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This is a version I made
using photoshop to remove
Spackle on the 1st 20 pages
& 'x' out Personal Identifiers.
Also rotated & aligned document back
to original source document size

L. Hines

this is what is being shared with our
Veterans

Copy furnished.
COMUSMACV
ATTN: MACAG-PD
APO 96222

ORIGINAL

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By NAVA, Data

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20 JUL 70

GPAG-PA Dunagan, Kern W. 1st Ind

XXX-XX-XXXX (22 Jun 70)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Medal of Honor

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: The Adjutant General, ATTN: AGPB-AB, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 20310

Recommend approval of award of the Medal of Honor.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

1 Incl
nc

WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commander in Chief

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COMUSMACV
ATTN: MACAG-PD
APO 96222

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MACAG-PD

22 JUN 1970


SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Medal of Honor

Commander In Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO 96558

Forwarded in accordance with Section II, para 24b(3), AR 672-5-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Recm for Awd
(Dunagan, Kern W.)


DONALD J. MORGAN
Major, USA
Asst AG

A handwritten signature, appearing to be "DJM", is written over the typed name "DONALD J. MORGAN". Below the name are the titles "Major, USA" and "Asst AG".

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By NAVA, Dala

0441
Ser 3013

20 JUL 1969

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FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on CO 1ST BN 46TH INF 196TH BDE DA Form 638 of 25 JUL 1969


From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: Secretary of the Army
Via: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Medal of Honor; recommendation for award of, case of Captain
Kern W. DUNAGAN, USA, xxx-xx-xxxx

1. Readdressed and forwarded recommending approval of the award of the Medal of Honor to Captain DUNAGAN.

JOHN S. McCAIN, Jr.

Copy to:
COMUSMACV (MACAG-PD) ←



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
MACAG-PD DUNAGAN, Kern W. 4th Ind
xxx-xx-xxxx (25 Jul 69)
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND,
VIETNAM, APO 96222 22 JUN 1970

TO: Commander In Chief, Pacific, FPO 96610

1. Recommend approval of the Medal of Honor.
2. Request this headquarters (ATTN: MACAG-PD) be advised when final action has been taken.

5 Incl
nc


CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS
General, United States Army
Commanding

MACAG-PD File

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19 JUN 70 5 51 PM

DISPOSITION FORM

4909

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT
MACAG-PD	Recommendation for Award
THRU ACofS, J1 TO CofS	FROM AG
	DATE 17 JUN 70 MAJ Morgan/rlj/2274
	CMT 1

1. PURPOSE. To obtain signature of COMUSMACV on indorsement at Tab A to the recommendation for award at Tab B.


2. DISCUSSION.

- At Tab B is a recommendation for award of the Medal of Honor to Captain Kern W. Dunagan, xxx-xx-xxxx, United States Army.
- The recommendation has been reviewed by the Awards and Decorations Board, this headquarters, and the proposed indorsement is in accord with the recommendation of the Board.
- Recommendations of intervening headquarters are as follows:

CO, 196th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division	MH
CG, Americal Division	MH
CG, USARV	MH

3. RECOMMENDATION. Signature of COMUSMACV on indorsement at Tab A and return of correspondence to this office for dispatch.

2 Incl
as


W. A. RUTLEDGE
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

APPROVED/SIGNED	
COMUS	<u>X</u>
DEPCOMUS	
COFS	<u>noted</u>
D/COFS	
DATE	<u>220740 gln 70</u>

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By NARA, Data

RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD, USE ONLY				DATE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HEROISM <input type="checkbox"/> MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE (AR 672-3-1)		PREPARED TO REACH APPROVING AUTHORITY IN DUPLICATE.		25 July 1969
THRU: Commanding General USARV, ATTN:AVMAG - PG APO 96375	TO: Department of the Army ATTN: AGPM -AC Washington, D.C.	FROM: (Unit) Commanding Officer 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th Bde APO SF 96219		
PART I - STATUS AT TIME OF RECOMMENDATION				
1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME DUNAGAN, KERN W.		2. SERVICE NO. XXX-XX-XXXX	3. GRADE CPT	4. BRANCH (Or MOS II WO) 1542 Inf
5. ORGANIZATION Co A, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th Bde		6. RESIDENCE (Number, Street, City, and State, including ZIP Code) [REDACTED]		
7. RECOMMENDED AWARD Medal of Honor	8. POSTHUMOUS AWARD <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	9. NAME, RELATIONSHIP, AND ADDRESS OF NEXT OF KIN Anna Dunagan (Wife) [REDACTED]		
PART II - STATUS AT TIME OF ACT OR SERVICE				
10. SERVICE NUMBER XXX-XX-XXXX	11. GRADE Cpt	12. BRANCH (Or MOS II WO) 1542 Inf	13. ORGANIZATION Co A, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th Bde	
14. HAS ALL SERVICE BEEN HONORABLE SUBSEQUENT TO THIS ACT OR SERVICE (If not, summarize on reverse side.) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO				
15. IF PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE SUBMITTED FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE TYPE OF AWARD RECOMMENDED, BY WHOM, WHEN, ACTION TAKEN, AND HEADQUARTERS None				
16. OTHER U. S. DECORATIONS RECEIVED (Include date and authority) (Do not list service medals; list foreign decorations only when same period as this recommendation.) None				
17. DID YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR SERVICE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO				
PART III - RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROISM				
18. WERE YOU AN EYE WITNESS TO THE ACT <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		19. IF CERTIFICATES OR AFFIDAVITS OR EYE WITNESSES OR PERSONS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS ARE NOT INCLOSED, GIVE REASONS Sgt Robert T. Tulles-Medevac-106th General Hospital-Camp Zana		
20. PERSONS IN IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD				
a. FULL NAME		b. SERVICE NO.	c. GRADE	d. UNIT
David A. Waltz		XXX-XX-XXXX	1 Lt	Co E, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th
Thomas N. Tamanaha		XXX-XX-XXXX	1 Lt	D Btry, 1/14 Arty
Joseph S. Dolock		XXX-XX-XXXX	1 Lt	Co C, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th
Pete Gonzalez		XXX-XX-XXXX	Psg.	Co C, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th
(See Continuation Sheet #1)				
21. IF ANY OF ABOVE PERSONS HAVE BEEN AWARDED OR RECOMMENDED FOR AN AWARD FOR HEROISM FOR PARTICIPATION IN THIS ACT, GIVE NAME AND TYPE OF AWARD David A. Waltz - Silver Star -(Downgrade)-BS "V" - GO 7259-Americal-11 Sep 69 Thomas N. Tamanaha - Silver Star-Pending-Americal Pete Gonzalez - Silver Star-GO 8928-Americal-1 Sep 69				
22. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED				
a. LOCATION Thanh Phuoc (4), Republic of Vietnam Map Tien Phuoc, Vietnam, I:50,000 Grid Sq.		b. INCLUSIVE DATES 1307 12 May - 14 May 1969		c. TIME 0810-193 May 1845-14 May
2. CHARACTER AND CONDITIONS OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER Wide valley floor with overgrown hedgerow-lined hills and brush and bamboo-lined steep bank streams in open rice paddies. Bright, clear days with abnormally high temperatures (100 degrees) and nights with no moon (zero illumination)				
23. DESCRIBE ENEMY CONDITIONS (Morale, Proximity, Fire, Observation, Casualties, and Action; what the enemy was doing and what it did as the result of the act.) Morale high. Battalion size North Vietnamese Army force armed with 60 and 82 MM mortars, rocket propelled grenades, M79 grenade launchers, heavy weapons and semi-automatic and automatic rifles. Estimated size force 250-300 men.				

DA FORM 638

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923570

By

NARA, Date

24. UNIT MORALE, CASUALTIES AND MISSION: INDICATE WHAT THE UNIT WAS DOING AT TIME OF ACT.
Morale high. Unit moving to secure position four (4) kilometers away to relieve pressure on Battalion Headquarters under attack. Alpha Company with Reconnaissance Platoon attached was a force of less than one-hundred men. Thirteen KIA's, forty WIA's, ten MIA's.

25. WHAT WERE COMRADES WHO WERE IN IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY DOING - HOW DID THEY PARTICIPATE IN THE ACT
Comrades in immediate proximity were providing suppressive fire to enable the element to tactically withdraw from the area to relatively secure locations where combat first aid could be administered to wounded personnel.

PART IV - RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE

26. UNIT, HEADQUARTERS, OR SECTION IN WHICH DUTY WAS PERFORMED

27. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED

29. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT

28. SERVICE COMPLETED ☐ YES

☐ TO BE COMPLETED ON OR ABOUT

☐ NO ☐ TO BE REASSIGNED ON OR ABOUT

☐ TO BE RETIRED ON OR ABOUT

☐ TO BE RELIEVED FROM AD ON OR ABOUT

PART V - TO BE USED FOR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS

30. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ☒ DEED OR ACT ☐ ACHIEVEMENT PERFORMED OR SERVICE RENDERED

FOR AWARD FOR HEROISM: WAS ACT VOLUNTARY? DESCRIBE WHY ACT WAS OUTSTANDING AND IF IT WAS MORE THAN WAS NORMALLY EXPECTED, EXPLAIN HOW. IF IN AERIAL FLIGHT, DESCRIBE TYPE AND POSITION OF AIRPLANE, CREW POSITION OF INDIVIDUAL, AND ALL UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE: TITLE AND DUTIES OF ASSIGNMENT, INCLUDING CHARACTER OF SERVICE DURING PERIOD FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED (Give complete description of technical or specialized positions, including dates of assignment and relief); WHAT DID THE INDIVIDUAL DO THAT MERITS THE AWARD? WHY WAS THIS OUTSTANDING WHEN COMPARED TO OTHERS OF LIKE RANK AND EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR POSITIONS?

See Continuation Sheet #2 - Narrative Description

31. DESCRIBE EFFECTS OR RESULTS

See After Action Draft

32. RELATED POSITION OF PERSON INITIATING RECOMMENDATION TO PERSON BEING RECOMMENDED

Battalion Commander 1st Bn, 46th Inf

33. IF APPROVED, FORWARD AWARD FOR PRESENTATION TO

N/A

34. INCLOSURES (Include proposed citation, sketches, and eye witness statements when required.) A. Enclosure

- 1) Narrative Description
- 2) Witness Statements - (Eight)
- 3) After Action Report
- 4) Map

35. TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, AND TITLE OF PERSON INITIATING RECOMMENDATION

GEORGE R. UNDERHILL
LTC, Infantry, Oadg

36. SIGNATURE

George R Underhill

REVERSE SIDE MAY BE USED FOR DRAFT OF PROPOSED CITATION, AND CONTINUANCE OF ABOVE ITEMS, IF NECESSARY.

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By <u>NAVA</u> , Date <u> </u>

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CONTINUATION SHEET #1

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERVICE NO.</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Brian P. Shaw	XXX_XX_XXXX	Sp/4	Co A, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th Bde
Richard M. Belanger	XXX_XX_XXXX	Sp/4	HHC, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th Bde
Walter W. Brownlee	XXX_XX_XXXX	1 Lt	Co C, 1st Bn, 46th Inf, 196th Bde
Roy J. Ginder	FR XXXXX	Major	USAF



JESSE C. SELLERS
CPT, INF
Adjutant

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CONTINUATION SHEET #2

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
MOH CAPTAIN DUNAGAN

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On 12 May 1969, a major North Vietnamese offensive began throughout the Americal Division area of operations. The most intense and savage attacks occurred in the 1st Battalion 46th Infantry area of operation with an enemy assault on Forward Support Base Professional at 0220 hours and against Company A with the battalion Reconnaissance Platoon attached. CAPTAIN KERN W. DUNAGAN, XXX-XX-XXXX, as the Company Commander of Company A and the only company officer with the company, 1Lt David A. Waltz, the Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, and 1Lt Thomas N. Tamanaha, A Company's artillery forward observer, were the only other officers with Company A during the action on 13 and 14 May 1969. At 0810 hours on 13 May 1969, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was leading his unit towards a terraced knoll covered with a quilt pattern of small overgrown and hedgerow-lined fields when the lead element began engaging North Vietnamese Army soldiers moving in groups of twos and threes. This was the start of a thirty-five (35) hour battle between A Company with the Reconnaissance Platoon attached, an initial force of under a hundred (100) men, and the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd NVA Regiment, a force estimated between two-hundred fifty (250) and three-hundred (300) men. A prisoner captured during the battle verified his unit alone, which was the 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd NVA Regiment, contained about one-hundred (100) men and that the mission of his battalion was to stop Company A from returning to Forward Support Base Professional, the Battalion Headquarters, four (4) kilometers away, which was under constant barrage and attack. A Company's mission was to relieve the pressure on Forward Support Base Professional by clearing the high ground north of the fire base and was proceeding with all haste as the battle began. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was constantly aware of his assigned mission and made every attempt to get to his objective area. Throughout the morning, continued sporadic actions occurred. Around noontime, a medevac was successful in evacuating some friendly casualties wounded in action and heat exhaustion patients. Throughout the entire battle, the helicopters and Air Force jets working the area met with hostile fire. Upon reaching the knoll in the early afternoon, the intensity of the enemy action increased. The company sustained five (5) more wounded, but confirmed four (4) North Vietnamese soldiers killed and captured two (2) AK-47 automatic weapons and one (1) SKS rifle. Many of the enemy were shot at close range, but due to the situation and heavy vegetation they could not be confirmed. Frequently, the enemy would appear but the men in the middle and the rear of the company would not fire for fear of endangering their comrades ahead. The enemy acted as though their losses were unimportant as long as they channelized the company's movement. Part way up the knoll, late in the

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afternoon, the company began receiving enemy mortar, heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire, sustaining additional casualties. At 1645 hours, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was directing the Reconnaissance platoon to the northwest of the company perimeter and assisting a helicopter bringing in an emergency re-supply of ammunition when a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and mortar rounds fell in the company command post area. The assistant pilot of the re-supply helicopter was shot in the head and later died in the operating room, while one man was killed and five (5) wounded on the ground. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was knocked down flat on his back, seriously wounded in the jaw by a mortar fragment; however, he quickly recovered and continued to direct his unit by radio. As night began to fall, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN skillfully pulled his company back into a defensive position, assuring all dead and wounded were inside the perimeter and were provided first aid. By now his own wound had stopped bleeding, but the swelling and pain made talking most difficult. Throughout the night, the unit maintained their position and arranged for medical evacuations the morning of the 14th of May. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, sensing he had run into a major enemy force, throughout the night kept his men calm and planned and directed his men to secure a medevac helicopter landing zone and a route out of their position in the morning. To aid in the withdrawal, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, early on the morning of the 14th of May, sent an element of the Reconnaissance platoon to the southeast along a stream leading out of the area. An AC-47 "Spooky" Air Force gunship, firing in support of the Battalion Headquarters, still under attack on Forward Support Base Professional, was diverted to Company A at 0530 hours on 14 May. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN directed the gunship against suspected enemy positions to support the medevac and aid his troops to deploy and secure the landing zone. At 0635 hours, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN also assisted an airborne Air Force Forward Air Controller with air strikes delivering napalm and five-hundred (500) pound bombs on suspected mortar positions. As a result of these actions, the medevac was completed without serious incident, evacuating one (1) KIA and thirteen (13) WIA's. As the medevac was being completed, the Reconnaissance element, sent ahead to secure the company's withdrawal route, made contact with a well-entrenched enemy force and suffered one (1) KIA and three (3) WIA's. By this time the company's strength had dwindled down to approximately sixty-six (66) men. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, displaying outstanding bravery and leadership, began walking point for the entire company down off the knoll and into the brush and bamboo-lined stream bed in an attempt to link up and establish contact with the Reconnaissance element that was pinned down approximately three-hundred meters to the east. Enemy activity had now increased until there was continuous sniping, heavy volumes of small arms and automatic weapons fire, and frequent mortar barrages. As CAPTAIN DUNAGAN linked up with the Reconnaissance element at about 0930 hours, he quickly evaluated the tactical situation of

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the beleaguered element and unhesitatingly, despite his extremely painful wound, crossed the stream to rescue one of the critically wounded men, who was lying helpless and partially exposed on the upper bank to the enemy fire. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was met by automatic rifle fire and was again wounded by an enemy AK-47 round in the arm. Seemingly unaware he had been hit again and with complete disregard for his own life, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN continued towards his seriously wounded comrade. Completely disregarding the enemy fire and his own wounds, he pulled and dragged the wounded soldier back to the relative safety of the stream bed. Oblivious of his own extraordinary heroism and outstanding personal example, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN continued to rally his men and organized his defenses. The situation now became very serious as the enemy successfully maneuvered to trap the company in the stream bed. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, in intense pain and standing waist deep in the stream, proceeded to call in and direct airstrikes and AH-1G Cobra helicopter gunships onto the enemy positions. At 1105 hours, Company C was ordered to force march back to A Company's aid arriving in a position to attempt a link-up at about 1500 hours. During this four (4) hour period, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN calmly, and with great professional skill, kept his men probing, returning fire and personally directed numerous air-strikes and helicopter gunships against the encircling enemy force. By now the painful shrapnel wound in his jaw was noticeably affecting his ability to speak; however, his concise orders and directions over the radio, delivered calmly and with great presence of mind, was producing devastating effects on the enemy. Frequently exposing himself over the edge of the steep stream bed, he would locate and direct rocket-firing gunships on the enemy positions. At 1500 hours, as Company C deployed their forces down the east end of the stream in an attempt to reach CAPTAIN DUNAGAN'S men, they also came under intense mortar and automatic weapons fire, sustaining numerous casualties. At one point, a platoon of Company C got to within twenty to fifty (20-50) meters of Company A but could proceed no farther. The two forces were separated by an open stretch in the stream bed approximately twenty-five (25) meters long that did not have any vegetation to provide concealment. A smaller stream from the north joined the main stream in the middle of this open stream. It was here that the enemy had excellent fields of fire from three (3) principle directions from the north and had initially halted a move by the Reconnaissance element. Company C also sustained casualties in this killing zone as they attempted to link up with A Company. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN again tried to move his men down the stream passed the open stretch towards the halted C Company element. The first two men were cut down by automatic rifle fire delivered from the small stream facing the open stretch. The blood of the fallen men, clearly visible from the aircraft overhead, turned the stream red for fifty (50) meters. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, still determined to break out of the untenable position, made the decision to move out of the stream bed on the south bank and crawl passed the open killing zone towards the C Company elements. Still suffering from his painful wounds, he started out with the lead group when a new enemy position opened up and quickly killed the five (5) lead men and seriously wounded one other. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, realizing the futility of their attempt, dropped his pack

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
and ordered the men following to crawl back into the stream bed. At approximately 1630 hours, after returning to the stream bed, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN realized he had left the classified cipher gun to the KY-38 secure radio set in his pack. Recognizing the serious impact to the entire United States Army radio security, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, despite his wounds and without hesitation, quickly crawled back out into the open area, constantly exposed to the intense hostile fire, and recovered the cipher gun. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was out in the open area crawling and being shot at for about ten (10) minutes before he was able to return to the relative security of the stream bed. By now the Company's casualties had risen to the critical point. The enemy, constantly dropping mortar rounds and firing 40MM, M-79 high explosive grenades onto their positions, had inflicted wounds on almost half the dwindling forces. From 1630 to 1700 hours, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, talking on the radio with the forward air controller and helicopter fire team leaders, continued to direct accurate napalm and gunships onto the enemy positions so close to his troops that the heat and shrapnel were becoming a hazard. Several of the enemy began to maneuver into the thick brush and bamboo along the northern bank directly over the friendly forces. Rifle fire and hand grenades were used by both sides at close range before the enemy was silenced. It was plainly evident that A Company had to get out of their untenable position before dark or all of them might be lost. At 1715 hours, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, through the Battalion Commander, made a desperate decision to provide concealment with a smoke screen enabling everyone to make a break toward C Company's supporting position located three-hundred (300) meters across open rice paddies to the South. Neither of the artillery batteries had sufficient HC smoke rounds on hand and it was necessary that white phosphorous rounds, although quite dangerous, be used to build up and sustain a sufficient smoke screen. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, moving throughout his position, readied his men and ordered them to lighten their loads, destroying any useful property not carried, and demanded that no wounded be left. He gave directions and organized the men in groups around a man with a compass. The C Company element that had not been able to reach Company A was pulled back to their company's defensive position. All of C Company's machine guns were given targets off the flanks of A Company's route of withdrawal while gunships were directed to fire through the smoke screen over the heads of the withdrawing company into the high ground to the north of the stream as the artillery smoke screen was being fired. It was quickly apparent that there were not enough uninjured men left to both help the wounded and carry the dead. The agonizing decision was made on the radio between CAPTAIN DUNAGAN and the Battalion Commander that the dead must be left. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, after assuring himself that all the wounded were assigned a carrying party and that the smoke had built up to a sufficient density, led his company out across the open rice paddies towards the friendly perimeter of Company C. The enemy, sensing Company A was getting away, directed their small arms and automatic weapons fire across the open field, but the continuing

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smoke barrage suppressed its effectiveness. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN and 1Lt Waltz were in the first group to successfully reach Company C's perimeter where they began to successfully assist and account for their men. After almost all the men were accounted for, it was discovered that a six (6) man carrying party, led by 1Lt Tamanaha, had been hit by a 155MM white phosphorous round. By now, the smoke screen had begun to dissipate and the enemy fire was increasing. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, with complete disregard for his own life, critically wounded and exhausted, ran back out into the rice paddy to assist in their recovery. Through the smoke and continuous fire, he called and searched for his men. He found Sergeant Robert T. Tullos, a squad leader in the Reconnaissance element, crawling along the bullet-swept area with his left foot blown away. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN immediately helped apply first aid, using Sgt. Tullos' trouser draw-string as a tourniquet. Disregarding his own wounds and help offered by an aid man, Specialist Four Richard M. Belanger, who came to assist CAPTAIN DUNAGAN amidst the enemy fire, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN lifted Sgt. Tullos on his shoulders and ran back to Company C's positions, being forced to stop and rest along the way. After closing again with Company C, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was told that Specialist Four James E. Johnson, his senior aid man, was still out in the rice paddy. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, seriously exhausted and suffering from his painful wounds, started back out to find Specialist Four Johnson when he was stopped at the perimeter's edge by the discovery of Specialist Johnson inside the friendly perimeter. While checking his men and preparing them for medical evacuation, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN also learned that 1Lt Tamanaha had been rescued and assisted to the extraction site. At 1815 hours, "Dust-Offs" were called and the medevac was completed by 1845 hours. The Company Commander of Company C had to force CAPTAIN DUNAGAN to be evacuated on the Command and Control helicopter, the last helicopter out of the area. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, physically and mentally exhausted, twice wounded and in great pain, landed at Fire Support Base Professional and reported the status of his unit to the Battalion Commander. The Battalion Commander had to order CAPTAIN DUNAGAN to the hospital for medical treatment since he did not want to leave his troops. It was later determined that CAPTAIN DUNAGAN'S jaw wound caused him to lose two teeth and numbed his face, his arm had bone splinters numbing his fingers and a hairline fracture in one of his ankles had been discovered. During the course of the thirty-five (35) hour battle against a numerically superior force, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN repeatedly rallied his men by his extraordinary valor, outstanding leadership and professional skill. The love and devotion for his men was significantly displayed on two specific occasions in which he totally disregarded his own safety while saving the lives of others. His personal example in time of grave danger was an inspiration to all his men. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN'S personal heroism and timely professional actions reflect great credit upon himself, the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, the Americal Division and the United States Army.


JESSE C. SELLERS
CPT, Infantry
Adjutant

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AVDF-BESA DUNAGAN, Kern W. 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Medal of Honor

DA, HQ, 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, AMERICAN DIVISION, APO 96256 21 Oct 69

TO: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHAC - FC APO 96375

1. Recommend approval.

2. Throughout a thirty-five hour-period of sustained combat with elements of the 3rd NVA Regiment, Captain Kern W. Dunagan was wounded twice by enemy fire and also sustained a fractured ankle. Through his leadership and bravery above and beyond the call of duty, he saved the lives of several men and prevented his unit from being annihilated. I strongly recommend Cpt Dunagan be awarded our nations highest decoration for valor.

T.H. Tackaberry
THOMAS H. TACKABERRY
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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AVDF-AGPD DUNAGAN, Kern W. 2st Ind
XXX-XX-XXXX (25 Jul 69)
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award

DA, HQ, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374 NOV 12 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHAG-PD,
APO San Francisco 96375


1. Recommend approval.

2. Captain Dunagan distinguished himself during the period 13 May 1969 to 14 May 1969 while serving as Commanding Officer of Company A, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry. On 13 May 1969, Captain Dunagan was moving with his company toward Landing Zone Professional when the unit came under intense hostile fire from a well entrenched element of the 3d North Vietnamese Army Regiment. In the ensuing battle which raged for 35 hours, Captain Dunagan fearlessly and repeatedly exposed himself to the insurgents in order to call in and adjust supporting fire on the numerous enemy fortifications. In addition, he braved the hostile fusillade on several occasions to rescue fallen comrades from further injury and enable them to be given medical attention with minimal delay. Despite being wounded in two separate encounters, Captain Dunagan refused to be extracted from the area and remained with his men to inspire them and direct operations against the determined insurgents. His courageous and continually timely actions contributed significantly to defeating the large North Vietnamese Army force and truly merit the award of the Medal of Honor.

3. The Silver Star has been awarded as an interim award under authority of General Order Number 11448, Headquarters, Americal Division, dated 5 November 1969.

4. The information contained in the recommendation has been verified against the individual's personnel records and the recommendation is not in contravention with AR 600-31.

5 Incl
Added 1 incl
5. GO 11448


HOWARD H. COORSEY
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Commander

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AVHAG-PD DUNAGAN, Kern W. 3d Ind

(25 Jul 69)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO 96375

TO: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
APO 96222

1. Recommend approval.

2. Captain Dunagan distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity, at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty. His heroism has been recognized by the interim award of the Silver Star.

5 Incl
nc

Frank T. Mildren
FRANK T. MILDREN
Lieutenant General, US Army
Deputy Commanding General

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C E R T I F I C A T E

On 14 May 1969, at 1000 hours, Company C was given instructions to change their mission. We were told to move back and help Company A who was engaged in heavy contact with an estimated battalion-size force of the North Vietnamese Army. We were about 3000 meters from Company A. The day was very hot. We decided the best way to get to Company A was to drop our packs. The third platoon left a squad of ten (10) men to secure the equipment. When we reached our point of deployment (BT 139069), the first platoon started toward Company A. When they were about two-hundred (200) meters outside the perimeter, the first platoon was fired upon. They returned fire, killing one (1) NVA and captured one (1) NVA, plus one (1) SXS. We sustained one casualty. Then, with the aid of the third platoon, we dropped back. After we were back, more air-strikes and artillery were brought into the area. The third platoon was then given the mission to go get Company A. We decided to go down the stream bed because the only other way was an open rice paddy. We also decided to do reconnaissance by fire all the time because of the enemy force in the area. I was in radio contact with Company A all the time because all air-strikes were coming in on their frequency. We got to within twenty to fifty (20-50) meters of Company A's point element. At this point, we had not received any fire as yet. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was giving me a great deal of assistance by adjusting artillery and air-strikes around me. We walked approximately another five (5) meters and then we started receiving heavy fire from our front and both flanks. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN'S lead element at this time was in visual contact. Within a matter of seconds, my platoon had four (4) KIA's and three (3) WIA's. I had extensive conversation with CAPTAIN DUNAGAN telling him he had to start moving his men and that I would stay as we could. I heard CAPTAIN DUNAGAN tell his men calmly that they had to start moving. I looked over the river bank and saw his men starting to move toward my location. While this was going on, I was calling in air-strikes and artillery to try to cover their rear, from where I thought much of the fire was coming. I could see three (3) of his people fall. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN came back and said they could not do it that way. I am not sure if CAPTAIN DUNAGAN led his people over the bank, but there was a time when he was not on the radio. I had to start pulling back because the three (3) WIA's were wounded critically and I only had fifteen (15) men left in my platoon. I had to leave four (4) KIA's back because every time I tried to move forward or to get one of the people in front of my platoon, someone else was shot. I pulled back, directing my men to move to our perimeter. Soon after, smoke was called in to try to conceal Company A's movement. As the smoke engulfed the area, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN started moving his men through the bullet-swept rice paddy. He finally made it to our position. He then left our perimeter and went into the rice paddy to see if any more needed help.


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He found a man with his foot blown off. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN carried that man back to our position. He then started to look for his senior aidman. Someone told CAPTAIN DUNAGAN that he was in our command post. When everyone in Company A was in our position, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN rounded up the people who had to get out and personally made sure that they were all on the medevac helicopters. When the last helicopter came in, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN had to be ordered onto the vehicle.


JOSEPH S. DOLOCK
1Lt, Infantry
Platoon Leader

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
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WITNESS STATEMENT

While flying as a forward air controller in support of the 1/46th Inf, 198th Inf Bde, 14 May 1969 (1400H-1700H), I monitored conversations between the Battalion CO and Cpt Dunagan, CO, Company A, 1/46th Inf.

A Company, 1/46th Inf had been heavily engaged for several hours by an estimated NVA Battalion located at coordinates BT135175 and BT138074 when I arrived to provide them with close air support. I heard Cpt Dunagan tell Battalion CO, LTC Underhill, that he had been hit but that it was not serious. Cpt Dunagan, CO, Company A, 1/46th Inf had refused medical evacuation and some 20 to 30 minutes later was again wounded while attempting to retrieve two wounded personnel of his company. Again Cpt Dunagan refused medical evacuation. I observed Cpt Dunagan carrying a wounded man, pack, radio and weapons to a more secure area while passing through intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. Because of automatic weapons fire (.50 cal), Helicopter gun ships were unable to provide suppressing fires for medical evacuation ships to extract the remaining wounded personnel of A 1/46th. Throughout the time I was airborne over the area, monitoring the radio of the unit in contact, Cpt Dunagan had complete control of the situation. His calm and precise directions to aircraft in support of him was truly heroic. Though wounded twice and still receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire from at least two directions, he directed air strikes close to his position to allow him to regroup his company. Cpt Dunagans actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Army.


ROY J. GINDER
MAJ FRXXXXX
USAF

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STATEMENT

On 13 May 1969, grid (BT 119055), we departed our night defensive position at approximately 0630 hours enroute to Forward Support Base Professional. The previous day we had been advised to return to Forward Support Base Professional as soon as possible, due to an enemy attempt to overtake the LZ. At this time, Reconnaissance was OP CON to Alpha Company. While enroute to Forward Support Base Professional, we engaged two (2) Viet Cong at (BT 126067), resulting in one (1) Viet Cong KIA and the capture of one (1) AK-50 weapon. The other Viet Cong successfully evaded. After calling a spot report to Battalion, we were underway toward our objective. After moving approximately six-hundred (600) meters to grid (BT 127071), we again engaged the enemy. Our point element killed one (1) NVA soldier, who was fully equipped with SKS rifle, chicom grenade on his pistol belt, pith hat, green khaki uniform and pack. After another spot report, we were again enroute. At approximately the same time, we were advised by 1Lt John Edwards, Bravo Company's Company Commander, that he had spotted thirty (30) VC/NVA heading in a westerly direction and that he was processing artillery on the enemy. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN advised all of our element to be on full alert. At approximately 1300 hours, we spotted approximately five (5) NVA soldiers evading northeast and engaged them with small arm weapons, but with negative results. Near the same location, our rear element had movement spotted to the rear. They engaged the movement with M-60 and M-16 fire. Soon after, we then started to receive small arms enemy fire. At this time, the Reconnaissance platoon had been separated from our main element and the enemy had gotten between us. While in contact, we had two (2) rocket-propelled grenades fired at our location by the enemy and 60MM and M-79 grenades. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN contacted 1Lt David A. Waltz of Reconnaissance and decided to use grenades to rid the enemy between us. Small arms were ineffective and too dangerous, due to the fact that we would be firing onto friendly forces. The Reconnaissance platoon then got on line and consented to throw grenades while our element gave adjustments and target locations. After Reconnaissance successfully linked up with Company A, they killed three (3) The four (4) NVA that were between us. After the link-up, we moved across the river on the trail at (BT 131073) and secured a Landing Zone for the wounded friendlies, approximately four (4), at (BT 132074). Meanwhile, we had Cobra gunships work over the area where we had made contact. After the dust-off was completed, we again started forward to Forward Support Base Professional. We had moved approximately three-hundred (300) meters when we decided to make a Landing Zone to accept our resupply. While attempting to set up security to our east, the second platoon received heavy sniper fire and recoilless weapon fire. Immediately, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN started to process artillery. Then we began to receive 60MM mortar fire. We pulled back to the proposed Landing Zone and sent our third platoon and Reconnaissance

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up a hill at (BT 133077) to provide security. They were met by an unknown size enemy force with heavy small arms fire, M-79, automatic weapons fire and 60MM mortar fire. They received heavy casualties. After the wounded and one (1) friendly KIA were brought down to the Landing Zone, we called for a medevac. When the dust-off came in, the enemy moved its fire from Reconnaissance and the third platoon to the Landing Zone. The dust-off was completed successfully with the wounded and one (1) KIA. Soon after, a resupply helicopter came in and when it touched down, the enemy put a concentration of small arms and 60MM fire onto the Landing Zone. The co-pilot was struck in the head by small arms fire and killed him. The pilot fought with the copter, while the co-pilot was removed from the helicopter. The pilot then successfully got the aircraft away from the Landing Zone. The helicopter brought in three (3) men and a resupply of "C" rations, mail and some ammunition. One of the men who ran off the helicopter was killed by a mortar round. The same round sent a piece of shrapnel into CAPTAIN DUNAGAN'S jaw. The blow sent CAPTAIN DUNAGAN to the ground, rendering him unconscious. At the time he was wounded, he was on the radio talking to 1Lt Waltz. I scrambled over to him, thinking he was dead. Hovering over him, I called his name and after a second, he came to. He started to get up, but I tried to keep him down. He jumped up, grabbed the radio and finished his conversation with 1Lt Waltz. After we succeeded in getting the Reconnaissance platoon and the third platoon back to our location, we picked up the wounded and dead and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN led us to a night laager. When we arrived, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN set the positions of the perimeter and put out the word for complete light and noise discipline. The night defensive position was located at (BT 133075). At our night defensive position, we had all the wounded around the Command Post where the medics could keep close watch and give aid when needed. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN had no sleep that night and was in terrific pain due to the wound in his jaw. He would go around and try to comfort the wounded when he was not directing "Spooky," which assisted us all night. He told me and Specialist Four Thomas A. Matiniane, the other RTO carrying the company net, to get some sleep and he would monitor the radios. During all of the action on 13 May, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN remained calm and kept his sense. Even after being knocked down by the fragment of mortar, he kept cool and composed. He never once was concerned for his own safety. When he was struck, he was looking around for enemy positions by standing erect, even though we were under heavy fire. I think that some of the wounded might not have lived if it was not for CAPTAIN DUNAGAN. He would go around and try to comfort them and just let them know he was with them. He was a great morale factor. He also helped carry a wounded man to the night defensive position on 14 May. We departed our night defensive position at approximately 0700 hours and moved to a Landing Zone at (BT 134073). We had our wounded and dead evacuated and accepted a resupply of ammunition. The total evacuated was approximately five (5) litter patients and ten (10) ambulatory. We had one (1) friendly KIA who was evacuated by our Command and Control helicopter. While breaking down our resupply, we sent an

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element of Reconnaissance down the stream to secure and reconnoiter the area. At approximately 0745 hours, the Reconnaissance element radioed us and said they had been ambushed by an unknown size enemy force. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN ordered everyone to pack and move. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN personally walked point along with 1Lt Waltz. We moved in two columns, with the Company Commander taking the lead. The river was approximately fifteen (15) yards wide, five (5) feet deep and each bank was ten (10) feet above the water level. It had heavy vegetation along each side. It was chosen for the concealment it would provide the element. When we arrived at the element's location (BT 136074), the Reconnaissance element was pinned down. One of the men instructed CAPTAIN DUNAGAN as to where the men were located. It was reported that the point man of Reconnaissance was hit and dead, but was unconfirmed because we could not get to him. They also had two men wounded in the legs. When CAPTAIN DUNAGAN found out where the men were trapped in the cross fire, he dropped his pack and darted across the river, up the bank and to where the men were pinned down. While doing so, he received a wound from an AK-47 in the left elbow and the projectile lodged in his forearm. He dragged one of the men back to safety. While doing so, he instructed the rest of the men who were pinned down to withdraw and led the way for them. We contacted Battalion and requested air support. We got support from two sets of gunships, and an unknown number of FAC's, which controlled airstrikes. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN directed the ordinance of gunships as close as twenty (20) meters from our location. The high banks of the river enabled us to do so without fear of friendly casualties. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN directed the gun-ships by popping smoke and giving the aircraft direction and proximate locations from the smoke. After approximately a half hour to forty-five (45) minutes of rockets from the gunships, we tried to move again. An element of Reconnaissance started across and received heavy automatic weapons fire, resulting in one (1) KIA and one (1) WIA. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN directed the gunships in for another hour of ordinance and he had the FAC put airstrikes on the hills and enemy locations around us. While this was taking place, we spotted one (1) NVA cross the river in front of us. We engaged him with small arms, with no results. At this point, we had to pull back in fear of the enemy coming along the bank in front of our point, where there was no observation. We pulled back approximately twenty-five (25) meters. After realizing that he had left his KY-38 cipher gun in his ruck sack, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN left the radio for a minute and went back to where he left it. Alone and unprotected, he crawled up to the pack and retrieved it. He then returned to the radio and his men and conducted more air support. While the troops were in the river, our element observed NVA moving on our flanks and engaged them when possible. The whole time, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN would keep passing encouragement to the men. At no time did anyone feel like giving up or quitting. After the air ordinance was put in for another hour and closer than ever, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN decided to try to move again. We started out on the west side of the river, up the bank and along the edge. We had just passed the location of the Reconnaissance element and all looked well until automatic weapons fire cut down the first four (4) men. All were killed. We got down and

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returned a base of fire, but were not sure where the enemy was. About three (3) rounds suddenly ripped through our position, wounding one (1) RTO in the back and killing one (1) man by striking him in the head. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN decided the last chance would be to get on line and assault. Our strength of men had dwindled to less than forty-five (45) men between Company A and Reconnaissance. He had given the order to spread on line and advised LTC George R. Underhill of his actions, LTC Underhill, the Battalion Commander, told him not to do so because he figured there should be a less costly way to get out. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN agreed and ordered us to pull back into the river. He again called on more air support and discussed the situation with LTC Underhill. I am not sure how or who brought the idea up, but it was decided that a smoke screen might work to aid our movement. At approximately 1715 hours, the artillery smoke rounds started to drop around our location and we waited for it to build up to where it would be effective as a smoke screen to conceal us. We planned to evade through the smoke to the south, toward Company C and their established perimeter with a secure Landing Zone. The location of Company C was at (BT 139069); CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then gave every man encouragement and advised all of what was to happen. We were to run directly south, which CAPTAIN DUNAGAN showed everyone by pointing in the direction of our movement. Company C was to put down a base of fire to the northeast. We ran for approximately two-hundred fifty (250) meters until we came to the edge of the smoke. During the run, we were taking heavy small arms fire and the smoke rounds were still dropping in. All our equipment had to be left behind and the wounded that were unable to make it alone were aided or carried by others. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN observed the yellow smoke and showed us the way to the friendly perimeter. After reaching Company C's perimeter, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN started to account for his men and assisted in grouping them. After hearing of a carrying party assisting a wounded man, who was struck by a 155MM smoke round, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN ran back into the rice paddy and searched for the party. Finding one of the men with his foot blown off, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN physically carried the wounded man on his back, despite his own wounds and strain, to Company C's perimeter. He started to return to the paddy where smoke rounds were still coming in when persuaded not to by a man who went out also and could not find any of the other men. We had three (3) medevacs pick up the many wounded and dead and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, when knowing his company was safe, finally was persuaded to get on a helicopter and receive medical treatment. At no time during all contact did CAPTAIN DUNAGAN show signs of weakness or complain of pain. His decisions were never hasty or not well thought out unless he had to do something in a split second. He showed no regard for his own safety, only for the welfare of his men. When we had to run through the smoke, we had to leave the dead men, which totaled thirteen (13) KIA's. He knew it had to be done; he tried every possible way to get the men out. If it were possible to take the dead, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN would have done it.

Brian P. Shaw

BRIAN P. SHAW
SP/4, XXX-XX-XXXX
RTO


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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sergeant First Class Pete Gonzalez, acting platoon leader of the second platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, was present when my platoon came within twenty to fifty (20-50) meters of Company A on 14 May 1969. We never reached their position and we were eventually forced to move back and set up south of the main trail. At approximately 1730 hours, Company A called in a smoke screen in an attempt to provide enough concealment for their evasion into our perimeter. Alpha Company, led by CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, came through my sector. Soon after the men started coming in, I could see CAPTAIN DUNAGAN go back out to help the wounded. I saw him return later carrying a man who had his left foot blown off. He then took control of his company and moved them to a landing zone for evacuation. He was wounded, but did not leave until all the other wounded were safely out of the area.



PETE GONZALEZ
SFC, Infantry
Acting Platoon Leader

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, 1Lt Thomas N. Tamanaha, was the forward observer to Company A and was the only other officer, with the exception of CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, attached to Company A at that time. We had been given the mission to proceed toward an objective in the vicinity north of Forward Support Base Professional the night of 12 May 1969. The morning of the 13th showed only two (2) small contacts resulting in two (2) NVA KIAs. However, the tempo of the war increased as the afternoon crept along. In the vicinity of grid (BT 130072), we started seeing the NVA in groups of ten (10). Some thirty (30) to forty (40) NVA were spotted in the rice paddy south of our grid along the finger of the high ground. Although no confirmed body count was made, with the exception of four (4), I estimate at least twenty (20) NVA were either killed or wounded within a reasonable count, excluding any considerations for the artillery fire. Company A and the Reconnaissance platoon, under the leadership of CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, continued to proceed north along the high ground. At grid (BT 134076), CAPTAIN DUNAGAN sent Staff Sergeant Charles K. Crosswhite and the second platoon to the stream south, intending to secure it for the purpose of bringing in a resupply helicopter. The second platoon then came under contact in the stream. Some of the men of the first platoon, who were securing the east side of the company's perimeter, spotted several NVA running in the rice paddy near the second platoon. Artillery was called on both the NVA and a mortar position east of the second platoon. The second platoon was also fired upon by a recoilless rifle from the south. The second platoon was then withdrawn to the company's perimeter. Since the time of day was growing increasingly short, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN ordered the Reconnaissance Platoon to the knoll at grid (BT 133077) to prepare for the company's night defensive perimeter. At approximately 1800 hours, the NVA started their fierce mortar and small arms fire, including machine guns and grenade launchers. Severe friendly casualties were suffered, requiring an immediate "Dust-Off." The "Dust-Off" was completed successfully without further casualties. The decision was then made to bring the Command and Control helicopter in for emergency resupply of ammunition. While hovering on the Landing Zone, the co-pilot was shot in the head by a sniper who had crawled near the perimeter. This sniper was quickly eliminated. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN completely disregarded warnings from his RTO and myself of all incoming mortar rounds. Thinking only for the people of the Reconnaissance and the third platoon, who were under the most severe part of the attack, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN stood on one knee and continued directing the two platoons over the radio. Not ten minutes had passed after the Command and Control helicopter had left when one of the many mortar rounds fired by the NVA impacted approximately thirty (30) meters from the Command Post, killing one (1) and seriously wounding CAPTAIN DUNAGAN in the jaw. After being stunned by the wound for a few seconds, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN instantly regained his composure and continued

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directing the company. Withdrawing the Reconnaissance and third Platoons, the company moved south along the finger to the vicinity of grid (BT 133074) to our night defensive perimeter, where a small fortified position was found. Luckily, our night defensive position was not attacked during the night. Several helicopters were brought in the next morning to medevac the wounded and also to bring in more emergency resupply. An element of the Reconnaissance platoon was sent forward up stream toward the east to reconnoiter the area. The element made contact and withdrew a few meters; however, they suffered a few friendly casualties. Under the direction and constant leadership of CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, Company A and the Reconnaissance platoon began its trek up stream to aid the pinned down element of Reconnaissance. Knowing the depressed feeling of the men that this day was actually a continuation of the last, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN and 1Lt David A. Waltz expressed their fine leadership by walking point and setting an example. Upon linking up with the Reconnaissance element and learning that four of the men up ahead were pinned down, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN dashed forward, securing one of the wounded and directed the rest of the men back. During the rescue, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN sustained his second wound in the left elbow. Company C's first platoon then made its attempt to relieve some of the pressure by moving east to west along the stream. However, the platoon returned to their company's perimeter after capturing one prisoner of war. Soon after, another platoon of Company C was sent toward our location, this time in the stream itself. The platoon made its way by reconning by fire. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then decided to move the company toward the platoon of Company C in the stream. However, before reaching the platoon, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN decided to go around an open area in the stream by climbing the stream bank to the right. While in the process of crawling around the open area through the rice paddy, four friendly casualties were immediately sustained. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN ordered for four (4) M-79 rounds to be shot in the treeline about fifty (50) meters to the front. Two friendly casualties were suffered at this time, which prompted CAPTAIN DUNAGAN to withdraw to the secured stream. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then announced that a smoke screen was to be fired south of the stream in the three-hundred meter wide rice paddy. The smoke screen was to cover our tactical advance to the friendly perimeter of Company C. Sergeant Robert T. Tullos, who was with me helping to carry one of the wounded men shot through the leg along with four others, became part of the very last group to leave the stream. A white phosphorous round which impacted two (2) meters from Sergeant Tullos caused him to lose a foot. Sergeant Tullos, at this time, became separated from myself; however, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN later rescued him in the rice paddy.

Thomas N. Tamanaha
THOMAS N. TAMANAH
1Lt, Arty
D Btry, 1/14 Arty

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C E R T I F I C A T E

On 13 May 1969, my company, Company C, 1st Battalion 46th Infantry, began moving toward our objective following Bravo Company. After many hold-ups, I split with Bravo Company and moved north of them, staying south of the Burlington Trail. At coordinates (BT 140064), we spotted two (2) NVA and fired upon them, killing one (1). We continued to move toward our objective. After being plagued by heat casualties and problems, we stopped at coordinates (BT 145072) for resupply and water. After that, we moved on and had to have three (3) men extracted because of the heat. It was late, so we night lagged at coordinates (BT 154074). That night we watched Forward Fire Base Professional get hit hard by mortars, RPG's and recoilless rifle fire. We watched "Specky" work with flare ships all night long. We had heard on Battalion net that Company A was in heavy contact behind us as they and Reconnaissance had moved back up the valley and moved along the north side of the Burlington Trail. I remember hearing of a chopper pilot being killed while trying to resupply Company A and Reconnaissance. However, I do not remember the day or time I heard this. On 14 May, at 0700 hours, I called and talked to the Battalion S-3 asking if he wanted me to continue to my objective or go back to Alpha Company. He directed me to push on to my objective. We continued moving to our objective and, at approximately 1200 hours, I received a call while at coordinates (BT 161067) to turn around and go to coordinates (BT 138068) to help relieve the pressure on Company A and Reconnaissance. We moved north of our location and moved directly west, after moving to the Burlington Trail. Upon moving away from the Burlington Trail, I took the route as follows, by coordinates (BT 148074), (BT 148072), (BT 145070), (BT 144067), (BT 139067), stopping at (BT 138068). I had two (2) heat casualties that we were carrying and helping until we reached that point. Upon reaching the designated area, I sent the first platoon into the creek to move north. They dropped over a rice paddy and 1Lt Grant saw an SKS sticking out of a hole. He pulled it out and with it came a NVA. He hit the NVA and secured his weapon, then shot another as he ran from the area. The first platoon then came under heavy fire and moved back and brought the prisoner of war with him. The man could speak a little English and he told us: "100 NVA in ambush" Next, I sent the third platoon and second platoon in the stream. I had 1Lt Delock, the third platoon leader, put his radio on Company A's frequency, so he could coordinate with CAPTAIN DUNAGAN. As they proceeded up the creek, they came upon Company A's first dead body. At that point, a sniper cut down our first six (6) men. The remainder of the two platoons tried to stay and hold until Company A could move toward them, but the fire was so intense that Company A could not move in our direction. We tried to recover our dead, but every time we reached for them, heavy fire would begin again and they would shoot the bodies five or six times more. We were forced to

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pull back once more, bringing two (2) of our six (6) bodies with us. I also had wounded that were removed successfully from the ambush site. We were about to go back in for the third time when CAPTAIN DUNAGAN said there was no chance of our platoons getting to them and for them, at this time, to get to us. He requested smoke by artillery so that they could evade across the rice paddy. During the entire day, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN never lost control of the situation; the manner by which I am stating this is because of his calm radio conversations and the decisions he was making on the radio. At no time did I ever feel that he had lost any control over his situation and his men. Smoke was brought in and my machine guns were placed so that they could give cover fire while they evaded. As soon as the smoke came in we started to fire, keeping our fire to the east of the north-south stream line. Company A and Reconnaissance soon began coming into our left flank. The first time I actually saw CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was when he entered our perimeter line. He was told that some men had been hit by a smoke round and he immediately ran back to the smoke in an attempt to find them, all the while under enemy fire. When he came out again, he had a man on his shoulders who had a foot gone. He carried him up to where we were and we took the man from there. I had heard that he also crawled through intense fire earlier to get the secured radio set out; however, I did not specifically see this occur. We then moved back and set up a landing zone for medevacs. All the while we were there, we had gunships and air-strikes with napalm and drag bombs working over us. They stayed until the medevacs were completed. We also used a smoke-ship for the medevacs. I told CAPTAIN DUNAGAN that he must get on the final medevac because we would not be able to get him out after we started to move because of the terrain. He wanted to stay, but he finally consented and went on the last helicopter from our area.

Walter W. Brownlee

WALTER W. BROWNLEE
1Lt, Infantry
Commanding

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By NAVA, Dalt

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C E R T I F I C A T E

On 13 May 1969, Company A and my platoon, Reconnaissance, had been instructed to move from (BT 119055) to a location north of Forward Support Base Professional in order to ease the pressure on the Support Base, which had been under constant attack. At this time, my platoon was under operational control of Company A and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, Alpha Company's Commander. As we moved north and east in the vicinity of the Burlington Trail, Company A was in the lead with my element trailing. Company A made two (2) sharp encounters, each resulting in one (1) NVA KIA and two (2) weapons captured. It was evident that there was considerable enemy activity in the area. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN decided that our safest route would take us across the valley and along the high ground to the north. After the two engagements, we started receiving some small arms and automatic weapons fire from several different locations. As we moved north towards the high ground, Company A and one element of my platoon started spotting North Vietnamese Army soldiers in groups of four (4) and (5). They were heavily camouflaged, moving all around us. It is my opinion that we did kill quite a few NVA. But we could not confirm them because of the heavy fire. At this time, Company A sustained some critically wounded personnel. The Reconnaissance element, while moving up to Company A, ran into a well-camouflaged group of four (4) NVA soldiers, who fired at us as we approached. Nobody was wounded, so we quickly advanced, making contact with Company A. My element was now spread out and in the exposed area. We lobbed quite a few grenades in the bamboo clumps, which was the suspected hiding place of the insurgents. After this, we moved forward to check out the area. At this time, a 60 MM mortar, approximately four-hundred (400) meters southwest of my platoon, dropped two (2) rounds on our position with no results. I directed my rear squad to lay down some M-60 fire, which they did, and they apparently silenced the mortar. At this time, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN moved to the outside of the perimeter to aid us in finishing off the four (4) NVA. Some more grenades were thrown and we succeeded in getting four (4) NVA KIA's and two (2) AK-47s and one (1) SKS-44. At this time, the 60 MM, which had moved closer to us, started dropping more rounds, but again we sustained no friendly casualties. Artillery was fired into the area and it apparently silenced the mortar. Realizing that we had numerous enemy around us, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN first evacuated the wounded and then had us start moving again in order to secure some high ground for that evening's night laager. Before that could be done, we had to take a much needed resupply, as both Alpha Company and Reconnaissance were low on both food and ammunition. We moved to a location near our proposed night laager where CAPTAIN DUNAGAN instructed me to move my platoon three-hundred (300) meters north to secure the high ground for our night laager. After I moved up the hill and had a perimeter set up, a call came through that one of Company A's platoons had come under attack, sustaining friendly casualties. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then sent the third platoon up the hill to my location to start digging in, as

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By NAVA, Data

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darkness was rapidly approaching. The second platoon moved up the hill and, as I was putting them into position, the hill came under intense automatic weapons fire. The third platoon, which had started digging in, received the brunt of the fire and suffered one (1) KIA and several were seriously wounded. The hostile fire began to engulf the entire hill. At this time, mortars started dropping from several different positions on both Company A and Reconnaissance. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, at this moment, was at the bottom of the hill and he called for a dust-off with gunships. The dust-off came in and evacuated the one (1) KIA. Then a resupply helicopter came in and came under fire. The co-pilot was shot in the head and the helicopter was lurching dangerously on the landing zone. At this time, a 60MM round landed near the Command Post, killing one man who had just arrived on the helicopter and wounding CAPTAIN DUNAGAN in the jaw. I did not learn that CAPTAIN DUNAGAN had been hit until I came down from the hill later. At no time was my radio communication with CAPTAIN DUNAGAN broken. He remained calm and continued to relay my artillery and gunship adjustments. At no time was I aware that he was wounded. Due to the intense fire on the hill, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN decided that I should withdraw our elements from the hill with our wounded and link up with the main element. After this had been accomplished, we moved several hundred meters south into a heavily vegetated area. We then formed a perimeter with the remaining people putting our wounded in the center. At no time was there any panic. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN remained calm and reported our situation to Battalion as I checked out the perimeter. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then decided that we would evacuate the wounded in the morning and then move along a stream to the high ground to the south of the valley. Throughout the night CAPTAIN DUNAGAN remained awake and, despite the swelling of his face and his excruciating pain, directed "Spooky" on suspected enemy locations. On the next morning of 14 May, the evacuation of the wounded was completed. During the evacuation, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN instructed me to send a small element to the stream to secure a route of withdrawal for the remaining people in our elements. As they were moving up the stream, they were ambushed by a well-concealed, well-entrenched enemy force. During the initial contact, one man was killed and three men were seriously wounded. We received word via radio of their situation and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN immediately moved us to their location. At this time, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN completely disregarded his own safety and walked point down the stream. We linked up with my element and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was again wounded, this time in the arm by an AK-47 round, while he was helping one of the wounded. He made sure that all the wounded were moved to a secure area within our element before he would accept any medical attention. After he was bandaged, he and I put the men in a perimeter, using the banks of the stream for cover while we awaited gunships. When the gunships arrived, we directed them to the areas where the NVA were dug in. Even during this time, after he was hit for the second time, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN remained calm and kept everybody going. After the gunships finished, I moved what was left of my platoon forward, but we were driven back when two (2)

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of my RTOs were hit by automatic weapons fire. We called more airstrikes and gunships in all around us because we were now moving to the ridges to the north, from where we were receiving mortar fire. The fire was so intense that even the jets, who were dropping napalm and high explosives, were receiving fire going in and coming out of their passes at the targets. More than once I monitored gunship pilots who kept on saying that they could see numerous enemy dug in, and several NVA running on the trails north of the location. Company C then sent one (1) element down the stream to try to relieve some of the pressure on us and help secure a way out from our location. I remember seeing men from Company C as close as thirty (30) meters away before they were driven back. It seemed that any hope of getting out was fading. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then made the decision that if we could get to move around this trouble spot in the stream, we could possibly link up with Company C in the stream. He personally led the men up the stream bank and attempted to crawl around on the right bank toward Company C's location. The enemy had that way covered and killed six (6) of the crawling men. The rest withdrew along with CAPTAIN DUNAGAN back to the stream bed where we reformed the perimeter. At this time, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN realized he had left his cipher gun in his pack up on the bank. Disregarding his personal safety, he crawled back up into the bullet-swept bank and was gone for about ten minutes. I could hear rifle fire in that direction and I figured that he was not coming back. Suddenly down the stream, I heard a voice, yelling "friendly, friendly." It was CAPTAIN DUNAGAN and he had the cipher gun. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then contacted Battalion and explained our critical situation. It was decided that the rest of us would cross the rice paddy to our south under the cover of a smoke screen and attempt a link-up with Company C. Again, with the same calm and professional manner he had displayed all through the actions on 13 and 14 May, he directed all equipment that could not be carried to be destroyed. He also made sure that all the wounded were assisted. When the smoke became thick enough, we dashed out into the rice paddies with CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, leading. Rounds were landing all around us, but the smoke screen prevented them from being very accurate. Suddenly, I spotted the yellow smoke of Company C's perimeter and yelled to everyone which way to go. I looked around and could see CAPTAIN DUNAGAN directing people into the friendly perimeter. When we reached Company C's perimeter, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN and myself waited and counted the men as they passed by. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, learning of a man missing, ran out to the rice paddy with a medic and, despite his wounds, succeeded in carrying Sgt. Robert T. Tullos, who had lost his foot when struck by a white phosphorous round, back to the relative safety of the perimeter. Sgt. Tullos informed us that ~~that~~ thought everyone with him had been killed by the white phosphorous round. With Company C, we secured a landing zone and evacuated the wounded, including CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, who was unwilling to leave his men. It is my belief that without the calm and cool leadership and moral support of CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, a lot less men would have survived in Company A and Reconnaissance during the actions of the 13th and 14th of May, 1969.

David A. Waltz

DAVID A. WALTZ
1LT, 05351981

Company Commander, Reconnaissance

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S T A T E M E N T

On the morning of 14 May 1969, at approximately 0900 hours, Company A and Reconnaissance were proceeding upstream in the creek bed when the point element of the Reconnaissance company made contact. Being a medic, I was walking next to the RTO of the third platoon and heard over the radio that one (1) man was killed and that our Company Commander, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, was hit. We finally grouped in the creek bed and set up a defensive perimeter. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then called for gunships and artillery. After the strikes, we were ordered by the Battalion Commander to proceed up the creek again. However, the enemy was dug in and opened up and killed another point man. We retreated to our earlier perimeter and the Company Commander called in more concentrated artillery, gunships and also air-strikes. At approximately 1600 hours, when the strikes had subsided, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN told us that we had to leave then if we planned to get out at all. He proceeded to climb up the north bank of the creek with the intention of heading east to meet Company C, which had tried to reach us. However, the first four (4) men over the top were killed and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, who had also gone up the bank of the creek, came back down into the stream bed. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then got on the radio and asked for an emergency CA of the troops to get us out. He was told this was impossible and then said we would have to either make a run for it to the south or crawl out at night. It was decided we would run the two-hundred (200) meters to the South across a rice paddy under the cover of white phosphorous and artillery rounds. We waited until the open area was filled with smoke and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN yelled for us to drop all packs in the water, except for radios, and not to fire when we ran since Company C would be waiting for us on the other side of the rice paddy. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN also directed six (6) men to carry a wounded man with a broken leg on a poncho. When we ran across the field we received a few sniper rounds, but that was all. We did not think anyone was hit, but when we had all reached the other side, I realized the men carrying the wounded man had not made it. I told this to CAPTAIN DUNAGAN and he immediately started running back across the open area, yelling for our lost man. I followed him until he went about seventy-five (75) to one-hundred (100) meters and he found one (1) man, waving frantically, with burns all over his body and a traumatic amputation of the left foot. I did not have any dressings or medical equipment left, but we checked his foot and saw that his bootstring had been used as a tourniquet and most of the bleeding had stopped. I mentioned to CAPTAIN DUNAGAN that he must be carried back and he insisted to carry him alone, and he gave me his weapon and told me to yell for some more that might be out in the rice paddy. He started back and I went about fifty (50) more meters and was fired upon, so I decided to return. About half way back to the perimeter of Company C, I saw CAPTAIN DUNAGAN with the wounded man sitting on the dike, exhausted. I suggested that

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CAPTAIN DUNAGAN take the weapons and I would take the injured man, but CAPTAIN DUNAGAN told me he could handle the wounded soldier and proceeded to the secured perimeter. We were constantly fired upon with semi-automatic weapons fire. We started crawling with CAPTAIN DUNAGAN completely assisting the wounded man and after about twenty (20) meters, we got up and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN carried the injured man over his shoulders, and ran along the cover of a dike. When we got to the Command Post, someone told CAPTAIN DUNAGAN that the senior aidman, SP/4 James Johnson, had gone looking for him back in the rice paddy. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then threw down his helmet and weapon and said he would go back to look for him and the others carrying the man with the broken leg. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN was just leaving the perimeter when he was told that SP/4 Johnson was safe inside the Company's Command Post, and the man carried by CAPTAIN DUNAGAN told him that as far as he knew, the others were all dead because they had taken a direct hit from a white phosphorous round. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN then directed us to an area for a landing zone to evacuate all the wounded and dead. After all the casualties had been evacuated on two medevacs, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN finally consented to allow himself to be evacuated. He did not leave his men behind, but his wounds needed the necessary medical attention immediately.

Richard M. Belanger
RICHARD M. BELANGER
SP/4
Company Medic

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

On the evening of 12 May 1969, Company A, 1st Battalion 46th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, was occupying a night defensive position approximately seven (7) kilometers southwest of Forward Support Base Professional (BT 119055). Company A had just completed a ground assessment of a B-52 airstrike and had assumed operational control of the Battalion's Reconnaissance platoon. CAPTAIN KERN W. DUNAGAN, Company Commander of Company A, was directed to conduct a reconnaissance in force operation toward Forward Support Base Professional, clearing the high ground in grid squares (BT 1307), (BT 1308), (BT 1407), (BT 1408), (BT 1507), (BT 1508), (BT 1607) and (BT 1608). At 0810 hours on 13 May, Company A engaged three (3) NVA evading, resulting in one (1) NVA KIA and one (1) AK-47 captured. At 1337 hours, Company A engaged four (4) NVA at (BT 136075), killing all of the enemy and capturing two (2) AK-47s and one (1) SKS. Company A also directed an airstrike onto the target area. Company A suffered five (5) WIA from enemy fire. All five (5) were evacuated by "Dust-Off." At 1645 hours, Company A began receiving intense enemy fire, including small arms, automatic weapons and 60MM mortars. Company A suffered one (1) WIA and began to move to a landing zone for a "Dust-Off." While moving to the landing zone, Company A was subject to more 60MM mortar fire, resulting in five (5) WIA and one (1) KIA. All of the friendly casualties were medevaced, while the medevac helicopter received intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. At 1840 hours, a resupply helicopter attempted to land at Company A's landing zone with an emergency resupply of ammunition. The aircraft was subject to approximately one-hundred (100) rounds of small arms and automatic weapons fire. The co-pilot was wounded in the head and died of wounds in a hospital operating room a few hours later. At 1843 hours, Company A was again subject to an intense mortar attack, resulting in two (2) KIAs and ten (10) WIAs. Contact with the enemy ceased at 1850 hours. Total enemy casualties for 13 May reported were six (6) NVA KIA, confirmed, and five (5) enemy small arms captured. Due to the sustained contact, many enemy KIAs were not reported. Company A moved to a night defensive position (BT 132073). At 0525 hours, Spooky II was diverted to Company A's location. At 0645 hours on 14 May, Company A began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire as they attempted to move to a landing zone to evacuate their wounded from the previous night. Company A directed an airstrike onto grid (BT 133077) to neutralize the enemy fire. At 0730 hours, a "Dust-Off" arrived on station to commence medical evacuations. The "Dust-Off" was escorted by armed helicopters. The "Dust-Off" made two (2) sorties into Company A's landing zone to extract the wounded. The Command and Control helicopter of Battalion Headquarters made one (1) sortie into Company A's landing zone with an emergency resupply of ammunition and extracted the remainder of the wounded. A total of two (2) KIAs and eighteen (18) WIAs were evacuated by the Command and Control helicopter and the "Dust-Offs" were subject to intense automatic

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weapons fire on all sorties. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN directed a second airstrike into the target area in an attempt to neutralize the enemy positions. From 1010 hours until 1105 hours, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN directed the fires of armed helicopters onto the target area as he attempted to move to the east. Company A was unable to move without being exposed to both direct and indirect enemy fire from vicinity (BT 133077). In addition, the enemy had dug into positions along the river bank in the vicinity of (BT 137073) and (BT 130073), thereby blocking the movement of Company A to the north, east and west. Company A was not able to move to the south because the rice paddies were exposed to direct fire from the north. Company C, 1st Battalion 46th Infantry, was directed to move overland to the area of contact to relieve pressure on Company A. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN continued to direct airstrikes against the enemy positions north of the river and armed helicopter strikes against the enemy positions along the river bank. Helicopter strikes were directed to within thirty (30) meters of the friendly troops. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN suffered a shrapnel wound in the face and a gunshot wound in the arm. At 1635 hours, Company C moved to within twenty to fifty (20-50) meters of the easternmost elements of Company A, but was subject to intense enemy automatic weapons fire, suffered six (6) casualties and was unable to effect physical contact. At 1710 hours, Company A and Reconnaissance moved to the south under the cover of an artillery white phosphorous smoke screen. Because of the close proximity of the enemy, the white phosphorous was placed in extremely close to Company A's location. Some of Company A's troops became confused and misoriented in the smokescreen and CAPTAIN DUNAGAN returned to the area to assist in their withdrawal and to help carry the wounded. At 1735 hours, Company A and Company C linked up and began to move toward a landing zone to evacuate their wounded. Twelve (12) friendly dead remained in the area of contact. At 1830 hours, Company A and Company C secured an area for a landing zone at (BT 154070), where "Dust-Off" medevacs and the Command and Control helicopters of the 1st Battalion 46th Infantry evacuated eight (8) WIAs, including CAPTAIN DUNAGAN. On 15 May, Company A and Reconnaissance returned to Forward Support Base Professional with ten (10) men from Reconnaissance and thirty-four (34) men from Company A. The remainder were WIA evacuated and eight (8) KIAs left on the battlefield. A prisoner captured in the area of contact by Company C, 1st Battalion 46th Infantry, on 14 May stated that he was a member of 3d Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Regiment, 2d North Vietnamese Army Division. The mission of his company was to prevent Company A from returning to Forward Support Base Professional. The strength of his company was approximately one-hundred (100) men. Weapons included an AK-47, an SKS-56, 56 caliber light machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, 30 caliber light machine guns, and 82MM and 60MM mortars. Their tactics included close surveillance of friendly troops and engagement at close range from fortified positions. The company was well-trained in the art of camouflage, displayed extreme patience and was well organized, disciplined and equipped.

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FOR CONSPICUOUS GALLANTRY AND INTREPIDITY AT THE RISK OF LIFE ABOVE AND BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN DISTINGUISHED HIMSELF DURING THE PERIOD 13 MAY 1969 TO 14 MAY 1969 WHILE COMMANDING COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 46TH INFANTRY. ON 13 MAY 1969, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN WAS LEADING HIS UNIT TOWARD LANDING ZONE PROFESSIONAL TO ASSIST FRIENDLY PERSONNEL SECURING THE BASE WHO WERE UNDER ATTACK FROM A LARGE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCE. WHILE SWEEPING TOWARD THE FIRE SUPPORT BASE, THE REINFORCING ELEMENT CAME UNDER INTENSE HOSTILE FIRE FROM A HEAVILY ARMED, WELL ENTRENCHED ENEMY FORCE FROM THE 3D NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY REGIMENT. FOR THE NEXT 35 HOURS, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN LED HIS MEN IN NUMEROUS SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INSURGENTS, OFTEN INSPIRING HIS MEN TO PERFORM IN A SUPERIOR MANNER DESPITE THE EXTREMELY ADVERSE CONDITIONS. OVER THE TWO DAY PERIOD, CAPTAIN DUNAGAN, DISPLAYING COURAGE FAR ABOVE THAT OF THE AVERAGE SOLDIER, REPEATEDLY AND FEARLESSLY EXPOSED HIMSELF TO THE HEAVY VOLUMES OF HOSTILE FIRE IN ORDER TO ACCURATELY DIRECT AIR STRIKES, GUIDE HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS, PROCESS ARTILLERY BARRAGES ONTO ENEMY FORTIFICATIONS, AND ASSIST THE WOUNDED PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH SUFFERING PAINFUL WOUNDS ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS, HE REFUSED TO BE EXTRACTED FROM THE BATTLE ZONE AND ELECTED TO REMAIN WITH HIS MEN TO LEAD THEM AGAINST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCE. HIS COURAGEOUS AND CONTINUALLY TIMELY ACTIONS WERE HIGHLY INSTRUMENTAL IN DEFEATING THE DETERMINED INSURGENTS AND CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO SAVING THE LIVES OF MANY OF HIS FELLOW SOLDIERS. CAPTAIN DUNAGAN'S

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CONSPICUOUS GALLANTRY, EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM AND INTREPIDITY, ABOVE AND BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY, ARE IN THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND REFLECT GREAT CREDIT UPON HIMSELF, HIS UNIT, AND THE ARMED FORCES OF HIS COUNTRY.

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GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 11448

5 November 1969

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR

1. TC 320. The following AWARD is announced.

DUNAGAN, KERN, xxx-xx-xxxx, CAPTAIN, INFANTRY
Company A, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, 196th Infantry Brigade APO 96374
Awarded: Silver Star
Date action: 13 May 1969
Theater: Republic of Vietnam
Reason: For gallantry in action against an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam. Captain Dunagan distinguished himself by intrepid actions on 13 May 1969 while serving as Commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry. On that date, the company was conducting a reconnaissance in force mission near Landing Zone Professional when it came into heavy contact with well entrenched elements of the 3d North Vietnamese Army Regiment. During the ensuing battle, which lasted for 35 hours, Captain Dunagan constantly exposed himself to the enemy fire to call in artillery, airstrikes, and direct the movement of his men. In one instance, Captain Dunagan, with complete disregard for his personal safety, braved the hostile fire as he moved across open terrain and carried a wounded and pinned down soldier to safety. Although he was wounded on two separate occasions, he refused medical evacuation and continued to direct his company and call in supporting fires on enemy emplacements. His outstanding leadership and courage were directly responsible for the defeat of the large enemy force and contributed significantly to minimize friendly casualties. Captain Dunagan's personal heroism, professional competence, and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service, and reflect great credit upon himself, the Americal Division, and the United States Army.

Authority: By direction of the President under the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved 9 July 1918.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JOSEPH G. CLEMONS
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

William J. Dean CPT, AIC
JAMES. R. RALPH, JR
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

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ENCLOSURE A

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR

NAME: KERN W. DUNAGAN

STATUS: Company Commander, Infantry Company, Captain, United States Army

ORGANIZATION: Company A, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, 196th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374

NEXT OF KIN: Anna Dunagan (Wife)
5402 East 30th Street
Tucson, Arizona 85711

PERSON WHO ASSISTED: First Lieutenant David A. WALTZ, Recommended for Silver Star

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT PERFORMED

LOCATION: THANH PHUOC (4), Republic of Vietnam.
Map Tien Phuoc, Vietnam, I:50,000 Grid Square 1307

DATE: 0810, 13 May - 1845, 14 May 1969

TERRAIN: Wide valley floor with overgrown hedgerow-lined hills and brush and bamboo-lined steep bank streams in open rice paddies.

WEATHER: Bright, clear days with abnormally high temperatures (100 degrees) and nights with no moon.

ENEMY CONDITION: Morale high. Battalion size North Vietnamese Army force armed with 60 and 82MM mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, M-79 grenade launchers, heavy weapons and semi-automatic and automatic rifles. Estimated size force 250-300 men.

FRIENDLY CONDITIONS: Morale high. Unit moving to secure position four (4) kilometers away to relieve pressure on Battalion Headquarters under attack. Alpha Company, with the Reconnaissance Platoon attached was a force of less than one-hundred (100) men. Thirteen (13) KIAs, forty (40) MIAs, ten (10) LIAs.

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NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF GALLANT CONDUCT

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For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty in Tien Phuoc District, Republic of Vietnam on the 13th and 14th of May, 1969: Captain Kern W. Dunagan distinguished himself while serving as Company Commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, with the Reconnaissance Platoon attached.

As Captain Dunagan was leading his men on a mission to relieve the pressure on the Battalion forward support base, Landing Zone Professional, which was under constant siege and barrage, the friendly element was ambushed by a well-entrenched, well-equipped force of North Vietnamese Army regulars, estimated to be between two-hundred and fifty (250) and three-hundred (300) men. During the ensuing thirty-five (35) hours of extremely heavy contact and close combat, Captain Dunagan continually and fearlessly exposed himself to the hostile fusillade in order to accurately direct air strikes, helicopter gunships, process artillery onto the enemy's fortifications and assist his wounded personnel. Although seriously wounded on two (2) separate occasions and suffering excruciating pain, Captain Dunagan refused to be evacuated from the bullet-swept area so that he could lead and direct his men against the fanatical insurgents.

Captain Dunagan's conspicuous gallantry, extraordinary heroism and intrepidity, above and beyond the call of duty, are in the highest tradition of the United States Army and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the Armed forces of his country.

The facts contained in the proposed citation and this narrative account have been substantiated by the statements of the eyewitnesses.

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