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Hqs, 196th Inf Bde.
LZ BALDY (BT132452), RVN
261200 September 1969
KMB

OPORD 16-69 (Operation GOLDEN FLEECE) (U)

References:

a. Maps, Vietnam: Series L7014, sheets 6639I, 6639IV, 6640I, 6640II, 6640III, 6739IV, 6740III.

b. OPORD 7-69 (Operation GOLDEN FLEECE) (U), Americal Division.

TASK ORGANIZATION: Current Task Organization.**1. (C) SITUATION.****a. Enemy Forces:**

- (1) Current INTSUM.
- (2) Annex B, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces:

(1) Americal Division continues current operations; conducts rice denial operations; protects Vietnamese nationals harvesting rice; interdicts enemy LOC/supply lines and increases GVN influence in rice harvest areas.

(2) 7th Marine Regiment continues current operations.

(3) 198th Inf Bde continues current operations, conducts rice denial operations, protects Vietnamese nationals and interdicts enemy LOC/supply lines.

(4) 7th Air Force and 1st Marine Air Wing provide tactical air support,

(5) 16th CAG provides airlift support.

c. Attachments and detachments: None.

2. (C) MISSION: 196th Inf Bde continues current operations in assigned TAOR; conducts operations to deny rice to the enemy; interdicts enemy LOC/supply lines and provides security forces to assist RF/PF/GVN forces conducting rice denial operations in the Bde TAOR.

3. (C) EXECUTION:**a. Concept of Operations:**

(1) Maneuver: 196th Inf Bde conducts combat operations in assigned TAOR to deny rice to enemy forces and to interdict movement into and out of harvest areas; conducts combined security operations with the RF/PF forces in rice producing areas (Annex A, Opns Overlay).

(2) Fire Support: Normal fire support will be provided by Div Arty.

b. 2-1 Inf:

(1) Continue current operations.

(2) Effect direct coordination with officials in THANG BINH and TAM KY districts for use of National Police, RF-PF forces, and refugees to harvest rice in contested and VC controlled areas.

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Operation GOLDEN FLEECE) (U)

Evacuate confiscated and harvested rice to designated collection

(4) Coordinate with and assist units of 5th ARVN Regt in rice denial operations.

(5) Interdict along boundaries of rice harvest areas.

c. 3-21 Inf:

(1) Continue current operations.

(2) Effect direct coordination with officials in NUI LAC SON CFZ and THANG BINH District for use of National Police, RF-PF forces, and refugees to harvest rice in contested and VC controlled areas.

(3) Evacuate confiscated and harvested rice to designated collection points

(4) Interdict along boundaries of rice harvest areas.

d. 4-31 Inf:

(1) Continue current operations.

(2) Effect direct coordination with officials at HIEP DUC District Hq for use of National Police, RF-PF forces, and controlled areas.

(3) Evacuate confiscated and harvested rice to HIEP DUC District Hq.

(4) Interdict along boundaries of rice harvest areas.

e. 1-46 Inf:

(1) Continue current operations.

(2) Effect direct coordination with officials in TIEN PHUOC District and HAU DUC District for use of National Police, RF-PF forces, and refugees to harvest rice in contested and VC controlled areas.

(3) Evacuate confiscated and harvested rice to TIEN PHUOC or HAU DUC Districts.

(4) Interdict along boundaries of rice harvest areas.

f. F/17 Cav: Continue current operations emphasizing search for rice.

g. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Direct coordination between commanders is authorized and directed.

(2) Direct coordination with Province/District officials is authorized and encouraged.

(3) Intensify surveillance and intelligence gathering operations in and adjacent to rice harvest areas.

(4) Increase security of land LOC's in coordination with ARVN/GVN forces.

(5) Establish mobile or fixed check points in coordination with ARVN/GVN forces to uncover illegal transport of rice.

(6) Interdict enemy LOC's/supply lines in rice harvest areas.

(7) In conjunction with ARVN/GVN forces provide reaction forces to reinforce hamlets, harvest areas or storage points should the enemy attempt to harass, destroy or capture rice in these areas.

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Coordinate with GVN officials to determine areas and the schedule of harvest.

(9) In conjunction with RVN/GVN forces identify rice destruction, however all destruction of unharvested rice id truction will be accomplished by RVN/GVN forces.

(10) Tentative harvest period: See Annex E, (Harvest Schedule is subject to change.

(11) Conduct Civil Affairs and PSYOPS operation in a C (Civil Affairs) and Annex D (PSYOPS).

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION and LOGISTICS: Current Admin O in

5. (C) COMMAND and SIGNAL:

a. Signal: Current SOI/SSI in effect.

b. Command: Bde CP remains on LZ BALDY, on order mo

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Annexes:

- A - Operations Overlay
- B - Intelligence
- C - Civil Affairs
- D - Psychological Operations
- E - Harvest Schedule

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Annex ^B (Intelligence) to OPORD ¹⁶ ~~41~~-69 (Operation GOLDEN FLEECE) (U)

REFERENCE: No change

1. (U) MISSION: See OPORD.
2. (C) AREA OF OPERATION:

a. Weather:

(1) General: Weather conditions in the 196th Inf Bde TAOR are influenced by prevailing conditions in ANNAMITE MOUNTAINS and over the SOUTH CHINA SEA. The September to March monsoon weather in the TAOR is an outgrowth of typhoons and tropical storms prevalent in the SOUTH CHINA SEA during these months and are tempered by overland conditions. Heavy rains, thunderstorms are common from September through January and occur most frequently in the afternoon and evening. The heaviest precipitation occurs along coastal and mountainous regions exposed to the moist Southwest monsoon winds. Visibility will be reduced by increased cloudiness and fog. Temperatures will vary with a mean low of 75 degrees and a mean high of 85 degrees; relative humidity will vary from 80% to 90%.

(2) Effects of Enemy Courses of Action:

- (a) Enemy movement will be restricted due to heavy rainfall.
- (b) Enemy movement security will be enhanced due to heavy rainfall, cloud cover, and fog conditions.

(3) Effects On Our Courses Of Action:

- (a) All forms of reconnaissance will be restricted due to heavy rainfall, cloud cover, and fog conditions.
- (b) Tracked vehicle movement will be hindered by the flooding of lowland areas.
- (c) Wheeled vehicle movement will be restricted to improved roads.

b. Terrain (Rice Harvest Area):

(1) Existing Situation:

(a) TIEN PHUOC/HAU DUC: The terrain is compartmented by hills and rows of heavy vegetation. Rugged mountainous terrain dominates the cultivated area on all sides. Many hillsides are terraced to accommodate increased paddy acreage. The river network in these areas remains in a flooded condition throughout most of the monsoon period. There are numerous helicopter landing zones in the area many of which will be flooded due to the heavy rain conditions.

(b) HUEP DUC/THANG BINH/TAM KY: The terrain in this area is generally flat and open. The HUEP DUC area is bordered by the NUI CHOM and DEO LE mountains on the North and by rugged foothills to the South and West. The THANG BINH/TAM KY area is a coastal plain bounded by hills starting at BT2018 along a line to the Northwest to BT1130. The terrain is compartmented by rows of vegetation. Rivers and streams throughout the area will remain in a flooded condition throughout the monsoon. There are numerous helicopter landing zones in the area, but many will be in a flooded condition due to heavy monsoon rains.

(2) Effects Of Enemy Courses Of Action:

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^B Annex ¹⁶ (Intelligence) to OPRD ¹⁶ X-60 (Operation X-60) (U)

(a) TIEN PHUOC/PAU DUC: The hills and heavy vegetation provide the enemy with sufficient cover and concealment to maintain numerous staging and storage sites. Enemy control of the terrain dominating the rice fields would give him the capability to observe and direct fire on harvesting parties. There are numerous sites for defensive positions. Covered routes into and out of the rice areas are well suited for quick raids and ambushes.

(b) HIEP DUC (D)/THANG BINH (D)/TAM KY (D): The area is characterized by open terrain and low dominating high ground diminishing toward the mountains. The mountainous area provides good cover and concealment for enemy anti-aircraft positions and mortar positions. There are few sites for defensive positions in the lowland area. Cover is minimal in the coastal area making enemy movement susceptible to friendly reconnaissance.

(3) Effects of Friendly Courses of Action:

(a) TIEN PHUOC/PAU DUC: The terrain accommodates the friendly unit capability of ground and air operation for movement and protection of harvesting parties.

(b) HIEP DUC/THANG BINH/TAM KY: The valley terrain affords rapid cross-country movement of harvesting and security parties. The level terrain enhances friendly reconnaissance and fire support capabilities.

3. (C) ENEMY SITUATION:

a. General: Experience has shown that effective rice denial operations have diminished the enemy's capability to mount and sustain offensive operations. The enemy habitually uses the area around TIEN PHUOC/PAU DUC as a base. Much of the rice consumed in that base is believed to originate in the TIEN PHUOC/PAU DUC area. Rice gained in the HIEP DUC (D)/THANG BINH (D)/TAM KY (D) area has been used to support local VC and to replenish cache sites for NVN use during offensive periods. The enemy does not have a sustained capability to fully resupply his units operating in the latter without this local source. The enemy can be expected to attempt to keep both areas open as food sources.

b. Disposition, Composition, and Strength: See current INTSUM.

c. Reinforcement Capability: See current INTSUM.

d. Peculiarities and Weaknesses:

(1) General: The enemy is afforded adequate routes of approach to and from the areas of concern by the nature of the terrain. These routes are more numerous and provide better cover and concealment in the TIEN PHUOC/PAU DUC area than in the HIEP DUC/THANG BINH/TAM KY sectors.

(2) Enumeration:

(a) The enemy has sustained heavy losses in the past two months reducing his fighting strength.

(b) Various reports indicate the enemy is hungry and in desperate need of food. He must move into the lowland area in which he is vulnerable to acquire rice.

(c) Terrain dictates certain limited access routes into and from the areas of harvesting.

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The enemy is limited to a few local cache sites in which rice must be stored initially.

(e) The enemy is susceptible to engagement by friendly units, artillery, and tactical air.

4. (C) ENEMY CAPABILITIES:

a. Observation:

(1) Conduct up to regimental size ground attacks against friendly security units in harvesting areas.

(2) Conduct sapper attacks and/or attacks by fire against fire support bases, friendly units or rice harvesting parties.

(3) Conduct terrorist and sabotage activities against the civilian population.

b. Analysis and Discussion: The enemy can be expected to attempt to effect whatever action is necessary to acquire a maximum amount of rice from these areas. The enemy is capable of launching major ground and indirect fire attacks against friendly units, fire support bases, and/or civilian population centers within these and other areas in support of that objective.

5. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Probable Courses of Action:

(1) Conduct sapper attacks and/or attacks by fire against friendly units, fire support bases, and rice harvesting parties in and contiguous to the major harvesting sites.

(2) Conduct terrorist and sabotage activities against populated areas.

b. Vulnerabilities:

(1) Presence of enemy troops in the lowland areas increases susceptibility to discovery by friendly elements and enhances friendly capability to effectively engage.

(2) Interdiction of enemy routes to and from harvesting areas is enhanced by the terrain.

(3) Acquired enemy rice must initially be concentrated in a limited number of accessible cache sites.

(4) The enemy is susceptible to friendly artillery and tactical air support.

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