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HQ 4-3 Inf  
LZ BRONCO  
271600 April 1971  
GFD-48

OPORD 5-71

Reference: Maps, South Vietnam: 1:50,000; Series L7014: Sheets 6738I, 6738II.

(C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

A 4-3 Inf	Bn Control
B 4-3 Inf	Recon
C 4-3 Inf	4.2
A Btry (-) 6-11 Arty (DS)	

1. (C) SITUATION:

- Enemy Forces: Annex A, Intelligence.
- Friendly Forces: Annex B, Operations Overlay.

2. (C) MISSION: 4-3 Inf (-) conducts combat assaults into multiple LZ's in the Brigade Reconnaissance Zone in order to interdict VC forces moving through the area and locate and destroy VC base areas vicinity Nui Hoc Hoa Mountain.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operation: 4-3 Inf (-) conducts CA beginning 280800 Apr 71 with the Bn Fwd CP and elements of E Co opening a forward Command Post at BS688327 (FSB Jeff). Upon establishment of FSB Jeff, at 281100 Apr B Co conducts CA into multiple platoon-size LZ's, conducts squad-size search and clear operations in AO. C Co conducts CA into LZ 5, 6 and 7, conducts search and ambush patrols vicinity Nui Hoc Hoa Mountain; A Co conducts CA into LZ 8, 9 and 10 upon completion of C Co, interdicts VC infiltration route along Nuoc Dinh stream and conducts search and ambush patrols in AO.

b. Fires:

(1) There will be a 5 minute Arty prep on each LZ immediately prior to the insertion of troops.

(2) Priority of fires to unit involved in air move; thereafter to be determined by tactical situation.

c. A Co:

(1) Conduct CA following C Co into LZ's 8, 9 and 10; thereafter conduct squad-size search and ambush patrols in assigned AO.

(2) Interdicts VC infiltration routes along Nuoc Dinh streamline in sectof.

(3) Special attention will be devoted to locating and destroying enemy base areas and rest areas in the draws and valleys adjacent to Nuoc Dinh streamline.

d. B Co:

(1) Conducts CA effective 281100 into LZ's 1, 2, 3 and 4; thereafter conduct squad-size search and ambush patrols in assigned AO.

(2) Special emphasis will be placed on complete area saturation initially and search of areas adjacent to cultivated areas to destroy VC resupply caches.

e. C Co:

(1) Conduct CA following insertion of B Co into LZ's 5, 6 and 7; thereafter conduct search and clear patrols oriented toward Nui Hoc Hoa Mountain.

Group 4  
Downgraded At 3 Year  
Intervals: Declassified  
After 12 Years

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(2) Relieved from reaction force required of 1 platoon combat ready for deployment within 30 minutes notice; the entire company within 60 minute notice; effective 271800 Apr.

f. D Co:

(1) Retrains LZ Bronco.

(2) Brigade reaction force, will have one (1) platoon combat ready for deployment within 30 minutes; the entire company within 60 minutes effective 271800 Apr.

g. Recon Platoon:

(1) Conduct CA effective 280800 to FSB Jeff. Provide fire base security for Bn Fwd CP.

(2) Be prepared to conduct local security patrols.

h. Heavy Mortar Platoon:

(1) One section consisting of 2 each 4.2 inch and 1 81mm mortar will deploy to FSB Jeff.

(2) Be prepared to support by fire all LZ's within 4.2 range.

i. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Planning ACL for UH1H 6 pax each.

(2) Units operating within 500 meters of company boundaries are authorized direct coordination.

(3) Steel helmets will be worn.

(4) A minimum of 3 offensive mech ambushes will be emplaced by each rifle squad.

(5) Units reports location changes every hour or after 1000 meters of movement whichever occurs first.

(6) All rice paddy areas will be destroyed by drainage.

4. (c) SUPPLY AND SERVICES:

a. Supply:

(1) Resupply will be from SE pad.

(2) 3 day resupply schedule will be in effect. Initially the following schedule will be followed:

30 Apr - B Co

1 May - C Co

(3) Units are requested to limit resupply request to ammunition, rations, water and emergency items.

b. Services: Malaria tablets and salt tablets will be taken and consumed as required by Bn SOP and 23d Div regulations.

5. (c) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Commander: FSB Jeff (BS688327).

b. Signals:

(1) Current SOI in effect.

(2) CA frequency: secure plain.

(3) Reports: SOP.

(4) CA net will open 30 minutes prior to air move.

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ANNEX A INTELLIGENCE  
ANNEX B OPERATIONS OVERLAY  
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ANNEX A to OPORD 5-71

Reference: Maps, South Vietnam: 1:50,000; Series L7014: Sheets 6738I, 6738II.

I. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS:

a. The terrain in the area of operations varies from triple canopy jungle in the northeastern portion to rice paddies and agricultural areas in the central portion. The area is mountainous but also has numerous streams (some indicated on the map, others not). There are many trails in the area. Those shown on the map are depicted fairly accurately but are not all inclusive and do not reflect all the trails in the area.

b. The weather is expected to have only a small effect on the operation, if any at all. Ground fog can be expected in low areas especially in the early morning. This may hamper air mobile activities at times but no great difficulties are expected. Ceilings are expected to be 2000 to 3000 feet in the afternoons. Little or no rainfall is expected for the next 7 days. Illumination will decrease until 1 May and then generally increase to about 75% by 15 May.

c. The major enemy unit which the battalion can expect to encounter in the AO is the 403d Sapper Battalion. This unit has also been known as the 2d Sapper Battalion, the 9th Sapper Battalion, the 4th Battalion as well as the 1088th Infiltration Group. The 403d Sapper Battalion, which is directly subordinate to MR-5, trained under the 305th Training Division in North Vietnam. In March 1969, the 403d began to infiltrate to South Vietnam under the designation of the 1088th Infiltration Group. In June 1969, the 403d arrived at its present location west of base area 124. On 2 and 29 January 1970, it was believed that elements of the 403d were involved in sapper attacks on allied outposts in Duc Pho.

d. The 403d Sapper Battalion is believed to have a total strength of 400-600 men divided into a headquarters, 2 sapper companies, an infantry company, a transportation platoon, a recon platoon and a signal platoon. The battalion's equipment includes unknown numbers of the following items: submachine guns, B-40 rocket launchers, 60mm mortars, grenades, satchel charges and PRC-10, K-63 and 15 watt radios.

e. Currently the 403d Sapper Battalion is believed to be operating in the coastal plains with its maneuver elements while retraining a headquarters and the rear services sections in base area 124. It is suspected that the 403d is attempting to harvest rice or collect rice recently harvested by the local farmers in the lowland areas. The 25 April attack on an ARVN outpost at BS845303 which lasted over 3 hours was attributed to the 403d as an attempt to remove a bothersome GVN installation from its area of interest. The headquarters and rear services sections are currently held in the vicinity of BS7327. Activity in this area is believed to consist primarily of production and transportation, both geared to support the combat and subversion operations being conducted farther to the east.

f. The 403d Sapper Battalion has the ability to attack by fire as well as by ground assault. Ground attacks are generally preceded by a 40 to 50 minute mortar attack during or immediately after which penetration of the perimeter is attempted by sappers. The enemy has the capability of delivering CS by mortar interspersed with HE or by hand in

the form of grenades or cannisters of CS. As is the case with most enemy units, the 403d Sapper Battalion is very susceptible to a rapidly changing tactical situation.

g. Since there hasn't been an operation in this area in at least 6 months, it is not expected that many booby traps will be encountered. The enemy will probably continue to avoid contact in preparations for the upcoming Spring-Summer offensive. However, the 403d's specialty is ground sapper attacks and therefore any stationary unit or position is a possible target for such an attack.

## II. OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS:

- a. On 18 Jan at BS713298 observed 1 bunker.
- b. On 21 Jan at BS767318 UH1H at 0' received moderate .30 cal fire, 3 hits, negative casualties.
- c. On 23 Jan at BS771297 Observed numerous trails with signs of heavy use.
- d. On 24 Jan at BS755298 B/123 Avn engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA and OH-6A received moderate .30 cal fire with negative hits.
- e. On 24 Jan at BS743287 Ranger team inserted, found 3 tunnels, engaged estimated 5-10 VC.
- f. On 28 Jan at BS769305 Observed 4 bunkers and 6 huts.
- g. On 19 Feb at BS780319 Destroyed 4 booby traps, 2 105mm rounds and 2 82mm rounds.
- h. On 10 Feb at BS756299 Engaged 8 VC/NVA.
- i. On 23 Feb at BS779332 Engaged 2 NVA with gunship.
- j. On 13 Apr at BS765299 Destroyed 2 booby traps and engaged 2 VC/NVA.

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
EX-B (OPORD OVERLAY)  
TO OPORD 5-71  
REF. MAP 1:50,000 VN

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**ANNEX-B (OPORD OVERLAY)  
(TO OPORD 5-11)  
REF. MAP 1:50,000 VN**

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