

LEGRO

S. HRG. 102-1006

ANALYSIS OF LIVE SIGHTINGS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA
AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
ANALYSIS OF LIVE SIGHTINGS

—
AUGUST 4 AND 5, 1992
—



ANALYSIS OF LIVE SIGHTINGS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA
AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

ANALYSIS OF LIVE SIGHTINGS

AUGUST 4 AND 5, 1992



Printed for the use of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1993

60-642 ⇆

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-040027-9

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, *Chairman*
 BOB C. SMITH, New Hampshire, *Vice Chairman*

THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota
 HARRY REID, Nevada
 CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
 J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska
 HERB KOHL, Wisconsin

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
 HANK BROWN, Colorado
 CHARLES GRASSLEY, Iowa
 NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, Kansas
 JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, *Staff Director*

(II)

C O N T E N T S

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1992

Statements of:	Page
Chairman John F. Kerry	1
Prepared statement	6
Vice Chairman Robert Smith	7
Senator John McCain	14
Senator Charles E. Grassley	16

WITNESSES

Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; accompanied by Robert Sheetz, Chief, Analysis Branch; Gary Sydow, Chief, Analysis Branch; Warren Gray, Chief, Current Operations Branch; and Robert DeStatte, Senior Analyst, Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency	19
Prepared statement	21

BRIEFING TEAM INFORMATION

The Defense Intelligence Agency's Briefing to the Senate Select Committee on POWs and MIAs, August 4, 1992	28
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Ministry of Interior, Prisons and Seminar Camp System	42
Memorandum for Central Documentation Office from D. Warren Gray, Chief, Current Operations Branch	150

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE

Memorandum for the Chairman, Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs	175
Response to Request for Additional Information from Mr. Robert Sheetz, Chief, Special Office for POW/MIA, Defense Intelligence Agency	179

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1992

Statements of:	Page
Chairman John F. Kerry	181
Senator Charles E. Grassley	182

WITNESSES

Robert Sheetz, Chief, Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency; accompanied by Gary Sydow, Chief, Analysis Branch; Warren Gray, Chief, Current Operations Branch; and Robert DeStatte, Senior Analyst, Analysis Branch	184
Prepared statement	270

(III)

APPENDIX

Memorandum for the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/ MIA Affairs.....	308
Questions for the record for Mr. Robert DeStatte.....	308
Case Number 1072.....	335
Case Number 1117.....	349
Case Number 1243.....	359
Case Number 1117.....	400
Case Number 1309.....	488
Case Number 2626.....	520
Case Number 2638.....	558
Case Number 8395.....	632
Case Number 8432.....	660
Case Number 995.....	684
Case Number 6356.....	898
Case Number 5169.....	911
Case Number 5343.....	936
Case Number 5993.....	975
Case Number 12778.....	979

ANALYSIS OF LIVE SIGHTINGS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1992

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Robb, Daschle, Smith, McCain, Kassebaum, and Grassley.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR
FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KERRY. The hearing will come to order.

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs meets this morning to continue its investigation into the fate of Americans still unaccounted for from the war in Southeast Asia.

We began, as most of you know, with a set of hearings last November that established a baseline of knowledge, if you will, and allegations about the POW/MIA process. Since that time we have continued with an examination of the Soviet Union's possible role in interrogating American prisoners, as well as from previous wars. We have travelled to Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, and are following-up now in a process that we think in the next couple of months will begin to both shed light as well as tie-up a lot of loose ends with respect to this issue.

I think the committee can take pride in the fact that we have set in motion one of the largest and most rapid—and we hope most effective—processes of declassification of Government documents in U.S. history. And we are well along now in our efforts to interview and to depose literally hundreds of individuals from public and private life who have knowledge of information or information on this issue.

Last month we held hearings concerning lists of POWs and MIAs compiled by the Department of Defense. For the first time we analyzed, as an outside group, those lists. And our committee reconstructed those lists.

We identified—as people know—a group of 244 names, which was quickly reduced by 111 names, by virtue of the debriefings that took place of returnees, leaving a grouping of about 133; at which time we said very clearly that needs to be further scrubbed—scrubbed is a—further reviewed, and analyzed in order to determine how it fit with the Vessey list, and the Department of Defense list.

We have gone through that process now. But the point still remains. That as of 1973 and Operation Homecoming, there was this group that, at that time, based on the knowledge people had at that moment, that there were questions about them.

That does not mean—and I reemphasize this. There were headlines in various papers around the country that misinterpret what the committee was saying.

The committee cannot draw a conclusion as to whether or not any or all or some of those people in that group were, in fact, alive in 1973 at that moment. What is clear is that they represent a group of people about whom our Government had legitimate questions, and reason to believe—based on their last known live status or POW status—that a full accounting should have been forthcoming.

But I emphasize again, no one can say with a certainty, that any, all, or some were, in fact, alive at that moment in time.

The DIA and the committee staff have reviewed those 133 cases. And we have concluded that a number were found to have died prior to 1973—that is, the process, if you will, of scrubbing.

Both the committee and the Defense Department agree, however, that when you subtract those whose remains have been returned since 1973, as well as those who were mistakenly listed as POW or otherwise—and that is obviously a process that must be showed how we arrived at that, and we will—that you still have valid questions remaining today about 43 of those who were on the committee's identified list.

These 43 are among the 135 names on the list targeted for priority investigation by General Vessey and General Needham's joint task force for a full accounting.

Now, I want to emphasize today, as I did last month, that none of these numbers—133, 43, or 135—reflect individuals that we know with certainty were left behind. But it is the universe of people about whom there remain the most serious questions: whether because they were once listed as having been taken prisoner; or because they were otherwise known or thought to have survived their incident.

These are the cases that are currently the subject of the priority investigation by the United States in cooperation with the government of Vietnam.

And I would like to make it also very clear here that the government of Vietnam has agreed to receive and review any and all of these names. They are part of the discrepancy process currently under review. Remains have been returned, and that process continues to whittle down as our joint task force accounting process works with the Vietnamese process. And that cooperation appears to be greater today than it has been at any time in the history of this process—with our teams on the ground and with a permanent office in Vietnam.

Now, it is in this context that we come here today. And we begin this morning—2 days of really rather extraordinary hearings. They are not easy hearings for everybody to follow or understand, but they are critical hearings with respect to the process of this committee.

Because we are going to—for the first time in the history of this issue—publicly vent the live-sighting reports, the live sightings of American prisoners in Southeast Asia.

Now a live-sighting report, for those new to this process, is just that: it is someone—a refugee, a boat person, a former political prisoner, a diplomat—anyone—a traveller, a tourist, anybody—who has been in a position to observe who comes out of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia with information—or Thailand, or elsewhere, Hong Kong—with information that an American or Americans may still be held prisoner.

The information could be first-hand or it could be hearsay. It could involve one American or many Americans. It could be detailed or it could be vague. It can be recent or it can be as far back as at the end of the war or during the war.

The point is that it contributes—by virtue of its existence—to the possibility, to an analysis process that must be done to determine whether or not Americans may have been left behind, or have remained alive at least up until the time of a particular report.

Now, the handling of live-sighting reports is one of the most controversial aspects of the POW/MIA issue. A review conducted by the Executive Branch, itself, referred to the existence at one point of a, quote, mind-set to debunk such reports.

On the other hand, tens of thousands of staff hours have been devoted to receiving, evaluating, and following-up on, or seeking to categorize these reports. They are a major focus of the Defense Intelligence Agency's work, and a major focus of this committee's investigation.

For the past 20 years, there has been nothing more tantalizing than a live-sighting report that an American was seen alive in captivity in various parts of Southeast Asia.

And there is nothing more frustrating than the failure of these reports to become manifest in the form of a returning American—with the single exception of Robert Garwood in 1979.

The sheer number of live-sighting reports—more than 1,500 since the end of the war—indicates to some—to some Americans, that is—that perhaps hundreds must have been left behind.

However, on the other hand, our failure over 20 years to locate any one of those Americans has caused others to conclude that the reports must be false.

Regrettably, or necessarily—as the case may be argued—these reports have been secret. And this process has been held to close quarters, with the result that a lot of rumor, a lot of innuendo, a lot of allegations have surrounded these reports and this process.

So today, for the first time, we are going to air it publicly, as part of the effort of this committee to engage in a public dialogue on this subject, and to try to lift the cloak of secrecy and hopefully be able to get answers.

We will not only ask the experts for a public explanation of what they think, but we will probe and test and question their reasoning; the actions they have taken to categorize reports; and to evaluate those who have provided them; and the efforts that have been made to follow-up.

We will also analyze other people's perceptions of what these reports may or may not mean.

Now, I say that one has to, obviously, keep these reports in a context as we go along. I have again and again tried to stress the notion that this is an on-going process. We cannot draw conclusions until our process is complete. And we are not going to.

I would ask others to join us in that effort. There are some who like to wave around one, or two, or three live-sighting reports and say this is conclusive proof.

It is not conclusive proof, as I think people are beginning to understand. And I think it is terribly important to handle these responsibly.

On the other hand, it is equally important to be fair in understanding what a particular report may mean—and not to simply discard it because it is easier to do that. If the report leaves legitimate questions, the report leaves legitimate questions. And we are going to have to deal with those.

Now, all information in front of this committee is currently being declassified. We are not holding on to anything pending anything. We are trying to declassify as fast as resources permit us.

And I might add the same can be said for the Defense Department and the other agencies with whom we are dealing. Literally dozens of people are working around the clock redacting and dealing with sources and methods and privacy. But the information is being made available. And we will make it available as fast as this committee can declassify.

We are doing so now.

In fact, today, all of the live-sighting reports that are part of today's discussions are being made public for the first time, as are a number of documents surrounding them.

Now, I want to just make sure everybody understands the ground rules. The only documents that will not be made public or released or declassified, as we understand it in this committee, are those that are specifically the purview of a family's right to privacy; where they assert that right to privacy as an individual family and they do not want something made public.

Or, secondly, where sources and methods—with respect to national security concerns—might be compromised. I might add, however, that no one in the public has to simply take one of the agency's word at face value with respect to sources and methods. Every member of this committee has the right to review, in unredacted form, any and all documents. And if there is a question about any document, I assure you members of this committee will review it in order that we can maintain the integrity of this investigation. So that when we come to a conclusion we can announce that, in fact, we have reviewed them and we, as a committee, will have seen what is in these documents.

That includes, I might add, National Security Council minutes, as well as the WSAG minutes, as well as the negotiation documents of 1973 and on.

In closing, I would like to say one other thing that I have said before. And that is, that I cannot emphasize strongly enough that this is the time to do away with fantasy and to do away with speculation in this process. The committee has been working diligently to create a real database on this issue. Occasionally we pick up the news accounts and read someone in some part of the country

quoted as saying well, they did not take into account this list; or there are these people out there.

I want to emphasize, there are no magical mysterious, "these people" out there. The universe that this committee is now narrowing down to is, to the best of our knowledge, the only existing universe of potential POW/MIA. There are finite lists of those who went to Vietnam in service to their country. There are finite lists of those who were killed in action and came back and, with honors, received a burial.

There is a finite list of those who did not come back and are unaccounted for—either KIA-BNR, body not recovered, or perhaps not recoverable. There are finite lists of those who served in so-called "black" operations. And this committee has looked at those, and is looking at them.

We know as we sit here today of no other list of people. And I say that in early August of 1992, several months before this committee goes out of existence.

If anybody knows of someone engaged in some operation, or someone whose family asserts that they did not come back, and they are not on a list, or there is somehow some other list, now is the time to come forward with it—not to assert at the end of this process that the committee overlooked something.

This committee is whittling down rapidly what the potentials are here. Where we know from the last hearing that there are not 2,266 people truly MIA today; that many of those are accounted for by virtue of the reports which are being reviewed now by the Defense Department. And we will review them. And at the final process, hopefully those, too, will be public. But the point is, that now is the time for people to come forward with information.

On the other hand, as I have underscored as hard as I know how, there remain some very legitimate questions about 1973 and what we knew at that point in time; and about this counting process. So we ask people to come forward if they have any of this information.

Clearly, the strength of this committee's final report will be in its ability to draw not on some of the information, but on all of the information. And I am pleased to be able to say that because of the current documents of the Kissinger papers being provided, the Nixon papers, and others, the committee will have unprecedented amounts of documents and testimony from which to try to draw conclusions.

Now, on that note, let me just say a final word about this process today. We are going to have several panels, over the course of the 2 days, focusing on a number of different areas. The live-sighting reports that we will be dealing with—two sets on Vietnam, two sets on Laos—represent what we are told by our investigators are the strongest cases: the cases with the greatest potential of being found to, indeed, be evidence of somebody being alive.

So an examination of those cases, we thought, would be the best place to begin publicly in an analysis of the first-hand, live-sighting report process. We will try to make this as much of a dialogue as possible. It is a learning process for a lot of us on the committee. And some of it is tedious, but all of it is critical to understanding

the potential that some American might be alive today and being held against his will in Southeast Asia.

I think the staff that have worked on this deserve credit for their loyalty to the issue and for their zeal in trying to find any kind of way of understanding this issue better, and in their creativity in trying to present us with some challenging ways to approach it.

And our hope is that this will be viewed as a constructive process; an engaged process of analysis; out of which we can draw a good set of conclusions about the overall live-sighting and follow-up process.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerry follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN KERRY, CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS, AUGUST 4, 1992

The select Committee meets this morning to continue its investigation into the fate of Americans still unaccounted for from the war in southeast Asia.

We began last November with a set of hearings that established a baseline of knowledge and allegation about the POW/MIA process. We have continued with examinations of the Soviet Union's possible role in interrogating prisoners from this and previous wars; we have traveled to Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand to ask for cooperation and to follow up on leads; we have set in motion one of the largest, most rapid and most effective processes of de-classifying government documents in U.S. history; and we are well along in efforts to interview and depose literally hundreds of individuals from public and private life who have knowledge or information on these issues.

Last month, we held hearings concerning the lists of POWs and MIAs compiled by the Department of Defense. For the first time, an outside group—our Committee—reconstructed those lists. We identified a list of 133 Americans who had been recorded as POWs by DOD or DIA either before or after Operation Homecoming, but who were not accounted for at that time. Since those hearings, the DIA and the Committee staff have reviewed further these cases and concluded that many were found to have died prior to 1973. Both the Committee and the Defense Department agree, however, that valid questions remain about 43 of those on the Committee's identified list.

These 43 are among 135 names on the list targeted for priority investigation by General Vessey and General Needham's Joint Task Force for a Full Accounting. I want to emphasize today, as I did last month, that none of these numbers—133, 43 or 135—reflect individuals we know with certainty were left behind after Operation Homecoming. This is simply the universe of people about whom there remain the most serious questions, whether because they were once listed as having been taken prisoner or because they were otherwise known or thought to have survived their incident. These are the cases that are currently the subject of priority investigation by the U.S., in cooperation with the governments of the region.

It is with this context in mind that we begin this morning two days of hearings into reports of live sightings of American prisoners in southeast Asia. A live-sighting report is just that. Someone, a refugee, a boat person, a former political prisoner, a diplomat, anyone in a position to observe, comes out of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia with information that an American or Americans may still be held prisoner. That information could be first-hand or hearsay; it could involve one American or many; it could be detailed or vague; it could be recent or as far back as the end of the war—the point is that it contributes to the possibility that some Americans may have been left behind and remained alive at least up to the time of the report.

The handling of live-sighting reports is one of the most controversial aspects of the POW/MIA issue. A review conducted by the Executive branch, itself, referred to the existence at one point of a "mindset to debunk" such reports. And yet tens of thousands of staff hours have been devoted to receiving, evaluating, following up or seeking to categorize these reports. They are a major focus of the Defense Intelligence Agency's work and a major focus of this Committee's investigation.

For the past 20 years, there has been nothing more tantalizing than reports that Americans have been seen alive in captivity in various parts of southeast Asia, and nothing more frustrating than the failure of these reports to become manifest in the form of returning Americans, with the single exception of Robert Garwood in 1979.

The sheer number of live-sighting reports, more than 1,500 since the end of the war, indicates to some that Americans—perhaps hundreds—must have been left

behind. However, our failure over 20 years to locate any of those Americans has caused others to conclude that the reports must be false. Today, for the first time in the history of this issue, we will not only ask the experts for a public explanation of what they think, but we will probe and test and question their reasoning, the actions they have taken to categorize reports and to evaluate those who have provided them, and the efforts that have been made to follow up.

I say that this process will occur in public for the first time because, until now, these reports have not been available to the public. All of the live-sighting reports referred to in the hearings this week have been de-classified and we have been assured by DIA that all of the others will be de-classified as rapidly as possible. We have agreed only that, in the declassification process, intelligence sources and methods will be protected and ongoing investigations will not be jeopardized. With these guidelines in mind, if anything should come up during the next two days that our witnesses feel they cannot discuss, they should say so and we will pursue it in an appropriate fashion. But I want to make it clear to everyone involved that the purpose of this hearing is to share information, and to do so in a way that will allow the public, as well as this Committee, to make some judgments about the process and how well or how poorly it has worked. The days of hiding information without good cause are over.

In closing, I want to repeat something I have said over and over again during the Committee's hearings and on numerous other occasions, as well. I cannot emphasize it enough. If someone, anyone, has information concerning American POW/MIAs that they believe this Committee should investigate, *now* is the time to let us know. If anyone believes there are witnesses or other individuals we should hear from, now is the time to let us know. If anyone has a theory based on fact that we should take into consideration, let us know now—not three months from now or after the Committee has completed its work.

Both the strength of this Committee and the ultimate integrity of our final report will depend on our willingness to draw conclusions based not on some of the facts, but on *all* available information. It is vital to remember that isolated statements, facts, reports or documents may well point in one direction, while the bulk of the evidence points in another. That is why we are charged not only with gathering information as widely and as broadly as we can, but also with correlating it, testing it, and questioning it as thoroughly and as objectively as possible.

This has been our pledge to the families and activists; this is the duty we have to our colleagues in the Senate; this is the responsibility we have to the American people; and this is the process we will carry forward during these two days of hearings and during the hearings and other phases of our inquiry to come.

Senator KERRY. Senator Smith.

STATEMENT OF VICE-CHAIRMAN ROBERT SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being a few minutes late.

Mr. Chairman, 8 years ago, when I first came to Congress, I became involved in this issue. And the involvement basically consisted of my involvement on the task force, as well as some individual meetings with various members of the DIA.

The meetings always dealt with source information regarding human intelligence—the human intelligence portion always dealt with source information and source analysis.

Source analysis, as it was presented, usually meant taking interviews or talking with other refugees about a source; conducting various background checks; and sometimes giving polygraphs.

But the focus was clearly, in my opinion, on the source, more than what the source said. And the analyst always concluded that a source fabricated a story based on that analysis—that source analysis.

But I always felt, along with some of my colleagues in the House at the time, that there was something missing; that we did not usu-

ally see raw data; we had no personal contact with the source; and for the most part saw few, if any, messages or other traffic.

But what I now realize, and one of the purposes of the hearing today, is that there is a second way of analyzing this information. Basically, it is content analysis: specifically, in the case of what is plotted, is the location of what individual sources said they saw, and therefore a cluster.

The two approaches, in my opinion, should complement each other, not contradict each other, necessarily. It is just one way to add to the accuracy of the information. I would like to illustrate that in my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I do want to note for the record, that because of information that I have not received, and I have asked for, and that the counsel has asked for, I am at a bit of a disadvantage, I am sorry to say. I did request one aerial photograph of the Citadel, showing Ho Chi Minh's tomb and the Ministry of National Defense. I did not get that for the hearing today.

Second, I requested a briefing board on downtown Hanoi. I did not get that. I asked for recent studies on prison systems in Vietnam and Laos. I did not get that. And the files that we have been given to work with—in some cases, not all—in some cases, are incomplete. There simply is nothing in them.

So my remarks will have to be tempered somewhat because I did not have that information, which I considered crucial to what I wanted to do.

And let me just begin and try to go through this quickly, by introducing what is called the Cluster Map, which will be shown here today. It has been seen in the press. And I would like to try to explain it briefly.

Long before this committee existed, senior DIA officers thought that a cluster map was useful—it was a good way of looking at live sightings. Admiral Brooks thought so; Colonel Gaines did; General Tighe did—all said so in various reports of the DIA effort.

Admiral Brooks wrote in 1985 not even the most basic kinds of analysis had been done on the information, such as plotting it on a map. That is a quote. That sentence was edited from the declassified version of the Brooks reports released to the public by the DIA.

The only line in the report that refers to plotting reports on a map is the one that is redacted. I find that interesting, since this is really the subject of the hearing today—that that particular line was redacted from the document.

The posting of flags on the map is called the cluster theory by some. It is not a theory, in my opinion. It is a very basic way of organizing and analyzing information by location. As a matter of fact, it is taught at the DIA. The investigators just sorted through some 15,000 reports, whittled them down to only those that dealt with alleged Americans in captivity after Operation Homecoming—some 928 reports or so; and plotted them on the map. All of this information came from the DIA.

There is nothing—nothing—no information that we used that came from anyone other than the DIA, all the materials. Nothing was added. They did not post flags for fabrications or frauds—

which both of us agreed were fabrications or frauds. They took those out.

They did not post flags for dog-tag reports, remains, crash sights, individuals seen living freely, smugglers, civilian returnees, or single—reports of single prisoners. There are no flags in Cambodia, for the most part. This confirms out worst fear that Americans who may have been captured by the Pol Pot gang, the Khmer Rouge, did not survive or were taken out of Cambodia.

For purposes of this hearing, we have confined the discussion to basically 155 live-sighting files which concern two areas in Vietnam, and two in Laos, that we have clustered. The DIA has 155 reports in their files as individual sources. We have just clustered those for the purpose of discussion, which was pre-determined in previous conversations with the DIA.

All of these numbers are probably very confusing for some who are trying to figure this out and understand what is being said.

And the best way to illustrate this technique is to use an example. And the only one that I want to use for the moment is a downtown Hanoi cluster. Those reports talk about seeing prisoners in a prison area, and basically the Ministry of National Defense Compound, referred to as the Citadel.

And the best way to illustrate that is to quickly run through that. And then with the idea that after we are finished, we would ask questions of the DIA on that.

The cluster of reporting involves an area—in this particular sighting—involves an area of downtown Hanoi, Vietnam, that is one of the most secure areas in all of North Vietnam, according to the Agency. It is called the Citadel. It is the Vietnamese version of our Pentagon.

It includes the Ministry of National Defense, the PAVN headquarters, various military agencies, and residential quarters for senior military officers. You can see on a map that the Citadel is over 1/2 kilometer square, located in the north-central part of the city, bordered by four different streets—and actually a site that some of you are familiar with on the west of—in an area on the west side, by a park area leading to Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum and, indeed, the war museum, itself, on Dien Bien Phu street. These are visited by the public.

Access to the Citadel is highly restricted, and U.S. intelligence experts say that the Citadel compound is perhaps the most secure area in Vietnam.

During the war, American POWs were held in the northeast corner of the walled compound and facility, known as Alcatraz, or Plantation West, which is near the military publishing house, on Ly Nam De. During the war, some Americans were held across the street at 17 Ly Nam De, at a compound known as the Plantation.

After the war, the Plantation was rumored to house the remains of U.S. servicemen and later became an army film repository. There have been numerous visits to this by U.S. delegations—including myself and many of my House colleagues in 1986.

But I do not want to talk about the Plantation today. The area west of the Plantation, inside the compound, an area—also an area south of the Plantation, along the east side of Ly Nam De Street—the current, official DIA position in this area is there is no evi-

dence to sustain a belief that U.S. POWs were detained after Operation Homecoming in this area. That has been stated to the committee.

Some 600 reports that our investigators have focused on tell us something else, however. These 600 people have told the U.S. Government—I emphasize, these people have told the U.S. Government—that Vietnam has a terrible secret: that it lied about American prisoners of war, and held many back at the end of the war. That is the message that these reports are telling us.

In order to keep its secret, these intelligence sources say that Vietnam kept the Americans in isolation; moved them around at night; kept them in secret prisons. Not everyone knew that, according to the sources—especially inmates of the reeducation camps.

Thus, while some former inmates tell us they did see American POWs, the many that tell us they did were not, probably—the many that tell us they did not were probably also telling the truth. According to the intelligence many inmates—and even many northerners—were not privy to that secret.

But in the greater Hanoi region, alone, some 150 sources indicate that the secret was not foolproof. That is because the prisons and camps required supervisors and guards. They needed maintenance, repair work, food, medical help, et cetera.

Within the narrow confines of Hanoi, 70 separate sources reporting over nearly 2 decades, betrayed Vietnam's secret—according to the sources—by reported sightings or other information about American POWs being held in Hanoi—the last place where people would expect them.

And the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense and Interior harbored the biggest secret of all, according to the sources—they ran a secret, underground prison system in the heart of Hanoi, under the feet of visiting dignitaries—including myself—who had been there on three, different occasions; a prison which held American prisoners of war after Operation Homecoming, and well into the late 1980's, the sources say.

Over a 15-year period, these sources have filled-in details concerning the construction and operation of this facility next to the Ho Chi Minh tomb.

The stories of POWs in these areas, long after the war, sounds like a Tom Clancy novel. And, indeed, some will say that is what it is. But these reports are not from fictitious people. They are real people telling us what they said they saw, and what they said they heard.

I will now summarize quickly what these reports stated to the United States Government, and I will do so in chronological order. And Mr. Chairman, I will not run through each one of these, obviously, to be very brief here.

Again, I want to say that the part that concerns me—and I would hope we would get into it in the question—is a statement by the agency that there is no evidence to sustain a belief that U.S. POWs were detained after Operation Homecoming in this area. That is what we are talking about. You decide if you can support that statement.

But I would like to ask the DIA to defend their analysis on that, and I want America to know what these sources stated.

And I will be putting all of these reports in the record.

But for the first time, the committee is able to discuss these reports in the open, because with much prodding from the committee, our Government is finally beginning to release these reports to the American people.

Now let me just cite a couple of examples of the sources. There are some 14 to 17 sources in the Citadel which I will enter for the public record.

But just using a couple of examples—there is a—

Senator KERRY. Let me just interrupt you there and say that all of the live-sighting reports, all clusters are being made part of the record. All are being released today, as well as additional documents. So they will all be part of the record.

[See Appendix]

Senator SMITH. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is a Vietnamese source who left Vietnam with his wife; settled in England in 1979; in July 1981 he sent a letter to the American embassy in London and passed on the following information: In June 1974 the source was assigned to a work detail. He was trimming trees, under guard, inside the Citadel, on the west side of Ly Nam De. While in the tree, saw four to five caucasians, he said, standing next to the ground floor of a building, where he estimated there were about another 70 inside. The PAVN security officer on his work detail told him they were American pilots and mechanics. In the fall of 1978, the same source says he, again, saw caucasians inside the Citadel on a second floor balcony, et cetera.

DIA states that the source's information is unsubstantiated, at best; and most of it probably a fabrication.

In another case, another source—again seeing prisoners in the Citadel—the DIA states that that source was evasive during his interview, and they recommend no further contact be made with the source.

Certainly, everybody is familiar with Robert Garwood, an American prisoner in 1978. While still in Vietnam, he stated he saw several Americans at a compound in Ly Nam De, near a cistern—which is across the street from the Citadel. He drew a sketch of the location.

DIA labeled Garwood a convicted collaborator, and does not place any credence in his reporting on live sightings.

I have been at that compound, and visited that cistern.

The cistern certainly does exist.

In another case, DIA states that the source could not have seen what he said he saw from a vantage point, because the source could not see what he saw. Yet, the source passed two polygraphs.

And we could go on through a number of these, Mr. Chairman. And this will all be a part of my statement for the record.

But one I want to focus on is this one, source 7591 as we have identified it: This source was interviewed in a refugee camp in Pusan, South Korea, in 1987. That is when he was interviewed. He states that he was told by a Vietnamese army officer that as late as 1985 there was an underground detention facility adjacent to Ho Chi Minh's tomb, which was holding American prisoners of war.

The facility, according to the army officer, was constructed in 1970. As the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum was being constructed—Ho

Chi Minh died in 1969 and they immediately began building the facility—the civilian construction workers who built the facility had to undergo extensive background checks during the three generations of their families.

He describes the security at the tomb as being very tight, and states that the underground detention facility was constructed underneath Be Dinh Park, right next to Ho Chi Minh's tomb.

He states he first heard about the facility from friends at the National School in Vietnam in 1980. And when he again visited Hanoi in 1985, the army officer provided the same information. The source talked about the transfer of American prisoners there taking place at night.

There is no DIA assessment of this report in the file that we received—no assessment.

And we have others from boat people; and other reports which essentially confirm—not confirm, but essentially say that there were people in that—in that facility—contrary to the statement made by DIA.

Considering all of the information that we do have in the files regarding sightings that cluster in this area—and this is what I am saying—based on the content of what they said, the locations cluster. These are unrelated. They span a period of 15 years. And they cluster in the Citadel—or across the street from the Citadel—that information, to the best of my knowledge, and information was not plotted, or at least according to the internal reviews it was not.

And considering all of this, I believe that the presence of a secret, underground facility for POWs in Hanoi could be a rational explanation. And I think we ought to determine whether or not the DIA has evidence at all that would indicate that there is such a facility.

Because if there is, obviously then what they said, these individuals said, has a great deal of credence and therefore deserves another look.

The majority of the ultimate source of information on the underground prison are construction works. Construction workers. We are not talking about in all cases them saying they saw POWs. They are saying they built—they built the Citadel prison. They worked on it. They are people associated with senior PAVN officers who knew about this prison. They do not build a prison for nothing.

Based on what the sources say about security, some association with senior officers would be necessary to learn about this underground American POW facility. And the DIA has judged these sources of the eyewitness and hearsay reports to be fabricators, or people who were mistaken or misinformed about what they saw or heard.

That not only misses the point, Mr. Chairman, it also prevents the recognition of a point. If you only concentrate on individual sources, you miss the very existence of the prison. You totally miss the prison if it exists.

My biggest regret is that it took me so long to discover this. I also regret that it took so long for me to finally obtain three, internal reports—Tighe, Brooks, and Gaines—from the DIA which tell

me why I should not accept the DIA conclusions based on source analysis.

Let me briefly quote from these reviews: September 1985, Thomas Brooks, Admiral Brooks, former DIA official states: One, follow-up actions have not been pursued; a mind-set to debunk has resulted in sloppy analysis; the analysts do not have an open mind; the database is a wasteland; there are unhealthy attitudes; there is no coherent or disciplined collection report; there is not enough analysis; there is almost a total lack of management; there was intense report initially focused on veracity of sources with a view toward discrediting them; the sources, in the main, have no ulterior motive; the sources should not be badgered when they volunteer information; et cetera.

General Tighe, former Director of DIA, in his report states, there is evidence that Americans remain alive in Vietnamese custody against their will—even in the limited sample of reports we reviewed. An unresolved case according to DIA means, quote, we have not yet proved these reports are false, unquote.

The greatest problem associated with POW issue is the lack of professional analysis of available intelligence. There is little evidence that any significant analysis of the intelligence received has been accomplished in recent years.

These are not my words. These are the words of General Tighe in this case.

The verdict of folk wisdom is ignored. That is, where there is smoke, there is fire—again, General Tighe. There is a dominant emphasis on the negative. National technical means have never been levied proactively in an attempt to locate POWs, and so forth.

There is an enormous volume of unanalyzed, hearsay reports. Hearsay reports are impeached by DIA from the start. This is an irresponsible distortion of the intelligence process, as I understand it.

Most refugee sources know what they saw—even though DIA analyses conclude the opposite. For instance, we found sources who easily distinguished American caucasians from Russians or Germans or fair-skinned Asians. The Thai report also concluded that the Vietnamese are engaged kind of in a ritual of victory, the display of oriental superiority which is why they are not being forthcoming on the issue.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that our investigators from the committee have spent hundreds of hours reviewing the files. Basically nothing has changed in the last 5 years since these secret, critical reports were written.

Essentially, the approach is the same: review the source, look at the source, ignore the message and shoot the messenger. And basically, the same people who have been doing this for some years—several years—are still here. A good example in recent time were the statements made by Mr. Yeltsin who were immediately discredited. Mr. Yeltsin was a drunk, it was stated, or he did not know what he was talking about.

So I believe we are entitled to hear from the agency, and this is the purpose of the long introduction here, Mr. Chairman is that in terms of the Citadel, I think we should hear from the DIA whether

or not there is a detention facility there, underground, at the Citadel, near Ho Chi Minh's tomb. Is there or is there not?

And that is just one cluster of reporting. If there is a Citadel prison, then those people who said there was a prison were telling the truth about that. And if they were telling the truth about that, they very well may have been telling the truth about the men, American men, they claim to have seen in that prison.

That is just one cluster. We will be looking at three others in addition to that. And I think that the questions ought to be asked on that Citadel. And if, in fact, the Citadel does exist, then the Vietnamese and the Lao are responsible for the fate of American POWs—if they are there. And I believe that it is our obligation here to determine the truth regarding the Citadel. And we should demand to see the Citadel.

We talk about the cooperation of the Vietnamese. We ought to go—if, in fact we establish there is a prison there—then we ought to be there tomorrow morning with all of the people in the ground in Vietnam and say we want to see inside the Citadel underground.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Smith.

Now, so that everybody understands what is happening here, put what Senator Smith said into context—what Senator Smith has done at the request of the committee, is outline the cluster concept, and sort of the state of the evidence that we have received.

And as I am sure you can understand, General, these are the kinds of questions that are emerging automatically from the documents that have been presented, as well as from the analysis that the staff has been going through for a period of time.

And so Senator Smith is really framing for you the committee's approach today, and a small sub-set of questions that we have—which is why we have 2 days of these hearings set out at this moment. And if we need more, we are prepared, obviously, to go through more.

But those are just some of the questions that we are going to want to analyze today. And before we get to that, let me turn to Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Before addressing the subject of today's hearings, I would like to briefly comment on actions that have been taken by the Bush Administration to resolve the many difficult questions involved in the POW/MIA issue.

Judging by what took place at the National League of Families Convention the other week, the President's POW/MIA policy is either unknown, misunderstood, or ignored in the emotional controversy that the issue has become.

Since coming to office, the President has pursued an accounting of our POW/MIAs with more dedication than any President to my knowledge since the Vietnam war. Under his leadership, the United States has dedicated substantial more resources to the pursuit of answers about our missing servicemen.

During his term, he has quadrupled the funding for field operations to serve for these answers. Since he came to office, he has more than doubled the number of personnel involved in the search for answers.

Thanks to his effort, as well as the members of this committee and thousands and thousands of Americans, the United States has opened a POW/MIA office in Hanoi and resident American investigators pursue information about our POW/MIAs and conduct live-sighting investigations in military archives, prisons, and military facilities. Because this administration successfully negotiated with the Vietnamese to obtain this unprecedented access.

I believe that the President has been responsive to the families and the public's right to know. Under the provisions of the legislation which I sponsored, the administration has declassified nearly 2,000 live-sighting reports, such as those we are going to discuss today. Those reports are now in the Library of Congress and available to anyone for inspection.

The President has been extraordinarily accommodating to this committee. He has allowed us access to virtually every file, memo, and piece of paper we have expressed interest in. Most recently, of course, the President responded to the committee's request for declassification by releasing 1.5 million pages of formerly-classified material. And he has assured committee members that all other documents we require will be released to the public.

I know, Mr. Chairman, how deep emotions run on this issue. I have experienced it first-hand. Throughout the emotions and anxiety that attend this issue, we must remember what it is that we seek: we seek the truth and nothing but the truth. We should not be diverted from that pursuit by calls to support one point of view or another. And anyone who provides assistance as valuable as that provided by the President should be commended, and not denounced.

I am sure that all the members of this committee will agree that the President deserves to be commended for his good-faith efforts to assist us in our important work.

Allow me now to make a few, brief remarks about today's hearing. As we begin this open discussion of the many reports with the United States has received, which purported to be evidence of Americans in captivity in Southeast Asia, I must strongly caution the committee and the public from drawing preliminary conclusions based on one, two, or several live-sighting claims, before you listen carefully to the explanation of the analyses of these reports.

Live-sighting reports are often seemingly compelling. And they are often very sensational. They are almost always more sensational than analyses done to determine the veracity of the reports; to read in print that an individual, quote, saw ten Americans in a prison yard in 1986 is far more exciting than to hear that the investigators have gone to the prison and that the physical descriptions contained in the live-sighting report did not correspond to the reality; or that the source later recanted; or that ten Americans in a prison yard may really have been ten Russians at a military base.

I must also raise my concern that we not lose sight of the importance of not only evaluating the information we receive, but also

evaluating the source of the information. If an individual with a past record of offering misinformation for sale, or has been involved in other criminal enterprises, or has pursued other fraudulent means to emigrate from his country or obtain financial rewards tells me that he has seen an imprisoned American, I would be foolish not to consider the source as I consider the information.

The truth of the matter is that the search for our POW/MIAs has been greatly complicated by unethical and/or desperate individuals who have, for one reason or another, sought to peddle false information to the United States and to the families.

So I would caution everyone: listen carefully to the live-sighting reports; listen carefully to the analyses of those reports. The truth, though elusive, will be found if only we are patient enough and thoughtful enough and fair enough to see it.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.

Senator Grassley.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Particularly, thank you for your leadership as we go about doing a very difficult job that this committee has been given to do.

I want to first of all associate myself with the last paragraph or so of your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, where you commended the staff investigators for trying to do their work to try new and different approaches to analyzing information; to doing everything we could to get everything out on the table.

I felt like I—implicit in your comment was maybe a necessity of explaining the new approaches that are being used here. I hope that you will not feel any necessity for explaining anything that this committee does. Because we are just in the pursuit of doing the people's work in the sense of our constitutional responsibilities of oversight lay out specifically what was in our mandate to do to get to the bottom of this issue.

Basically what is being done today is an opportunity to put everything out on the table. I think the truth comes out when everybody has a chance to know what everybody else knows. One of the questions I would like to have answered during the process of our hearings, Mr. Chairman, is simply to have the Department of Defense explain what there is about the bureaucracy in the Department of Defense that would keep the approaches that are being used here from at least being tried. And some of these people that are working on this for this committee had previously worked for the Department.

And what is there about this or any other issue that keeps new ideas or new approaches from surfacing? Why does the Congress of the United States have to kind of try new idea and try to analyze from a different point of view? Because if there is a major problem there demonstrated by the unwillingness to try new approaches within investigating this issue, within the Department of Defense, what is something wrong with our whole system of gov-

ernment that would suppress new tactics, new approaches, new procedures, just to lay everything out on the table.

And then that says something about, well, what is wrong with our system of participatory democracy where no idea, no approach should be suppressed. The whole essence of our system of government is openness, to get everything out on the table, to let the people decide. That is true of this committee. There should not be anybody on this committee that really does not want to try any new idea or any new approach. We should just be trying to get everything out. The public's business must be made public, particularly after 20 years of carrying on this debate.

And so, Mr. Chairman, your comments were, I think, very appropriate, and I do join you in complimenting our people working and bringing out what they think is something that has been overlooked by our own Department of Defense and other agencies involved with this.

But there is really no necessity for explaining, because we are just doing what we are called upon to do, and what our constitutional responsibility does. And that is to raise questions about DIA's analysis of live sighting reports and it's conclusion that none of the thousands of first-hand and hearsay reports has been of a live American prisoner.

These questions are raised less than 2 weeks after the Department of Defense declassified three internal reports that were critical of DIA's analysis. Those internal reviews criticized DIA's mindset to debunk all information pertaining to alleged live sighting of prisoners.

Of course here is, at issue, DIA's methodology. DIA's method is to judge each report independently. If the source can be proven to lack credibility or if there are discrepancies in his or her account, the substance of the account is deemed invalid, it seems.

Some formally in DOD and on this committee have suggested an alternative methodology that can be more illuminating and can better explain the data. And, of course, that is why we are here today.

I would like to throw out an example to illustrate the problem. Suppose I overheard Senator Kerry and Senator Smith tell each other that they saw a POW on our trip to Hanoi this spring. Suppose the two Senators are inaccessible to you. You must, therefore, rely upon my statement. Let's say that I heard Senator Kerry say this at 10:00 a.m. in the elevator, yet by the time that I was able to recount this to you, I mistakenly think that I heard it at noon in the Senator's dining room.

Now, critics say that DIA would do the following. First, it would quickly determine that Senator Kerry was meeting with Senator Cheney at noon that day, and Senator Smith was giving a speech. The substance of my report, even though true, might be debunked by DIA because of the discrepancies in my account. The fact that it is hearsay also means that the report may not be checked out. This criticism, perhaps valid, perhaps not, is what we will explore today.

As a point of departure, let me say that it is somehow passing strange, Mr. Chairman, that out of thousands of accounts of seeing or hearing about live American prisoners that not one, not one is deemed valid. Statistically—statistically that is remarkable. That

fact alone demands scrutiny of the methodology. How can it be that zero—zero out of thousands of accounts are false?

Perhaps there is some underlying motive that can explain why so many would come forth and lie. Is it because they want money? Is it because they want safe passage to the United States? If that is so, what about those who are already in the United States and those who do not want any money? Is it because they are spreading disinformation for the Vietnamese or the Lao? If that were so, they would be shooting themselves in the foot since steady progress is being made towards normalization.

Whatever the case, I would certainly like to know what the grand motivator is behind all the lies. Perhaps the answer is that there is no grand motivator. Perhaps, DIA says, it boils down to a case-by-case basis. The problem with this theory is that the real world just does not work that way. Statistically, that does not work because life is random.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Kerrey is presiding right now. He will be returning. Senator McCain has gone to a meeting. He also will be returning, and other colleagues will be here. A full set of the live sighting files that are being used for today are available for the press or others in H-705, which is the Hart Building, and the conference room of 705. So, the full set of the live sighting reports are available.

Let me, before I introduce General Clapper, say that as chairman of this committee, it is my responsibility to guarantee, as best as I can, the integrity of our approach of this committee to this issue. I am interested, as I have said again and again in the truth; I mean, not a shade of it, not somebody's slant of it. And so our effort today is in that spirit. And I hope all parties, those with interest in the audience will understand that, and those here.

I welcome this open opportunity to have this kind of vetting. It is something that I have pushed for since the first day that the committee came together. And while I have objected to individuals who make their own determination as to when information should be released, there has never been anything but an effort by this committee to vet this as we are doing it here today. But the committee wanted to understand what it was we were dealing with, which is why we have proceeded, I think, intelligently and in a way that has tried to bring people in rather than create confrontation.

I ask everybody to approach these two days in that spirit of trying to understand this, and not looking for scapegoats or creating battles where we do not need to have them. I particularly ask members of the audience, who on occasion have articulated frustration with the process, that if you would help us in this process to be able to get through our work and refrain from those kinds of demonstrations of anger or frustration, this process will have its day. And it will have its day better by our being able to work our way here.

And so I caution people ahead of time. If there are interruptions or demonstrations of some kind, or people do not like an answer of one of the witnesses, let us decide where we are going to go next. I do not think we need coaching or encouragement on it. I think that you will find our questions probative on all sides of this ledger.

I approach this simply looking for real answers, not trying to construct a truth. But I will tell you that the balance of doubt, the presumption, if you will, has to fall in favor of those who served and who are listed as POW/MIA. And I think that presumption is one that most people in this country would accept and support. So, it is up to us to analyze what takes away that presumption.

Now, General Clapper, we welcome you here today. We look forward to your testimony. I am glad you can stay with us longer than you had originally anticipated. And I gather you will introduce the panel that is going to work with you today. And so, without further ado—I would like to ask you to stand and be sworn, if I may.

Would you raise your right hand? Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

General CLAPPER. I do.

Mr. SHEETZ. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., USAF, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT SHEETZ, CHIEF; GARY SYDOW, CHIEF, ANALYSIS BRANCH; WARREN GRAY, CHIEF, CURRENT OPERATIONS BRANCH; AND ROBERT DeSTATTE, SENIOR ANALYST, SPECIAL OFFICE FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Senator KERRY. If you would identify yourself, please?

General CLAPPER. Sir, I am Lieutenant General James Clapper, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency since 18 November of last year. With me is Mr. Bob Sheetz, who is the Chief of our POW/MIA Office in DIA, and other members of his staff we can introduce later.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, distinguished members of the committee, in response to your invitation, I am pleased to provide my perspective as part of this inquiry. Accompanying me are several experts from DIA's Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs who will discuss those cases of special interest and other issues that you and other members of the committee have raised in your 27 July letter of invitation to me.

Ten days ago, I had my first opportunity to publicly explain my views concerning the POW/MIA issue when I addressed the annual meeting of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. My main point to them is the same I would make here today. That is, I have always been deeply concerned about accounting for the missing and will ensure that DIA's efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting will not waiver during my tenure as director.

On a personal note, I served two tours in the war in Southeast Asia. The first in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966; the second in 1970 and 1971 during which I flew 73 combat support missions over Laos and Cambodia in EC-47's. To my knowledge, I am the only DIA director who actually ever flew any such missions over these two countries.

I know of fellow airmen who were shot down and never returned. I also ear-witnessed, if you will, by overhearing the communica-

tions taking place during search and rescue operations, several heart-rending such evolutions, many of which were successful but some of which regrettably were not.

Throughout my intelligence career, I have followed the POW/MIA issue closely, especially as director for intelligence at the U.S. Pacific Command from 1987 to 1989, and now, of course, in my present role. Following my confirmation last year as DIA director, I emphasized the priority that DIA places on the POW/MIA issue by assigning the agency's special office for POW/MIA affairs to report directly to me. I have great confidence in the professional competence, dedication, and integrity of the current members of this office.

POW/MIA intelligence investigations, collection, and analysis comprise one of DIA's highest priorities. And this level of attention will be sustained. I would like to mention some things that DIA has done briefly—mention briefly some things that DIA has done in the last year significantly to expand the effort. Our Stoney Beach operation headquartered in Bangkok has grown with the opening of the U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi. We now have live sighting investigators permanently stationed in Bangkok and Hanoi, and hope to have similar positions filled very soon in Laos and Cambodia.

Regarding DIA's support to General Needham's joint task force, I recently signed a memorandum of understanding with Admiral Larsen, the Commander and Chief of the Pacific Command governing our relationship and the support we will provide. It is now standard practice for DIA to send live sighting investigators out with each field team the task force dispatches. We have nearly doubled the size of our special office here in Washington, and in so doing have tripled the number of military members in that office. I think we have been forthcoming with the staff of the committee and other interested parties in the Congress, and have provided access to all DOD intelligence material, maps, locating data, policy papers, and other classified data to which access is normally limited, to include materials we brought with us today.

The end result of this effort is that everything within DOD that pertains to POW/MIA's that I have any jurisdiction over has been made available to the committee. We are also complying with committee requirements and the recent executive order to declassify all material on POW/MIA's.

I just returned from Russia, where I emphasized our deep interest in the POW/MIA issue during unprecedented discussions with my counterpart, the chief of the GRU, as well as the chief of staff of the Russian military, and the number two leader of the former KGB. In addition, my chief of staff, Mr. Dennis Clift, is serving with Ambassador Toon on the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

My assessment is that we have made progress on several fronts this year. The most recent was the successful tracking down, by our Stoney Beach team, of the origin of the photograph purporting to show several missing Americans. It remains DIA policy to follow on all leads related to POW/MIA's, even those suspected to be the only way to close this matter success-

fully is to thoroughly examine and resolve all reports of live sightings.

In conclusion, sir, I would tell you that although many of the highly emotional, contentious issues surrounding the POW's and MIA's originated long before you or I came to our present incumbencies, I will certainly not shrink from my current responsibility to act on behalf of those still missing. I will not betray the trust that those in Congress have shown in the intelligence community over these many years, or for those who have, for whatever reason, lost that trust, I am committed to doing all I can to restore it. In that context, my focus is on the now and the future.

I would like now to introduce several members of DIA's Special Office for POW/MIA affairs who will explain our procedures in this area and provide a detailed briefing on the cases in which you have expressed special interest.

In addition to Bob Sheetz, Gary Sydow, Chief of the Analysis Branch; Warren Gray, Chief of our Current Operations; Bob DeStatte, our Senior Analyst; and then I believe Colonel John Cole will be here tomorrow, who is Chief of our Stoney Beach project in Bangkok.

I also have Major Jeannie Schiff, Captain Cynthia Chambers, and Lieutenant Paul Maguire. You remember these officers are the ones who briefed this committee in closed session during early July. We have rewritten that briefing so that it can be presented today in this unclassified setting.

They will begin by providing an overview of the all-source intelligence system, will discuss the prioritization of investigations, the kinds of information presently being collected in Indochina, how it is gathered, and finally, and most important, based on the discussions thus far this morning, how it is assessed.

[The prepared statement of General Clapper follows:]

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., USAF, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this Committee, I'm pleased to have been invited to these hearings and to provide the Defense Intelligence perspective as part of this continuing inquiry into the matter of alleged sightings of American prisoners of war in Indochina subsequent to Operation Homecoming. Accompanying me are several experts from DIA's Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs who will discuss those cases of special interest stipulated in your 27 July 1992 letter of invitation.

INTRODUCTION

Ten days ago, I had my first opportunity to publicly explain my views concerning the POW/MIA issue when I addressed the annual meeting of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. My main point to them is the same one I would make here today—that is, I have always been deeply concerned about accounting for the missing, and will ensure that DIA's efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting will not waiver during my tenure as Director.

I served two tours in the war in Southeast Asia—the first in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, and the second in 1970 and 1971 during which I flew 73 combat support missions over Laos and Cambodia in EC-47's. To my knowledge, I am the only DIA Director who actually flew any such missions over these two countries. I know of fellow airmen who were shot down and never returned. I also "ear-witnessed" several heart-rending Search and Rescue, or SAR, missions—many of which were successful, but some of which, regrettably, were not. Throughout my intelligence career, I have followed the POW/MIA issue closely, especially as Director for Intelligence at the U.S. Pacific Command from 1987 to 1989, and now in my present role.

Following my confirmation last year as DIA Director, I emphasized the priority DIA places on the POW/MIA issue by assigning the Agency's Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs to report directly to me. I have great confidence in the professional competence, dedication, and integrity of the members of this office. POW/MIA intelligence investigations, collection and analysis comprise one of DIA's highest priorities. This level of attention will be sustained.

EXPANDED AGENCY EFFORTS

I want to begin by outlining some things DIA has done in the last year to significantly expand its POW/MIA effort:

Our Stony Beach operation, headquartered in Bangkok, has grown with the opening of the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi. We now have live-sighting investigators permanently stationed in Bangkok and Hanoi, and hope to have similar positions filled very soon in Laos and Cambodia.

Regarding DIA support to the new Joint Task Force/Full Accounting, I recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command, governing our relationship and the support DIA will provide. It is now standard practice for DIA to send live-sighting investigators out with each field team the Task Force dispatches.

We have nearly doubled the size of our Special Office here in Washington and, in so doing, have tripled the number of military members in that office.

DIA has, I believe, been extremely forthcoming with the staff of this Committee, and other interested parties in the Congress, and has provided access to all DoD intelligence material, maps, locating data, policy papers and other classified data to which access is normally very limited. The end result of this effort is that everything within DoD that pertains to POW's/MIA's has been made available to this Committee. We are also complying with Committee requirements and the recent Executive Order to declassify all material on POW's/MIA's.

I have just returned from Russia where I emphasized our deep interest in the POW/MIA issue during discussions with my counterpart, the head of the GRU, as well as the Chief of Staff of the Russian military and the number two head of the former KGB. In addition, the DIA Chief of Staff, Mr. Denis Clift, is serving with Ambassador Toon on the Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on Prisoners-of-War and Missing-in-Action.

My personal assessment is that we have made progress on a number of fronts this past year. The most recent example was the successful tracking down—by our Stony Beach team—of the origin of a photograph purporting to show several missing Americans. I am quite comfortable with our current analytic methodologies and management approach.

CONCLUSION

It remains DIA policy to follow up on all leads related to POW's/MIA's, even those suspected to be fraudulent. We believe the only way to close this matter successfully is to thoroughly examine and resolve all reports of live sightings.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I would tell you that although many of the highly emotional, contentious issues surrounding the POW's and MIA's originated long before you or I came to our present positions, I will not shrink from my current responsibility to act on behalf of those still missing.

I will not betray the trust that those in Congress have shown in the Intelligence Community these many years, or, for those who may have, for whatever reason, lost that trust, I am committed to doing all I can to restore it. But I can't re-do history. My focus is on "now" and the future. I pledge DIA's unwavering support for all efforts aimed at achieving the fullest possible accounting.

INTRODUCTION OF DIA BRIEFERS

I would now like to introduce several members of DIA's Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs who will explain our procedures in this area and provide a detailed briefing on the cases in which you have expressed special interest.

First, I want to introduce: Bob Sheetz, Chief of our Special Office; Gary Sydow, Chief of the Analysis Branch; Warren Gray, Chief of Current Operations; Robert DeStatte, our Senior Analyst; and Colonel John Cole, Chief of our Stony Beach Project in Bangkok.

Also, seated with me at the table, are:
Maj. Jeannie Schiff; CPT Cynthia Chambers; and LT Paul Maguire.

You might remember that these three officers are the same ones who briefed this Committee in closed session during early July. We've rewritten that classified briefing so it can be presented today in this unclassified setting. They will begin by providing an overview of the all-source intelligence system, and will discuss the prioritization of investigations, the kinds of information presently being collected in Indochina, how it's gathered, and finally, how it's assessed.

Senator KERRY. Did you have any opening, Mr. Sheetz?

Mr. SHEETZ. No. I will have one tomorrow, sir.

Senator KERRY. Fine. Let me invite those who are going to be, at this point, part of the panel—I do have some questions for you, General, and I want to ask them.

Before I do, I want to put this map and this concept in a proper context if I can. Now who, among our investigators—I just want to ask some sort of ground-setting questions here. Do you want to answer them, or John McCreary?

John, if I could just ask you, so that we have a full explanation for everybody of what is—before you respond, because I want you to respond to this. Obviously, we have asked that.

This is John McCreary, who is one of our staff investigators. What is represented on the map right now? All those flags represent how many live sighting reports?

Mr. MCCREARY. 928 flags are posted there.

Senator KERRY. And the 928 flags that are posted there have been screened from the total of 1,500, is that correct?

Mr. MCCREARY. A total of 15,000.

Senator KERRY. 15,000. 15,000 all through the war, correct, and afterwards?

Mr. MCCREARY. That is right.

Senator KERRY. But since 1973, there have been 1,500.

Is that accurate?

Mr. MCCREARY. I think there has been—Mr. Sheetz knows the answer to that.

Senator KERRY. Do you know that, Mr. Sheetz, live sighting reports filed since Operation Homecoming?

Mr. SHEETZ. Roughly 1,500.

Senator KERRY. 1,500. All right.

Mr. MCCREARY. Are those first-hand live sightings?

Mr. SHEETZ. First-hand.

Senator KERRY. First-hand live sighting reports filed since 1973 Operation Homecoming. 1,500, correct? The 928 that you have posted up here, are they also taken from the 15,000, or only from the 1,500?

Mr. MCCREARY. From the larger universe.

Senator KERRY. From the larger universe of 15,000.

Mr. MCCREARY. Of the 15,000, if I can clarify, Mr. Chairman please, we have posted 215 of that number. In addition, we have posted over 713 from the hearsay batch. So we have two categories of files. We have first-hand live sightings and hearsay reports. And we have posted 215 first-hand live sightings on the map, and 713 hearsay reports.

Senator KERRY. Is it possible, just so I understand the beginning point here and the committee record is clear—the 713 and the 215 represent the full measure of flags on this map?

Mr. MCCREARY. That is correct, and they represent a DIA file.

Senator KERRY. I understand. All taken from DIA file.

Mr. McCREARY. Precisely.

Senator KERRY. The question is, of the 215 first-hand live sightings, are they exclusively from the post-Homecoming period, or do they represent also from the larger universe?

Mr. McCREARY. Those reports, all 928 reports have a date of sighting that is after Homecoming.

Senator KERRY. Okay. That is important to understand. So, every flag up here represents a sighting date and time and place post-Operation Homecoming?

Mr. McCREARY. That is correct.

Senator KERRY. Now, they were screened in addition to that, correct?

Mr. McCREARY. The total universe was screened in addition.

Senator KERRY. Can you just explain quickly for the record what that screening is?

Mr. McCREARY. We use 16 different screens, and Senator Smith, I think, touched on the most important ones. For the purpose of posting flags to the map, we did not use single reports except where we believed that the resolution of a single report seemed unlikely.

We did not use reports of individuals who returned. We did not use reports of smugglers. We did not use reports of fabrications, after we examined the file, we agreed that DIA's determine of fabrications was, in fact, a legitimate one. Clear and obvious frauds—we accepted DIA's evaluations of most of those. We accepted DIA's evaluations of specific individuals who had returned home in one capacity or the other—drug smugglers and things like that.

We did not post flags for people who were not seen in conditions of captivity. Reports that indicated men living freely were not posted to the flag. Missionaries—we accepted DIA's evaluation when the evidence in the file said that the men were missionaries; Mennonites, Quakers, things like that. In total, there were 16 filters.

Senator KERRY. I just want to establish that what is represented here is a much-filtered, greatly reduced number. This is a refinement of the 15,000 total now represented as 928 on the map. Thank you. I just wanted to establish where we are beginning with what is on the map here. And out of this map, which is in effect representing a number of different clusters—as one can see just looking at the map.

There is a large cluster of flags around Hanoi. There is a large cluster of flags around Son La or Viengxay in Laos. So, we have taken what, after further analysis by our staff, raises the most significant questions of those remaining 928 live sighting reports. And that is what we want to try to get into at this point in time. Is that clear, and you understand that Mr. Sheetz, and General Clapper?

Before we start moving into an inquiry regarding the first cluster, which will be Hanoi—oh, let me just also ask you for explanation. The colors mean something different, do they not, the color of flag?

Mr. McCREARY. Yes, they do.

Senator KERRY. Just if you could explain quickly the color.

Mr. McCREARY. One point I wanted to make, I forgot to mention, just to make it explicit, reports about Robert Garwood were not plotted on this map. At the time we did this map, we accepted DIA's judgment about resolution of sightings of that genre.

Senator KERRY. And there were some 300 or so reports referring to Robert Garwood, correct?

Mr. McCREARY. That is right.

Senator KERRY. Those 300 reports—

Mr. McCREARY. They are not reflected on this.

Senator KERRY. Fair enough.

Mr. McCREARY. Now, the colors. The colors represent decades of sightings for ease of reference. Blue represents sightings where the date of the sighting is the decade of the 1970's, but after Homecoming. The red flags are sightings in the 1980's and the 1990's. The yellow flags are flags where sighting is imprecise as to date, or the information is imprecise as to date but is after Homecoming.

Senator KERRY. And those are the only three colors?

Mr. McCREARY. Those are the only three colors. There are different shaped flags for hearsay reports and for first-hand live sightings, but that is something that is difficult to see from a distance.

Senator KERRY. Okay. Fair enough. We will get into the detail of what kind of report made of a particular cluster as we look analytically at the substance of those reports.

Now, General, let me just ask you a few broader questions first, if I can. You noted that you cannot redo history here, and it is important, obviously, as we try to look at some of the internal criticisms made of DIA.

You know, I say at the outset, they were not on your watch. You were only on this for the last year, and I understand that. But I would take it that you have reviewed the Gaines report, Tighe report, and so forth. Is that fair?

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I have.

Senator KERRY. Have you found it necessary to take any corrective action at this point, or to change the process or approach?

General CLAPPER. Sir, I think that many of the corrective actions that were indicated or implied in both those reports have been taken, and were underway—had been taken before I arrived on the scene at DIA. What I have attempted to do is just to further reinforce those findings and to try to correct additional shortcomings by ensuring we had additional personnel where required, moving the POW/MIA office into better working conditions, and doing whatever else I could to facilitate the effort, given the contentiousness and emotional nature of the issue.

I think, by and large, many of the corrective actions were already undertaken. Colonel Gaines, for example, was subsequently put in charge of the office after he wrote it. So he had his own—seemingly his own agenda to fix. As best as I can tell, many of those actions were apparently taken.

Similarly, I think if you read the whole context of the Tighe report, to include some exceptions that were taken to it by two of the panel members, again I think it's a question of putting everything into historical context. But the bottom line is, in my view, that I think that many of the corrective actions that were indicated have been taken.

Senator KERRY. Now, since 1980, there were 121 first-hand live sighting reports in 1980. The date of sightings we have broken down. There were 15 in 1973, 101 between 1974 and 1979. And there were five between 1980 and 1992. Only 3 of the 121 remain unresolved, so you have resolved 118 of those.

Likewise, in 1981 there were 100 first-hand live sighting reports, 78 of which the date of sighting was from 1974 to 1979. Of those, only 1 remains unresolved, so 99 have been resolved. In 1982, there were 78 first-hand live sighting reports. There were 18 in 1973. 44 between 1974 and 1979, 16 between 1980 and 1992. All 78 have been resolved.

Likewise, for the next successive years, 1983, 1984, 1985, there were 106, 117, and 116. All of them have been resolved with the exception of one in 1985. Now, I could go through all the way up to 1992, and indeed, we are going to at some point in these hearings later on. I do not want to go into detail on this now. But, most of these live sighting reports during the 1980's and 1990's are resolved.

The bulk that are not resolved are the most recent ones. In 1989, you have 15 unresolved out of 149. In 1990, you have 16 unresolved out of 132. You have 28 unresolved out of 92 for 1991. And in 1992, you had 46 first-hand reports, 30 of which remain unresolved.

I would think that, given the nature of prioritization and the increased access in Vietnam, that a live sighting report rendered in the year 1991 or 1992 would be the highest order of priority and the fastest resolved. Can you help me understand why the bulk of those remain unresolved?

Mr. SHEETZ. If I could, Senator, we do have a new process, as you well know having travelled to Vietnam just a couple months ago yourself. We do have a process in place where we can send cases out there for our live sighting investigators to investigate.

But before we send those cases out there, we want to give a very quick, thorough analysis of the case, match it up with whatever data we hold in our files, present the live sighting investigator with a complete package to go out into the field with not only information on the particular sighting, but now we're also sending out, along with that sighting package, all other previously closed live sighting reports and hearsay reports that are in that same immediate geographic area.

We're continually refining the process. I, too, am desirous of having it sped up, but we can only work it as fast as we can get the reports in here, analyze them, and get them back out.

Senator KERRY. I understand that, Mr. Sheetz, but I'm troubled by it. I mean, I have to tell you that—

Mr. SHEETZ. Well, if I could just sort of walk through one. A source in a refugee camp; just got into the camp. We have arrangements with the U.N. people who administer the camps and in Thailand with Thai officials that we screen the people as they arrive.

And if they have information about any American POW's or MIA's from the war, we'll send one of our investigators up from Bangkok immediately and investigate that report; take the information. Then we do an analytic evaluation.

Many times, because the initial contact with that source—our field collector was not privy to all the information we have about a

particular geographic area in Vietnam, may not be aware of all the subtleties surrounding that report, we've got to go back to the source in some circumstances to sharpen up the original reporting. We do that through what we call a source-directed requirement, or SDR. It takes a couple of months for that process to work.

I guess we balance off the need for thoroughness and completeness and accuracy against the risk that we would take in going off half-cocked with half-developed or poorly developed information in a live sighting report.

And the reason I raise that is the Vietnamese, while they say good things to you and Senator Smith while you were over there, and to Secretary Solomon, in actual practice we have great difficulty working with our counterparts in scheduling live sighting investigations. And they will tell us that the information that you're bringing to us is preposterous.

And after we do, indeed, finally go out there and, in cases so far, we don't find a live American, they say, see, we told you so, this is ridiculous information.

Senator KERRY. Now, let us deal with reality here for a moment, because it is important to put these in their context. In 1991, you got 92 live sighting reports. 12 of those, however, referred to a sighting of somebody back in 1973, correct?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. 55 of them referred to a sighting of somebody in 1974 to 1979. So, while you get a report in 1991, the report is as to a place in time 15 years ago or more, correct?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. Hardly likely that in many cases that you go to that place and you find the same person in the same place that they were reported to have been in 15 years ago, I would assume. Only 25 of the reports in 1991 were as to people between 1980 and 1992. Is that accurate?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. Now, how many of those reports, those 25, would have been as to somebody being seen in real time, in now time, i.e. in 1990, 1991, 1992. Do you know?

Mr. SHEETZ. I don't have that number off the top of my head.

Senator KERRY. Are there some?

Mr. SHEETZ. I think the most recent sighting that we have right now is approximately—it purports to be approximately 6 to 8 months old. So, there is a time lag.

Senator KERRY. Now, has that been checked out? Would a recent sighting get greater priority than earlier ones?

Mr. SHEETZ. As soon as we have a complete package to send out to the live sighting investigators we send it out. And, certainly, a report that we think has credence, a current report would get priority treatment. But the notion is that we give them all priority treatment.

Senator KERRY. We are going to come back to this. This is a little bit aside from the cluster piece we want to start with, but I did want to try to get at that, and it is one of the areas that we have got to look at the course of these two days.

Let me let you now begin. You have a presentation, do you not, with respect to the framework that's been set out? I would like to

allow you your opportunity to give us that presentation, and then we will begin a process of inquiry. Let me ask if Senator Daschle has any opening comment?

Senator DASCHLE. No opening comments, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. SHEETZ. I'm going to slide to the end and bring out three briefers up here.

Senator KERRY. I would just like to ask each of you, why do you not remain standing and I will swear all of you in. Could you raise your right hands, please? Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major SCHIFF. I do.

Captain CHAMBERS. I do.

Lieutenant MAGUIRE. Yes.

Senator KERRY. Would you each identify yourselves for the record?

Major SCHIFF. I am Major Jeannie Schiff, U.S. Air Force.

Captain CHAMBERS. Captain Cynthia Chambers, U.S. Army.

Lieutenant MAGUIRE. Lieutenant Paul Maguire, U.S. Navy.

Senator KERRY. Thank you all very much for joining us, and Mr. Sheetz, it is your show. Why do you not take off?

Mr. SHEETZ. Major Schiff is our first briefer.

[The information follows:]

THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S BRIEFING TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POWS AND MIAs, AUGUST 4, 1992

VG1: TITLE SLIDE

Major SCHIFF. Good morning Mr. Chairman, good morning Senators, ladies and gentleman.

VG2: PURPOSE

The purpose of this briefing is to describe the U.S. Government's All-source intelligence collection and analysis effort on the live prisoner issue, and to outline what the *intelligence* has to say about the possibility that American prisoners of war remain behind in Southeast Asia.

VG3: USG POSITION

As you are aware, the U.S. Government position is: While there is no information to confirm that Americans are still detained in Southeast Asia, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Because the U.S. Government cannot rule out the possibility, the Department of Defense continues to aggressively investigate this issue.

VG4: HIGHLIGHTED OVERVIEW

This briefing will cover the areas shown here and will provide you with a comprehensive overview of our effort.

VG5: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HISTORY

Within the U.S. Government, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has the executive responsibility to pursue intelligence on the POW issue. Our agency has worked this issue since 1964 and continues to do so today, using every available means of intelligence collection. We assess each report or piece of intelligence on a case-by-case basis and we compare it to all the other information we have. Our work is routinely reviewed within our own agency, by other intelligence agencies, by policy makers, and by congressional oversight committees, including this committee.

VG6: ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

This briefing will demonstrate why professional intelligence analysis on this issue is much more complex than it may appear. Specifically, we want to illustrate that drawing conclusions from single sources or reports—particularly when far more information is available—is both misleading and misdirected. DIA uses an all-source approach to investigate and evaluate all information. This means that we use every scrap of information we can collect. This comprehensive approach is the only realistic way to go.

VG7: INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

The sources of intelligence we use include:

Human intelligence, or information supplied by people, such as refugees, businessmen, journalists, and diplomats. Indochinese historical records, and political documents also fall into this category.

Signals intelligence, or information obtained from communications intercepts. This type of intelligence was useful during the war to identify crash sites and track the movement of U.S. prisoners.

And, imagery intelligence, or intelligence from photography. As you will see, imagery can be used to confirm the accuracy of human source reporting.

Now let me give you a real example of how the Defense Intelligence Agency applies an all-source approach to analysis of a single report.

VG8: QUYET TIEN MAP

In 1979, we received information from a source who said he saw 50 U.S. POWs between 1973 and 1978 while he was held in the Quyet Tien Reeducation Camp near the China border.

VG9: WORD SLIDE, EXAMPLE ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: REPORT OF 50 U.S. POWS IN QUYET TIEN REEDUCATION CAMP IN 1973-1978

Reports like this one, where the sources describe seeing POWs with their own eyes, are categorized as firsthand live sightings—they receive our highest priority for further investigation.

We used all-source analysis to investigate this report. We looked at photography to see if there was a camp in the area the source described, and there was. However, the photography showed that during the time the source said he saw U.S. POWs in this camp, the gates were wide open. In fact, it was not being used as a prison at all. Through other sources, we learned that it was being used as a military supply station. However, to be certain that no POWs had ever been held in this camp, we located former inmates to ask if they knew of any Americans held there. These people all denied that any Americans had ever been held in this camp. But we didn't end our investigation there.

VG10: CAMP SKETCH

We asked all of our sources to draw a map of the camp so we could compare their sketches with our photography. Each of the former inmates that we had located from this camp provided accurate sketches—one of which you see here. In fact, the only person whose sketch of the camp was not accurate was the original source who claimed he saw 50 U.S. POWs in the camp.

The moral of the story is this: Relying on only one source of information would have led us to believe that there were U.S. POWs in this camp. Taking a multiple source approach convinced us that this was obviously not the case. The U.S. Government is prepared to take any measures necessary to rescue American POWs from captivity. However, to recommend launching a rescue operation based solely on one source's information could have had serious consequences.

VG11: ALL-SOURCE COORDINATION

Another facet of an all-source approach requires coordination with other Government agencies. Let me tell you about another case in which information provided by other agencies helped resolve several sightings.

VG12: MAP OF RACH GIA

In 1987, we received information from one of these agencies that the Vietnamese had arrested an American on a boat in the Gulf of Thailand. Within a few months

we began receiving refugee reports that a blonde or brown haired American was being held in the prison at Rach Gia.

VG13: SKETCH OF RACH GIA

We are very familiar with this prison. The sketch you see here is from a former inmate. Our prison database contains numerous reports on Rach Gia. We have photography, and we know how the prison has been used over time. Our prison database also contains interviews with private American citizens who were held in Rach Gia during the post war period for violations of Vietnamese law.

It was clear that the man arrested in 1987 was not a U.S. POW, but we continued to collect information on this case for two important reasons. First, as the U.S. Government's expert on Indochinese prison systems, we routinely study the handling of all foreign prisoners in order to gain insight on how potential U.S. POWs might be handled. Second, we collected information on this case because we had begun to receive reports of an American prisoner in Rach Gia. Since we are in the business of looking for U.S. prisoners of war, we take all such reports very seriously.

The bottom line, of course, is that this man was not a U.S. POW. In fact, we learned from other agencies that he was allegedly involved in drug-trafficking and may have fled the U.S. to avoid criminal prosecution. The point here is that, within a few weeks of the time a westerner showed up in a maximum security prison in Indochina, we knew he was there.

VG14: COLLECTION AND INVESTIGATION

The two examples I've shared with you demonstrate why it is critical to apply an all-source approach to analysis of any single piece of intelligence. Of course, all-source analysis is only as good as the intelligence on which it is based. For this reason, the U.S. Government's intelligence collection capability on the POW-MIA issue is continually being improved.

VG15: LIVE-SIGHTING INVESTIGATIONS

One of our newest programs involves sending investigation teams to the countries of Indochina to look into reported sightings of U.S. POWs. For the first time since the end of the war, the Indochinese governments have permitted U.S. investigators to visit areas where we have had reports of live American POWs, and to interview local sources to corroborate original reports.

VG16: CAY CAY MAP

For example, this past spring our investigator visited the remote Cay Cay reeducation camp in a forest in Tay Ninh province where three sources had reported that in 1987, they saw a black American prisoner. Sources stated that he was sometimes seen chained to a log or tending buffalo.

VG17: MAN FROM CAY CAY

Our investigator located the camp and interviewed the man you see here. Born of a French-Cameroon father and a Vietnamese mother, he was serving time in the reeducation camp on criminal charges and was employed clearing forests. His work required him to chain logs to buffalo carts and he routinely carried the chains over his shoulders. Again, as our investigation showed, this man was not a U.S. POW.

VG18: MAP OF COMPLETED LSI LOCATIONS

Although this in-country investigation program has only been in operation a few months, you can see that we have covered targets all over Indochina. We've been to Dien Bien Phu, Son La, Cao Bang, and multiple targets in Hanoi. Our investigator has methodically searched every single street and alley in Hanoi. We've sent investigators up and down Provincial Route 19 in Lam Dong Province looking for an American said to be selling firewood at a local market. We've had people looking in Ben Tre City for an alleged American POW said to be collecting garbage there in 1990. We've been to Saang Prison in Cambodia and to the Tchepone area in Laos to check out a photograph alleged to be MIA Daniel Borah.

VG19: MAP OF JOINT FIELD AND LSI AREAS

Joint task force teams have visited the areas highlighted here. We also have multiple source reporting which covers all of Indochina. However, so far, we have not found any U.S. prisoners of war.

Since, thus far, I've illustrated our all-source approach with examples from Vietnam, I'd like to now turn to Laos to clear up some commonly-held misconceptions about the POW situation in that country.

VG20: LAOS, A BLACK HOLE

To begin with, I can tell you that Laos is not the black hole some believe it to be. People who think otherwise point to the difference between the small number of prisoners who returned from Laos and the far greater number who returned from North Vietnam. But as I will show you, this is comparing apples with oranges.

VG21: LAOS BAR GRAPH

What you see here is a bar graph showing what happened to airmen shot down in South Vietnam, Laos, and North Vietnam. A comparison of air losses is relevant because 90 percent of our losses in Laos were aviators. On the graph, the red shows the percentage of airmen rescued, the blue shows the percentage captured and returned, and the yellow shows the percentage who are still unaccounted for.

As you can see, Laos and South Vietnam are very similar. A large portion of downed airmen were rescued in both countries. The small portion captured is relatively equal.

The real exception here is North Vietnam. North Vietnam is different because intense air defenses made it very difficult to rescue downed aircrews. Since fewer men could be rescued, more of our airmen were captured, and later more were returned from North Vietnam.

By the same token, because search and rescue operations in Laos and South Vietnam were more effective, more downed airmen were rescued, and fewer became prisoners.

VG22: MAP OF HO CHI MINH TRAIL

Others who say that Laos is a special case cite a second reason for their belief. They say that because the Lao Government did not sign the Paris Peace Agreements, it did not return prisoners at the time of operation homecoming. This belief is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of who controlled the territory where most of our losses in Laos occurred.

The dots on this map show all of our losses. The Ho Chi Minh Trail network is shown by these black lines. Notice that most of the trail is well within Laos. This area was totally controlled by the Vietnamese. Almost 85 percent of U.S. personnel lost in Laos were lost in this area.

Our intelligence indicates that U.S. POWs captured in North Vietnamese-occupied areas of Laos, remained under Hanoi's control. In Laos, as in South Vietnam, most U.S. prisoners held by the North Vietnamese, were eventually moved to prisons in North Vietnam.

When looking at Laos on a case-by-case basis, we find that very few missing men would have become prisoners of the Pathet Lao. Almost everyone lost, was lost in an area under North Vietnamese control.

VG23: LAOS: NOT A SPECIAL CASE

The odds for returning home were better in Laos than in North Vietnam. The odds for capture were very similar to South Vietnam. In the final analysis, there are no compelling reasons to believe that substantial numbers of aviators were captured and retained by the Pathet Lao. The bottom line is that Laos is not the MIA/POW black hole it has been depicted to be.

VG24: TRAFFIC SLIDE

Having briefed you on our all-source analytical approach, I will now turn the discussion over to Captain Chambers who will talk about U.S. losses in Indochina and discuss our best candidates for possible POWs if any, in fact, were held past the time of operation homecoming. Captain Chambers.

Captain CHAMBERS. The idea that live American prisoners could have been left behind in Indochina after the war continues to haunt the American consciousness.

Currently, there are 2,266 Americans who are unaccounted-for from the Vietnam War. When we say unaccounted for, we include all those whose fate is still unknown as well as those who are known to be dead, but whose remains have not yet been recovered.

VG25: PRESSING FOR ANSWERS

The difficult task of identifying who might have survived and remained a prisoner after the war, began even before prisoners were released during Operation Homecoming in 1973 and it continues today. After 1975, when our access to Indochina abruptly declined, we continued to press the Indochinese Governments to give us answers about our missing. In some cases, the known circumstances of an individual's loss made it clear that the Indochinese Governments had knowledge about these people that they had not yet shared.

VG26: RON DODGE

Knowledge of the fate of men like Ron Dodge, who did not return during Operation Homecoming but whose photo in captivity appeared in the September 1967 issue of Paris Match. CDR. Dodge's remains were returned by the Vietnamese fourteen years later in July 1981, but no explanation regarding the circumstances of his death was provided. Our Government's demand for an explanation was deemed a "Hostile Act" by the Government in Hanoi. Vietnam's refusal to provide information about this man is typical. Again and again we have pressed the governments of Indochina for information on all of our missing without results. Over time, sometimes an unbearably long time, we were able to obtain some answers. Regrettably, these answers have not yet led to a live American but only to the resolution of cases by the return of remains.

VG27: JTF-FA INVESTIGATION (WORDS)

In 1988, the U.S. Government began investigating the cases of those individuals who had the best chance for survival. These investigations, which are underway as we speak, are carried out by the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting.

VG28: JT INVESTIGATION (PHOTO)

The investigators, like the one pictured here, start at the point on the ground in Indochina where individuals were last known to be alive, and track them until we are able to confirm their fate. This approach requires identifying which of our missing Americans could have survived.

VG29: UNACCOUNTED FOR MAP

This computer generated map shows the loss locations of all Americans who are still unaccounted for in Indochina. Those killed-in-action are represented by the blue dots—missing-in-action are in red. The distinction between killed-in-action and missing-in-action is critically important.

VG30: UNACCOUNTED FOR (NUMBERS)

Of the total 2,166 unaccounted for Americans, 1,095 were killed-in-action—leaving 1,171 Americans missing-in-action. Let me explain how we arrive at these numbers. Based on the circumstances surrounding their loss incidents, the Services declared these 1,095 individuals dead at the time they were lost. A large number of these were over water cases where aircraft crew members were not recoverable even at the time of loss. Similarly, on land, battlefield conditions or the circumstances of loss often prevented recovery of remains.

The Defense Intelligence Agency reviewed all 2,266 cases to identify those people who had the best chance for survival. Our analysis indicated that, with few exceptions, if a live POW was held after Operation Homecoming, he would not have come from among those people declared killed-in-action by the Services. This leaves 1,171 individuals whom the Services declared missing-in-action.

VG31: RANGE OF LOSS

However, our investigation of their loss incidents reveals that not all 1,171 are likely candidates for survival. Shown here is the range of loss circumstances for those listed as missing-in-action.

First and foremost are the people we call "last known alive." I will expand on this category shortly.

Although alive, some of these servicemen are known to have been gravely wounded with little chance of survival.

We also have cases where information on an individual's fate is mixed or evidence of their fate is lacking. For example, off-the-radar scope cases, those cases where aircraft simply disappeared into a cloudbank, are in these categories. These are the most difficult cases because it is almost impossible to know where to begin an investigation unless more information becomes available.

In some of the 1,171 cases, we know the individual didn't survive even though he wasn't declared killed-in-action by his commander. There are cases where all identifiable traces of an individual were eliminated by the sheer force of an explosion. Finally, there are those who are known to have died in captivity.

VG32: LAST KNOWN ALIVE DEFINITION

To identify those people who could have survived and become POWs, the U.S. Government established a definition of "last known alive" cases which is shown here. A review of all cases determined which individuals met the "last known alive" criteria. Their cases are among those designated as the highest priority for investigation.

VG33: DONALD SPARKS

Private First Class Donald Sparks is one of the individuals who was "last known alive" he was captured during a firefight on June 17, 1969. We have letters which PFC Sparks wrote describing his foot wound and his first 10-months of captivity. We also have reports from released POWs that their prison camp guard mentioned a prisoner named "Don" whose foot was healing. We don't know what happened to Donald Sparks. Those answers are held by the Indochinese Governments.

VG34: PRIORITY CASES (MAP)

As shown here, the 269 individuals for priority investigation are drawn from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and have been the focus of our field investigations that began in Vietnam in September 1988. As opportunities have presented themselves, the investigations have expanded into Laos and Cambodia.

VG35: PRIORITY CASES (MATH)

However, not all 269 individuals are likely candidates for survival and possible captivity. Based on our field activities in Vietnam, 61 of these people are known to have died.

An additional 78 cannot be considered as possible POW candidates for one of the following reasons.

(1) They are known to have died but happened to have been lost in the same incident with a "last known alive" person;

(2) They are known to have died in captivity but are incorporated as priority cases because, at one time, they were carried by their respective services as a "POW;" or

(3) They do not meet the criteria for a last known alive designation, but are included as discrepancy cases because we believe the Indochinese Governments are withholding information concerning their fate.

And finally, there are remains still under analysis at the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii that we expect will lower this number further once they are identified. There are also several cases where we have information that points strongly, but not conclusively, to death at the time of loss.

VG36: "WHO COULD HAVE SURVIVED"

This leaves us with 100-125 individuals. If POWs remain in Indochina, they are most likely to come from this group. Because the number can change based on the receipt of new intelligence, it should be viewed as dynamic, falling within a range. There are simply too many unknowns to support a single figure, and the priority of individual cases can be raised as we get new intelligence. In fact, the United States recently raised the investigation priority of six missing servicemen based on new information from Vietnamese records.

VG37: ARCHIVAL RECORDS

Vietnamese records, such as the one shown here, often contain information previously unavailable in U.S. files. As you may recall, I spoke earlier of off-the-scope cases and how difficult they were to investigate. Vietnamese records have given us valuable leads to investigate in some of these cases. We have been actively pressing the Vietnamese for more records, but this continues to be an uphill battle.

VG38: HOMECOMING AND BEYOND

As I have explained, our analysis sets an upper limit on the number of MIAs who could possibly be POWs. It does not suggest that they are POWs or that any POWs were, in fact, held past the time of Operation Homecoming. What we are talking about here are those MIAs who potentially could have survived. We do not know if they survived. I cannot overemphasize this distinction.

VG39: TRAFFIC SLIDE

Having briefed you on our efforts to determine who might have survived, I will now turn you over to Lieutenant Maguire who will discuss what postwar reporting tells us about the possibility that live Americans were held after Operation Homecoming. Lieutenant Maguire.

VG40: MAP OF INDOCHINA

Lieutenant MAGUIRE. The countries of Indochina have not been totally closed to Westerners since the war. Although official American access has been limited, other nations have maintained a diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian presence. Asian and Western diplomats, businessmen, AID workers, and journalists have crisscrossed Indochina, and many have reported their observations. In fact some have mistakenly been reported as U.S. POWs themselves, but none have ever corroborated reports of American POWs.

VG41: "THE REPORTS"

However, the largest body of postwar intelligence about missing Americans is refugee source reports. Over 15,000 source reports have been received since 1975, and that number grows every day. Over half of these reports are a direct result of a comprehensive United States effort to screen over two and a half million refugees from Southeast Asia.

Source reports fall into 4 major categories.

A. Firsthand live sighting reports are based on eye witness experience and have proven to be the most accurate and useful of the source reports primarily because firsthand witnesses have greater knowledge of the details and circumstances of a sighting. Additionally, information from first hand sightings is easier to verify, investigate and follow-up on.

B. Hearsay reports contain information reported second and third hand and are potentially important but in many instances, because of their lack of detail, are not as useful as firsthand reports.

C. Crash and grave reports claim to know where American aircraft have crashed or where the remains of American servicemen are buried. They are particularly important to the mission being conducted by Joint Task Force-Full Accounting.

D. The largest body of reporting is called dog tag reporting. These reports contain information normally found on U.S. military ID's commonly called dog tags.

VG42: DOG TAGS

The reports give names, blood types, religious affiliation, or other personal data, but 97 percent of them are not about missing Americans. In fact, many are not even about people. However, each report is individually evaluated.

VG43: "ARC INFO FHL"

This graphic depicts the locations of all firsthand live sightings of American POWs. The reports cover a large part of Indochina.

To date we have received almost sixteen hundred firsthand reports. DIA evaluates these reports and our results are reviewed by an independent panel made up of representatives from other U.S. intelligence agencies.

VG44: "PIE CHART"

This pie chart shows the results of DIA's analysis of firsthand reports. Many people believe that DIA calls most of these reports fabrications. Actually, we have concluded that about 70 percent are true.

There is also a belief that DIA only correlates these reports to accounted-for people. This too is a misconception. DIA has correlated 43 firsthand reports to 33 unaccounted-for Americans.

None of the reports tells us that anyone lost in wartime was held past the time of Operation Homecoming in 1973.

In most cases the firsthand information reported helped to confirm other intelligence in our possession.

In many cases we have other information that goes beyond what was reported in the live sighting reports.

As of today, 108 reports are still under active investigation.

VG45: FIRSTHAND CORRELATIONS

Altogether, firsthand live sighting reports have been correlated to 137 separate incidents involving 237 people, both accounted-for and unaccounted-for.

VG46: "ARC INFO HEARSAY"

This graphic depicts all hearsay live sighting reports. Hearsay reports come from people who get their information second and third hand. An example of a hearsay report is "My friend told me," or "I heard at the market."

Hearsay reports vary by country. In Vietnam hearsay reports account for about half of all live sighting reports and they tend to echo the details and descriptions of actual firsthand reports. However, in Laos hearsay reports account for almost 80 percent of the live sighting reports and, in many instances, they are vague in detail. Like off-the-scope cases, discussed earlier by Captain Chambers, hearsay reports are difficult to verify or investigate.

VG47: "LOOK-ALIKES"

One of the problems in investigating firsthand and hearsay live sighting reports is the large number of people in Southeast Asia who look like Americans and are reported as U.S. POWs. We call this group of individuals look-alikes. This group includes Amerasians, Afro-Asians, and Eurasians; Russian advisors, Western diplomats, missionaries, drug traffickers, and tourists.

VG48: "JOHNNY KING"

For instance Johnny King, an Asian who often passed himself off as a United States POW.

VG49: "FATIMA DRUG REHAB"

Or the Eurasian photographed at the Fatima Drug Reeducation Center in Ho Chi Minh City.

VG50: "WALTER T. ROBINSON"

Here is a young Afro-Asian who has been identified in numerous reports as an American POW named Walter T. Robinson. The real Walter T. Robinson is a Caucasian living in the Midwest. He was never listed as a POW or an MIA.

VG51: "AHRAO"

I'm sure everyone here is familiar with this photo which was alleged to be Daniel Borah, Jr. and later found to be a Lao tribesman named Ahrao.

VG52: "GUNTER DITTRICH"

And this photo of Gunter Dittrich which was purported to be former U.S. Army Captain Donald Carr.

VG53: "DOCTORED PHOTO OF THREE"

And this photo, which was identified as missing Americans John Robertson, Albro Lundy, and Larry Stevens, is an altered version of a photo which came from a 1989 Cambodian version of "Soviet Union" magazine.

VG54: "REAL PHOTO OF THREE"

In the magazine the original photo appears in a story about collective farming in the Ukraine in the 1920's and as you can see, none of the individuals in the original have a mustache.

The subjects of these photos have all at one time or another been reported to be U.S. POWs or have passed themselves off as U.S. POWs. Investigating these reports is important but is also extremely difficult and time consuming. These photos are vivid examples of why more than a single picture or single report is required to verify a POWs existence.

VG55: "ARC INFO FHL AND HEARSAY"

This graphic represents all firsthand live sighting reports in red and all hearsay live sighting reports which were detailed enough to be plotted in blue.

As you can see there are some areas where the reporting tends to be heavier and gives a clustered appearance.

Some members of the Senate committee staff believe that the reports within some of these areas prove that U.S. POWs were held past Homecoming.

VG56: SENATE CRITERIA

Our understanding is that Senate staffers used three criteria to reach that conclusion. These three criteria are shown here.

However, to reach these conclusions about "clusters," other types of intelligence were ignored and only a handful of the over 15,000 source reports were used.

VG57: "DIA CLUSTER ANALYSIS"

DIA has analyzed clusters since the mid-1980's. In fact when a new source report is received at DIA it is standard procedure to look at all previous firsthand and hearsay reports in the same geographic area and to look at any report that contains similar information regardless of source or location.

DIA briefed the results of cluster analysis to Members of Congress in 1987. In fact a member of this committee's staff took part in those briefings.

One of the great benefits of our own cluster analysis has been the wealth of knowledge about the handling of prisoners that we have acquired.

Additionally, we have found that in real clusters the percentage of firsthand live-sightings which turn out to be fabrications is notably lower than among firsthand reports as a whole.

VG58: "DIA ANALYSIS OF SENATE CLUSTERS"

Senate investigators identified twelve "clusters" which met their three criteria and where they believed reporting indicated "live POWs."

DIA looked at these areas—but we didn't just look at the source reports within these clusters—we used all the information which we have in our data base as well.

After conducting all our source analysis we couldn't find information to support the Senate staff's claims. In fact we found that four of the areas identified by the staff were not clusters.

I will briefly go through two of the areas that were identified by the Senate to demonstrate what DIA's analysis showed.

VG59: "MAP OF DAK CHUNG"

One of the areas identified was near Dak Chung in Laos. DIA looked at the 16 live-sighting reports from that area. Two were firsthand reports that had nothing in common with the hearsay reports. The first firsthand report was an accurate description of an accounted-for American moving up the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The source of the second firsthand report admitted lying.

VG60: "DAK CHUNG" (WORD SLIDE)

Senate investigators called Dak Chung a cluster because of six hearsay reports that recounted the same story. At first glance these reports looked promising because they all seemed to corroborate each other. But in-depth analysis showed that all of the reports were similar because one of the six sources had told the same story to the other five.

What we are left with is not a cluster of six but a cluster of one. And that one source admitted lying about his original story. So now we have no cluster.

Of the remaining hearsay reports:

Three were too vague to plot geographically, and one of these recounts the story of a free living American, his wife and two children. This hearsay story has been frequently recounted throughout Laos and Vietnam, particularly among the ethnic minorities in those two countries. All that varies in the story is the location given for where the American and his family are living.

The remaining hearsay reports are from ethnic minorities who heard a story second or third hand from their uncle, nephew or brother-in-law. Many of these stories are so vague in detail that they are difficult if not impossible to investigate. The reports we can investigate turn out to be false. Additionally, another common theme is that almost all of the reports are coupled with requests for monetary assistance.

Once the "cluster of one" source is removed you are left with reports scattered over a large area that do not have anything to do with each other and are vague at best. So DIA has concluded that Dak Chung is not a cluster. But we could only reach that conclusion by carefully reading and investigating each report.

VG61: "MAP OF KHAM KEUT"

Another area identified by the Senate as a cluster is Kham Keut in Laos. Let me say first that Kham Keut is a cluster. The cluster is centered around the only four firsthand reports in the area.

VG62: "KAHM KEUT" (WORD SLIDE)

These firsthand reports are all true and they all concern the detention of a U.S. civilian and a foreign national in the area in 1975. This goes back to what I said earlier. The percentage of true firsthand reports within real clusters is higher than the percentage of true firsthand reports on the whole.

Among the hearsay reports—once again—more than half came from people who got their information from a relative, and most are too vague to investigate. Almost all came from people who asked for money to finance the POW's rescue or to assist them in obtaining further proof of his existence.

Four of the reports were based on information which came from flyers distributed throughout Laos. These flyers contained personal information about an unaccounted-for pilot. Reports echoing the flyers come from all over Laos.

Three of the hearsay reports are about the detention of foreign nationals in the area.

The remaining six reports are either too vague to plot—including another story about the free living American and his family or they are still under investigation.

VG63: "SOURCE REPORT SUMMARY"

After careful analysis, we did not find a single report or group of reports within any of the twelve areas identified by the Senate which would confirm that a U.S. POW was held against his will after the war.

In summary I would say that source reports, particularly live sighting reports, remain the largest and most accurate type of post war intelligence on POWs and MIAs. However, it cannot be stressed strongly enough that relying on this one source of intelligence or any other single source of intelligence can be dangerously misleading. Professional analysis requires input from a variety of intelligence sources.

VG64: "ARE THERE LIVE PRISONERS?" (USG POSITION)

We conclude, ladies and gentlemen, with the following assessment: After years of postwar searching, thousands of reports evaluated, and every available means of intelligence collection employed, no single report, or combination of reports, has ever been able to confirm that American prisoners of war remained in captivity after Operation Homecoming in 1973. Nonetheless, the many unanswered questions that

remain, continue to bring us back to the United States Government position on this issue, which precludes ruling out the possibility that Americans may remain captive in Indochina. For that reason, we will continue our investigations, using every intelligence resource that the U.S. possesses, to achieve the fullest possible accounting for our missing Americans.

Thank you.

Major SCHIFF. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senators, ladies and gentlemen. The purpose of this briefing is to describe the U.S. Government's all-source intelligence collection and analysis effort on the live prisoner issue, and to outline what the intelligence has to say about the possibility that American prisoners of war remain behind in Southeast Asia.

As you are aware, the U.S. Government position is, while there is no information to confirm that Americans are still detained in Southeast Asia, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Because the U.S. Government cannot rule out the possibility, the Department of Defense continues to aggressively investigate this issue.

This briefing will cover the area shown here, and will provide you with a comprehensive overview of our effort.

Within the U.S. Government, the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, has the executive responsibility to pursue intelligence on the POW issue. Our agency has worked this issue since 1964, and continues to do so today using every available means of intelligence collection.

We assess each report or piece of intelligence on a case-by-case basis, and we compare it to all the other information we have. Our work is routinely reviewed within our own agency, by other intelligence agencies, by policy makers, and by Congressional oversight committees including this committee.

This briefing will demonstrate why professional intelligence analysis on this issue is much more complex than it may appear. Specifically, we want to illustrate that drawing conclusions from single sources or reports, particularly when far more information is available, is both misleading and misdirected.

DIA uses an all-source approach to investigate and evaluate all information. This means that we use every scrap of information we can collect. This comprehensive approach is the only realistic way to go. The sources of intelligence we use include human intelligence or information supplied by people, such as refugees, businessmen, journalists, and diplomats. Indochinese historical records and political documents also fall into this category.

Another category, signals intelligence, is information obtained from communications intercepts. This type of intelligence was useful during the war to identify crash sites and track the movement of U.S. prisoners. We also use imagery intelligence, or intelligence from photography. As you will see, imagery can be used to confirm the accuracy of our human source reporting.

Now, I'd like to give a real example of how the Defense Intelligence Agency applies the all-source approach to analysis of single reports. In 1979, we received information from a source who said he saw 50 U.S. prisoners of war between 1973 and 1978, while he was held in Quyet Tien reeducation camp near the Chinese border.

Reports like this one, where sources describe seeing POW's with their own eyes, are categorized as first-hand live sightings. They re-

ceive our highest priority for investigation. We used all-source analysis to investigate this report. We looked at photography to locate the camp in the area the source described, and we found it.

However, the photography showed that during the time the source said he saw U.S. POW's in this camp, the gates were wide open. In fact, it wasn't being used as a prison at all. Through other sources we learned that it was being used as a military supply station.

However, to be certain that no POW's had ever been held in this camp, we located some former inmates to ask if they knew of any Americans held there. These people all denied that any Americans had ever been held in this camp. But we didn't end our investigation there. We asked all of our sources to draw a map of the camp so we could compare their sketches with our photography.

Each of the former inmates that we had located from the camp provided accurate sketches, one of which you see here. In fact, the only person whose sketch of the camp was not accurate was the original source who claimed that he saw 50 U.S. prisoners of war in the camp.

The moral of the story is this. Relying on only one source of information would have led us to believe that there were U.S. prisoners of war in the camp. Taking a multiple source approach convinced us that this was obviously not the case. The U.S. Government is prepared to take any measures necessary to rescue American prisoners of war from captivity. However, to recommend launching a rescue operation based solely on one source's information could have had serious consequences.

Another facet of an all-source approach requires coordination with other Government agencies. Let me tell you about another case in which information provided by other agencies helped to resolve several sightings. In 1987, we received information from one of these agencies that the Vietnamese had arrested an American on a boat in the Gulf of Thailand. Within a few months, we began receiving refugee reports that a blond or brown-haired American was being held in the prison at Rach Gia.

We were very familiar with the prison. The sketch you see here is from a former inmate. Our prison database contains numerous reports on Rach Gia. We have photography and we know how the prison has been used over time. Our prison database also contains interviews with private American citizens who were held in Rach Gia during the post-war period for violations of Vietnamese law.

It was clear that the man arrested in 1987 was not an American prisoner of war, but we continued to collect information on this case for two important reasons. First, as the U.S. Government's expert on Indochinese prison systems, we routinely study the handling of all foreign prisoners in order to gain insight on how U.S. prisoners of war might be handled.

Second, we collected information on this case because we had begun to receive reports of an American prisoner in Rach Gia. Since we are in the business of looking for prisoners of war, we take all such reports very seriously. The bottom line, of course, is this man was not a U.S. prisoner of war. In fact, we learned from other agencies that he was allegedly involved in drug trafficking and may have fled the U.S. to avoid criminal prosecution.

The point here is that within a few weeks of the time a Westerner showed up in a maximum security prison in Indochina, we knew he was there.

The two examples I've shared with you demonstrate why it is critical to apply an all-source approach to analysis of any single piece of intelligence. Of course, all-source analysis is only as good as the intelligence on which it is based. For this reason, the U.S. Government's intelligence collection capability on the POW/MIA issue is continually being improved.

One of our newest programs involves sending investigation teams to the countries of Indochina to look into reported sightings of American POW's. For the first time since the end of the war the Indochinese Governments have permitted U.S. investigators to visit areas where we've had reports of live American prisoners of war and to interview local sources to corroborate original reports.

For example, this past spring, our investigator visited the remote Cay Cay reeducation camp in a forest in Tay Ninh Province where three sources reported that in 1987 they saw a black American prisoner. Sources said that he was sometimes seen chained to a log or tending buffalo.

Our investigator located the camp and interviewed the man you see here. Born of a French Cameroon father and a Vietnamese mother, he was serving time in the reeducation camp on criminal charges and was employed clearing forests. His work required him to chain logs to buffalo carts, and he routinely carried the chains over his shoulders. Again, as our investigation showed, this man was not an American prisoner of war.

Although this in-country investigation program has only been in operation a few months, you can see that we have covered targets all over Indochina. We've been to Dien Bien Phu, Son La, Cao Bang, and multiple targets in Hanoi. In fact, our investigator has methodically searched every single street and alley in Hanoi.

We've also sent investigators up and down provincial Route 19 in Lam Dong Province looking for an American said to be selling firewood at the local market. We had people looking in Ben Tre City for an alleged American prisoner of war said to be collecting garbage there in 1990. We've been to Saang prison in Cambodia and to the Tchepone area in Laos to check out a photograph alleged to be MIA Daniel Borah.

Joint Task Force teams have visited the areas highlighted here. We also have multiple source reporting, which covers all of Indochina. However, so far we have not found any U.S. prisoners of war.

Now, since I've thus far illustrated our all-source approach with examples from Vietnam, I'd like to turn to Laos to clear up some commonly held misconceptions about the POW situation in that country. To begin with, I can tell you that Laos is not the black hole some believe it to be. People who think otherwise point to the difference between the small number of prisoners who returned from Laos, and the far greater number who returned from North Vietnam. But as I will show you, this is essentially comparing apples with oranges.

What you see here is a bar graph showing what happened to airmen shot down in South Vietnam, Laos, and North Vietnam. A

comparison of air losses is relevant because 90 percent of our losses in Laos were aviators. On the graph, the red shows the percentage of airmen rescued, the blue shows the percentage captured and returned, and the yellow shows the percentage who are still unaccounted for.

As you can see, Laos and South Vietnam are very similar. A large portion of downed airmen were rescued in both countries. The small portion captured is relatively equal. The real exception here is North Vietnam. North Vietnam is different because intense air defense made it very difficult to rescue downed air crews.

Since fewer men could be rescued, more of our airmen were captured, and later more were returned from North Vietnam. By the same token, because search and rescue operations in Laos and South Vietnam were more effective, more downed airmen were rescued and fewer became prisoners.

Others who say that Laos is a special case cite a second reason for their belief. They say that because the Lao Government did not sign the Paris Peace Agreements, it did not return prisoners at the time of Operation Homecoming. This belief is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of who controlled the territory where most of our losses in Laos occurred.

The dots on this map show all of our losses. The Ho Chi Minh Trail network is shown by the black lines. Notice that most of the Trail is well within Laos. This area was totally controlled by the Vietnamese. Almost 85 percent of U.S. personnel lost in Laos were lost in this area. Our intelligence indicates that—

Senator KERRY. Say that again, so that we establish—85 percent of people lost?

Major SCHIFF. Yes, sir.

Senator KERRY. Were lost. And will you show again with arrow the map area.

Major SCHIFF. In the area of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Mr. SHEETZ. It's 85 percent in Laos, sir.

Major SCHIFF. In Laos.

Senator KERRY. I am sorry. 85 percent of the loss in Laos.

Mr. SHEETZ. Right.

Major SCHIFF. Our intelligence indicates that U.S. prisoners of war captured in areas of Laos remained under Hanoi's control. In Laos, as in South Vietnam, most U.S. prisoners held by the North Vietnamese were eventually moved to prisons in North Vietnam.

When looking at Laos on a case-by-case basis, we find that very few missing men would have become prisoners of the Pathet Lao. Almost everyone lost was lost in an area under North Vietnamese control.

The odds for returning home were better in Laos than in North Vietnam. The odds for capture were very similar to South Vietnam. In the final analysis, there are no compelling reasons to believe that a substantial number of aviators were captured and retained by the Pathet Lao. The bottom line is that Laos is not the MIA/POW black hole it has been depicted to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just stop you there to ask you one question. While it might not be the black hole that it is reported to be, is there not a group of aviators believed to have been unaccounted for in Laos at the time of Operation Homecoming?

Major SCHIFF. Yes, sir, there is. They are among the priority cases.

The CHAIRMAN. That group amounts to how many?

Mr. SHEETZ. There are right now still 64 discrepancy cases for Laos.

The CHAIRMAN. Pertaining to Laos?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So there are 64 question marks pertaining to Laos which would have been the body of that group about whom we had legitimate questions at the end of the war.

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So when you say it is not a black hole, you are saying that notions that of the 500-plus airmen lost over Laos, the notion that many more than the 64 that we have questions about is improbable, is that accurate?

Mr. SHEETZ. Yes, sir. Many of the reports that have circulated publicly talk about hundreds of American prisoners being held by the Pathet Lao and hundreds of American prisoners at various times in the 1980's alive in Laos. Looking at the Laos losses only, we only find 64 from all the unaccounted-for individuals that represent discrepancy cases, primarily last-known-alive cases.

Senator SMITH. Excuse me, just one other point on Laos. What intelligence information do you have on the prison system in Laos?

Major SCHIFF. We have a couple of studies that have been done. I believe the committee has one of them.

Senator SMITH. How many prisoners did you come up with, approximately, in Laos?

Mr. SHEETZ. Senator, if we could, the person who needs to really answer that question is Warren Gray. He is not among this briefing team. If we could hold that question for later, or I could bring Mr. Gray up the table.

[The information follows:]

LAO PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, PRISONS AND SEMINAR CAMP SYSTEM

1. The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of Interior (MOI) was responsible for the administration and management of all labor reform, reeducation, rehabilitation, seminar, prison, interrogation, and temporary detention facilities for various categories of domestic civil and political criminals, including civilian and military LPDR government and communist party officials who committed criminal and political offenses. The MOI was also responsible for the detention and interrogation of non-Lao foreign nationals in special central-level detention and interrogation facilities. These facilities were usually reserved for national-level political, espionage, and national security-related cases. Cases involving ethnic Vietnamese residents of Laos and ethnic Vietnamese resistance group members captured in Laos were turned over to Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) MOI jurisdiction; captured Vietnamese resistance group personnel were transferred to SRV MOI control in Vietnam. Although fragmentary reporting noted that the MOI had picked up various foreign nationals (Australian, British, French, Thai, West German) after 1975 who were eventually released and allowed to leave the country, reporting did not identify or name the facilities in which they were detained in Vientiane City for questioning.

2. Reporting has indicated the LPDR MOI went through several reorganizations since December 1975 under the guidance and direction of the SRV MOI Specialist Group in Vientiane, and that the LPDR MOI was organizationally structured on the model of the SRV MOI. Reference was made in reporting to a Police Interrogation- Investigations Department under the General Department for Peoples Police (GDPP), which, like the SRV MOI's GDPP Police Interrogation- Investigations De-

partment, would have central-level pre-trial detention and interrogation facilities for the interrogation, investigation and future disposition of major civil criminal cases. Since the LPDR MOI's General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI) is modeled after the SRV MOI's GDCI, it should also have a Security Interrogation- Investigations Department with its own central-level pre-trial interrogation and detention facilities. These facilities would hold domestic anti-regime political (counter-revolutionary, counterrevolutionary, economic security, resistance, sabotage, espionage, national security) suspects, as well as foreign nationals, for interrogation, investigation and further disposition.

3. The GDCI's predecessor organization, the Political Security Bloc, had at least two pre-trial detention and interrogation facilities in Vientiane City which appear to fit the profile of central-level GDCI Security Interrogation- Investigations Department facilities. One was known as the That Dam Detention and Interrogation "Center," and the other as the Phonthan Prison. Domestic political cases were held at both facilities, where officers from at least Foreign Counterespionage (Political Security) Department 53 were involved in questioning and investigating political cases with documented or suspected foreign connections. Although no foreign nationals were specifically noted in reporting at these two facilities, one of them may have been involved, for example, in the detention of a West German in 1987. In early September 1987, the Pakse police in Champassak Province arrested a West German female passport holder (not further identified by name) for entering Laos illegally. The woman had papers stating she was a Buddhist nun, who had been ordained in Sri Lanka and was a resident of Ubon Province, Thailand. The Pakse police suspected she was a foreign intelligence agent, and detained and questioned her for 15 days before transferring her on 23 September to the MOI in Vientiane where she was still held as of 28 September 1987; no further information is available.

4. The General Department for People's Police (GDPP) sat on top of a chain of command which was responsible for the MOI prison system. It was headed by General Saisompheng Sengsoulignavong (1981-1990) and his deputies, Lieutenant Colonels Phosai Saipanya (1981-1987), Onsa Vilavong, Sali Phailot, Souban Keophila, and Champa. As of late 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Phosai Saipanya was also in charge of the That Dam Interrogation Center in Vientiane. As of June 1986, the GDPP had about 2,200 personnel. Personnel were assigned to one of at least eight subordinate departments—general staff research, administrative management police, criminal police, traffic and firefighting police, prisons police management (rehabilitation), economic police, security guards police, police interrogation-investigations. The GDPP had two SRV MOI advisory specialists assigned to its main GDPP staff office, as well as two SRV MOI advisory specialists assigned to each department under the GDPP. As of June 1981, the GDPP also had three East German advisory specialists/technicians. Reporting noted that, during the year 1985, 704 persons were arrested for criminal behavior, 154 were sent to prison, 464 were sent to "seminar" camps, 667 civil prisoners were released from prison, 74 prisoners received commuted sentences, and 70 detainees were released from "seminar" camps.

5. The GDPP Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Department was headed by Colonel Bounthiem (1981) or Lieutenant Colonel Souban Keophila and his deputy, Major Bounmai Sivin. Two SRV MOI advisory specialists were assigned to the Prisons Management Department. The Department administered all central-level prisons, the reeducation seminar camp system for former Royal Lao Government (RLG) and Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR) personnel, and provided staff guidance and direction to the prison management police offices of the Vientiane City Public Security Office (PSO) and all provincial PSO's. Provincial PSO prisons management police offices, as well as subordinate district PSO's, had at least one detention facility. Central facilities included the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane Province, the That Dam Center in Vientiane City, and the Phonthan Prison in Vientiane City. The Central Sam Khe Prison was French-built at Kilometer Marker-6 (KM-6: TE-5492), was commanded by Than Sounphy (1977-1978), and held about 600 inmates; an unknown number of Thai nationals were held at the Sam Khe Prison during 1977-1978. The Phonthan and That Dam facilities were pre-trial interrogation and detention facilities for criminal and political suspects. The Phonthan and That Dam facilities were associated with the MOI's General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI). Political counterrevolutionary, counterrevolutionary, economic security, sabotage, espionage, and national security-related cases were held at these facilities for interrogation, investigation, and further disposition. As of May 1983, the Prisons Management Police Department had 75 headquarters staff personnel; none reportedly had any extensive legal training or background.

6. The Department also had a "rehabilitation" camp complex in Keo Oudom District, Vientiane Province, at the Nam Ngum Dam reservoir [data]: Thao Island (male detainees only), Nang Island (female detainees only), Setthakit, Nampho and Thong Islands. The island camp complex was built in March 1976. It received its first group of 1,500 inmates on 9 April 1976, who had been picked up in massive arrests in Vientiane. Thao Island, formerly known as Ling (Monkey) Island, held about 800 FAR captains and majors as of May 1976. According to the 18 October 1976 issue of the "New Vientiane" daily, the island "reeducation centers" were for drug addicts and for the rehabilitation of "victims of the old regime." In November 1976, the second phase of mass arrests of undesirables in Vientiane began. Among those arrested were teachers, merchants, and foreign mission employees on CIA spy charges; about 750 to 1,000 political prisoners were first held at the MOI's Central Sam Khe Prison before being transferred to the island camp complex for rehabilitation. According to the 29 November 1976 issue of the "New Vientiane" daily, about 2,300 persons had undergone reeducation at the island camps (500 women and 1,800 men). The paper noted that 100 men and 100 women had requested to remain on the islands. By December 1976, the camp complex held about 2,000 inmates; 1,500 on Thao Island and 500 on Nang Island. The camps were referred to by the LPDR as being "drug rehabilitation" islands; "32-year-old welfare official Sichan Sirivong" acted as deputy chairman of the committee running the islands.

7. As of 1978, the island camp complex held about 1,200 inmates in what the LPDR called "rehabilitation centers" and "reeducation centers for social evils." As of mid-1985, the island camp complex held about 1,200 inmates. The Thao Island Camp was commanded by MOI Lieutenant Colonel Inthong and his deputies, Major Bouathin and Captain Khamphet; the camp held 125 male inmates. The Nang Island Camp was commanded by a female named Khamtao, and held 300 female inmates. The Setthakit Island Camp held about 30 individuals who had attempted to escape from the Thao and Nang Island Camps. The Nampho Island Camp was the largest; it was a maximum security hard labor camp with about 600 detainees. The Thong Island Camp held several hundred male inmates who had been transferred from the Thao Island Camp. The LPDR claimed the camps only held common civil prisoners, drug addicts, prostitutes, gamblers, "hippies," and juvenile delinquents. The LPDR used the camps as model showcases for visiting foreigners. No foreign nationals were reported in detention on this island camp complex.

8. In October 1983, the MOI completed construction of a new central-level prison for political prisoners at Phonthan Village, Vientiane City; the prison was more commonly known as the Phonthan Prison. The Phonthan Prison was a pre-trial temporary detention facility, where criminal suspects were interrogated and investigated by the GDPP and where political suspects were interrogated and investigated by the GDCI. The Phonthan Prison consisted of two 8 by 40 meter concrete buildings with corrugated metal roofs; each building had ten cells. No foreign nationals have been reported in detention at this prison.

9. The Reeducation or "Seminar" System of the LPDR dates back to June 1975 when Pathet Lao security forces began taking over power from Royal Lao Government (RLG) authorities. RLG civil officials and FAR officers were placed in political criminal categories and were sent to seminar camps for reeducation. Responsibilities for the seminar camps were shared by the LPDR MOI and by the LPDR Ministry of National Defense (MND). MND seminar camps were believed to be run by the MND Political Staff Department. In 1977, seminar camps were renamed "production units" to avoid international condemnation. In June 1983, all MND seminar camps, also known as "production units" and as "construction battalions," were turned over to the MOI GDPP's Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Police Department, which delegated authority for their administration to the prisons management police offices of its provincial public security offices (PSO's). Although the LPDR denied the existence of reeducation and seminar camps, a reeducation camp system continued to exist in Laos under the guise of "production" camps. The LPDR currently prefers to use the term "rehabilitation" when referring to detention facilities. Although the total number of detainees is subject to debate, the following information was available on various types of detention facilities in Laos.

10. FAR field and general grade officers and RLG civil officials of equivalent rank were placed in a maximum security detention camp system in Houa Phan Province, near the Vietnamese border. The Houa Phan seminar camp system was initially established in July 1975 with seven camps (Camps 1 through 7). It was the worst camp system in Laos, and was more commonly known as the Vieng Sai or Sop Hao camp system. Detainees were categorized as dangerous and unlikely to be released. About one-third of all inmates reportedly died from malnutrition, starvation or were executed during the period 1975-1986. After the MND turned over control of the camp

system to the MOI in July 1983, the camps were operated by the Houa Phan Province PSO, which established a central camp headquarters at Sop Pan Village (VH 2064) under the command of a MOI lieutenant colonel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp system. Comments on this camp system are as follows:

A. Seminar Camp 1 was also known as the Sop Ka, Na Ka and "Soun Phiseth" (Special) Camp, and as the Sop Hao Prison. Camp 1 was located at Na Ka Neua Village (VH 441737) on the east side of the Nam Mo (Nam Ma) River across from Sop Hao Village (VH 4373) in a valley about 21 kilometers from Vieng Sai District Town. Camp 1 was a secret political prison which held 39 Lao prisoners. Camp 1 was intended by the LPDR to be a "death camp" with no survivors of reeducation. The camp held the Royal Lao family, 14 generals, and 11 other senior RLG officials. If inmates did not die from malnutrition or dysentery, they were executed. The deceased included: King Sisavang Vatthana (1979); Crown Prince Vongsavonang (1977); Queen Khamphoui Vatthana (1981); Crown Prince Sisavang Vatthana; Lieutenant General Bounpon Makthephalak; Major General Phasouk Solatsaphak; Brigadier Generals Kan Isixiengmai, Itsala Kataidonsoulit, Li Litthilusa, Lamngoun Phasavat; Colonels Heng Saithavi, Touby Lyfoung, Khamchan Padid, Lian Pavongviangkham; Luang Prabang Province Governor Chao Souk Bouavong; Lao Ambassador to China Balien Phavongviengkham; Minister of Religious Affairs Soukan Vilaysan; and, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Toubi Li Foung. Camp 1 was closed down in April 1985 after the last two generals (not further identified) were executed on 7 April 1985. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp.

B. Seminar Camp 2 was located at Nouei Nong Tao Village (VH 463704) on the west side of the Nam Mo River near the Houai Vong tributary (VH 4769), and was north of Camp 1. As of August 1986 Camp 2 held about 150 Lao inmates. Of this number, 53 were residents of Vientiane who were not allowed to mix with other inmates. The 53 prisoners from Vientiane were charged with attempts to stage a coup d'etat in 1977; six received life sentences, 13 received 20 year sentences, and 34 received 10 to 15 year sentences. An unknown number of Camp 2 inmates were transferred to Camp 5 in March 1981. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp.

C. Seminar Camp 3 was initially located on the west side of the Nam Mo River near the Houai Vong tributary (VH 4769) at Houei Nong Tao Village (VH 467702). Camp 3 was relocated by late 1980 to Ban Sop Phan (VH 2166) near Ban Loune Village (VH 1868) in Vieng Sai District. Camp 3 was situated on the northern bank of the Nam Pan River, west of its junction with the Nam Hao River, and was about 38 kilometers northeast of Sam Neua City (VH 0157). Route 6 ran along the extreme eastern side of the camp area. In late 1978, Camp 3 held about 330 FAR and police majors and lieutenant colonels from FAR Military Region 1 (MR-1). In 1979, Camp 3 received another 110 FAR MR-1 majors and colonels who had been held in the Phong Saly Province camp system. Camp 3 was commanded by Khamang and his deputy Bounpheng, and had a 50-man guard force. In mid-1983, Camp 3 became a temporary holding camp for others in the Houa Phan seminar camp system who were being considered for release. During the 1983-1985 period, Camp 3 grew to about 300 inmates, plus 800 dependents. As of August 1986, Camp 3 held about 150 inmates who were being considered for release in Vientiane, and was reportedly closed down later (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. Seminar Camp 4 was established in September 1975 and held about 520 FAR and police majors to colonels, and civilian grade equivalent inmates, who had been categorized as "progressive" educatees. Until late 1976 the camp was located on the south side (VH 3883) of the Nam Mo River in Xieng Kho District on Route 6 between Muong Hang and Muong Ham Villages. In late 1976, Camp 4 was relocated to a new site at Ban Nam At (former Kok Pho) Village (UIJ 9301) about three kilometers south of Muong Et (Muong Het) Village (UJ 9703) on the west side of the Nam Et (Nam Het) River, about 18 kilometers from Xieng Kho District Town (VJ 1202). In 1977, about 100 colonels and civilian grade equivalents were transferred to Camp 5. In 1978, about 250 inmates were transferred to Camp 6. In 1981, Camps 4 and 6 were moved from their Nam Et River site to the original Camp 4 location (VH 3883) on the south side of the Nam Mo River on Route 6. The two camps were consolidated and called "Sawmill Production" Unit 6. Seminar Camp 4 was officially closed down with the merger. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Seminar Camp 5 was initially established in June 1975 on the south side (VH 6311) of the Nam Sam River (VH 5212) across from Sam Tai District Town (VH

6211), and moved permanently in early 1976 to a natural cliff area near Ban Sop Phua Village (VH 8325). Camp 5 was a maximum security facility for "incorrigible" hardliners, holding about 700 FAR and police colonels, general grade officers, and senior-level civilian ministers and equivalent ranking officials. On 12 October 1977, 26 senior ranking colonels, generals and ministers were transferred from Camp 5 to Camp 1. Camp 5 received an unknown number of incorrigible "hardliners" from three reeducation camps in adjacent Phong Saly Province in December 1978 when these camps were closed down in fear of Chinese attack. In September 1979, about 25 general grade officers and civilian equivalent grades were accused of plotting to overthrow the LPDR, and reportedly were later executed. By 1982, Camp 5 was known as the Huoay Ta-Ngeua Road Construction Unit. As of June 1983, Camp 5 held about 400 inmates who were assigned to hard labor construction gangs in Sam Tai District. Camp 5 was still in existence as of August 1986, and was later reportedly closed down (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

F. Seminar Camp 6 was established on 21 July 1975 about five kilometers west of Muong Et (Muong Het) Het Village (UJ 9703) on the south side of the Nam Et (Nam Kho) River between Muong Et Village and Na Kham Village (UH 9698) in Xieng Kho District. Route 67 ran through the camp. Camp 6 had the distinction of having been originally used by the Pathet Lao as a prisoner compound as early as 1969. In August 1975, about 600 FAR and police field and general grade officers, and civilian de-grade equivalents (ministers and province chiefs) were detained at Camp 6, where they were informed that they would not be eligible for release. Later, surviving detainees were categorized as "progressive" educatees. In 1978, Camp 6 received about 250 inmates from Camp 4. Camp 6 then held about 800 inmates, including the FAR Supreme Commander, the FAR G-2 Chief, the FAR Inspector General, and other FAR generals, plus about 200 dependents. Camp 6 was commanded by Colonel Bounlert and had at least a 35-man guard force. In 1981, Camps 4 and 6 were moved from their Nam Et River site to the original Camp 4 location (VH 3883) on the south side of the Nam Mo River between Muang Hom and Muang Hang Villages on Route 6, where the two camps were consolidated and called "Sawmill Production Unit 6." By June 1982, Camp 6 was known as "Production Unit 6." Inmates were assigned to bridge and road construction and repair, and timber-cutting crews. Camp 6 was still in existence as of March 1987, and was later reportedly closed down (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

G. Seminar Camp 7 was located in an area (VH 422752) about 1,200 meters north of Camp 1 on the east side of the Nam Mo River across from Sop Hao Township (VH 4373), Vieng Sai District. Camp 7 inmates waited six months to three years for trial which found them guilty and sentenced them to long terms of hard labor. The number of detainees at Camp 7 was 350 to 400 during 1976-1978, 450 to 500 during 1979-1980, 250 to 300 during 1981-1982, 150 to 200 during 1983-1984, and 180 to 250 during 1985-1986. Only a few detainees were released and only a few successfully escaped. Two or three prisoners died daily from starvation, disease or were executed. The dead included Lieutenant General Bounleut Sanichan; Brigadier Generals Noupheet Daoheuang, Atsaphangthong Pathammavong, Bounchan Savatphaiphan, Thongphan Khanoksi, Bounthieng Venvongsot, Chao Sin Saisana, Rattanabanlang Chounlamonti; Colonels Amkha Khanthamaisai, Phom Phanthavong, Kavin Keonakon (Police), Khammouk Pengsiaroon (Police); Director of Public Works Itsara Don-sasourith. As of August 1986, Camp 7 held about 250 inmates; inmates included FAR/RLG and LPDR military personnel. Camp 7 may be identical with the Thong Fek Prison which was about 14 kilometers east of Sam Neua and which was a pre-trial sentencing facility. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

H. The Pha Deng Camp (VH 2335) was located at Phou Pha Deng about two kilometers east of Vieng Sai District Town on the road to Nameo (VH 6644). The Pha Deng Camp encompassed a 100 by 200 meter area which was bordered by steep cliffs on one side and a deep valley on the other side. Inmates were kept in caves, and harsh conditions inside the camp led to a number of cases of insanity. As of early 1986, it held about 25 FAR/RLG survivors, who were scheduled for release. Other FAR/RLG inmates had been moved to Seminar Camps 2, 5 or 7. After the last survivors were released in 1986, the Pha Deng Camp was converted into a camp for LPDR personnel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

I. One Vietnamese boat refugee provided hearsay information about a detention camp which held six U.S. POW's (including two blacks) as of April 1982 in a small valley where Thao La La Hamlet was situated in Houa Phan Province.

11. In June 1983, under MOI direction, the Houa Phan Province Camp complex composite seminar production battalion headquarters at the

Sop Phan Camp near Na Luong Village (VH 3866), Muang Poua Canton, Viengsay District. The composite battalion headquarters staff was commanded by MOI Lieutenant Colonel Maisin Misai (Maysing Meesay), and had four guard companies and two special independent platoons. Each guard company was responsible for the security of one camp. Company 1 was unlocated. Company 2 was colocated with the battalion headquarters and guarded about 100 inmates who were involved in constructing agricultural settlements and roads. Company 3 was located at Houay Ngum Village, Muang Hang Canton (VH 3981), Xieng Kho District (VJ 1101), and guarded inmates who were involved in road construction in remote areas near the Vietnamese border. Company 4 was located at Sop Long Village (VH 3192), Muang Hom Canton, Xieng Kho District, and guarded inmates doing road and bridge repair. The 1st Special Platoon was located in the remote Lao Huong mountainous area, and the 2nd Special Platoon was colocated with the Viengsay District Military Headquarters (VH 2949), where inmates constructed and repaired buildings. Prison inmates of the Sop Hao camp system were assigned to two production groups which worked on a road and bridge construction project at Sop Long Village (VH 0261), an irrigation project at Houei Tao (VH 0461), and on a hospital, school and residential construction project at Lao Houng Village. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camp sites.

12. As of December 1986, Camp 14 was newly established in Houa Phan Province. It was located about one kilometer from Sam Neua District Township (VH 0057), held about 300 inmates, and was operated by the Houa Phan Province PSO as a pre-trial temporary detention facility. The camp was constructed of bamboo and had more than 20 buildings to house inmates and guards. The camp was surrounded by three barbed wire fences, and was divided into light, medium and heavy security areas. Inmates included former RLG officials, and LPDR political prisoners and civil criminals. The camp had a 90-man guard force. As of May 1988, Camp 14 held only civil criminals and LPDR officials on various charges; no RLG inmates were detained there. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

13. Phong Saly Province had a seminar camp complex between August 1975 and November 1978, which held about 2,000 RLG/FAR inmates and about an equal number of family dependents in one of five seminar camps. Each camp has a 50-man staff, including a 35-man guard force. By August 1986, only Camp 5 existed in Phong Saly Province with about 150 FAR enlisted and NCO detainees. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in the Phong Saly Province camp system, which had consisted of Seminar Camps 1 through 5.

A. Seminar Camp 1, also known as the Thong Nam Noi and the Muang Khoua Seminar Camp, was established in August 1975 along Route 19 near Sop Kai Village (TJ 3429), about ten kilometers southwest of Muang Khoua District Town. The camp was located on the east side of Route 19 at Kilometer Marker-91 (possibly TJ 5329) along the Pak River. Initial inmates included about 500 RLG police and FAR lieutenants and captains. Inmates were allowed to be accompanied by dependents to discourage escape attempts. In December 1976, 200 inmates were moved to the Pak Nam Noi Camp (TJ 1334) and to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4. In June 1977, about 200 FAR enlisted and NCO personnel from Camp 2 were moved to Camp 1. In December 1978, all remaining officer inmates (number unknown) were transferred to the Pak Beng Camp (QC 2302) in Oudomsai Province and then to the Pak Xuang Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuang, they were flown to two C-47 and C-123 aircraft in the Phonsavan Camp (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attepeu Province, where they were placed in southern seminar camps. They were replaced at Camp 1 by 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates with dependents from Camp 2. In April 1982, 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates with dependents from Camp 4 were transferred to Camp 1. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo Village in Boun Neua District. Camp 1 was closed down sometime in 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

B. Seminar Camp 2, also known as the Muang Mai District (TJ 6942) Seminar Camp, was located near the SRV border about 200 kilometers northeast of Muang Khoua District Town on the north side of Route 19 near the Nam Noua River. Camp 2 held about 900 RLG/FAR inmates and dependents. All were FAR and RLG police enlisted and NCO personnel from Louang Prabang, Luang Prabang, and Sayaboury Provinces. Inmates were used on road construction work. In June 1977, about 200 inmates were transferred to Muang Khoua Seminar Camp 1, replacing junior grade officers who were moved to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4, and about 700 inmates were moved to a new Camp 2 site at Pak Nam Noi (TJ 1334). During 1979, Camp 2 had 300 enlisted and NCO inmates; 300 enlisted and CNO inmates were

Seminar Camp (QC 2302), Oudomsai Province, in July-August 1975. The Pak Beng Camp was a temporary holding facility for RLG and FAR personnel. FAR personnel were sent to the Nam Bac Seminar Camp (TH 3582) in Luang Prabang Province before being further transferred to the Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp system. In December 1978, FAR junior grade officers in the Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp system were gradually transferred to the Pak Beng Camp and then to the Pak Xuang Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuang, the inmates were flown in two C-47 and C-123 aircraft to Phonsavan (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attapeu Province. The Oudomsai Province camp (not further identified) was closed in early 1979, and all inmates (mostly FAI: MR-1 officers), were transferred to an unknown camp in Xieng Khouang Province. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.

18. Luang Prabang Province had several detention and seminar camps. Between 1975 and 1985, there were two main seminar camps, two smaller ones, and a jail in Muang Ngoi District Town. All were located along the Nam Ou River or along its tributaries. The two main seminar camps were Hatchesan (TH 5890) and Nam Bac (TH 3582), which was across the Nam Bak River from Ban Nakhon Village (TH 4680). In 1976, about 500 FAR NCO's were transferred from Luang Prabang Province to the Nakay Seminar Camp in Khammouan Province, and several hundred FAR MR-1 NCO's were held at the Nam Bac Camp (TH 3582). Most NCO's were usually released after two to four years of imprisonment. Comments are available on the following camps:

A. The Ban Hatchesan Seminar Camp (TH 5890) was established in August 1975 for RLG civil servants from Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang and Sayaboury Provinces. The Hatchesan Camp was located south of Muang Ngoi District Town in a valley formed by the Phaboun and Phapae Mountains along the Nam Ou River; it was bordered on the south by the Nam Kong River and on the north by the Nam Ngoi River. The Hatchesan Camp held about 400 inmates plus 350 dependents. Inmates were usually released after two to four years of imprisonment. The Ban Hatchesan Seminar Center was noted in the overt Vientiane press in June 1977, and was closed down in 1980 after remaining inmates were transferred to seminar camps in Xieng Khouang and Attapeu Provinces. No foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at this camp.

B. The Nam Bac Seminar Camp (TH 3582) was established in August 1975 for FAR personnel, and was also known as the Oudomsai (Nam Bac) District Seminar Camp, in Luang Prabang Province. FAR MR-1 officers were initially held at the camp. On 31 November 1975, 110 FAR MR-1 field grade officers were transferred to Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 4. Lieutenants and captains were also sent to Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 1, and NCO's were sent to Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 2. The Nam Bac Seminar Center was noted in the overt Vientiane press in June 1977. The Nam Bac Camp held several hundred NCO's and a few officers until it was closed down in 1980 after remaining inmates were transferred to seminar camps in Xieng Khouang and Attapeu Provinces. No foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at this camp. However, one individual, whose reliability was undermined, provided information about 12 U.S. POW's who were held at the Nam Bac Camp after being captured there during the war years; five U.S. POW's were reportedly moved to the USSR in 1985 and seven were reportedly still kept at the Nam Bac Camp of mid-1986 with about 30 alleged former Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) POW's.

C. The Ban Hatxao Seminar Camp or Jail (TH 5226 or TH 5477) (2035N/10238E) was located on the bank of the Nam Hgu River, and held about 60 RLG civil servants. In December 1978, Ban Hatxao Camp inmates were moved to the Ban Pakchim Seminar Camp (2026N/1023E) and were gradually released after about four years of imprisonment. The Ban Hatxao Camp held about 200 prisoners as of September 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. The Ban Nam Camp (TH 0012) held about 200 captured Lao resistance members as of late 1983. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Two small seminar camps (Nos. 193 and 196) were respectively located near a bridge over the Nam Bak River near the junction of the Nam Bak and Houei Nguoi Rivers, and at Nanongxung. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these two camps.

F. A camp for returning Lao refugees was located about 40 kilometers northeast of Luang Prabang Township near the Nam Ai River. Another camp for returning Lao refugees was built in the Ban Gnhok Van area (TH 1808). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.

G. Another individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about having seen two Caucasians in leg irons, who had been captured before 1972, along the main road about 8.0 kilometers east of Muang Ngoi (TH 5891) in April 1986. This person also provided information (FIR-317/09341-86 of 22 July 1986) about a detention camp at Ban Don Lae (TH 5085) in Muang Ngoi District, which held two male and four female Americans in a cave guarded by eight People's Armed Forces of Vietnam (PAVN) and 14 LPAF personnel; the cave camp was called the Widow's Cave (Tham Mae Mai). Other than this, no foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp in the province by former inmates.

20. In Khammouan Province, the camp system held about 2,300 RLG and FAR inmates as of July 1985, including about 500 FAR and police officers. In 1975, field grade officers were sent to the Sepone Seminar Camp in Savannakhet Province. About 50 RLG police enlisted and NCO personnel, and second lieutenants were sent to the Phonkhen Seminar Camp (WE 1738) in September 1975, where they were assigned to agricultural and road repair tasks on Route 8. In September 1976, 43 surviving inmates were relocated to the Thoen Douan (Theun Douan) aka Nakay Seminar Camp (WE 2554), Gnommalat District, where it was also known as the 74th Production Group. About 500 NCO's were transferred from Luang Prabang Province to the Nakay Camp in 1976. As of late 1979, the Nakay Camp held about 2,000 enlisted and officer personnel through captain rank from Khammouan and Savannakhet Provinces. Inmates were assigned to one of six production battalions under the 74th Production Group. Inmates performed hard labor, clearing forests, cultivating rice paddy fields, and repairing roads. Dependents began joining the inmates in 1980. AS of mid-1984, inmates at the Na Kai province camp (WE 3060) were used as the labor force for State Forestry Enterprises Nos. 4 and 5. The Mahaxai 75th Production Subgroup (1725N/10512E) had about 400 inmates who performed road construction and repair work on Route 12 between Gnommalat District and Thakhek District Town. The Naden Camp (1729N/10525), also known as the 70th Production Group, was relocated in 1980 to new quarters about 2.5 kilometers east of Ban Haden between Route 12 and the Xe Bang Fai River. About 25 percent of all inmates in the Khammouan Province camp system either died or escaped. As of January 1986, the camp system held about 200 inmates and dependents who were assigned to one of four 50-man companies. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Khammouan Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about four U.S. POW's at the Nadeng Prison in Khammouan Province as of February 1983. This same report also noted that the Lao resistance member had obtained information from an escaped inmate who reportedly had met two U.S. POW's at this prison during the period mid-1981 to January 1983.

B. Another Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 17 U.S. POW's being held at a detention camp near Phahio Village (possible WD 4598), which was about two kilometers southwest of the junction of Routes 122 and 123 (WD 4799) and about 50 kilometers southeast of Mahaxai District Town.

C. This same Lao resistance member had earlier claimed to have information on one U.S. POW who was being protected and guarded by villagers at Napeng Village (WE 7115), Talong Canton (WE 7019), Boualapha District, in October 1986. The source for this Lao resistance member was also debriefed and claimed that one U.S. POW was being held by Napeng villagers as of November-December 1986.

21. In Savannakhet Province, about 3,500 seminar camp inmates (with dependents) from the ranks of sergeant to major were assigned to five road construction and two bridge construction units along Route 9 from Xa Thamouak (WD 9732), Phin District, Savannakhet Province, east to the Vietnamese border, and west to Phalane Canton (WD 6041), Atsaphangthong District, Savannakhet Province. Production work camps were located near Xa Thamouak (WD 9732), Sepone (XD 3244), Senkua Toulouang (XD 1753), Lako (XD 5857), and Ban Buk (XD 6152). In July 1975, all FAR personnel in FAR Military Region 3 (MR-3) were ordered to report for indoctrination training. About 300 FAR MR-3 officers from the ranks of major to colonel were held at the Pa Ngum School (1634N/10445E) in Savannakhet City for a one-month preliminary seminar before being sent in mid-August and September 1975 to the Sepone Seminar Camp by C-47 aircraft. Twelve senior officers, including Brigadier General Nouphe Daoheuang (FAR MR-3 Commander), Police Colonels Chanpheng Phetsomphou and Sisouvan, Colonels Soulang Phetsomphou and Kamko, and Lieutenant Colonel Sivasai, were transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp complex. On 7 September 1975, 290 majors to colonels were sent

to the Sepone Seminar Camp, which held about 1,000 inmates and dependent families. By March 1978, the Sepone Seminar Camp was closed down because of repeated escape attempts. About 190 Sepone Seminar Camp inmates were transferred to the Senkua Tonglouang Seminar Camp (XD 1884) near Ban Senkua (XD 1753), about 30 kilometers northwest of Sepone near the Nambok/Nam Xe Kok River (XD 1954). The Senkua Seminary Camp held about 1,000 inmates and dependent families. Again, because of repeated escape attempts, about 100 surviving inmates of the Senkua Seminar Camp were relocated in April 1979 to the Lako Seminar Camp (XD 5957), also known as the Vink Camp, about seven kilometers from the Vietnamese border. During February-June 1983, about 30 Lako Seminar Camp inmates were relocated to the Ban Buk (Ban But) Seminar Camp. The Ban Buk Seminar Camp (XD 6152) was located about 10 kilometers south of the Lako Seminar Camp, and was about five kilometers from the Vietnamese border. As of late 1986, there were only 16 inmates and one family left at the Ban Buk Camp. Other inmates either had died, were shot attempting to escape, or had been transferred to the district jail for disciplinary action. Camp officials never spoke of release, and it appeared that the policy was to let the inmates gradually die off. The Ban Phabang Seminar Camp (1653N/10619E) held about 600 elderly and retired RLG civil servants and FAR personnel with dependents who had been transferred from camps at Ban Kengkhan and Ban Xieng Hom (1647N/10619E); inmates did agriculture and husbandry work. The Ban Dong Seminar Camp (1638N/10625E) initially held about 900 officers through captain rank, and by late 1984 held about 300 surviving inmates. The Ban Dong Camp was located about 22 kilometers east of Sepone District Township along Route 9. The Savannakhet Province Public Security Office (PSO) administered the Kaeng Khan Prison (XK 221530) in Sepone District, which held about 200 inmates in harsh conditions; about 50 inmates were held in solitary confinement on espionage charges. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Savannakhet Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 19 live American POW's at a site near [data], Muang Angkham [data].

B. Another Lao resistance member (see paragraph 22C below), who was determined to be deliberately fabricating, claimed he had heard from others of seven Americans held in June 1986 at a detention camp in Savannakhet Province about 30 kilometers north of Sepone District Town (XD 3244) and about ten kilometers northeast of Phabang Mountain (XD 4266). Three Americans were held at this camp, while four other Americans had been moved to a camp at Ta-Oy (Ta-Oi) District (XC 6148) in Saravane Province. This person also claimed hearsay information on two Americans being held in a detention camp in Samoi (Samouai) District, Savannakhet Province, about five kilometers from the Vietnamese border in an area with cliffs known as Lako (XD 5857). After found to be deliberately fabricating, this person attempted to change his story with further hearsay information, claiming that American POW's had been held in Sepone District in 1984-1985 and had been moved to either Dakchung in Sekong Province (formerly part of Saravane Province), or Tady in Saravane Province, or Lamam in Saravane Province.

22. The Saravane Province seminar camp system existed between July 1975 and at least 1980. In July 1975, about 900 RLG police and FAR Military Region 4 (MR-4) officers and NCO's were initially concentrated in a temporary seminar camp at the Saravane Town Airfield (XC 5738). All were moved to the Ban Bung Kham Seminar Camp (XC 2238) in August 1975. In September 1979, about 200 officers were flown by C-47 aircraft from Luang Prabang Province to the Pakse Airfield, Champassak Province, where they were then taken by truck and on foot to the Dakchung Seminar Camp (YC 4211 or YC 5010) near the Vietnamese border. As of 1980, all seminar camps in Saravane Province became known as "production" camps. In 1980, the Dakchung Camp was closed down; half of the inmates were sent to Attopeu Province half were reportedly sent to an unlocated camp in Vietnam. About 2,000 RLG police and FAR MR-4 NCO's had been assigned to agricultural and road repair "production" units in the Thateng (WC 4907) area of Saravane Province and in the Paksong (XB 3278) area of Champassak Province. Saravane Province was later split in two with the eastern half being currently known as Sekong Province. Sekong Province includes the areas of the Dakchung and Thateng camps. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Saravane Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about two U.S. POW's at the Dakchung Camp in November 1986.

B. Another Lao resistance member, who was later determined to be deliberately fabricating, claimed to have information about American POW Eugene DeBruin in the Sepone area [data] in November 1987.

C. Another Lao resistance member (see paragraph 21B above), who was later determined to be deliberately fabricating, claimed he had heard from others of seven Americans held in June 1986 at a detention camp in Savannakhet Province about 30 kilometers north of Sepone District Town (XD 3244) and about ten kilometers northeast of Phabang Mountain (XD 4266). Three Americans were held at this camp, while four other Americans had been moved to a camp at Ta-Oy (Ta-Oi) District (XC 6148) in Saravane Province. After found to be deliberately fabricating, this person attempted to change his story by claiming he had heard from others that American POW's had been held in Sepone District of Savannakhet Province in 1984-1985 and had been moved to either Dakchung in Sekong Province (formerly part of Saravane Province), or Tady in Saravane Province, or Lamam in Saravane Province.

D. Another individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided hearsay information on sightings of American POW's in Saravane Province, two live Americans at a detention camp in Ta-Oy (TA-Oi) District (XC 6148) of Saravane Province in 1985, and on six Americans being held in Hue, Vietnam.

23. The Attopeu Province "seminar" system held about 600 inmates as of September 1986 who were detained in the 402nd and 979th "Seminar" Battalions. An unknown number of inmates were detained at the 981st "Seminar" Battalion which is unlocated in Attopeu Province. The camp system was established in June 1975 for the detention of FAR Military Region 4 (MR-4) civilian and military personnel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp system. Comments are as follows:

A. The 402nd Seminar Battalion was established in June 1975 in Attopeu Province at the Houai Phok Camp (YB 0238) and consisted of four seminar companies in subcamps of about 150 detainees each. In June 1975, about 600 FAR MR-4 Region 4 officers from second lieutenant to colonel rank were concentrated at the Teacher's College at Kilometer 3 (WB 8971) east of Pakse District Town (WB 8671), Champassak Province, for preliminary indoctrination. Upon registration, about 100 majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels were flown directly to Attopeu (XB 9838) on 27 July 1975; an unknown number of these officers were later transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp system. After completing a one-month course, 400 second lieutenants and captains detainees were assigned to "Seminar" Companies 1 through 4. On 15 August 1975, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Seminar Companies were flown by C-47 aircraft from Pakse to the Attopeu Airport. The 4th Seminar Company of 100 detainees was sent to Samakhsai (Attopeu) District (XB 9837). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these sites.

B. During the first three months in Attopeu Province, about 10 officers tried to escape; all were captured and executed. The 1st Seminar Company of junior grade officers was located at the base of the Phou Saphong Mountain and the Nam Xe Kong River (XB 9882), Saisettha District; the 2nd Seminar Company of 180 lieutenants and captains was at Houai Phok (YB 0238), Saisettha District; the 3rd Seminar Company of 180 lieutenants and captains was at Ban Bung along the Nam Xe Kong River, Saisettha District. In early 1976, the 3rd Seminar Company was relocated to Ban Hatliang (YB 0636) where it received inmates from the dissolved 4th Seminar Company which had been located at Ban Hom (XB 9824). In 1977, the 1st Seminar Company was relocated across from the Attopeu Province Military Command and the 2nd Seminar Company was relocated to Ban Kengpok. In mid-1977, about 120 inmates from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Seminar Companies were assigned to a road construction unit which repaired a twelve kilometer section of the road to Ban Fangdeng (YB 0932). The 2nd Seminar Company was located opposite Fangdeng Village at YB 0839, moved in 1977 to Houei Pok Village (YB 0238) to work on Route 16, and worked on an airstrip at XB 9638. The 2nd Seminar Company had 100 inmates plus dependents and was still located near Fangdeng Village in January 1987. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp sites.

C. In September 1979, a group of 600 RLG police and FAR officers, students and air force pilots were moved from camps in northern Laos (Phong Saly, Xieng Khoang, Louang Namtha, Oudomsai) and from the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane to an unknown location in Sansai District, about 30 kilometers from Attopeu Township near the SRV border. This group was the 979th Seminar Battalion. Chao Chanthalangsy, a younger brother of the Lao King, was killed at the Attopeu Camp in March 1985, and was buried in a cemetery for seminar inmates near the Attopeu Airport (XB 9638). In 1981, the 979th Seminar Battalion with about 300 inmates was relocated to the Dakkoum Camp near the Vietnamese border. Inmates performed