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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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(11) 22 May 67

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20 Apr 67

(2) 56P

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Junction City  
conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division  
(Handwritten)

(u) (s)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Junction City. Operation Junction City was conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division during the period 22 February - 20 April 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)  
Commanding Officers  
5th Battalion, 46th Infantry  
5th Battalion, 12th Infantry  
6th Battalion, 31st Infantry  
31st Engineer Battalion (Che)  
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)


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32 REGT, 4TH INF DIV



AFTER ACTION REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 101st ABN ADVR, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
ARO San Francisco, Calif

1. SEC-C

12 May 1971

## 2. SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Reports (U)

To: Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AC of S, D  
APO San Francisco 96225

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I, II, III.  
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Phase I 220001 Feb 67 - 172400 Mar 67,  
Phase II 130001 Mar 67 - 072400 Apr 67, Phase III 000001 Apr - 202400 Apr 67.

## 3. (U) LOCATION:

Phase I: Western War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province  
Phase II: Western War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province  
Phase III: Central War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province and Western Binh  
Dong Province

## 4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

## 5. (C) COMMANDERS:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div	COL Marshall B. Barth
2d Bn, 12th Inf	LTC Jim F. Elliott
2d Bn, 22d Inf (O)	LTC Ralph W. Julian
3d Bn, 22d Inf	LTC John A. Bunker (To 6 Apr)
	LTC James E. Wilmar (8 Apr to present)
1st Bn, 5th Inf (O)	LTC Richard C. Rogers
2d Bn, 10th Inf	LTC Charles A. Gillis
2d Bn, 30th Armor (-)	LTC Raymond L. Stanley
2d Bn, 77th Arty	LTC Walter E. Helm (To 15 Mar)
	LTC Jack A. Vacancy (15-Mar-)
C Btry, 1st Bn, 9th Arty (OBS)	LTC Fred J. McGrath (4 Mar - )
B Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty JBD	CPT John L. Owsley (11-15 Mar)
	CPT Samuel R. White (17 Mar - 8 Apr)

GROUP 4  
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3 Hwy, 2d Bn, 11th Arty (long)	CPT OSS Major - T Arty
C Grp 1/10 Cav	CPT Douglas Barr
3rd Stryers Bn (Prov)	Maj Richard M. Morris
Co C, 1st Eng Bn	CPT Carl B. Triple
Co D, 27th Eng	CPT Johnson R. Kohler
Co C, 53rd Bn Eng	CPT Robert T. Knott
1st Bn 1P50	CPT Robert D. Powers
3d Plt, 4th MP Co	2LT Jerry Sted

## 6. (C) TANK ORGANIZATION:

## a. Phase I:

2/2 Inf	2d Co
1 Sq, 11th LRPB	Co A, 2/2 Inf (A)
1 Sq, 2/2 Inf	Co B, 2/2 Inf
1/22 Inf (M)	2/77 Arty (A)
C/1/2 Inf	1 Sq, 4th MP
1 Sq, 11th LRPB	2d Co
1 Sq, 2/2 Inf	2/14 Inf
3/22 Inf	C/500 Eng
1 Sq, 11th LRPB	2/11 Arty (-)
1 Sq, 2/2 Inf	1st Bn 1P50 (-)

## b. Phase II:

2/2 Inf	2/22 Inf (A)
1 Sq, 11th LRPB	1 Sq, 11th LRPB
3/22 Inf	3 Sq, C/2 Inf
1 Sq, 11th LRPB	2d Co
3d Plt, 2d Bn	2/77 Arty
C/1/2 Cav	A/2/22 Arty
B/2/2 Arty (-)	
C/500 Eng	
C/2 Inf (-)	
1st Bn 1P50 (-)	
3d Plt, 4th MP	

## c. Phase III:

2/2 Inf	2d Plt/Deck
3 Sq, 11th LRPB	Co, 2/2 Inf
3/22 Inf	Plt, C/1/10 Cav
2 Sq, 11th LRPB C/2 Inf	Plt, C/2 Inf
3 Sq, 11th LRPB	5 Sq, 11th LRPB
Plt, C/1/10 Cav	C/2 Inf
Plt, 2/2 Arty	3 Sq, 11th LRPB
2d Plt, 3d Plt, 4th MP Co	2d Co
2d Co	C/500 Eng
2/2 Arty (-)	C/1/10 Cav (-)
2/77 Arty (-)	C/2 Inf (-)
	3d Plt, 4th MP (-)

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## 5. (a) SUPPORTING FORCES

## a. Artillery

## Phase I:

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery was in direct support of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Its mission was to support the maneuver battalions with on call and immediate fire requests.

## (2) Positions Occupied:

Entry	Coord	Dates Occupied	Means Occupied	Section	Distance
A/2/77	XT085800	22 Feb-4 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
A/2/77	XT145705	4 Mar-13 Mar	Convoy	N/A	5 Km
B/2/77	XT045300	22 Feb-12 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
B/2/77	XT045742	12 Mar-13 Mar	Convoy	N/A	13 Km
C/2/77	XT085800	22 Feb-3 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
C/2/77	XT045705	3-13 Mar	Convoy	N/A	5 Km
C/2/77	XT113705	13 Mar	Convoy	N/A	9 Km

## (3) Statistical Data:

## (a) Artillery Ammunition Expended:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
I. HE	4880	4353	6385	15,620
II. WP	310	122	213	645
III. ILL	25	0	87	112

## (b) Fuses:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
I. PD	4741	4292	6256	15,300
II. TI	310	113	224	649
III. VT	194	70	97	361

## (c) Missions By Type:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
I. R&I	367	363	845	1,557
II. Support	261	127	209	597

## Phase II

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery reinforced was in direct support of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Its mission was to support the maneuver battalions with on call and immediate fire requests.

## (2) Positions Occupied:

Entry	Coord	Dates Occupied	Means Occupied	Section	Distance
A/2/77	XT341903	17-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 Km
B/2/77	XT282603	17-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 Km
B/2/77	XT341903	18-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 Km
C/2/77	XT380627	18-20 March	Convoy	N/A	23 Km
A/2/77	XT383703	19-20 March	CH-47	13	13 Km
B/2/77	XT383703	19-20 March	CH-47	13	13 Km
C/2/77	XT383703	20-29 March	CH-47	13	9 Km
C/1/8	XT380627	20 Mar-1 Apr	Convoy	N/A	6 Km
C/2/13	XT380627	21-23 Mar	Convoy	N/A	23 Km
B/3/13	XT380627	29 Mar-4 Apr	Convoy	N/A	13 Km
A/2/77	XT341903	29 Mar-3 Apr	CH-47	13	13 Km
B/2/77	XT380627	29 Mar-4 Apr	CH-47 & Convoy	13	16 Km (Air) (6 Km Road)
C/2/77	XT380627	21 Mar-4 Apr	CH-47 & Convoy	13	13 Km (Air) (6 Km Road)
A/2/77	XT693303	3-4 April	Convoy	N/A	23 Km

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A/2/77	XT527567	4-6 April	Convoys	N/A	24 MI
B/2/77	XT527567	4-7 April	Convoys	N/A	29 MI
C/2/77	XT527567	4-7 April	Convoys	N/A	29 MI
D/3/77	XT527567	4-7 April	Convoys	N/A	34 MI

## (3) Statistical Data

## (a) Artillery Ammunition Expended

Day	Type	105mm				155mm	
		A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	C/1/8	C/2/13	Day
1. ME	6672	3763	3590	2237	601	20,863	2279
2. VP	172	116	231	133	33	141	16
3. ILL	3	1	11	0	0	17	3
4. Reserves	3	36	3	0	0	40	N/A

## (b) Fuses

1. FB	6614	5683	3562	2203	393	20,684	2217
2. TI	193	1630	177	167	41	2,236	26
3. VT	43	32	36	0	0	133	34

## (c) Missions By Type

1. ME	797	631	863	366	137	2,810	266
2. Spt	200	124	189	86	25	618	31

## Phase III

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery reinforced one in direct support of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Its mission was to support the numerous elements with on call and direct artillery support.

## (2) Positions Occupied

Day	Coord	Dates Occupied	Name Occupied	Section	Distance
A/2/77	XT276700	11-20 April	Convoys	N/A	30 MI
C/2/77	XT276703	11-20 April	Convoys & CS-67	10	20 MI (Road)
D/3/77	XT276700	11-20 April	Convoys	N/A	20 MI (Air)

## (3) Statistical Data

## (a) Artillery Ammunition Expenditure

Day	Type	105mm				155mm	
		A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	C/1/8	C/2/13	Day
1. ME	1563	1910	2097	2931	9,071		
2. VP	70	12	62	67	211		
3. ILL	33	0	0	69	107		
4. Reserves	0	0	0	0	0		

## (b) Fuses

1. FB	1473	1094	2670	2933	9,076
2. TI	117	36	91	110	340
3. VT	18	0	18	18	54

## (c) Missions By Type

1. ME	366	328	477	676	1,643
2. Spt	70	19	70	71	230

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b. DSCP

(1) Extensive use was made of tactical air to include pre-planned, immediate and combat proof missions with the normal air request channels being used for all missions flown.

## (2) Statistical Data:

## (a) Missions:

	JO I	JO II	JO III
1. Preplanned Miss. Req.	77	163	56
2. Preplanned Miss. Flown	70	74	29
3. Preplanned Sorties	210	224	114
4. Immediate Miss. Req.	13	23	4
5. Immediate Miss. Flown	13	23	4
6. Immediate Sorties	21	59	11
7. Combat Proof Miss. Req.	1	-	-
8. Combat Proof Miss. Flown	1	-	-
9. Combat Proof Sorties	2	-	-

## (b) Results of TAC Air:

1. VC KIA	Dak	Net 10%	Dak
2. Structures Destroyed	10	9	5
3. Bombers Destroyed	12	6	17
4. Bombers Damaged	7	3	9

## (c) Battle of Saci Tre:

1. Immediate Miss. Req.	- 70
2. Immediate Miss. Flown	- 28
3. Immediate Sorties	- 59
4. Estimated VC KIA	- 100

(3) TAC Air support proved to be timely, accurate and an asset in the operation. Requests for both preplanned and immediate TAC Air support were submitted through regular channels with no difficulty encountered. All systems were thoroughly proven during the Battle of Saci Tre on 21 March 67 in which TAC Air proved to be an invaluable asset in fending off the reported organized assault by the VC 278 Regt on this Brigade's elements. On that day alone, TAC Air accounted for 101 VC KIA KIA.

## c. Army Aviation

## Phase II

(1) Heliborne Operations: Heliborne operations were limited. All units were in place on D-Day and were not moved by air until the 7th of March when the 3/22 and 2/12(-) were lifted by CH-47's of the 213th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. The lift of the 3/22 from XTO00024 to WTV71731 commenced at 0900 hours and was completed by 0930. The aircraft were refueled and the lift of the 2/12 (-) started. This lift from PBB 128 (XTO002790) to WTV71731 was completed at 1220. This was the

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First time the Brigade lifted troops by CH-47. The reason was the small LZ from the 3/22 area. Although this was a flight, the lift was mostly and was conducted at a minimum time. On 20 March when the Bridge in Da Nang was cut, the first transport portion of the Line C Jack to the Phuoc Tuy and the 3/22 was again used in airlifting the 2/22 (-) and the 1/22. The moves were made from Da Nang, position 720 (AT775505) to Trai Me. The troops were then flown by CH-47 aircraft to Da Nang.

(2) Resupply: Aerial resupply during this period of time was limited. The majority of resupply was accomplished by convoy however, i.e., supplies etc was flown to the area by CH-47 helicopters. Units operating on various days were the 4th, 5th, 11th, 118th and 1/22 Combat Assault Aviation Companies. Resupply was conducted in routine manner and no unusual situations were experienced. In preparation for the exercises a non-directional beacon was erected at the Da Nang air strip for use by USAF aircraft operating to and from the airstrip. It has since been taken down.

(3) Refueling: Refueling of our organic CH-3D aircraft while in Thai Binh area became a problem and a man from the Bde section had to be placed with the Division Artillery Aviation Section. The service then became satisfactory. At this time the semi-permanent Aviation refueling point at Da Tiong was not operational. This meant the Bde aviat had to remain at Da Tiong throughout this phase.

(4) Other:

(a) Organic CH-3D aircraft flew many and varied missions during this phase. The first mission was the wire laying performed on 1 Feb. This was the first time this method had been employed. The mission enabled land line communications to be established immediately between the Bde CP and those of the 3/22 and 2/22. In support of this phase our CH-3D flew 84 missions, 1700 sorties and 10440 hours and carried 1658 passengers.

(b) Problems experienced with our helicopters started on 6 March when during starting and run-up of one CH-3D the bubble started cracking and splits. It was patched by "E" Company 725th Maint Bn and is still in use.

(c) At 1730 hours 7 March the engine failed in an CH-3D, the helicopter was autorotated to an unsecured area without further damage. The crew and passengers were extracted without incident. Overnight security of the helicopter was provided by the 11 ACR. The following morning the helicopter was extracted to Ch Chi although it took an unusual amount of time. Primary cause was the late arrival of the crew that prepared the aircraft for lifting.

Phase II

(1) Heliborne Operations: This phase was also characterized by few heliborne operations. The first helilift occurred on 19 March when a Combat Assault was made to LZ GOLD (AT306700). It was a two Da lift with the 3/22 conducting the initial assault. The lift was made from the Bn Da airstrip. Although the first flight of five aircraft experienced no difficulty, the second did. The VC had prepared this LZ with command detonated mines so that an air assault could be thwarted. Four of the choppers in the second flight were downed in the LZ, three were completely destroyed, the fourth was evacuated by CH-47. The lift continued until the 3/22 was in LZ GOLD. During this lift a total of 6 ships had been either damaged or destroyed. After the 3/22 lift had been completed a thorough search was made of the LZ and other mines were found with buried wires leading to concealed bunkers. The few VC at this LZ proved to be a spectator force. After refueling and regrouping the 143rd Aviation Bn was able to provide 13 ships for the helilift of the 7/12. The lift of the 2/12 went smoothly until the last flight approached LZ GOLD. On final approach the VC fired at the flight. Another seven ships were damaged. One of the seven had to

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(2) Battle of Saar River. The Battle of Saar The command at  
KOBLENZ March 1945 initially the 114th Combat Assault Helicopter Company  
was to be used in for use. No light fire teams and 5 x M47's were available.  
A further request, forwarded to 10th Inf Div for the tanks  
was to provide. One of the M47's was released and only four could be  
adequately utilized. There were very few to act as this day by Army  
artillery all wounded were evacuated from the battle areas. Emergency res-  
uscitation (resuscitation) were given in direct heating even although heavy  
casualties received. All personnel performed in an outstanding manner.  
The units participating in this battle are listed below.

- (a) 11th Combat Assault Helicopter Company
- (b) 1 SH-17 from the 721st Combat Assault Company
- (c) 3 CH-47s from the 300th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company.
- (d) 1 Black Hawk Team from the 31st Combat Assault Helicopter Company.
- (e) 6 aircraft including 2 light fire teams from 2 DTG, 3D Sqn, 4th Cdo.
- (f) Best-Off aircraft.
- (g) 2 aircraft from the 252d Avn Bn. One was used as the Friends Commanders C4C plane.

It should be noted that a medic from the 3/4 CR was winched down into the jungle at the sight of a downed F4 aircraft. Had either of the two pilots have survived the crash, they could have been extracted by the medic. This action was done in an extremely hasty manner. Of note also is the action of the light fire team from the 3/4 CR. During the F4 aircraft hit and crashing into the jungle below, they descended in and unloaded all of their ordnance into the surrounding area to deter any possible activity in that area by the VC.

(3) Resupply. During this phase the Brigade relied more heavily on aerial resupply. Due to late evening arrival at LZs and long turn-around times the Brigade experienced several difficulties with resupply. One solution to eliminate a last minute rush on resupply was to

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roughly the 2/22 Inf (B) by CH-47. All Class I resupply, ammunition, etc was being landed by CH-47. This eliminated several problems and has been the practice of this brig in since. As the units originally turned their way toward Da Nang, the turn around time was greatly reduced and normally by a rail road was accomplished without any major problems. During this phase an aviation tower was stationed at the Da Nang air strip. This enabled a short turn around for refueling of the CH-3D aircraft. A corridor with 4 refueling points and a 10,000 gallon bladder for JPAFs was also established at the Da Nang airfield. These services saved many valuable minutes of flying time.

(a) Others:

(a) In support of this phase of the Operation the CH-3D aircraft flew 504 missions, 1,072 sorties, 1,665 hours and carried 1,229 passengers. On 3 April the CH-3D's planes carried 208 passengers and 4 flying 23:00 hours. This phase was not free of incident with the CH-3D. At 1730 hours 23 March after an OH-3D had landed at Saat Da for a passenger pickup, a CH-47, Stratosphere 20011, flew over and slightly in front of the CH-3D. The rotor wash from the CH-47 caused the main rotor to flex down into the tail boom. The resulting damage was to the main rotor blades, the tail boom, and the drive train components of the tail rotor system. At the time of arrival of the CH-47 the aviator had shut down the engine, was not in the aircraft and could only hope no damage would occur. The main rotor blade on the CH-3D was turning fast enough that it could not be stopped. CH-3D were not working out of the pad at the time of the accident. CH-3D "40452" was lifted by CH-47 from Saat Da to Cu Chi at 1357Z, 24 March 1977. It was further evacuated to the 605th Maintenance Bn (M) at Phu Loi.

(b) On one occasion the 3/22 used CB to capture a POW. One of our aviators evacuated the POW from the area to the Da Nang Base Camp. Not knowing the method of capture a gas mask was not used on this flight. Before the landing was made at the base camp the aviator could hardly see from the effect of CB.

(c) On 7 April the 2/22 evacuated 30 tons of rice by CH-47. The rice was loaded internally and was a time consuming process. All rice of this quantity should be loaded in nets and sling loaded. The CH-47 is too valuable to spend extra time in a Z when not really necessary.

Phase III

(1) Heliborne Operations: During the third phase of the Operation the Brigade used helibit to insert and extract the Infantry groups. The first lift was the 36th Ranger Bn, helibited from Tay Ninh a field to the airfield at the Phu Kien Special Forces Camp on 11 April 1977. This was the first in-country helibit by the 107th Combat Assault Helicopter Company. There were no problems experienced during this lift. On 12 April after flying by C-7A from Da Nang to Saat Da, the 3/22 was helibited to LZ HUOL (K1161605). The LZ was secured by the 2/22. This lift was also made by the 107th, their second in-country lift as a unit. The lift was slow and took an overall event of three. Other units would have completed this lift without refueling; however, the 107th did not. This was not such an important factor during this lift or the delay could have been tactically significant. One of the two aircraft took seven rounds of small arms fire but there was no significant damage. On 13 April C-2/77 was helibited by CH-47 from the Saat Da airfield, to the Phu Kien Special Forces Camp. The lift was accomplished by the 213th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. There were no problems experienced. The 2/22 moved from LZ HUOL to Da Nang by CH-47's from the 200th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. There were no problems experienced. C-2/77 was helibited from Phu Kien to the Saat Da airfield. The track load was used to move another battery of Army from Saat Da to Phu Kien camp. The lift was longer than required for a single battery move but the overall time for movement of two batteries was less.

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(2) Resupply: Aerial resupply was used extensively. The only significant problem encountered was the long turn around time. Supplies were lifted by CH-46 and CH-47 aircraft in routine manner. The aviation section tender was stationed at Sacl De and served many hours of flying time.

(3) Other: The CH-3C aircraft flew 361 missions, 754 sorties, 212:25 hours and carried 770 passengers. The only incident experienced by this section during this phase occurred at 1010 on 19 April. After dropping a Special Forces WCO off on top of Muu Bo Din the sergeant in off loading his equipment threw his sleeping bag into the main rotor system. This required that the main rotor blades be changed.

(4) Summary: During the period of Operation JUNCTION CITY the Brigade conducted five Infantry Bn sized lifts by CH-47 and six by CH-46 aircraft. There were four Artillery lifts by CH-47. Units conducting the CH-46 lifts were the 90th, 110th, 162d and the 107th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies. In addition to the units listed above the 1st and 116th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies also supported the Brigade during the operations as resupply ships.

The Brigade's organic aircraft flew a total of 1739 missions, 3,526 sorties, 1,033:55 hours and carried a total of 3,663 passengers. The 1,033:55 hours flying time represents many hours of maintenance, most of which was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Excepting a few daily inspections at the field locations all maintenance was performed at Camp Rainier. The better lighting and working conditions can account for the high rate of flyable aircraft the section maintained throughout the operation. The total flying time represents 41 intermediate (25 hours) inspections. All except three of these were pulled during hours of darkness. In some instances the crew chiefs worked through the night so that we could have one more aircraft flying for the following day's operation.

B. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence concerning the Brigade's area of operation during Phases I, II, and III of Operation JUNCTION CITY was obtained from 25th Division HQ, the 135th Brigade HQ detachment, and from liaison visits to the Truc Bi and Truc De Special Forces Camps.

b. Available information concerning the area of operations for Phase I indicated a large number of base camps, hospitals, training sites and supply facilities were located within the AO. VC Forces believed to be operating in the AO included the 70th Security Guard Regiment via LZ 972 to LZ 375, elements of the 271st Regiment located west of the Ea Mat River (MT940), and the 920 Artillery regiment which was unlocated. It was anticipated VC units would attempt to avoid large scale engagements unless success seemed certain.

(1) From the beginning of the operation February 27 until the end on 14 March there was only one significant contact. On the 35th of February 8/2/12, via LZ 972, was engaged briefly by an estimated VC platoon. The VC used the ruse of tying a piece of come wire, similar to the type used with command detonated mines, across the anticipated route of the American unit. When the platoon reached the wire it followed it to the end where he was ambushed and killed by small arms. It was at this point the 77th unit engaged in a brief fire fight, breaking contact before effective artillery fire was brought to bear. In the next afternoon, via LZ 972, 8/4/12 was guided to a base camp by an aerial observer and was engaged by an estimated VC Battalion and completely surrounded. Using close artillery fire the company was able to hold off the enemy assault until they were reinforced by another company from 800 meters away. Results of the engagement were 11 VC KIA (1C), 30 VC WIA (20w). Identification of the VC unit as the 24th, 271st Regiment was possible through documents taken from dead VC. Only on this occasion did the VC attempt to engage directly with American units. All other contacts were limited to groups of three to six VC.

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(2) There were three significant mortar attacks during the operations of these only one had any effects. On 27 Feb at 0210H the 1/22 (1) larger site, ITO70041, received 40-70 rounds from mortar fire causing 10 US WIA. The mortar attacks of 5 March, via IZ289729, and 9 March, via WZ959706, both completely missed their targets. On both occasions what was believed to be mortars firing were heard shortly after the units stopped for the day. It is assumed the VC were registering in a different direction prior to the attacks later that night. Judging from the number of rounds, 40 and 150 respectively, which impacted out side the friendly positions it is apparent that no attempt was made to adjust the mortar fire once it began.

(3) Of the sixteen base camps discovered two were considered regimental size, two battalion size and the remaining four were company size or smaller. All base camps located were within 200 meters or closer to a stream or other source of water. Each camp was encircled by a barrier system with interconnected trench system. Defensive positions showed evidence of careful planning of fields of fire, were well concealed and expertly organized. Some claymore positions were buried on the enemy side of a tree usually with a single strip of white cloth or an X cut into the tree.

a. During phase I of Junction City, elements of CO23V were reportedly trapped west of Route 4. Indications were that several reinforce units moved into Western War Zone C in an effort to relieve the pressure on CO23V elements. Every unit, reported to be encountered in the Phase II operational area included the 101st Regiment of the CCC Artillery Regiment and possibly the 7th Loc Battalion. Due to heavy losses suffered by VC forces on 26 Feb 67, via IZ289729 and on 10-11 March 67 via IZ276755 it was believed that VC units would engage in decisive combat unless surprised or forced to fight to protect installations they deemed important.

(1) Proof that there were VC in the operational area was received on the first day of the operations. Three APC's were damaged by AT mines, two APC's were damaged by RPG rounds, and eight body troops were located and destroyed.

(2) On the 19th of March an airborne assault into LZ CO23D via IZ387717 was met by command detonated mines causing the destruction of three helicopters, killing three, killing 10 US soldiers and wounding 10.

(3) The attacking force on 21 March at the Battle of Baoi. The was identified as the 278 VC Regiment reinforced by elements of the 900 Artillery Bn and other service elements. Identification was made from captured documents and interrogation of POWs. Of the weapons captured 50 were RPG-2's. The presence of such a large ratio of AT weapons indicates the VC are not for mechanized forces. Through Phase II the VC utilized the RPG-2's as effective weapons against APC's. The majority of weapons captured were in extremely good condition and a number of AK-47's with folding bayonets were captured. It can be reasonably assumed these weapons were recently brought in country.

(4) The other engagements covered but were limited to brief fire fights with platoon size VC units. On 25 March, Co C, 1/22 engaged in a daily road clearing operation was engaged by an estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 US KIA, 3 US WIA and 1 damaged tank. VC casualties were unknown. On 4, 1/22 briefly engaged an estimated platoon unit via IZ387726 on 26 April. The VC unit was very well armed and damaged 3 APC's with RPG rounds. Heavy casualties were unknown.

(5) There were a few minor encounters with small groups of 2 to 4 VC until the 3d of April when C/2/22 was informed that was believed to be a rearguard element IZ387727. The fight occurred at 1400H in the afternoon and continued until due time the VC broke contact. During the area of the previous days contact a regimental size base camp was located. The base camp had been recently occupied and departed VC abandoned 10 tons of food stuffs, some min equipment and clothing. No further contact occurred during Phase II.

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1. Even though VC forces suffered heavy losses, it was believed VC units maintained a high level of offensive spirit. Attacks on up to Battalion size units. The presence of the 1st Regiment ARVN, the 11th Regiment ARVN, 12th NVA Regiment ARVN and the 2d Bn, 70th Regt, ARVN presented a definite threat to the existence of the Phuoc Nok ARVN CIDG Camp. It was not anticipated VC forces would engage in decisive combat.

(1) Only once during Phase IIT did VC forces verify their presence. On the night of 14 April 1970 the CIDG forces at Phuoc Nok and C Btry 2/77 Arty received 75 rds of 82mm mortar fire via I280787.

(2) There was no ground contact with any force larger than a company. Body traps and mining incidents dropped significantly.

2. Enemy Initiated incidents during Operation JUNCTION CITY were as follows:

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
(1) Sniper Fire	7	27	4
(2) Mortar Fire	8	2	2
(3) Mining	7	29	2
(4) Body Traps	0	6	0
(5) Engagements	12	15	4
(6) Fire Against Aircraft	6	2	2
(7) Base Camps Located	26	22	3

3. Major VC personnel, Equipment losses are listed in paragraph C-3.

4. Enemy Communications

(1) In the larger enemy base camps located, communication wires were found throughout indicating extensive use of land line communications.

(2) An enemy radio captured during the Battle of Soni Tre was similar in configuration to our MRC-35. The radio was of Chinese manufacture and identical to one captured during operation CANNON. It is assumed that VC forces are attempting to equip their units with a standard radio making them independent of captured communications equipment.

5. Enemy Tactics

(1) In both Phase I and Phase II VC units took offensive actions where the opportunity presented itself for what appeared an easy victory. Each attack initiated by the VC showed evidence of careful planning and displayed professionalism in execution.

(2) In each attack VC forces developed tremendous volumes of small arms fire. Utilizing this cover individuals did not attack in the costly manner were attacks but advanced by leaps and bounds similar to our own battle drill.

(3) Fortifications encountered were capable of sustaining very heavy artillery and air attacks. There were no new designs or types of fortifications noted that had not been previously encountered.

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1. Terrain: Area of operations for each phase was basically identical.

(1) Topography: Area is fundamentally low and flat. The predominant terrain feature is Mud Da Lom which is 907 meters above sea level. The period of operations was characterized by low water causing minor streams to be too shallow or even intermittent. Principle streams have steep banks and bottoms of mud and silt.

(2) Vegetation: The area consists of primarily broad leaf evergreen forest. The secondary forest consists of broad leaf evergreen trees 75-90 feet in height. The canopy is usually discontinuous and the undergrowth is extremely dense. The undergrowth consists of low trees, shrubs, bushes and vines.

(3) Tactical Aspects of the Terrain

(a) Observation depends entirely upon the vegetation. In the forest regions observation is generally poor. In areas that have been defoliated both aerial and ground observation are aided significantly. Grassland areas generally furnished good observation.

(b) Fields of fire are extremely limited in dense forests and require clearing in all cases. Areas of grasslands and dry crops offer the best fields of fire.

(c) In areas of dense jungle track movement is slowed to 1000 meters an hour or less in places. These areas are extremely hard on tracked vehicles. In most places wheeled vehicles are limited to existing roads. Movement off of roads will be drastically curtailed during and after any rain falls.

2. MISSION:

a. Phase I: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was

(1) To establish blocking positions in sector on D-Day to seal escape routes to the west, vicinity Condom border.

(2) To conduct SB operations following D-Day to destroy COVTS facilities and VC/VPA forces, supplies, and installations.

(3) To provide security for PIB bases and Route 22 from sector to Trat M.

b. Phase II: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was to attack on D-Day into Phu Loi C to destroy COVTS and VC/VPA forces and installations.

c. Phase III: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was to assume responsibility of 196th Light Infantry Bde, 25th Infantry Division Fighting Brigade Mission and continue responsibility for 3d Bn, 1st Inf Div EOR.

3. Concept of Operation Phase I:

a. Maneuver: On D-3 the 2d Bn, 12th Inf was to fly by C-123 from Cu Chi to Ban Tiong Base Camp and secure it. The 2d Bn, 12th Inf was to remain at PIB EOR (Operation Overlay Annex A) where they had been since the termination of Operation GARDEN. The 2d Bn, 22d Inf, also still in the area of operation, was to secure PIB E and conduct local SB operations. The Brigade CP was to move overland from Trat M to PIB EOR. The 3d Bn, 22d Inf was to airlift from Ban Tiong to Trat M by C-123 and then helilift into the operational area. All units were to establish mobile blocking positions with contact patrols constantly keeping the units adjacent to each other in contact. All units were to conduct extensive SB in the area of their own sectors. The Infantry units to daily cleared and secured Route 22 w/ the mechanized battalion, and cavalry troops escorted one or more supply flights.

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a. Fire Support. Battle 1 air assault will "round out" the operations. Direct Fire support was provided by one LA and attached artillery at the Fire Support Base. (See Annex A).

b. References:

- (1) OPORD 3-67, HQ, 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div dated 19 Feb 67
- (2) Prog 0 1 to OPORD 3-67 dated 24 Feb 67
- (3) Prog 0 2 to OPORD 3-67 dated 01 Mar 67
- (4) Prog 0 3 to OPORD 3-67 dated 01 Mar 67
- (5) Prog 0 4 to OPORD 3-67 dated 01 Mar 67
- (6) Prog 0 5 to OPORD 3-67 dated 05 Mar 67
- (7) Prog 0 6 to OPORD 3-67 dated 06 Mar 67
- (8) Prog 0 7 to OPORD 3-67 dated 21 Mar 67
- (9) Prog 0 8 to OPORD 3-67 dated 21 Mar 67

Phase II

a. Maneuver. One reinforced mechanized company from 2/22 Inf (O) with attached engineer platoon and one battery from 4/77 Artillery initially moved overland from Da Nang to Suoi Da. The second day the infantry companies and engineer platoon employed a "lift" at LZ 390627. The artillery battery was to establish a FSB at the Bridge site. The 3/22 Inf minus Co C, 2/12 Inf and the 2/77 Arty (-) then were to airlift to LZ GOLD (LZ386705) and establish FSB GOLD at that location. The 2/12 Inf was to move west to search and destroy. The 3/22 (-) was to secure the FSB and search and destroy in that sector. The 2/22 Inf (O) and the 2/36 Armor (-) were to cross the Suoi Suoi river and conduct SB operations. (See Annex B, Operations Overlay).

b. Fire Support. Tactical Air was on call. Direct support artillery was provided by the 2/77 Artillery and attached units.

c. References:

- (1) OPORD 4-67, HQ 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div dated 17 Mar 67.
- (2) Prog 0 1 to OPORD 4-67 dated 18 Mar 67
- (3) Prog 0 2 to OPORD 4-67 dated 19 Mar 67
- (4) Prog 0 3 to OPORD 4-67 dated 20 Mar 67
- (5) Prog 0 4 to OPORD 4-67 dated 21 Mar 67
- (6) Prog 0 5 to OPORD 4-67 dated 22 Mar 67
- (7) Prog 0 6 to OPORD 4-67 dated 23 Mar 67
- (8) Prog 0 7 to OPORD 4-67 dated 24 Mar 67
- (9) Prog 0 8 to OPORD 4-67 dated 25 Mar 67
- (10) Prog 0 9 to OPORD 4-67 dated 01 Apr 67
- (11) Prog 0 10 to OPORD 4-67 dated 02 Apr 67
- (12) Prog 0 11 to OPORD 4-67 dated 03 Apr 67
- (13) Prog 0 12 to OPORD 4-67 dated 05 Apr 67

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(1) Prog O 1 to OORD 5-67 dtd 05 Apr 67  
(2) Prog O 1 to OORD 5-67 dtd 06 Apr 67  
(3) Prog O 15 to OORD 5-67 dtd 07 Apr 67

Page III

a. Maneuver: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility of 19th Light Infantry Brigade Base Camp and MACB with 1/22 Inf, 1/5 Inf (H) and 1/7 10th ARVN Ranger Bn, 2/34 Armor (-) secured Sector Ds. 1/22 Inf arrived by air and 2/12 Inf (H) arrived overland to War Zone C to conduct MACB operations in War Zone C. (See Operations Overlay, Annex C).

b. Fire Support: Tactical air was on call. Direct support artillery was provided by the 2d Bn, 77th Artillery.

c. References:

(1) OORD 5-67, HQ 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div dtd 9 Apr 67  
(2) Prog O 1 to OORD 5-67 dtd 10 Apr 67  
(3) Prog O 2 to OORD 5-67 dtd 12 Apr 67  
(4) Prog O 3 to OORD 5-67 dtd 15 Apr 67  
(5) Prog O 6 to OORD 5-67 dtd 18 Apr 67

II. EXECUTION:

a. Chronological Summary: (Units less than Bn size included only on days of significant contact or activity).

(1) 22 Feb 67 (Bn)

(a) 2/12 Inf: A Company reported a sniper fired several rounds of automatic weapons fire at a vehicle on Hwy 22. A Company returned fire with an RPG and sent a patrol in pursuit with negative results. At 1105 hrs Company A observed 4 VC at coord E1047907. Artillery fire was called in with negative results.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0700 hrs Co A was placed under OORD of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. At 0730 hrs a patrol from Co B established contact with an unknown number of VC, via coord E1077916, resulting in the wounding and capture of 1 VC who later died. The VC was armed with a US M-16 rifle, webbelany, and 160 rds of 7.62 ammunition. At 0910 hrs 1/22 Inf arrived at the heli-lager position (via coord E1076012) and departed to the South to establish contact with 3 VC at coord E1068109, resulting in 1 VC WIA (Pain).

(c) 1/22 Inf: 1/22 Inf airlifted by C-130 from Da Nang to Trei M for further helilift into IC 1000M vicinity, coord E1079010. From 12 1000M the battalions conducted MACB operations 8-10 along both sides of CL 22 to establish blocking position HEDWID via coord E1061005. One US WIA resulted from fragments of a marking round which landed in an A Co ambush patrol vicinity coord E1051012 at 1735 hours.

(d) 2/77 Artillery: Remained at HEDWID (E1060010), location of the unit at close of operation GARDEN.

(e) 2/12 Inf: Secured Da Nang Base Camp, conducted local patrols with no contacts.

(2) 23 Feb 67 (Bn)

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to conduct local patrolling and provided security for PBB 200.

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(a) 2/22 Inf (N): Companies B and C conducted S&D operations in their designated sectors of the BN AD. At 1130 hrs an element of C/1/10 Cav cleared the 1st larger area (vic coord 120777Z) and was placed under control of 2/22 Inf (N).

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co's 1st platoon secured LZ BNG via coord 120608Z, while 3d platoon cleared GL 72 to the northern limit of TAOR. B Co departed at 1230 hours on a company S&D operation northeast of REDFRO and established a defensive perimeter via coord 120918Z. 3d platoon, Co C cleared GL 22 to southern limit of TAOR. The 2d platoon, while on a reconnaissance patrol, engaged an unknown number of VC via coord 120842Z. Resultant: One US KIA and one US WIA. Company C elements of 3d platoon at 1400 hrs. Co B received small arms fire from an estimated 10 VC via coord 120731Z at 2205 hrs. Fire was returned and artillery called in. Resultant: 4 US KIA (2C), 1 Chicom 9mm sub machine gun, 1 Chicom M-7, 1 US M-1, 2 Chicom grenades, 2 smoke pouches, web gear, and loose ammunition recovered.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Remained in BR at P3B LZB.

(e) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure Da Nang Base Camp with local patrols.

(f) 22 Feb 67 (D-Day):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure P3B LZB, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co's B and C 2/22 Inf (N) and C/1/10 Cav conducted search and destroy operations in pre-designated sectors of the BN AD. At 1415 hrs Co B cleared their larger area via 120608Z. At 1740 hrs an element of C/1/10 Cav hit a mine at coord 120570Z, resulting in 1 US WIA with extensive damage to the M113 tank. At 1900 hrs Co C cleared their larger area via coord 120474Z. At 1930 hrs C/1/10 Cav cleared BR larger area 120748Z.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co 1st platoon secured LZ BNG via coord 120608Z at 0700 hrs for the extraction of 3/22 Artillery. 3d platoon cleared GL 22 south to defensive strong point Times Square via coord 120435Z, while the Mortar platoon cleared GL 22 to the northern limit of TAOR. All Co 4 elements returned by 1600 hrs with negative contact. Co 3 assumed security mission for Base REDFRO. Co C departed REDFRO at 0715 hrs on a company size search and destroy mission southeast to the Buri May river. One US WIA resulted from a self inflicted gunshot wound. During evacuation of WIA, Dentist helicopter received automatic weapons fire via coord 120748Z. Supporting gunships delivered suppressive fires with unknown results. Co C established a night defensive perimeter via coord 120410Z at 1740 hrs.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Began Operation JUNCTION CITY with 4/2/77 BR to 2/22 Inf (N), 2/2/77 BR to 2/12 Inf and C/2/77 BR to 3/22 Inf.

(e) 2/12 Inf: Secured Da Nang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 2/22 Engrs: BR of the Bridge, repaired Hwy 21.

(g) C/304 Engrs: Continued development of the Base Camp at Da Nang.

(h) 23 Feb 67 (D+1):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure assigned sector and conduct local patrols and ambushes. Conducted S&D operations west of Hwy 22.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co's B & C, 2/22 Inf (N), and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of BN AD. At 1935 hrs C/1/10 Cav received 1 US WIA while returning by fire at coord 120410Z.

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At 1400 hrs C/1/10 Cav discovered a base camp near KED83002, and captured 10 kilograms and a small quantity of documents. They engaged at this location. At 1700 hrs, Co B engaged near KED94309. At 1730 hrs Co C engaged near ward KED74004.

(c) 1/2 Inf: Co A departed Operational Base KED730 for a one day SAB operation east of CL 22. A tunnel ten feet long was destroyed via coordination. Co A closed Base KED730 at 1450 hrs and received perimeter defense. A Co's M1 platoon and Mortar platoon searched and cleared CL 22 to the northern and southern limit of CL 22. Co C continued SAB operations along the western bank of the Ben May River. At 1730 hrs Co C elements engaged 7 VC on the eastern bank of the river via ward KED74004. Resultant 3 VC KIA (1T), 1 VC WIA (2W), and 7 pairs of black pajamas captured. Three airstrikes were called in on suspected VC base camp via ward KED15031 at 1830 hrs with unknown results.

(d) 4/77 Arty: Remained in BL.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Swept Da Tung base camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 24 Feb 67 (D+2):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to sweep assigned sector and conduct local patrols and ambushes. Conducted SAB operations west of Bay 22.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co's B & C, 2/22 Inf (N) and C/1/10 Cav conducted search and destroy operations in designated sectors of the Da N-O. At 0700 hrs C/1/10 Cav continued search of the base complex at ward KED33004, resulting in the capture of 50 pounds of equipment and destruction of 10 tents and 5 barrels. At approximately 1130 hrs Co B discovered a VC base camp complex at ward KED03030. A small quantity of documents, small arms ammunition, and 14 hand grenades were found. One Mine booby trap was destroyed. At 1700 hrs Co's B & C engaged at ward KED15035. At 1800 hrs C/1/10 Cav engaged at ward KED73004.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A conducted search and destroy operations northeast of KED730. A heavily mined base camp containing twenty barrels and sleeping platforms was found and destroyed via ward KED15034. 1 VC KIA (1C) was found. Co B secured Base KED730 and cleared CL 22 to the northern and southern limits of CL 22. Co C continued SAB operations and swept previous day's airstrike zone. A VC base camp engaged via ward KED15030 with unknown results. Search of area resulted in the discovery and destruction of a VC base camp containing 3 AF mines, 1 two pound block of explosives, three barrels, 12 footballs, and 3 grenades. The wreckage of a B-57 bomber, 58AF 0-21557, and the remains of the crew were located via ward KED15037. Co C established a defensive perimeter via ward KED15037.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued BL 34 BLs.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Swept Da Tung base camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 25 Feb 67 (D+3):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Co B, departed PFB KED on a SAB mission NW of BL. At approximately 1225 hrs, Co B made contact with an estimated VC platoon with automatic weapons at ward KED64034 resulting in 2 friendly KIA and 5 friendly WIA. Co B reported receiving sniper fire at 1700 hrs at ward KED15030. VC casualties unknown.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0700 hrs Co's BL continued SAB operations in designated sectors of Da N-O. At 1130 hrs Co B discovered a base camp at ward KED15034 and engaged it with artillery and mortars.

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There were no US casualties and VC casualties are unknown. At 1600 hrs, Co C destroyed 1,400 lbs of polished rice and 800 bags of salt. They captured 190 rds of M-1 ammunition. At 1515 hrs, 2/22 recon platoon escorted a long range reconnaissance patrol of 3/4 Cav to coord AT032404. At 1700 hrs Co B & C lingered at coord AT111051.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued search and destroy operations and destroyed a VC base camp containing 13 bunkers, 1 tunnel, 100 meters in length, and several bottles of 33% beer vic coord AT123405. An LZ was prepared to evacuate 1 US WIA (broken arm) and the crew of the H-34. A night defensive perimeter was established vic coord AT123405. Co B secured Operational Base RENPRO. At 2040 hrs a B Co ambush patrol fired four claymore mines at an estimated 3 VC vic coord AT111407 with unknown results. Co C continued SAD operations and engaged a squad of VC vic coord AT111051. Results 1 VC KIA (Bk), 1 VC WIA (Fimb), several weapons, ammunition, money, letters and documents recovered. A cache consisting of 24 100 pound bags of salt and 6 five gallon cans of dried fish was found and destroyed vic coord AT120032. C Co closed RENPRO and assumed responsibility for operational base security.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB 3d Rde.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Da Tieng Base Camp, continued local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 26 Feb 67 (D-6):

(a) 2/12 Inf: B Co made contact with 8 VC at 1115 hrs with negative friendly and unknown VC casualties. At approximately 1135 hrs Co B found a 3 gallon can of documents at AT043827. Co B reported finding a base camp at AT043829 at 1400 hrs containing several bunkers, with huts and a trench system. All of the huts were destroyed. B Co made contact at 1335 hrs at AT044830 with an estimated 20-40 VC with automatic weapons. Co B had contact from the front, left and right flanks and the rear. B/3/22 started to B/2/12 location at 1330 hrs. The linkup of the two elements was effected at 201736 Feb 67. Results of the encounter were 8 US KIA and 24 WIA. Enemy losses were 11 VC KIA (Bk), 3 thatched huts destroyed, 350 rds of linked Chicom 7.62 mm, 600 lbs of unpolished rice, a bicycle repair shop, 2 Chicom automatic weapons and 1 H-79 were captured.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): Co B, C and C/1/10 Cav conducted SAD operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1140 hrs, Co B moved into an area, vic coord AT1117062, marked "Restricted Area Mine". They disarmed and destroyed one Chicom grenade booby trap. At 1315 hrs Co B 2/22 Inf engaged 4 VC at coord AT122041, resulting in 1 VC KIA (Bk), 1 US WIA and the capture of 1 AK-47 weapon SN130763 w/3 magazines, 22 rds 7.62 AK-47 ammunition, 79 rds of 7.62 ammunition, Chicom serrated grenade booby trap, 2 Chicom hand grenades and 1 set of web gear. At 1730 hrs Co B lingered at coord AT113835. C/1/10 Cav lingered at coord AT073832. At 1800 hrs Co C lingered vic coord AT073833.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued SAD operations near RENPRO. A large VC base camp (200 meters by 300 meters) was located vic coord AT111038. Numerous huts, food, ammunition, grenades, propaganda material and weapons were evacuated or destroyed. Co B departed Base RENPRO to conduct SAD operations west of QL 22. At 1800 hrs Co B was attached to the 2/12 Inf and ordered to link up with an unknown size VC force vic coord AT044830. Link up was made at 1734 hrs and Co B secured an LZ vic coord AT043831 for the evacuation of US wounded. C Co continued security of Operational Base RENPRO.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB 3d Rde.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Da Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols.

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(3) 27 Feb 57 (D-6):

(a) 2/22 Inf (A): At 0010 hrs the 2n reported four incoming mortar rounds resulting in 1 G WIA, and 12 B WIA. At 0700 hrs Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted SAB operations in designated sectors of the Bn ADs. At 1205 hrs coord K201.744, Co B destroyed 2 to 3 KILL AR mines, which were stacked on the other and flagged for pressure or command destruction. The bunker from which the mines could be detonated via coord K201.744, was also destroyed. At 1415 hrs, via coord K201.664, Co B found a partially destroyed mine sweep. At 1700 hrs, Co B destroyed via coord K201.664. Co C destroyed via coord K201.664. C/1/10 Cav destroyed via coord K201.664.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0010 hrs the 2n reported the area received approximately twenty three mortar rounds resulting in 1 G WIA, and 12 B WIA. At 0700 hrs Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted SAB operations in designated sectors of the Bn ADs. At 1205 hrs coord K201.744, Co B destroyed 2 to 3 KILL AR mines, which were stacked on the other and flagged for pressure or command destruction. The bunker from which the mines could be detonated via coord K201.744, was also destroyed. At 1415 hrs, via coord K201.664, Co B found a partially destroyed mine sweep. At 1700 hrs, Co B destroyed via coord K201.664. Co C destroyed via coord K201.664. C/1/10 Cav destroyed via coord K201.664.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued search of TC base camp located via coord K201.664. A night defensive perimeter was established via coord K201.664. Co B remained attached to 2/12 Inf and swept battle area via coord K201.664. Numerous hats, tunics, tunrels, ammunition, KIC, mines, tools and other equipment were found and destroyed. Co B secured via coord K201.664 and established a night defensive perimeter. Co C continued security mission for base ARDFTD. A reconnaissance patrol from Co C reported impacts of five mortar base plates via coord K201.664. Patrol closed ARDFTD at 1330 hrs.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DD 34 Rds.

(e) 2/18 Inf: Secured Da Tang Base Camp, conducted local patrols.

(3) 28 Feb 57 (D-6):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure PFB LDR and conducted local patrols. At 0051 hrs the 2n reported four incoming mortar rounds resulting in negative friendly casualties.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted SAB operations in designated sectors of the Bn ADs. At 0658 hrs, the Recon platoon while retrieving a vehicle discovered a battalion size base camp via coord K201.664. At 1008 hrs, via coord K201.664, C/1/10 Cav destroyed 3 tunrels, at 1125 hrs via coord K201.664, C/1/10 Cav destroyed 2 hats and 50 meters of trench in a small base camp.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued search of base camp located via coord K201.664 and eliminated or destroyed mines, Maytrials, narcotics, weapons, tools, KIC, ammunition and rice. Co A continued SAB operations and closed operational base ARDFTD at 1705 hrs. Co B continued SAB operations and at 1420 hrs was detached from 2/12 Inf. Co B cleared base ARDFTD at 1735 hrs and assumed base security mission. Co C continued security mission for base ARDFTD. At 1730 hrs Co C began SAB operations east of Co B.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DD 34 Rds.

(e) 2/18 Inf: Secured Da Tang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and missions.

(3) 1 Mar 57 (D-7):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Co A reported finding 2 hats, 1 box of polished rice, several rice footlock, 1 ground, 3 bolt action rifles and 1 Chinese machinegun at K201.734 via a house-to-house operation.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted SAB operations in designated sectors of the Bn ADs. At 1020 hrs, via coord K201.737, C/1/10 Cav hit 2 AR mines, resulting in 5 G WIA, and extensive damage to an APC (K201.737). At 1130 hrs via coord K201.738, Co C destroyed one GDU 1b bomb (K201.738). At 1230 hrs Co B discovered a base camp and storage area, re-

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bulletin in the amount of 50 pounds of weapons and supplies and the other 100 pounds of weapons and 10 liters of fuel. At 1300 hrs, Co B discovered 100 liters of fuel and 10 liters of water. At 1400 hrs, Co B discovered 10 liters of water and 10 liters of fuel. At 1500 hrs, Co B discovered 10 liters of water and 10 liters of fuel. Co C discovered via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750.

(b) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued to conduct SAD operations in designated sectors of the Bn AD. At 1000 hrs, Co A continued to conduct SAD operations and took fire from 100 meters. At 1045 hrs, Co A continued to conduct SAD operations and destroyed via record 1704750. Co B continued to conduct SAD operations and took fire from 100 meters. At 1100 hrs, Co B continued to conduct SAD operations and took fire from 100 meters. At 1145 hrs, Co B continued to conduct SAD operations and took fire from 100 meters. Co C continued to conduct SAD operations and took fire from 100 meters. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750.

(c) 2/77 Arty: Continued SAD operations.

(d) 2/14 Inf: Secured Da Tiong & a Camp, conducted local patrols.

(e) 2 Mar 67 (D-4):

(f) 2 Mar 67 (D-4): Continued to secure PGS 12R, conduct local patrols.

(g) 2/22 Inf (D-4): Co A, B, C and C/1/10 Cav conducted SAD operations in designated sectors of the Bn AD. At 1300 hrs, via record 1704750, Co B discovered 16 lbs of documents and destroyed via 5 mil cans of benzene, a 55 gal drum of kerosene, 3 million crickets of fish, and one 5 gal can of mercury. At 1600 hrs, via record 1704750, Co B discovered 2感恩 gifts approximately 2 months old. At 1700 hrs, via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750, resulting in 1 US WIA, 1 ARV WIA, 1 equipment and light damage to 1 M1A1 tank. At 1730 hrs, Co B discovered via record 1704750. Co C discovered via record 1704750. At 1800 hrs C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750. At 1800 hrs C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750.

(h) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued search and destroy operations and secured 12 RULT via record 1704750 for the destruction of B and C Co. A Co continued SAD operations and made contact with an unknown number of VC via record 1704750. Resultant: 1 US EW, 2 US WIA. Artillery was called in and shelling resulted in 1 additional US WIA. A Co established a tight defensive perimeter via record 1704750. Co B was helilifted from Da Tiong 12 RULT into 12 RULT and began SAD operations to the west. B Co 1-401D, part 1, 2 fresh VC graves, and several body traps via record 1704750. A night defensive perimeter was established via record 1704750. Co C was helilifted from Da Tiong 12 RULT to 12 RULT and began search and destroy operations to the west. A night defensive perimeter was established via record 1704750.

(i) 2/77 Arty: Continued SAD 34 34 hrs.

(j) 2/14 Inf: Secured Da Tiong & a Camp, conducted local patrols and patrols.

(k) 3 Mar 67 (D-9):

(l) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure PGS 12R and conduct local patrols.

(m) 2/22 Inf (D-4): Co C and C/1/10 conducted search and destroy operations in designated sectors of the Bn AD. At 0900 hrs, via record 1704750, Co C discovered 15 five gallon cans of tar. 14 cans were destroyed and 1 was evacuated. At 1100 hrs, C/1/10 Cav discovered an unoccupied VC base camp, and destroyed 7 huts. At 1105 hrs, via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed 1 AT mine resulting in 1 US WIA and 1 ARV WIA destroyed. At 1700 hrs, Co C destroyed via record 1704750, C/1/10 Cav destroyed via record 1704750.

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(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A searched a VC base camp via road 17069618 and captured or destroyed large quantities of ammunition, food, bicycles, rice, tea, hats, electrical wire, and clothing. Co A continued SAB operation and established a night defensive position via road 17211816. Co B located and destroyed rice, documents, clothing, uniforms, weapons and explosives via road 17061515 and established a night defensive perimeter. Co C returned to base 170610 and assumed responsibility for perimeter defense. One Chinese Mori rallied at 1500 hrs.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued 2B 34 Rds.

(e) 2/1b Inf: Secured Ban Thong Ban Camp, conducted local patrols and maintenance.

(f) 4 Mar 67 (D+1):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure 2B 22B and conduct local patrols.

(b) 2/22 Inf (b): Co B and C/2/22 Cav conducted SAB operations in designated areas of the 1a AD. Co C remained in the 1a longer areas, via road 17073018 for maintenance. At 1400 hrs Co B departed via road 17073018. At 1500 hrs, C/2/22 Cav reported to 0400 14 Mar, 1st Inf Div, and Co A returned to control 2/22 Inf 20 from 2B 22B, 1st Inf Div. Co A longered via road 17000700.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A and B continued SAB operations west of GL 22. Co were extracted from 12 via road 17010018 and returned to Ban Ban 160700 at 1500 hrs. Co C continued security of Ban Ban 160700.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 4/2/77 plus a small advanced party from C/2/77 and B/2/77 moved by convoy to AD MEACHEN (17051700).

(e) 2/1b Inf: Secured Ban Thong Ban Camp, conducted local patrols and maintenance.

(f) 5 Mar 67 (D+2):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Co A made contact on a Banthetay camp at 17011607 with an estimated 3 VC. Casualties were 2 VC KIA (dead) and 2 VC WIA.

(b) 2/22 Inf (f): Co B & C secured route 2B North of the 1a longer for elements of the 11th AR, 190th 2d Inf Div, and the 27th Inf Div. Co A and elements of Ban Ban secured 12 at road 17011519 for a Vietnamese Marine Div. At 0800 hrs, via road 17010018, Co B found and destroyed approximately 3000 lbs of unexploded rice and 2000 lbs of salt. At 1115 hrs, via road 17071619, Co A received 2 VC KIA resulting from a VC rifle grenade. At 1400 hrs companies B & C cleared the 1a longer areas, via road 17071619, for maintenance. At 1500 hrs, via road 17071719, Co A and Ban Ban discovered and destroyed 6 huts, and longered in these via.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Remained at 1a Ban 17-720 and prepared for movement to via road 17071719.

(d) 2/77 Arty: C/2/77 and B/2/77 moved by convoy to AD MEACHEN to join 4/2/77. 2/2/77 remained at 2B 22B and became 2B. 4/2/77 and C/2/77 remained 12 to 2/22 Inf and 3/22 Inf respectively. A/2/22, B/2/22 and C/2/22 Arty established 2/77 brackets.

(e) 2/1b Inf: Secured Ban Thong Ban Camp, conducted local patrols and maintenance.

(f) 6 Mar 67 (D+3):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued security of 2B 22B, conducted local patrols.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (W): On A with attached Engr elements moved to Hwy 20 and began road clearing operations west from coord K7012773, towards LOGO. At 0730 hrs, via coord K7081061, Co C located various bats and a com of 40 CBW units. Between 0730 hrs and 1100 hrs, Co B and C (-) secured for convoys from 2/35th Arty to AD BLA/XXMBS coord K7018792. At 1145 hrs, Co B & C and the CP Grp 2/22 Inf (W) displaced to via coord K7011773 closing at 1225 hrs. A patrol from Co C which was on an observation and rear security mission (coord K7078037) cleared the no longer area at 1600 hrs.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Airlifted from BEMPRO to LZ JULIAN via coord K7966730. Re moved north toward Objective BEMD22 via coord K7936790. Co B located and destroyed at large VC base camp via coord K7966772. A night defensive perimeter was established via coord K7935774.

(d) 2/77 Arty: At 0217 hrs 2a (-) received 60 rds of 82mm and 60mm mortar fire via coord K735770 resulting in no casualties and insignificant damage.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Da Nang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and patrols.

(f) 7 Mar 67 (D-1):

(1) 2/12 Inf: On 7 Mar at 1200H, Co A, C, Mq element and Recon were airlifted to LZ 2000 (K7966750) and moved to secure blocking position ELLIOTT at coord K7078799. Co B continued to secure PZB LZB at K7078799. Co A, C, Mq element and Recon platoon closed blocking position ELLIOTT at 1400H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (W): At 0730H 2/22 Inf (W) displaced from larger position and attacked west along Hwy 20 to secure LZ 2000, via coord K796975. At 0735H, Co C destroyed 1 pressure type mine, with no casualties or damage to equipment, via coord K7968765. At 0830H Co's A, B, C and CP Group 2/22 secured LZ at 2000. At 0935H, Co A provided security for attached elements of 1/4th Engs to complete mission of clearing Hwy 20 to 2000. At 1000H Co C displaced North to secure a foot bridge for 2/12 Inf via coord K7940771. Bridge was secured at 1122H. After 1115, movement of 3/22 Inf and 2/12 Inf was completed at 1230H. Co A and CP Grp 2/22 Inf displaced to AD J.C.E via coord K7966761. Recon elements 2/22 Inf destroyed a square. Recon element remained at 2000 to assist Co A in a security mission moving North to the 2a CP locations. At 1400H via coord K7946766, Co B destroyed a rice hut. At 1435H the last elements from 2/22 Inf cleared the foot bridge, and Co C moved to larger area via coord K7968766. Co A landed via coord K7968752.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A destroyed night defensive position via coord K7935774 and continued in SBD operations. A river crossing was made via coord K7968774. The 2a MIA resulted from short artillery fire. A Co joined in perimeter via coord K7954776. Co B continued to secure the VC base camp located on 6 Mar via K7935776. Base camp was destroyed and B Co continued in SBD operations. One fresh VC gave up via coord K7967762. Co B joined in defense perimeter via coord K7954776 at 1400H. Co C continued in SBD operations and destroyed 1 rice hut via coord K7935770, at 1230H. 1 55 gal drum of unknown contents, bats, chemical weapons and chemical were found and destroyed via coord K7954770. Co C joined in perimeter via coord K7954776, at 2000H.

(d) 4/77 Arty: Continued 2a MIA.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Da Nang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and patrols.

(f) 8 Mar 67 (D-1):

(1) 2/22 Inf: 8 Mar 67 at 0730H Co A & C moved out from blocking position ELLIOTT on opposite Co moved SBD operations. Co C reported a VC base camp at coord K7935770 at 1130H. Co C started receiving fire from inside the base camp resulting in 2 2a MIA. Artillery

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and air strikes were employed with unknown VC results. After the artillery and air strikes were lifted, Co C moved inside the base camp discovering 2 large bins of an estimated size of 2000x50' filled with 240 tons of polished rice. The bins and bins were destroyed. Co C A 4 position for 3 March was in the cover 47°57'75". Recon and Pgs elements stayed in bivouac position 47°57'75".

(b) 2/22 Inf (A): Remained in bivouac positions AD JULIA and conducted SAB operations in the vic of their larger area. At 0930H, via cover W794752, recon platoon destroyed 8 pigs. At 1030H, 1 KM from Co C accidentally shot himself in the hand while cleaning an M-16 rifle, and was immediately evacuated. At 1030H, via cover W794753, Co F discovered 300 gallons of cooking oil. At 1230H elements of the Recon platoon moved to cover W7972751 to convert an larger work party at AD MACE-MORSE via cover W7927750. The mission was completed at 1400H. At 1330H via cover W7955752 an individual from Co B received shrapnel in the knee from a grenade used to blow a bunker while on patrol. The man was evacuated. At 1800H all elements cleared larger area.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued in SAB operations 100' of 1000. The VC base camp containing 20 pigs, 20 chickens, grenades, huts, 2 weapons and documents were found and destroyed via cover W7950750. A telephone was connected to a wire line discovered via cover W7946750 and Vietnamese voices were heard. Co A joined the 2nd night perimeter via cover W7944756 at 1730H. Co B continued in SAB operations 100' of 1000. At 1130H Co C found and destroyed 1 weapon and 100 lbs of polished rice via cover W7946755. At 1330H Co B destroyed six 2 man bunkers via cover W7946756. 1 VC KIA (BG) wrapped in poncho was found via cover W7946756. Co C continued in SAB operation 100' of 1000. At 1700H Co C found and destroyed one 55 gal drum of polished rice via cover W7946756 at 1730H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued 2B 34 Rds.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Shelled the Tien Lang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 9 Mar 67 (DoL5):

(a) 2/22 Inf: The recon platoon and Pg element received approximately 150 mortar rds at cover 47°57'75" at 0930H, all landed outside the perimeter. No friendly casualties were received. Co A found twenty 5 gal cans of food type (English) and a food plate type setting at cover 47°57'754. Co C received sniper fire via of cover 47°57'756. Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (BG) and an additional 5 tons of rice was found.

(b) 2/22 Inf (O): At 0930H Co B & C reported incoming mortar rds to the North of their position. At 1045H 2/22 attacked along Axis C-MACE-MORSE and Axis JULIA, to objective via cover W7972750. At 1215H via cover W7972777, Co B discovered a hut containing approximately 15 lbs of bicycle parts. At 1310H via cover W7937750, Co A destroyed a 55 gal drum of rice. At 1330H, via cover W7946752, Co C located an empty underground room 12°42'42" N. At 1330H via cover W7947752, Co B discovered a deserted base camp. The base camp was 100-150 meters in diameter, with surrounding trench system and connecting trenches and tunnels. At 1800H the 1a cleared objective area.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued SAB operation 100' of 1000. At 1200H Co A joined defensive perimeter via cover W7946756. Co B continued in SAB operation and destroyed five 55 gallon drums of rice via cover W7946756. Co B joined defensive perimeter via cover W7946756 at 1400H. Co C continued SAB operation. A base camp was found and destroyed via cover W7946756. Co C joined defensive perimeter via cover W7946756 at 1400H.

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(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 34 Bdes.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dan Tiong Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes. At 0300H Co A conducted SAD operations to cover RT512000.

(19) 10 Mar 1967 (D+16):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued local patrols and ambushes, continued searching area of previous day's action.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0915H, via cover WT993603, Companies A&B attacked through AO WHITE. At 1145H, Co C attacked through AO BLUE. At 1330H, CP Group 2/22 Inf (M) followed Co C axis of advance to a Bo longer site via cover WT982203. Co A lagged via WT994630. At 1425H, via cover WT984104, Co A discovered a base camp, surrounded by a bunker and trench system with six huts, two of which had concrete floors. In one hut 30 lbs of document and propaganda sheets were found.

(c) 3/22 Inf: In continued SAD operation until 1715H when a Bn night defense perimeter was established via cover WT772026.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 34 Bdes.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dan Tiong Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(20) 11 Mar 67 (D+17):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued SAD operations via WT993603.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A, B and C conducted SAD operations in designated area of Bn AO. Co A lagged at cover WT772026. Co B lagged at cover WT984227. Co C lagged with Bn CP Group, via cover WT984226.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A departed Bn defensive position via cover WT772026 and conducted SAD operations to the Northeast. A Co returned to Bn defensive perimeter via cover WT772029 at 1800H. Co B secured Bn defensive perimeter via cover WT772026. Co C departed Bn defensive perimeter and conducted SAD operations South along 3001 Ia IP. River. Fourteen huts, a wall, a latrine, quantities of cement and documents were found and destroyed via cover WT770216. Co C joined Bn defensive perimeter cover WT772026 at 1800H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 34 Bdes, C/1/3 arty teams attached 2/77 Arty.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dan Tiong Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 1/3rd Inf (M): 0300H 34 Bdes 0900H, conducted SAD operations and blocking positions WT772026, destroyed one small base camp at WT984227.

(21) 12 Mar 67 (D+18):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued local patrols and ambushes, continued SAD operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A, B and C conducted SAD operations in designated area of Bn AO. Co A lagged at the cover WT984226. Co B lagged at cover WT984227. Co C lagged with the Bn CP Group, via cover WT984226.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies AB, continued defense of battalion perimeter via cover WT772026. Co C conducted SAD operations to the West and returned to Bn base at 1300H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: B/2/77 moved by convoy from PFB 200 (WT984226) to Military Reservation (WT977702) and remained DS.

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(a) 2/14 Inf: Secured ~~OUTPOST~~ <sup>OUTPOST</sup> Base Camp, conducted local patrols and patrols.

(b) 1/17th Inf (W): SDO operations, destroyed two 2.75 mortars at ~~W7772710~~, 3 mortars, 2 bunkers, 11 nests, 1500 lbs rice, 1 bicycle at ~~W7772791~~.

(22) 13 Mar 67 (D+19):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Recon platoon destroyed one boat, two bunkers at ~~W7739777~~, Co C destroyed 2 walls and 2 foxholes at ~~W7867791~~.

(b) 2/22 Inf (W): At 0400H, via coord W7799229, Co A discovered one accordion, one trailing aid of a US M1 carbine, and rice sack filled with rice. At 1000H, via coord W7799418, Recon platoon 2/22 Inf (W) discovered an East-West trench line 150 meters long, which contained 10 lbs of documents. Co C lingered at the same location on 12 Mar 67.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A,B conducted SDO operations to the Southeast and Northwest of 3/1 base via coord W7772828. Both units closed in base by 1600H. Co C secured in perimeter.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Conducted D3, 34 RMs.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and patrols.

(f) 1/5th Inf (W): Conducted SDO operations via W7946703. Co A made contact with unknown number of VC resulting in one VC KIA, one US WIA, destroyed one foot bridge, 4 bunkers, 8 nests, 6 canvas printers lost, 365 gals water oil, killed one VC, captured 1 Chinese carbine.

(23) 14 Mar 67 (D+20):

(a) 2/22 Inf: The 2/12 Inf conducted SDO operations North toward 3/11 Inf via ~~W7739003~~ and discovered a foot wide rice camp and reactivation area at ~~W771777~~. They then established blocking position RRD at ~~W7739003~~.

(b) 2/22 Inf (W): Companies A,B and C 2/22 Inf (W) conducted SDO operations in designated sectors of Bn 10. At 1100H via coord W7000320, a patrol from Co A received one US WIA from a VC force of unknown size. Area was swept with no results. Co A lingered via coord W7903226, Co B lingered coord W7903227, and Co C lingered with Bn CP Group at coord W7903226.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf departed in base via coord W7737721, and moved to PE RRD via coord W7739021. In elements secured 12 RRD for the reactivation of 2/12 Inf.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Conducted D3, 34 RMs.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and patrols.

(f) 1/5th Inf (W): Departed for Bn Co to base under OPORD 206418Z Mar 67 at 1300H. At 1000H Recon platoon APC damaged by a mine at ~~W7707720~~. Bn Co had one APC damaged by a mine at ~~W7737733~~ resulting in light damage.

(24) 15 Mar 67 (D+21):

(a) 2/22 Inf: At 0400H the Bn (-) mobilized from blocking position RRD to Trvl 21, and then shifted by 0430H to Ban Tieng closing base camp at 1300H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (W): 2/22 Inf (W) escorted 2/77 Arty and elements of 3/22 Arty to Ban Tieng. The Bn closed Camp Banlak at 1600H.

(c) 2/22 Inf: The Bn was repositioned from PE RRD via coord W7739021 by 0845 to Trvl 21 Bn CP and 0845 to Ban Tieng by 0915. Bn closed Ban Tieng by 1400H.

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(1) 2/77 Arty: Operation to provide continuous artillery coverage to Da Tieng was initiated. Batteries were moved into positions along the route of march to provide continuous artillery coverage.

(2) 2/14 Inf: Released from security mission of Da Tieng Base Camp, began move to Cu Chi.

(25) 16 Mar (D+22):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Base camp security, local patrols and rehearsals, prepared for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): Base camp security, local patrols and rehearsals, prepared for future operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Base camp security, local patrols and rehearsals, prepared for future operations.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Prepared for continuation of operations.

(26) 17 Mar 67 (D+23):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of Da Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): Continued security of Da Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Continued security of Da Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued security of Da Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(27) 18 Mar 67 (D+24):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The 2/12 Inf airlifted from Da Tieng at 0953H by C-130 to Soni Da, landing at 0945H. The Bn (-) spent the rest of the day at Soni Da.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0830H 2/22 Inf (H) (-) inserted Camp Binhay for coord XX387035. At 0730H Co C and B team departed 100m to the rear to coord XX387035. At 0730H, via coord XX386430, an APC HMMWV from Co C detonated a mine resulting in 4 US WIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 0800H, via coord XX387030, an APC HMMWV from the B team pit detonated a mine resulting in 4 US WIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 0857H via coord XX386434 B team pit received 2 to 3 hits from an RPG II, resulting in no casualties. Air strikes were immediately called to cover the hostile area. B team pit continued to receive RPG II fire from two positions at the same location. At 0950H B team had another RPG II hit on APC resulting in 2 US WIA and 3 US WLA. At 1100H, after 6 T-55 air sorties, and artillery preparation Co B swept the area in which B team had contact. At 1107H, an APC from Co B detonated a mine resulting in 6 US WIA and one APC HMMWV destroyed. One US WIA was caused by small arms fire. Co B completed the area sweep with no results. At 1400H 2/22 Inf (H) inserted at via coord XX386434.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf began Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE II at 0800H when its elements were airlifted by C-130 to Soni Da via coord XX387035. Airlift was completed at 0830H and a defensive perimeter was established via coord XX386434.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty, Team Btry A, moved by convoy to Soni Da (XX381300). Btry C occupied a position at PBB HAMMIE (XX386437) with the mission of direct support to 2/22 Inf (H) as they moved overland to LZ SILVER. 2/77 tactical headquarters and Batteries A and B prepared for capture of LZ SILVER. 2/77 Arty moved to Da Tieng for base camp defense.

(e) C/4th Bn: At 0430H put in ARB at XX386437, moved ARB at 1730H after crossing was completed. Team team obtained to each Inf.

(28) 19 Mar 67 (DoS):

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(a) 2/12 Inf: At 1300H the Bn (-) was airlifted into LZ GOLD. Lift was completed at 1415H. Bn (-) moved to via coord (X1346700) to set up a CP and assist in providing security of LZ GOLD.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0630H, Recon platoon moved as the Bn advance guard to coord X1375673. At 0756H, Recon platoon received an RPG II and small arms fire at coord X1375673. Co A swept the area and found one US claymore mine with blasting cap, one battery and one Chinese hand grenade. At 0915H via coord X1377677 Recon platoon again received RPG II and small arms fire. 82mm mortars and artillery were employed. After the supporting fires had ceased the area was swept with mag results. At 1205H, via coord X1376676, Co A received small arms fire and 1 claymore mine, resulting in 4 US KIA, and 2 US WIA. Co A was withdrawn and two sorties of TAC air were employed along with medium and light artillery. At 1545H Recon and Co C crossed the Bn laager area via coord X1377672. At 1615H Co B swept the area of Co A's contact and came under small arms fire, but received no casualties. Co B found a heavy blood trail (1 VC KIA Poco) and 2 light blood trails (2 VC WIA Poco). Co B also destroyed two AT mines at coord X1377677. At 1700H Co C received one US WIA which resulted from a short artillery round at via coord X1377672. At 1710H Co A moved to coord X1360637, and was placed under OPCON of 2/22 Inf Aver.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B began an airmobile assault into LZ GOLD via coord X1360704 at 1015H. B Co's 2d lift landed, hitting VC triggered a command detonated mine causing heavy damage to 4 helicopters and numerous casualties among Co B personnel. When Co A's first and second lifts landed on LZ GOLD, the VC detonated two additional command detonated mines causing heavy damage to the remaining helicopters. VC snipers in the tree line surrounding LZ GOLD were engaged with unknown results. LZ GOLD was secured and defensive perimeter established at 1300H. Results of assault: Three BMDs destroyed, three UH1Cs damaged, ten US KIA, eighteen US WIA, seven aviators KIA. A sweep of the LZ revealed nineteen 82mm mortar rds and two 173mm rounds flagged for command detonation. Company C (-) continued security for Bde CP at Soni Da via coord X1344540.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Headquarters, 2/77 Arty, Batteries A and B airlifted into LZ GOLD, (X1385705), after the LZ had been secured by 3/22 Inf. LZ GOLD was then redesignated Fire Support Team GOLD. (A last minute change in plane designated GOLD instead of SILVER as the objective area).

(e) 2/34 Armer (-): Became OPCON 34 Bde, 4th Inf Div, across attached one Co with 2/22 Inf (M):

(29) 20 Mar (DoS):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 0730H the Bn (-) commenced movement to AD ORANGE. At 1000H the Bn located a small base camp at coord (X1360711). One claymore was detonated as US forces approached base camp, resulting in mag friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0900H via coord X1376676, Co B discovered a large base camp and captured eight weapons. Approximately 30 rifle grenades, 4 directional mines, 40 lbs of documents, and approximately 3000 lbs of captured items consisting of clothing material and guns. VC also captured. At 1030H Co A 2/22 Armer was placed under OPCON of 2/22 Inf (M). At 1400H 2/22 Inf (M) departed at coord X1360637.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued covering for GOLD and conducted platoon size reconnaissance patrols with mag results. Co C (-) continued security mission for Bde CP at Soni Da. A Company B night patrol located via coord X1360631 reported heavy VC movement at 1300H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Btry C airlifted into FSB GOLD joining the remainder of the Bn. C/1/0 Arty became attached and occupied positions at FSB GOLD.

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(e) 2/14 Armor (-): At 0730H beginning 170049Z/2/22, affected link 1 at 0835H. At 1130H elements began movement toward AD BLACK. At 1100H received 1 MSG II rd, no damage or casualties. At 1430H located small VC base camp, engaged at 17060716.

(f) 21 March 67 (Da27):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 210640H Mar 67, the 2/12 Inf located via word 17060716 was alerted by Hq, 3d Bde, that PFB GOLD was under attack and to be prepared to move to that location. Co C, 2/12 Inf was alerted to move and received the order to move to PFB GOLD at 1400H. The 2/12 Inf received 16 rds of mortar fire of unknown origin at 0700H. Six rounds f 12 w/10 CP Group resulting in 5 FA within the CP Group and 2 WIA within the Recon plt. Approximately 10 rds falling on A and B Co resulting in 1 WIA and 7 WA of Co A and 1 WIA from Co B. At 0745H Co C, moved toward PFB GOLD by the most direct route. Co A followed approximately 15 minutes later. Co B, secured an LZ successfully effecting a Dust-OFF for injured personnel. About 0800H Co B, CP Group and Recon plt departed for PFB GOLD. Co C moved at maximum speed through 150 meters of heavy bamboo thicket. They were exposed to sporadic sniper fire and mortar fire in an effort to prevent them from reinforcing the unit under attack. Lead elements of Co C made contact with the enemy security force as they reached the outer perimeter of PFB GOLD at 0800H. The SJ of the 3/22 Inf directed Co C to take up defensive positions on the Southwest portion of the perimeter as the unit closed in at 0800H. During movement to relieve the units under attack C Company received 6 WIA. Upon arrival of Co C along with other reinforcing friendly forces the VC broke contact after suffering heavy casualties. Co C was joined by other elements of the 2/12 Inf as they arrived at PFB GOLD. Co A made contact with 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA during a sweep of the perimeter.

(b) 2/22 Inf (W): At 0835H Recon and Co C led the Bn to reinforce 3/22 Inf and 2/77 Arty at PFB GOLD and began engaging the enemy. Two minor US WIA and 4 VC POW and a large amount of weapons and ammunition resulted from this engagement. At 1200H via word 17060703 Recon plt 2/22 Inf (W) departed to recover the bodies of 2 Air Force P/C KIA resulting from the crash of a PAC plane shot down during the battle. Upon reaching the site the bodies were recovered. Also, 7 VC KIA were found via word 17060702. The Bn engaged at word 17060707. The Bn collected an additional 7C VC (SC) after the Battle of PFB GOLD. This SC was submitted for addition to the Bn total.

(c) 3/22 Inf: C Co (-) continued security mission for Brigade CP at 0600H via word 17060703. A and B Companies continued security mission for PFB GOLD via word 17060704. At 0800H, B Co, 3d Plt eight ambush located via word 17060701 reported movement in front of and around the outer position. No further movement was reported and at 0830H patrol prepared to return to GOLD. At 0830H PFB GOLD came under heavy enemy (KIA and WIA) mortar attack, and 3d Platoon ambush patrol made contact with a large VC force. Within five minutes this patrol was overrun and all personnel were killed or wounded. At 0830H the Reconnaissance Patrol, 3/22 Inf engaged a large VC force which had approached to within thirty-five meters of PFB GOLD's Southeastern perimeter. Shortly thereafter, the entire perimeter was under attack by waves of VC firing recoilless rifles, RPG II recoil launchers, automatic weapons and other small arms. Heaviest attacks were concentrated on the Northeastern and Southeastern portions of the battalion defensive perimeter around PFB GOLD. As the attack continued, the three artillery batteries of the 2/77 Arty began firing counter-mortar fire in an effort to neutralize the VC mortar concentrations which continued to rain the entire fire support base. During the initial assault, Co B reported that 1st Plt positions (Southeastern perimeter) had been penetrated and that the reaction force from 2/77 Arty was required to reinforce this sector. At 0700H the reaction force began moving to the 1st Platoon's portion of the perimeter. At 0700H the first PAC arrived at GOLD and within five minutes airstrikes had begun. Additionally, close supporting fires from two batteries of 105mm (2P) had been brought in to within one hundred meters of the battalion's perimeter. At 0710H, Co B reported that the 1st Platoon had been overrun and surrounded by a bunch wave attack. Airstrikes were called in along the Perimeter to relieve the 1st Platoon's portion of the perimeter. The PAC who was controlling these strikes was hit by friendly VC automatic weapons fire and was shot down. At 0730H the 2d Platoon reported that

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the 2/77 Artillery fire beehive rounds into the Southeastern and Southern sectors of his perimeter. At 0756H B Company reported that complete penetration had been made in 1st Platoon's sector and that ammunition supply was minimal. Ammunition and a twenty man reaction force from A Company were sent to B Company at 0813H when B Company's Northern sector was overrun by another human wave attack. At 0815H A Company's night ambush patrol which had established a night ambush at via court 273A/704 monitored PEB GOLD's perimeter. All personnel had managed to make the perimeter during H. At 0818H the A Company Commander reported that a VC penetration had been made in the Northern sector of the perimeter. At 0820H the quad .50 located in the Northern sector of the perimeter was used by PEB II to set perimeter overruns. By 0840H, the Northeastern, Eastern, and Southern portions of PEB GOLD's perimeter had withdrawn to a secondary defensive line around the guns of the artillery batteries. The Northern, Western, and Southern sectors held fire despite the presence of large numbers of VC who had infiltrated to within fifteen to twenty-five meters of the defensive bunker. Attacking VC had infiltrated to within hand grenade range of the Battalion CP and to within five meters of the Battalion Aid Station. To counter this new threat, the remaining headquarters of the 2/77 Artillery began firing beehive rounds into the attacking VC. Airstrikes were brought in to within fifty (50) meters of friendly forces and supporting 105mm and 155mm batteries threw up a continuous wall of high explosive around the battalion perimeter. When the 2/77 Arty exhausted its supply of beehive rounds, HE rounds of charge one were fired direct fire at point blank range. At 0900H the situation, though tense because of ammunition shortages, was still under control. The Northern, Western, and Southern sectors of the perimeter were still intact and under moderate pressure from the VC. Although pushed in, the Northeastern, Southeastern, Eastern portion of the perimeter were intact and had contained and broken the continuous VC attacks which had been thrown against them. At 0901H, a relief column from the 2/12 Inf broke through from the South and linked up with Company B. Joining forces, Co B and elements from the 2/12 Inf unit reattached from West to East to re-establish the original perimeter. At 0912H, a mechanized infantry and armor column from the 2/22 Inf and the 2/34 Armor, broke through from the Southwest and swept forward along the trailline toward the Northwest. By 0920H the original perimeter had been re-established and mapping up operations had begun. At 1007H four (4) resupply UH-1s arrived at PEB GOLD with ammunition and began evacuating the wounded. By 1045H medical evacuation of friendly casualties had been accomplished; the battle area had been secured; and artillery and airstrikes continued to pound the VC routes of withdrawal. For the remainder of the day, battalion elements maintained police of the battle area and reconnaissance for future combat missions.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty remained at 2209H/703 and supported elements in contact. The Bn received mortar and ground attack in conjunction with attack on 3/22 Inf (-) at 0800H. Bn adjusted artillery and air strikes. Artillery was initially fired as counter mortar then guns were used in a direct-fire final protective role. Bn observed PEB crash at 0745H, requested and got another PEB, 3 Platoon had three guns out of action at 0800H and 4 Platoon had one gun out of action. Bn requested to via of one gun position. Bn began using beehive rounds in direct fire supplemented with HE. By the end of the action 17 guns were damaged but all but three were kept operational through makeshift action.

(e) 2/34 Armor (-): At 2209H 2/34 Armor (-) effected link up with elements of 2/22 Inf (4) followed the column to relief of PEB GOLD.

(f) 2/12 Inf: 2/12 Inf (-) assisted in covering PEB GOLD with local patrolling. Results were 13 VC bodies discovered as well as a quantity of miscellaneous equipment.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (H): 2/22 Inf (H) moved from PEB GOLD via road 1736706 and attempted to recover Obj BIA via road 17363727. At 0912H, Tn A 2/24 Armor attacked followed by Tn B 2/22 Inf. Tn A 2/22 Inf attacked via road 1736705. Tn A detonated 2 mines at mines with no casualties. They also located a grave site containing one VC. At 1043H via road 1736706, another grave site was discovered. At 1412H, Batoon and the CP Group 2/22 Inf (H) moved along Axis 18012 to join Tn A 2/24 Armor. At 1710H Tn C 2/22 Inf (H) and Tn A 2/24 Armor discovered a base camp which contained 30 hand grenades. At 1700H the Bn lowered. Three pre-planned air strikes were placed along axis of advance road 1736706.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Companies A and B conducted security of PEB GOLD. One US WIA received at 0530H when individual failed to answer challenge. A recovery-reconnaissance patrol found two VC PIA (EC) and one HVC II (EC) round. Two VC KIA credited to the Battle of Sudi Tre on 21 Mar 67. Co C (-) continued security mission for the CP at Sudi Da.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued OB mission.

(e) 2/24 Armor: Conducted sweep in area of previous day's battle in conjunction with 2/22 Inf (H).

(f) A Trp 1/6 Cav: Checked security.

(g) 2) Mar 67 (D+D):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 0800H Co B combat patrol reported finding 1 VC body, 1 can of machinegun ammo, 1 VC hat, 4 grave sites, web gear, grenade and a home made stretcher on road 1736703. At 0912H the same platoon reported finding 1 Chinese grenade and one VC grenade at 1736703. Co A reported 5 VC bodies at road 1736715 at 1100H. Co B found 2 VC bodies at road 1736477. All were results of the Battle of Sudi Tre. In the area of the battles large amounts of web gear, grenade, small arms ammunition and 3 HVC II anti-tank weapons were located.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0812H Tn C 2/22 Inf (H) reported larger area in route to Obj BIA. At 0812H via road 17371736 Tn C found several garden plots and bunkers with evidence of recent occupancy. At 0912H they discovered two base sites 10'x20' and 15'x15', via road 17370737. Both sites were well bunkered. At 0920H via road 17367720 the Bn PAC reported receiving heavy ground fire. At 0930H Tn C developed four garden plots, three bunkers, and two dozen grenade traps at road 17371736. At 1100H via road 17364727 Tn C discovered three VC KIA (EC) in bunkers. The 3 VC KIA were the result of air strikes at 0800H. At 1312H via road 17367720 Tn C discovered 8 bunkers around a clearing. At 1312H Tn B also discovered a VC base camp with a trench line running E-W. Tn B via road 17364724. At 1500H Tn B engaged an undetermined size VC force. Three eleven-rounds were fired at their location. Artillery was fired into the area but with unknown results. At 1600H via 17364721 Tn C had one officer KIA. At 1800H Co C discovered two VC KIA (EC) and captured one cell 43 grenade gun. At 2000H the last element of 2/22 closed the larger site at road 17370733.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Companies A & B continued security mission for PEB GOLD. At 0800H Co A combat patrol located six VC bodies, one machine gun barrel and 300+ rounds of ammo via road 1736706. One HVC II credited to the Battle of Sudi Tre, 21 March. Co C (-) continued security mission for the CP at Sudi Da.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued OB.

(e) 2/24 Armor (-): Continued attack into the Bn C with no contact.

(f) 4/3/6 Cav (-): 0800 34 34, secured mission of escorting supply between Obj BIA, Sudi Da, PEB GOLD with no contact.

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(17) 24 Mar 67 (D-31)

(a) 2/22 Inf: At 0900H Co B reported finding a VC body at record K136970. At 1100H Co A captured 1 VC POW from the Battle of Buoi Tre at record K136970.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0900H Co B departed the laager position for predesignated SAB operations. At 0945H Co C departed in route to previous day's contacts. At 0945H via record K136970 Co B discovered a cache of long rice in a hole about K136985. It was destroyed in place. At 1000H Co C discovered one mass kill and a variety of livestock. One VC WIA was also discovered. At 1030H via record K136970 Co B found a bloody trail (1 VC WIA POW). POW captured by Co C stated that the 15th and 1st Regt took part in the action of 21 March 67. At 1115H Co C found three RPG rds in a trench which were destroyed in place. At 1100H via record K136970 Co B discovered a base camp which contained a pair of bloody trousers (1 VC WIA POW), evidence indicated that fifteen VC had spent the night there. At 1500H via record K136972 Co C discovered and destroyed one 500 lb bomb. At 1930H all Bn units closed laager areas.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A & B continued security mission for PNP QM. Co A (-) conducted a one day SAB operation Northwest of PNP QM. Two VC bodies were found via record K136971, credited to Battle of Buoi Tre. Co C continued security of Bn CP at Buoi Tre.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued B, M, Rds.

(e) 2/34 Armor: Continued attack into War Zone C.

(f) 4/23 Inf (-): 0900H M Rds.

(18) 25 Mar 67 (D-31)

(a) 2/22 Inf: The 2/22 Inf advanced along with QM and 9-6 up the CP at record K136972.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 1030H via record K136972, Co C discovered an arms bag and Chinese grenades. There was evidence of recent activity at this location. At 1530H, 2/22 Inf CP Group with Co A 2/34 Armor closed new laager sites via record K136970. At 1730H Co B arrived at the laager sites to take up security positions. At 1800H all elements closed in laager sites.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued security mission for PNP QM. An A Co ambush patrol observed one VC via record K136669. Art was called in with unknown results. C Co (-) infiltrated into 12 QM at 0730H and joined the Bn perimeter at PNP QM. An ambush patrol from Co C (-) found three VC bodies, 1x pistol bolt, one entrenching tool, one carbine, detonating cord and clothing via record K136770. Three VC KIA were credited to the Battle of Buoi Tre, 21 Mar.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued B, M Rds.

(e) 2/34 Armor: Continued SAB operation in 40 Black, located 8 tanks and 200 lbs unexploded rags at K136972. An estimated 15 Co was observed from the air at K136974, air strikes and artillery were called in and 2/34 Armor passed, located 5 VC KIA (IC), killed by artillery, observed one secondary explosion in vicinity of air strikes. Received one RSO II round and reported 3 VC, engaged with unknown result to one A/JO damaged. Bn laagered at K136972.

(f) 4/23 Inf: Continued clearing and repairing road from PNP QM to K136972, lead elements of road clearing team were engaged by approximately 15 VC at K136975, air strikes and artillery called in, results were 8 VC KIA and 8 VC WIA, unknown enemy results.

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(4) 25 Mar 67 (D-5)

(a) 2/2 Inf (R): Continued B&B operations, received update info at 1700Z 23 Mar via radio.

(b) 2/2 Inf (R): At 0900Z 23 Mar, Co B departed on B&B operations, at 1000Z Co B reported to 1st Lt, Co A, about 250 personnel. At 1200Z 23 Mar, pit returned to 1st Lt, Co A. At 1300Z, the 1st Lt, Co Group and the Return pit arrived at a new base position, via road 1701-730.

(c) 1/2 Inf: Co A continued security mission for PIP 1701-730. An ambush patrol from Co A found two 100 mm mortars, 100 kg grenades, clothing and food via road 1701-730. A night ambush patrol from B Co detected movement at 2200Z via road 1701-730 and returned to 0000Z at 2300Z. Co C (-) continued security for PIP 1701-730. A 100 mm personnel carrier patrol located two 100 mm mortars, one 100 mm, one 82 mm, and one 40 mm mortar pit via road 1701-730. At 1100Z the pit patrol found and destroyed a large camp consisting of four huts, eight huts, a kitchen, and a classroom via road 1701-730. At 1300Z two 100 mm mortars with crew, two 82 mm mortars and option were found via road 1701-730. An ambush patrol from Co C (-) called in artillery on movement via road 1700-730 via unknown route. See W 11A (R) (2nd of Best Tree).

(d) 2/7 Inf: Continued B&B, 30 Mar.

(e) 2/3 Armor: Continued B&B operations in AD 1700Z, on 2000Z at 1701-730.

(f) 1/2 Inf (R): Continued B&B operations in zone, and two 100 mm mortars destroyed at 1701-730, 1701-730, and 1701-730. Observed from air 5 TC at 1701-730, engaged via 100 mm mortars, unknown results. At 1300Z (1701-730) a platoon from the 1st Lt, Co A engaged against 2/4/2 (see below) in 3 TCs. One AMG damaged as a result of a strike. 1000 TC engaged via 2 unknown results. Co engaged with AMG Co at 2nd TC and 2/4/2 at 1701-730.

(g) C/4 Armor: Continued B&B, 2000Z from PIP 1701-730 to PIP 1701-730, destroyed one mortars via 1701-730, CP located at PIP 1701-730.

(h) 27 Mar 67 (D-11)

(a) 2/2 Inf: 1st Lt (-) conducted B&B operations in AD 1700Z. 1st Lt (-) discovered a B&B 10 km via road 1700-730 and its reported location were mortar rounds. These were all set up to be command detonated. All were destroyed.

(b) 2/2 Inf (R): At 0800Z Co B reported no longer site on an B&B operations. At 0800Z Co C departed the no longer site on a B&B operation. At 1000Z via road 1701-730 Co C discovered an abandoned base camp. Within the camp they found 100 personnel items of clothing, 100 100 lb bags of rice, 100 mortars, rubber soles for sandals and 3 recently dug trenches. All equipment was destroyed. At 1100Z via 1000 TCs 1/2 Armor reported hearing mortars rounds to their front at a distance of 100-500 meters. Artillery was placed on the long distance, but with no results. At 1300Z, an 82 mm Co 3 reported movement to their front. After engagement with hand grenades, a patrol made a search of the area with no results.

(c) 3/2 Inf: A and B Companies continued security mission for PIP 1701-730. Co C (-) conducted B&B operations in Eastern sector of AD 1700Z. Co C's 1st Lt, 1st Lt, 2nd Lt, 3rd Lt, 4th Lt, 5th Lt, 6th Lt, 7th Lt, 8th Lt, 9th Lt, 10th Lt, 11th Lt, 12th Lt, 13th Lt, 14th Lt, 15th Lt, 16th Lt, 17th Lt, 18th Lt, 19th Lt, 20th Lt, 21st Lt, 22nd Lt, 23rd Lt, 24th Lt established a night ambush patrol via road 1701-730.

(d) 2/7 Inf: Continued B&B, 30 Mar.

(e) 2/3 Armor: Continued B&B mission.

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(f) 4/7 Inf (-): Continued B&D in area.

(g) C/4th Bnops: Located and destroyed one 20 lb mine at 1300Z 15 Mar.

(h) 18 Mar 67 (D+3):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued B&D operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0815Z Co B departed the Bn Lager area to conduct B&D operations in the sector. At 1000Z Co C departed the Lager area to conduct B&D operations in the sector. At 1400Z after completing the B&D operation in sector, Co C returned to the Bn Lager area to perform maintenance. At 1515Z a combat patrol from Room plt 1/7 Inf (N) conducted a B&D operation to the South of the Bn Lager positions. The patrol cleared the Bn Lager area at 1600Z. The result of the patrol was the discovery of one 55 gal drum of CB which was destroyed in the Lager area.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn conducted security mission from PIB 0010 and conducted daylight reconnaissance and night search patrols within the Bn.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued B&D, 24 Mar.

(e) 2/3 Arty (-): Continued B&D in AD 121-CL. Two VC were seen at 121107Z and engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (E) and one Chinese soldier and miscellaneous personal documents recovered.

(f) 4/22 Inf (N): Assisted OICB of C/1/10 Cav and their element of Room 239 security and survey escort. Brought surveys between the Bn, 2nd Bn, Room 239 and PIB 0010.

(g) 4/3/6 Cav: Relieved OICB of 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div at 0830Z.

(h) C/4th Bnops: Continued present mission of operating route, destroyed one 20 lb mine at 1300Z 15 Mar.

(i) 29 Mar 67 (D+5):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued B&D operations northeast toward PIB 0010 with no contact.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0700Z the Room platoon departed the Bn Lager area heading South. At 0745Z, Co B and C proceeded to the Northern edge of the Bn AD. The Bn was swept to the west with two company elements. At 0815Z the CP Group and Co A 2/3 Arty departed to a new larger area. At 1015Z the CP Group and Co A 2/3 Arty discovered 10 bats, some clothing, 2 Chinese grenades, and 1 lb of documents. At 1300Z Co C cleared the Lager position. At 1400Z a Room element crossed a stream via covered 121107Z and found evidence of recent setting of traps. At approximately 1400Z Room element returned to the Lager position.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn conducted security of PIB 0010 and at 1015Z began a B&D operation to the Southwest. At 1130Z Co A found and destroyed three handbags and five packages via covered 121107Z. The VC KIA (E) were credited to the Bn. At 1200Z two hand grenades were recovered from a 12 via covered 121107Z. Co C (-) had no contact. A Bn perimeter was established via covered 121107Z and night patrols were established. A patrol from Co C (-) discovered three VC via covered 121107Z at 2100Z and killed in early fire with unknown results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty airlifted from PIB 0010 to Room 239 and Room 239, moved to PIB 0010. A Party occupied positions at Room 239. 2/3/6 Arty recovered from French Port (121104Z) and joined the Bn at PIB 0010.

(e) 2/3 Arty: Continued search and destroy mission.

(f) 4/22 Inf (N): Continued B&D mission.

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(9) 30 Mar 67 (D+36):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted SBOP operation Southeast to PL COPIA.

(b) 2/12 Inf (N): Approximately 0600H Co C departed the larger site for SBOP operation along assigned axis to the Southeast. Approximately 0700H Co D departed larger site for SBOP operations to the Southeast. At 1000H the CP Group with the Recon platoon crossed at an intermediate larger site via coord K1377660. At 1120H via coord K1377660 Co C received small arms fire from an estimated reinforced VC squad. There was one US WIA and two enemy casualties. Co B also detonated a mine with an APC Mine. This was a pressure type mine employing 10cm mortar fuse. There was no damage to personnel or equipment. At 1200H Co A 2/12 Armor continued to move on their axis to the Southeast. At 1300H Co C discovered hand grenades, clothing and claymore mines in the vic of their previous contact. At 1315H via coord K1385660, Co C received small arms fire and hand grenades. Artillery was employed into the area with unknown results. At 1400H Co C received two AF rds into their position. An APC was hit with both rds causing 3 US WIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 1730H Co B found three claymore mines.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf continued SBOP operations Southeast of PL COPIA. Co A found and destroyed 2 grenades rigged as booby traps via coord K1317667. Co B found and destroyed three 75mm howitzer rds and three 4.2" mortar rds via coord K1316677 at 1015H. Two men and one dog suffered from heat exhaustion and were evacuated from a LZ via coord K13671. At 1710H a Bn perimeter was established via coord K1326660.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IB, 3d Plt.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Continued SBOP operations.

(f) 2/34 Armor (-): Continued SBOP operations.

(g) 31 Mar 67 (D+37):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) crossed PL COPIA via coord K1377632 and conducted a SBOP operation Southeast to PL COPPA via coord K1316576.

(b) 2/12 Inf (N): All elements of the Bn proceeded to the Southeast and searched areas of the previous day contact. At 0622H Co C found entrails (1 VC KIA (Post)). At 0930H Co B discovered a classroom 15m x 20 meters with a seating capacity for 70 personnel. At 0955H Co D discovered another classroom which contained 26 men tables, and a mess hall. At 1020H via coord K1392661, Co A discovered 3 fresh graves (3 VC KIA DC). At 1100H via coord K1390660, Co C found one bolt action carbine. At 1115H Co B found one carbine, 3 claymore mines, and sixty 60mm mortar rds. At 1310H Co B discovered 7 bicycles and several rds of ammunition, which were destroyed. At 1330H, Co D discovered an arms cache which contained 2 new type grenades. At 1330H Co A 2/12 Armor found a bin of rice measuring 1x1x1' and 4 bicycles. At 1417H Co 4/2/12 Armor discovered 10 bags of rice at coord K136677. Also discovered were three claymore mines, one 10cm shell, 10 bicycles and approximately 400 lbs of rice which were destroyed. At 1420H via coord K1367660, Co B found two carbines. At 1440H via coord K1367676 Co 4/2/12 Armor discovered a base camp which had been recently used. It was well constructed and contained hate, blankets, and a mess hall with a 40 man seating capacity. Evidence indicated that the base camp was a medical school. At 1530H Co B discovered two bunker systems approximately 200 meters in length. At 1545H via coord K1367669, Co C discovered a long base camp with several well built bunkers. At 1550H via coord K136669, Co B discovered a trench system in the slope of a hill and two more small base camps.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn elements continued SBOP operations Southeast of PL COPIA. Co B found and destroyed one Chinese AP mine and one 20 lb bomb (GP) via coord K1326699. At 1315H Co C (-) engaged an estimated VC squad with unknown results via coord K1326699. At 1400

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location C Co (-) found and destroyed a VC base camp (150x250 meters) which contained hats, bedding, a well, bicycles and parts, clothing, compressed air, documents. A perimeter was established at 1645H via coord X1113653.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB 3d Rds.

(e) 4/21 Inf (H): Continued present mission, located and destroyed buildings and terrain at X1112614, injured one civilian vic fire. No, evacuated.

(f) 2/34 Armor (-): Continued to attack H, crossed PL COBRA with no contact, hit a mine at X1112614 with heavy damage to one tank, no casualties.

(g) C/4 Engs: Received one RPG II rd at X1112763, resulting in 3 US WIA and one bulldozer damaged. Fire was returned with unknown results. One homemade mine destroyed at X1112614.

(h) 2 Apr 67 (D+30):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued operations south of PL COBRA.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0730H began moving circuits to vic X11157625. At 0945H coord X11157625 in A/C RDL3 from Co B detonated a mine resulting in 1 DB WIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 1130H the PL Recon elements moved South of the laager area coord X11157625, to check for possible crossing sites. At 1400H all companies moved out on SD missions. At 1800H all companies had closed the PL laager site via coord X11157625.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf continued SD operations SW of PL COBRA. Co A found and destroyed 20 old bunkers via coord X1110653, and an abandoned VC base camp via coord X1113653. Fifteen bunkers were found and destroyed via coord X1112763. Co B found and destroyed a weapons cache via coord X11125637. Cache contained one German Mauser rifle, one RPG w/ barrel, 200 rifle grenades, tools and assorted ammunition and explosives. Co C (-) engaged an unknown number of V. via coord X11125637 at 1605H resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) and 1 AL-47 captured. A VC base camp was found and destroyed via coord X1113635. 3/22 Inf established a night defensive perimeter via coord X1113635.

(d) 2/77 Arty: C/1/8th Arty was detached from 2/77 Arty and departed.

(e) 4/23 Inf (H): A Co received one RPG II at X1112614 with heavy damage to one APC. Co C received major fire from vic X1115533, returned fire with 82mm mortars. No US casualties were sustained, unknown VC casualties.

(f) 2/34 Armor (-): Continued attack to PL COBRA, linked up with 2/22 Inf (H) and purified task organization (released attached companies). A Co received small arms fire via X1112613 with no casualties, returned fire with unknown results. PL became OP/COBRA to 190th Reg at 2200H.

(g) C/4 Engs: 100mm AVB at X1112613 after crossing of 4/23 Inf (H) and 2/34 Armor (-).

(h) 4th SB: Truck lightly damaged by mine at X1112614.

(i) 2 April 67 (D+30):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Discovered 1 grave of VC KIA (EC) at X1115305.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0730H Co A received three sniper RDS resulting in one US casualty. At 1300H via coord X1112763, Co A

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discovered three old M16A1 rifles and three receiver groups. At 1300H vic coord XE14005 the Bn recon platoon detonated a booby trap which resulted in one US WIA. Co A searched the area and discovered approximately 100 booby traps which were surrounding the base camp. This base camp consisted of 30 bunkers and 15 structures. Captured were 30 lbs clothing, 18 lbs documents, 10 lbs medical supplies and one M16 model 1935 7.62 rifle. At 1310H vic coord XE14005 Co A received 1 US WIA from sniper fire. At 1330H all elements closed the Bn larger site via coord XE1406006.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn continued SAB operations SE of PEB 0012. Co A located and destroyed a VC base camp via coord XE136623 at 1250H. One VC was engaged at 1700H via coord XE136623 with unknown results. Co B and Co C reported no contact throughout the day. Bn elements formed a defensive perimeter via coord XE135610.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DE, 34 hrs.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Conducted SAB operations in AC PEBK. B Co ambush patrol engaged 2 VC at XE1391518, results 1 VC KIA (Posse), no US casualties. At XE1391519 B Co engaged 5 VC killing one with no US casualties. At XE1413533 located and destroyed a small base camp. A Co detonated a grenade booby trap with no damage at XE1417570. C Co destroyed a base camp with underground tunnels, mine area and hidden ammunition at XE140557. Bn larger at XE140511.

(f) 3 April 67 (D+6):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) crossed PL COMBA and conducted SAB operations SE to PL PTTEN via coord XE150550.

(b) 3/22 Inf: At 0730H Co A's AD bay 2 sweeping the 3 portion of the Bn AD. At 0800H the Bn Recon plt moved to a possible crossing site on the Saigon River and began preparing it for crossing on 4 April. The crossing site was located at via coord XE1376687. At 1220H via coord XE1375210 Co C discovered a small recently used base camp. One Thompson M16 cal .45 was found. At 1230H via coord XE1374538 Co A apprehended a National Policeman who stated that he had been kidnapped in Saigon and held prisoner by the VC since Nov 66. The victim was badly burned in a recent airstrike and stated that 7 VC had been killed, two or more would die, and seven were wounded during the same airstrike. Co A also found and destroyed 10 lbs of documents, 5 lbs of medical supplies, 20 hand grenades, 1 rifle grenade, three M16 "Bouncing Betty" mines, 8 hats, 1 bunker and 300 lbs of polished rice. At 1450H via coord XE1360570 Co C discovered an old base camp and destroyed 15 hats, 24 grenades, 5 lbs fried meat, and 5 lbs dried fish. At 1450H via coord XE1379566 Co C discovered and destroyed 12 bunkers and 2 hats. At 1720H via coord XE140575 Co B received two WIA from a US hand grenade. At 1915H all elements closed Bn larger area via coord XE1406006.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf continued SAB operations SE of PEB 0012. Co C (-) received sniper fire via coord XE150559. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1612H Co C (-) located a large VC base camp occupied by a unknown number of VC via coord XE1405597. The VC broke contact at 1620H. Results: 3 VC KIA (EC), 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, large quantities of enemy equipment, narcotics, clothing, bicycles, food and ammunition destroyed. Co C (-) closed Bn perimeter via coord XE1505596 at 1910H. Co A reinforced Co C (-) at 1450H and at 1737H A Co made contact with an unknown number of VC at a base camp via coord XE1505590. Results: 1 US WIA, 1 VC KIA (EC). Co A closed Bn perimeter via coord XE1505596 at 1400H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Btry A displaced from Bn to PEB 0012 (XE140505) by convoy to support the elements of the Bn as they moved eastward toward the over 1M of the Mekong Flotation.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Co C ambush patrol received small arms fire and hand grenades from unknown size VC force at XE140545. Patrol moved

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and received fire from unknown force at 1700Z. Patrol left stay behind patrol and moved up line. Reaction force moved to location of contact and could find no results. Contact not made again.

(r) C/A Bnrg: Improved PVB APZL and cleared 1200h to PVB APZL.

(14) 4 Apr 67 (D+1):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) helilifted to LZ BOMB ~ ~ ~ 172605Z.

(b) 2/22 Inf (O): At 0700h the Bn began a move. ~ ~ ~ on 12 via road 173062Z. At 1145h Companies A & B covered LZ for elements of 2/12 Inf. Upon completion of the security mission the Bn moved to a larger position via road 173062Z.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co B covered Bn perimeter via road 17355506. Companies A & C (-) searched VC base camp located previous afternoon. Numerous items of equipment and food supplies were found and destroyed. One VC PV with weapon was captured and executed. At 1615h, 3/22 Inf helilifted to PVB GM via road 17355506. A & B Companies covered PVB GM while Co C (-) prepared to conduct and search AP CHAM 1h via road 17355506.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty (-) and 3/3/13 Arty moved by motor convoy to PVB GM 17342707. They A then displaced to this same location to again have the entire Bn in PVB GM. One 2½ ton truck damaged and 2 US WIA at 17342707 by RPG II rounds.

(e) 4/23 Inf (O): Moved overland from Bnrd Bn to Camp Rainier, attack Bn along Axis 103007, detonated one mine at 17323609 resulting in moderate damage to 1 ARV and two US WIA, 1傷者 at 17323609.

(f) C/1/10 Cav: Provided convoy escort between Camp Rainier, PVB GM and Tay Ninh, had one tank damaged by RPG II or HE round, 1傷者 at 17321507, no casualties.

(45) 5 Apr 67 (D+2):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Encountered and killed one sniper at 17300507, captured 1 Soviet 7.62 pistol, located a base camp that had been struck by air and artillery at 17331603 and one VC buried at 17303504. Mine detectors, 2 pigs, 3 cook stoves, 2 tons rice and miscellaneous furniture were destroyed in the base camp.

(b) 2/22 Inf (O): At 0700h the Bn began GM operations in assigned Bn 40 with no contact. At 1000h all Bn elements landed at road 173062Z.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A and B Co's conducted security mission for PVB GM. Co C (-) conducted AP CHAM via road 17355506 at 0800h. Search was completed by 0730h with no contact. The Bn was engaged with sporadic fire from a BZ via road 17355506. At 1030h, 2d pit engaged 2 VC via road 17355506 with no results. The Bn 55 and a Civil Action Group joined Co C at Ap Cham 1h to conduct Civil Action/Recon activities. The BZ again entered the area via road 17355506 at 1030h and were engaged with no results. Co A conducted security of PVB GM and conducted platoon size daylight reconnaissance patrol to the Bnrt. Co B conducted GM operations South and West of PVB GM with no results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued Bn, 3d Bn.

(e) 4/23 Inf (O): Continued to attack along Axis 103007 until 1000h when mission was changed, searched area bounded by 17300000, 17310000, 17301600.

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(4) 6 April (D+4):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Co A and 2/22 Inf B Co found a small base camp at 0700H. A Co found base camp at 0700H with no men present. Co C located 10 tons of rice at 0720H via coord 1721578. No pds found. At 0730H 2/22 Inf killed 1 VC and capturing one 7.62mm rifle. Also some propaganda materials were evacuated.

(b) 2/22 Inf: At 0600H units conducted S&D operations in designated areas of responsibility. At 1100H via coord 1721578 Co B sighted 14 VC. The VC were engaged with RPG and airstrikes. Civilians were not killed by ground troops. At 1400H via coord 1721578 resulting in 1 VC killed with unknown VC casualties. At 1400H all elements dispersed via coord 1721578.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn elements continued security of P30 GEN. Co B conducted S&D operations N of P30 GEN. M-16 platoon, Co C, remained C Co (-) at corner of 1721578 via coord 1721578. At 2300H Bn C departed AP Chanh 14 for ... Coach 5 to ... via coord 1721578. Co A reported P30 GEN at 2130H to secure Rte 141 between P30 GEN and Da Nang.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Day A returned to Camp Rainsford by convoy in a disengagement by echelon as the maneuver elements of the Bn began working their way back toward the base camp.

(e) 4/23 Inf (M): Continued S&D operations, located pds & rice at 1750H where LF shot at twice the previous night, received 3 r/b's sniper fire at 1750H, 0836, escorted A Day 2/77 Arty to Da Nang Bn Camp, reported to 0600H of parent unit at 1800H.

(f) 7 Apr 87 (D+4):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued S&D, located 1 small base camp at 1757503 and 1 village with carrying firms at 1750580. CP for the night was established at 1757503.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0600H 2/22 Inf (M) began search and destroy through the Michelin Plantation towards Camp Rainsford. At 0700H via coord 17555586 Co B discovered a small base camp. At 1040H via coord 1751077 Co A located 1000 pds. At 1300H the Bn Recon platoon detected an AP mine with an RPG K13 resulting in no US casualties and minor damage to the LJC. At 1415H Co's A & C made a search of section to AP 13 via via coord 17561498, with no results. At 1500H all elements except Recon closed Camp Rainsford. The Bn Recon platoon dispersed via coord 17517673.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co B continued security of P30 GEN, while Co A established defensive position via coord 17510500 at 0030H. At 0700H Co A closed Da Nang Bn Camp at 1930H. Co C continued movement to AP Chanh 6 via coord 17519517, and established position at 0530H. Civilian action/Recon activities took place while Co C secured and searched the village with no results. At 1615H Co C received 15 to 20 r/b sniper fire at AP Chanh 6. Fire was returned with unknown results. Since the Artillery convoy departed P30 GEN, B Co began S&D operations toward Da Nang. At 1500H consecutive wire and fifteen VC bodies were found and destroyed via coord 1753465. Co B closed Da Nang at 1630H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 3/2/77 Arty detached, and with 6/2/77 Arty departed Da Nang. 3/77 (-) closed back to base camp.

(g) 8 Apr 87 (D+5):

(a) 2/22 Inf: The 2/22 Inf conducted S&D operation in the Michelin Plantation closing base camp at 1800H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): All 2/22 Inf (M) units conductedensive maintenance on vehicles and equipment for entire day. Recon platoon at Camp Rainsford at 0600H.

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(e) 3/22 Inf: A Co secured assigned sector of Da Tlang Base Camp. At 1300H B Co moved by convoy to secure Mai Da Dan Gravel Crusher via coord XX260524. B Co elements closed gravel crusher at 1600H and established a defensive perimeter. C Co continued its S&B operations in Mai Da Dan Rubber Plantation. At 1400H C Co found and destroyed 3 AP mines via coord XX304437. 2 UR VMA werecharted off at 1515H from a LZ via coord XX309457 when Co C elements detonated two AP mines. Four additional mines were found and evacuated via coord XX309453. C Co closed Da Tlang Base Camp at 1530H and reported no further contact.

(a) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB from Da Tlang Base Camp.

(b) 9 Apr 67 (D-46):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A departed Da Tlang by convoy to secure Tay Ninh West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission at Mai Da Dan Gravel Crusher. C Co departed Da Tlang by truck at 0630H for PBB KHE via coord XX307454. Co secured PBB KHE at 0807H and secured LZ 26 from Tay Ninh to AJ via coord XX372423. At 1700H C Co's 3d platoon found and destroyed two hundred pounds of plastic sheeting via coord XX304473. At 2040H 3d platoon's entrench via coord XX306452 detected movement and called in artillery with unknown results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB mission from Da Tlang Base Camp.

(e) 1/5 Inf (N): GPODE 3d Plt, conducted S&B operations in conjunction with 36th ARW Ranger 17, Langveng at XX307335.

(f) 10 Apr 67 (D-47):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co assumed responsibility for security for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter and laterite pit via coord XX324457 at 1000H. B Co's 3d platoon was attached to A Co at 1030H. 1 BN from A Co was accidentally struck and killed by a low flying C-130 while scanning a bunker on Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter. B Co continued security mission for Mai Da Dan Gravel Crusher. C Co continued security mission for PBB KHE and LZ 26 from Tay Ninh to AJ via coord XX372423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB mission from Da Tlang Base Camp.

(e) 1/5 Inf (N): Conducted S&B operations with 36th ARW Ranger 17, captured 1 VC8 (female) at XX306454, destroyed 30 lbs of rice, 1 weapon at XX306455. Captured 1 German Mauser rifle.

(f) 11 April 67 (D-48):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0430H 2/22 Inf (N) with attachments Co C 2/12 Armor and 1st platoon G-4 Bn Bnps displaced from Da Tlang and Saat Da via convoy XX306457 and moved via coord XX372400 to secure an area for 3d Platoon CP and an LZ for 2/22 Inf. 2/22 Inf (N) moved along the HHR providing security for 3d Platoon CP and Co A 2/77 Arty, clearing the HHR between Saat Da and PBB KHE. Co B moved to advanced point to guard to

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coord AT274523 and then followed Co A 2/22 Inf to secure AT2 0452 and secured the road back to the rear elements. Co C 2/22 Inf received security for the AT2 CP and P Co 2/22 Inf. At 0700 2/22 Inf, Co A 2/22 Inf closed PBB EME. 1/2/74 Armor destroyed one T-54 and one T-62. The tanks closed PBB EME. 1/2/74 Armor destroyed one T-54 and one T-62 and the tanks closed PBB EME. 1/2/74 Armor destroyed one T-54 and one T-62 and the other AT 2/22 Inf closed AT274523. At 1400 2/22 Inf moved to the Phu Nhieu area and via coord AT274523 to perform a security mission for elements of 2/22 Inf to move elements to Suoi Da at 1200H. These elements closed Suoi Da at 1200H.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter. While B Co continued security mission for AT2 0452 and the rear elements. At 1030H a 3 Co reconnaissance patrol detained three T-54 via coord AT274523. At 1100H a second 3 Co reconnaissance patrol apprehended one female T-54 via coord AT274523. All detainees were evacuated to Tay Ninh West by helicopter at 1300H. Team Charlie continued security mission of PBB EME and AT2 26 from Tay Ninh to AT2 via coord AT274523.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty minus 3 Btry, moved by convoy to Suoi Da (AT274523). From Suoi Da, 2/77 Arty moved into PBB EME (AT274523) near to Pek Kick Special Forces Camp and had the assigned mission of DB of the 36th ARVN Ranger Bn. The Headquarters and Btry A continued by convoy to PBB EME (AT274700), escorted by the 2/21 Inf (A) and was joined by 3/2/13 Arty which was attached. 4/2/77 was assigned the mission of DB of 2/12 Inf and 5/2/13 Arty DB of 2/22 Inf (A). 3/2/13 Arty was attached and replaced 5/2/13 Arty at PBB CUCOLINE (AT274523).

(e) 1/5th Inf (N): Secured 36th ARVN Ranger IP to Tay Ninh, reverted to CRCON parent unit at 1200H.

(52) 12 Apr 67 (D+9):

(a) 2/22 Inf: The 3d (-) airlifted from Da Nang to Suoi Da via coord AT274523. They then airlifted from Suoi Da to AT2 via coord AT274523 at 1130H. 3d Operations were conducted in AD COOLIE.

(b) 2/22 Inf (A): At 0730H Co C departed to secure 12 PBB EME. At 0715H Co C departed on a SBD operations. At 0815H Co C upon completion of mission, 12 PBB EME, performed SBD operations. At 0815H via coord AT2056095 the 2nd Air sorties were flown on a suspected VC camp. Two 500 lb bombs were dropped via coord AT2056095 during this strike. At 1000H CP displaced to a new location via coord AT274700. Co C was relieved of its SBD mission to provide security for this move. At 1100H Co B discovered 1 hut containing 100 lbs of polished rice via coord AT247692. The rice and hut were destroyed. At 1700H Co B closed at the new CP location.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter. B Co continued security mission for 1/1 in Da Gravel Crusher. Co C continued security mission for PBB EME and AT2 26 from Tay Ninh to AT2 via coord AT274523.

(d) 2/77 Arty (-): Continued support with 3 Btry at Camp Rinder, 4 Btry and CP at PBB EME (AT274700), C Btry at PBB OIL. 4/2/77 Arty was at PBB CUCOLINE, 5/2/13 at PBB EME.

(e) C/4 Engs: Assisted in establishing PBB EME.

(f) 2/34 Arvns: CRCON 3d Bn, attached platoon to 3d Bn, remained at Suoi Da.

(53) 13 Apr 67 (D+10):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued move to PBB EME and closed at 1215H. Assisted defense of PBB EME, conducted SBD in AD COOLIE. CP at AT274692.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (N): All Bn elements performed maintenance until 0900H. At 0900H S&D operations were conducted in AO PARTNER. At 0935H Co A via coord XT223719 discovered and destroyed one hut and one bicycle. They captured 1 model 40 rifle, 1 Phillips radio, 15 lbs of documents, 10 lbs miscellaneous ammunition, practice grenades, a pistol and various homemade items. At 1130H via coord XT207730, Co C discovered and destroyed 1 hut and five 1 man bunkers. At 1300H via coord XT231717 Co A discovered a VC base camp and captured 20 lbs of miscellaneous gear (clothing, parachute material and soap). All elements closed laager sites by 1730H.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued security of Tay Ninh West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission for Muoi Ba Don Gravel Cruiser via coord XT260574. Team Charlie continued security mission for PBB 242 via coord XT373423 and secured LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ via coord XT373423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/34 Armor: Continued to secure Bn 1 Bn.

(54) 14 Apr 67 (D+51):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of PBB 242, conducted local S&D operations, destroyed one bicycle at XT290708.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0730H Co A departed its laager area for S&D operations. At 0737H Co C departed CP location for S&D operations. At 0910H Co B departed CP location for S&D operations. Prior to this time, this unit performed maintenance in the laager areas. At 1040H via coord XT229704 Co A discovered 1 hut which was destroyed. At 1110H CP Group secured by the Bn Recon pit displaced to via coord XT212747. The Recon pit then conducted S&D operations in Bn AO. At 1220H via coord XT067765 Co C found and destroyed 100 rds of cal .30 ammunition. At 1700H via coord XT190714 the Bn Recon pit discovered and destroyed 1 hut, 2 bunkers and 1 foxhole.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co's 2d pit ambush patrol, reported hearing movement via coord XT108526 at 0300H. At 0457H the patrol engaged movement with the following results: 1 VC KIA (EC), 2 VC WIA (Confirmed) and 1 AK-47 captured. Ambush patrol closed Tay Ninh West at 0710H and reported no further contact. B Co continued security of Muoi Ba Don Gravel Cruiser. Team Charlie continued security mission for PBB 242 and LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ via coord XT373423.

(d) 2/34 Armor: Continued security of Bn 1 Bn, no contact. A/2/34 Armor remained under OPFOR 3d Bn for security Bn 1 Bn, in reverted OPFOR parent unit.

(e) 2/77 Arty (c): Moved PBB 242 to XT307077, loaded and ready to fire at 1000H. At 1330H A Party received 75 rds 105mm mortar fire and small ground attacks. Defensive fires and air strikes caused enemy to break contact. One building was damaged, 4 CS WIA, 1h CBB WIA.

(55) 15 Apr 67 (D+52):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of PBB 242, conducted S&D operations locating a deserted base camp at XT290708, destroyed 6 rifle grenades with strip cartridge, 2 rolls fine wire.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0800H Bn Recon pit began search and destroy operations. At 1100H via coord XT290725 Bn Recon pit discovered a base camp surrounded by a trench system. Within the base camp they discovered 6 huts, 1 containing 20 bundles of unpolished rice. Other units of the Bn remained at the CP location, via coord XT212747, for maintenance, training and establishment of daylight patrols.

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(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Day Ninh Base Camp perimeter. A Co also conducted the last RTO mission for control AT 0600. It reported no contact and the RTO was successful. Co continued security mission for Day Ninh to RTO via coord X22605714. Co C secured Day Ninh via coord X223712 and RTO 26 from Tay Ninh to RTO via coord X237411.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB, 3d RTO.

(e) 2/34 Armor (-): Continued security of Suoi Da.

(56) 16 Apr 67 (D+5):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of PBB EDM. A Co destroyed 2 tons of unpolished rice at X2264717. B Co made contact with estimated VC squad and located extensive tunnel system at X2264600.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0730 hrs Co A departed the CP location for SBD operations. In conjunction with this mission, Co A was to prepare a crossing site via coord X2186714. At 0755 hrs Co C departed the CP location for SBD operations. At 0800H Co B departed the CP location for SBD operations. At 1205H Co A had completed the creek crossing via coord X2236714. At 1310H Co A via coord X2283776 discovered three Bloody guerilla bandages. At 1425H they discovered an old base camp via coord X2226773. The camp contained 8 huts, and 7 bunkers which were destroyed. It appeared the huts had not been occupied for a long period of time. At 1807H all Bn elements had closed the Bn CP location upon completion of SBD operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Night ambush patrol from Co 4 reported hearing an ox cart approaching ambush site via coord X2134555. 4.2 inch mortar fire was called in via coord X2115553 with unknown results. B Co continued security mission for RTO via Don Gravel Crusher via coord X22605714. Co C established and secured PBB EDM via coord X220592 and continued security for LZ 26 from Tay Ninh to RTO via coord X237423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB, 3d RTO.

(57) 17 Apr 67 (D+6):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Bn (-) continued to secure PBB EDM and conduct SBD operations in LC COUGAR. The Recon plt of the 2/12 Inf initially attached to C Btry 2/77 Arty at PBB OAK at coord X2274775. Co B made contact with 4 VC at coord X2264600 resulting in 1 US WIA and 2 VC casualties. They also found a base camp at X2264775 recently used including bunkers with trench system.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0600H units departed the CP location via coord X2230000 for SBD operations. The Bn Recon plt remained behind for CP security. At 1415H Co B reported bunkers over looking a trail, via coord X2223797 to X2224795 and bunkers with overhead cover coord X2223797 and X2226803. At 1415H Co C reported sighting 3 VC in the open via coord X2246820. At the same time Co B reported discovery of a base camp via coord X2203617 which was approximately half destroyed by previous air strikes. At 1400H Co B sighted a complex of trench lines via coord X2233903.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Day Ninh West Base Camp while B Co continued security for RTO via Don Gravel Crusher via coord X22605714. A reconnaissance patrol from Co F approached 2 ANZL ARVN, and 1 VC via coord X2274557. Co C continued security mission for PBB EDM via coord X220592 and RTO 26 from Day Ninh to RTO via coord X237423.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB mission.

(58) 18 Apr 67 (D+7):

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(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued security of PSS BM and conducted PSS operations. One 105mm mortar round was fired from small arms while security was maintained by PSS BM and BM. No hits were found on anything.

(b) 2/22 Inf (A): Continued PSS operations in 10 PANTHER. In Room pit provided CP on 10 PANTHER. By 0700 all elements had cleared the CP location and moved 121000Z. At 0700 via board 121000Z Co B reported passing through a VC hospital complex which had been destroyed by Co A on 29 Nov 66. There were no signs of activity since that time. At 1005N via board 121002Z Co B received small arms fire from 2 to 3 VC resulting in 1 US WIA. This enemy was engaged by fire with negative results. At the same time a Co B APC (HILL) detonated a mine resulting in negative casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1055 hrs via board 121003Z Co B encountered a command detonated mine which exploded in front of the APC and caused no casualties or damage. At 1200 hrs via board 121002Z Co B received small arms fire while checking out a trench line. At 1200 hrs a Co B APC (HILL) detonated a mine with no casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1255 hrs the CP Group 2/22 Inf and the 10 Room pit began displacing toward via board 121007Z. At 1255N the lead element (A Room APC (HILL)) detonated a mine and immediately received small arms fire and rounds from an RPG II. Results of the action were one US WIA, five US WNs, and unknown enemy casualties. 2 APC's had minor damage caused by mine and RPG hits. At 1300 hrs via board 121008Z Co B received more small arms fire while checking a hut resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1400 hrs via board 121008Z Co B discovered an extensive base camp area containing approximately 15 huts, 3 classrooms, and documents which indicated the camp could be an old signal school. There was an estimated 500 feet of trench system in and around the complex. The VC employed approximately 12 command detonated explosives or booby traps as Co B entered the area. This included a rifle grenade which was used against an APC. An estimated 8 to 12 VC were in the area. At 1500 hrs Co A was ordered to move first and link up with Co B. Upon link up at 1515 hrs both units completed a thorough search of the base camp without incident and returned to the CP location via board 121002Z at approximately 1705 hrs. Co C linked up with the CP group and Room pit at the area of contact, and proceeded to the new CP location via board 121002Z closing in the early afternoon.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued security mission for Day Shift West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission for Day Shift Base Gravel Crusher via board 121005Z. Team Charlie continued security mission for PSS C, 2011PSS via board 121005Z and LTL 26 from Day Shift to N via board 121002Z.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued PSS mission.

(59) 19 Apr 67 (D+46):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued PSS, security of PSS BM with no contacts.

(b) 2/22 Inf (A): 2/22 Inf (A) displaced to PSS BM via board 121002Z.

(c) 2/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Day Shift West while B Co secured Day Shift Base Gravel Crusher. Co C secured PSS C, 2011PSS via board 121005Z and LTL 26 from Day Shift to N via board 121002Z.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued PSS 3d Rds.

(60) 20 Apr 67 (D+47):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Day Shift (-) helilifted from PSS BM to Camp Relocation, Room helilifted from PSS C, 2011PSS to Camp Relocation. Day Shift (-) cleared at 0900 hrs.

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1. **Q:** *What is the best way to learn English grammar?*

**A:** *There is no best way to learn English grammar. The best way is to practice as much as possible. You can read English books, watch English movies, and listen to English music. You can also practice writing English sentences and paragraphs. The more you practice, the better you will become at understanding and using English grammar.*

2. **Q:** *What are the most common mistakes made by non-native English speakers?*

**A:** *Non-native English speakers often make mistakes in verb tense, verb conjugation, and verb agreement. They also often struggle with prepositions, articles, and pronouns. Additionally, they may have difficulty with idiomatic expressions and colloquial language. It's important to practice and seek feedback to improve these areas.*

3. **Q:** *How can I improve my English pronunciation?*

**A:** *To improve your English pronunciation, you can listen to native speakers and practice repeating their words. You can also use pronunciation guides and apps to help you learn the correct sounds and intonation. It's important to practice regularly and seek feedback from native speakers to refine your pronunciation.*

4. **Q:** *What are some effective ways to learn English vocabulary?*

**A:** *There are many effective ways to learn English vocabulary. You can read English books, watch English movies, and listen to English music. You can also practice writing English sentences and paragraphs. The more you practice, the better you will become at understanding and using English grammar.*

5. **Q:** *What are the most common mistakes made by non-native English speakers?*

**A:** *Non-native English speakers often make mistakes in verb tense, verb conjugation, and verb agreement. They also often struggle with prepositions, articles, and pronouns. Additionally, they may have difficulty with idiomatic expressions and colloquial language. It's important to practice and seek feedback to improve these areas.*

6. **Q:** *How can I improve my English pronunciation?*

**A:** *To improve your English pronunciation, you can listen to native speakers and practice repeating their words. You can also use pronunciation guides and apps to help you learn the correct sounds and intonation. It's important to practice regularly and seek feedback from native speakers to refine your pronunciation.*

7. **Q:** *What are some effective ways to learn English vocabulary?*

**A:** *There are many effective ways to learn English vocabulary. You can read English books, watch English movies, and listen to English music. You can also practice writing English sentences and paragraphs. The more you practice, the better you will become at understanding and using English grammar.*

8. **Q:** *What are the most common mistakes made by non-native English speakers?*

**A:** *Non-native English speakers often make mistakes in verb tense, verb conjugation, and verb agreement. They also often struggle with prepositions, articles, and pronouns. Additionally, they may have difficulty with idiomatic expressions and colloquial language. It's important to practice and seek feedback to improve these areas.*

9. **Q:** *How can I improve my English pronunciation?*

**A:** *To improve your English pronunciation, you can listen to native speakers and practice repeating their words. You can also use pronunciation guides and apps to help you learn the correct sounds and intonation. It's important to practice regularly and seek feedback from native speakers to refine your pronunciation.*

10. **Q:** *What are some effective ways to learn English vocabulary?*

**A:** *There are many effective ways to learn English vocabulary. You can read English books, watch English movies, and listen to English music. You can also practice writing English sentences and paragraphs. The more you practice, the better you will become at understanding and using English grammar.*

11/11/1959 by 20. Transferred by 2/22/60 and 6/27/60 to 2nd in 1st year other elements of the institution in carrying back to base camp. Spur 2 was released from attachment.

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## (b) Equipment Destroyed

	Left	Right
11. 7 lbs bread	7 lbs oil	12.5 lbs fish
7 lbs flour	5 lbs flour	10 lbs spice
11.9 lbs rice	10 lbs rice	10 lbs sugar
1 lbs 10 lbs flour	5 lbs flour	8 gal fish oil
20 lbs rice	100 lbs water oil	260.8 tons rice
1 case 10 lbs bread		5 cans beans
1 triangular tent	Books	4000 lbs peas
14 lbs Tha 10		20 gal popper
1 M1 destroyed by fire	5 cans cat meat	10 gal beans
1 200 lbs bread	6 pieces	100 gal lard
20 2.75m rootlets	7 shovels	7 cans creature
<u>Structures</u>	<u>Books</u>	150 lbs assorted food
197 huts	13 sheets tin	10 gal milk
768 houses	200 bale salt	7 lbs candy
3000 pencil sticks	50 aluminum plates	30 lbs sausages
6 fast bridges	100 burlap bags	60 gal cooking oil
3 latrines	42 gal beer	60 gal shrimp
1000 meters brooms	1 stove	60 gal sausages
6 walls	4 crates soap	30 lbs peas
<u>Transportation</u>	25 aluminum pots	22 pieces
10 bicycles	10 plastic bags	26 chickens
175 lbs zinc bicycle parts	800 white carbon paper	50 lbs tobacco
2 cases bicycle parts	50 harmonicas	10 lbs salt
5 weapons	1 flashlight	30 lbs flour
10 lbs zinc carrying rocks	1 steel pot	200 fish
1 set carts	4 cans ink	
	20 rolls printing oil	

## PAGE II

## (a) US Losses

(b) Personnel: 4) 22, 72, 100, 7 MIA (Non-hostile)

## (c) Equipment

WEAPONS

2 Quad 20 cal H2 destroyed  
 2 105mm Howitzers destroyed  
 9 105mm Howitzers damaged  
 1 100mm how destroyed w/limp  
 5 M16 rifles  
 20 M16 rifles

GUNS

1 47mm bazooka  
 1 82mm mortar destroyed  
 2 82mm mortars destroyed  
 2 82mm mortars destroyed  
 2 100mm mortars destroyed

## (a) Army Losses

(b) Personnel: 47 22 (20), 216 72 100 (Non), 10 72, 3 100, 100

## (c) Equipment Destroyed

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12 13 14  
15 16 17  
18 19 20  
19 20 21 22  
23 24 25 26

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30, 75 rdz SA memo  
 610 AD rdz AFM II  
 1940 stick grenades  
 117 concussion grenades  
 31 rdz 75mm HE  
 7 rdz 57mm HE  
 4 4.2" mort rdz  
 70 40mm anti-aircraft  
 3 Chickas booty traps  
 1 LC 14th AT memo  
 30 Element rdz  
 2 hand & 2000 4" mines  
 5 4.2" min  
 2 110 L.P.  
 9 1000 detonators  
 200 M16 2" grenades  
 4 M72 2" rdz  
 2 CBU bomblets  
 6 60mm mort rdz

Page 1

17 pigs  
1000 lbs  
100 lbs of bacon  
125 lbs of lard and cooking oil  
5 lbs of dried meat  
75 lbs of dried fish  
45 lbs of cans of monchitas  
sardines

9761

2200 lbs web gear and equipment  
5 gal fuel  
1 four liter can  
1 shot f-1000  
55 gal oil can  
2 gas tanks  
3 carb stoves  
1 bicycle

Манда

12 RPG II  
 26 RPG  
 40 AK-47  
 3 US 12 ga shotguns  
 18 US BAR  
 5 M-14  
 12.7 MM machine guns  
 10 RPG Captured  
 1 RPG pistol  
 1 RPG  
 1 M-16  
 1 M-19  
 13 Chinese 7.62  
 20 MG M132  
 2 Hand made carbines  
 1 RPG captured  
 1 AK-47 captured  
 2 German assault  
 6 Mortars (40 mm)

- 6 "amm" and receiver groups
- 1000 m
- 1 Sawed-off pistol
- 1 7.62 rifle
- 6 hand made body traps (1 lb  
each)

87

3 bicycles  
1 mg fish  
10 tons rice  
5 gal oil  
100 lbs salt water and equipment

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2007 January 25, 1977

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(2) Equipment to transport 11 boats, 11 trailers, 10,370 lbs rice, 1 bushel fish, 1 sponge, 3 AT mines, 16 lbs salt, 6 formulas, 3 bicycles, 6 rifle cartridges, 6 carbined cartridges, 1 pistol, 2 rolls fine wire, 15 shovels, 1 175 cu. ft. 250 cu. ft. 11 shovels, 27 CBB bags, 3 carmine grenades, 1 box 50 cal. amm.

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(1) During Phase I of the operation, the 3-1 section maintained a forward element with the forward assault group. The officer provided information required to the forward assault group and the assault group and supplied to the forward area. The assault group received all information required, passing such information to the rear elements for redistribution to their quarters. The majority of the 3-1 functions were performed in the rear areas, with only the reconnaissance and action reporting to the CO's structure being forward.

**3. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS**

**(1) Phase I, 17 Mar - 17 Apr 67**

During the first of the operation, the 3-1 section maintained a forward element with the forward assault group. The officer provided information required to the forward assault group and the assault group and supplied to the forward area. The assault group received all information required, passing such information to the rear elements for redistribution to their quarters. The majority of the 3-1 functions were performed in the rear areas, with only the reconnaissance and action reporting to the CO's structure being forward.

**(2) Phase II, 18 Mar - 7 Apr 67**

During the second phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 3-1 section maintained a unit from the forward areas but performed all functions at the front. All reports were to be orally transmitted to the rear areas necessary action was accomplished. As a result of the numerous organizations within the Battle of Baoi Tre, one mortuary clerk was separated and reported from the 25th Infantry Division to support the 3-1 section. This lowered the expenditures and decreased processing of approximately 200 separate casualty reports.

**(3) Phase III, 8-30 April 1967**

In Phase II, the 3-1 section was not from the forward base camp at the front. Due to infrequent contact with the enemy, no casualties were taken and no problems encountered in casualty reporting. Actions regarding the forward command post of capture or replacement were forwarded by courier to the rear area Command Major.

(4) Comments: Since most administrative actions are accomplished in the rear, there does not appear to be a requirement to have more than one officer and one 3-1 with the forward elements on operation. Casualty reports are to be orally processed when forwarded directly to the rear area command post.

**b. Supply: Operation JUNCTION CITY Phases I, II and III.**

During Phase I of JUNCTION CITY all classes of supply were issued through the PIA located at Trac 10. The Bridge teams were also located at Trac 10. Distribution to the forward areas was made by hand and RIF.

During Phase II of JUNCTION CITY all classes of supply (except Class III and Class V (Priority only)) were issued through the PIA by RIF. A Class III and Class V (Priority only) PIA was set up at Trac 10. A survey was discontinued daily to Trac 10 for pick up of necessary supplies.

During Phase III all resupply was by air from the Phuoc. No problems in the resupply areas were experienced during the operation.

**c. Maintenance**

(1) During Phase I of Operation JUNCTION CITY, a forward element from Co 4, PIA 10 located in the PIA to support AT-4, assault and automotive equipment. Repair parts were received from the rear area at the front. All priority repair parts were drawn from Co 10 of the Phuoc, to the rear areas.

(2) During Phase II & III of Operation JUNCTION CITY support was performed from the rear area at the Phuoc. All maintenance was returned to the 1/12 and conducted at the Phuoc. Repair parts, priority equipment, were sent to the Phuoc, to the rear areas.

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units reported losses.

b. Status of each Class of Supply

(1) During Phase I a three day storage of C-Rations and a one day storage of A-Rations were maintained at the PFCs. During Phase II all Class I was held at Da Nang with 5 days of C-Rations and one day of A-Rations.

(2) Class II is: (Stockage Level)

- (a) IECAS 7 days
- (b) JPA 5 days
- (c) AT 10 days
- (d) PTC 5 days

(3) Class 7: An ASP was maintained at Truoc K. during Phase I. During Phase II the 3d Bn maintained one Class 7 (Army) aero at Da Nang, during Phase III all came over from Da Nang and Lay Vinh by air and overland convoy.

c. Hospitalization and Evacuations

(1) For Operation JUNCTION CITY, beginning 22 Feb 1967, it was decided to move Co A, 25th Medical Bn to the forward logistical base at Truoc K. This company became operational on 24 Feb, replacing Co A, 17th Med Bn which had deployed a medical section at Truoc K for Operation GUARDIAN. Co A, 25th Med Bn was able to deploy a laboratory and dental capability with their medical section in Truoc K. Two aero-ambulances were placed on standby at the medical company location at Truoc K.

(2) Early in Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 3d Bn, functioning as a blocking force, was in a relatively static role. It's operated from fixed CP locations in a fixed T-28. In this configuration, it was possible to locate the battalion aid station and surgeon in the area of the CP in direct support of the tactical units. At Hoc Mieu, where the artillery and an infantry battalion were located, a single aid station was adequate for medical support. Evacuation was primarily by air, the routine and priority patients being returned to Truoc K on resupply helicopters, and to Da Nang via over-the-Dust-Off. In the later phases, units of the brigades in a more mobile role, moving from objective to objective through dense jungle foliage. Consequently it was impractical and time consuming to move the aid station with the infantry units. There was increased reliance on the company aid men who often decided which of the wounded and sick required evacuation. Aid stations were maintained at the forward support level where the CP and artillery were deployed.

(3) JUNCTION CITY II, beginning 18 Mar 1967, presented the brigade with its first mass casualty situation. Early in the battle of 21 Mar 1967, in anticipation of a large number of casualties additional Dust-Off helicopters were requested. A total of four Dust-Off ships were available, ready to enter the landing zone as soon as the tactical situation permitted. These ships plus four resupply ships were used for casualty evacuation. In addition, many casualties were returned to Da Nang on the return flight of resupply helicopters which were taking ammunition and other supplies into the area of operation. Many patients were returned to duty after being treated at the battalion aid station in the forward area. Approximately 110 casualties were evacuated in the action, 94 requiring evacuation to hospitals, including the brigade's medical company in Da Nang.

(4) Medical evacuations and wrecks after the battle of  
Savannakhet were routine and no significant or unusual situations were  
encountered. JUNCTION CITY, Phase III began 8 April 67 and presented  
little problem as to medical evacuation and treatment. The 4th Medical  
Evacuation company returned to base camp at Ban Thong as the need for  
its presence in the field during Phase III was not indicated. Adequate  
medical care and performance was given by the individual battalions and  
brigades. An additional Dust-off was assigned to Tuy Phuoc which  
alleviated the problem of an adequate number of helicopters for eva-  
cuation. There were 10 casualties evacuated during the last phase of  
the operation and no significant delays were encountered.

#### 12. Medical Equipment and Techniques

(a) Special Equipment. Personnel division of a fire support  
team may be greatly enhanced by the addition of pyrotechnic devices  
equivalent to the normal direct fire weapons. These weapons  
are identified to the personnel using the pyrotechnic and are referred  
to as smoke bomb type sections for smoke. Firing one is pyrotechnic  
and kept at the gun port (team). (See Section I, para. 4b of this doc).

The H-570 proved to be satisfactory for烟幕彈 and  
own base support however and which to use during combat. These  
are identified to the personnel using the pyrotechnic and are referred  
to as smoke bomb type sections for smoke. Firing one is pyrotechnic  
and kept at the gun port (team). (See Section I, para. 4b of this doc).

(b) The diesel powered H-34 proved superior to the gasoline  
powered H-34 in all respects.

#### 13. Techniques

(1) An OH-3D helicopter was used to lay smoke via the  
smoke route. Smoke Report Boxes and the like. The helicopter merely  
dropped the smoke wires from the top of the smoke canopy enabling the  
troops to have land line communication very quickly after establishing  
smoke screens.

#### 14. Summary

(a) Speed was found to be most essential in the conduct of  
operations and CPs and PIs in particular. Control center personnel were  
brought to the field just to aid in the conduct of the PIs and in  
CP. Once the bunker was complete they were sent back to base camp.

(b) The use of the countermeasures and ground patrol effectively  
in marking and/or identifying the enemy bunker positions was found to be very  
useful. This is the ultimate advantage of the ground troops over  
airborne troops in the actual destruction of the ground troops.

#### 15. Commander's Analysis

(a) Operations within Ban Thong and Control Area Zone C during the  
three phases of Operation JUNCTION CITY are considered to have been  
highly successful.

The destruction of base camp facilities and capture of  
positions of supplies, documents, communications and weapons were only  
a part of many propaganda, search, hold and combat effectiveness. The  
success in improvement of road net work and construction of landing  
zones will allow future operations in the area.

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The pressure of the initial phases of Phase II, in conjunction with the overall pressure of Operation JUNCTION CITY, caused the enemy to commit his forces in a major battle resulting in the defeat and, to a large extent, the destruction of the combat power of one of the enemy's main force regiments. This was the first major battle in which the Brigade as a whole participated. It removed the confidence of the Brigade in its ability to engage and defeat the best efforts of the enemy and proved the validity of the fundamental principles of security, firepower, and adherence to basic concepts of ground warfare.

b. Lessons Learned

(1) (a) Item: Engineer work party security.

(b) Discussion: Engineer work parties have been subjected to ambushes and sniping because security forces were too far away.

(c) Observation: Security forces must be with the lead elements (usually mine clearing teams) and on either flank to be effective. Reconnaissance by fire (artillery and small arms) works very well during road clearing operations.

(2) (a) Item: Mixed Landing Zones.

(b) Discussion: Many LZ's and potential LZ's were booby-trapped with command-detonated charges. Charges varied from bombs (up to 750 lbs), to claymore mines, to 155, 105, 82 and 81mm shells. Usually a small permanent force guards the LZ and is prepared to detonate the mines as helicopter lands.

(c) Observation: A heavy artillery preparation frequently causes the party to leave or will destroy the wires of command detonated devices. When discovered command detonated mines should be destroyed in the following manner:

1. Cut all wires leading from charge, one at a time.
2. Tie wires together. Use Western Union pig tail tie.
3. Blow charges in place by placing C-4 (Usually ribbon charge) on top so that main force of charge will be down into the ground.

For Lessons Learned, Battle of Suoi Tre,  
See Annex D.

FOR THE COMMANDER

*John S. S. 1/16, 9/*  
COLIN M. MORRIS  
Major, Infantry  
Adjutant

5 Annexes

Annex A - Operation JUNCTION - Phase-I } Withdrawn at 0900 SA

Annex B - Operation JUNCTION - Phase-II } Withdrawn at 0900 SA

(0 indicated)

Annex C - Operation JUNCTION - Phase-III Withdrawn at 0900 SA

Annex D - Lessons Learned, Battle of Suoi Tre

Annex E - Photographs, Battle of Suoi Tre Withdrawn at 0900 SA  
(Selected copies only)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE  
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO US FORCES WO288

AVBDC-C

31 MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned "Battle of Suel Tre."

TO: CG, 25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: S-3 AVBDC-C

1. 3d Bn, 22d Infantry.

a. Item: "Stand to" Formation.

Discussion: In accordance with SOP the battalion conducted a 100% alert thirty minutes prior to DWT and began a perimeter sweep to clear the area of possible infiltrators. This action probably triggered the enemy attack. At the time, the Battalion was at 100% alert and this was critical in blunting the first assault.

Observation: Conducting stand to and perimeter sweeps continues to be one of the most important security measures.

b. Item: Conduct of security patrols.

Discussion: Around the base camp at PSC GOLD there were two reinforced squad size ambush patrols and OP/LP positions in front of each platoon. One patrol did hear and report noise at 0435 hours which alerted the battalion. More patrols observing the enemy would possibly have fixed the avenue of approach and enabled us to spoil his attack with artillery.

Observation: Saturation patrolling is necessary for early warning. A squad size patrol from each company, OP/LP's in front of each platoon, and platoon size ambush on the primary avenue of approach is recommended.

c. Item: Reaction force.

Discussion: The Bn reaction force consisted of the Reconnaissance platoon and elements from the 2d Bn, 77th Artillery. The enemy attack, once initiated, was vigorous and determined. There was little time for any reaction before the base camp was heavily engaged. The reaction force had been rehearsed the night prior to the attack. They were committed and were able to blunt one penetration and reestablish the perimeter.

Observation: A ready reaction force proved to be a vital asset. To be effective they must be rehearsed and available with equipment immediately at hand. Areas of responsibility and signals must be rehearsed.

d. Item: Planned artillery concentrations.

Discussion: Very quickly after the assault was initiated artillery concentrations were needed within 30 meters of the perimeter. There was some delay in getting this fire as there were no preplanned fires this close.

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SOLICITED AT 3 YRS. INF. DIV. 19  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS  
207 DIR 320C.1

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Observation: Preplanned fires should be planned within 10 meters of the defensive perimeter. Preplanned fires should be adjusted as close as troop safety permits during initial organization of the defense and even closer concentrations should be plotted and on call.

2. 2d Bn, 12th Infantry.

a. Item: Fire coordination between units closing during relief of area under attack.

Discussion: During movement to PSB GOLD on 21 March 67 it was necessary for the lead element of 2/12 Inf to shift from its original course during final phase of units closing. There was some difficulty encountered in coordinating fires as the reinforcing elements closed on PSB GOLD.

Observation: Aerial observers can eliminate problems of fire coordination. It is advisable to have one per battalion.

b. Item: Use of established trails during movement to provide relief to units under attack.

Discussion: Upon receipt of warning order to provide a force to reinforce units under attack at PSB GOLD on 21 Mar 67, 2/12 Inf formed to move out. The battalion perimeter then came under attack by indirect fire from VC mortars (at that time it was of undetermined origin). Co C moved out immediately by the most direct route avoiding established trails. They were followed by the remainder of the battalion. Co C encountered sniper and mortar fire enroute to PSB GOLD but did not meet a large enemy force. By avoiding established trails units of 2/12 Inf were not effectively blocked in moving toward PSB GOLD. There is every indication from the mortar attack just when the battalion started to move that the enemy had located the 2/12 Inf and had anticipated their attempt to reinforce. If an enemy blocking force was used, they were not in the heavy jungle but were on the main avenues of approach. They were not able to significantly delay or block the advance of the 2/12 Inf.

3. 2d Bn, 77th Artillery.

a. Item: Artillery Inner Perimeter.

Discussion: Even with Infantry support around the artillery element, an inner perimeter is developed within the infantry perimeter. This inner perimeter consists of fighting holes close to the howitzers and the PDC bunkers. This perimeter is not manned, but is available in case of ground attack for the artillerymen to fight from and protect their howitzers and PDC.

Observation: When the infantry was hit by the mass assault, the inner perimeter gave the infantry a secondary position to fall back to. At the inner perimeter the artillerymen were also available to beef up the fighting line. Use of the howitzers in direct fire could also be effected when the inner perimeter was manned.

b. Item: Use of Beehive in Direct Fire.

Discussion: After coordination between the infantry security and the artillery, the time came when the need for beehive was essential to hold the enemy. The infantry had fallen back to the howitzer positions or taken cover into their own foxholes to avoid the blast and the flechettes. Because of the close range of the enemy waves the fuses were set at muzzle action.

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Observation: The booby trap was extremely effective in stopping the assaulting enemy troops. Later there were numerous bodies found that had been killed by the fuses of the booby trap. It stopped everything in its path. An after action was the preparation of preplanned booby concentrations for all howitzers. If the Infantry and the individual howitzer sections had the data for those concentrations, they would have called for them by target number depending on what portion of the perimeter needed them. Reaction time would have been reduced.

c. Item: Artillery Reaction Force.

Discussion: The artillery battalion had two (2) reaction forces of 10-15 men each for use in strengthening the perimeter, both were needed. During the attack both reaction forces were committed to strengthen the infantry perimeter. Everyone on the reaction force must know the signal to assemble, where to assemble, and exactly how to maneuver out to the weakened portion of the perimeter.

Observation: Rehearsals are essential in the assembly and deployment of the reaction force and the reaction force was rehearsed the evening before the attack of LZ GOLD. This rehearsal proved invaluable as both the assembly and deployment went very swiftly and smoothly. Also each group should be armed with several M-79 Grenade launcher and numerous hand grenades as both proved invaluable in holding off the assaults.

d. Item: Placement of Artillery for Mutual Support.

Discussion: Each artillery position should have artillery within range to support that position. The mutually supporting units can fire in the defensive concentrations for each other, fire the counter-mortar targets for each other, and fire in general support in case of ground attack.

Observation: The 105mm Howitzer battery within supporting range of the PAB provided the primary artillery support, firing nearly 1100 rounds in less than four hours with most of it in the first 90 minutes. It was instrumental in the defense of the artillery position, and may have been the extra punch needed to prevent an enemy penetration.

e. Item: Shields of the 105mm Howitzers.

Discussion: Because of the air-mobile concept in the movement of 105mm howitzers, shields have been removed to reduce the weight. During the attack on the artillery position the howitzers proved to be a prime target of the enemy. Both recoilless rifle rounds and small arms fire were used very extensively against the howitzers. Had the shields been on the howitzer, the crewmen would have been afforded more protection and there would have been fewer friendly casualties.

Observation: The extra weight involved with keeping the howitzer shields attached can be compensated for by leaving back several non-essential items of equipment. This policy has been initiated and one lift with shields has been made with no problems.

f. Item: Use of hand grenades and grenade launchers (M-79) in fighting off an attacking force.

Discussion: The most effective small arms weapon in stopping the attacking force was the M-79 grenade launcher. Hand grenades were also very effective. The terrain was extremely favorable hence the enemy had natural cover in his approach to our position. The grenade launcher and hand grenades were used very effectively against the attacking enemy.

Observation: The small arms basic load of ammunition for the howitzer battery should be adjusted to double the number of M-79 grenade launchers and hand grenades. Extra grenades and small arms ammo should be stored where it is easily accessible and close to the fighting holes.

h. Item: Storage of ammunition adjacent to howitzers.

Discussion: All ammunition in an artillery position should be broken down and stored at the howitzer positions. Under heavy attack, it is very difficult to get to an ammunition storage area. The ammunition should also be placed in a bunker for protection. Much of our ammunition was ruined by fire and several rounds detonated at the gun positions.

Observation: As quickly as an ammunition resupply comes in it should be stored at the howitzer positions. Bunkers with overhead sandbag cover should be constructed at each position to protect the ammunition.

4. 2d Bn 22d Infantry + 2d Bn 34th Armor:

a. Item: Speed and shock action in the attack.

Discussion: Once the enemy had committed himself to the battle the reinforcing armor and mechanized forces were employed with as much speed as possible. They entered PSC GOLD taking full advantage of their speed and shock action.

Observation: The tactic of firepower and shock action was again proved effective as all the mechanized elements were brought into use and none were neutralized despite the number of anti-tank weapons available to the enemy. (Over 30 RPG-7 weapons and nearly 11 rounds of ammunition).

5. General.

a. Item: Reinforcement time.

Discussion: Once ordered to move to reinforce PSC GOLD the commanders of the reinforcing battalions (2/12 Inf, 2/22 Inf (W), and 2/34 Armor) pressed to the attack without allowing their elements to go sidetracked, slowed down or engaged with enemy delaying actions.

Observation: The aggressiveness of the Battalion Commanders in moving to the scene of the battle enabled the Brigade to turn a well fought defensive action into a timely offense and substantial victory.

6. Summary:

With the exception of some techniques in the use of the Boe-Miva round there were no new or startling lessons learned as a result of the Battle of Suoi Tre. Rather, the value of the essentials of pre-planning, rehearsing, preparing positions, and proper training to insure that every man can properly accomplish his assigned mission constitute the lesson of the Battle of Suoi Tre. The principles of security, surprise, mass, and the importance of commanders at all levels remaining mission oriented are as applicable in guerrilla warfare as in conventional warfare.