

Colonel, I do have to run to a meeting shortly and Senator Smith will Chair in my absence. I will be back before the end.

Were there some Americans who stayed behind after their service, or after the war, for a period of time?

Mr. TIN. To my knowledge, after the Japanese war, there were several Japanese willingly to stay in Vietnam, two, there is instructor trainer, they train in militaries. And, after the French War, there are some member of the French Communist Party, the deserters, to remain, and especially they are working in the service of propaganda for the enemy rank, and remain. And it is after 1960, they back in France. There are some American also.

But, in this war, I think that there are no American alive remain after 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say no live Americans remained, could there have been some Americans—We have talked and you told me that there were some deserters living in the Saigon area around Tan San Nhat; is that accurate?

Mr. TIN. Yes, because—before 1973, before the Paris Agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the Paris Agreements?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I think about there are several deserters who is around Tan San Nhat air base who has Vietnamese wife there. But not after 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. After 1973, you say they left Vietnam?

Mr. TIN. Yes, they left.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Bob Garwood case, you say there were no Americans living, they left, and yet Bob Garwood was there until 1979?

Mr. TIN. I don't know where is this case specially. But I have some rumor that all of the people in Da Nang know very much the case of Garwood from 1977 to—1977 and 1978.

Mr. REID. I didn't understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. What he said was, he didn't know the case very well, but that he heard rumors that all of the people in Da Nang knew of the existence of Bob Garwood, certainly in the period of 1977 to 1979. Is that fair?

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if you didn't know about Bob Garwood—

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. —why is it not possible that you might not have known about some other Bob Garwood?

Mr. TIN. I think at long time certainly they don't think this secretly, the appearance of American in any—in any place. The contact is a mystery for a short time, for some month only or some—But so long, you see, now it is after about now—18 years after the Paris Agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying is that it is hard to keep a secret, that if there were another Bob Garwood, people would know; is that what you are saying?

Mr. TIN. This is right.

The CHAIRMAN. If you didn't know about Bob Garwood from 1973 until 1979—

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. —could there not have been another Bob Garwood during 1973 to 1979 that you didn't know about? I mean, it is possible; isn't it?

Mr. TIN. I don't think that, because the problem of the POW and MIA in the last 10 years become a very important—important issue. Before, no people is interested in that.

The CHAIRMAN. What if somebody had decided they wanted to stay, I mean, what if they felt their country had left them because they were declared dead in 1973 and they chose to live there and said we don't want you to tell America about us because we don't want to be tried as a deserter or hassled or whatever; could that have happened?

Mr. TIN. I think that is not—It is not true.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. TIN. Not possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that not possible?

Mr. TIN. Because, in Vietnam now the rumors of the foreign, especially an American alive, certainly spread very, very quickly. It don't take secretly.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are saying that an American could not easily live in Vietnam today without everybody knowing it; is that what you are saying?

Mr. TIN. Yes, it is true. Because the communication now is very spread and very quickly. People travel in the country, many—there is many reporter, many newspaper. And if there is a suggestion of one American, a very big noise, a very, very big noise in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me yield to Senator Smith who will Chair now for a period and I will return. I have some more questions.

Senator SMITH [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to yield my time for the moment to Senator Brown because I know that he has to leave in a few minutes. So, Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Colonel, I was hoping that you might share some of your background with us, your education and where you got your commission and your training.

Mr. TIN. Yes. From a childhood, I attend French lycée in Hoa.

Mr. LONG. French college.

Mr. TIN. Yes. In French college, in Hoa. And I have received a baccalaureate in Hoa.

Mr. LONG. That's a high school degree.

Mr. TIN. A high school degree. And, after that, I enter in the army immediately after the Japanese coup—

Mr. LONG. The Japanese special coup that took over from the French.

Mr. TIN. The French. In March 1945. And after I attend Viet Minh organization. It's a secret organization of Viet Minh for the independence. And after I attend, the August is the revolution. And I enter in the army, in the People's Army, in September of 1945.

And, after that, I was in the army until—until 1982. I moved to the Nhan Dan newspaper, daily.

Senator BROWN. You grew up in the Hoa Phu Binh area?

Mr. TIN. I grew up in Hoa, and after in Hanoi.

Senator BROWN. And you went to high school, you got a high school degree in Hoa?

Mr. TIN. Yes, high school degree.

Senator BROWN. You mentioned that there were some French that stayed behind after Dien Bien Phu.

Mr. TIN. Yes. Yes. Some French remain after Dien Bien Phu.

Senator BROWN. Were any of them held against their will that you know of?

Mr. TIN. None.

Senator BROWN. So the only ones that you know of—

Mr. TIN. I think one, yes, on the agreement, it said for volunteer.

Senator BROWN. Basically Marxist who were there for philosophical reasons.

Mr. TIN. Yes, from political reason.

Senator BROWN. I noticed you were in the military—

Mr. TIN. Excuse me. Most of them have adopted the name—the surname of Ho Chi Minh. For example, the case of Ho Chi Phan, Ho Chi. He is originally German, originally. But he adopted the new name of Ho Chi Minh.

Senator BROWN. The background that we have seen on you indicates that you were an officer in the army that went into Cambodia.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. In that period, do you remember hearing anything about American POW's, Americans in Cambodia or Laos?

Mr. TIN. I enter in Cambodia just the 7 of January 1979, and so on the first day, I am in the royal palace at noon of this day. And I never—and I remained there more than 3 years, more than 3 years. And I realized that any, any news of any American prisoner who are in Cambodia.

Senator BROWN. The article I read on you also indicated that you were involved in planning for the movement of troops from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1964. Can you tell us anything about that?

Mr. TIN. Yes. This is after the assassination of President Kennedy, and after the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, I am sending to the South to—a special team to investigate on the spot on how the situation had changed in that time, and to plan the enter of great military units from the North to the South. I have men in the streets for more than 1 year in the highlands, in the provinces of Ban Teung, Quang Nghe, and many other provinces.

Senator BROWN. So you personally went to the South to help plan—

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator BROWN. No.

Mr. TIN. It is a team, a team. A team of about more than 10 Colonels, of high ranking Colonels.

Senator BROWN. Of the troops that went to the South, what route did they take?

Mr. TIN. I have all of these—Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Senator BROWN. In Laos?

Mr. TIN. Yes. We go by car from Hanoi to Vinh Linh, to nearby demilitarized zone, demilitarized zone, on April 17, and after that

by walking, and walking about 1 month, arrive at the Highlands. And after I have two through the—Route 1.

Senator BROWN. This period, 1964, 1965, and 1966 was when I had a chance to visit your old home area in the northern part of South Vietnam, the Da Nang area or the area we called I Corp. At that time many in the U.S. were convinced that no troops, no personnel from the north ever moved to the South.

Mr. TIN. I always say that Vietnamese soldiers has fighting on our own soil.

Senator BROWN. On the prisoners that might have been captured by Vietnamese troops located in Cambodia or Laos or South Vietnam, was there a policy that they be brought to Hanoi, or were they held at various spots?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I think that on Laos—on Laos, they consider that there are many of American plane that was shoot down, hit on the sky of Vietnam, but many parachute on Laos. You see?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Mr. TIN. They hit on the sky of Vietnam and after they parachute in Laos. In that case, the Laos would render those pilots to Vietnam side. I think that is some case in Xam Nua and in some province from nearby Vietnam.

Senator BROWN. So the policy was to bring them to Hanoi?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Not leave them in Laos?

Mr. TIN. No, no.

Senator BROWN. The reports we have, then, of detention camps, prison camps in Laos, I assume they must have been temporary?

Mr. TIN. I don't hear about that. But I think that is temporary, I think this is. Because if they hit the—the plane was hit in Vietnam, a good chance that he has parachuted in Laos, the Lao ran this to Vietnam.

Mr. REID. What about one that is hit over Laos; where did they stay?

Senator BROWN. The pilots or navigators that might have come down in Laos, would they have been returned to Hanoi as well?

Mr. TIN. I think that, no. It is according to the Laos—belong to the Laos.

Senator BROWN. They may have stayed in Laos?

Mr. TIN. Yes, that's right.

Senator BROWN. You mentioned the publicity or the awareness of the POW issue in this last decade in Vietnam.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Is there an awareness of the reward that is offered for returning live POW's? Have you heard of that?

Mr. TIN. No. It is not they mention—they don't mention the figure of reward. And there are many speculation about one millions of dollars each case. But we don't mention any figure on the mass media. So I propose that should be made public, the reward for each case. It is encourage people to be in search of this case.

Senator BROWN. Colonel, we all very much appreciate your coming to testify today.

Mr. TIN. Thank you.

Senator BROWN. The years since the war have been ones that have been difficult for Americans. But we are enriched with many Vietnamese who came as refugees to this country.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator BROWN. They are some of our brightest and hardest working citizens. We are glad you have come. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Brown. I am going to take a 2-minute recess here while the stenographers change over.

[Recess]

Senator SMITH. We will reconvene here. Colonel Tin, excuse me for the interruption.

Senator Kassebaum, you are next.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Tin, I think Senator McCain emphasized again the important parts of your testimony, where you commented on what steps you would like to see the Vietnamese Government take to allow access, really free access everywhere.

I would like to just ask you how forthcoming do you believe the Vietnamese Government would be today to the suggestion you have made and that Senator McCain had reiterated would be quite an enormous step forward?

Mr. TIN. I think that they are in the situation when they are more or less pushed into the—to cooperate with us.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So you believe that they would be forthcoming in allowing unimpeded access to files?

Mr. TIN. I think that now there are new leaders. They're not being sort of tied down by old errors and that they are looking for help from the different agencies of the American Government. So I think they would have a more cooperating attitude.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You had great knowledge, of course, of the documents and the archives, and you made, I thought, an interesting comment about how the discipline was very high and, therefore, very accurate records were kept. Is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Yes, they're very disciplined.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I wonder if you could comment at this point on what condition these records are in now in the archives, and when was the last time that you saw them?

Mr. TIN. These archives are very well kept by the Defense Department.

Senator KASSEBAUM. These records are all very much intact?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. From the various camps, are they all part of a central system of records?

Mr. TIN. I think that after the camps are being dissolved and no more camps, most of these—all of these documents are being sent to the Center for Enemy Propaganda. That although they don't have computers, they are being very well kept in files.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. You mentioned in your testimony that as far as Cambodia and Laos, you do not know the situation there. I just would like to ask you as someone who was very involved in the negotiations regarding the prisoners—in the book, *Kiss the Boys Goodbye*, you were mentioned there—insisting in this account that the United States must deal for prisoners held in

Laos with the Pathet Lao. And that, "We clearly reiterate our position that the question of persons captured in Laos is within the sovereign power of Laos and beyond the competence of the four-part Joint Military Commission."

Then it goes on to say, "Despite evidence to the contrary, Secretary Kissinger said he had been told there were no POW's in Cambodia." I guess, Colonel Bui Tin, what I would like to ask you is, as someone who was very involved at that point, and a former member of the government, what do you believe is the level of influence today of the Vietnamese Government on the Lao/Cambodian Governments?

Is there an opportunity to explore further with them what the situation is? Because obviously this is where it seems to me there has been a real bottleneck as well and we have been unable to in any way establish the same relationship as we have with the Vietnamese Government.

Mr. TIN. Some time ago it's easier for the Vietnamese to talk to these two governments. As in Cambodia, we have a whole system of experts overseeing most of the—all of the ministries and the agencies. For the last 4 years, they have all withdrawn. In Laos, the army has withdrawn a long time ago, and recently all the experts are gone, too. They have followed a very different path from the Vietnamese.

However, in Cambodia the Hun Sen Government is still very sympathetic to the Vietnamese Government. However, at this time, it is very true that they are very independent of the Vietnamese. Recently they even changed the name of the party and they say nothing any more about socialism. And the influence of Hanoi over Phnom Penh is day by day lessened.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess Colonel, you are saying that at this juncture you would believe the Vietnamese Government does not have much leverage either with the Lao or Cambodian Governments to be more forthcoming, regarding the prisoner war missing in action issue.

Mr. TIN. It is true.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator SMITH. Senator Reid.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You talked about the pilots that were shot down over the skies of Vietnam, but the pilots would bail out in Laos. They would be taken to Hanoi. Is that right?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. Prisoners that were shot down over the skies of Laos and parachuted or crashed-landed into Laos and were still alive, did they stay in Laos?

Mr. TIN. I am not very sure about that.

Senator REID. The reason that I asked the question is, one of the real accounting problems we have is that we have a large number of pilots shot down over Laos that we cannot account for.

Mr. TIN. I think one of the very hard cores is, as I mentioned about this helicopter that was brought down and there were people Russian in there who have never been found, because the forest is very, very dense. In 50 meters, you hardly can see each other.

Senator REID. When did you leave Vietnam?

Mr. TIN. Last year in September.

Senator REID. In your statement that you gave, you indicate that the local unit or chief officer must send a report of every captured prisoner to the center every day and the total every week and every month to the Center for Propaganda for Enemy belonging to the Defense Organization. In short, you have said that for every prisoner of war, there were very complex, detailed records kept for each prisoner.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. Whether he was sick, how much food they ate.

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. Those records, I would assume, are still someplace in Vietnam. Is that right?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I think that.

Senator REID. Where would they be?

Mr. TIN. In the Defense Ministry, in the—Department for Political Affairs and in the special department in charge of the prisoners of war and also on different province, because they have draft, and now they have written out, each province, their own history.

Senator REID. Yes. So in addition to the records kept on the individual prisoners after the conflict was over, the different provinces were ordered to prepare a history. So we have the history, plus the individual record of person that was captured. Is that true?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator REID. So those should be available someplace.

I know that your statement is that you want us to try to get things moving along as quickly as possible, but General Vessey said that he was told that a lot of these records had been eaten by termites.

Mr. TIN. I think that at least the people will still remember, because each prisoner is a historical event in the mind of the people.

Senator REID. But what I wanted are the written records, and does he think that they have been eaten by termites?

Mr. TIN. It's possible, in certain places.

Senator REID. How would you define your responsibilities after you got out of the army? You ran a newspaper, is that right?

Mr. TIN. I'm a deputy editor of the party's newspaper.

Senator REID. Would it be fair to state, using an overworked term, that you were a propagandist for the party?

Mr. TIN. All the party's newspaper are obviously considered as a propaganda organ.

Senator REID. I have no further questions.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, if I may just ask a question regarding Senator Reid's asking about the condition of the records. I am sorry. I thought I understood—and I asked about the condition of those records—that you stated they were in good condition. Did I not hear that?

Mr. TIN. I think at least in the Defense Ministry it should be, while in the provinces at the different localities, nobody can say what are their conditions. I know that they are very serious of keeping records so they can write the provincial history.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I guess, to follow on for just a moment, I thought also you had said those provincial—the records from the

provinces and the camps as they were closed had gone into the central archives.

Mr. TIN. In the provinces it is not very sure that all are being sent.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I see.

Mr. TIN. In the camps, yes, but in the provinces, no.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Senator MCCAIN. Just a follow up to that, Colonel. In other words, all records are not centralized at the Ministry of Defense?

Mr. TIN. I think that each camp has to return the documents to the initiating agency, for example. Oh—I'm sorry. The camp must return the localities where the prisoner has been held, to return these houses, physical facilities, to the old agency that they took over to turn into a prisoner camp. Then the documents concerning the prisoner of wars were being sent to the Enemy Propaganda Center, because they are conscious that the issue of American prisoners of war are very important issues.

Senator MCCAIN. Let me make a stab at it, can I, Mr. Chairman?

There are records that were kept in Hanoi which are very accurate and, you believe, undamaged. Is that true?

Mr. TIN. That's very possible.

Senator MCCAIN. There are other records which, for one reason or another, were kept in the provinces, which you cannot assure the Committee are in good condition?

Mr. TIN. Even in the provinces, sometime there's 1 or 2, or maybe 10 prisoners, and these are being very—considered important issues, so it's possible that they still keep certain documents.

Senator MCCAIN. But you believe that there is a great deal of evidence and records that are kept in Hanoi and in the provinces that can help us resolve this issue?

Mr. TIN. Yes, certainly.

Senator SMITH. Colonel, if there was one person today in Vietnam who could give us the most information on the records that you speak of, who would it be?

Mr. TIN. Two translators, interpreters from the Center for Enemy Propaganda, and Mr. Nguyen Minh Y, presently of the rank of Major. Mr. Y knows Senator McCain very well. Mr. McCain while in the camp has a Vietnamese name, Mr. Cai. Each American prisoner of war has a Vietnamese name. The second person is Mr. Dung, who is also an interpreter. He is no longer in the army. He is working at the Ho Chi Minh City in the foreign affairs.

Senator SMITH. Thank you. Senator Grassley, I will turn to you in just a moment. I had not had a round here, so I want to just ask a few questions.

In your statement, Colonel, you indicated that you are now regarded as a traitor by your government—former government.

Mr. TIN. Yes. By the government, but many people in the government do not regard me as such.

Senator SMITH. Do you consider yourself a defector?

Mr. TIN. No. Very few people think that way too, with me.

Senator SMITH. You were a hero in Vietnam, 37 years in the army. You led the tanks into Saigon. What about your family? What has happened to your family now in Vietnam? Where are

they? I mean, you do not have to tell me if it is a secret, but are they safe?

Mr. TIN. It is very, very harassed. My wife has in many times asked to come and questioned whether she received any letter from me. And she is still a party member, and the party has given her an order that she and all the children should not have any communication by letters with me.

My daughter is a doctor, and ophthalmologist in the central medical center. She is 34 years of age this year. She is in a surgical ophthalmology center. She has been fired. Now she is selling glasses in the hospital.

My son-in-law has received a grant from the Harvard School, Harvard University, but is not allowed to exit the country. All my friends have been—have been received—ordered not to write to me.

Senator SMITH. Just one follow-up question on that point and I will move to another subject. Your family is being housed by the government—are they being housed by the Vietnamese Government?

Mr. TIN. It's a rented house that we rented from the government.

Senator SMITH. Colonel, I would like to go back to a couple of the areas that Senator McCain touched on, regarding your statement about interrogation of POW's by the Soviets. I am not asking you to list names. Please do not if you know, but we will get that later. But do you know first-hand, or second-hand knowledge names of American POW's who were interrogated by the Soviets? Do not mention the names if you know them.

Mr. TIN. I don't know. I only know those who have knowledge of electronics.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me?

Mr. TIN. Electronics. The prisoners of war who had an expertise in electronics would be interrogated by the Russians.

Senator SMITH. Do you know first-hand—do you have first-hand knowledge or hearsay knowledge of names of those American POW's who were interrogated by the Russians?

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator SMITH. None at all?

Mr. TIN. None at all.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any idea when they were interrogated?

Mr. TIN. I think it's about December 1972, concerning the B-52.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever speak directly to those POW's after they were interrogated by the Soviets?

Mr. TIN. No.

Senator SMITH. Do you know where we might get the names? Again, you do not have to mention the name if, in fact, there is some reason for not doing it. You can give it to us in executive session. But do you know the name of any individual or individuals in Vietnam today who would know the names of the American POW's who were interrogated by the Soviets?

Mr. TIN. Possibly in the defense intelligence section.

Senator SMITH. During the war, when a prisoner was captured by either the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao, can you describe for me the relationship between the two of you in terms of that prisoner? Say the Pathet Lao took a prisoner; you wanted that pris-

oner to be sent back to Hanoi. Was that done willingly by the Pathet Lao, or did you have to extract the prisoner?

Mr. TIN. The army in Laos is very disciplined. They would do that, and friendship between the two nations are good. And they are willing to send them back.

Senator SMITH. At about the time of the peace accords, you stated and it was quoted in some papers: "We are insisting that the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of prisoners take place to no relation to the POW's held by the Pathet Lao, said Bui Tin, chief spokesman for the North Vietnamese delegation." That was during the time, 1973, at the time that the accords were being signed. When you said no relation to the POW's held by the Pathet Lao, when you made that statement, did you have direct knowledge of POW's held by the Pathet Lao?

Mr. TIN. I had no knowledge at that time of any POW's in Laos. It is according to the idea of General Le Wan Hoa who asked me to prepare such a statement. I was answering the questions.

Senator SMITH. So General Hoa instructed you to make that statement?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I will yield at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Colonel, again, could you maybe come close to the microphone. When did you go to Paris to be part of the discussions?

Mr. TIN. Was that the discussion during the Paris conference? I have been never in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. So, in 1973, I am sorry, I thought there was a period there you were. Only at the Camp David talks?

Mr. TIN. Yes. David Camp.

The CHAIRMAN. So that was the only period you were in discussions.

Mr. TIN. I was at Tan San Nhut.

The CHAIRMAN. But in 1973, you were a combatant in the south, correct?

Mr. TIN. I come to Tan San Nhut from Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year?

Mr. TIN. Immediately after the signing of the Paris accords.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1973?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. He was part of the team involved in the exchange of POW's and the North Vietnamese came to Tan San Nhut.

The CHAIRMAN. For what period of time were you in Hanoi prior to that, before you came down to Tan San Nhut?

Mr. TIN. All of 1972 I was in Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. All of 1972?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And part of 1973?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And after going to Tan San Nhut, did you return to Hanoi?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So there was a continuum of your presence in Hanoi, during that period?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is the period you say you had access to the records and the record keeping about POW's. Is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, during that period of time after the signing of the accords, the bombing of Cambodia continued and the flights over Laos continued. Correct? And what happened to the people who were shot down during that period of time?

Mr. TIN. I have not heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know if anyone was lost?

Mr. TIN. I only know about the activities of the American air force through Newsweek and other newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. But there was a secret war that continued after the 1973 signing of the accords. Correct?

Mr. TIN. I know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not any American prisoners were taken during that secret war?

Mr. TIN. I never heard of anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. You never heard about it?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean that you do not know, or does that mean you never had occasion to see anything? Can you be more explicit?

Mr. TIN. I have not seen, nor have I known.

The CHAIRMAN. During the war, the Soviets had some people in Laos. Is that correct?

Mr. TIN. Would you repeat?

The CHAIRMAN. During the war, 1971, 1970, 1969, 1972, the Soviets had some people in Laos, did they not?

Mr. TIN. Yes. A number of experts. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There were prisoner of war camps in Laos, were there not?

Mr. TIN. Not after 1973. I don't know if there was anything after 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to 1973, regular forces of the People's Army of Vietnam were in Laos. Correct?

Mr. TIN. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Those forces of the People's Army of Vietnam controlled the camps in Laos, did they not?

Mr. TIN. I don't think so and most of the work they did is to build roads in northern Laos and along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point I am getting at is that the Soviet personnel who were in Laos conducted some interrogation of people who were captured in Laos, did they not?

Mr. TIN. I have not heard such a story.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible that they did? Is it possible that the Soviet special personnel were involved in interrogating some of the electronic surveillance flights that were shot down?

Mr. TIN. I'm not very sure, but it's possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What happened to those Americans captured in Laos who were turned over to the People's Army in Laos?

Mr. TIN. I don't think so. If they did they would have bring them directly to Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were the instructions within the military?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I believe those are the instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there documents that show those orders and those instructions?

Mr. TIN. I understand there is, but I don't know where there is any instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, are there written documents of these orders?

Mr. TIN. No. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. TIN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be any records that you know are available in Vietnam now that would indicate the standing orders?

Mr. TIN. It's possible they exist in the archives, but it's not directly to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. So you do not know. You have not seen them, you cannot say where they are, or even if they exist?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. TIN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard of the—or are you familiar with what is known as the 101st International Liaison Group that captured people in Laos?

Mr. TIN. No. Whose group is that, belong to who?

The CHAIRMAN. The 101st International Liaison Group.

Mr. TIN. I have heard very vaguely of that. There is some kind of a organization, but I'm not very sure of such news.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you hear of it?

Mr. TIN. Recently, about 4 or 5 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. And what did you hear about it?

Mr. TIN. A number of so-called heroes who wants to go Thailand, from Thailand to go into Laos and try to organize a search to make themselves known, that is what I heard about it.

I'm not sure that these are very reliable stories.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand what that was, heroes?

Mr. TIN. Rambos, if you will, Rambos. That's another translation. The direct translation is people who want to call themselves heroes, who want to go from Thailand into Laos to make themselves a big name.

The CHAIRMAN. To do what?

Mr. TIN. To search for the missing in action.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have a Vietnamese translation for Rambo?

Mr. LONG. Not yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Sylvester Stallone will be very upset to hear that. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Coming back to the issue of Bob Garwood and the possibility of others being there in 1975 when the government of the south fell. You were in Saigon, correct?

Mr. TIN. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. There was considerable disorganization nationally, is that not right?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And there were not really good communications in all parts of the country. Is that accurate?

Mr. TIN. Is it between North and South Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, between all of the provinces and the central government.

Mr. TIN. I think it was only a few weeks, but after that it's all reestablished.

The CHAIRMAN. It was reestablished?

Mr. TIN. We can even telephone from the central government to the district government.

The CHAIRMAN. Now when I was in Vietnam recently and talked with the General Secretary and the Foreign Minister, they indicated that after the government fell in the south there were some foreigners still there who were placed in camps, who were held. I think foreign journalists, perhaps some other foreigners.

Mr. TIN. I understand there are some foreign people, but I don't think they were placed in camps. I don't believe they are in prisoners' camps. There was a French general who has been sent out of the country. He has been extradited, but he has never been arrested. A number of American journalists. I met quite a number of camera people and American journalists. A few, a short time later they leave Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is in fact what was indicated to me, that they subsequently left. But the question is could there have been any Americans who chose to live there at that point in time?

Mr. TIN. I have no news from them and I don't believe they are. I am a reporter and I'm very inquisitive, very curious to go into the new provinces to look for news, to find intelligence. And I never heard of those Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you immediately travel to any of the provinces after the fall of the government?

Mr. TIN. Yes. I went to Metok and Hatchien and Chodel and Tienin, all over the provinces.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never heard anything of any American who was being held anywhere?

Mr. TIN. No. I never heard of any news at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley?

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask any questions. I would like to just make a couple of statements.

They are kind of repetitive of something I have said before. For the benefit of the Colonel, I am not going to argue with him whether or not there are any Americans or other POW's in Vietnam.

I just would like to tell him that the purpose of this Committee is that there are a great number of people in this country who feel that there may be. This Committee is formulated for the purpose of finding out what our Government knows before we worry about what the Vietnamese government knows or does not know or the extent to which they are cooperating with us.

But for the benefit of the Vietnamese government and also for the benefit of the Colonel, I would suggest that if the Vietnamese government might be in a position of governments generally, that when they make a statement they find it difficult to deny it or back out of it.

I want to assure the Vietnamese government, I want to assure the Colonel that as far as I am concerned I would be one who if there is an American POW who comes out of Vietnam, to say that this is a very beneficial step toward normalization of relations. I, for one, would not as a Senator chastise or punish the Vietnamese government because of their willingness to help bring people out even though for a long period of time they have said that there are none there.

So that would bring me to the point of the existence of this Committee. I do not presume that people in Hanoi believe that this Committee was set up for the purpose of bringing charges or complaints against the Vietnamese government. If it were, I want to allay any suspicion they might have and say that this Committee was set up because under our system of government we have people who believe that our Government has not pursued this the way that they should. I am skeptical about that myself, but not accusatory. This is our effort to further our public's right to know and to get this information out. It is not to be punitive in any way or to build a case against the Vietnamese government.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a valuable statement. We appreciate it. Are there any further questions?

Mr. TIN. I have a statement that is exactly the meaning of my coming here.

The new leadership in Vietnam are not being tied down by the past. They have the opportunity to cooperate completely and fully with America. My recommendation to your commission are in that direction. Whatever the suspicion, we should lay it on the table. For example, refugees who come here have seen, who declare have seen so many people, who have seen a number of hundreds of remains. Let them go home back and show the places, point out the places.

And those of the live sightings, we should bring it out on the open table and exchange. That is the only way and the truth is always difficult.

The Vietnamese proverb says that even a needle that is very small, by the end it will come out. So that in the quest for truth there needs to be cooperation. That was my spirit.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I think Senator Smith has a few more questions.

Senator SMITH. You have been very patient and we appreciate it. We are about ready to end this.

Just a couple of questions kind of scattered around here. We had some information in the late 1960's that there may have been a couple of deserters in the Danang area that did not come back. Do you know anything about deserters in Danang in 1968 or 1969 or in that period of time?

Mr. TIN. I have come to Danang many times, and also Hue, that was my native province. I never heard of such news. If there were, in the case of one live American, the people of Danang, the rumor would be all over the place and the whole country would know about it, especially for the last 5, 6 years, the question of a live American in Vietnam has been such an issue among the boat people who left. Before they left they would like to look around and see if there was anything they could bring out. And people who

want a visa into this country would like to look around and find something. And the inquisitive troops belonging to the newspaper, he calls it an army of newspapermen, are very inquisitive about this incident.

And so many of the foreign reporters who came into the country and has been criss-crossing the place, French, Japanese, Americans, they all come to Hanoi and they met me. They also are very inquisitive. They want to see and hear. And we have not found any news.

Senator SMITH. You, in your statement, you said there are absolutely no live Americans in Vietnam.

Mr. TIN. In my knowledge, yes.

Senator SMITH. Absolute, but to the best of your knowledge, there are none?

Mr. TIN. Because I am very curious. I am a journalist and cover the program more than 30 years.

Mr. LONG. I am repeating. I am not translating.

Senator SMITH. Regarding, again, and if you have an answer to this question, I would prefer that—well, let me ask it this way.

Do you know, and if you do know, do not mention the name at this time, do you know who in Vietnam today would know if any American POW went to the Soviet Union?

Mr. TIN. Certainly.

Senator SMITH. You know who would know?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Would you be willing to provide that to the Committee?

Mr. TIN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Do you know anybody in the Soviet Union who would know?

Mr. TIN. In 1977, I was part of the delegation, a military delegation, headed by General Giap and we went to Moscow. That was the first group after the victory. I have talked to many generals and colonels. Their general feeling was that they were happy that we had been victorious.

However, but most of their advice to the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese never followed. That was April 1977.

In May 1977, I also went to Beijing for the same military delegation headed by General Giap. The generals, the Russian generals and Soviet generals and Chinese had the same opinion that the Vietnamese never followed their advice, always had a very independent attitude.

That means that the Vietnamese never followed exactly the recommendations from the Soviets and from the Chinese. For example, the military delegation from China to Vietnam always advised that we should never use battalion in Vietnam in the war because if we did the American fire power would destroy us. And the Soviet generals always tell us that it is very difficult for us to try to equal our fire power with the Americans. Never think of a general offensive militarily. You should think about diplomatic relationship discussions.

I brought this up to show that the Vietnamese are very sensible to independence. The Vietnamese have their own attitude. They are not following the Soviet or the Chinese. The only thing is to

receive arms and munitions and not allowing the desire or the opinion of the other countries to influence them.

Senator SMITH. Colonel, two final quick questions.

To the best of your knowledge, either directly or indirectly, do the Vietnamese have a mortuary of American remains in Vietnam?

Mr. TIN. I don't believe so.

My friend, Mr. Nguyen Tuc Hai, he died, he was a classmate. He was the director of the Center for Enemy Propaganda. We studied together in Hue for 7 years. He is directly responsible for this issue. He died 3 years ago because of a liver ailment.

He always said to me that as soon as we have about 10 or 12 remains, we would pass it on right away to the Americans because the Americans also were having pressure on that. Then we have to send people out to collect the remains.

Senator SMITH. A last question. In the so-called discrepancy cases that General Vessey is now talking to the Vietnamese about, those cases in some cases are about missing American servicemen who had been captured and filmed, interrogated, all of these things on the record.

Yet, we still do not know, the Vietnamese tell us they do not know what happened to them, given your knowledge and testimony today about the sophisticated records that they have, how do you explain the fact that the Vietnamese could not tell us what happened to a man who had been captured, filmed, interrogated, seen by other POW's, how could they not know what happened to him?

Mr. TIN. I suggest that these kinds of cases we should leave it, put it on the table with the new Defense Minister, with the new General Staff and the Politburo and all this evidence should be publicly shown to them. Then they must surely come to certain results.

Senator SMITH. Well, they do not. They have not.

Mr. TIN. To find out up to what stage of resolution these issues has been solved.

Senator SMITH. I yield, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask, real quickly, two questions? One, Colonel Bui Tin, how do you explain the fact that a very significant percentage of prisoners who were shot down over Vietnam were returned, yet there were very few who were shot down over Laos who were returned?

Mr. TIN. I have heard—I have been thinking about this issue. The Laotian soldiers is very kind, because they are Buddhists, except those from the Meo Hmong tribe. I think that they do not have any wicked attitude toward the prisoners. I think the real cause are the Lao forests, the tropical forests.

Senator McCAIN. Colonel Tin, finally, obviously the Vietnamese placed great value on the prisoners of war, and it was in their interest to keep them alive. What value, what use did the Vietnamese Government want to make of the prisoners of war?

Mr. TIN. I have been witnessing the policy, the humanitarian policy in the camp toward the prisoners. We have direct instructions from the late President Ho Chi Minh to give them higher rat-

tions than the troops because they have been exposed to a better standard of living.

Senator McCAIN. Not to interrupt, but what reason? Was it to use as a negotiating chip at the bargaining table? Was it to use for publicity purposes to help win the war, or what other reason?

Mr. TIN. I have no feeling and no thinking that they are using the prisoners of war for political reasons. I don't believe they have held the remains for negotiation or for bargaining.

I understand that some of the leadership is very stupid and very low educational level, but they have enough intelligence and wisdom not to use this remains as bargaining chips, and they believe—they know, they understand that this is one of the priorities of Americans in the negotiations.

Maybe down at the district level, perhaps those people at the lower levels say, we have 200,000 missing in action, why do we have to worry about a few Americans? These are at the very low level.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an important issue. What you're saying is that in the general population in Vietnam there is not as much support to look for or find the remains. Can you be more explicit?

Mr. TIN. These people do not believe in this kind of reward because it doesn't come from the Government. This says, \$2,400,000 reward for American prisoners of war delivered by the International Red Cross.

People only believe in this when they have the mass media communication by the Government, so that if the Government communicates that there is a reward for a certain limited period of time, then it is possible that the militia who has buried those remains, they may try to go and bring them up. These kinds of cards, these kinds of communication, only force people to go and dig up the tombs of hundreds of people in certain cemeteries.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Just a personal question. Where were you in 1968 and 1969?

Mr. TIN. I was in Quang Tri Province.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'm relieved to know that.

Colonel, thank you very much for taking the time to be here with us. I know you delayed your trip back to France in order to be here today.

I don't know if you would like to spend a minute, but some of the team from Vietnam is here. Mr. Bill Bell is here, and he might want to have a minute or two to talk to you a little bit, so if you could spend some time with them, I think that would be very, very helpful.

We thank you for your testimony. The Committee will take a recess until the hour of 2 p.m., at which time we will hear from the authors of two books and then move into some of the photograph testimony later this afternoon.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman, are we going to finish these panels today?

The CHAIRMAN. We will finish these panels today. We are going to try to move a little more rapidly if we can this afternoon. We will commence at 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. There's a great deal to try to cover, so we want to try to move right into it as rapidly as we can. I would like to ask both of you if you would stand so I can swear you before you get too comfortable.

[Witnesses sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Our witnesses are Monika Jensen-Stevenson, who is the author of the book, *Kiss The Boys Goodbye*, and Nigel Cawthorne, who is the author of the book, *The Bamboo Cage*. Both have obviously spent time researching this issue, and we welcome your testimony this afternoon, thank you. Ms. Stevenson, why do you not start off?

STATEMENT OF MONIKA JENSEN-STEVENSON, AUTHOR

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It's a great honor to appear before this distinguished group of Senators. I know that many of the Senators on this Committee have worked long and hard to finally bring to justice an issue that has so strongly affected our country and has for so long been neglected. I was told that I only had 5 minutes so I'm going to make this very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we have given anybody less than 7, and I don't want anybody to be an exception to this rule. I'm happy to give you the 7. The reason we're trying to hold the openings down is not to exclude the testimony, because we're going to put the full testimony in the record. It is really to allow more time for questions and more time to be able to talk, and obviously if there is something you want to say—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is what I was going to say. I hope you will feel free to ask me any questions and ask tough questions if you want.

I came here at my own expense here today because I and my husband have spent the last 6 years of our lives researching and writing a book about the subject you will address. The conclusions we drew were ones that I would have thought inconceivable 10 years ago.

I am here because the response to the book has made it overwhelmingly clear that the many people who concern themselves with this issue need desperately to have one segment of the U.S. Government champion their right to know the truth about what happened to American soldiers who were taken prisoner in a war that everyone wanted to forget about as soon as it was over.

This issue, as we see it, is about trust between citizens and their Government on that most important contract when soldiers risk their lives for their country and the country promises certain protections in return. Sadly, in my view, that trust has been badly abused by the Government agencies who have controlled the POW issue.

When I began this story for 60 Minutes program, I was an experienced reporter. I was not naive. I felt that almost nothing would shock me, but I was shocked to find that my Government, which I believed had a common objective with the families of the missing

and veterans, was deliberately lying and putting an incomprehensible resistance to the people whom they were most obligated by moral, legal, and constitutional mandate to protect.

We found, my husband and I in the writing of the book, that the interagency group which controls this issue not only lied with impunity, they did so with the full conviction that they had a moral right to do so. We wanted to find out why, but the best answer we ever got was that it was necessary for reasons of national security. Whatever that meant in that context, it did not include the American soldiers who were caught by a vicious enemy in war situations that embarrassed this country.

The soldiers lost in Laos, for example, were protected by no national security umbrella, they were simply designated nonexistent. The official Government position has always been that there is no credible evidence of prisoners left behind in Laos or anywhere else in Southeast Asia. With the best will that can only be described as a blatant lie, yet it is policy.

We came across large amounts of credible evidence, evidence collected by the most expensive and the best technology in the world, as well as that reported by competent and loyal human agents, many of whom were our former allies and risked their lives, their limbs, and also lost prisoners in that conflict, evidence that was described on my 60 Minutes segment by Gen. Eugene Tighe, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as a miracle.

Now, if the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency in all those critical years knew that it was a miracle, we believe that the interagency group controlling POW's also knew it, yet almost all of that evidence, a lot of it, has been inexcusably retired, left to disintegrate and be destroyed. That is a fact which will make this Committee's job very, very difficult.

Another devastating lie is that if men are still alive, they are there by choice. My husband knows something about that. He saw French prisoners long after the French Indochina War was over and filed a report with the Canadian Government. The Vietnamese displayed these prisoners to my husband as converted communists, but it was clear that they were prisoners, and that they were under extreme duress.

Like Bobby Garwood in Vietnam, abandoned by their country, they had no way of telling the truth about their real position without forfeiting their lives. We believe the POW-controlled group knows that about Bobby Garwood and the other American prisoners that they have reports on.

Another lie is that the Vietnamese never offered to return prisoners. We, too, have talked to the Vietnamese, my husband more extensively than I, and we have talked direct to people who were direct witnesses to meetings where the Vietnamese made an offer of prisoners for money. One was made to the Woodcock Commission in the late 1970's.

The truth is that lies have become U.S. Government policy on prisoners, and that's a policy that is more generally known as plausible deniability.

I would like to give you just one very graphic example of what happens to credible intelligence and what happens to our institu-

tions. One of our sources is a retired CIA man of high rank who personally saw prisoners in Laos in the early 1980's.

He reported this to the appropriate agencies, and he knew which ones they were. The negative response spurred him to look into that policy, and what he found was a deliberate, organized attempt by some intelligence officials to misinform and harass the families of the missing who were most vocal in their disaffection of Government policy.

He brought very specific charges to the Justice Department. When we tried to find out what happened to those charges, they had disappeared. All that one investigator could find was a self-serving document that cleared DIA of all wrong-doing. The investigator then asked the Department of Justice for the full file. The official said he would have to take this up with another Government department, and later the official withheld the complete file because of a third agency's objection.

Is this what American justice has sunk to, that a third agency without identifying itself can interfere with critical matters affecting the lives of prisoners of war that are brought before the Department of Justice?

I know that many of the readers of our book find this unacceptable, and we hope and they hope that you will not only address this problem but that you won't allow this investigation to be made ineffective by the same kinds of abuse, abuse of secrecy, and that you will rectify this kind of activity.

I have been asked to bring up one more matter by the people who have been working quietly and diligently on the issue of live prisoners. They are concerned that perhaps this Committee will address itself too much to the issue of remains and not live prisoners, and they recognize that you have a full year's investigation ahead before you can issue any definite statements about prisoners, but they are urging that you issue now a public statement which says, if there are Americans alive in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia who were taken prisoners during the Vietnam War or because of activities growing out of that war, the Select Committee will welcome them home.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE STORY

I was pregnant with my first child when this story began with an episode I produced for CBS TV News' *60 Minutes*. Soon my daughter will be 6 years old. I am aghast at how she has gone through so many stages since I produced that segment about men who might be dead or alive. For Americans who are among the missing, though, whole life-times has passed. Their children are fully grown.

My *60 Minutes* report, aired during the Christmas season of 1985, looked at the possibility that U.S. government spokesmen were not telling the whole truth about men and women of the armed forces being left behind in Vietnam when they said that there was no credible proof that prisoners had been kept by the enemy. President Richard Nixon had promised, on January 23, 1973, that with a ceasefire imminent "all American prisoners-of-war [POW's] throughout Indochina will be released" with "the fullest possible accounting for all those who are missing-in-action [MIA's]." MIA's are American servicemen who were involved in specific battles with the enemy, but who were not acknowledged officially to have been either killed in action (KIA) or taken prisoner by them. In many cases, I found later, their capture and imprisonment was monitored by U.S. intelligence.

I had stirred up a hornets' nest. From all over the United States, and later from abroad, came letters and telephone calls from Vietnam veterans, families of the

missing, and serving officers who said they were relieved that finally a powerful news outlet had the courage to deal with a great national scandal.

The last thing I had in mind while preparing the television news-magazine segment was to expose an American scandal. I was so innocent that when I got calls from a National Security Council colonel in the White House to drop the story, weeks before I had completed the necessary interviews, I failed to take his threats seriously. My knowledge of Vietnam was limited to what I had read in the newspapers at the time (much of it forgotten) and to wearing a POW bracelet while I was a student at the University of Wisconsin. The emotional impact went no further than my distress over the disappearance of my friend Lance Sijan, a Phantom pilot who behaved with incredible heroism after he was shot down near Hanoi. For me, "the longest war in American history" had no clearly defined beginning or end.

However, when I began to research the story, I found that much of the background of the POW/MIA issue was already on the record. There were said to be 2,497 unaccounted for by the 1980s, but the figure fluctuated. I quickly learned that President Nixon's promise had not been kept. When prisoners were officially released in the early months of 1973 the enemy gave virtually no accounting of the missing in action. The North Vietnamese released 591 men—far less than anyone expected.

Among those unaccounted for were prisoners lost during the secret war in Laos. It had been a long though unacknowledged war. When French rule ended in 1954, the enemy had used terrorism and treachery. He routinely exploited neutral territories in Laos and Cambodia to smuggle weapons into South Vietnam—against international agreements. But the U.S. had responded in kind since 1958, 6 years before Congress passed the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution that formalized U.S. entry into Vietnam. The secret "war" in Laos continued throughout the Vietnam conflict.

In January of 1973, just before the Vietnam peace accords were signed, the Pentagon books carried the names of 317 men missing in Laos. At the same time U.S. government spokesmen were quoted as saying they believed the number was much higher. The Communist Pathet Lao spokesman, Soth Petrasy, told reporters that the Pathet Lao had a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they were being held. He insisted that they would be released only if there was a separate truce agreement between Laos and the United States. Some headlines of the day tell the story: "Pathet Lao says no truce, no American POW's," "Fate of U.S. POW's still a mystery," and "U.S. demands list of POW's in Laos." But the Pathet Lao, were not part of the negotiations for the release of prisoners.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger insisted to the public that prisoners in Laos would be returned by Hanoi. He maintained this stance despite the fact that Bui Tin, chief spokesman for the North Vietnamese, also insisted the United States must deal for prisoners held in Laos with the Pathet Lao. Tin said, "We clearly reiterate our position that the question of persons captured in Laos is within the sovereign power of Laos and beyond the competence of the four part joint military commission." Despite evidence to the contrary, Kissinger said he had been told there were no POW's in Cambodia.*

Just before the release of the last group of prisoners from Hanoi after peace terms in March of 1973, the Pathet Lao, in a statement laced with undertones of malice, agreed to the release of 9 Americans captured by the Vietcong in Laos. Their agreement was redundant. All 9 had been captured by, and were in the hands of, the North Vietnamese. No single prisoner captured by the Pathet Lao was ever released. On April 14, Roger Shields, the Pentagon's Prisoner of War Task Force chief, said "there were probably no more live American soldiers loose anywhere in Indochina." Families of the missing claim it was a statement he would later say had been forced on him. Shields said, further, that there was no evidence that any POW's (with three exceptions) had been executed during the war years. So where were the 371 and possibly more men known by the U.S. government to have been captured by the Pathet Lao? There was no answer from any of the governments involved.

The families of these men had become alarmed when, on June 8, 1973, a North Vietnamese defector named Nguyen Thanh Son surfaced. He told AP, UPI, and NBC correspondents that he had seen 6 prisoners. He believed they were Americans who had not yet been released. An American officer present at the interview requested that news services play down the details. Soon after I began questioning families of MIA's about this press conference, I received a copy of a State Depart-

* On March 17, 1976, 3 years after Kissinger had proclaimed there were no prisoners in Cambodia, Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters said, "In Cambodia, several personnel known to have been captured prior to April 1975 have never been accounted for."

ment declassified telegram which persuaded me that the National Security Council move to stop my story was not the first time attempts had been made to silence the media. The telegram, sent from the U.S. embassy in Saigon to Washington, said, "in follow on [defector Nguyen Thanh Son] . . . AP mention was consistent with embargo request, while UPI and NBC after talk with embassy press officer omitted item entirely from their stories."

Missing from the group of men who were returned by the North Vietnamese were over 50 men known by the U.S. government to have been captured and held prisoner at one time or another. Beyond that there was a large number of men suspected of having been captured by the North Vietnamese. Many returning prisoners had seen such men being taken captive or displayed to Vietnamese villagers, but they had never been seen in the prison system. I would learn later that the U.S. government had a list of over one thousand such men—a list that included detailed knowledge of their capture, physical condition, and whereabouts until 1975, when Saigon fell. The United States was able to obtain such information on its prisoners through electronic eavesdropping and its extensive network of Vietnamese agents.

Other prisoners who were not acknowledged were all those whose existence had not been verified by returning prisoners. According to some intelligence analysts who tracked prisoners, the U.S. government knew that many were kept in remote prison camps, although it listed such men in the MIA category. Some of those prisons and camps were especially geared for technical talents—highly skilled American servicemen who had expertise in fields like electronic warfare, about which the North Vietnamese and their Soviet and Chinese allies needed information. Some of those special talents were put to work in highly secret North Vietnamese war projects; others were farmed out to the Soviet Union or China. Amputees, the emotionally disturbed, and other seriously maimed prisoners were kept in special camps from which not one prisoner returned. Most astounding, some prisoners were actually hidden in the main prison compounds in Hanoi. One such man, Air Force Col. Norman Gaddis, who was shot down on May 12, 1967, did appear on the 1973 list of returnees—unexpectedly. He had never been accounted for by the Vietnamese. Yet for almost 4½ years he was kept in a section of the prison known as "Heartbreak Hotel". In all that time no other American prisoner had seen him. If he had not finally been spotted by other prisoners after the Vietnamese moved POW's and consolidated them in several key locations because of the attempted Son Tay raid to rescue prisoners on November 21, 1970, Gaddis would probably have ended up an MIA.

I learned of another group who never came home. Hearing of *60 Minutes'* plan for a segment on MIA's, a few families contacted me about a subject they had held close to their hearts for 12 years. Their men had been sent on missions, primarily in Laos and Cambodia, after the peace accords were signed on January 27, 1973. Some of these men had voiced their objections to base commanders, because they feared that if they were caught by the enemy in contravention of the Geneva Agreements, they would be charged as war criminals. The families who came to me had excellent intelligence information that their men had not been killed in action but had been captured.

After the ceasefire, the U.S. had demanded from the Vietnamese and the Laotians lists of all prisoners on their records. It was made clear that the Vietnamese were expected to return all prisoners captured by their allies. I was shocked when I was told that some of those prisoners, captured in Laos after the ceasefire and known by the U.S. negotiating team, through the efforts of U.S. intelligence eavesdroppers, to be alive and in captivity, were first penciled in on the list of prisoners that were demanded from the Vietnamese and then crossed off. To acknowledge them would have meant acknowledging the continuing involvement of the United States in covert wars in Laos and Cambodia. I was told by the families that some Department of Defense officials were so disturbed by this that they registered their objections in writing. Those documents, I was told, were classified.

It was easy for me to understand why the Pathet Lao would continue to hold prisoners who had not been negotiated for by the U.S. government or who were caught in contravention of the peace agreements. It was harder to understand why the Vietnamese would hold on to prisoners after the peace was signed. Then I learned this was not the first time the Vietnamese Communist government had kept prisoners long after a conflict ended. French POW's were sold for many years after the French-Indochina war, for cash and other concessions. They were called "pearls."

A former foreign service officer in Vietnam, considered to be one of the foremost experts on the French POW/MIA experience, testified before a 1976 House Select Committee that 200 French POW's were released by the Vietnamese some 11 to 14 years after the war. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam had never admitted holding

them. She suggested to the Committee that American government representatives speak to the Vietnamese not about prisoners, but about deserters, or better yet, "war criminals," since the Vietnamese had categories for such men, but none for prisoners. The French had paid an unrevealed but supposedly large sum for French remains and the maintenance of French graves and cemeteries in Vietnam, she said.

It seemed that the U.S. government had expected to bargain for prisoners, but somewhere along the road, abandoned the idea. Article 20 of the Peace Agreement stated:

The United States anticipates that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indo-China. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the U.S. will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post war reconstruction. . . .*

President Nixon reinforced that pledge with a secret promise of 4½ billion aid dollars in a letter to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on February 1, 1973. That letter was not released until 4 years later. The promise of reconstruction aid was never kept, largely because Congress, angered by reports from returning prisoners of war of torture and mistreatment by Hanoi, would never grant such aid. Because of Watergate and his attendant resignation, Nixon lost all possibility of arranging fund transfers from other programs. The promises that were not kept rankled the Vietnamese Communists. Time and again they were to hint during negotiations that the prisoners issue was tied to the promised reconstruction aid.

Over the next 12 years, scores of Vietnamese refugees told stories of prisoners who were held back as "pearls," but who were never bargained for by the U.S. government. There were stories that the Vietnamese aired statements made by U.S. government officials who claimed there were no more prisoners in Southeast Asia, in order to humiliate and torture prisoners who had been left behind.

The fact that prisoner returns were intimately connected to payment of reconstruction funds was clearly understood by the 1976 House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. On December 13 of that year the members concluded their report, *Americans Missing in Southeast Asia*, with the following statement:

That the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has called for selective implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement specifically article 21 dealing with American reconstruction aid to Vietnam in exchange for POW/MIA information under article 8b. (p. 239).

Over the years that knowledge received little attention from committees on Capitol Hill. Perhaps lawmakers were too busy, but it seemed to some families as if a war of attrition was being waged against the men who had been left behind. No matter how much solid intelligence was obtained that men were alive and imprisoned in Vietnam, some government official or committee would find a way to negate it—even when those intelligence chiefs in charge of the issue declared that they too believed men to be alive and imprisoned in Indochina.

What started as possibly an error of judgment, or an act of political expediency, grew with the passing years into a conviction that national security would be hurt by the disclosure that U.S. intelligence capabilities, which were formidable, had failed to serve the men who fight.

Hundreds of refugees reported seeing American prisoners in all parts of Communist Southeast Asia in the early postwar years. Some of those refugees had spent time in prison with Americans. A few of them took their responsibility to report what they had seen seriously enough to testify under oath before congressional committees. Analysts at the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), often took seriously one part of a witness's testimony only to debunk that part having to do with live men. For example, in the early 1980s, a former Vietnamese colonel of Chinese descent testified in disguise before a congressional committee about a warehouse of remains of over 400 Americans in the heart of Hanoi. He explained the Vietnamese would cold-heartedly pull out some of those remains and return them to the United States when diplomatic concessions were required. The colonel, known as "The Mortician," passed lie-detector tests, and his story about the remains

* On February 21, 1973, a peace agreement between the Laotian Provisional National Union government and the Pathet Lao was signed. The agreement also took note of a promise of aid from the U.S. government. Article 1, Sec. c. read: "The two parties take note of the declaration of the U.S. Government that it will contribute to healing the wounds of the war and to post-war reconstruction in Indo-China. The Provisional National Union Government will hold discussions with the U.S. Government in connection with such a contribution regarding Laos."

became part of DIA formal history. Yet a retired DIA official told me that The Morician had been just as truthful about live prisoners. He had testified that he personally saw groups of prisoners on numerous occasions before he fled Vietnam in 1979. That part of his testimony, even though he had passed all interrogations and lie-detector tests with flying colours, was determined to be a fabrication.

There was an effort to steer anyone with an interest away from the subject of living men. It took me a long time to see that the issue was larger than the roughly 2,500 MIA's admitted to by the U.S. government.

My real education began after the *60 Minutes* broadcast. The show had presented two sides of an argument. One was that there was no credible evidence that anybody had been left behind from among loyal, serving Americans. This was the government case, but officials covered themselves by adding, "If any are still there, getting them back is a priority—unless they're deserters and traitors." The opposing view was that our intelligence on prisoners was voluminous but never put to use; two highly qualified Special Forces men said the intelligence was suppressed.

My husband had many friends in the military and intelligence. So did I. He also had a great deal of experience in Southeast Asia. He could assess the growing complaints reaching my office that secret intelligence was not serving those it was meant to serve. Vietnam marked the blossoming of covert warfare. If the men who fight these wars cannot depend on the intelligence services, they have justification for asking awkward questions.

Those who contacted me were driven by anger and concern for the defense of their country. Their misgivings had crystallized around the POW/MIA issue because many proffered detailed knowledge of how American intelligence on prisoners had never been acted upon. I might have dismissed their allegations if I had not received those curious NSC threats; and if, after *60 Minutes* ran my segment on prisoners, a Pentagon publication had not appeared, exclusively devoted to branding as liars all those who had appeared on the program to state their belief that, based on the best possible current intelligence, prisoners were still being held by the Vietnamese and their allies.

Kinfolk of the missing, and the doubting vets, lacked the resources of a national broadcast-news network. I could call upon such resources, but I was to experience a milder and briefer version of the nightmare of frustration experienced by these Americans. Intelligence documents were declassified, then hastily reclassified when the critics pointed out discrepancies and demanded answers. Some vets with experience in electronic intelligence in Southeast Asia had started to build complex information networks. By 1989 these networks were described by one former intelligence officer, Col. Earl Hopper, Sr., as "better than the intelligence resources at DIA"—even though the Defense Intelligence Agency had the task of coordinating all intelligence on the missing. Colonel Hopper's son, also a colonel, was still among the missing.

The DIA director, through the toughest war years and long afterwards, was Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, who told me flatly that he had seen the best possible evidence of Americans still alive. For speaking out, he was publicly humiliated.

He was not alone among senior officers whose audacity was punished when they failed to toe the official line. Yet they had to confide to somebody. They peeled away my innocence. First I learned never to ask direct questions when mysterious references were made to outfits like ISA, MACV, SOG, CCN, or SLAM.* Bit by bit, I discovered these were units with roots in a special secret service created in 1958, nominally under the South Vietnamese president, and supported and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

I found that intelligence on prisoners had been efficiently collected; so much so that today, more than 14 years after the U.S. evacuation of Saigon, all Vietnam is laced with grapevines of human intelligence on prison camps—on who is in them, and on who runs them. Yet despite the intelligence and despite the existence of a special unit designed to rescue them, no American military prisoner was ever officially brought out. POW's and MIA's seemed to be getting lost in what many military men considered an ever-increasing isolation of intelligence agencies.

A friend of my husband, with intelligence experience going back to World War II, suddenly resigned from the CIA. He had quarreled with the Director, Bill Casey, the year before Casey died in 1987. Casey, he said, tampered with intelligence reports, and slanted them to suit White House thinking. It wasn't in the spirit of the words at the entrance to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, which quoted the biblical promise that "ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free."

* For further details on these units see pp. 181-2 and the glossary.

My husband's friend had held one of the most sensitive posts. Now he was discarded, implying serious problems in the agency. This was a difficult conclusion for my husband to reach. He had liked Casey as CIA director.

A new director, Judge William Webster, appeared before Senate Intelligence Committee hearings on April 8, 1987. The Committee, judging Webster's fitness for the new task, asked him what his philosophy on intelligence might be. Webster said he could add nothing to what my husband had written in his book *A Man Called Intrepid*. "Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is an essential weapon, perhaps the most dangerous. Safeguards against its abuse must be devised, revised, and rigidly applied. . . . The character and wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. . . ."

Americans really have little opportunity to know if they have abdicated a small part of their freedom to people they *should* trust. They dutifully refrain from poking their noses into national secrets, confident that those who guard them are doing the best possible job with the greatest integrity. The armed services, in turn, need the best possible intelligence to carry out their duties. They deserve first consideration. If an American is taken prisoner, he should know that he will get the full and non-political attention of his country's formidable intelligence resources. Admiral William Crowe said at his retirement as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the autumn of 1989, "We need first and foremost the best possible intelligence." He should have added, "And the integrity to act upon it for the good of all the people." Without integrity, secrecy can become a license for opportunists to distort and corrupt the system. It suddenly struck me that, for once, ordinary Americans could get a sense of how effective these intelligence services were from the way the POW/MIA issue had been handled.

My husband knew something about such things. He had extracted a Canadian fighter pilot from China, where Communist officials swore they knew nothing of the flier's existence. He had talked to French prisoners in Communist Vietnam, long after Hanoi and Paris jointly agreed that none existed.

What we could not understand, as we went along, was the intelligence bureaucrats' fear of re-examining their own performance. Were there deep reasons for hoping the issue would die in time, just as death in time must release all Americans left behind? Or was it merely a military *morale* problem?

One ordinary American who felt she could break the usual conventions of secrecy was Ann Holland. Her husband, Melvin, had vanished at a super-secret base in Laos. He was not in uniform, and technically there wasn't a war there. Ann had obeyed all the demands made upon her by the U.S. Air Force officials to stay silent. Then she discovered that nothing at all was being done for her husband; and she would not be jeopardizing any rescue operations, which she thought were in progress, if she made waves. She was like a growing number of Americans who gladly surrendered a part of their independence in the interests of "national security," but who decided that, on this issue, they had every right to ask questions in public and demand replies from public institutions.

She wrote me after seeing the *60 Minutes* segment: "The pain the families have had to live with. . . . The nights, the sleepless nights. . . . I would find my youngest child wandering through the house looking for something. Looking in closets, cupboards. . . . and when I asked what he was looking for, he didn't know. . . ."

Her children have grown up with a ghost for a father. Ann would write me again: "Two of my sons now serve in the Air Force. If I quit asking questions now, who will be there for them if their time comes? This is *our* country and if the people running it aren't doing their very best, then they need to be reminded of what this country stands for. We do *not* leave men behind who gave all they had to give when they were asked, believing we would give all we had to give to get them back."

Not all my sources put things down on paper. I taped many conversations and to give a sense of just a few of the stories of courageous Americans like Ann, they are quoted to illuminate both the issue of POW's and the abuses of secrecy. Some of our sources were afraid to be identified. In the end, however, most decided to risk their careers or harassment, and agreed to let me use their names.

I am not by nature secretive, or cautious. But since that seemingly innocent entry into a secretive world 5 years ago, I have learned not to take things at face value. One of my tutors was Ross Perot, who is much more than a Texan entrepreneur. He displayed a grim resolve to get to the bottom of the POW/MIA issue from the moment he realized the numbers of prisoners returned in 1973 were inexplicably small.

I called him one day about an inquiry from a "federal government investigator." The man wanted to question me about possible crimes involving U.S. officials in Southeast Asia. He gave me his office phone numbers and his official designation.

Perot used his resources to probe. He called me back. "If there's such a government department, I'll buy you the biggest steak in Texas," he said.

Perot had to pay up. We discovered there was an investigative service buried within the General Accounting Office in Washington, DC. It had no authority, though, to dispatch agents to find out what I might know. I rejected the man, who had asked me to cooperate in "a matter of national security." He then showed his true colors. "You'd better be sure to tell the truth in your book," he said. I had never told him I was writing a book.

So many of our sources had similar stories to tell. Calls in the night. Veiled warnings. I didn't believe them. Not in the beginning. In the end, I kept going for the same reason that motivated Ross Perot. It was "the right thing to do."

It seemed the right thing to do because so many of the POW/MIA families and the veterans of the war had never had the opportunity to tell their side of the story. Since 1981, the government, including the official organization designed to deal with the issue, had said that the issue of POW's and MIA's had the highest priority, but that there had been no credible evidence of men left alive in captivity that was strong enough to act on. They had many outlets for telling their side of the story and they had the advantage, because so much of the material on POW/MIA's remains classified.

The secrecy that cloaks the issue has led many people to conclude that there are some in the government who don't want the truth to come out. The natural question that arises is "Why?"

There are undoubtedly many reasons behind the reluctance of officials to look seriously at the allegations of those most directly involved in the issue. Some of those responsible have been caught up in bureaucratic inertia, some have acted on directives that they thought were legal and appropriate, others have acted from a moral and professional belief that the POW/MIA issue could be resolved properly only if national-security concerns were paramount, and some have seemed motivated primarily by a desire to defeat Vietnam and its allies in Cambodia, and have tied the POW/MIA issue to the resolution of that situation. Some have possibly believed that activists might compromise government efforts to get men back—either through rescue missions or relocation. Some have engaged in Iran-Contra-like activities, demonstrating the same confusion of motives that were revealed during those hearings. Just as with Iran-Contra, it is almost impossible to say which bureaucrats and which government departments were responsible for specific actions.

However, pinpointing motives and pointing the finger at individuals was never the object of this book. That is the job of the appropriate government agencies. We wanted to give voice to those Americans who had not been heard and who seemed to have good cause to criticize and to demand an overhaul of a system that stalled whenever they asked for a proper accounting of their friends and loved ones lost in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ms. Stevenson. Mr. Cawthorne?

STATEMENT OF NIGEL CAWTHORNE, AUTHOR

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Gentlemen, my opening statement should be my book, *The Bamboo Cage*, which says all I have to say about this issue. However, my book is not published in this country and it is extremely difficult to obtain over here, so perhaps I should summarize the main points.

The book maintains that more U.S. prisoners of war were taken than were ever admitted to. The source for this is the Department of Defense's own documents. As you know, much of the figures for casualties and body counts given during the Vietnam War are pure fiction, and in any war manipulation of such figures for morale and propaganda purposes is inevitable. The papers also show that prisoners were segregated into distinct groups, and the conditions that some of the prisoners were kept in do not match with the experiences of any man who returned in Operation Homecoming in 1973.

During the war, the National Security Agency made an analysis of what happened to pilots who were shot down. They noticed that most of the airmen downed near the main prison camps around

Hanoi and Haiphong were taken there and did not pass any installation of strategic importance on the way. Injured men were thought to be taken to China. Those with special skills or vital strategic information were taken to the Soviet Union. They did not return.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is asserting that?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Jerry Mooney, largely, but what he asserts is corroborated by some of the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just curious. Go ahead.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Men captured along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in other areas where manpower was needed, were forced into slave labor. Plainly, those who had worked on projects with strategic importance like the huge underground warehouses at the southern end of the infiltration routes that were being prepared for the eventual invasion of South Vietnam could not be returned. The Communist Vietnamese could not return Americans who knew of their plans. After debriefing, their remains were given directly to the government of the Republic of South Vietnam who continued fighting the Communists for 2 years after all prisoners were supposed to have been returned.

The papers also make it very clear that American prisoners were taken, and held, by the Pathet Lao. The NSA knew this too. None of these Americans taken by the Pathet Lao were ever returned, even though the Pathet Lao said, during the war and afterward, that they were holding American prisoners.

These men, it was said, would be returned after the war in Laos was over, and the U.S. bombing of that country ceased. The U.S. bombing of Laos did not end until August 1973, 4 months after the American administration said all American prisoners of war had been returned from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

From their analysis of the radio traffic, the NSA knew that not all prisoners would be returned at the end of the war. Some had been earmarked as bargaining chips—hostages—held against the reparations the American Government had long talked of.

Perhaps the NSA knew of the situation of the French prisoners from the First Indochina War. After their defeat in 1954, the French government spent millions of dollars ransoming their prisoners. They were still being returned as late as 1979, 25 years after they had been captured. Certainly the CIA knew this. American intelligence documents show that it was known that French prisoners from the first Indochina War were still being held in the area around Ba Vi, throughout the second Indochina War—the American war—from 1965 to 1973.

Not only was it known that the Vietnamese were holding American prisoners hostage, there were even attempts to pay a ransom. On February 1, 1973, 5 days after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, President Nixon secretly wrote to Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the North), promising \$3.25 billion in reparations. However, when the prisoners, returned in Operation Homecoming arrived home, they revealed they had been brutally tortured. Their inhumane treatment outraged Congress which banned all reparations to Vietnam and later to Cambodia and Laos—despite the pleadings of the Administration. Embroiled in the Watergate scandal, President Nixon's influence did

not carry the weight it might have done otherwise. And Congress did not know of the President's secret agreement with Pham Van Dong—not one penny of which has ever been paid.

The Paris Peace Accords talked of the release of all prisoners of war, not just the American prisoners who were being held by the Communists. As the 60-day release period ticked by, the Communists quickly suspected that their prisoners of war were not being returned—with good reason. The American and allied troops had long been cavalier with Viet Cong suspects. The government of South Vietnam were no more humanitarian.

Frank Snepps' book, *Decent Interval*, speaks eloquently of the fate of one North Vietnamese who had been a prisoner. Nguyen Van Tai, a former Deputy Minister of public security in the North, had come south in 1962 to take charge of resistance in Saigon. He was captured. He helped engineer the assault on the U.S. compound in 1968. He was captured in 1970 and held in solitary confinement, in a chilled, windowless white room, for over 4 years where a series of interrogators tried to break him.

However, in 1971, a year after his capture, attempts were made to exchange him for American prisoners being held by the Viet Cong. These attempts failed.

In 1973, when the release of prisoners was supposed to have taken place, he was not returned. He was held—in the same conditions—for another 2 years, until 1975, when the fall of the South seemed inevitable. Then, as the Communist troops massed at the gates of Saigon, he was loaded onto an aircraft and thrown out over the South China Sea.

I believe that some people have already told this Committee that the new Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is not to be trusted. Because, as military director of the Viet Cong he was responsible for the execution of at least 3 American prisoners held by the Communists. Terrible though this was, this is no time for recrimination. Intelligence documents from 1973 confirm that the Vietnamese Communists made a deliberate policy decision not to return all their prisoners. The Laos also made it plain that they would use the same tactic as the Vietnamese, when it came to demanding reparations from the U.S.

There is also evidence that attempts were made by the U.S. Government to prevent the press and broadcast media from reporting that Americans were still held in Communist hands long after they were supposed to have been released.

There is a seamless carpet of evidence from 1973 up to the present day, that Americans are still being held in captivity, against their will, in Southeast Asia. Letters have been smuggled out. Photographs have emerged. Names, service numbers, aircraft identifiers, zip codes have been reported. Hundreds of refugees say that they have seen white and black men in captivity in Vietnam and Laos. Sometimes these people are identified, and, occasionally, it has been possible to track prisoners by name, as they are moved from camp to camp in Southeast Asia.

It has also been alleged that boat people and other refugees volunteer this information to ingratiate themselves to the American authorities. They know, from bitter experience, that any information on POW's gets them into trouble.

It has also been said that they do it for money. But reward whose publications have elicited thousands of reports of live sightings have not been collected.

Often, refugees don't even realize the significance of what they have seen. They were told during the war that American pilots were bandits, criminals. They were not surprised to see such criminals still in captivity. Besides, people fleeing the Communist regimes of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have other things to worry about than the fate of American servicemen.

The Vietnamese government, at low levels, have often talked of the prisoners they have held. High ranking defectors and long-term prisoners of the Vietnamese regime have been released at critical moments—like the change of an American administration—and tell of Americans still being held.

The evidence from all these sources tells the same story—that American prisoners are still being held in Southeast Asia. When I put this evidence before the Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi in 1989 and asked them for another explanation, they did not answer me. They simply told me that I was a friend of Vietnam. I hope I am a friend of America, too.

I have been asked to testify before this Committee because I am quote, "strongly critical of the U.S. Government action to account for POW's and MIA's." That is not so.

My aim is simply to discover the truth of the matter, whether American servicemen are still being held in captivity in Southeast Asia or not. I think the agencies responsible for accounting for the MIA's have done a sterling job, given that the U.S. Government does not want to know the truth.

If the Defense Intelligence Agency proved that they were there what could the American Government do about it? They could not pay the reparations that were promised to the Vietnamese in 1973 for the men's release, because Congress won't allow it; nor could they ask Congress to pay the money without having to admit that the guys were there in the first place.

The American people, seemingly, don't want to know the truth either. More than 30 American publishers have told me that. The Vietnamese government can hardly be expected to own up after all this time. They have few enough friends as it is. They would be branded as barbarians, and shunned as an international pariah.

My job in writing the *Bamboo Cage* was to collect all the available evidence and evaluate it. The case is just overwhelming. I'm a writer, not a politician or a diplomat. I have written down the simple truth as I have found it. I have tried to present the evidence to the American people so that they could make up their own mind. That, I understood, was the American way.

There are Americans still alive in captivity in Southeast Asia. It is beyond doubt. What America does about it is up to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I know Members will have a lot of questions.

Let me just pick up on your last statement. You say there are beyond doubt, Americans being held in Southeast Asia. What is the strongest piece of evidence that you have of that?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I think that if one looks at the evidence, piece by piece, one doesn't get anywhere. You don't see the wood for the trees.

If the question is the weight of the evidence that all testifies to the same thing—

The CHAIRMAN. But give me the weight of the evidence, or build this—you have spent years with it. It is in your head. You have written a book. Give me a quick picture. I mean, what is the sort of weight of the evidence that says that they are alive today, right now?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Plainly, one can't testify that they haven't all been killed in the last 5 minutes. The question is that it's a seamless, carpet of evidence that comes from during the war and beyond. It just—there is no time—at no time does it stop.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. I understand what you are saying. I am just trying to help you make your own case. But I want you to make it. I mean give me sort of the pieces of the thread—this should just rattle out, I would think. I mean there is the evidence of who; there is the picture of this; there is the live-sighting—I mean, what is it that lets you draw that conclusion with that kind of conclusiveness?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I think from reading and analyzing intelligence documents; from reading and analyzing the testimony of refugees; from speaking to former intelligence officers; from speaking to former congressmen who have seen evidence; and speaking to the Vietnamese—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can you tell me any Vietnamese person who says they know somebody is alive today?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I believe there are people who are named in my book, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you believe there are, or there are? I mean can you direct me to them?

Senator REID. What was your question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. What Vietnamese people—I am saying, what Vietnamese people today could say that there is somebody alive in Vietnam?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Today?

The CHAIRMAN. Or last week, or last year.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I'm sorry, it has been 2 years since I have written this book and it is difficult to remember. But certainly there are named people in my book who say there were, and there are people there.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back to the numbers issue. How do you arrive at the judgment that more people were taken prisoner than we recorded or than we admitted.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Simply from looking at your own records, I think that they are the most glaring discrepancy. There was an incident on the DMZ in 1967, I believe, when the Marine Corps reported that eight people were missing. But on that day, according to the Pentagon's records, there was only one person missing that day. A Vietnamese who was captured said there were 29 people captured that day.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that ever reconciled, do you know? I mean, having been out in battle. I can well remember what happened in a

spot report, and then what you learned when the dust settled a couple of days later. I mean you realize that somebody you thought was missing and you reported missing turned up; or you realized that some people that got separated appeared.

I mean, was there any reconciliation effort with respect to those, or have you just taken the raw reporting of those days?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. No, no, these are records. One comes from the Marine Corp's evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, you're not the only person who has suggested that the numbers are off-kilter. And the Committee is not—I mean we're going to have to try to run that down. Because there are families that have also suggested the numbers are out of kilter. We're going to try to look at it. I am just trying to understand your determination and methodology.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. The Marine Corps reporting was from the Marine Corps history, which wasn't simply the first day's report. They had gone back to the battlefield and done an accounting there.

The CHAIRMAN. And did they subsequently report those people as, indeed, missing or captured, or what?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. They were listed in the Marine Corps history—it says they are missing from that day.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was never—you are saying, factored into the total numbers that were reported by the United States as a whole?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, have those discrepancies been cross-checked with DIA or with the appropriate services?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. And you know that to a certainty?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Well, I certainly haven't done that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you haven't done it. All right, now Ms. Stevenson, you talked about the lies. I would like to try to focus on that. I have read your book, and I am interested particularly in some conversations you have had with Mr. Childress and other things that took place.

But if you were going to say, Senator, here is the most glaring lie, the most obvious sort of example that you could tell the Committee in a short framework, and so we can really hang on to it and understand it, what would you pick?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, what I said in my statement, that there was no credible evidence, and I have no problems—I've had extensive conversations with General Tighe. I've had extensive conversations with people in the Pentagon who are working on this issue. I've had extensive conversations with people in the agency. I've had extensive conversations with people who are working for ISA or they were involved in a rescue effort. They all tell me that I trust them. I believe they told me that without really compromising themselves.

But when they say it is so, I believe it—particularly when General Tighe says it. Because I found him always to be a man of the utmost integrity. There is nothing in his record that would lead me to believe that he lied.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say General Tighe said it, we have met with General Tighe. We have had a conversation. He is going to be here to talk to us publicly. But what is it you say he said? What is the conclusion you draw?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That there is an amazing amount of credible evidence. We also spoke to a good number of the people who were on his commission, including Gen. Robbie Reisner, who we have absolutely no doubt, based upon the intelligence, that they saw, that there is not only credible evidence, that there is proof-positive that men were alive when that commission looked at the material that was current intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Ms. Stevenson, in order to help the Committee to try to make this the last inquiry we have to make—I recognize author's privileges, and they are different, obviously, from those of somebody testifying in court and so forth, in terms of source identification—can you identify sources, to the Committee, so the Committee can talk to people in confidence?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have identified sources already, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the minority investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is a separate effort, completely. Can you identify them to the Senate Select Committee?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I can, in almost every instance, except for when I ask permission to identify people to that other Committee. And I would have to go back and ask if it is all right to give the same information to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do that please?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Certainly, if you will let me know what you would like.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, we have a Member of the Select Committee.

Senator GRASSLEY. I just want to help you on this point.

At one point, when this Committee was getting underway, you wanted to discuss with me about an attempt by her to call you, about sources. And that was why she was trying to call you at that particular time, to give you those sources. She wanted to be fully cooperative with this Committee.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But I also want to make sure that I'm not stepping on any toes. And I want to make sure that it is done in the right way.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. So I will leave the procedure for it up to you. But certainly, I would be willing to turn over all sources.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it, and, in fact, we did communicate. I talked to Ms. Stevenson. She was in Bangkok. In fact, we met when we went to Bangkok.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would also like to point out that our book has the most incredible scrutiny by lawyers, by one of New York's top law firms. And everything had to be documented, and they checked with everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, my last question—because my time is up, but—you have both said with certainty that people are alive. And this is the sort of Catch-22 circular argument, Hobson's Choice, whatever you want to call it, that we get into in this thing.

Vietnam is saying let us normalize, put your people into the country, go wherever you want. Now, assuming—and I have never made an argument for normalization until this is resolved. But let us assume, solely for the purposes of this argument, that one normalized tomorrow. And people were then streaming all over the country. The presumption is that if people were alive, and they were holding somebody, that would be the worst thing for them. I mean they are asking to have us come in and go everywhere. Because we are going to discover somebody.

Does that not mean that they are not going to allow that to happen? I mean, they are not going to—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, Senator, I think it is a lot more complicated than that. There are a couple of things to consider with this. I think it has always been historically possible for communists to hide prisoners. I think there are plenty of examples of the Soviets and the Vietnamese, et cetera.

But aside from prisoners, I mean the official position when my husband saw French prisoners in Vietnam, is that there were none. At one point they found—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have just answered the question. Your husband saw French prisoners. So when Americans go in there, presumably they would see American prisoners.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But they were passed off in the same way that the gentleman this morning explained that they were communists, that they were converted communists. And my husband knew that they were not, because they were really under duress. They had to check every minute, even to lift up their eyes.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, but the point I make is that somebody saw them. If Americans start going into the country, the likelihood is somebody is going to see them.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, the other thing to keep very aware of is that the prisoners are moved back and forth, across the border areas of Laos and Cambodia, that is well known. I will answer your question now. I will answer the same question that you asked Mr. Cawthorne.

Why am I most certain? Because I have spent the last 2 years living in Southeast Asia. And I have no problems believing the people who have seen them. These are people who have not asked for any money. As a matter of fact, some of them are people who have renounced all material goods. They are incredibly moral, up-standing, decent people who proved that, as far as America goes, during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well are you talking about—who are you talking about?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm talking about Asians.

Senator McCAIN. Which—can you give us those names?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think you will know why I am not prepared to openly give you those names. If you can work out a way to protect our men, yes. We are not naive about this, are we? We know what would happen if I announced names right here.

The CHAIRMAN. But when you say—

Senator REID. I am sorry, you have me. I do not know what would happen.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. You do not know what would happen to the men who are being held in a hostile situation, when our former enemies are saying they have no prisoners?

The CHAIRMAN. But you see, that is what gets us into the exact Catch-22 circular argument. Here we are, struggling to find them, here we are struggling to negotiate their release, or whatever. Let us say we found them. What you are suggesting is they are not going to let us find them because they are going to kill them. That is what you just said, correct?

So if they are not going to let us find them and they are going to kill them if we get a hint that they are holding them, what are they holding them for? For the inevitable day when we find them so that they can kill them?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Not if they get a hint that they are holding them.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they holding them for, then?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I don't know. I think there are people who say they are holding them to see what will happen in the future. And at the moment they are very uncertain.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they are never willing to use them as a negotiating tool, if they are not ever willing to come to anybody in 19 years and say give us \$25 million, we give you these people. Eventually they are going to die, and it does not do them any good.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But I think they have tried to use them as a negotiating tool. And I think that if you bring Mr. Shinkel before this Committee, and you can assure him that the people will be protected, he will bring people who were direct witnesses to offers made by the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am playing devil's advocate here and I am trying to press this issue because I want to lay on the table whatever the rationales are. One keeps grappling with it. And I am going to—as I have said to people—I am going to ask these questions on both sides of the fence here to try to get at it. But it just occurs to me that there is a struggle, still, to understand how you break through that. If they are going to get killed the moment somebody knows they are there, yet there is nobody that ever sort of negotiates for them; and then you go through this process where we are searching for them, and yet they are holding them, despite the fact that we are searching for them, and if we find them they may kill them, you get into a tortured kind of circularity here.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think this Committee will be able to do that, and I think that you will get the appropriate response from people.

The CHAIRMAN. That we will be able to do what? Speak to those people?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think you will be able to speak to witnesses, people who have had direct contact with prisoners as long as they have reassurance that it will be handled properly.

The CHAIRMAN. I can guarantee you that anybody who can give us true, first-hand information of a live-sighting, this Committee will guarantee their safety.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It is not me you have to reassure.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but you will give us these names and lead us to these people? Is that accurate?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I am saying that in some instances you have to have people like Al Shinkel come before this Committee, because he is one of my links to these people. I don't have the influence with them that he would have.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say that we are well-beyond my time, and I apologize to my colleagues. But this is the last ground, in a sense. And so I can assure you the Committee is going to bend over backward to examine these people, to examine their evidence, to talk to people, to keep confidences, but to find out what is going on here. Because it is critical that they be spoken to.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Can I just tell you one thing, and it will explain the situation that I am in.

Before I came here, I got a call. Before I left Thailand, I got a call from Mr. Shinkel who said can you tell me if I can trust the Committee, and if I can bring the witnesses who will listen to me to Washington? And they include, for example, the man the high-ranking Vietnamese who was there when the Vietnamese offered the Woodcock Commission 160 prisoners. He asked can I trust them? What do you think? And I said that the people I've been working with are certainly trustworthy. And I would advise that. But that's as far as I can go. I'm certainly willing to be helpful in that way.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, pardon me, but who is Mr. Shinkel?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shinkel is an individual who lives in Thailand who has had a long involvement as one of those dedicated to trying to find live people in either Laos or Vietnam.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. He's a retired Air Force intelligence man, and he has given testimony before congressional committees before—one very, very important bit of testimony that still is classified.

The CHAIRMAN. He came to see me when I was in Bangkok. And we agreed that the Committee will follow-up with him.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure about the answer of the witness. Is she saying that she will give us the names that she has, or does it require the permission of Mr. Shinkel in order for us to get the names that you have?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer that?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. In some instance, it would require his agreement, yes.

Senator MCCAIN. And why would that be?

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that is because he was a source, and you made an agreement with him.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right, because I'm not an intelligence person involved in this. I'm not an activist. I'm a reporter.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, I think it's a question of the reporter-source relationship, and I respect that. And I think that is something we have to do. However, Mr. Shinkel has said to me that he is willing to cooperate, and the Committee will obviously seek to have his cooperation.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Ms. Stevenson, I just want to reiterate what Senator Kerry said, as one who has been involved in this issue myself for a number of years. As most people know, and most—if not all

of the Members of this Committee—have been involved in one way or the other. There is so much information out there. I have heard a lot of it. I have talked with you, as you know, and I have talked with others. I think I have talked to everybody I know of who believed that they had information on this issue, including the DIA for a number of years.

But if we are going to get to the bottom of it, and as I said in my opening statement, I realize we have to earn that trust. But this is the last shot. I really believe that. And I think everybody on this Committee believes it. We are really trying to get to the truth. And we are not going to leave any stones unturned. And I understand protection of sources—believe me, I understand it. Although Senator Kerry can say—and I will say—that we will guarantee, of course there is always the human possibility that something may compromise that. I am certainly not going to tolerate it, or allow it, but within those parameters of human beings, sometimes not living up to agreements, I hope that we can.

Because if we cannot, we will never get to the bottom of this. In my opinion, there is so much information out there that conflicts, that the only way we are going to be able to look at it is for somebody to put it all together, and synthesize it, and weed out what is truth and what is not.

And I would just second the motion that has already been made here that wherever you can—under whatever parameters you need to provide to protect the people—to get those people to us if you can.

I wanted to specifically ask you about one source, and obviously I do not expect you to identify the source. And I do not know whether that individual was identified to Senator Grassley or anyone involved in the other report. But the one that was of interest to me, of great interest to me, was the source that you identified as Casino Man in your book.

He said—just quoting a couple of lines from this individual in your book—now, quoting Casino Man—he said “he knew what had occurred when Site 85 fell, that is the Lima site in Laos, 1968. He knew men had been betrayed. He knew men had survived. And he knew that some had been taken prisoner.”

Then, in a later discussion with the same individual whom you identified as Casino Man, “I believe in the institution”—and this is quoting him again—“I believe in the institution of the CIA. I just think parts of it have gotten into the wrong hands. And I’ve got proof, proof this cover-up is not the work of any one administration. There has been a group of people who have controlled certain issues through four presidencies. And any big investigation into missing men would lead to its condemnation.”

Without getting in to, I would like you to first of all, to say how much credence you put in that, that individual in terms of what he said—or she, whoever—Casino Man, I assume is a man—and second, would you—if you have not already—be willing to provide that source to the Committee?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I had his permission to provide some of the material he gave me to the other investigation. I have never felt very comfortable with him because he is just a sort of complete intelligence man. And I have trouble with people like that. And

one problem is that I really don’t know whether—when he gave me permission to give it to those people—I also have permission to give it to this Committee.

I would certainly be willing to try—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say that two Members of those people are on this Committee. I hope we do not have a problem.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, is this something you can work out yourself?

Senator SMITH. If you have already given it, then there should not be a problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a problem, Senator Helms?

Senator HELMS. It is no problem with me.

Senator SMITH. There are a lot of Members that want to ask questions. And I just have one more of Mr. Cawthorne.

A good deal of the information that you used in your book came from the series of volumes which were identified as uncorrelated information relating to missing Americans in Southeast Asia, allegedly published by DOD in what, 1978? December 15, 1978.

What is the status of those volumes now? Are they classified documents—to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I’m afraid I don’t know.

Senator SMITH. Does anyone on the Committee know whether they are classified documents?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator SMITH. Can you go into some detail about those documents as to what specific information in those documents was provided to you, and they are DOD documents. So if they are DOD documents, then you feel that at least the information that was gathered, you would have some reason to believe it might be accurate—at least the information that you’re referring to as incriminating, as far as live Americans are concerned?

So could you comment on that in terms of its veracity?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Well, the documents, themselves, say if the document refers to interrogation of a Vietnamese prisoner or defector, it has an assessment of what the interrogator thinks, or what the source man thinks at that time.

Senator SMITH. I am told that my staff is correct, that the documents are not classified.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I’m relieved to hear that.

Senator SMITH. I guess you are not in trouble leaking classified documents.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Monika, I must tell you how delighted I am that you have come. Your book, I think, has done more to bring this issue to the attention of the American people—and perhaps to Congress as well—than any, single effort that I am aware of. And I found your book an excellent book. I think there are an awful lot of Americans who deeply appreciate the endless hours and the time you put into it, as well as the personal sacrifice that I know it included.

I am told that you did not have an easy time getting this published. I wonder if you would share with us the problems you ran into as you sought to make the facts public.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, that is true. We started that project with a great deal of enthusiasm, with one of the largest publishers in the United States—in the world, as a matter of fact.

We got a very nice advance. They welcomed us with opened arms. I warned the publisher that we had had some problems at 60 Minutes, and that they could expect the same problems of pressure. I had gotten pressure when I worked for 60 Minutes not to do the story.

They went ahead anyway, and we worked on it for 3 years with complete enthusiasm. Then two things happened: one, letters were received from certain people in covert operations threatening a libel suit—on the surface it didn't look like a real threat, but our lawyers assured us that that is the only way it could be interpreted; and also, another book was published called *Out of Control*. A suit was initiated by General Secord and that book was taken off the stands. The author won that suit, but long after the book was destroyed.

Anyway, it was soon after these two things happened that our first publisher decided not to publish the book. We had a great deal of trouble. Well, we were not able to persuade them.

What was interesting was that in the last meeting we had with them, they were very, very adamant in asking us to identify our sources. The source that they wanted identified was Colonel Negro. And at that time, we had not identified him. He was assassinated soon after that. But they really kept pressing who that man was.

The other interesting thing was, you asked about Casino Man, Senator Smith. Right before they dropped the book, Casino Man came from half-way around the world, because they wanted to know who he was. He had requested a lawyer with a national security clearance. And he was willing to give them, everything—every bit of documentation that he had.

On the day he arrived they changed their minds. They did not want to see him. And then they dropped the book. Anyway, we were able to sell the book to a Canadian publisher, and we initiated a suit against the first American publisher on the basis of lack of fair dealings. The Canadian publisher then later sold it to Penguin, another American publisher, and it was sold to an English publisher as well.

But similar pressures were applied. It went through a very heavy legal period. And it did finally come out—thank God there are some publishers with courage.

Senator BROWN. Well, you have been through a great deal. But I think it is going to yield some dividends. We hope this hearing will be of some value in following-up—and it is following-up, I think, that may be the most important.

Now, you have mentioned a statement by the Committee that would be helpful. I want you to know that that statement is going to be offered as a motion in this Committee. We will go on record to welcome those people home. But I am wondering if you do not have other suggestions for us as to top priority things that we ought to bring and we ought to follow-up on.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, it is hard to do in the large sense. I mean I am willing to do that over a longer period of time. I think one of the crucial things—because so many people involved with

this issue have been disappointed, have come forward with information, and have had—well, their entire lives compromised. I think this is particularly true of Asians who have testified, or who have been willing to come forward.

So they are now very reluctant. And I think that that statement will be important. But I think there must be other ways that you will have to show them that they really have your support, that you will stand behind them; that if they come here something won't happen so that they will be endangered, or their families are endangered.

I think most of them, what they really want is just a kind of public recognition that they are not liars; that they are not self-serving.

Senator BROWN. You mentioned the Woodcock Commission. As I read the summary of that commission, they concluded "there is no evidence to indicate any American POW's from the Indochina conflict remain alive, for the reasons of terrain, climate, circumstances of loss, and passage of time."

That, of course, was in 1977 before Bobby Garwood came out.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right. And again, I accept the word. This is really one of Mr. Shinkel's people—the one I mentioned who was a witness to a meeting where 160 men were offered. I have no reason to disbelieve that man. As far as I know, he has never asked for anything for that information. He is hurting himself by saying it—at least he would have hurt himself in the past.

Senator BROWN. Do you know of the American negotiators that were present when that offer was laid on the table?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. No, but I think that is a question that you should ask this gentleman, and ask Mr. Shinkel.

Senator BROWN. Well, it is clearly an area we can follow-up and try to verify. We have the ability to call negotiators if they were there.

I have looked through a letter by Congressman Ben Gilman of New York that conveyed criticism of your books, challenging its veracity. I do not know if you have had a chance.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have not seen that. I have heard of it. People here have mentioned it.

Senator BROWN. I would appreciate if—and I have looked through it myself—if you would be willing, when you have had a chance to review it, if you would advise us of any comments you would like to make with regard to it, to those observations.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would.

Senator BROWN. The ones that I have looked at—frankly, the facts they cite seem to substantiate your book, rather than their criticism of it. But I think your observations of those characterizations would be helpful to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.

Senator Reid.

Senator REID. A Man Called Intrepid was sure great. Tell your husband that.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Thank you.

Senator REID. Tell us about the threatening phone calls from the Government officials urging you not to do your story.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, it's in the book. And just roughly, it was when I was working for 60 Minutes.

Senator REID. Who were the officials?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. The official was Col. Richard Childress.

Senator REID. You attribute your notes being stolen, that were in your briefcase, to government operators.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But I don't know that for a fact. A lot of strange things happened that had never happened to me before.

Senator REID. How many books did you sell?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I believe that it is close to 100,000 altogether, between the U.S., Canada, and England.

Senator REID. If American POW's are ignored by the U.S. because it would embarrass certain CIA officers or others, why would Laos or Cambodia or Vietnam not release them just to do that, just to embarrass the U.S.?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think there are factions in those countries that wanted to do that. I think there is a conflict within them. My husband described that. It is in our book. When he was over there, he spoke to some hard-line people who made that quite clear.

Senator REID. You actually believe that as we speak here today, there are Americans who were in the military during the conflict in Southeast Asia who are alive today over there?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think we ought to give it a chance. I agree with Mr. Cawthorne. I mean, I have no idea whether they were not killed off in the last 5 minutes, but I believe, since so many were alive at the end of the war, the chances are pretty good. We know from historical records that certain Soviets survived a longer time than that, so there is a good possibility, yes.

Senator REID. What is your estimate as to how many?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I really don't like to do that. I would think hundreds, but that is my personal opinion.

Senator REID. Senator Brown referred to the letter from Congressman Gilman.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I've not seen that, but—

Senator REID. Well, let me read to you from this letter, dated in January of this year. He says that he has received this book and it has been brought to his attention, and he relates here that Mr. George Brooks was advising bookstores in his area, his congressional district, that they should place it under the fiction department.

He goes on further to say, "The logic of the motive of this cover-up as outlined in your letter eludes me. As you recall, President Reagan never hesitated to blame his predecessor, President Carter, for any of the economic or diplomatic problems that befell our nation during his Presidency. It makes no sense to me in the one instance he would countenance a cover-up to protect the reputation of his predecessor.

"Likewise, I find it highly unlikely that President Carter, the man who granted amnesty to Americans who avoided the draft and was elected to the Presidency on a platform condemning the excesses of Vietnam and Watergate, would be overly eager to cover-up the role of Presidents Nixon and Ford in the war.

"Your contention that President Bush would be embarrassed by the truth belies all logic. If the President were able to return even

one live missing American to his home prior to the 1992 elections, he would be hailed as a hero by all Americans and his reelection would be virtually assured. The idea that he would rather cover-up for Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter rather than do this flies in the face of common sense."

How would you respond to these three paragraphs?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Senator Reid, I hope that President Bush does just that, I hope one returns and I hope President Bush becomes a hero.

Senator REID. But you see, you are not answering the question.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I don't know what the question is.

Senator REID. The question why would these various men who have been President of the United States, cover up for the other.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think that is a very complicated question, but I think all of those men, all of those Presidents, were advised by bureaucrats who were working on the issue throughout, many of them.

And I can only tell you again why would the strong, personal opinion of a man like General Tighe be discounted. And why would even the Reagan administration, who made it a national priority, lie about his testimony. He testified before Congress about every 6 months on this, and yet when I did a 60 Minute show in which he said that on air, they issued a public statement saying that he had never talked about this, that he had indeed only mentioned it once in 1981. What I have tried to understand is why do we discount the testimony of the most qualified people on this issue.

Senator REID. Mrs. Stevenson, hopefully this Committee will not discount any testimony. But this is the third day of testimony. We have been here now 3 days, and we have had a string of witnesses who have said, the latest being the Colonel this morning and this afternoon, who said if there were an American in Vietnam, we would know about it, and there are not any.

We are talking about almost 20 years, people being in effect hidden in Vietnam. Now, I would hope that you are right. I hope there are hundreds, 200 as you say, Americans alive over there. I hope that very much. But at this stage the facts that I have been presented belie that. The only information we have from you and Mr. Cawthorne is speculation.

Now we should follow the advice that we have been given and follow up every lead, and I hope we do that. But how—I mean, do you believe that there would be places in Vietnam where these people could be hidden for almost 20 years?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I'll give you two examples. One, my husband was there during the Truce Commission. He is a Canadian, so he was there with the Canadian delegation to the Truce Commission after the French/Indo-China conflict. And there was a strong speculation that the Vietnamese were bringing arms in from the Chinese side. They were never able to prove that until about 5, 10 years later, when it was verified. I think it is very easy in a closed society like Vietnam to hide prisoners, arms, anything else.

The other thing I want to tell you is we have recently also met with the Vietnamese—not the official negotiators, but certainly high ranking. And I said, look, this Committee is going to go into

session, and they are going to represent the American people and that's a lot different from the negotiators that you have been dealing with. Because the American people really want answers and the American people want to know, for example, what happened to the prisoners we know were alive, the ones our intelligence tells us were alive. What happened to Peter Cressman and what happened to Colonel Donahue?

Those are two examples I outlined for them. And he says, why are you bringing up these cases? The American Government has never brought these cases up with us, and we have done everything that the American Government has asked of us.

Senator REID. My time has expired Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Reid.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for appearing here today. Mr. Chairman, just let me preface my questions with the following remark. I said at the onset of this hearing that I assumed that Americans were alive, and I will continue to assume it until we have as full an accounting as possible. I have assured my friends Red McDaniel, Jack Bailey, and others who are in the audience, that I intend to ask tough questions. I think it is legitimate to ask tough questions of people who have beliefs on both sides of this issue. I hope that that is well understood, because without tough questions being asked, Mr. Chairman, I do not see how we are going to get to the bottom of this issue.

So I would like to repeat. I assume that there are Americans alive until we have as full an accounting as possible, which we do not have. At the same time, there is a lot of information that we have to wade through, and the only way we are going to get to the bottom of this issue is through asking very difficult and tough questions from people who come down on both sides of the issue.

Having said that, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, in your book you state, and I quote: "Most astounding, some prisoners were actually hidden in the main prison compounds in Hanoi. One such man, Air Force Col. Norman Gaddis, who was shot down on May 12, 1967, did appear on the 1973 list of returnees unexpectedly. He had never been accounted for by the Vietnamese, yet for almost 4½ years he was kept in a section of the prison known as Heartbreak Hotel. In all that time, no other American prisoner had seen him. If he had not finally been spotted by other prisoners after the Vietnamese moved POW's and consolidated them in several key locations because of the attempted Son Tay raid to rescue prisoners on November 21, Gaddis would probably have ended up an MIA."

Mrs. Jensen, I speak from personal experience. That is totally false. We knew that Colonel Gaddis was in prison. We were in communications with him, he appeared at a Christmas church service in 1969, which was filmed by the Vietnamese. I would like to know, since I know that that statement is false from my own personal experience, I wondered where you had acquired such information?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well at the time I got that from other people who were in your situation.

Senator MCCAIN. Who?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I can't give you that right here and now, but it was by talking to other people.

Senator MCCAIN. I would hope you would supply that for the record because it is just not true.

[The material referred to may be found on pps. 2-4 of the appendix.]

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I have heard the contradiction to that, and I accept the possibility. But at the moment I don't know which side is right.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, if you do not want to take my word for it, that is fine.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I didn't say that, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Cawthorne, you state in your statement: "During the war the National Security Agency made analysis of what happened to pilots who were shot down. They noticed that most of the airmen down near the main prison camps around Hanoi and Haiphong were taken there if they did not have to pass any installation of strategic importance on the way."

Now, Mr. Cawthorne, in the early years of the war, 1965 and 1966, the Americans did not bomb the northern parts of Vietnam, Hanoi and Haiphong. Most of the prisoners who were in Hanoi in the Wallo prison that were captured during the early years of the war, in fact virtually all of them, were shot down in the southern part of the country—Bin, in that area. Now, they were all taken north to Hanoi.

How does that jibe with your statement—some of them, it took as long as a week to 2 weeks to get there. Is it your allegation that they did not have to pass any "any installation of strategic importance on the way"?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I also mentioned in the book that the analysts didn't begin to analyze the shoot-downs until after 1970.

Senator MCCAIN. So they did not analyze those that were shot down in 1965 and 1966?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. No.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, frankly, that does not make any sense, Mr. Cawthorne. I mean, people were shot down and captured during the first couple of years, most of them in the south. They were taken north usually by truck, and obviously, they would have had to have passed by installations of strategic importance since, as you know, it is a relatively narrow country with very few main arteries of transportation.

Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, I would like to bring up an issue which I think is important because in your book you cite a U.S. Army Major, Mark Smith—I will preface my remarks by saying I do not know nor have I ever met Major Smith although I have heard about him—and he is mentioned throughout your book as one of your key sources.

Now, I think that if you use a source as extensively as you used Major Smith, obviously, you like to look into the background because any journalist, and I'm sure you're an outstanding professional journalist likes to look at the veracity of that witness.

Now, the facts are that a hearing was held in 1986 by the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee. They invited Mr. Smith and his col-

leagues to present their evidence. Mr. Smith failed to honor his commitment until a month later when he had to be issued a subpoena, and then the hearing was reported in the press and is a matter of official record in the Senate.

The view of those Senators who were on that Committee was that his evidence proved not true. In fact, according to some witnesses Major Smith invited one of the Senators to the parking lot, because there was some disagreement.

Mr. Smith said that the White House also had shown an interest in the tape. According to Mr. Smith, officials under the direction of Vice President George Bush told him to offer Mr. Gregson \$4.2 million deposited in the Bank of America in Singapore for the tape. Those are false statements said a spokesman for the Vice President. The Vice President did not authorize Mr. Smith or Mr. McIntyre or any other party to pay any money for their reported evidence.

I guess my question to you is, did you have any qualms about quoting him so extensively, given the clear questioning of his veracity by a Senate Committee—not this one?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm not sure what that last statement you read from having to do with the Gregson case has to do with—

Senator McCAIN. It has a great deal to do with his veracity.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. —with my book because that's in our book.

Senator McCAIN. No, but it has something to do with his veracity, which is the reason why I quoted it. The Vice President of the United States—now President of the United States, disagreed with him.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Right. And all I can say is that I did look extensively at Mark Smith's record—so did my husband—especially as related to the charges that were brought against him. And there was a file this thick (indicating 2 inches) which clears him. We looked at all of that.

What happened in that instance were false charges were brought against him. It makes me believe that something was not handled properly in the later questioning. Now, Mr. Smith says in that particular instance that you bring up, which we did not deal with in our book—I do know about it—that the reason he did not show up for that particular Committee meeting was because the Committee did not honor its promise to keep the name of the witness he was bringing out of the public. The morning that he arrived, he saw Robin Gregson's name in the newspapers, and that is why he did not show up.

That is what I was talking about earlier when I said that a lot of people who have information about this are afraid to come before this Committee, because things like that happened in the past. There has to be an absolute guarantee when there is a guarantee. People cannot be compromised in that way because quite often their lives are at stake.

I believe that Senator Simpson apologized to Mark Smith. That is on the record in Mark Waple's files—he was a witness to that, and you can call Mr. Waple and ask him about it. He himself said that he thought he had goaded Mr. Smith beyond endurance.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much. I see that my time is expired. I will be glad to wait until the next round.

May I make just one comment, Mr. Chairman, about General Tighe.

In your book, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, you say: "General Tighe told me flatly that he had seen the best possible evidence of Americans still alive before speaking out. He was publicly humiliated."

I have known General Tighe for many years. I have seen him testify before this Committee. I have seen his remarks widely publicized throughout the country. I know no one who sought, nor did, publicly humiliate General Tighe. He is held in the highest regard by all of us, and I do not think that statement is accurate.

But I also think that it is very important that General Tighe has said consistently that he has seen no hard evidence, but the weight of all of the cases that he saw convinced him of that. And I think that it is very important that the record be clear that General Tighe, who will be able to elaborate before this Committee, stated that to this Committee and to me, or to the Foreign Affairs Committee when I was on there, and to me personally on several occasions. To my knowledge he has not changed that opinion.

I do respect his view. I know that the Members of this Committee respect his views, otherwise we would not have him before the Committee, and I know of no one who tried to humiliate him.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Senator, I don't know if you've read the portion of the book where we talk specifically about the humiliation. I guess it is a matter of opinion whether that was public humiliation or not. In my husband's and my view it was, and in a lot of people's view it was.

Senator McCAIN. It is not in General Tighe's, ma'am.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I will also tell you that if you read the Bar Association Intelligence Newsletter, which is edited by Admiral Mott, where he reviewed our book, he called General Tighe and had a conversation with him about our book, and General Tighe—that is public I think—backed our book and said he had no quarrel with it, and repeated the statements that he had made to me—again, openly—on the 60 Minutes program.

Senator McCAIN. I was not commenting on whether he agreed or disagreed with your book, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson.

You were saying he was publicly humiliated, and I do not believe that is correct, nor does he believe that is the case. And I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But you read from the beginning of the book, where you're talking about credible evidence, that he has only talked about the weight of evidence. He has said, and we have records of it, that there very definitely is credible evidence. And on 60 Minutes as more than credible; he described it as a miracle.

The CHAIRMAN. You have to leave, so do you want to take a minute?

Senator SMITH. I appreciate the chairman's indulgence. I just want to say in response to two things that Senator McCain said, I, too, hold General Tighe in the greatest regard—highest regard—and I think all Members of the Committee do.

However, having personally reviewed the Tighe Report in its unedited version, I can tell you that there are people within the agency who did not hold him in the highest regard. I want to state for the record that that information—because I read it, and I cannot comment on it now because it still is a classified document, about the content of it, but it certainly was not a complimentary introduction to the Tighe Report written by an individual from the Defense Intelligence Agency. I will stand on that point.

The second point I feel—with all due respect to Senator McCain—I can only comment on what I know about this and I am not going to comment beyond that. As far as Mark Smith is concerned I was as frustrated as anybody else that the information that he thought that he would bring—we thought he would bring forth regarding that videotape—did not come forth. I was not a Member of the Murkowski Committee and therefore had no input into that all, so I do not know the facts there.

But I do know for a fact that—and I am not going to go beyond saying this—that people in the very highest levels of Government were very interested in that tape, and that I was personally involved in the negotiations for that tape myself. I will state for the Committee in executive session if they like, as to who those high level people were. But I cannot comment beyond that, other than to say that everything that Senator McCain said regarding that \$4 million was not exactly accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. First of all, Mrs. Stevenson, let me just answer your concern. I want the Committee on record and I want anybody who is thinking about coming forward to understand that this Committee is determined to keep whatever agreements it reaches with people with respect to protection of their identity or whatever, within one limit. And the limit is—and it will only be in agreement with the person—that if it is necessary in terms of public knowledge, this is not something that can go on or be kept behind closed doors forever.

Because the Committee's purpose is to shed light on this and we are insisting on shedding light. With the Pentagon opening up, it will be totally contradictory for us to shut down.

But on the other hand, if the opening up is enhanced by keeping one individual protected for some reason, clearly the Committee is prepared to do that. And we will have to defend ourselves by the information—the quality of the information we put out and the quality of the judgments we make as to whether or not we were justified in doing that. And the proof in that will not be until the end of this process.

The second point I want to make is that for those who are measuring the tone or approach of questioning here and trying to draw conclusions about somebody's view, I want to reiterate what Senator McCain said. If somebody comes in front of this Committee and says to us with a certainty, Senator, they are all dead and I know it, we are going to put that to the same test as somebody who comes here and says I know there are people alive. That is, by nature, adversarial to a certain degree, though I am determined to keep it from being adversarial in a way that suggests to anybody they are better off not coming forward. We do not want this Committee to wind up doing that.

Finally, I will say to you that it will be unusual for us to be in this kind of a predicament because we knew what we were doing when we set out these first 3 days as establishing the parameters. We recognize that a lot of this work will be through deposition and interview, and a certain amount of investigative background work that will—just like putting together any case. Before you go to court with your case, you do your preparation and a lot of that is going to be done.

So I respect your willingness to put your evidence and theories to test, and that is what is happening here.

Who is next? Senator Kassebaum. Am I correct on that? Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Just briefly I would like to say, Mrs. Stevenson and Mr. Cawthorne, that I was invited to sit on this Committee by Senator Dole. We were selected by the majority and the minority leaders. It was with great reluctance that I agreed to serve on this Committee because I do not have a background in understanding much that has gone on. I have tried to read a great deal; I have tried to understand. I think you can understand how perhaps someone coming fresh to this would be quite perplexed by some of the testimony back and forth over the last several days.

I think the hardest thing for me to understand is to hear from both of you who have spent a great deal of time and involvement in, and a great deal of research, Mrs. Stevenson, on your part, to say that you both believe strongly that there are still alive Americans there, and that this is being covered up by our Government.

Now, I am not debating the point of whether they are or are not there, but what I am trying hard to understand is what is the motivation for this.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I can only tell you that I have had the same difficulties for a long time and still do to a degree because they are so hard to understand. I think a lot of it has to do simply with what happens when you have a job and you have made a mistake. I think a big mistake was made at the end of the war. I think that mistake was compounded, perhaps with a lot of people not deliberately, but once those men were abandoned and people knew about it, ever bit of evidence that seemed to come in was discredited in some ways.

I spoke to one of the children of a missing man just before, and he has a letter which I think is now blown up and being shown around, which talks about fingerprints on his father's case. He has never been able to get those fingerprints. They are now missing.

I mean, when you look at this subject, you find a long history of mistakes like that. And then when you begin to realize the intelligence of the people and their background, it's just very hard to believe that it is only incompetence that has created this long record of mistakes.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. I think it's quite easy to understand that politicians don't draw attention to problems they can't solve. And it seems to me this problem is an intractable problem, and you don't shout about it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I do not really agree with that. I mean it is easy to shout frequently about things you do not understand. I think it is really something that is hard to understand. I can un-

derstand that mistakes may have been made as the peace treaty was put into place and as they were trying to bring people home quickly. What I find hard to understand is that still at this juncture there would be people held there against their will.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But we cannot really look at that unless we look at the history. If men were abandoned then there is a good chance that men are still alive. In order to do that we really have to look at the intelligence.

I think it is paramount that this Committee seriously look at the Peter Cressman case. Now here is a man who was shot down and captured after the Peace Accords were signed. That is something pretty heavy to hide. That is something that I think one can easily understand why. And as a matter of fact, I have talked to people in the Pentagon who have told me about that case, who have told me that they were terribly upset about it. It was a very, very important emotional upset for them. So much so that they put it on paper, and that was classified.

Now, I think it's important that this Committee get a hold of that protest by Peter Cressman's own colleagues, or at least people who cared about him, who were in the service.

Senator KASSEBAUM. In your book, *Kiss the Boys Goodbye*, in speaking of intelligence, you say the intelligence on the prisoners has been officially collected, so much so that today, and this when you are writing more than 14 years after the U.S. evacuation of Saigon, all Vietnam is laced with grapevines of human intelligence on prison camps and on who is in them and who runs them. Is this U.S. intelligence that you are referring to?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. In the first place, there is a basis for those prisons. Under the old system, it's the old French system and they use that same system for Americans.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But when you were speaking of an intelligence network, you were speaking of their intelligence or our intelligence?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm talking about our intelligence, the intelligence that we have on American troop prisoners.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Right, but is it a network composed of Vietnamese, or of our own—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It is a network of Asians, largely, who are working for American, either on an ad hoc basis, maybe they formerly worked full time and now they work on a free-lance basis.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Is this information that has been available to you as you have been working over there?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. This is information that as we researched it we came across it. It has been available since the end of the war and a lot of it came about because people—our former allies—were in prisoner with other Americans. I mean the best example of that is the Vietnamese general who was in prison with Bobby Garwood and who reported on that to President Reagan.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So this intelligence network, that still is ongoing there, I would guess—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes it is, and I think it's also important for this Committee to get hold of Bobby Garwood's official debriefing. You could learn a lot from those papers.

The CHAIRMAN. We have requested that, and I have been told we will get it.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. At the same time, perhaps you should get the unofficial debriefing that General Tighe did with Bobby Garwood which is, professionally I believe, just as good.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just a last question. Do you feel that there is a distinction to be made between those that you believe may still be in Vietnam and in Laos?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I do think there is a distinction. I think there is much more evidence today about prisoners in Laos than there is in Vietnam, and I think that has been probably done quite deliberately because a lot of them are in the border areas so they could easily have been moved back and forth.

I think that's an example. Some of your colleagues, some other Senators who went to Vietnam in 1986, were told that there might be prisoners. They wouldn't be under the control of the Vietnamese but the Vietnamese would help us to look for them. I think that's a very good example of what's happened. They've been moved, and some of them are perhaps totally not under Vietnamese control. But most of the evidence indicates that there is some Vietnamese control in the areas where they're being held.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Monika, have you sensed any real problems with the distribution and sales of your books that might indicate some outside interference?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I can only say that strange things have happened. I don't know if it's a matter of incompetence or whether there has been interference, since there has been some interference sometimes. I think that's true, too. I don't want to think that, so I steer away from it. When we were doing the promotion for the book last year, it was not in any of the major cities where we were. People who wanted to buy the book had to wait, sometimes months, to get it. They were persistent enough to have really turned the book into a success. It's that kind of thing.

Before the book came out in the United States, we were pressured, very much pressured—under the threat of no publication—to settle our suit with the first publisher. But I think it could logically happen in the business. I have no proof that there was any direct pressure.

Senator GRASSLEY. When did the Vietnamese offer prisoners to us and what were the circumstances? You briefly describe some such offer involving the Woodcock Commission. I would like to have you elaborate on that offer and on any others you might have, and most importantly, describe how you know it?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. This is something I know through someone through Al Shinkel, and I believe Mr. Shinkel and I think the man's record really stands for itself. He was present. He was a Vietnamese official who was present when an offer made for 160 men in exchange for money. I don't know if you were here when I said that one of the last things Mr. Shinkel said to me before I left Thailand was that could he bring this man and other people to this

Committee if he could have a guarantee that they would be protected, because they were willing to speak before the Committee.

And as I said, I mentioned that I had been working with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority investigation, and I certainly felt that they could work with the people here.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. The Wall Street Journal, sir, reported an offer in 1981.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right. That's another offer.

Senator BROWN. Would the Senator yield on that?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, I will yield.

Senator BROWN. I was hoping you might follow up to find out who that offer was made to.

Mr. CAWTHORNE. According to the story in the Wall Street Journal it was discussed in the Oval Office by President Reagan and the Cabinet.

Senator GRASSLEY. Monika, have you—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just interrupt again and pin that down. Is it according to the Wall Street Journal that it was discussed by the President and the Cabinet, or other sources?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. By the Wall Street Journal.

The CHAIRMAN. The Wall Street Journal story suggested that?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that story?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. It's in here. I could dig it out for you if you like.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it cited in the book?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. But that's another example of where one of the witnesses got into a lot of trouble with certain government agencies and I think the person who could explain that to you the best is Mr. Ross Perot.

The CHAIRMAN. We have spoken to Mr. Perot and will further.

Senator GRASSLEY. Monika, have you talked to U.S. officials who claim to have seen U.S. POW's or anyone else who has seen POW's since 1973?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have and I mentioned that in my opening statement. You weren't here to hear that.

Senator GRASSLEY. My point is, would you be willing to put them in touch with this Committee?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would certainly be willing to try, yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Cawthorne, would you also be in a position like Monika, to assess for access to some of your sources who have firsthand knowledge on this subject and let us know about them?

Mr. CAWTHORNE. Certainly, yep.

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.

Second round. Senator McCain, do you have further questions?

Senator McCain. Just briefly I would like to pursue this matter of the negotiations a little further. Please, Mrs. Jensen-Stevenson, do you know at what time frame these negotiations took place?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I'm sorry, which negotiations?

Senator McCain. The negotiations you referred to for 160 POW's. Do you know at what time frame that took place?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. During the time of the Woodcock Commission was in Vietnam.

Senator McCain. Do you know when that was?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. You probably have more precise dates than I do. I don't have my documentation in front of me.

Senator McCain. Your testimony is that there was an offer made for 160 live POW's?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. My testimony is that is a source for that, a Vietnamese who was an official present there who was well know to Mr. Shinkel. According to Mr. Shinkel, one of the last things he said to me was that if he felt assured that this Committee would treat this witness properly, that he would be willing to come here to testify.

Senator McCain. Then it is my understanding your testimony is that Mr. Shinkel has information on an individual who states that there was—

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. My testimony is that I know this witness through Mr. Shinkel, and I have respect for both people.

Senator McCain. In other words, it is not just Mr. Shinkel, you have also had contact with this individual?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I can only go according to my journalistic judgment, perhaps I can be proven wrong, but I believe, yes, I believe him.

Senator McCain. Now this individual was a high-ranking Vietnamese official?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well you know when you get into high-ranking.

Senator McCain. I would think you would have to be fairly high-ranking to be there.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. He was high-ranking enough to be present.

Senator McCain. I would think you would have to be fairly high ranking in order to make an offer.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I didn't say he made the offer. I said he was present when the offer was made.

Senator McCain. And who made the offer?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. The Vietnamese.

Senator McCain. Which Vietnamese?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I don't know that.

Senator McCain. You do not know?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. No I don't know.

Senator McCain. And you do not know who the offer was made to?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I know that it was made to whoever was officially there to receive such an offer.

Senator McCain. Do you have any idea who that was?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Specifically names?

Senator McCain. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, if I can look back at my papers on the Woodcock Commission I could give it to you. I don't have them here.

Senator McCain. These were Americans this offer was made to?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. There were Americans on the Woodcock Commission, that's right.

Senator McCAIN. And the offer was made to the Americans on the Woodcock Commission?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That's right.

Senator McCAIN. So we could contact the Americans on the Woodcock Commission as well and ask them?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would hope that you would do that, and I would hope that you speak with Mr. Woodcock. I have spent quite a bit of time talking to him.

Senator McCAIN. Mr. Woodcock corroborates that?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. No, he does not, but I think you will find it interesting talking to him.

Senator McCAIN. Well, as a matter of fact I have talked to him several times in the past, and I find him to be a very outstanding man who served his country very well including, I believe, as our first Ambassador to China, as well as a very respected leader in the labor movement.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. So he would be a very good witness for you to bring in.

Senator McCAIN. But he has no knowledge or denies that that happened?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Or as he puts it, he doesn't know.

Senator McCAIN. I see. But I just wanted to get it straight for the records. It is your direct information from talking with this former Vietnamese official that a meeting took place sometime during the Woodcock Commission where an offer was made for 160 live Americans in return for an undisclosed amount of money; is that correct?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. An offer was made for the men, yes. I don't know that much about the money part.

Senator McCAIN. But it was financial?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mrs. Stevenson, I know it is in your book, but I want you to relate it anyway to the Committee. First of all, how long were you at 60 Minutes?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Just short of 6 years.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you were with 60 Minutes you were a regular?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I was a staff producer, that is, I was working for CBS. I had just renewed another 6-year contract.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were a producer of the regular Sunday night shows?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes, I was. I was not a freelancer. I did not come in just to do one story. I worked for 60 Minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. You worked for it?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. It is considered one of the best jobs in the business.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct. And you have under your belt the production of a significant number of segments that 60 Minutes has aired; is that not correct?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I do. And I have an Emmy, and I also have a gold medal for best documentary at the International Film Festival in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, at some time, you began this story as a regular 60 Minutes project with enthusiasm and excitement, I take it?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I did. I have to admit I am somewhat ashamed of my views at the time, because I had no question, for example, that Garwood was a traitor. That is how I thought of him. I initially really wanted to look at that.

The CHAIRMAN. So you began really where a lot of Americans begin with this, which is sort of doubting and questioning?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I did. I thought that Garwood was really making up the prisoner issue. I had been aware of the Bo Gritz things and I thought they were hoaxes; I really did believe that. I mean, I leaned in that direction. I wanted to be objective, and I think ultimately I became objective.

The CHAIRMAN. In the course of your investigation you began to experience, did you not, things that were different from anything you have experienced in any story you have done?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is true. I did not think I was naive, but I really believed that no agency of the Government would try to interfere with a program like 60 Minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was the interference because they felt, and maybe you cannot even answer this, was it because you sensed that they just did not agree with what you were saying, or you were going off on a slant that was wild, or was it because you were doing this at all or getting into this? Can you even tell the difference?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. They just did not want the program done. The reasons initially were that all of the people, and Colonel Childress seemed to know who I had spoken to, that all of the people I had dealt with were crazy, gold smugglers, senile, et cetera, et cetera.

When he saw that I persisted, he then verified that there were prisoners, at least in his mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want you to describe the conversation that you had with Colonel Childress. This is a conversation you personally had, is that right?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. This is a conversation that I personally had. It was, however, witnessed by other people in my office.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this the telephone conversation with Colonel Childress?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do not you describe to the Committee what happened.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, when I did not respond properly by agreeing to not go ahead with the program he tried another tack, and that was to tell me that if I persisted in doing the story I could endanger the lives of prisoners who were still over there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he said to you on the telephone?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is what he said to me on the telephone.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question in your mind whatsoever?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. There is no question in my mind whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say to him?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I was flabbergasted that he would try, and I already at that time had a great deal of respect for people I

had dealt with, like General Tighe, like Red McDaniel. I invited him to come on the program and say publicly what he had said on the phone. He said he could not do that, but that I should get someone else, like Secretary Richard Armitage. I said, but we have tried to get the Secretary and he has not responded. He said, he will now. And that was right. The next time we tried Armitage he did respond.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did your conversation end abruptly?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I do not know what you mean by abruptly. It did not end on the friendliest of notes, and neither did the second conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the second conversation?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. We did an interview with Congressman Solarz after that. And Congressman Solarz made some remark about how he did not want to be sandbagged. I said we were not going to sandbag him, but, as a matter of fact, I did know from a very good source in the administration who would be the person to know that there were prisoners alive and that it was known to the U.S. Government.

He tried to grill me on that, and I said, well, I could not say, even though I had not agreed with Colonel Childress that I would keep him anonymous. At that point, professionally I thought I would do that. I said I could not tell him, but I could tell him that it was a very solid, high-ranking source that had told me that.

On the following working day I got a call from Colonel Childress demanding how I could tell Congressman Solarz about our conversation, and that in fact he had never said that at all and I had misunderstood.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did you subsequently have a conversation with Richard Armitage?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. We did an interview with Mr. Armitage, and I am sorry I cannot remember his public relations director at the time, but the pre-questions were done through his P.R. person.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you learn any more in the course of that interview?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Did I learn any more about the prisoner issue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I learned that his office and he considered there was no credible evidence, that there was none.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what they said?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is right. And I referred to General Tighe several times because I had come across his testimony in the Congressional Record. It was done in a subtle way, but the attitude toward General Tighe was certainly disparaging.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, again, from a devil's advocate perspective, is it possible that when Colonel Childress said that to you, "well, if you persist in doing this you are jeopardizing a lot of Americans," that he was speaking conjecturally, that he was saying it in the context that if there were people alive and you went ahead and did this, that this would hurt, but not that he was affirmatively saying—I mean is there any interpretive room there?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. There was never any doubt in my mind, but this could always be a possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. The possibility of what?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That that is what he was doing. I mean, you would have to ask him.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. But you took it as an absolute, outright statement?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I certainly did. And I believe he made similar telephone calls to other people, like Red McDaniel, where he indicated the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. In which he indicated similarly that this makes it more difficult to bring people who were alive?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. That is right. There is an affidavit in the Smith-McIntyre lawsuit about that other call with Captain McDaniel.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any other Member have any further questions of this panel?

Senator BROWN.

Senator BROWN. In your book on page 233, you quote Danny Sheehan by saying, "I think I can prove how profits from drugs and arms finance covert wars in the name of American national security." If you would share with us here the evidence that you have on that and any availability of that evidence.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, there is a lot of evidence. I mean, I think if you want to explore that it would be useful for you to talk to people who are a lot more knowledgeable about that. I spent some time talking to Alfred McCoy, who wrote "The Politics of Heroin."

He spent a lot of time in the early 1970's personally talking to people in Laos and Thailand who were involved with that activity, including General Vang Pao. He is much more knowledgeable than I am.

What is in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority material is, for example, an interview with a high-ranking Laotian general, who also talks about that, which was background for our book as well. But, we went to people like McCoy, who are the experts.

Senator BROWN. As I read your book, there is at least a suggestion or a hint that some of the reluctance to bring American servicemen home in the Laos area is somehow related to the drug trade. Is that a fair statement?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes. I mean, we did not deal with that extensively because that would be another whole book and a lot more research would have to be done. But it is certainly clear that part of that "secret war," as it is known, was financed by the sale of illegal drugs and arms.

Senator BROWN. Do you have any additional names of people who you think could give testimony or information that would help us?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. On the drug question?

Senator BROWN. Yes.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes, I think I could provide you with that. I just recently participated in a teleconference with many of

the people that we had been in touch with, and it would probably be easy for me to give you the list of those people.

[See p. 2 of the appendix.]

Senator BROWN. I think the Committee would be interested in that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to the Senator that, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Narcotics and Terrorism, we spent a significant amount of time looking at some of those issues, and there is a long report of the Subcommittee that has a huge amount of now documented information. In fact, some of the people involved in that in this hemisphere are being used by our Government as witnesses against major drug dealers in this country, including the Noriega trial.

So, there is a large body of evidence about it over a long period of time.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I have to tell you we did rely upon other direct witnesses. We have not had any sort of direct dealings with drug dealers or anything like that. But I think the work, for example, of Alan McCoy, who is a professor at the University of Wisconsin, is very solid when you look at it and you check back on the work he did.

Senator BROWN. What can you tell the Committee about rescue missions, the covert efforts to rescue the POW's?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, I can tell you that I spoke to people in the Pentagon who were directly involved with some of those missions, and they told me point blank that the intelligence that those initial efforts were based on was absolutely topnotch. One of the people I spoke to at the very beginning about this also was Admiral Tuttle. Another person was with ISA, which has since been discredited to some extent, but I still believe that the information we got about those early rescue attempts was accurate.

Senator BROWN. In this area also, I think the Committee would appreciate any suggestions you might have for people who would be able to provide information about those missions. You have already given us some, and if others occur to you, I think it would be helpful to us.

[See p. 2 of the appendix.]

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I would hope that one of the things that this Committee would do would be to get the SEPA records of the Ron Rewall trial, where the judge determined that it could not be open to the public because of the emotional impact it would have on the families of prisoners.

We saw some of those papers and some of that testimony, and I think you would have access to all of it. I think it would be very important for you to look at it.

Senator BROWN. You have spent some time with Bobby Garwood.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator BROWN. Would you indicate or share with us your view of how reliable his information is and whether or not he did indeed switch sides?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. My view and that of my husband, who has a lot more experience in dealing with intelligence matters, is that he was never a collaborator and he did not lie about other prisoners. I know that General Tighe has told us that he could not

possibly have made up the things that he said in his debriefing; that it so closely matched what DIA knew about other prisoners.

I think he has really been maligned. I think his life has been, to a large degree, destroyed. He has made a remarkable comeback. He has handled it very well.

Senator BROWN. Did he indicate to you how it was he came to be captured in the Danang area?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes. Of course I know that too from the court-martial records and other sources. I would like to tell you a story about Garwood. We knew a lot about him, but we did a radio program in Chicago last year, last fall, a new news show and suddenly a call came in very urgently from someone California who had been just driving through the city.

He said, I just had to call you. I heard you talking about Bobby Garwood. I want you to know that he was still in the Marine Corps. I was present at that first debriefing or first talk that Garwood had with the Marine Corps, and he did nothing but talk about other prisoners.

That is just an example of the kind of information that has come in on Garwood.

Senator BROWN. The specific area that I was concerned about was, as I understood from your book, he was captured in an area near Danang, out by Marble Mountain, near the hospital air base complex.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes. I do not know if you remember, but initially he was charged with desertion. At the last minute at the court-martial the person who had actually raced with him for the job, that particular driving job, they were both drivers, showed up and said, yes, it was an official assignment. And he was captured.

I have also seen copies of a photograph of him under guard, with his hands tied. That, for some strange reason, was never shown at his court-martial.

Senator BROWN. Did he ever mention how it was he was captured, though, the actual capture? I mean, I was in Danang at the time. That part of the peninsula is quite a secure area.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, he was ambushed. I mean, it is in the book. And I do not want to contradict myself by now repeating it, but we described it as he described it to us. I mean, it was an ambush.

Senator BROWN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it there are no other questions of this panel.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Let me announce then—

Senator McCAIN. If I could just make one comment. Mr. Quhyn, who was the interpreter for the Woodcock Commission, has stated to us that there was never an offer for 160 POW's. I would be interested in his statement.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. All I can say is, gentlemen, you have the option of bringing the witness here, and I hope that you do. Maybe you will disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is not up to us to disagree.

Senator McCain. It is not a matter of disagreement; it is a matter of evidence.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Well, the evidence will be when you bring the person here, then you can decide whether he is lying or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me just say that I think that there is going to be a lot of evidence swirling around. We have had absolutely polar opposite statements on certain things, not by your panel, but in the course of testimony that we have heard. Some of which, incidentally, is not as far apart as it may seem at first blush.

I mean, Colonel Bui Tin's testimony this morning, while he professes knowledge of and firsthand testimony to the effect that no one is alive today, clearly left room in terms of where he was and what he knew in the early days of the aftermath of the war. So that there is a lot of room here to begin to sort this out. And I think that is exactly what the Committee has to do.

I want you to understand that all of this needs to be checked out, and that is why you are here. I think what is positive is that we are going to check it out, and you have come here with that understanding.

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. I think so, too.

The CHAIRMAN. We need to work with you more in order to be able to do that.

Let me just ask you one quick question. How long will you be here? Are you going back to Bangkok?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be here another day or so?

Mrs. JENSEN-STEVENSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate it if staff could meet with you tomorrow to further inquire with respect to some of these names, places, people, and so forth, so that we can begin that process almost immediately of going after it.

The second thing I would like to announce is that we had previously scheduled the administration and certain agencies to come back this afternoon in order to respond immediately. Unless they insist that they would like to do that this afternoon because of anything that has been stated or put in the record I would prefer and I think the Committee would prefer, to slide that over until next week or to permit staff to go through the 3 days of testimony. It will permit us and them to do a better job of culling questions and discrepancies so that we can address them without a sense of being rushed.

So, my preference would be, barring their insistence to the contrary, that we would delay them until week, and simply complete the panels that are set out today.

Ms. Stevenson, Mr. Cawthorne, your books are your own testimony, obviously, and I am confident that every Member of the Committee and the staff are going to go through them in great detail. We are going to try to pare every single inconsistency against other inconsistencies and so forth, because, as I think everybody has said, this is really the last shot. And if we do not do that and try to separate what we understand to be reality or not there is no way for this Committee to begin to answer these questions.

So, we thank you for it. And I thank you. You have come a great distance at great personal expense, and we are very appreciative for that. And we would like you to just be available to the staff in the next hour so that we could pursue some of those issues.

Thank you.

We have two panels. I do not think they are going to take that long. The next panel is Mr. Jeffrey Donahue, the author of the POW-MIA Timeline, and Ted Sampley of the Homecoming II Project, U.S. Veteran News and Report.

Following that, the final panel will be made up of the most recent publicized cases of photographs of Col. Jack Bailey, on the Carr case; Hamilton Gayden on the Borah case; and Albro Lundy, Shelby Robertson Quast, and Gladys Fleckenstein, representing the Lundy/Robertson/Stevens case.

Gentleman, would you stand please so I can swear you in.

[Whereupon, the witnesses were sworn.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Donahue, do you want to lead off.

STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE, AUTHOR POW/MIA TIMELINE

Dr. DONAHUE. Yes, sir. I would like to shorten my opening—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you pull the mike close to you. Without objection, your full text will be placed in the record with any accompanying materials.

Dr. DONAHUE. That is why I would like to shorten my opening statement, if I may, and then make some brief comments, and take questions on a few important issues that have been raised over these 3 days: the nature of the intelligence, the nature of the conspiracy and the coverup, the mandate for the Committee—

The CHAIRMAN. Would you identify yourself with just a little background?

Dr. DONAHUE. Yes, indeed. My resume is in my statement that I've issued. My name is Jeffrey Donahue. I'm the brother of Maj. Morgan Jefferson Donahue, missing in action in Laos since December 13, 1968. I've been involved in this issue ever since then.

I am the author of the Indochina Timeline, which I've submitted to the Committee. I'm a member of the board of directors of the National League of Families. I'm a member of the National Alliance of Families, the Connecticut Forget-Me-Nots. I've been in Laos I guess 5 times since 1988. I went to Laos extensively in 1973, 1974, 1975 I guess; Thailand many times in the interim.

I'm chairman and president of Friends for Humanitarian Aid to Laos, which is a Federally tax exempt charity, incorporated in Connecticut, and travel there extensively and will be going again in January.

The CHAIRMAN. And what do you do to earn a living?

Dr. DONAHUE. I have been with Union Carbide for the last 13½ years, and presently hold the position of manager of international finance and treasurer for Latin America and Africa.

The CHAIRMAN. And who funds the efforts that you undertake?

Dr. DONAHUE. Friends for Humanitarian Aid to Laos is purely private. We solicit donations, contributions of medical equipment and supplies from corporations and distribute them in Laos