying only one source of information would have led us to believe that there were U.S. prisoners of war in the camp. Taking a multiple source approach convinced us that this was obviously not the case...</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	...the U.S. Government's intelligence collection capability on the POW/MIA issue is continually being improved.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	...as the U.S. Government's expert on Indochinese prison systems, we routinely study the handling of all foreign prisoners in order to gain insight on how U.S. prisoners of war might be handled... The point here is that within a few weeks of the time a Westerner showed up in a maximum security prison in Indochina, we knew he was there.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schlatter 12/01/92	...judgments of a source are a fundamental part of intelligence analysis. And the fact that some sources are weighed and found wanting is not an indictment of the analytic process or of the analyst; it is a fact of life.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schlatter 12/01/92	It's a fact of life that you encounter people who either make up a story or who really are telling you the truth, but they don't have a clear view of what they're saying and they embellish a little bit, or you have people who simply come forward with a very straightforward story.

Live-Sighting Reports	Schlatter 12/01/92	<p>The charge is made that we believe everybody is lying. We do not. Demonstrably, seven out of 10 or more of the people who talk to us are telling us the truth.</p> <p>I found a lot of frustration. I was frustrated every day I went into that office and every day I left, and I am still frustrated 2 1/2 years out of it. But to then take the leap from frustration to saying you knowingly and willingly turned your back on a valid report of a man that you could have rescued is absurd. And that is why I am so hard over on denying or declaring the invalidity of the mindset to debunk. Because that is where I found that argument to lead.</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Schweitzer 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: Well, what do you say to the live-sighting report process? Here we are. We get live-sighting reports. People come in and say, I saw an American. What do we do?</p> <p>Schweitzer: I've never heard one, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: You have never had somebody come to you?</p> <p>Schweitzer: No, sir.</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 08/04/92	<p>...because the initial contact with that source -- our field collector was not privy to all the information have about a particular geographic area in Vietnam, may not be aware of all the subtleties surrounding that report, we've got to go back to the source in some circumstances to sharpen up the original reporting. We do that through what we call a source-directed requirement, or SDR. It takes a couple of months for that process to work.</p> <p>I guess we balance off the need for thoroughness and completeness and accuracy against the risk that we would take in going off half-cocked with half-developed or poorly developed information in a live-sighting report.</p>
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Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: But as a ready pool of sort of information, here you have boat people. These are people who hated the government. They risked their lives, they got into boats, they went out into the South China Sea, they were escaping communism, escaping the country, they had a reason to hate it and foul it up. And yet thousands upon thousands of them said they had never seen anything, is that correct?</p> <p>Sheetz: Yes, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Now, is that as relevant as a counterbalance in terms of proving a negative, if we are working with statistics, as people who say they did see something as a hearsay?</p> <p>Sheetz: In fact... one of the techniques we use when we deal with this bogus reporting coming out of reeducation camps. When we've got 200 and 300 inmates who were there who said that they never saw any Americans and then suddenly somebody appears who was there at the same time that says, you know, there were 50 Americans in this facility.</p> <p>So you have to -- it's not enough just to take individual reports and throw them up on the map. You've got to look at them in the context of all that you know. This is another way of talking about doing all-source analysis. You know, evaluating each report in terms of what you know about the area and how that report fits in.</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 12/01/92	<p>Things are on track, things are moving ahead with regard to those investigations. But the results are not all in yet.</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 08/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: ...given the nature of prioritization and the increased access in Vietnam, that a live-sighting report rendered in the year 1991 or 1992 would be the highest order of priority and the fastest resolved. Can you help me understand why the bulk of those remain unresolved?</p> <p>Sheetz: ...before we send those cases out there, we want to get a very quick, thorough analysis of the case, match it up with whatever data we hold in our files, present the live sighting investigator with a complete package to go our into the field with not only information on the particular sighting, but now we're also sending out, along with that sighting package, all other previously closed live-sighting reports and hearsay reports that are in that same immediate geographic area.</p> <p>We're continually refining the process, I, too, am desirous of having it sped up, but we can only work it as fast as we can get the reports in here, analyze them, and get them back out.</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 11/15/91	<p>DIA has held all along that the report of the mortician that he saw three Caucasians who were identified to him by another person as probably being Americans -- that report stands, there is validity to that report. . . . I am unaware of any firm, credible evidence that Americans were held against their will after Operation Homecoming.</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 12/04/92	What I think we were really referring to is the notion that yes, there is a foundation for that rather large structure. And embedded in that foundation, it now turns out there's a couple of generators and some other equipment that's related to the facility. Is that a prison? I think not...
Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 06/25/92	<p>Sen. Reid: Gentlemen, what is the latest live-sighting report that any of you know of?</p> <p>Mr. Sheetz: We receive them all the time. The inventory of --</p> <p>Sen. Reid: When you say all of the time, it would not be unusual to receive a couple a week?</p> <p>Mr. Sheetz: Many weeks we could receive two or three or four or more. We have generally an aggressive inventory that we are investigating. Between 80 to 125, and about every 3 months, we hold a review board where representatives of the entire intelligence community plus the State Department and the Joint Staff and OSD come in and listen to our analysts describe what we have been able to do to resolve or otherwise investigate the case.</p> <p>And cases get closed out at that point, and the inventory drops down to maybe 75 or 80, and then over the next couple of months it will build back up. And we will hold another review board. So it's a very fluid figure.</p>

Live-Sighting Reports	Sievarts 06/25/92	<p>[Investigating live-sighting reports] remained an active, if not primary then secondary, mission of all the American intelligence agencies to my knowledge right into the mid-Seventies and even to this day. The problem is that the kinds of information that began arriving after '73 were qualitatively different from what was coming in before '73. It's not a question of attitude by analysts, but rather simply the information itself, and it's for that reason that I drew attention to what is, to me, a significant difference.</p> <p>The absence of that kind of verifying information in which the name or some other detail that... would let you know that this was real.</p> <p>I have sometimes said that the very large number of sightings themselves raised incredulity. There could not have been as many American prisoners as the live-sighting reports suggest were there.</p>
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Live-Sighting Reports	Sieverts 06/25/92	<p>The very large number of these reports should have triggered caution, since it was clearly improbable that there were ever enough prisoners to correlate with all the alleged sightings. It is noteworthy that in most of these reports no information was provided on the name or names of the people reportedly seen.</p> <p>While the war was underway, we received reports on captured Americans which often had names associated with them. This was so even if the reports came from indigenous, illiterate people who would render an American name phonetically.... it was the way of validating that information. Among American prisoners we learned so clearly over the years that the exchange of names was the highest priority.</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Sieverts 06/25/92	My work with refugees has made me deeply aware of the desperation that these people face and feel.
Live-Sighting Reports	Tighe 06/24/92	...the only way you're going to prove all of these things is to go over there at the point that is under discussion, so you can query the local people even or examine the sight of a crash.
Live-Sighting Reports	Tighe 06/24/92	[In] 70 percent of those reports, analysis that was done in our office said that those individuals told us the truth.

Remains	Bell 12/04/92	<p>Mr. Bell: Rather than concentrate on numbers of cases, prioritized a list where you have leads that can be followed now, regardless of where the case is in the country, and do the cases that have the greatest probability of success first, based on those leads. And, at the same time, have someone working on the development of leads for those cases for which you have no leads.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: That seems to make sense.</p> <p>Mr. Bell: To move the thing forward.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Well, are we not doing that in the context of having put the toughest discrepancy cases in front of them? I mean, General Vessey sat there and put them there.</p> <p>Mr. Bell: Yes, sir, we have, but we're at a dead end on some of the cases, and unless we come up with some new information, it's pointless to go back and investigate them again.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Are there a number of cases on which we really know the fate of people, but we just do not have the remains?</p> <p>Mr. Bell: Yes, sir.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: So, in effect, we have really resolved some cases, but we do not take them off the list simply because we do not have remains.</p> <p>Mr. Bell: But there are also some cases where we do not know the fate of the individual and also do not have remains or any possibility of further leads in the case.</p>
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Remains	Childress 08/12/92	...Vietnam could solve the live prisoner issue by returning their remains. So the key question is, if they're not alive, why is Vietnam not solving it?
Remains	Christmas 11/05/91	I think that it's unfair to our people in the field to suggest that their primary focus is on remains recovery. We go where the facts lead us as we identify each case and try to follow it through for the fullest possible accounting. If, in fact, the facts lead us to the notion that we can either recover the remains or that we think the Vietnamese or Laotians have those remains, we think it's important as our accounting to the families that we can give them information.... They want them to walk out of the jungle and come home, but they will tell you very quickly that if that can't be the case, please end the uncertainty for me. Give me something that I can put this to rest, I've been with it so long.

Remains	DeStatte 12/04/92	<p>Mr. DeStatte: First, I doubt that more than a few remains, if any, are in the hands of private citizens in Vietnam. It would be culturally antithetical, as well as illegal.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Well, let me just ask you something. You know, there is intelligence that -- I mean, some people within your own house assert that there are remains being held.</p> <p>Mr. DeStatte: Yes, sir, I understand that.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: You disagree with that completely?</p> <p>Mr. DeStatte: That's correct. I acknowledge that there may be some instances where private citizens may have remains, but I think that that's rare. I think that we should avoid setting up a mechanism that ultimately is simply a disguised means of paying incentive rewards to private citizens.</p> <p>I think what we should be doing is providing Vietnam's official organs, such as we are doing with the museums, means by which they can help us find the answers we're looking for and the return of the remains, and rely on -- and also articulate, for Vietnamese leaders, problems as we understand those problems, and rely on Vietnam and Vietnam's leaders to resolve the internal problems of recovering remains; to resolve the internal problems of recovering information and sharing that with us. And I think that's the appropriate approach, myself.</p>
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Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	<p>Mr. Schweitzer: Well, after our meeting I had meetings with the Vietnamese all that day, and into the night... the importance of this historic trip of yours to Vietnam [was stressed], and what could be achieved during this trip.</p> <p>And I was told to me that they simply have no remains. That if the success or failure of this trip and of establishing relations with the U.S. is dependent upon their turning over the remains they have in their possession, or that is believed they have in their possession, then it's going to fail. They have no remains.</p> <p>Now, I don't mean to indicate to you that there are not remains out there. There are, and the investigators that are there, the analysts are going to get them as the people of Vietnam --</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: But you are suggesting those are the ones in private hands?</p> <p>Mr. Schweitzer: Private hands.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Or in provincial hands.</p> <p>Mr. Schweitzer: Or, possibly, that haven't been excavated yet. The location of the grave sites is known by -- you were given the example by Colonel Dai, a very vivid example. He knows the location of four graves.</p>
Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	<p>Sen. McCain: You do not disagree with that, Mr. Schweitzer, that there are remains in different parts of the country.</p> <p>Mr. Schweitzer: I wouldn't disagree with anything Bill Bell says. He's the real expert on this.</p>

Remains	Larson 12/04/92	<p>...There are remains somewhere, because we have photographs of bodies that they had at one time that we do not have remains for. So there are some that once were available that we do not have, and we don't know where they are.</p>
Remains	Needham 12/04/92	<p>Sir, the one area that I don't know what to tell you is the answer to the remains. I can give you a scenario that Morrissey was buried in an area and maybe they lost the records. However, we are working with them and we have presented those cases to them. We're going to talk to them more about it next week.</p> <p>I believe, as Admiral Larson said, they are trying to find a way to get themselves out of this situation, because they are concerned about the laws. They're also concerned about taking remains from individuals and convincing them that they have no chance of getting any money somewhere down the road.</p>

Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	<p>Sen. McCain: Mr. Schweitzer, I asked General Vessey this morning on the issue of the allegation of the warehousing of remains. One, have you seen any evidence of warehousing of remains? And, two, what is your opinion about that theory that there may be several hundred American remains kept somewhere in Hanoi, or somewhere in Vietnam?</p> <p>Mr. Schweitzer: There is no such warehouse, sir. If, at one point in the '70's or early '80's, if there were some remains somewhere in Hanoi, those remains have by now, as the officials retired who were in the program, as they went back to their provinces, various memorabilia, maybe even remains, have gone back with them. And while there may have been some remains at some point -- I don't know that, but if there were, they are now in private hands.</p> <p>Sen. McCain: You are absolutely convinced there is no warehouse for the large number of U.S. remains somewhere in Hanoi?</p> <p>Mr. Schweitzer: Yes, sir. There is no such warehouse.</p>
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Remains	Ford 12/04/92	<p>...I am struck by the fact that the cases that bother me, that gnaw away at me on this issue, is the cases that they should know the most about: the ones where we have the photographs of people on the ground dead in Vietnamese control, the last known alive cases that we've investigated that they had custody of them, based on our joint investigations.</p> <p>Those are the ones that are not showing up. Now, I can understand, as some have said, that they've lost the coordinates, a bomb went off and when they went back to get them they didn't find them, somebody took them home when they retired as a gold bar, they were going to sell them back to somebody at some time in the future.</p> <p>I can understand that for, give me a number, 25 percent, 40 percent, but not all of the most likely cases where we know they had control over an American that was dead on the ground. They don't lose them all.</p>
Remains	Ford 12/04/92	<p>Mr. Ford: ...I remember being told two years ago in Hanoi: There are no archives; we have no archives; why would we not give them to you if we had them? They have been eaten up.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: I remember that. Vessey spoke to that, though.</p> <p>Mr. Ford: But why is that different than the remains?</p>

Remains	Ford 12/04/92	<p>This is one that I have a nightmare about, and that's that something Carl Ford will say or do to his superiors will give the Vietnamese the impression that they don't have to give us those remains and they destroy them, they get rid of them.</p> <p>I shuddered when all of the people told the truth as they saw it today, because if the message ever gets to the Vietnamese that the U.S. Government believes they don't have remains we aren't going to get any. And I just can't for the life of me - I will err on the side of trying to provide the answers for the families as long as I can. That's my bias.</p>
Remains	Ford 12/01/92	<p>The fact is that every piece of evidence that we have gotten in the breakthrough suggests that they do have far more information than they have provided thus far, that they, in fact, have to explain to us if they do not have the remains, why not.</p>

Remains - Excavations	Gadoury 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: What did you pull out of this crash site?</p> <p>Gadoury: The aircraft involved was an AV/OV-2, which crashed into the side of a mountain. It's scattered over a large area. The exact dimensions were -- I don't recall the exact dimensions, but it was over 100 meters wide, and probably about the same distance going from the bottom of the slope up a 60 degree slope to the top. And there was a wide distribution of wreckage.</p> <p>As we started going, meticulously following the Identification Laboratory's excavation procedures from the bottom to the top --</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: So, you literally began to sift through soil, right?</p> <p>Gadoury: Right.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: You would sift through soil, and you would clean it out, and you would find fragments of bone; you would find fragments of teeth.</p> <p>Gadoury: On this last situation, we were not able to finish the site, but we found over 300 bone fragments, and a number of teeth, and quite a few personal effects and personal equipment.</p>
Remains	Larson 12/04/92	<p>General Needham said that -- and I do not want to misquote him, but the impression I had is that he believes that there are remains that are known to exist being held by individuals, as well as perhaps local government officials. There is some expectation, of course, that some bounty would be paid for remains. We have made it clear that that is not the policy of the United States.</p>

Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	However, this does not mean that remains, or even partial remains may be found for most of these cases. The majority of the remaining MIA cases in Vietnam may eventually be resolved by means of other factors. These will include photos, documents, aircraft wreckage, memorabilia, and personal stories told by a farmer, a People's Army Vietnam soldiers, and civilians.
Remains	Vessey 11/05/91	. . . U.S. analysts have combined these facts to build a case which suggests that the Vietnamese government could be holding as many as several hundred sets of remains.
Remains	Vessey 12/04/92	...for example, if there were an air crash they were to find -- the local people were to find the crash, find the pilot if he were alive, capture him; if he wasn't alive, find the remains then bury them on the spot and then report the location of those -- of the grave to the central authorities. And then the central authorities clearly had a system for recovering those remains at a later date, one, two, or five years later, and then sending those remains to central storage.

Remains	Vessey 06/25/92	In the past five years we've received 332 sets of remains... Of those, 125 have been identified and returned to their families. Another 107 might be those of Americans, but have not yet been identified, and the remaining 100 sets are not remains of missing Americans.  In the 119 discrepancy cases which have been the focus of our joint field investigations, 22 have been resolved through recovery, return and identification of remains. In 39 other sets we and the Vietnamese have agreed that the individuals involved are dead which confirms an earlier presumptive finding of death. In four of those cases we agree that we will not be able to recover remains.  For the other 35 of those cases we believe that there still may be an opportunity to recover the remains... The other 58 cases continue to be investigated. They all have been investigated at least once and most several times... none of the new evidence gathered... points toward any of the individuals being alive.
Remains	Vessey 11/05/91	...U.S. analysts have combined these facts to build a case which suggests that the Vietnamese government could be holding as many as several hundred sets of remains.
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	...we did not want to create the impression of ransom and reparations.

Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	<p>The North Vietnamese, in what turned into a constant pattern, immediately began to violate the agreement, especially with respect to a full accounting of MIAs. They did not hand over the POW list for Laos as required on January 27th.</p> <p>In response, we delayed deliveries to them of the confidential Presidential letter on recommending to Congress reconstruction assistance after peace had been established. The letter was kept confidential only to prevent a linkage between the agreement and what we presented as a unilateral American act. A Presidential report to the Congress in February 1972 had affirmed this undertaking, and have a figure of \$2.5 billion. It was again repeated in the Presidential speech of May 8, 1972. Mr. Chairman, some suggestions have been made, including this morning, that the North Vietnamese may have withheld some American prisoners in an effort to get this economic aid. I find this reasoning difficult to understand.</p>
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	I don't believe that reparations were their primary objective. Their primary objective was to take over Indochina, and if all they had wanted from us was economic aid, all they would have had to do was observe the agreement...
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	I certainly told them innumerable times that we were not paying ransom, we were not paying reparations, and they have never used it. They never said, you owe us economic aid, and therefore we are holding prisoners. If they had done it, I wouldn't have been astonished.

Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	To encourage compliance with these commitments we held out the inducement first offered by President Johnson in 1965, and frequently reiterated since, at least three times by President Nixon in 1972, of economic aid to North Vietnam.
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	<p>Finally, it is curious that Americans would make such an argument when the North Vietnamese did not. As the bipartisan House Select Committee reported in 1976, not once in all their discussions with the North Vietnamese, did they cite the American failure to provide economic aid as an excuse for their failure to provide a complete accounting. They have never denied their obligations. They have only denied that they have prisoners.</p> <p>Why should Americans now put forward an alibi for Hanoi which even Hanoi has never asserted?</p>
Reparations	Robson 09/24/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...Dr. Kissinger was very clear about that -- no linkage. Now, why would they bail out if they did not feel there was linkage?</p> <p>Colonel Robson: I know there was not supposed to be any linkage, Senator, but in fact there was. They were constantly trying to link things...</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Is Dr. Kissinger wrong in that perception?</p> <p>Colonel Robson: I know that he had the agreement, the understanding that there would be no linkage. But what happens in Washington and what happens in that little dusty room in Saigon is two different things, Senator.</p>

Reparations	Smith 09/22/92	[Habib] said in one of the first lists of negotiating points put forward by the North Vietnamese, "The communist side bracketed the release of prisoners with what they described as U.S. responsibility for war damage in Vietnam in a single numbered point. I know of no instance in which an adversary so openly treated this humanitarian problem in this way. We recognized from an early date what we were up against."
Reparations	Walters 09/21/92	...My understanding was this is what they really wanted from us, the postwar reconstruction aid and obviously they knew what we really wanted from them short of surrender was the prisoners.

Returned POWs	Ford 12/01/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: I think one area that could be very helpful and, frankly, it has been a real problem, is the POW debriefs. Not regarding anything in there other than the names of individuals that they saw. I have only -- we are restricted to the Chairman and myself. There are 590 of them, and it is impossible to get through those with the two of us doing it...</p> <p>Ford: Is there any possibility that as a compromise, Senator Smith, that you might allow us to go through that and do this work ourselves? I mean part of this is a contract that we have. It's not a legal contract, but it's certainly a contract in principle, not only to the past POWs but any future POWs.</p> <p>That when we talk to them after they come back, we know that they've been through hell. We don't expect them to be anything other than human but we want to know, we need to know what happened to them. And we've always made it clear in that process that these would be guarded as sort of nuclear weapons secrets or something, and that's the reason that we've done that.</p>
Returned POWs	Trowbridge 06/24/92	I know of no prisoners that came home that said, I saw an individual that was alive that we left behind, without other information that may have supported the fact that he died.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	... in 1990... I broke with the KGB and went public and denounced the organization as cruel, repressive and inhuman... What I am doing now is simply a continuation of my old story, for which I was sued... and deprived of my rank and pension and everything else. So I am not doing anything new...

Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: ...can you help us to understand why Mr. Nechiporenko allegedly said one thing to you at one moment and straight-out denies that he talked to anybody subsequently? Do you have an explanation for that?</p> <p>General Kalugin: ...my explanation is that he had consulted his former superiors and they would tell him, just say one... I think that's a premeditated lie on the part of the former intelligence organization, and I know the reason... Vietnam remains to be probably one of the last listening posts in the Far East, and to lose a relationship with them... would probably be a major setback for the Soviet intelligence, so why not keep a story which was coordinated with the Vietnamese?</p>
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>... I do care about people at home. I'm not a defector. I'm a citizen of my country. I love my country. I want to stay in that country. I want to change that country and transform it into something far better than we have today or we had in the last 70 years. And the United States, as I know it, is a country which I always felt friendly for and I will do my best to get both countries closer together and get Russia out of this mess and standing on its feet as a proud nation, a prosperous nation. That's my only desire.</p>
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>...to take any American against his will to the USSR would require a major political decision by the Politburo and Brezhnev personally... They would never risk [the damage to Soviet/American relations... It makes no practical sense, no political or military sense. They could have been interviewed on the spot and that made sense indeed.</p>

Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>I do have a lot of obligations [regarding confidentiality], according to the old rules, but I think it's time to set new rules.</p>
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>The GRU is an autonomous organization and the KGB's role in regard to the military intelligence is to protect this agency from foreign intelligence agencies' penetration, and second, to control their political health, so to speak. That was the major role of the KGB. Otherwise, they would act autonomously, do their things without the KGB's knowledge.</p>
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>At least for us, for [American POWs] to go would be the best thing, because we would have probably some potential sources. To keep them in Vietnam, it's a loss of everything, it's a complete failure as an intelligence operation.</p>
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>Two years ago, or about that time, I said publicly that the KGB was a state within a state which would do everything to disrupt the process of democratization in my country. I was denounced as a liar, as a mental jerk or something, and I was stripped of my honors and everything, but one-and-a-half years later, Mr. Gorbachev, after his return from the Crimea, said the same -- the KGB was a state within a state -- and he confirmed what I has said previously. . . . everything that I have said so far found at a later time confirmation.</p>
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	<p>I am sure that [Soviet military interrogation of U.S. POWs] happened, because they did have a major interest in American know-how, in weaponry, details, instructions. This would be a natural thing to expect, but this is my assumption. I do not say that this really happened.</p>

Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	I would reject the idea of American POWs taken to the Soviet Union. We don't have to take them to the Soviet Union. They could have been interrogated in Vietnam. The Vietnamese wanted us to interrogate them... to take any American against his will to the USSR would require a major political decision by the Politburo and Brezhnev personally... They would never risk, because of one or a handful of Americans, to be taken inside to damage the Soviet/American relations... It makes no practical sense, no political or military sense. They could have been interviewed on the spot and that made sense indeed.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	Sen. Reid: Why couldn't your story be a continuation of the intrigue, deceit and lies and destroying records that you were involved in for some 32 years?  General Kalugin: Well, it makes no sense. I am 57 and I've lived a very interesting life. Today I want to live a different life, just an honest and simple [one]. You may believe it -- as I say, take it or leave it.

Soviet Union	Kerry 01/21/92	General Kalugin's startling account has been disputed by the Government of Vietnam, discounted by the CIA and denied outright by the KGB agent who allegedly carried out the interviews. This conflict between statement and denial is precisely the type of situation the Committee expects to run into time and time again. Our intent is to build as complete a record as we can, to take neither allegations nor denials at face value, to contact original sources whenever possible, and to locate contemporaneous documentation wherever it exists. We cannot, in this way, be sure of arriving at the truth, but we can be certain that we have left no avenue unexplored in our pursuit of the truth.
Soviet Union	Kohl 11/15/91	What happens in 41 years that we do not go back and re-inquire and ask whether or not there is some information that would be useful?.. We inquired about many, many people in the Soviet Union about whom we were concerned -- Soviet Jewry, rightfully so, Raoul Wallenberg and many others. Why were we not at the same time asking consistently about POWs and missing POWs in the Soviet Union that we did not have any information on, or inadequate information on?
Soviet Union	Mooney 01/22/92	The interest in Moscow Bound is totally surprising to me... It's an intelligence given... The Soviets do take our people... Unlike World War II and Korea, the Soviets did not need a bunch of people for labor. They were after the minds... They were not stealing them by the hundreds. They were few and rare.
Soviet Union	Shields 06/25/92	Some early releases came home from Vietnam via Moscow, but we never had any indication that prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union and detained there.

Soviet Union	Smith 01/21/92	General Kalugin's comments have produced admissions from the CIA, the KGB, and even Vietnam, that at least one American POW was interrogated by the Soviets. For seven years, I was told just the opposite.
Soviet Union	Vessey 06/25/92	<p>Vessey: And Colonel Nechiporenko who was Kalugin's source, said that isn't what I told Kalugin. I told him I interviewed one person in 1973... The Vietnamese say yes, that's what happened... Now, surely the Soviets gave questions to the Vietnamese. There are all sorts of information that the Soviets desperately wanted from our people, and surely they had worked out some sort of arrangement to try to get that information from our people. As far as we know, from debriefing the prisoners returned, none of them reported having been interrogated by the Soviets. There were some Cubans involved, but none were interrogated by Soviets.</p> <p>Senator Kassebaum: Any Chinese?</p> <p>Vessey: And so far as I know, none by the Chinese.</p>

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Sen. Grassley: Mr. Andrews, I want to ask about Morse code K. DIA determined that the Dong Manh facility was a re-education center, yet the CIA analysis shows it to be one of the most security facilities that they have seen, and we have had reference to that in the CIA memo. Can you back up your assessment and indicate to us why the CIA's analysis is wrong?</p> <p>Mr. Andrews: Senator, as I said in my statement and in subsequent questions already, that initial analysis was their best estimate at the time. This was made prior to the extensive interviews we have had of inmates of the facility where we got a lot more information on the security and the nature of the facility. That's our best judgment.</p>
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	The USA and possible K remain unexplained despite extensive tasking of information collection activities of the intelligence community. No correlation to a known, unaccounted for individual -- to a known, unaccounted for individual -- has been made. And unless an unexpected lead develops, there is little more that can be done other than continuing to monitor the situation.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: Now that, to say the least, is pretty outrageous, based on this Senator's opinion. You teach people to communicate, you teach them how to communicate, you teach them what to communicate with, and then you do not keep the number so that you can identify them when they communicate. You are going to have a hell of a job identifying them, are you not?</p> <p>Mr. Andrews: Absolutely.</p>

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Every image that I am aware of that we have taken, we've analyzed and the committee has been made aware of, and we've talked about today...
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	...of all the millions of square kilometers of territory in Southeast Asia that we've examined over the years, we really only have two unexplained sets of symbols which were clearly intended to communicate something to an observer from above. And that's the 19 or 1573 TH and the USA with the possible K.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...let us assume that a number appears on a photograph. Let us assume that you cannot make any determination any way, shape, or form, that thing was created by a natural object. Your analysts say there is nothing that we can find anywhere in any of the imagery in any way we analyze this, that in any way that this number that we see was made by natural objects.</p> <p>You then see that number. What is going to be your recommendation if you cannot determine for sure that it was a man-made object? What is going to be your recommendation? What are you going to do?...</p> <p>Mr. Andrews: Sir, I will offer you a personal opinion. We always, when we have reason to believe that something may be an indicator, we follow up, as Mr. Erickson says or as Mr. Dussault said. The first thing you do is go collect more information. So that's exactly what we would do. Until we could resolve it, we would follow up. And that's what we've done with these others.</p>

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	I think that it's -- it's very hard when you're trying to go back a number of years to try to put yourself in the place of an imagery analyst or an analyst in that time frame tho know why he concluded what he concluded. We've done the best we could, at the committee's request, to reexamine all this imagery and bring in multiple people to look at it. And what we looked at, we saw a possible 52 that we believed we could explain.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Mr. Andrews: If there was a number on the ground that an escaped prisoner made and we detected it, we would not dismiss it until we had done everything we could to resolve what the case was.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Well, you may not be able to.</p> <p>Mr. Andrews: Well -- and that's our problem. So we keep it unexplained. It would immediately go on my unexplained list, Senator Smith.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Well, it sits on the unexplained list, what happens to the poor guy down there that is making the number?</p> <p>Mr. Andrews: Senator, we do everything we can with the resources available to us to follow up on these various numbers.</p>

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Viewing a poor-quality print with a magnifying glass is just not how imagery exploitation should be done...When the JSSA personnel viewed the original quality imagery of the printed photography on a light table using high resolution optics the nature of all the supposed evader symbols became clear.</p> <p>They were simply vegetation, shadows, or artifacts of the photography production process. Some possible symbols were even in the tops of 200 foot tall trees, an unlikely place for an evading POW to leave a signal. When shown photographs of other locations -- and I think this is very significant -- other locations in Africa and one in Utah, the JSSA personnel also saw the same kinds of symbols, symbols which again disappeared on the light table.</p>
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	No one -- not DIA, not CIA, and not the JSSA -- can correlate the USA and possible K symbols to an unaccounted-for individual.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...in spite of all that information, in spite of the fact that they were taught to provide identifying information to imagery from above, we do not have the list of those identifier numbers to find them if they signal. Is that correct?...</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. As far as I know right now, yes, sir.</p>
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: I think the laws of probability would indicate to you that if there are a series of numbers that identify with an individual or individuals who are missing in action in Southeast Asia and those numbers correlate with individuals, the laws of probability would tell you that it is a very high probability that those people are, in fact, identified with those numbers.

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: Is it your position that these symbols are -- well, to use the term, is it your position that what you say on the imagery is valid until proven otherwise?</p> <p>Mr. Andrews: Yes, sir.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Is it your position, as well?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.</p>
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>...the other point that Senator Smith made that I would like to respond to regarding circling the wagons and directed that everybody get in line...</p> <p>None of the players, and you have deposed them on this particular subject, none of the players were asked or directed or forced in anyway to change their minds...</p> <p>We simply brought them together so that we could better serve the committee. We're not circling the wagons. We want to get the information to you. We believe there's a good story to tell if we get the accurate information and not the incomplete information on the table.</p>

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...nobody said to this Committee when we showed you this [information on symbols], thank you... We will take a look at that. Maybe we missed something. That is not what we heard.</p> <p>What we heard was immediately circling the wagons, pulling everybody together, saying we will have one position on this. No one is to talk to the committee. We will have one position to the committee, and we are telling you now that position is that those are not symbols and those people are not missing. And I find it outrageous that is the way this issue is being treated...</p> <p>Andrews: Senator, if I could, first of all, we do take them very seriously. When the USA came to our attention, we had an analyst on an airplane within a couple of days to Southeast Asia to try to follow-up on actions that we could take to determine what was there. We collected additional intelligence information and continued that process.</p>
Symbols	Chagnon 10/15/92	<p>Ms. Chagnon: The gentleman here before us said that here was one possibility of these being written by POWs, one being that it was a ruse by resistance people. Those letters could be Lao letters.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: What would it say in Lao? Does it say anything?</p> <p>Ms. Chagnon: ...it could be ba ra hoi, which means don't wait. It could be the abbreviation for those three words...I have a Lao friend staying with us...I said what would these letters stand for if you saw them anywhere, and she immediately picked out ba ra hoi...</p>

Symbols	CHECK QUOTE	He also stated under oath, that although Committee investigators suggested he contact JSSA to become educated in the distress symbol program, he did not arrange for such a briefing until June; page 21.
Symbols	Clapper 12/01/92	The joint investigation team travelled to Sam Nuea Province on 29 November '92, located the rice field where the USA symbol was made, interviewed it's owner, and discovered that the owner's eldest son made the USA symbol by copying it from an envelope because he liked the shape of the letters.
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	<p>Sen. Grassley: Mr. Dussault, did you also think that you saw a name faintly scratched in the field?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.</p> <p>Sen. Grassley: Without telling us the name, did you try to match it with the names on the missing list?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: About three days later, yes, sir. At first I didn't realize it was a name.</p> <p>Sen. Grassley: Did it match any names?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: To my recollection, it did.</p>
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	And in this case, in my mind, it's a possibility that the individual may have tried over the last 15 years various signals. None of those got any attention, so he's going to go with a blatant USA.

Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: And it has the walking appearance, whatever that extra -- I don't want to get into any classified area. Do you believe it's distinctly a K?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: It to me looks like a K, and that's how I think we ought to consider it. And I've said that in writing, I think, and I've really done that for a reason. My position is...Give the benefit of the doubt to the operator. That's always been my concern.</p>
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	<p>Sen. Grassley: Did you see, 72 TA 88?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. To my recollection that's what I saw.</p> <p>Sen. Grassley: How did you interpret that?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: At first, my first interpretation of that is -- 72 was the year the guy went down. TZ was his E&amp;E code letters. And 88 could have been the year he arrived there or the year he left. And that was my interpretation. I don't know if that's even close. That's just speculation.</p>
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	<p>Sen. Grassley: When you saw 72 TA 88, did it match a person that was missing?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Sir, again, we are talking a year, two letters, TA -- and those are E&amp;E code letters that applied during 1972.</p> <p>Sen. Grassley: when you found the name, though, did it match when that person went down?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.</p>

Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...we cannot assume that is made while the person is in captivity, can we? The person could have escaped, is that not correct?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir, that is correct.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: And made it while he was escaping?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, that's one of the possibilities. He could be an escapee hiding out in that area, made a K, went back into hiding, for a couple of weeks, stayed close by, within a kilometer, which is his training, and then goes back and does the USA. Again, maybe even at night, under a moonlit night, or something like that, he gets out there and works for three hours.</p>
Symbols	Dussault/ Erickson 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...we have an agency that teaches pilots escape and evasion procedures and identifying or authenticating numbers in order to locate them. Those people who taught that were not sent any imagery until at least, at the minimal, 1985; most of it was seen after this committee showed it to them in 1992. Is that correct?</p> <p>Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.</p> <p>Mr. Erickson: Yes.</p>
Symbols	Elder 10/15/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: ...If you could remove yourself from what you heard here this morning, did you ever hear any information from anybody regarding that, any indigenous person in Laos or anybody else who was in Laos regarding the USA?</p> <p>Mr. Elder: I did not.</p>

Symbols	Erickson 10/15/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: Now, we have discussed this previously, and this is not classified. But how long would it take a person to dig out a USA of that size?</p> <p>Mr. Erickson: At least an hour per letter for one individual.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: So, three hours of work?</p> <p>Mr. Erickson: At least.</p>
Symbols	Erickson 10/15/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: Now, with respect to the K up there, it has been referred to occasionally as a walking K. Without getting into great details about walking, does that appear to be a walking K?</p> <p>Mr. Erickson: To me, it does.</p>
Symbols	Godley 09/24/92	<p>We had one very peculiar incident. Some random aerial photography happened to take a picture of a rice paddy or some cultivated area, and we thought we saw USAF spelled out in this field, even with an arrow. We got very excited about it, and we sent an intelligence team of local American irregulars -- these were Hmong. They went there and they said there was absolutely no evidence of any American or any other prisoners in that area.</p>
Symbols	Grassley 10/15/92	<p>On October 2 and 5, the Committee received a full court debunking from DoD on the pilot code numbers in two closed sessions. They said that numerous sets of numbers seen in a photo and which match code numbers of known MIAs were shadows and vegetation. They made the numbers disappear, presto, just like that, by some sort of high-technology equipment.</p>

Symbols	Gray 12/04/92	<p>Mr. Gray: Yes, sir, exactly. The owner was brought out. We talked to him about the symbol being seen in his field several years before. At first he didn't understand what we were talking about. As the conversation went on, he laughed when they showed him the line drawing of the USA. He said I know now what you're talking about. My sons did that 3 or 4 years ago and they did that based on letters that we got from our relatives in the United States.</p> <p>We said we'd like to see those letters. They brought them out and written under the sender's address on these envelopes in big letters was USA. The owner of the rice field said my sons saw this. They went down, one of them wrote it in a hut. The other said I can do better than that, and he went out into the middle of the field, stacked up rice straw, and burned it in the shape of a USA.</p> <p>We asked if we could speak to his sons and he said absolutely. They were brought out. They were 20 and 17-years-old. They admitted that they had made the symbol. The older son that he had done it by stacking up the rice straw. He was asked if he had written anything else and he said, yes, I made a stick airplane and he drew that for us. And he said he also did a dragon's head in the same area either days before or day after he burned the USA into the rice field.</p> <p>We have pictures of the letters that came from the United States. It turns out most of the villages in Ban Hui Hindon have letters from the United States and all of them have on them in big letters USA. So he says -- the long man said that's where he got the idea for the USA.</p>
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Symbols	Gray 12/04/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: Mr. Gray, I have no reason to doubt what the individual told you. On the other hand, I do not have any reason to believe him either. So let me just ask you a tough question. Was he [given a polygraph test]?</p> <p>Gray: He was not [given a polygraph test].</p>
Symbols	Gray 12/04/92	<p>Vice Chairman Smith: Now do you have proof that he made this?</p> <p>Mr. Gray: Do we have proof that he went out and burned a symbol into the field? We have his word.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: Well see the point I am making -- I am not doubting what you say, I am really not. I am just trying to make a point here that we make these quantum leaps when it relates that is not live Americans. We draw the conclusion the man is telling the truth. He may be, I do not know.</p> <p>But I guess what frustrates me in trying to get to the bottom of the issue...is that when we get live-sighting reports, which are [given polygraph tests] and pass some, we do not believe them. And we do not have any evidence to contradict it in some cases. In many cases we do, but in some cases we do not, and we do not believe those reports.</p> <p>So I mean I guess I get concerned about -- DIA and intelligence people are supposed to be strict and tough on methodology.</p>
Symbols	Santora 10/15/92	<p>...when you're not looking at the original imagery and you're trying to detect something on anything else, any other form or copy of that imagery, then all bets are off on what you might see or might not see.</p>

Symbols	Sheetz 12/04/92	<p>I share the Senator's concern about the need to be as careful as you can given the situation that you are in, to make sure you are collecting accurate information. And I would point out that I was a bit skeptical when I first heard about this and the first thing I asked Warren when he came back was there any indication at all that these kids had been coached or that someone had sort of prepared the war for Warren's entry and had pushed these people out.</p> <p>Because I will admit, we have had experiences in the past in Southeast Asia in investigating cases where witnesses appear to have their story coached. But in this case we did not even know who we were looking for and it was only through happenstance that they were able to track these kids down. And basically they dug the kids out on their own. They weren't pushed out there by a local Lao official saying ha, we found the person who made these symbols.</p>
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Symbols	Shields 06/25/92	<p>Sen. Robb: Let me just go back to the question that I think has troubled the panel... it has to do with the whole question of compartmentalization of information during a critical period and what appeared to be the lack of sharing of information and/or critical questions being directed to those who might have been able to help in that reconciliation process.</p> <p>General Tighe observed during his testimony yesterday that when policy makers in the early 1970's made statements about no Americans being left behind, that the intelligence analysts tended to believe them, despite contradictions with most current intelligence, simply because they felt that the policy makers had access to compartmentalized information not available to them.</p> <p>Shields: Senator, to my knowledge, all of the intelligence agencies, including the NSA, were part of our process. That information was fed in... into the DIA.</p>
Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	<p>...it would be my position... that if information like this was provided to me, I would want to take the position that these symbols should be treated as valid until proven as otherwise. But that is not the position that has been taken here. The position that has been taken here is that these symbols are not valid.</p>
Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	<p>...what do we need this agency for? If we have signals and we are training people to do is, and then when we get the signals but we do not have the capability to determine whether it is a signal, it does not make any sense to me.</p>

Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	<p>[to Andrews] ...But basically, what you are saying here is that the analysis on 52, by your early analysis, is incorrect, or may have been incorrect. Therefore your analysis today very well may also be incorrect. And yet you are taking the emphatic position that you are correct.</p>
Symbols	Smith 09/24/92	<p>if we are talking about negotiating an end to a war and accounting fully for all of our prisoners of war, and we have photographs like that -- if somebody has presented you an analysis of those photographs and they say they are not true, they are not accurate, they are not Caucasian, they are something else or somebody else, fine. But your testimony is not that you got that testimony. Your testimony is that you never saw the photographs, and that very well may be the case. But the point is, it shows there is a communication breakdown somewhere, in terms of information that we had on POWs.</p>
Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	<p>Second, if a pilot were to attempt to communicate by ground signal, letter or whatever means, by using his authenticator number, the U.S. government will be unable to identify the individual if his number happened to be among those numbers DIA can't account for. This could be potentially tragic.</p>
Vessey Cases	Ford 11/15/91	<p>The way we define a discrepancy case is, a case about which the United States Government has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia should have specific knowledge. The term 'discrepancy case' includes not only individuals who were last known alive, but also individuals who we are not certain of their fate, or who were known dead but for whom the Indochinese Government should be able to provide information or remains.</p>

Vessey Cases	Trowbridge 06/24/92	...the 97 who were listed as prisoner that have not subsequently been accounted for. They have made their way into the General Vessey list as priority cases. And those are the cases that are the core of the search efforts that are ongoing right now.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 06/25/92	It was not to mean that we weren't going to investigate the other cases. We were going to investigate all the cases, but these were the priority cases because they appeared to be the cases of those people had the best chance of being alive.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 11/05/91	. . . my approach with the Vietnamese is that we are not trying to reconstruct the past or come up with war crimes trials or any such thing as that. We want to know what happened to our people. First, we want to know, are there any live Americans there? We are not going to ask the question about what you said in the past, that you said there were not any, and now there are. Fine, if there are some, let us have them and we are just going to ignore the past statements. If people have been killed under circumstances that are embarrassing, we are not going to make an issue out of that. What we want to know is where are our people, what happened to them?

Vessey Cases	Vessey 06/25/92	So in early 1989 I asked DIA and JCRC to work together to refine the list and include all cases where the evidence showed that the person involved was alive when he last knew of him and we had evidence that he likely came under Vietnamese control or was captured and for whom we had not yet had an accounting.  I also asked that the border areas be searched for the same sort of cases. And as a result of that effort we added 39 people lost in Vietnam and came up with 49 so-called discrepancy cases in the border area.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 06/25/92	I wanted to be able to confront that assertion that they had held no live prisoners with the sort of glaring examples that led Americans to believe that there may well have live American prisoners held. So at that time, the Defense Intelligence Agency officials gave me a list of about 70 cases... they were the cases for those individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have been able to account readily, some of them were not cases of people we thought had been reported to have died in captivity, but the remains had not been returned and we believed that the Vietnamese government should be able to account for them.  Most of them were in fact people who the U.S. believed we had the evidence to show that they were alive when we last saw them, they were captured or about to become captured.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 11/05/91	The people who are missing are my comrades, as they were comrades of many of the people on this committee.

Watergate	Kerrey 09/22/92	<p>The question today for this committee is how could this have happened? Several witnesses who were appointed policymakers in 1973 have identified Watergate as the culprit. They believe the United States would have forced North Vietnam to abide by the terms of the peace treaty had President Nixon not been weakened and distracted by the scandal of Watergate. Perhaps this is true.</p> <p>It also seems likely to me their attitude towards informing the public, coupled with their obsessive desire and need for secrecy, led to information about our missing being withheld from the American people. While they were trying to keep information about Watergate secret, they were also trying to keep information about our missing in action secret. The faulty judgment which resulted in one tragedy also produced a second.</p>
Watergate	Kerry 09/22/92	<p>It is clear also that paramount among the pressures of that time, when the agreement was signed and implementation began, was the energy and attention- sapping saga of Watergate.</p>
Watergate	Kissinger 09/22/92	<p>Now on the impact of Watergate, I think it is only fair to point out that the opposition to using any kind of military force strongly antedated Watergate. If you read the media of February and March when the Administration was repeatedly saying that it preserved the right to enforce the agreement, we were constantly told that we had no right to enforce a cease-fire. And it was something we always objected to on the ground that under those conditions any time America ends a war and makes a cease-fire, it has, in effect, surrendered because it cannot enforce what it has fought for.</p>

Watergate	Kissinger 09/22/92	<p>...it is quite possible that President Nixon did not have the same strength to resist that pressure as he might have had without Watergate. He never said that to me. I think the position he took, which was that he wanted one more negotiation before considering military operations, was a perfectly reasonable position. I had a somewhat different view, but I had always a somewhat more professorial view and he had a somewhat more understanding of the political situation; that's why he was President.</p>
Watergate	Rodman 09/21/92	<p>I think knowing all the risks that we were heading into as 1973 began, none of us anticipated Watergate and how it would explode and totally wipe out Nixon's political leverage, and I think our analysis was that some of the crucial votes in the Congress that we used to defeat were lost this time and it was probably because of the demoralization of the President's supporters, so this was an unanticipated factor.</p> <p>But I agree with what Winston said earlier, and it's very important. We signed this agreement believing that if we did the right thing we had a good chance to maintain it, and that there was a chance that the South Vietnamese -- that the struggle within Vietnam would turn into some kind of political competition. There was a chance for this agreement to survive, and a lot depended on what we did.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Well, I accept that, and I said earlier, and I'm convinced from all the reading that I have been doing, that Watergate looms far larger in this than I had ever imagined...</p>

Watergate	Secord 09/24/92	What I think happened was we evolved through the Watergate era on this issue, and it just dragged on and on, and it was just kind of pushed off to one side, and it became less important in people's minds. And to our discredit, I think, it kind of left the consciousness of nearly everyone. But I think those of us who knew the truth, or what we thought to be truth, were always bothered by this. I don't know what else I can say.
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Live-Sighting Reports	Trowbridge 06/25/92	<p>Sen. Brown: My understanding is that we have hundreds of statements that are sworn statements, where people have passed a polygraph test, indicating there are Americans being held as POWs... That indicates Americans are being held. Now, how do we reconcile that?</p> <p>Trowbridge: There is information that individuals have indicated that there are prisoners being held. Of that information, we don't have convincing information, or we have none that we have confirmed.</p>
Live-Sighting Reports	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Right now we have, I believe, 40 unresolved reports that talk about Americans living freely in Vietnam. We do not know who they are.
Normalization	Ford 12/01/92	...I happen to believe that it's very much in U.S. interests to normalize our relationship with Vietnam. I spent two years in Vietnam. I have every reason to know that country and the horror of that war, but I think it's something we need to put behind us, both in a political sense and in an emotional sense, and I think economic and whatever. I think it makes a lot of sense to move forward.
Normalization	Griffiths 12/01/92	Once we do that, I think that the United States should move forward just as rapidly as Vietnam acts in the context of the roadmap.

Normalization	Kerry 12/04/92	<p>...if you read what is in Phase Two, let us say you were to do the business piece that involved permitting U.S. firms to sign a contract, but they cannot execute on it, they cannot execute...you are whetting the Vietnamese appetite.</p> <p>But Phase Two specifically says continue the rapid repatriation. Vietnam in phase two is not alleviated of any responsibility. Vietnam specifically is required to continue the rapid repatriation of American remains readily available to Vietnam.</p> <p>Vice Chairman Smith: If they become available after Phase One, true.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: So they must continue the process. We have an expectation of the continuation of remains in Phase Two. The roadmap clearly contemplated it, and it leverages it.</p> <p>Now, let us say a couple of companies move in. Let us say you chose to only let it be certain kinds of companies, whatever. They go in. The Vietnamese start to get excited: Hey, this is working. But you do not get more of those remains. They cannot execute on the contracts. Everybody is going to get angry: Hey, how come you are not able to move forward? Gee, we thought we would be able to make this a real business thing, but where are those remains?</p> <p>All of a sudden you have increased your capacity to get them. You lose no leverage. You increase the leverage. Phase Two contemplates it.</p>
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Normalization	Kerry 12/03/92	<p>Now some of us may feel, just as policy people all over the agencies may feel, that one step or another may serve better to get some of those answers. But none of us feels that we should give up leverage. None of us feels that we should move to an actual commercial product-moving relationship. Every comment that we have suggested in terms of the roadmap suggests that those who have advocated some step are simply saying, we think we can get more information and still maintain leverage.</p>
Normalization	Quinn 12/04/92	<p>...I think it's important to emphasize that we do have a policy in place to deal with Vietnam, the roadmap policy. And it's premised on two underlying pillars. One, that we should speak clearly and authoritatively to the Vietnamese, and so we gave them our policy in writing and we told them that it was approved by the President, by all of the relevant secretaries.</p> <p>Secondly, the roadmap was premised on both parties taking steps, concomitant steps, to address the concerns of the others. That policy, plus the work of General Vessey, General Needham, all of the people from DOD who have been up here, has produced results and I outlined those in my testimony the other day in terms of offices and prisons access, live-sighting investigation, remains that have been returned.</p>

Normalization	Quinn 11/15/91	<p>There was also a charge, a criticism, of our overall policy, particularly the State Department's role in the POW/MIA effort, that we are acting at the behest of commercial interests, that we are rushing to normalize relations with Vietnam.</p> <p>I doubt that those who would charge this have heard from the American businessmen and businesswomen who see me almost every day, and who leave, for the most part, disappointed. I tell them that we will not have the domestic support system necessary for Government or a business to move ahead with Vietnam until we resolve the POW/MIA issue. I add that there is hope for the future, because our policy appears to be working; but the embargo will remain in place until the proof is in.</p> <p>American economic interests have high standing in our foreign policy, but in the case of Vietnam, these interests are weighed against even higher priorities. It is true we are in a rush, a rush to obtain the fullest possible accounting for the 2,271 American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. The uncertainty has gone on far too long. We are doing our best to energize the process and elicit the cooperation we need from the governments in the region.</p> <p>We have had some notable success in the past year, but more must be done. As we get results, we will take the commensurate steps that will help put the past behind us. The response from Vietnam is slow and begrudging. So, too, will be the pace and scope of normalization. At every opportunity, we remind Vietnam of this fundamental reality.</p>
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Normalization	Quinn 12/04/92	<p>...the question now is how to keep it going. I believe the record demonstrates [Vietnamese cooperation] that the philosophy underlying our roadmap -- that when each side is taking steps that we're able to move ahead, but that whenever we stop taking those steps that we run the risk of bringing the whole process to a halt. I think it should be that philosophy which continues to guide us in the future.</p>
Normalization	Quinn 12/04/92	<p>...If I could just say, I think the explanation you gave of how these steps were supposed to work is exactly right and exactly what was in our minds when we laid them out.</p> <p>It was intended that as you took them to increase your leverage and too, as you draw nearer to what in our view is what the Vietnamese want from us, that that would impel them to do all the more that they could to respond to what we want from them.</p>

Normalization	Smith 12/04/92	<p>...I think we lose all of the leverage that we have by moving to Phase Two at this point, and let me explain very simply why.</p> <p>We got the information that we received from Mr. Schweitzer when we indicated to the Vietnamese that we knew that they had it. So they provided it to us. Understandable. Now, if we were to go at this point and accept the premise that they have no more remains and move on to Phase Two or accept the premise that all live-sighting reports are resolved and move to Phase Two, not only is there not an incentive for them to provide them to us; there is a disincentive, because if we move into Phase Two and there is a cache of remains somewhere or a group of Americans somewhere still alive, to bring that information forth would immediately stop the process of the roadmap.</p>
Offers	McCain 09/24/92	<p>Sen. McCain: Let me ask, at any time, did you receive or know whether the Vice President or the President of the United States received information of an offer of Americans for money?</p> <p>Murphy: I doubt very much that could have happened. It's something that he would probably have discussed with me if he had gotten it separate from me. He never did. I can only assume that it never happened.</p>

Offers	Perroots 12/01/92	<p>Perroots: ...let me tell you, they turned into being inquisitions. And when I found that out I took steps to alter it. But I was probably to blame. This was part of the whole atmosphere that we generated to make sure that we were responding to virtually every critic, to make sure that nobody could make the suggestion that we were hiding anything.</p> <p>We trailed that film. It was in Billy Hendon's office that he said he had the names of the people on that film that refused -- it is a two-way street. You have got to have cooperation with the agency responsible for the identification of those people. And there were other inconsistencies in the way the Congressman operated that resulted in our terminating that kind of activity.</p> <p>Sen. McCain: It is worthy of note, Mr. Chairman, and I was going to wait until the hearing tomorrow, that former Congressman Hendon has also refused to cooperate with a committee request concerning our investigation of fraud and fundraising, and I think that is interesting, particularly coming from people who are demanding full disclosure of all other information...</p>
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Offers	Schlatter 12/01/92	<p>Schlatter: ...the episodes that we underwent was that we would be called to come to this member's office, and in support of his legislation he would have some of his colleagues there. And he would say all right, I want you to read this report. Well, we would take the report out and we would read the report. Well, stop right there. Read that again. So we would read this one sentence again. Now, Colonel or mister or whomever he was talking to, what do you make of that report? Well, we would lay out our investigation and our analytic findings.</p> <p>We would then be subjected to considerable degree of criticism for our investigations or our findings. The end result was that we chased ourselves round in circles. The same reports were reviewed time and time again, the same questions asked and the same answers given. At one point, the member ordered an analyst to go stand in the corner after...</p> <p>Sen. McCain: He told an analyst to go stand in the corner?</p> <p>Schlatter: Yes, sir...</p>
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Offers	Vessey 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: You have had the opportunity to raise this issue in the most personal way on behalf of the President of the United States?</p> <p>Vessey: I have.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Have you, in the course of those meetings, confronted the Vietnamese repeatedly with the question of live Americans in their country?</p> <p>Vessey: I have.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: And what have they responded to you each time?</p> <p>Vessey: We hold no live Americans.</p> <p>Chairman Kerry: Has money been offered to them, deals been offered to them?</p> <p>Vessey: No. I have not offered money, but I've made it clear that it is the fundamental basis on which we can move forward in any fashion.</p>
Offers	Vessey 12/04/92	<p>Sen. McCain: Do you believe that would be a good idea to say to the Vietnamese that we will give you a couple of billion dollars if you will give us any live Americans?</p> <p>Vessey: I think it's a bad idea.</p> <p>Sen. McCain: Why do you think that would be a bad idea?</p> <p>Vessey: Well, there are -- there are rules of international warfare. There's the Geneva Accords. And I believe that we should promote civilized behavior among nations and that we all ought to respect the dead, the captured in warfare according to those rules, and that we should expect nations to abide by those rules.</p>

Oral Histories	Bell 12/04/92	<p>Chairman Kerry: ...I want to ask you, in your judgment, on the oral histories, do you think that is sort of a gold mine, so to speak, and something we ought to pursue significantly?</p> <p>Mr. Bell: I think the oral-history program is not only important from the standpoint of the interviews with the individuals for verbal testimony, I think it's also important in that they can identify areas where records are stored or areas where records were stored at one time. And also, a lot of the personnel -- in fact, most of the personnel who participated in the war kept personal diaries, and they retained those as much as possible and they still have those around today.</p>
Oral Histories	DeStatte 12/04/92	<p>I agree that what we have referred to as the oral history program is very important. As a matter of fact, this is something I've been discussing with my counterpart and the people at the museum. Having a record that documents the fate of the missing person is really only one step in the accounting process. The final step should be, wherever possible, to return the prisoner's remains. And to do that, in many cases, it's going to require the help of witnesses, eyewitnesses.</p>
Oral Histories	Schweitzer 12/04/92	<p>220 million Americans and 70 million Vietnamese couldn't do this. And yet Colonel Dai and I got together and these things just started coming out. And it was just so natural and so easy for us. There was nothing to it. But, when you look at it it seems mysterious, and I don't think it is. I just think it was the time and it just happened, and it's going to continue happening. It's just the beginning, and I think all the rest is coming.</p>

Peace Talks	Daschle 09/21/92	<p>Mr. Aldrich, on the 24th of January of 1973 Dr. Kissinger stated at his press conference that there were no secret understandings in the sense of secret commitments. He said that there were statements by each side of its intentions or interpretations of the agreement on which the other side might or might not choose to rely...That is very important public pronouncement, probably equal in consequence, in many respects, to the pronouncement of the President a couple of months later....Dr. Kissinger announced on the 24th that there were no secret agreements, and that was left unchallenged. No one came forth on his staff, in the administration, by the President, to clarify a fundamental mistruth.</p>
Peace Talks - Implementation	Godley 09/24/92	<p>The Symington Amendment was the final blow. That amendment, as I recall it, limited the dollar value of our military expenses in Laos to \$300 million a year. This was to cover ammunition, aircraft sorties, bombs, food, and to pay indigenous personnel.</p> <p>I don't believe that in the history of warfare there has ever been a military commander operating under such budgetary restrictions. We were beaten, not by the men in the field, but by public opinion at home, and were negotiating from a position of abject weakness...</p>
Peace Talks - Implementation	Godley 09/24/92	<p>Any efforts to obtain a full accounting of POW/MIAs were doomed to failure unless the North Vietnamese could see some advantage in acceding to our request.</p>
Peace Talks - Implementation	Grassley 09/22/92	<p>[quoting General Walter's Testimony] "Something like half the prisoners that were known to have been captured alive never came back to France after they reached a deal with the North Vietnamese."</p>

Peace Talks	Haig 09/21/92	...the bombing halted and the negotiations began at a time when Hanoi could see clearly that the Congress, the American people and the American psyche no longer had the stomach to do what it had to do.
Peace Talks	Haig 09/21/92	What I'm saying is be sure you know the constraints that existed, because it's my personal judgment, maybe wrong, maybe naive, that Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon never made a decision that they didn't think (with some probably minor exception) was not dedicated to the proposition that we want to get our prisoners out, all of them, as quickly as possible. And I believe that. So that's my contribution to your deliberation.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/24/92	I enlisted in 1965, was commissioned in 1966, went over in 1968 twice, came back in 1969, and volunteered, volunteered to go over, volunteered to go down to the southern part where we were fighting in the Navy, and went over to win. But I came back in 1969 convinced that what was going to happen in 1975 was going to happen. And the notion of trying to fight a war with these crazy restrictions that we were trying to fight it with just convinced me that you cannot fight a war that way.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/22/92	There is nothing in the record that suggests you asked the Congress of the United States for the right to bomb because they were holding prisoners that they would not give back. Nothing.
Peace Talks	Kerry 09/21/92	I do not want this to be confrontational. It is not meant to be; no member wants it to be. But 20 years later, folks, you know as well as I do that we are here because, for better or worse, the intentions we sought in 1973 have yet to be fulfilled. We do not have a full accounting.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/21/92	<p>...The debate is about what happened in this country in our attempts to get our prisoners back and were families dealt with honestly, were the American people dealt with honestly...We are not here..to rehash the war, to renegotiate the agreement. We want to know what decisions were available to us and how we might have made choices to get them back.</p> <p>Now, you said we did not get a full accounting. All we are trying to do is understand why we were not able to get that full accounting. Was there anything disingenuous in that process of not getting it? Were we lied to? Were families not told the truth? Was it inadvertent, was it simply impossible as a consequence of the circumstances you have described?</p> <p>Now, I have taken up more than my time here, but I would ask you what it was that prevented us, once we knew that did not have a full accounting, from going to the American people and raising their consciousness around that reality? Would people not have coalesced around the notion that they were not getting back Americans who were supposed to come home?</p>
Peace Talks	Kerry 09/22/92	A lot has been said and written about the man the committee will hear from today, but the one thing that has never been said about him is that he was out of the loop.

Peace Talks	Kerry 09/22/92	The pressures on our negotiators during those critical years were real and unavoidable. We had a President elected in 1968 who took office in 1969 on a pledge to end U.S. participation in the war. We had a public hungry for that moment, anxious for the goal to be achieved. And we had a complex set of political and military objectives throughout Indochina that were at risk. We had a very determined and skillful adversary, and we had tantalizing but imperfect information about the number and status of prisoners in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/22/92	[citing Kissinger's memoirs] But what is very clear, we were willing to move heaven and earth to support President Thieu, we were willing to move heaven and earth to enforce the bombing on the violations for infiltration, but we never talked about moving heaven and earth to have that full accounting and never did the American people learn, never did this come to the Congress. And I think it would have been one of the great levers that you had, but it was not there.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger	It did not matter whether we could have added one or another clause to the agreement. The provisions with respect to the missing in action were perfectly plain. They just didn't carry them out.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Most commentators -- I would say all commentators, Congressional or media -- opposed any effort to stand up to Hanoi, arguing that the United States had no right to retaliate at all against the North's blatant violations. ...By the middle of April, Hanoi's violations were overwhelming.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Unfortunately, it was also no secret that these efforts to pin Hanoi down amounted to firing empty cannons. In theory we had three sources of leverage available: bombing the North, offering economic aid to Hanoi and giving military and economic aid to Saigon to deprive Hanoi of the hope of military victory.  The Congress took all three levers away, denying us both the carrot and the stick. When the Congress eliminated our leverage, we were trapped in the classic nightmare of every statesman. We had nothing to back up our tough words, but more tough words.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	...Hanoi sensed our leverage was rapidly eroding. A host of congressional resolutions made it clear that we would have no support for military action.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	It is totally inappropriate for those who prevented any sort of military action to blame those of us who wanted to enforce the agreement because they can find this or that document that gave one or other reason.

Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	Monday-morning quarterbacks can argue that the Paris Peace Accords were not perfect. I agree. To me, the ideal outcome would have been an American victory. But, Mr. Chairman, we had to deal with the war in the specific circumstances we faced.  Even with the perspective of 20 years, I am convinced that in those circumstances, no better agreement was obtainable. For example, just as I was leaving for the final negotiations in January 1973, the House and Senate Democratic caucuses each passed, by very large margins, resolutions calling for legislation to cut off all funds for the war. ...since Congress removed both incentives and penalties for Hanoi's compliance, how exactly would any achievable amendment have changed Hanoi's behavior?
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	The problem with the Paris Accords was not with the words, but with their implementation by North Vietnam. ...the U.S. Congress even more vigorously, and successfully, undercut our ability to enforce those accords.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	We have had many disagreements on policy, and honorable people will differ about this. But on the fate of our prisoners, Mr. Chairman, there can be no division. We had all an equal concern.

Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	There were also numerous Congressional resolutions. Most were Congressional resolutions which were not binding. But whether they passed or not, they were all known to the Vietnamese and weakened our negotiating position. 35 of these resolutions were introduced in 1972 alone.  ...During this period many political leaders, including Senator McGovern and 30 other U.S. Senators, were calling for unconditional, unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam without any formal North Vietnamese commitment or the concurrent or even subsequent return of our MIAs and POWs, or accounting for the missing in action. . . .  At the same time, members of the American peace movement were spreading the word that they had been told by the North Vietnamese that setting a deadline for our withdrawal would create favorable conditions for the subsequent release of American prisoners of war.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	Privately, you see, the problem was they were counting a great deal on our domestic opposition, so they were going extremely slowly in the negotiations.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Oh, it's a fair question, Mr. Chairman, and the answer to it is that this body prevented the enforcement of the agreement. When we spoke of iron-clad guarantees we never thought we were dealing with a bunch of Lord Fauntleroy's whom we could hand a document to. We thought we had the right to enforce the agreement, which was then taken away from us.

Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	From the day we entered office, we had no more consistent goal than the release of the brave Americans held prisoner throughout Indochina and a full accounting of their missing colleagues. The negotiating record makes clear that this matter was insistently raised with the North Vietnamese. There was no issue on which American officials, from the President on down, were more adamant. Yet here we are 20 years later being pilloried in leaks without a shred of evidence, with the unforgivable libel that we knowingly abandoned the very group whose suffering was the biggest single incentive for our exertions.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	The problem with the Paris accords was not with the words, but with their implementation by Vietnam. From the very start, Hanoi began violating the accords. The record shows clearly that while the executive branch tried strenuously to bring pressure on Hanoi, in particular those relating to POWs and MIAs, the U.S. Congress even more vigorously, and successfully, undercut our ability to enforce those accords.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	If the Vietnamese violated these provisions it was not because of any omission by the responsible U.S. officials but because we had been stripped of the weapons we might have used to enforce that commitment.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	We had, in meetings with many groups, said forever that if we got the terms we asked for we would end the war. That we were not pursuing the war and that we were not making these proposals as gimmicks; we meant it.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Despite all these obstacles, strenuous negotiations resulted in a joint communique on June 13th, reaffirming and strengthening all the POW provisions, ...We made no secret of our outrage with Hanoi's violation.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	I therefore cannot accept, Senator Kerry, that information was knowingly kept from the American public. Nobody had a monopoly of anguish in that period. Nobody had any conceivable interest in deceiving the American people.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	In response to my presentations, Le Duc Tho disdainfully read me editorials from the American press and speeches from the Congressional Record.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	[quoting from his 1973 statement] "...as for us at home it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of anguish and that no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight. And now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which would preserve the dignity and self-respect of all parties, together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America."
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	If Saigon collapsed, the residual American force would become hostage. The number of our prisoners would increase exponentially. In the end, we achieved the terms we set out to obtain, and which our critics had repeatedly told us were unattainable. In the process, we dramatically improved the conditions for the return of American forces. We demanded and obtained release of all prisoners.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Only when our leverage was in the process of being dismantled, while the Saigon Government was disintegrating, in the absence of a cease-fire, would we be permitted to talk about our prisoners under conditions of unspeakable chaos.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Nobody ever questioned that the accounting for the missing was unsatisfactory. We raised it at least 60 times during 1973. The only difference is that we did not know of confirmed prisoners. And had we known it, we would have taken the most drastic steps. As I will say in my statement, but it is better clearly understood now, I advocated the resumption of military operations to enforce the agreement starting in the middle of March, 1973.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	...we never accepted that They're all dead, and continued to express our dissatisfaction with Hanoi's failure to account for the MIAs.
Peace Talks	Laird 09/21/92	I knew about the secret negotiations probably as soon as Ambassador Harriman went over there. I was a member of the -- we had, at that time, a smaller committee in the House of Representatives that handled highly classified operations. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Committee, I was informed of those negotiations as they went forward in Paris. And I was kept informed regularly, of course, as Secretary of Defense.

Peace Talks	Lord 09/21/92	I believe the final agreement was the best possible one at the time, given the mood in America and the pressures on the U.S. side. It was a far better deal than almost anyone on the American scene thought possible, and that almost all of Congress and the media and certainly the demonstrators were calling for.  It is unfair, retrospectively, to forget the atmosphere of the times in evaluating the agreement today. It is unfair to examine our maximum positions during the course of the negotiations and complain that they were not all realized in the end. By definition, any agreement had to be a compromise and reflect the realities of both the battlefield and American domestic support.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Moorer 09/24/92	The country was in a state of near anarchy,...
Peace Talks - Implementation	Moorer 09/24/92	...I don't think that any nation has ever fought a war with 500,00 troops and let the capital of the opposing nation have a sanctuary.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Richardson 09/24/92	The question is one of what the public will support, what Congress would support in the circumstances, what the international political costs are of a new use of force. And, indeed, I don't know exactly when the vote taken by Congress was, but it was not long after that Congress specifically prohibited the use of force for this or any other purpose having to do with Vietnam.

Peace Talks	Schlesinger 09/21/92	...but one must assume that we had concluded that the bargaining position of the United States in dealing with Vietnam, North Vietnam, was quite weak, we were anxious to get our troops out, and that we were not going to roil the waters if that could be avoided. That would be my judgement.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Secord 09/24/92	<p>Sen. Brown: But faced with the cutoff of funds, what would you have recommended? What should we have done? What should the Administration have done faced with the cutoff of funds for military alternatives?</p> <p>Secord: If the Congress totally tied our hands with respect to ability to wage another offense, another bombing campaign, then what I alluded to earlier seems to be the only option. That would be to mount an intensive intelligence operation using all of our intelligence community and really putting some dollars behind it.</p>

Peace Talks - Implementation	Richardson 09/24/92	<p>those of us here in Washington and in the Government -- when you and your fellow prisoners of war returned, it was a tremendously, to me, moving and exciting moment. I had the opportunity then to talk with many of you, and it was an indelible experience.</p> <p>And I think that this feeling, very broadly shared, may have had something to do with the whole feeling that peace had been achieved, the prisoners were home, it was over. It had been truly a nightmare.</p> <p>All I can say is that it would have been a very tough call, when the North Vietnamese in effect abrogated the whole agreement by re-invading or invading South Vietnam. Then surely had the political -- had it been politically feasible, bombing and, I think, other military responses should have been initiated.</p>
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