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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Junction City  
conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

(U) (8)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Junction City. Operation Junction City was conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division during the period 22 February - 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to ensure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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as

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 11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)  
 Commanding Officers  
 5th Battalion, 46th Infantry  
 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry  
 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry  
 31st Engineer Battalion (Chc)  
 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)


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# 89 ADE, 4TH INF DIV



## AFTER ACTION REPORT

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1. IIC-6

12 May 1967

2. IIC-7 Combat Operations After Action Report. (U)

TO: Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AG of S, D  
APO San Francisco 96225

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I, II, III.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Phase I 0000Z Feb 67 - 172400 Mar 67,  
Phase II 1800Z Mar 67 - 072400 Apr 67, Phase III 0000Z Apr - 202400 Apr 67.

3. (U) LOCATION:

Phase I Western War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province  
Phase II Western War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province  
Phase III Central War Zone C, Tay Ninh Province and Western Binh  
Dong Province

4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

5. (C) COMMANDERS:

3d Bn, 4th Inf Div	Col Marshall B. Orth
2d Bn, 12th Inf	LTC Joe F. Elliott
2d Bn, 22d Inf (M)	LTC Ralph W. Julian
3d Bn, 22d Inf	LTC John A. Bender (To 6 Apr)
	LTC James R. Wilner (8 Apr to present)
1st Bn, 5th Inf (M)	LTC Richard C. Rogers
2d Bn, 16th Inf	LTC Charles A. Gillis
2d Bn, 16th Assn (-)	LTC Raymond L. Stalley
2d Bn, 77th Arty	LTC Walter E. Rahn (To 15 Mar)
	LTC Jack A. Veeney (15-24 Mar)
	LTC Fred J. Harvitt (24 Mar - )
C Bn, 1st Bn, 9th Arty (Obs)	CPT John L. Overly (11-15 Mar)
B Bn, 2d Bn, 13th Arty (Obs)	CPT Samuel R. Hite (17 Mar - 8 Apr)

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3 May, 2d Bn, 11th Arty  
(1000)

CPT  
C/S May - 7 Arty

C Coy 2/70 Cav

CPT Douglas Barr

1st Support Bn (Prov)

MAJ Richard M. Hoover

Co 1, 1st Engr Bn

CPT Carl E. Sciple

Co 2, 27th Engr

CPT Johnson R. Kohler

Co C, 53rd Engr

CPT Robert T. Howard

1st LPSO

2LT Robert D. Pomeroy

3d Plt, 4th MP Co

2LT Jerry Reed

6. (C) TASK ORIENTATION:

a. Phase Ia

2/72 Inf  
1 Bn, 11th LPSO  
2 Bn, 27th Engr

1st Control  
Co A, 2/72 Inf (X)  
Co B, 2/72 Engr  
2/77 Arty (AB)  
1 Sq, 4th MP

2/23 Inf (X)  
C/S 1st Cav  
1 Sq, 11th LPSO  
2 Bn, 2/27 Engr

2nd Bn  
2/74 Inf  
C/S 27th Engr  
2/77 Arty (-)  
11th LPSO (-)

2/22 Inf  
1 Sq, 11th LPSO  
1 Bn, 2/27 Engr

b. Phase IIa

2/72 Inf  
1 Sq, 11th LPSO

2/72 Inf (X)  
1 Sq, 11th LPSO  
3 Bn, C/S Engr

2/23 Inf  
1 Sq, 11th LPSO

1st Control  
2/77 Arty  
A/S 2/73 Arty

3d Bn Bn  
C/S 1st Cav  
2/77 Arty (-)  
C/S 27th Engr  
C/S Engr (-)  
11th LPSO (-)  
3d Plt, 4th MP

c. Phase IIIa

2/72 Inf  
3 Bn, 11th LPSO

2d Platoon  
Co, 2/74 Arty  
Plt, C/S 1st Cav  
Plt, C/S Engr  
5 Bn, 11th LPSO  
C/S Engr  
3 Bn, 11th LPSO

2/72 Inf  
2 Bn, 11th LPSO  
3 Bn, 11th LPSO  
Plt, C/S 1st Cav  
Plt, 2/74 Arty  
Sgt, 3d Plt, 4th MP Co

3d Bn  
C/S 27th Engr  
C/S 1st Cav (-)  
C/S Engr (-)  
3d Plt, 4th MP (-)

1st Control  
2/74 Arty (-)  
2/77 Arty (-)

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## 5. (C) SUPPORTING PHASES:

### a. Artillery:

#### Phase I:

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery was in direct support of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Its mission was to support the maneuver battalions with on call and immediate fire requests.

#### (2) Positions Occupied:

Btry	Coord	Dates Occupied	Means Occupied	Sorties	Distance
A/2/77	XT085800	22 Feb-4 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
A/2/77	XT045195	4 Mar-15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	5 Km
K/2/77	XT045800	22 Feb-12 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
B/2/77	XT045722	12 Mar-15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	13 Km
C/2/77	XT085800	22 Feb-3 Mar	Convoy	N/A	
C/2/77	XT045795	5-15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	1 Km
C/2/77	XT113705	15 Mar	Convoy	N/A	9 Km

#### (3) Statistical Data:

##### (a) Artillery Ammunition Expended:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
1. HE	4800	4353	6385	15,620
2. WP	310	122	213	645
3. ILL	25	0	87	112

##### (b) Fuels:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
1. PD	4741	4292	6256	15,369
2. TT	310	115	224	649
3. VT	194	70	97	361

##### (c) Missions By Type:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	TOTAL
1. Rbl	547	563	843	1,953
2. Support	241	127	209	577

#### Phase II

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery reinforced was in direct support of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Its mission was to support the maneuver battalions with on call and immediate fire requests.

#### (2) Positions Occupied:

Btry	Coord	Dates Occupied	Means Occupied	Sorties	Distance
A/2/77	XT341583	17-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 MI
B/2/77	XT282685	17-29 March	Convoy	N/A	22 MI
B/2/77	XT341583	18-19 March	Convoy	N/A	22 MI
C/2/77	XT388627	18-20 March	Convoy	N/A	25 MI
A/2/77	XT385705	19-29 March	CH-47	15	13 Km
B/2/77	XT385705	19-29 March	CH-47	15	13 Km
C/2/77	XT385705	20-29 March	CH-47	15	9 Km
C/1/78	XT388627	20 Mar-1 Apr	Convoy	N/A	6 Km
C/2/77	XT388627	21-25 Mar	Convoy	N/A	25 MI
B/2/77	XT388627	29 Mar-4 Apr	Convoy	N/A	12 MI
A/2/77	XT341583	29 Mar-3 Apr	CH-47	15	13 Km
B/2/77	XT388627	29 Mar-4 Apr	CH-47 & Convoy	15	14 Km (Air) (4 MI Road)
C/2/77	XT388627	21 Mar-4 Apr	CH-47 & Convoy	15	13 Km (Air) (4 MI Road)
A/2/77	XT093505	3-4 April	Convoy	N/A	25 MI

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A/2/77	KT527547	4-6 April	Convoy	N/A	24 MI
B/2/77	KT527547	4-7 April	Convoy	N/A	29 MI
C/2/77	KT527547	4-7 April	Convoy	N/A	29 MI
C/3/13	KT527547	4-7 April	Convoy	N/A	34 MI

(3) Statistical Data:

(a) Artillery Ammunition Expended:

			105mm				155mm
	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	C/3/13	C/2/13	TOTAL	B/3/13
1. HE	6672	5765	5590	2237	601	20,865	2279
2. WP	172	116	231	153	33	741	16
3. ILL	5	1	11	0	0	17	3
4. Bookings	3	34	3	0	0	40	N/A

(b) Fuses:

1. FT	6614	5685	5562	2203	593	20,684	2217
2. VT	193	1636	177	167	41	2,236	24
3. VT	43	32	36	0	0	133	34

(c) Missions By Type:

1. MBI	797	631	865	366	137	2,610	266
2. Spt	200	124	189	80	25	618	31

Phase III:

(1) The 2d Bn, 77th Artillery reinforced and in direct support of the 34 Bde, 4th Inf Div. Its mission was to support the numerous elements with on call and direct artillery support.

(2) Positions Occupied:

Day	Coord	Dates Occupied	Name Occupied	Section Distance
A/2/77	XT274700	11-20 April	Convoy	N/A 30 MI
C/2/77	XT278785	11-20 April	Convoy & CB-67	18 20 MI (Road)
B/3/13	XT274700	11-20 April	Convoy	N/A 20 MI (Air)

(3) Statistical Data:

(a) Artillery Ammunition Expenditure:

	A/2/77	B/2/77	C/2/77	B/3/13	TOTAL
1. HE	1503	1918	2697	2931	9,071
2. WP	70	13	62	67	211
3. ILL	33	0	0	69	107
4. Bookings	0	0	0	0	0

(b) Fuses:

1. FT	1473	1886	2678	2933	9,976
2. VT	117	36	91	116	360
3. VT	18	0	18	18	54

(c) Missions By Type:

1. MBI	368	308	677	676	1,643
2. Spt	78	19	78	71	236

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b. USAF

(1) Extensive use was made of tactical air to include pre-planned, immediate and combat proof missions with the normal air request channels being used for all missions flown.

(2) Statistical Data:

(a) Missions:

	JC I	JC II	JC III
1. Preplanned Miss Req	77	163	56
2. Preplanned Miss Flown	70	74	29
3. Preplanned Sorties	210	204	124
4. Immediate Miss Req	13	23	4
5. Immediate Miss Flown	13	28	4
6. Immediate Sorties	21	59	10
7. Combat Proof Miss Req	1	-	-
8. Combat Proof Miss Flown	1	-	-
9. Combat Proof Sorties	2	-	-

(b) Results of TAC Air:

	Dnk	Est 101	Dnk
1. VC KIA	10	9	5
2. Structures Destroyed	12	6	17
3. Bombers Destroyed	7	3	9

(c) Battle of Sui Tre:

1. Immediate Miss Req	- 70
2. Immediate Miss Flown	- 28
3. Immediate Sorties	- 59
4. Estimated VC KIA	- 101

(3) TAC Air support proved to be timely, accurate and an asset to the operation. Requests for both preplanned and immediate TAC Air support were submitted through regular channels with no difficulty encountered. All systems were thoroughly proven during the Battle of Sui Tre on 21 March 67 in which TAC Air proved to be an invaluable asset in sending off the reported organized assaults by the VC 272 Regt on this Brigade's elements. On that day alone, TAC Air accounted for 101 VC KIA.

c. Army Helicopters:

Phase 2:

(1) Heliborne Operations: Heliborne operations were limited. All units were in place on D-Day and were not moved by air until the 7th of March when the 3/22 and 2/12(-) were lifted by CH-47's of the 213th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. The lift of the 3/22 from XT000224 to UT971731 commenced at 0900 hours and was completed by 0915. The aircraft were refueled and the lift of the 2/12 (-) started. This lift from FSB LHM (XT000270) to UT971731 was completed at 1225. This was the

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First time the Brigade lifted troops by CH-47. The reason was the small LZ near the 1/20 area. Although this was a first, the lift went smoothly and was completed in a minimum time. On 12 March when the Brigade was forced to leave the northernmost position of the Line of Contact to the Da Nang area, the CH-47 was again used in airlifting the 2/12 and the 1/12. The troops were sent from the landing position LZD (XT772051) to Trail 21. The troops were then flown by CH-47 aircraft to Da Nang.

(2) Resupply: Aerial resupply during this period of time was limited. The majority of resupply was accomplished by convoys, however, the 1/12, etc. was flown to the LZs by CH-47 helicopters. While operating on various days were the 4th, 1st, 11th, 115th and 12th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies. Resupply was conducted in routine manner and no unusual situations were encountered. In preparation for this exercise a semi-permanent beacon was erected at the Da Nang air strip for use by USAF aircraft operating to and from the airstrip. It has since been taken down.

(3) Refueling: Refueling of our organic CH-47 aircraft while in Trail 21 area became a problem and a man from the 8th section had to be placed with the Division Artillery Aviation Section. The service then became satisfactory. At this time the semi-permanent Aviation refueling point at Da Nang was not operational. This meant the 8th aviation tankers had to remain at Da Nang throughout this phase.

(4) Other:

(a) Towards CH-47 aircraft flew many and varied missions during this phase. One such mission was the wire laying performed on 1 Feb. This was the first time this method had been employed. The mission enabled land line communications to be established immediately between the 8th CP and those of the 3/22 and 2/22. In support of this phase our CH-47's flew 814 missions, 1700 sorties and 10,410 hours and carried 1058 passengers.

(b) Problems experienced with our helicopters started on 6 March when during starting and run-up of one CH-47 the bubble started cracking and split. It was patched by "Z" Company 725th Maint Bn and is still in use.

(c) At 1730 hours 7 March the engine failed in an CH-47. The helicopter was autorotated to an unsecured area without further damage. The crew and passengers were extracted without incident. Overnight security of the helicopter was provided by the 11 ACR. The following morning the helicopter was extracted to Chu Chi although it took an unusual amount of time. Primary cause was the late arrival of the crew that prepared the aircraft for lifting.

Phase II

(1) Heliborne Operations: This phase was also characterized by few heliborne operations. The first helilift occurred on 19 March when a Combat Assault was made to LZ GOLD (XT104705). It was a two Bn lift with the 3/22 conducting the initial assault. The lift was made from the Trail 21 airstrip. Although the first flight of five aircraft experienced no difficulty, the second did. The VC had prepared this LZ with command detonated mines so that an air assault could be thwarted. Four of the choppers in the second flight were downed in the LZ, three were completely destroyed, the fourth was evacuated by CH-47. The lift continued until the 3/22 was in LZ GOLD. During this lift a total of 6 ships had been either damaged or destroyed. After the 3/22 lift had been completed a thorough search was made of the LZ and other mines were found with buried wires leading to concealed bunkers. The few VC at this LZ proved to be a caretaker force. After refueling and regrouping the 143rd Aviation Bn was able to provide 13 ships for the helilift of the 7/12. The lift of the 2/12 went smoothly until the last flight approached LZ GOLD. On final approach the VC fired at the flight. Another seven ships were damaged. One of the seven had to



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(2) Battle of Gail Taro. The Battle of Gail Taro occurred at Gail Taro, immediately the 11th Combat Assault Helicopter Company was sent in for use. Two light fire teams and 5 Chinooks were in a bivouac. At their request, I moved to Gail Taro for the Chinooks were in trouble. One of the Chinooks was released since only four could be effectively utilized. There were very few anti-air this day by Army units. All wounded were evacuated from the battle area. Many of our soldiers (paratroopers) were slain in violent haste even though heavy enemy fire was received. All personnel performed in an outstanding manner. The units participating in this battle are listed below.

- It should be noted that a medic from the 3/4 C v was winched down into the jungle at the sight of a downed F4c after it would either of the two pilots have survived the crash, they could have been instructed by the winch. This action was done in an extremely timely way. Of note also is the action of the light fire team from the 315th. Leaving the F4c aircraft hit and crashing into the jungle below, they fanned out in a fan and unloaded all of their ordnance into the surrounding area as later any possible activity in that area by the VC.

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roughly the 2/22 Inf (M) by CH-47. All Class I resupply, ammunition, etc was being handled by CH-47. This eliminated several problems and has been the practice of this Brig B since. As the units gradually turned their way toward Ban Tieng the turn around time was greatly reduced and resupply by a single means was accomplished without any of the problems. During this phase an aviation tower was stationed at the Ban Bn airstrip. This was able to direct turn around for refueling of the OH-63 aircraft. A windport with 4 refueling points and a 10,000 gallon bladder for JP-4 was also established at the Ban Bn airstrip. These devices saved many valuable minutes of flying time.

(A) Others

(a) In support of this phase of the Operation the OH-63 aircraft flew 504 missions, 1072 sorties, 16650 hours and carried 1,229 passengers. On 3 April the OH-63s alone carried 108 passengers and a flying 23:00 hours. This phase was not free of incident with the OH-63s. At 1750 hours 23 March after an OH-63 had landed at Ban Bn for a passenger pickup, a CH-47, Sycamore 28011, flew over and slightly in front of the OH-63. The rotor wash from the CH-47 caused the main rotor to flex down into the tail boom. The resulting damage was to the main rotor blade, the tail boom, and the drive train components of the tail rotor system. At the time of arrival of the CH-47 the aviator had shut down the engine, was not in the aircraft and could only hope no damage would occur. The main rotor blade on the OH-63 was turning fast enough that it could not be stopped. CH-47s were not working out of the pad at the time of the accident. OH-63 44121 was lifted by CH-47 from Ban Bn to Camp 2 at 1300Z, 24 March 1977. It was further evacuated to the 605th Maintenance Bn (M) at Phu Loi.

(b) On one occasion the 1/22 used CH to capture a POW. One of our aviators evacuated the POW from the area to the Ban Tieng Base Camp. Not knowing the method of capture a gas mask was not used on this flight. Before the landing was made at the base camp the aviator could hardly see from the effect of CH.

(c) On 7 April the 2/22 evacuated 30 tons of rice by CH-47. The rice was loaded interally and was a time consuming process. All rice of this quantity should be loaded in nets and sling loaded. The CH-47 is too valuable to spend extra time in a LZ when not really necessary.

Phase III

(1) Helicopter Operations: During the third phase of the Operation the Brigade used helilift to insert and extract the Infantry troops. The first lift was the 36th Ranger Bn, helilifted from Tay Ninh a field to the airfield at the Prok Klat Special Forces Camp on 11 April 1977. This was the first in-country helilift by the 187th Combat Assault Helicopter Company. There were no problems encountered during this lift. On 12 April after flying by C-74 from Ban Tieng to Ban Bn, the 2/22 was helilifted to LZ MUL (KIR61685). The LZ was secured by the 2/22. This lift was also made by the 187th, their second in-country lift as a unit. The lift was slow and took an unusual amount of time. Other units would have completed this lift without refueling however, the 187th did not. Time was not such an important factor during this lift or the delay could have been tactically significant. One of the two aircraft took seven rounds of small arms fire but there was no significant damage. On 12 April C/2/77 was helilifted by CH-47 from the Ban Bn airstrip, to the Prok Klat Special Forces Camp. The lift was accomplished by the 213th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. There were no problems experienced. On 2/22 moved from PHB BBN to Ban Tieng by CH-47s from the 200th Combat Assault Support Helicopter Company. There were no problems experienced. C/2/77 was helilifted from Prok Klat to the Ban Bn airfield. The back haul was used to move another battery of Art from Ban Bn to Prok Klat camp. The lift was longer than required for a single battery move but the overall time for movement of the batteries was less.

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(2) Resupply: Aerial resupply was used extensively. The only significant problem encountered was the long turn around time. Supplies were lifted by UH-1D and CH-47 aircraft in routine manner. The aviation section tender was stationed at Suoi Da and served many hours of flying time.

(3) Other: The OH-23G aircraft flew 361 missions, 754 sorties, 212.25 hours and carried 778 passengers. The only incident experienced by this section during this phase occurred at 1010 on 19 April. After dropping a Special Forces WFO off on top of Wai Ba Din the sergeant in off loading his equipment threw his sleeping bag into the main rotor system. This required that the main rotor blades be changed.

(4) Summary: During the period of Operation JUNCTION CITY the Brigade conducted five Infantry Bn sized lifts by CH-47 and six by UH-1D aircraft. There were four Artillery lifts by CH-47. Units conducting the UH-1D lifts were the 68th, 118th, 162d and the 187th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies. In addition to the units listed above the 1st and 116th Combat Assault Helicopter Companies also supported the Brigade during the operations as resupply ships.

The Brigade's organic aircraft flew a total of 1739 missions, 3,526 sorties, 1,033.55 hours and carried a total of 3,663 passengers. The 1,033.55 hours flying time represents many hours of maintenance, most of which was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Excepting a few daily inspections at the field locations all maintenance was performed at Camp Rainier. The better lighting and working conditions can account for the high rate of flyable aircraft the section maintained throughout the operation. The total flying time represents 41 intermediate (23 hours) inspections. All except three of these were pulled during hours of darkness. In some instances the crew chiefs worked through the night so that we could have one more aircraft flying for the following days operation.

B. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence concerning the Brigade's area of operation during Phase I, II, and III of Operation JUNCTION CITY was obtained from 25th Division J-2, the 125th Brigade RI detachment, and from liaison visits to the Trail III and Trail IV Special Forces Camps.

b. Available information concerning the area of operations for Phase I indicated a large number of base camps, hospitals, training sites and supply facilities were located within the AO. VC Forces believed to be operating in the AO included the 70th Security Guard Regiment via 122772 to 127376, elements of the 271st Regiment located west of the La Mot River (127360), and the UOD Artillery regiment which was unlocated. It was anticipated VC units would attempt to avoid large scale engagements unless success seemed certain.

(1) From the beginning of the operation February 27 until the end on 14 March there was only one significant contact. On the 25th of February 8/2/12, via 1204836, was engaged briefly by an estimated VC platoon. The VC used the ruse of tying a piece of coarse wire, similar to the type used with command detonated mines, across the anticipated route of the American unit. When the pointman reached the wire he followed it to the end where he was ambushed and killed by small arms. It was at this point the VC unit engaged in a brief fire fight, breaking contact before effective artillery fire was brought to bear. On the next afternoon, via 1204836, 8/4/12 was guided to a base camp by an aerial observer and was engaged by an estimated VC Battalion and completely surrounded. Using close artillery fire the company was able to hold off the enemy assault until they were reinforced by another company some 600 meters away. Results of the engagement were 11 VC KIA (K2), 30 VC KIA (R2). Identification of the VC unit as the 3d Bn, 271st Regiment was possible through documents taken from dead VC. Only on this occasion did the VC attempt to engage decisively as American unit. All other contacts were limited to groups of three to six VC.

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(2) There were three significant mortar attacks during the operations of these units only one had any effects. On 27 Feb at 0245H via 12722 (N) larger site, 1207004, received 60-70 mm mortar fire causing 10 US KIA. The mortar attacks of 5 March, via 1215777, and 9 March, via 12159706, both completely missed their targets. On both occasions what was believed to be mortar firing was heard shortly after the units stopped for the day. It is assumed the VC were repositioning in a different direction prior to the attacks later that night. Judging from the number of rounds, 40 and 150 respectively, which impacted out side the friendly positions it is apparent that no attempt was made to adjust the mortar fire once it began.

(3) Of the sixteen base camps discovered two were considered regional size, ten battalion size and the remaining four were company size or smaller. All base camps located were at least 200 meters or closer to a stream or other source of water. Each camp was encircled by a barrier system with interconnecting trench system. Defensive positions showed evidence of careful planning of fields of fire, were well camouflaged and expertly organized. Heavy claymore positions were worked on the enemy side of a tree usually with a single strip of white cloth or an X cut into the tree.

4. During phase I of Junction City, elements of COSVN were reportedly trapped west of Route 4. Indications were that several reinforced units moved into the northern zone C in an effort to relieve the pressure on COSVN elements. Enemy units expected to be encountered in the Phase II operational area included the 101st Regiment of the VC artillery Regiment and possibly the 7th 1st Battalion. Due to heavy losses suffered by VC forces on 26 Feb 67, via 12159729 and on 10-11 March 67 via 12176755 it was believed that VC units would engage in decisive combat unless surprised or forced to fight to protect installations they deemed important.

(1) Proof that there were VC in the operational area was received on the first day of the operations. Three APC's were damaged by AT mines, two APC's were damaged by RPG rounds, and eight heavy troops were located and destroyed.

(2) On the 19th of March an airmobile assault into 12 0010 via 12159717 was met by command detonated mines causing the destruction of three helicopters, damaging three, killing 10 US soldiers and wounding 14.

(3) The attacking force on 21 March at the Battle of Ban Tri was identified as the 278 VC Regiment reinforced by elements of the 9-80 Artillery Bn and other service elements. Identification was made from captured documents and interrogation of POWs. Of the weapons captured 50 were RPG-2's. The presence of such a large ratio of AT weapons indicates the VC are not for mechanized forces. Through Phase II the VC utilized the RPG-2 as an effective sniping weapon against APC's. The majority of weapons captured were in extremely good condition and a number of AK-47's with folding bayonets were captured. It can be reasonably assumed these weapons were recently brought in country.

(4) The other engagements covered but were limited to brief fire fights with Katon side VC units. On 25 March, C, C, 1st Brigade Bn on a daily road clearing operation was engaged by an estimated VC platoon resulting in 2 US KIA, 3 US KIA and 1 damaged tank. VC casualties were unknown. On 4, 2/22 briefly engaged an estimated platoon size unit via 12159754 on 24 April. The VC unit was very well armed and damaged 3 APC's with RPG rounds. Heavy casualties were unknown.

(5) There were a few minor encounters with small groups of 2 to 4 VC until the 3d of April when C/2/22 was contacted what was believed to be a rearward element 121597. The fight occurred at 1400 in the afternoon and continued until dark when the VC broke contact. Entering the area of the previous days contact a regional size base camp was located. The base camp had been recently occupied and departed VC abandoned 18 tons of food stuffs, some mine equipment and clothing. No further contact occurred during Phase II.

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Even though VC forces suffered heavy losses, it was believed VC units retained a limited offensive capability. The presence of the 1st Regiment 11200, the 2nd Regiment 11700, 11st WIA Regiment 11350 and the 24th Bn, 70th Regiment 11270 presented a definite threat to the existence of the 1st WIA 11200 Comp. It was not anticipated VC forces would engage in decisive combat.

(1) Only once during Phase III did VC forces verify their presence. On the night of 14 April 1970 the CIDG force at Peak Kick and C. Bay 2/77 Arty received 75 rds of 62mm mortar fire via 11260707.

(2) There was no ground contact with any force larger than a squad. Booby traps and mining incidents dropped significantly.

g. Enemy Initiated Incidents during Operation JUNCTION CITY were as follows:

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
(1) Sniper Fire	7	27	4
(2) Mortar Fire	8	2	2
(3) Mining	7	19	2
(4) Booby Traps	0	6	0
(5) Engagements	12	15	4
(6) Fire Against Aircraft	6	2	2
(7) Base Camps Located	16	22	3

2. Major VC personnel, Equipment losses are listed in paragraph C-3.

## g. Enemy Communications

(1) In the larger enemy base camps located, communication wire was found throughout indicating extensive use of land line communications.

(2) An enemy radio captured during the Battle of Shui Tre was similar in configuration to our RC-25. The radio was of Chinese manufacture and identical to one captured during Operation GAMMA. It is assumed that VC forces are attempting to equip their units with a standard radio making them independent of captured communications equipment.

## h. Enemy Fortifications

(1) In both Phase I and Phase II VC units took offensive actions where the opportunity presented itself for what appeared an easy victory. Each attack initiated by the VC showed evidence of careful planning and displayed professionalism in execution.

(2) In each attack VC forces developed tremendous volumes of small arms fire. Utilizing this cover individuals did not attack in the costly human wave attacks but advanced by leaps and bounds similar to our own battle drill.

(3) Fortifications encountered were capable of sustaining very heavy artillery and air attacks. There were no new designs or types of constructions noted that had not been previously encountered.

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1. Terrain: Area of operations for each phase was basically identical.

(1) Topography: Area is fundamentally low and flat. The predominant terrain feature is Mud Ra Lon which is 907 meters above sea level. The period of operations was characterized by low water causing river streams to be very shallow or even intermittent. Principle streams have steep banks and bottoms of mud and silt.

(2) Vegetation: The area consists of primarily broad leaf evergreen forest. The secondary forest consists of broad leaf evergreen trees 75-90 feet in height. The canopy is usually discontinuous and the undergrowth is extremely dense. The undergrowth consists of low trees, shrubs, bushes and vines.

(3) Tactical Aspects of the Terrain

(a) Observation depends entirely upon the vegetation. In the forest regions observation is generally poor. In areas that have been defoliated both aerial and ground observation are aided significantly. Grassland areas generally furnished good observation.

(b) Fields of fire are extremely limited in dense forests and require clearing in all cases. Areas of grasslands and dry crops offer the best fields of fire.

(c) In areas of dense jungle track movement is slowed to 1000 meters an hour or less in places. These areas are extremely hard on tracked vehicles. In most places wheeled vehicles are limited to existing roads. Movement off of roads will be drastically curtailed during and after any rain fall.

2. MISSION:

a. Phase I: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was:

(1) To establish blocking positions in center on D-Day to seal escape routes to the west, vicinity Cambodian border.

(2) To conduct S&D operations following D-Day to destroy CGVN facilities and VC/VNA forces, supplies, and installations.

(3) To provide security for FNB base and Route 22 from center to Trail M.

b. Phase II: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was to attack on D-Day into War Zone C to destroy CGVN and VC/VNA forces and installations.

c. Phase III: 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was to assume responsibility of 196th Light Infantry BDE, 25th Infantry Division Flanking Brigade Mission and continue responsibility for 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div BDE.

3. Concept of Operation Phase I:

a. Movement: On D-3 the 2d Bn, 14th Inf was to fly by C-123 from Chu Chi to Ban Hiep Base Camp and secure it. The 2d Bn, 14th Inf was to remain at FNB BDE (Operation Overlay Annex A) where they had been since the termination of Operation GAMMA. The 2d Bn, 2d Inf, also still in the area of operation, was to secure FNB I and conduct local S&D operations. The Brigade CP was to move overland from Trail M to FNB BDE. The 1st Bn, 21st Inf was to airlift from Ban Hiep to Trail M by C-123 and then helilift into the operational area. All units were to establish mobile blocking positions with contact patrols constantly keeping the units adjacent to each other in contact. All units were to conduct extensive S&D in the area of their own sectors. The Infantry units daily cleared and secured Route 22 w.r. the unobscured battalion and cavalry troops escorted one or more convoys daily.

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 b. Fire Support: Tactical Air was on call. Direct support artillery was provided by the 2/77 Artillery and attached units at the Fire Support Base (See Annex A).

c. References:

- (1) OPRD 3-67, HQ, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div dated 19 Feb 67
- (2) Prag 0 1 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 24 Feb 67
- (3) Prag 0 2 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 01 Mar 67
- (4) Prag 0 3 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 02 Mar 67
- (5) Prag 0 4 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 03 Mar 67
- (6) Prag 0 5 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 05 Mar 67
- (7) Prag 0 6 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 06 Mar 67
- (8) Prag 0 7 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 11 Mar 67
- (9) Prag 0 8 to OPRD 3-67 dtd 14 Mar 67

Phase II

a. Movement: One reinforced mechanized company from 2/22 Inf (M) with attached engineer platoon and one battery from 2/77 Artillery initially moved overland from Da Nang to Suoi Da. The second day the infantry companies and engineer platoon explored a bridge at KI90627. The artillery battery was to establish a FSB at the bridge site. The 1/12 Inf minus Co C, 2/12 Inf and the 2/77 Arty (-) then were to airlift to LZ GOLD (KI36705) and establish FSB GOLD at that location. The 2/12 Inf was to move west to search and destroy. The 1/22 (-) was to secure the FSB and search and destroy in that sector. The 2/22 Inf (M) and the 2/14 Armor (-) were to cross the Suoi Samet river and conduct S&D operations. (See Annex B, Operations Overlay).

b. Fire Support: Tactical Air was on call. Direct support artillery was provided by the 2/77 Artillery and attached units.

c. References:

- (1) OPRD 4-67, HQ, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div dtd 17 Mar 67.
- (2) Prag 0 1 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 18 Mar 67
- (3) Prag 0 2 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 19 Mar 67
- (4) Prag 0 3 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 20 Mar 67
- (5) Prag 0 4 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 21 Mar 67
- (6) Prag 0 5 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 24 Mar 67
- (7) Prag 0 6 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 25 Mar 67
- (8) Prag 0 7 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 28 Mar 67
- (9) Prag 0 8 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 29 Mar 67
- (10) Prag 0 9 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 01 Apr 67
- (11) Prag 0 10 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 02 Apr 67
- (12) Prag 0 11 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 03 Apr 67
- (13) Prag 0 12 to OPRD 4-67 dtd 05 Apr 67

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(24) Prag 0 13 to OICRD 4-67 dtd 05 Apr 67

(25) Prag 0 14 to OICRD 4-67 dtd 06 Apr 67

(26) Prag 0 15 to OICRD 4-67 dtd 07 Apr 67

Form III

a. Maneuvers: 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility of 1st Light Infantry Brigade from Camp and 2nd with 1/22 Inf, 2/5 Inf (M) and 1st South Vietnamese Ranger Bn. 2/3d Armor (-) secured South Bn. 2/22 Inf moved by air and 2/22 Inf (M) moved overland to War Zone C to conduct S&D operations in War Zone C. (See Operations Overlay, Annex C).

b. Fire Support: Tactical air was on call. Direct support artillery was provided by the 2d Bn, 7th Artillery.

c. References:

- (1) OICRD 5-67, HQ 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div dtd 9 Apr 67
- (2) Prag 0 1 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 10 Apr 67
- (3) Prag 0 2 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 12 Apr 67
- (4) Prag 0 3 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 15 Apr 67
- (5) Prag 0 4 to OICRD 5-67 dtd 18 Apr 67

11. EXECUTION:

a. Chronological Summary: (Units less than Bn also included only on days of significant contact or activity).

(1) 27 Feb 67 (Sat)

(a) 2/22 Inf: A Company reported a sniper fired several rounds of automatic weapons fire at a unit in War Zone 22. A Co may have returned fire with an M79 and sent a patrol in pursuit with negative results. At 1105 hrs Company A observed 1 VC at coord XJ07807. Artillery fire was called in with negative results.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0700 hrs a patrol from Co B established contact with an unknown number of VC, who were XJ07700, resulting in the wounding and capture of 1 VC who later died. The VC was armed with a US M16 rifle, a M16, and 160 rds of 7.62 ammunition. At 0930 hrs 1/22 Inf arrived at the Br-1000 position (vic coord XJ07600) and departed to the South to establish contact with 3 VC at coord XJ08000, resulting in 1 VC KIA (Post).

(c) 1/22 Inf: 1/22 Inf airlifted by C-119 from the Thang to Trail B for further heli-lift into 15 km. vicinity: coord XJ07900. From 12 3.00 PM the battalion conducted S&D operations south along both sides of QL 22 to establish blocking position XJ08000. At 1200 hrs 1/22 Inf arrived at the blocking position XJ08000. One US KIA resulted from fragments of a mortar round which landed in an A Co ambush patrol vicinity coord XJ08000 at 1735 hours.

(d) 2/27 Artillery: Positioned at SUB 225 (XJ08000), location of the unit at close of operation GAMBEL.

(e) 2/22 Inf: Secured the Thang Ban Camp, conducted local patrols with no contact.

(2) 21 Feb 67 (Sat)

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to conduct local patrolling and provided security for SUB 225.

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(c) 2/22 Inf (N): Companies B and C conducted 3d operations in their designated sectors of the Bn AO. At 1130 hrs an element of C/10 Cav closed the Bn laager area (vic coord XJ07742) and was placed under C/22 Inf (N).

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co's 1st platoon secured LZ ENK vic coord XJ060875, while 3d platoon cleared QL 22 to the northern limit of TACR. B Co departed at 1233 hours on a company 3d operation northwest of RENGRO and established a defensive perimeter vic coord XJ093213. 3d platoon, Co C cleared QL 22 to southern limit of TACR. The 2d platoon, while on a reconnaissance patrol, engaged an unknown number of VC vic coord XJ064522. Results: One US KIA and one US MIA. Company C elements cleared RENGRO at 1600 hrs. Co B received small arms fire from an estimated 10 VC vic coord XJ093213 at 2205 hrs. Fire was returned and artillery called in. Results: 4 VC KIA (BC), 1 Chicom 9mm sub machine gun, 1 Chicom M-7, 1 US M-1, 2 Chicom grenades, 2 ammo pouches, web gear, and loose ammunition recovered.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Remained in DB at F33 LEE.

(e) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure Chu Thang Nam Camp with local patrols.

(3) 22 Feb 67 (D-Day):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure F33 LEE, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co's B and C 2/22 Inf (N) and C/10 Cav conducted search and destroy operations in pre-designated sectors of the Bn AO. At 1615 hrs Co B closed their laager area vic XJ066411. At 1740 hrs an element of C/10 Cav hit a mine at coord XJ057448, resulting in 1 US MIA with extensive damage to the M161 tank. At 1904 hrs Co C closed their laager area vic coord XJ047457. At 1930 hrs C/10 Cav closed Bn laager area XJ074841.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co 1st platoon secured LZ ENK vic coord XJ060875 at 0700 hrs for the extraction of 1/32 Artillery. 3d platoon cleared QL 22 south to defensive strong point Thang Square vic coord XJ083517, while the mortar platoon cleared QL 22 to the northern limit of TACR. All Co A elements returned by 1600 hrs with negative contacts. Co B assumed security mission for Bn RENGRO. Co C departed RENGRO at 0705 hrs on a company wide search and destroy mission southeast to the Sui My river. One US MIA resulted from a self inflicted gunshot wound. During evacuation of MIA, Dustoff helicopter received automatic weapons fire vic coord XJ099805. Supporting gunships delivered suppressive fires with unknown results. Co C established a night defensive perimeter vic coord XJ016009 at 1740 hrs.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Began Operation JUNCTION CITY with 4/2/77 DB to 2/22 Inf (N), 4/2/77 DB to 2/12 Inf and C/1/77 DB to 1/22 Inf.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Chu Thang Nam Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 2/27 Engrs: DB of the Brigades, repaired Hwy 28.

(g) C/504 Engrs: Continued development of the Bn Camp at Chu Thang.

(4) 23 Feb 67 (D+1):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure assigned sector and conduct local patrols and ambushes. Conducted 3d operations west of Day 21.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co's B & C, 2/22 Inf (N), and C/10 Cav conducted 3d operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1535 hrs C/10 Cav received 1 US KIA while returning by fire at coord XJ041841.

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At 1400 hrs C/1/10 Cav discovered a base camp south of KIDJ002, and captured 10 rifles and a small quantity of documents. They laagered at this location. At 1700 hrs, Co B laagered south of KIDJ002. At 1730 hrs Co C laagered south of KIDJ002.

(c) 1/12 Inf: Co A departed Operational Base HENHO for a one day S&D operation east of QL 22. A tunnel two feet long was destroyed via coordination. Co A closed Base HENHO at 1450 hrs and resumed perimeter defense. A Co's M platoon and Mortar platoon marched and cleared QL 22 to the northern and southern limit of Bn M. Co C continued S&D operations along the western bank of the Sui My River. At 1730 hrs Co C elements engaged 7 VC on the eastern bank of the river via coordination. Results: 3 VC KIA (M), 1 VC KIA (M), and 7 pairs of black pajamas captured. Three airstrikes were called in on suspected VC base camp via coordination at 1830 hrs with unknown results.

(d) 1/11 Artys Remained in RM.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(5) 24 Feb 67 (Sat):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure assigned sector and conduct local patrols and ambushes. Conducted S&D operations west of My M.

(b) 2/12 Inf (M): Co's B & C, 2/12 Inf (M) and C/1/10 Cav conducted search and destroy operations in designated sectors of the Bn M. At 0700 hrs C/1/10 Cav continued search of the base complex at coordination, resulting in the capture of 50 pounds of equipment and destruction of 10 huts and 5 bunkers. At approximately 1130 hrs Co B discovered a VC base camp complex at coordination. A small quantity of documents, small arms ammunition, and 14 hand grenades were found. One flame boot trap was destroyed. At 1700 hrs Co's B & C laagered at coordination. At 1800 hrs C/1/10 Cav laagered at coordination.

(c) 1/12 Inf: Co A conducted search and destroy operations northeast of HENHO. A heavily mined base camp containing twenty bunkers and sleeping platforms was found and destroyed via coordination. 1 VC KIA (M) was found. Co B secured Base HENHO and cleared QL 22 to the northern and southern limits of Bn M. Co C continued S&D operations and swept previous day's airstrikes zone. A VC was engaged via coordination with unknown results. Search of area resulted in the discovery and destruction of a VC base camp containing 3 AT mines, 1 two pound block of explosives, three bunkers, 12 foxholes, and 3 weapons. The wreckage of a B-57 bomber, TMF O-21557, and the remains of the crew were located via coordination. Co C established a defensive perimeter via coordination.

(d) 2/11 Artys Continued in M M.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang base camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(6) 25 Feb 67 (Sat):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Co B, departed FVN INF on a S&D mission NW of RM. At approximately 1225 hrs, Co B made contact with an estimated VC platoon with automatic weapons at coordination resulting in 2 friendly KIA and 5 UN KIA. Co B reported surviving sniper fire at 1700 hrs at coordination. VC casualties unknown.

(b) 2/12 Inf (M): At 0700 hrs Co's M commenced S&D operations in designated sectors of Bn M. At 1130 hrs Co B discovered a base camp at coordination and engaged it with artillery and mortars.

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There were no US casualties and VC casualties are unknown. At 1400 hrs coord XT127455, Co C destroyed 1,400 lbs of polished rice and 800 bags of salt. They captured 190 rds of M-1 ammunition. At 1515 hrs, 2/22 recon platoon escorted a long range reconnaissance patrol of 14 men to coord XT032444. At 1700 hrs Co B & C lagged at coord XT115853.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued search and destroy operations and destroyed a VC base camp containing 15 bunkers, 1 tunnel, 100 meters in length, and several bottles of 337 beer vic coord XT123455. An LZ was prepared to evacuate 1 US MIA (broken arm) and the crew of the B-57. A night defensive perimeter was established vic coord XT123455. Co B secured Operational Base RENGRO. At 2045 hrs a B Co ambush patrol fired four claymore mines at an estimated 3 VC vic coord XT14875 with unknown results. Co C continued S&D operations and engaged a squad of VC vic coord XT118433. Results: 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC MIA (Fmb), several weapons, ammunition, money, letters and documents recovered. A cache consisting of 24 180 pound bags of salt and 6 five gallon cans of dried fish was found and destroyed vic coord XT126832. C Co closed RENGRO and assumed responsibility for operational base security.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB 3d Bde.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tien Base Camp, continued local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 26 Feb 67 (D-4):

(a) 2/12 Inf: B Co made contact with 8 VC at 1115 hrs with negative friendly and unknown VC casualties. At approximately 1135 hrs Co B found a 3 gallon can of documents at XT043827. Co B reported finding a base camp at XT045829 at 1400 hrs containing several bunkers, with huts and a trench system. All of the huts were destroyed. B Co made contact at 1335 hrs at XT046830 with an estimated 20-40 VC with automatic weapons. Co B had contact from the front, left and right flanks and the rear. B/3/22 started to B/2/12 location at 1350 hrs. The linkup of the two elements was effected at 201754 Feb 67. Results of the encounter were 6 US KIA and 24 VMA. Enemy losses were 11 VC KIA (BC), 3 thatched huts destroyed, 330 rds of linked Chicam 7.62 ammo, 800 lbs of unpolished rice, a bicycle repair shop, 2 Chicam automatic weapons and 1 H-79 were captured.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Co B, C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1140 hrs, Co B moved into an area, vic coord XT117862, marked "Restricted Area Mines". They discovered and destroyed one Chicam grenade booby trap. At 1515 hrs Co B 2/22 Inf engaged 4 VC at coord XT122861, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 US MIA and the capture of 1 AK-50 weapon SN130763 w/5 magazines, 22 rds 7.62 AK-47 ammunition, 79 rds of 7.62 ammunition, Chicam serrated grenade booby trap, 2 Chicam hand grenades and 1 set of web gear. At 1730 hrs Co B lagged at coord XT115855. C/1/10 Cav lagged at coord XT073862. At 1800 hrs Co C lagged at vic coord XT073893.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued S&D operations near RENGRO. A large VC base camp (200 meters by 300 meters) was located vic coord XT110838. Numerous huts, food, ammunition, grenades, propaganda material and weapons were evacuated or destroyed. Co B departed Base RENGRO to conduct S&D operations west of QL 22. At 1600 hrs Co B was attached to the 2/12 Inf and ordered to link up with an unknown size VC force vic coord XT046830. Link up was made at 1734 hrs and Co B secured an LZ vic coord XT043831 for the evacuation of US wounded. C Co continued security of Operational Base RENGRO.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DB 3d Bde.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tien Base Camp, conducted local patrols.

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(8) 27 Feb 67 (D-6)

(a) 2/27 Inf: Co A reported finding 1 mine at approximately 1400 hrs. Co A, C, recon and 14 elements secured FIB LEB conducted local patrols.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 1100 hrs the 2nd Lancer area received approximately seventy enemy mortar fire resulting in 1 US KIA, and 11 US WIA. At 0700 hrs Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of the 2nd AO. At 1105 hrs Co B destroyed 2 US M16 AF mines, which were stacked one on the other and rigged for pressure or command detonation. The bunker from which the mine could be detonated via cord KTD7546, was also destroyed. At 1115 hrs, via cord KTD7546, Co B found a partially destroyed base camp. At 1700 hrs, Co B launched via cord KTD7555. Co C launched via cord KTD7556. C/1/10 Cav launched via cord KTD7557.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued search of VC base camp located via cord KTD7558. A night defensive perimeter was established via cord KTD7559. Co B remained attached to 2/12 Inf and swept battle area via cord KTD7560. Numerous huts, bunkers, tunnels, ammunition, RCL, mines, tools and other equipment were found and destroyed. Co B secured 12 via cord KTD7561 and established a night defensive perimeter. Co C continued security mission for Base ABWFO. A reconnaissance patrol from Co C reported sighting of five mortar base plates via cord KTD7562. Patrol closed ABWFO at 1330 hrs.

(d) 2/27 Art: Continued 28 3d Bde.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Heng Base Camp, conducted local patrols.

(9) 28 Feb 67 (D-6)

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued to secure FIB LEB and conducted local patrols. At 0051 hrs the 2nd reported four incoming mortar fire resulting in negative friendly casualties.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of 2nd AO. At 0650 hrs, the Recon platoon while retrieving a vehicle discovered a battalion size base camp via cord KTD7563. At 1008 hrs, via cord KTD7564, C/1/10 Cav destroyed 3 bunkers. At 1115 hrs via cord KTD7565, C/1/10 Cav destroyed 2 huts and 50 meters of trench in a small base camp.

(c) 2/22 Inf: Co A continued search of base camp located via cord KTD7566 and evacuated or destroyed mines, bicycles, mortars, weapons, tools, RCL, ammunition and rice. Co A continued S&D operations and closed operational base ABWFO at 1705 hrs. Co B continued S&D operations and at 1120 hrs was detached from 2/12 Inf. Co B closed Base ABWFO at 1715 hrs and assumed base security mission. Co C continued security mission for Base ABWFO. At 1730 hrs Co C began S&D operations east of CL 22.

(d) 2/27 Art: Continued 28 3d Bde.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Heng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and evacuation.

(10) 1 Mar 67 (D-7)

(a) 2/22 Inf: Co A reported finding 2 huts, 1 ton of polished rice, several new footlock, 1 grenade, 3 bolt action rifles and 1 Chiem machinegun at KTD7570 on a reconnaissance operation.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co B & C and C/1/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of 2nd AO. At 1010 hrs, via cord KTD7571, C/1/10 Cav hit 2 AF mines, resulting in 5 US WIA, and withdrew to Base to Co A (D-11). At 1130 hrs via cord KTD7572, Co C destroyed one 20 lb bomb (dud). At 1230 hrs Co B discovered a base camp and storage area, re-



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[illegible]

(c) 7/24/68 Search Area T-10, B + Camp, conducted local patrols.

(5) 7/4 1-3: Continued to secure FBI JAZ, contact local  
patrols.

(b) 2/22 Inf (R): Co's B, C and C/L/10 Cav conducted S&D operations in designated sectors of the Bn AO. At 1300 hrs, via coord 1704276, Co B discovered 16 lbs of documents and destroyed six 5 gal cans of kerosene, a 55 gal drum of kerosene, 3 gallon crocks of fish, and one 5 gal can of motor oil. At 1655 hrs, via coord 1704158, Co A discovered 2 green slates approximately 2 months old. At 1700 hrs, via coord 1704569, C/L/10 Cav destroyed three anti-tank mines, resulting in 2 US M7A, 1 AUC M113 destroyed and light damage to 1 M48 tank. At 1730 hrs, Co A destroyed via coord 1704142. Co C destroyed via coord 1704757. At 1800 hrs C/L/10 Cav lagared via coord 1704853.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A continued search and destroy mission and secured LZ ROLF via coord XRD7821 for the insertion of B and C Co. A Co continued WAD operations and made contact with an unknown number of VC via coord XRD6018. Results: 1 "3 KV, 2 "3 KV. Artillery was called in and short fire resulted in 1 additional B WAD. A Co established a night defensive perimeter via coord XRD7821. Co B was hoisted from River R20870 into LZ ROLF and began WAD operations to the west. B Co located four traps, 2 fresh VC graves, and several body traps via coord XRD6018. A night defensive perimeter was established via coord XRD7821. Co C was hoisted from River R20870 to LZ ROLF and began search and destroy operations to the west. A night defensive perimeter was established via coord XRD7821.

(c) 2/14 Inf: Secured Chu Yang as a Camp, conducted local patrols and activities.

(a). 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure FSB LHM and conduct local patrols.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): Co G and C/1/20 conducted search and destroy operations in designated sectors of the Ia AG. At 0900 hrs, via coord IXT08078, Co G discovered 15 five gallon cans of bar. 14 cans were destroyed and 1 was evacuated. At 1330 hrs, C/1/20 Gcv discovered an unoccupied VC base camp, and destroyed 7 huts. At 1805 hrs, via coord IXT08076, C/1/20 Gcv destroyed 1 AT mine resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 APO KIA destroyed. At 1700 hrs, Co G laagered via coord KXD03077, C/1/20 Gcv laagered via coord IXT71830.

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(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A searched a VC base camp via coord XTH9618 and constructed or destroyed large quantities of ammunition, food bicycles, rice, tea, huts, electrical wire, and clothing. Co A continued S&D operation and established a night defensive position via coord XTH1188. Co B located and destroyed rice, documents, clothing, uniforms, weapons and explosives via coord XTH1615 and established a night defensive perimeter. Co C returned to base XTH10 and assumed responsibility for perimeter defense. One Chien Noi rallied at 1500 hrs.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued in 3d Bde.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang Ban Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(13) 4 Mar 67 (D-10):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued to secure S&D IIR and conduct local patrols.

(b) 2/22 Lf (N): Co B and C/2/70 Coy conducted S&D operations in designated areas of the 11th AO. Co C remained in the 11th AO area, via coord XTH7501h for maintenance. At 1600 hrs Co B engaged via coord XTH7781h. At 1800 hrs, C/2/70 Coy reverted to OPGON 3d Bde, 1st Inf Bde, and Co A returned to central 2/22 Inf (3d) from 3d Bde, 1st Inf Bde. Co A engaged via coord XTH7760.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A and B continued S&D operations west of Ch. 22. Co were extracted from FC via coord XTH1011h and returned to Ban HINH at 1500 hrs. Co C continued security of Ban HINH.

(d) 2/77 Artys: 1/2/77 plus a small advanced party from C/2/77 and B/2/77 moved by convey to AO HACHINH (XTH5775).

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang Ban Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(14) 5 Mar 67 (D-11):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Co A made contact on a perimeter operation at XTH1607 with an estimated 3 VC. Results were 2 VC KIA (Bass) and 2 VC MIA.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co B & C secured route 22 North of the 11th AO for elements of the 11th AO, 196th 3d Inf Bde, and the 17th Inf Bde. Co A and elements of Bann secured 22 at coord XTH15730 for a Vietnamese Marine Bn. At 0600 hrs, via coord XTH7760, Co B found and destroyed approximately 3000 lbs of unpolished rice and 2000 lbs of salt. At 1115 hrs, via coord XTH7787, Co A received 2 VC MIA resulting from a VC rifle grenade. At 1400 hrs companies B & C cleared the 11th AO area, via coord XTH7760, for maintenance. At 1800 hrs, via coord XTH7775, Co A and Bann discovered and destroyed 6 huts, and engaged in that vic.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Remained at Ban HINH and prepared for movement to via coord XTH7775.

(d) 2/77 Artys: C/2/77 and B/2/77 moved by convey to AO HACHINH to join 1/2/77. B/2/77 remained at S&D IIR and became Ch. 1/2/77 and C/2/77 remained in 2/22 Inf and 3/22 Inf respectively. 1/2/77, 2/2/77 and C/2/77 Artys reinforced 2/77 Artillery.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang Ban Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(15) 6 Mar 67 (D-12):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of S&D IIR, conducted local patrols.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Co A with attached Tiger elements moved to May 20 and began road clearing operations west from coord XT012773, towards LAGO. At 0730 hrs, via coord XT081841, Co C located various huts and a can of 40' CBU units. Between 0730 hrs and 1100 hrs, Co B and C (-) secured for convoys from 2/33rd Arty to AO BLANKNESS coord XT018782. At 1145 hrs, Co B & C and the CP Gp 2/22 Inf (N) displaced to via coord XT013773 closing at 1225 hrs. A patrol from Co C which was on an observation and rear security mission (coord XT078037) closed the rear larger area at 1600 hrs.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Airlifted from SEWFO to LE JULIAN via coord WT966738. It moved north toward Objective SEWEN via coord WT916789. Co B located and destroyed at large VC base camp via coord WT966772. A rear night defensive perimeter was established via coord WT955774.

(d) 2/77 Arty: At 0817 hrs Bn (-) received 80 rds of 81mm and 60mm mortar fire via coord XT057790 resulting in no casualties and insignificant damage.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Phu Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(15) 7 Mar 67 (D-13):

(a) 2/12 Inf: On 7 Mar at 1200H, Co A, C, Nq element and Recon were airlifted to LE LOON (XT966758) and moved to secure blocking position ELLIOTT at coord XT078799. Co B continued to secure F28 LEE at XT078799. Co A, C, Nq element and Recon platoons closed blocking position ELLIOTT at 1830H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0715H 2/22 Inf (N) displaced from larger position and attacked west along May 20 to secure LE LOON, via coord XT967752. At 0735H, Co C destroyed 1 pressure type mine, with no casualties or damage to equipment, via coord XT978765. At 0815H Co's B, C and CP Group 2/22 secured LE at LOON. At 0935H, Co A provided security for attached elements of 4/4th Bn to complete mission of clearing May 20 to LOON. At 1000H Co C displaced north to secure a foot bridge for 2/12 Inf via coord XT960771. Bridge was secured at 1122H. Air lift movement of 1/22 Inf and 2/12 Inf was completed at 1230H. Co A and CP Gp 2/22 Inf displaced to LO JUCK via coord WT966761. Recon elements 2/22 Inf destroyed a mine. Recon element remained at LOON to assist Co A in a security mission moving north to the Bn CP location. At 1800H via coord WT966766, Co B destroyed a rice hut. At 1825H the last elements from 2/12 Inf cleared the foot bridge, and Co C moved to larger area via coord WT966766. Co A lagged via coord XT966752.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A shifted night defensive position via coord WT955776 and continued in S&D operations. A river crossing was made via coord WT961771. The US MIA resulted from shore artillery rds. A Co joined in perimeter via coord WT954776. Co B continued to search the VC base camp located on 6 Mar via WT955776. Base camp was destroyed and B Co continued in S&D operations. One fresh VC grave was found via coord WT967760. Co B joined in defense perimeter via coord WT954776 at 1400H. Co C continued in S&D operations and destroyed 1 straw hut via coord WT961770, at 1230H. 1 55 gal drum of unknown oil, stove, pots, chemical munitions and chemical were found and destroyed via coord WT967760. Co C joined in perimeter via coord WT954776, at 2000H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued in S&D.

(e) 2/24 Inf: Secured Phu Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(13) 8 Mar 67 (D-14):

(a) 2/12 Inf: 8 Mar 67 at 0730H Co A & C moved out from blocking position ELLIOTT on separate Co sized S&D operations. Co C reported a VC base camp at coord XT957768 at 1130H. Co C started receiving sniper fire from inside the base camp resulting in 2 US KIA. Artillery

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and air strikes were employed with unknown VC results. After the artillery and air strikes were lifted, Co C moved inside the base camp discovering 2 large bins of an estimated size of 2000 lbs filled with 240 cans of unpolished rice. The rice and bins were destroyed. Co C & A positions for 8 March were in vic coord W755756. Recon and Rgt elements stayed in blocking position K111017.

(c) 2/22 Inf (M): Remained in blocking positions AO JUMAL and conducted S&D operations in the vic of their laager area. At 0930H, via coord W794752, recon platoon destroyed 2 pigs. At 1000H, 1 BM from Co C accidentally shot himself in the head while cleaning an M-16 rifle, and was immediately evacuated. At 1030H, via coord W794753, Co F discovered 480 gals of cooking oil. At 1230H elements of the Recon platoon moved to coord W7972751 to escort an Rgt work party at AO PLACE-HOUSE via coord W7027780. The mission was completed at 1400H. At 1530H via coord W7955762 an individual from Co B received shrapnel in the knee from a grenade used to blow a bunker while on patrol. The man was evacuated. At 1800H all elements closed laager area.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A continued S&D operation NW of 1000. The VC base camp containing 20 pigs, 20 chickens, grenades, huts, 2 weapons and documents were found and destroyed via coord W7950708. A telephone was connected to a wire line discovered via coord W7964750 and Vietnamese voices were heard. Co A joined the Rgt night perimeter via coord W7964756 at 1730H. Co B continued S&D operations NW of 1000. At 1130H Co C found and destroyed 1 weapon and 400 lbs of polished rice via coord W7966785. At 1330H Co B destroyed six 2 man bunkers via coord W7964756. 1 VC KIA (MC) wrapped in poncho was found via coord W7964756. Co C continued S&D operation NW of 1000. At 1700H Co C found and destroyed one 55 gal drum of polished rice via coord W7964756 at 1330H.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued IS 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Ban Thang Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(10) 9 Mar 67 (D-15):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The recon platoon and Rgt element received approximately 150 mortar rds at coord K1954778 at 0430H, all landed out side the perimeter. No friendly casualties were received. Co A found twenty 5 gal cans of lead type (English) and a lead plate type setting at coord K1955764. Co C received sniper fire via of coord K1956769. Fire was returned resulting in 2 VC KIA (MC) and an additional 5 tons of rice was found.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0130H Co B & C reported incoming mortar rds to the North of their position. At 0430H 2/12 attacked along Axis C-THUDON and Axis BULINT, to objective via coord W7973000. At 1215H via coord W7970777, Co B discovered a hut containing approximately 15 lbs of bicycle parts. At 1330H via coord W7937768, Co A destroyed a 55 gal drum of kerosene. At 1330H, via coord W7940771, Co C located an empty underground room 12'x12'x20'. At 1530H via coord W7927732, Co B discovered a deserted base camp. The base camp was 100-150 meters in diameter, with surrounding trench system and connecting trenches and tunnels. At 1800H the Rgt closed objective area.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co A continued S&D operation NW of 1000. At 1600H Co A joined battalion perimeter via coord W7940000. Co B continued S&D operation and destroyed five 55 gallon drums of kerosene via coord W7945708. Co B joined defensive perimeter via coord W7940000 at 1600H. Co C continued S&D operation. A base camp was found and destroyed via coord W7964753. Co C joined defensive perimeter via coord W7940000 at 1600H.



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(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bde.

(a) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes. At 0100H Co A conducted S&D operations to coord RT512488.

(19) 10 Mar 1967 (D-16):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued local patrols and ambushes, continued searching area of previous day's action.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0915H, via coord VT988403, Companies A&B attached through AO WHITE. At 1143H, Co C attached through AO BLUE. At 1333H, CP Group 2/22 Inf (M) followed Co C axis of advance to a Bn laager site via coord VT982295. Co A laagered via VT984830. At 1425H, via coord VT984184, Co A discovered a base camp, surrounded by a bunker and trench system with six huts, two of which had concrete floors. In one hut 50 lbs of document and propaganda sheets were found.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn continued S&D operation until 1711H when a Bn night defense perimeter was established via coord VT772824.

(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bde.

(a) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(20) 11 Mar 67 (D-17):

(a) 2/2 Inf: Continued S&D operations via VT995805.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A, B and C conducted S&D operations in designated area of Bn AO. Co A laagered at coord VT983888. Co B laagered at coord VT984827. Co C laagered with Bn CP Group, via coord VT983826.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A departed Bn defensive position via coord VT772824 and conducted S&D operation to the Northeast. A Co returned to Bn defensive perimeter via coord VT772829 at 1900H. Co B secured Bn defensive perimeter via coord VT772824. Co C departed Bn defensive perimeter and conducted S&D operations South along Jaoi La M. River. Fourteen huts, a wall, a latrine, quantities of cement and documents were found and destroyed via coord VT772824. Co C closed Bn defensive perimeter coord VT772824 at 1530H.

(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bde, C/1/Arty became attached 2/77 Arty.

(a) 2/14 Inf: Secured Don Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(c) 1/34th Inf (M): OFCEN 3d Bde OFCEN, continued S&D operations and blocking positions VT772824, destroyed one small base camp at VT774827.

(21) 12 Mar 67 (D-18):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued local patrols and ambushes, continued S&D operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A, B and C conducted S&D operations in designated area of Bn AO. Co A laagered at via coord VT983888. Co B laagered at coord VT984827. Co C laagered with the Bn CP Group, via coord VT983826.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A&B continued defense of battalion perimeter via coord VT772824. Co C conducted S&D operations to the West and returned to Bn base at 1330H.

(4) 2/77 Arty: 2/2/77 moved by convey from FUB MB (VT988403) to Military Reservation (RT577021) and remained there.

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(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dau Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 2/14 Inf (M): SMO operations, destroyed two 2.75 rockets at WY7770, 3 huts, 2 bunkers, 12 huts, 1000 lbs fire, 1 bicycle at WY7779.

(22) 13 Mar 67 (D-19):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Recon platoon destroyed one boat, two bunkers at WY7777, Co C destroyed 2 walls and 2 foxholes at WY786779.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At vic coord WY772229, Co A discovered one accordion, one trailing aid of 2 US M1 carbines, and one sack filled with rice. At 1014M, vic coord WY779912, Recon pl 2/22 Inf (M) discovered an East-West trench line 150 meters long, which contained 10 lbs of documents. Co C lagged at the same location on 12 Mar 67.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A&B conducted SMO operations to the Southeast and Northwest of Bn base via coord WY772222. Both units closed Bn base by 1600H. Co C secured Bn perimeter.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dau Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 1/5th Inf (M): Conducted SMO operations via WY766783. Co A made contact with unknown number of VC resulting in one VC KIA, one US KIA, destroyed one foot bridge, 4 bunkers, 8 huts, 4 cases primers ink, 165 gals motor oil, killed one VC, captured 1 Chinese carbine.

(23) 14 Mar 67 (D-20):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The 2/12 Inf conducted SMO operations North toward OMI HMT via WY773003 and discovered a Viet side base camp and recreation area at WY771797. They then established blocking position HED at WY773003.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): Companies A,B and C 2/22 Inf (M) conducted SMO operations in designated sectors of Bn AO. At 1120H via coord WY770050, a patrol from Co A received one US M1 from a VC force of unknown size. Area was swept with neg results. Co A lagged via coord WY773226, Co B lagged coord WY773227, and Co C lagged with Bn CP Group at coord WY773226.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf departed Bn base via coord WY777724 and moved to FE HED via coord WY773002. Bn elements secured LE HED for the extraction of 2/12 Inf.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued DS, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Inf: Secured Dau Tieng Base Camp, conducted local patrols and ambushes.

(f) 1/5th Inf (M): Reported for Bn Co to come under OTCN 1944h 2d Inf Bn at 1530H. At 1600H Recon pl 2d Inf APC damaged by a mine at WY770750. B Co had one APC damaged by a mine at WY773733 resulting in light damage.

(24) 15 Mar 67 (D-21):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 0800H the Bn (-) hoisted from blocking position HED to Trail B1 and then shifted by 0-123 to Dau Tieng clearing base camp at 1330H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): 2/22 Inf (M) executed 2/77 Arty and elements of 2/12 Arty to Dau Tieng. The Bn closed Camp Baidar at 1600H.

(c) 3/22 Inf: The Bn was extracted from FE HED via coord WY773002 by 0-123 to Trail B1 and shifted to Dau Tieng by 0-123. Bn closed Dau Tieng by 1600H.

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(4) 2/77 Arty: Operation terminated. Batteries leapfrogged into positions along the route of march to provide continuous artillery coverage.

(6) 2/14 Inf: Released from security mission of Don Tieng Base Camp, began move to Cu Chi.

(25) 16 Mar (D+22):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Base camp security, local patrols and ambushes, prepared for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Base camp security, local patrols and ambushes, prepared for future operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Base camp security, local patrols and ambushes, prepared for future operations.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Prepared for continuation of operations.

(26) 17 Mar 67 (D+23):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued security of Don Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Continued security of Don Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Continued security of Don Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued security of Don Tieng Base Camp prepared for continuation of operation.

(27) 18 Mar 67 (D+24):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The 2/12 Inf airlifted from Don Tieng at 0850H by C-123 to Sui Da, clearing at 0945H. The BN (-) spent the rest of the day at Sui Da.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0650H 2/22 Inf (N) (-) inserted Camp Raider for coord KX367035. At 0730H Co C and Recon departed Sui Da enroute to coord KX367035. At 0750H, via coord KX366330, an APC M113 from Co C detonated a mine resulting in 4 US KIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 0800H, via coord KX366330, an APC M113 from the Recon platoon detonated a mine resulting in 4 US KIA with moderate damage to the APC. At 0850H via coord KX366443 Recon platoon received 2 to 3 rds from an RPG II, resulting in no casualties. Air strikes were immediately called to cover the hostile area. Recon platoon continued to receive RPG II fire from two positions at the same location. At 0950H Recon had another RPG II hit an APC resulting in 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA. At 1100H, after 6 T-28 air strikes, and artillery preparation Co B swept the area in which Recon had contact. At 1200H, an APC from Co B detonated a mine resulting in 6 US KIA and one APC M113 destroyed. One US KIA was killed by small arms fire. Co B completed the area sweep with no results. At 1600H 2/22 Inf (N) departed at via coord KX366443.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf began Operation JUNCTION CITY, PHASE II at 0800H when BN elements were airlifted by C-123 to Sui Da via coord KX366575. Airlift was completed at 0850H and a defensive perimeter was established via coord KX366575.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty, less Btry A, moved by convoy to Sui Da (KX366575). Btry C occupied a position at PHU HUNG (KX366477) with the mission of direct support to 3/22 Inf (N) as they moved overland to LE SILVER. 2/77 tactical headquarters and Batteries A and B prepared for airlift into LE SILVER. 2/23 Arty moved to Don Tieng for base camp defense.

(e) 2/14 Arty: At 0450H platoon in ARL at KX366467, removed ARL at 1750H after sweeping was completed. Base teams attached to each Inf BN.

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(28) 19 Mar 67 (DeS):

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(a) 2/12 Inf: At 1300N the Bn (-) was airlifted into LZ GOLD. Lift was completed at 1415N. Bn (-) moved to via coord (XJ364700) to set up a CP and assist in providing security of LZ GOLD.

(b) 2/12 Inf (M): At 0650N, Recon plt moved as the Bn advanced guard to coord XJ375673. At 0756N, Recon plt received an RPG II and small arms fire at coord XJ375673. Co A swept the area and found one US claymore mine with blasting cap, one battery and one Chinese hand grenade. At 0915N via coord XJ377677 Recon plt again received RPG II and small arms fire. 81mm mortars and artillery were employed. After the supporting fires had ceased the area was swept with neg results. At 1205N, via coord XJ378676, Co A received small arms fire and 1 claymore mine, resulting in 4 US KIA, and 2 US WIA. Co A was withdrawn and two sections of TAC air were employed along with medium and light artillery. At 1545N Recon and Co C closed the Bn laager area via coord XJ377672. At 1615N Co B swept the area of Co A's contact and came under small arms fire, but received no casualties. Co B found a heavy blood trail (1 VC KIA Poss) and 2 light blood trails (2 VC KIA Poss). Co B also destroyed two AT mines at coord XJ377677. At 1700N Co C received one US WIA which resulted from a short artillery round at via coord XJ377672. At 1715N Co A moved to coord XJ400637, and was placed under OPCK of 2/34th Armer.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B began an airborne assault into LZ GOLD via coord XJ365704 at 1015N. B Co's 3d lift landed, hidden VC triggered a command detonated mine causing heavy damage to 4 helicopters and numerous casualties among Co B personnel. When Co A's first and second lifts landed on LZ GOLD, the VC detonated two additional command detonated mines causing heavy damage to the remaining helicopters. VC snipers in the tree line surrounding LZ GOLD were engaged with unknown results. LZ GOLD was secured and defensive perimeter established at 1300N. Results of assault: Three UNHs destroyed, three UNHs damaged, ten US KIA, eighteen US WIA, seven aviators KIA. A sweep of the LZ revealed nineteen 81mm mortar rds and two 175mm rounds rigged for command detonation. Company C (-) continued security for Bn CP at Sui Da via coord XJ344583.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Headquarters, 2/77 Arty, Batteries A and B airlifted into LZ GOLD, (XJ35705), after the LZ had been secured by 3/22 Inf. LZ GOLD was then redesignated Fire Support Team GOLD. (A last minute change in plans designated GOLD instead of SILVER as the objective area).

(e) 2/34 Armer (-): Became OPCK 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div, cross attached one Co with 2/22 Inf (M):

(29) 20 Mar (DeS):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 0730N the Bn (-) commenced movement to AO ORANGE. At 1305N the Bn located a small base camp at coord (XJ343711). One claymore was detonated as US forces approached base camp, resulting in neg friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown.

(b) 2/28 Inf (M): At 0930N via coord XJ378676, Co B discovered a large base camp and captured eight weapons. Approximately 30 rifle grenades, 4 directional mines, 40 lbs of documents, and approximately 3000 lbs of assorted items consisting of clothing material and guns were also captured. At 1215N Co A 2/34 Armer was placed under OPCK of 2/28 Inf (M). At 1230N 2/28 Inf (M) laagered at coord XJ344583.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued security for GOLD and conducted platoon size reconnaissance patrols with neg results. Co C (-) continued security mission for Bn CP at Sui Da. A Company B ambush patrol located via coord XJ365704 reported heavy VC movement at 1930N.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Battery C airlifted into FMS GOLD joining the remainder of the Bn. C/2/77 Arty became attached and occupied positions at FMS ORANGE.

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(a) 2/14 Arroyo (-): At 0730H, elements began movement toward affected area at 0830H. At 1130H, elements began movement toward AO BLANK. At 1200H received 1 MFG II rd, no damage or casualties. At 1200H located small VC base camp, located at XT68716.

(E) 21 March 67 (De27):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 2100H Mar 67, the 2/12 Inf located via coord XT68716 was alerted by HQ, 3d Div, that FSB GOLD was under attack and to be prepared to move to that location. Co C, 2/12 Inf was alerted to move and received the order to move to FSB GOLD at 0400H. The 2/12 Inf received 16 rds of mortar fire of unknown origin at 0700H. Six rounds fell on the CP Group resulting in 5 KIA within the CP Group and 2 MIA within the Recon platoon. Approximately 10 rds falling on A and B Co resulting in 1 KIA and 7 MIA of Co A and 1 MIA from Co B. At 0740H Co C, moved toward FSB GOLD by the most direct route. Co A followed a proximately 15 minutes later. Co B, secured an LZ successfully effecting a DUST-OFF for injured personnel. About 0800H Co B, CP Group and Recon platoon departed for FSB GOLD. Co C moved at maximum speed through 1500 meters of heavy bamboo thicket. They were exposed to sporadic sniper fire and mortar fire in an effort to prevent them from reinforcing the units under attack. Lead elements of Co C made contact with the enemy security forces as they reached the outer perimeter of FSB GOLD at 0800H. The 33 of the 3/22 Inf directed Co C to take up defensive positions on the Southwest portion of the perimeter as the unit closed in at 0830H. During movement to relieve the units under attack C Company received 6 MIA. Upon arrival of Co C along with outer reinforcing friendly forces the VC broke contact after suffering heavy casualties. Co C was joined by other elements of the 2/12 Inf as they arrived at FSB GOLD. Co A made contact with 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA during a sweep of the perimeter.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0800H Recon and Co C led the BN to reinforce 3/22 Inf and 2/77 Arty at FSB GOLD and began engaging the enemy. Two minor US KIA and 4 VC POW and a large amount of weapons and ammunition resulted from this engagement. At 1200H via coord XT68716 Recon platoon 2/22 Inf (N) departed to recover the bodies of 2 Air Force FIC KIA resulting from the crash of a F4C plane shot down during the battle. Upon reaching the site the bodies were recovered. Also, 7 VC KIA were found via coord XT68716. The BN departed at coord XT68716. The BN collected an additional 30 VC (BC) after the battle of FSB GOLD. This BC was submitted for addition to the BN total.

(c) 3/22 Inf: C Co (-) continued security mission for Brigade CT at Sui Do via coord XT68716. A and B Companies continued security mission for FSB GOLD via coord XT68716. At 0400H, B Co, 3d Platoon ambushed located via coord XT68716 reported movement in front of and around the ambush position. No further movement was reported and at 0600H patrol prepared to return to GOLD. At 0615H FSB GOLD came under heavy enemy (C and D) mortar attack, and 3d Platoon ambush patrol made contact with a large VC force. Within five minutes this patrol was overrun and all personnel were killed or wounded. At 0630H the Reconnaissance Patrol, 3/22 Inf engaged a large VC force which had approached to within thirty-five meters of FSB GOLD's Southeastern perimeter. Shortly thereafter, the entire perimeter came under attack by waves of VC firing recoilless rifles, RPG II rocket launchers, automatic weapons and other small arms. Heaviest attacks were concentrated on the Northeast and Southeastern portions of the battalion defensive perimeter around FSB GOLD. As the attack continued, the three artillery batteries of the 2/77 Arty began firing counter-mortar fire in an effort to neutralize the VC mortar concentrations which continued to rain the entire fire support base. During the initial assault, Co B reported that 1st Platoon positions (Southeastern perimeter) had been penetrated and that the reaction force from 2/77 Arty was required to reinforce this sector. At 0700H the reaction force began moving to the 1st Platoon's portion of the perimeter. At 0700H the first FSB arrived at GOLD and within five minutes airstrikes had begun. Additionally, close supporting fires from two batteries of 105mm (W) had been brought in to within one hundred meters of the battalion's perimeter. At 0715H, Co B reported that the 1st Platoon had been overrun and surrounded by a heavy VC attack. Airstrikes were called in along the contact perimeter to relieve the pressure on the perimeter. The FIC who was controlling these strikes was killed by VC anti-aircraft weapons fire and was shot down. At 0730H, the 2d Platoon reported that

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The 2/77 Artillery fire beehive rounds into the Southeastern and Southern sectors of his perimeter. At 0750H B Company reported that complete penetration had been made in 1st Platoon's sector and that ammunition reserves were exhausted. Ammunition and a twenty and reaction force from A Company were sent to B Company at 0815H when B Company's Northern sector was overrun by another human wave attack. At 0815H A Company's night ambush patrol which had established a night ambush at the corner of the perimeter reported that a VC penetration had been made in the Northern sector of the perimeter. At 0820H the 1st Squad located in the Northern sector of the perimeter was hit by 82mm mortar rounds and overrun. By 0840H, the Northeastern, Eastern, and Southeastern portions of FSB GOLD's perimeter had withdrawn to a secondary defensive line around the guns of the artillery batteries. The Northern, Western, and Southern sectors held firm despite the presence of large numbers of VC who had infiltrated to within fifteen to twenty-five meters of the defensive barriers. Attacking VC had infiltrated to within hand grenade range of the Battalion CP and to within five meters of the Battalion Aid Station. To counter this new threat, the remaining howitzers of the 2/77 Artillery began firing beehive rounds into the attacking VC. Airstrikes were brought in to within fifty (50) meters of friendly forces and supporting 105mm and 155mm batteries threw up a continuous wall of high explosive around the battalion perimeter. When the 2/77 Artillery exhausted its supply of beehive rounds, HE rounds of charge and were fired direct fire at point blank range. At 0900H the situation, though tense because of ammunition shortages, was still under control. The Northern, Western, and Southern sectors of the perimeter were still intact and under moderate pressure from the VC. Although pushed in, the Northeastern, Southeastern, Eastern portion of the perimeter were intact and had contained and broken the continuous VC attacks which had been thrown against them. At 0900H, a relief column from the 2/12 Inf broke through from the South and linked up with Company B, joining forces, Co B and elements from the 2/12 Inf counter-attacked from West to East to re-establish the original perimeter. At 0915H, a mechanized infantry and armor column from the 2/22 Inf and the 2/34 Armor, broke through from the Southwest and swept forward along the trailhead toward the Northwest. By 0920H the original perimeter had been re-established and mopping up operations had begun. At 1000H four (4) resupply UNID's arrived at FSB GOLD with ammunition and began evacuating the wounded. By 1045H medical evacuation of friendly casualties had been accomplished; the battle area had been secured; and artillery and airstrikes continued to pound the VC routes of withdrawal. For the remainder of the day, battalion elements continued police of the battle area and reorganized for future combat actions.

(d) 2/77 Art: 2/77 Art remained at HILLTOP and supported elements in contact. The Bn received mortar and ground attack in conjunction with attack on 1/22 Inf (-) at FSB GOLD. Bn adjusted artillery and air strikes. Artillery was initially fired as counter mortar then guns were used in a direct-fire final protective role. Bn observed FSB crash at 0745H, requested and got another FSB. Bn had three guns out of action at 0815H and 1 Bn had one gun out of action. Bn penetrated to vic of one gun position. Bn began using beehive rounds in direct fire supplementing with HE. By the end of the action 17 guns were damaged but all but three were kept operational through combat action.

(e) 2/34 Armor (-): At 210000H 2/34 Armor (-) effected link up with elements of 2/22 Inf (M) followed the column to relief of FSB GOLD.

(f) 22 Mar 67 (B-40):

(g) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) assisted in securing FSB GOLD with local patrolling. Results were 13 VC bodies discovered as well as a quantity of miscellaneous equipment.

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(b) 2/22 Inf (N): 2/22 Inf (N) moved from FSB OCLD via air to XT36706 and attacked to secure Obj K1 via road XT36727. At 0913H, Tn A 2/14 Armor attached followed by B 2/22 Inf. Tn B 2/22 Inf attacked via road XT36705. Tn A detected 2 enemy AT mines with no casualties. They also located a grave site containing one VC. At 1043H via road XT36706, another grave site was discovered. At 1412H, Spoon and the CP Group 2/22 Inf (N) moved along Axis WHITE to join Tn A 2/14 Armor. At 1710H Tn C 2/22 Inf (N) and Tn A 2/14 Armor discovered a base camp which contained 30 hand grenades. At 1900H the Bn moved. Three pre-planned air strikes were placed along axis of advance coord XT36756.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued security of FSB XED. One US KIA received at 0530H when individual failed to answer challenge. A reconnaissance patrol found two VC KIA (HC) and one RPG II rocket round. Two VC KIA credited to the Battle of Sam Tre on 21 Nov 67. Co C (-) continued security mission for Bn CP at Sam Tre.

(d) 2/77 Art: Continued DE mission.

(e) 2/14 Armor: Continued sweep in area of previous day's battle in conjunction with 2/22 Inf (N).

(f) A Trp 3/4 Cav: Heavy security.

(3) 23 Mar 67 (Sat):

(a) 2/12 Inf: At 0800H Co B ambush patrol reported finding 1 VC body, 1 can of machinegun ammo, 1 VC hat, 4 grave sites, web gear, grenades and a hand made stretcher at coord XT36703. At 0915H the Bn was alerted reported finding 1 Chinese grenade and one VC bunker at XT36707. Co A reported 5 VC bodies at coord XT36715 at 1115H. Co B found 2 VC bodies at coord XT36777. All were results of the Battle of Sam Tre. In the area of the battle large amounts of web gear, grenades, small arms ammunition and 3 RPG II anti-tank weapons were located.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0815H Tn C 2/22 Inf (N) departed Lager area in route to Obj K1. At 0840H via road XT371736 Tn C found several garden plots and bunkers with evidence of recent occupancy. At 0915H they discovered two hole sites 20' x 20' and 15' x 15', via road XT370737. Both hole sites were well bunkered. At 0930H via road XT367726 the Bn PAC reported receiving heavy ground fire. At 0930H Tn C destroyed four garden plots, three hole sites, and two dozen garden tools at coord XT371726. At 1125H via road XT367727 Tn C discovered three VC KIA (HC) in bunkers. The 3 VC KIA were the result of air strikes at 0930H. At 1315H via road XT367728 Tn C discovered 8 footlockers around a clearing. At 1330H Tn B discovered a VC base camp with a trench line running S-N at coord XT367726. At 1500H Tn B engaged an undetermined size VC force. Three claymore mines were fired at their location. Artillery was fired into the area but with unknown results. At 1600H via XT367721 Tn C had one officer KIA. At 1800H Co C discovered two VC KIA (HC) and captured one oil AS grease gun. At 1900H the last element of 2/22 closed the Lager site at coord XT371723.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A & B continued security mission for FSB OCLD. At 0800H Co B ambush patrol located six VC bodies, one machine gun barrel and 200' rds of ammo via road XT36706. VC KIA credited to the Battle of Sam Tre, 21 Nov. Co C (-) continued security mission for Bn CP at Sam Tre.

(d) 2/77 Art: Continued DE, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Armor (-): Continued attack into War Zone C with no contact.

(f) 4/14 Cav (-): SPURS 3d Bn, continued mission of securing escape routes between Tay Ninh, Sam Tre, FSB XED with no contact.

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(17) 24 Mar 67 (D-31):

(a) 2/22 Inf: At 0800H Co B reported finding a VC body at coord IX369702. At 0840H Co A captured 1 VC POW from the Battle of Sui Tro at coord IX369711.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 0910H Co B reported the larger position for pre-designated JAD operations. At 1000H Co A 2/34 Armor departed on JAD operations. At 0940H Co C departed in route to previous day's contact. At 0940H via coord IX361712 Co B discovered a cache of loose rice in a hole about 1/2 mile. It was destroyed in place. At 1000H Co C discovered one moss ball and a variety of livestock. One VC KIA was also captured. At 1030H via coord IX361711 Co B found a bloody trail (1 VC KIA Posing). POW captured by Co C stated that the 15th and 16th Regt took part in the action of 21 March 67. At 1145H Co C found three VC PWs in a trench which were destroyed in place. At 1200H via coord IX361701 Co B discovered a base camp which contained a pair of bloody trousers (1 VC KIA Posing), evidence indicated that fifteen VC had spent the night there. At 1530H via coord IX361728 Co C discovered and destroyed one 500 lb bomb. At 1930H all elements closed larger areas.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A & B continued security mission for FSB OCLB. Co A (-) conducted a one day JAD operation Northwest of FSB OCLB. Five VC bodies were found via coord IX361716, credited to Battle of Sui Tro. Co C continued security of Bn CP at Sui Tro.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB, 34, Bn.

(e) 2/34 Armor: Continued attack into War Zone C.

(f) 4/23 Inf (H): OPOW 34 Bn.

(18) 25 Mar 67 (D-31):

(a) 2/22 Inf: The 2/22 Inf advanced along with OCLB and set up the CP at coord IX361723.

(b) 2/22 Inf (H): At 1030H via coord IX361710, Co C discovered an enemy bag and Chicom granades. There was evidence of recent activity at this location. At 1530H, 2/22 Inf CP Group with Co A 2/34 Armor closed new larger site via coord IX361720. At 1730H Co B arrived at the larger site to take up security positions. At 1840H all elements closed in larger site.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Companies A and B continued security mission for FSB OCLB. An A Co ambush patrol observed one VC via coord IX361697. Artillery was called in with unknown results. Co C (-) infiltrated into LB OCLB at 0730H and joined the Bn perimeter at FSB OCLB. An ambush patrol from Co C (-) found three VC bodies, one pistol belt, one entrenching tool, one canteen, detaching cord and clothing via coord IX361709. Three VC KIA were credited to the Battle of Sui Tro, 21 Mar.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB 34 Bn.

(e) 2/34 Armor: Continued JAD operation in AO HACH, located 8 bunkers and 800 lbs unpolished rice at IX361702. An estimated VC Co was observed from the air at IX361765, air strikes and artillery were called in and 2/34 Armor pursued, located 5 VC KIA (H), killed by artillery, observed one secondary explosion in vic of air strikes. Received one RPO II round and spotted 5 VC, engaged with unknown results. One APO damaged. Bn lagged at IX361734.

(f) 2/77 Arty: Continued SB 34 Bn.

(g) 6/3 Bn: Continued clearing and repairing road from FSB HONK to LB IX361734. Lead elements of road clearing team were engaged by approximately 14 VC at IX361765, air strikes and artillery called in, results were 2 VC KIA and 8 VC KIA, unknown enemy results.

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(S) 25 Apr 67 (DUE)

b) 2/2 1971 Continued MD operations, resolved major fire at 1700 JTD with no results.

[illegible]

(b) 1/22/78: Co A continued security situation for F32 T22. An ambush patrol from Co A found two Viet minh in pit near by, two grenades, clothing and food etc. (cont) 1/23/78: A night ambush patrol from B Co detected movement at 2200H via comd 1/23/78G and returned to C22 at 2300H. Co C (-) continued security of F32 T22. A 24-man ambush patrol located two VC houses, two LA, one 4-1 pit, and one 4-11 pit at 0600H via comd 1/23/78G. At 1100H 1st pit patrol found and destroyed a one-man concrete 4-1 pit house, eight houses, a kitchen, and a classroom via comd 1/23/78G. At 1300H two VC houses with guns etc and opium were found via comd 1/23/78G. An ambush patrol from Co C (-) called in artillery on movement via comd 1/23/78G at 1500H resulting. Six VC KIA (K) (Kills of Just Two).

(4) 2/77 Arson Contaminated DB, 3: 2b.

2) 1/24 Arrives Continued 240 operations in 40 place. in  
24000' at 17.5/20.

On 12/12/67 (14) conducted 30 operations in area, and the aircraft numbers are F71348, F71372, and F71416. On 12/13/67, one aircraft was damaged with 147 engine, unknown results. At 1314 (12/13/67) a 147 engine was damaged against 2/1/73 resulting in 3 147s. One A/C damaged as a result of a ship. 147s to engine of 2 unknown results. On 12/14/67 with A/C Co at 1212 20 and 12/12/67 at 120 0000.

(g) C/A Ragni conducted a search from F21 2000 to F21 0000, destroyed one satellite mine at 171000, CP located at F21 2000.

(66) 27 Nov 67 (D-D):

(a) 2/12 Ref: Bu (-) conducts: SMO operations in AO WASH. In (-) discovered a SMO in bomb at coord 2307779 and in separate location were mortar rounds. These were all set up to be command destroyed. All were destroyed.

(U) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0500H Co B reported in larger site on an old position. At 0600H Co C departed the in larger site on a 1st position. At 1300H via comd ITX0110 Co B discovered an abandoned base camp. Within the camp they found 150 transportation crates of various size, 100 15 bags of rice, 100 containers, rubber shoes for soldiers and 3 recently dug handholes. All equipment was destroyed. At 1700H an LP from 4th Armor reported hearing mortar rounds to their front at a position of 500-500 meters. Artillery was placed on the target area, but with no results. At 2200H, an LP from Co B reported movement to their front. After engagement with hand grenades, a patrol made a search of the area with no results.

(6) 3/72 Info A and B Companies continued security mission for FSB 002A. On 6/72 conducted 243 operations in Eastern sector of 4000A. On 6/72 1st AC 24 pl teams cleared FSB 002A - 132A while 24 pl established a night ambush patrol via cord ST300737.

(C) 2/77 After Continued Ill, X Dies.

(6) 1/26 Lunar: Continued SLD mission.

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(f) 4/23 Inf (-): Continued S&D in area.

(g) C/4 Regt: Located and destroyed one 20 lb mine at KTH1435.

(37) 28 Mar 67 (D-34):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued S&D operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0815H Co B departed the Bn larger area to conduct S&D operations in the sector. At 1400H Co C departed the larger area to conduct S&D operations in the sector. At 1400H after completing the S&D operation in sector, Co C returned to the Bn larger area to perform reconnaissance. At 1515H a combat patrol from Room pit 1/77 Inf (N) conducted a S&D operation to the South of the Bn larger position. The patrol closed in the larger area at 1800H. The result of the patrol was the discovery of one 55 gal drum of CB which was destroyed in the larger area.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn conducted security mission from FEB 0210 and conducted daylight reconnaissance and night ambush patrols within the Bn area.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued S&D, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/14 Arty (-): Continued S&D in AO H-14. The VC were seen at KTH1375 and engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA (K) and one Chinese cart and miscellaneous personal documents captured.

(f) 4/23 Inf (N): Assumed OPCH of C/1/10 Cav and their mission of Route 239 security and survey work. Reported surveys between the Trung, Tay Nhat, and 3d Bn and FEB Brown.

(g) 4/14 Cav: Released OPCH of 3d Bn, 4th Inf Div at 0815H.

(h) C/4th Regt: Continued present mission of spending time, destroyed one 20 lb mine at KTH1465.

(38) 29 Mar 67 (D-35):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted S&D operations Northwest toward FC COMB with no contact.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0700H the Room pit team departed the Bn larger area heading South. At 0715H, Co B and C proceeded to the Western edge of the Bn AO. The Bn was caught to the east with two companies strong. At 0815H the CP Group and Co A 2/14 Arty departed to a new larger area. At 1015H Co B discovered 10 bats, one clothing, 2 Chinese grenades, and 1 lb of dynamite. At 1515H Co C closed the larger position. At 1615H a Room element crossed a stream via camp KTH1474 and found evidence of recent cutting of trees. At approximately 1900H Room element returned to the larger position.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn conducted security of FEB 0210 and at 1115H began a S&D operation to the Southwest. At 1130H Co A found and destroyed three bunkers and five bunkers via camp KTH15705. The VC KIA (K) were credited to the Battle of Binh Tru. At 1315H two last observations were on contact from a Bn via camp KTH1584. Co C (-) had no contact. A Bn perimeter was established via camp KTH15799 and night missions were established. A patrol from Co C (-) observed three VC via camp KTH1570 at 2115H and called in arty fire with unknown results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty airlifted from FEB 0210 to Binh Tru and, less Coy A, assigned to FEB 0210. A Coy occupied positions at Binh Tru. 2/12 Arty assigned from French Post (KTH1445) and joined the Bn at FEB 0210.

(e) 2/14 Arty: Continued search and destroy mission.

(f) 4/23 Inf (N): Continued S&D mission.

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(19) 30 Mar 67 (D-36):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted S&D operation Southeast to PL 00284.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Approximately 0600H Co C departed the Lager site for S&D operation along assigned axis to the Southeast. Approximately 0700H Co B departed Lager site for S&D operations to the Southeast. At 1000H the CP Group with the second platoon closed at an intermediate Lager site via coord KX17240. At 1100H via coord KX177500 Co B received small arms fire from an estimated reinforced VC squad. There was one US M&A and no enemy casualties. Co B also detected a mine with an APC M&A. This was a pressure type mine employing 100mm mortar mine. There was no damage to personnel or equipment. At 1400H Co A & 2/14 Armor continued to move on their axis to the Southeast. At 1500H Co B discovered hand grenades, clothing and claymore mines in the vic of their previous contact. At 1515H via coord KX185600, Co C received small arms fire and hand grenades. Artillery was employed into the area with unknown results. At 1600H Co C received two AF rds into their position. An APC was hit with both rds causing 3 US M&A with moderate damage to the APC. At 1700H Co B found three claymore mines.

(c) 3/22 Inf: 3/22 Inf continued S&D operations Southeast of FBN 0015. Co A found and destroyed 2 grenades rigged as booby traps via coord KX117667. Co B found and destroyed three 75mm howitzer rds and three 120mm mortar rds via coord KX116677 at 1015H. Two men and one dog suffered from heat exhaustion and were evacuated from a LZ via coord KX116677. At 1710H a Bn perimeter was established via coord KX122660.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued IB, 3d Bde.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Continued S&D operations.

(f) 2/14 Armor (-): Continued S&D operations.

(10) 31 Mar 67 (D-37):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) crossed PL 00284 via coord KX199362 and conducted a S&D operation Southeast to PL 00284 via coord KX116576.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): All elements of the Bn proceeded to the Southeast and searched areas of the previous day contact. At 0822H Co C found entrance to VC KLA (Pons). At 0930H Co B discovered a classroom 15m x 20 meters with a seating capacity for 70 personnel. At 0955H Co B discovered another classroom which contained 26 5 man tables, and a mess hall. At 1025H via coord KX192601, Co A discovered 3 fresh graves (3 VC KIA DC). At 1100H via coord KX190600, Co C found one bolt action carbine. At 1115H Co B found one carbine, 3 claymore mines, and sixty 60mm mortar rds. At 1310H Co B discovered 7 bicycles and several rds of ammunition, which were destroyed. At 1330H, Co B discovered an ammo cache which contained a new type grenade. At 1335H Co A & 2/14 Armor found a bin of rice measuring 6'x3'x3' and 4 bicycles. At 1417H Co A & 2/14 Armor discovered 10 bags of rice at coord KX186677. Also discovered were three claymore mines, one 105mm dsh, 10 bicycles and approximately 400 lbs of rice which were destroyed. At 1420H via coord KX187601, Co B found two carbines. At 1445H via coord KX187676 Co A & 2/14 Armor discovered a base camp which had been recently used. It was well constructed and contained beds, bunkers, and a mess hall with a 40 man sitting capacity. Evidence indicated that the base camp was a medical school. At 1535H Co B discovered two bunker systems approximately 200 meters in length. At 1545H via coord KX187609, Co C discovered a long base camp with several well built bunkers. At 1550H via coord KX186601, Co B discovered a trench system in the slope of a star and two more small base camps.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Bn elements continued S&D operations Southeast of FBN 0015. Co B found and destroyed one Chicom AP mine and one 250 lb bomb (DP) via coord KX122699. At 1335H Co C (-) engaged an estimated VC squad with unknown results via coord KX122655. At same

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Location C Co (-) found and destroyed a VC base camp (190x250 meters) which contained hats, bunkers, a well, bicycles and parts, clothing, a compressor and documents. A perimeter was established at 1600H via coord XH23633.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued BS M Bds.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Continued present mission, located and destroyed bunkers and a trench at XH23633, injured one civilian via Sam Bds, evacuated.

(f) 2/34 Armer (-): Continued to attack PL COMPA, crossed PL COMPA with no contact, hit a mine at XH27634 with heavy damage to one tank, no casualties.

(g) C/4 Regt: Received one RPG II rd at XH27634, resulting in 3 US KIA and one bulldozer damaged. Fire was returned with unknown results. One homemade mine destroyed at XH23633.

(h) 1 Apr 67 (D-38):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued operations south of PL COMPA.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0700H began moving enroute to via XH27625. At 0947H coord XH27625 an AFG M113 from Co B detonated a mine resulting in 1 US MIA with moderate damage to the AFG. At 1130H the Bn Recon elements moved South of the larger area coord XH27625, to check for possible crossing sites. At 1140H all companies moved out on S&D missions. At 1800H all companies had closed the Bn larger site via coord XH27625.

(c) 1/22 Inf: 1/22 Inf continued S&D operations SW of FSB COMPA. Co A found and destroyed 20 old bunkers via coord XH10653, and an abandoned VC base camp via coord XH13648. Fifteen bunkers were found and destroyed via coord XH27636. Co B found and destroyed a weapons cache via coord XH25637. Cache contained one German Mauser rifle, one M40 rd barrel, 200 rifle grenades, tools and assorted ammunition and explosives. Co C (-) engaged an unknown number of VC via coord XH28637 at 1605H resulting in 1 VC KIA (HC) and 1 AL-47 captured. A VC base camp was found and destroyed via coord XH28637. 1/22 Inf established a night defensive perimeter via coord XH23633.

(d) 2/77 Arty: C/1/8th Arty was detached from 2/77 Arty and departed.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): A Co received one RPG II at XH28634 with heavy damage to one AFG. Co C received sniper fire from via XH29534, returned fire with 61mm mortars. No US casualties were sustained, unknown VC casualties.

(f) 2/34 Armer (-): Continued attack to PL COMPA, linked up with 2/22 Inf (N) and purified task organization (released cross-attached companies). A Co received small arms fire via XH29633 with no casualties, returned fire with unknown results. Bn became OPCON to 196th Bds at 1200H.

(g) C/4 Regt: Withdrew AFG at XH29633 after crossing of 1/23 Inf (N) and 2/34 Armer (-).

(h) 4th S&T: Tank lightly damaged by mine at XH24626.

(i) 2 April 67 (D-39):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Recovered 1 grave of VC KIA (HC) at XH15505.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0700H Co A received three sniper rds resulting in one US casualty. At 1300H via coord XH27633, Co A

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discovered three old Mauer rifles and three receiver groups. At 1500H via coord KIL0005 the Bn recon platoon detonated a booby trap which resulted in one US KIA. Co A searched the area and discovered approximately 130 booby traps which were surrounding the base camp. This base camp consisted of 30 bunkers and 15 structures. Captured were 30 lbs clothing, 15 lbs documents, 10 lbs medical supplies and one M16 model 1935 7.5 rifle. At 1510H via coord KIL0005 Co A received 1 US KIA from sniper fire. At 1530H all elements closed the Bn Lager site via coord KIL06006.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Bn continued S&D operation SE of F23 0012. Co A located and destroyed a VC base camp via coord KIL3662 at 1250H. One VC was engaged at 1745H via coord KIL3662 with unknown results. Co B and Co C reported no contact throughout the day. Bn elements formed a defensive perimeter via coord KIL50610.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued SE, 3d Bn.

(e) 1/23 Inf (M): Conducted S&D operations in AO FINE. B Co ambush patrol engaged 2 VC at KIL7515.8, results 1 VC KIA (Pace), no US casualties. At KIL7515.9 B Co engaged 5 VC killing one with no US casualties. At KIL13533 located and destroyed a small base camp. A Co detonated a grenade booby trap with no damage at KIL17570. C Co destroyed a base camp with underground tunnels, mine area and hidden ammunition at KIL0557. Bn lagged at KIL0551.

(143) 3 April 67 (D-40):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) crossed FL COMMA and conducted S&D operations SE to FL PTINOM via coord KIL5550.

(b) 2/22 Inf: At 0730H Co's A&B began sweeping the 3 portion of the Bn AO. At 0800H the Bn Recon platoon moved to a possible crossing site on the Saigon River and began preparing it for crossing on 3 Apr. The crossing site was located at via coord KIL37607. At 1220H via coord KIL75210 Co C discovered a small recently used base camp. One Thompson SMG and .45 was found. At 1230H via coord KIL75338 Co A apprehended a National Policeman who stated that he had been kidnapped in Saigon and held prisoner by the VC since Nov 66. The victim was badly burned in a recent airstrike and stated that 7 VC had been killed, two or more would die, and seven were wounded during the same airstrike. Co A also found and destroyed 10 lbs of documents, 5 lbs of medical supplies, 20 hand grenades, 1 rifle grenade, three M16 "Bouncing Betty" mines, 8 huts, 1 bunker and 300 lbs of polished rice. At 1450H via coord KIL60570 Co C discovered an old base camp and destroyed 15 huts, 24 grenades, 5 lbs fried meat, and 5 lbs dried fish. At 1615H via coord KIL79566 Co C discovered and destroyed 12 bunkers and 2 huts. At 1725H via coord KIL70576 Co B received two KIA from a US hand grenade. At 1915H all elements closed Bn Lager area via coord KIL60606.

(c) 1/22 Inf: 1/22 Inf continued S&D operations SE of F23 0012. Co C (-) received sniper fire via coord KIL50559. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1642H Co C (-) located a large VC base camp occupied by a unknown number of VC via coord KIL60507. The VC broke contact at 1800H. Results: 3 VC KIA (MC), 1 US KIA, 2 US MIA, large quantities of enemy equipment, narcotics, clothing, bicycles, food and ammunition destroyed. Co C (-) closed Bn perimeter via coord KIL55596 at 1910H. Co A reinforced Co C (-) at 1650H and at 1737H A Co made contact with an unknown number of VC at a base camp via coord KIL55590. Results: 1 US MIA, 1 VC KIA (MC). Co A closed Bn perimeter via coord KIL55596 at 1605H.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Btry A displaced from Grid Bn to F23 0012 (KIL95305) by convey to support the elements of the Bn as they moved Eastward toward the cross RM of the Michalia Plantation.

(e) 1/23 Inf (M): Co C ambush patrol received small arms fire and hand grenades from unknown size VC force at KIL0555. Patrol moved

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and received fire from unknown force at XT38268. Patrol left stay behind patrol and moved again. Reaction force moved to location of contact and could find no results. Contact not made again.

(r) C/A Bagra: Improved FSB 47718 and cleared H2B 1h to FSB 47718.

(l4k) 4 Apr 67 (E-41):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The Bn (-) reallotted to LZ HUNT - XT26625.

(b) 2/22 Inf (U): At 0700H the Bn began a move to an LZ via coord XT34624. At 1145H Companies A & B secured LZ for elements of 2/12 Inf. Upon completion of the security mission the Bn moved to a larger position via coord XT58628.

(c) 1/22 Inf: Co B secured Bn perimeter via coord XT455596. Companies A & C (-) searched VC base camps located previous afternoon. Numerous items of equipment and food supplies were found and destroyed. One VC PW with weapon was captured and evacuated. At 1613H, 1/22 Inf reallotted to FSB GEM via coord XT529545. A & B Companies secured FSB GEM while Co C (-) prepared to cordon and search AP CHAM 1h via coord XT554540.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty (-) and 2/3/13 Arty moved by motor convey to FSB GEM XT527547. Party A then displaced to this same location to again have the entire Bn in FSB GEM. One 2 1/2 ton truck damaged and 2 US KIA at XT521522 by RPO II round.

(e) 4/23 Inf (U): Moved overland from Steel Bn to Camp Rainier, attack Bn along Axis HONOR T, detected one mine at XT23409 resulting in moderate damage to 1 APC and two US KIA, landed at XT58524.

(f) C/L 10 Cav: Provided convey escort between Camp Rainier, FSB GEM and Tay Ninh, had one tank damaged by RPO II or HE round, at XT521522, no casualties.

(L5) 5 Apr 67 (D-42):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Encountered and killed one sniper at XT538597, captured 1 Soviet 8mm pistol, located a base camp that had been struck by air and artillery at XT537603 and one VC buried at XT438544. Mine magazines, 2 pigs, 3 cook stoves, 2 tons rice and miscellaneous furniture were destroyed in the base camp.

(b) 2/28 Inf (U): At 0730H the Bn began GSF operations in assigned Bn AO with neg contact. At 1800H all Bn elements landed at coord XT58628.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A and B Co's continued security mission for FSB GEM. Co C (-) cordoned AP CHAM via coord XT582540 at 0800H. Search was completed by 0730H with neg contact. One Bn was overcast with迫击炮 fire from a LZ via coord XT582547. At 1000H, 2d plt engaged 2 VC via coord XT582548 with neg results. The Bn SF and a Civil Action Group joined Co C at AP CHAM 1h to conduct Civil Action/Boycott Activities. Two VC again entered the cordon via coord XT582541 at 1915H and were engaged with neg results. Co A continued security of FSB GEM and contacted platoon since daylight reconnaissance patrol to the East. Co B conducted GSF operations North and West of FSB GEM with neg results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued Bn, 3d Bn.

(e) 4/23 Inf (U): Continued to attack along Axis HONOR until 2100H when mission was changed, extracted area bounded by XT58628, XT438544, XT438540.

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(U) 6 April (D-43):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued S&D. Recon pit found a small base camp at 175000 with 100 tons of rice at 172000. Co C located 10 tons of rice at 172000. Co C reported 1 VC killed and capturing one 7.62mm rifle. Also the property materials were evacuated.

(b) 2/22 Inf: At 0600H units conducted S&D operations in designated areas of operations. At 1100H via coord 175000 Co B sighted 1 VC. The VC were observed with a rifle and a stick. Co B was established on ground troops. At 1200H Co B reported 1 VC killed in 1.13 km with unknown VC casualties. At 1200H all elements departed via coord 175000.

(c) 3/22 Inf: All elements continued security of F33 GEM. Co B conducted S&D operations 7 km north of F33 GEM. Further pit, Co B reported 1 VC at corner of 175000 via coord 175000. At 2300H Co B reported 1 VC killed in 1.13 km to the corner 175000. Co B reported 1 F33 GEM at 2100H to secure the area between F33 GEM and the F33 GEM.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Dory A returned to Camp Baidor by convey in a displacement by echelon as the maneuver elements of the 3rd began working their way back toward the base camp.

(e) 4/23 Inf (N): Continued S&D operations, located pit 1 block at 175000 where 1 VC shot at night the previous night, received 3 r's and 1 fire at 175000, escorted A Dory 2/77 Arty to the F33 GEM Camp, reverted to OPOW of parent unit at 1800H.

(U) 7 Apr 67 (D-44):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued S&D, located 1 small base camp at 175000 and 1 VC with carrying arms at 175000. CP for the night at 175000.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0600H 2/22 Inf (N) began search and destroy through the Michelin Plantation towards Camp Baidor. At 0700H via coord 175550 Co B discovered a small base camp. At 1000H via coord 175570 Co A destroyed 9 huts. At 1100H the 1st Recon pit detected an LP mine with an APC M13 resulting in no US casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1115H Co's A & C ran a search operation to 17513 via coord 175600, with no results. At 1200H all elements except Recon closed Camp Baidor. The 1st Recon pit is gored via coord 175170.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co B continued security of F33 GEM, while Co A established defensive perimeter via coord 175000 at 0600H. At 0700H Co A closed the F33 GEM Camp at 1930H. Co C continued movement to 175000 via coord 175170, and established cordon at 0530H. Civic Action/Support activities took place while Co C secured and searched the village with no results. At 1615H Co C received 15 to 20 r's and 1 fire at 175000. Fire was returned with unknown results. The artillery convey departed F33 GEM, 3 Co began S&D operations toward the F33 GEM. At 1500H concertina wire and fifteen VC body bags were found and destroyed via coord 175170. Co B closed the F33 GEM at 1630H.

(d) 2/77 Arty: 2/77 Arty detached, and with C/2/77 Arty departed the F33 GEM. 2/77 (-) closed back to base camp.

(U) 8 Apr 67 (D-45):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The 2/12 Inf conducted S&D operation in the Michelin Plantation closing base camp at 1812H.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): All 2/22 Inf (N) units conducted extensive maintenance on vehicles and equipment for entire day. Recon pit at Camp Baidor at 0800H.

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(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co secured assigned sector of Ban Tieng Base Camp. At 1300H B Co moved by convey to secure Mai Ba Dan Gravel Crusher via coord XT260574. B Co elements closed gravel crusher at 1600H and established a defensive perimeter. C Co continued its S&D operations in Michelin Rubber Plantation. At 1100H C Co found and destroyed 3 AP mines via coord XT260457. 2 UN W/A were dusted off at 1510H from a 12 via coord XT260457 when Co C elements detonated two AP mines. Four additional mines were found and evacuated via coord XT260457. C Co closed Ban Tieng Base Camp at 1515H and reported no further contact.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS from Ban Tieng Base Camp.

(h9) 9 Apr 67 (D-46):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A departed Ban Tieng by convey to secure Tay Minh West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission at Mai Ba Dan Gravel Crusher. C Co departed Ban Tieng by truck at 0630H for FSB HUE via coord XT260744. Co secured FSB HUE at 0807H and secured LZ 26 from Tay Minh to NJ via coord XT272421. At 1700H C Co's 3d plt found and destroyed two hundred pounds of plastic shooting via coord XT260473. At 2040H 3d plt's ambush via coord XT260452 detected movement and called in artillery with unknown results.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS mission from Ban Tieng Base Camp.

(e) 1/5 Inf (N): 0700H 3d Bn, conducted S&D operations in conjunction with 36th ARVN Ranger TF, launched at XT260730.

(SD) 10 Apr 67 (D-47):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co assumed responsibility for security for Tay Minh West Base Camp perimeter and laterite pit via coord XT22497 at 1000H. B Co's 3d plt was attached to A Co at 1025H. 1 BN from A Co was accidentally struck and killed by a low flying C-130 while moving a bunker on Tay Minh West Base Camp perimeter. B Co continued security mission for Mai Ba Dan Gravel Crusher. C Co continued security mission for FSB HUE and LZ 26 from Tay Minh to NJ via coord XT272421.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS mission from Ban Tieng Base Camp.

(e) 1/5 Inf (N): Conducted S&D operations with 36th ARVN Ranger TF, captured 1 VC (female) at XT260544, destroyed 30 lbs of rice, 1 weapon at XT260545. Captured 1 German Wehr rifle.

(SD) 21 April 67 (D-48):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Conducted maintenance and preparation for future operations.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0630H 2/22 Inf (N) with attachments Co C 2/34 Arty and 1st plt C/A Bn deployed from Ban Tieng and Mai Ba Dan via coord XT260472 and moved via coord XT272421 to secure an area for 3d Bn CP and an IS for 2/12 Inf. 2/22 Inf (N) moved along the HUE providing security for 3d Bn CP and Co A 2/77 Arty, clearing the Bn between Mai Ba Dan and FSB HUE. Co B moved as advanced guard to guard to



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(c) 1300 Lulu A Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp. Airborne Mr. White & Co continued security mission for Chuoi Lam. Patrol number 10559, a 3 Co reconnaissance patrol obtained three TKS via coord AT23576. At 1100 a second 3 Co reconnaissance patrol approached one female TKS via coord AT23559. All detainees were evacuated to Tay Ninh West by helicopter at 1300H. Don Charlie continued security mission of FSB 4122 and LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to ST via coord AT23563.

(c) 1/5th Inf (N): Recontacted 36th ARVN Ranger TF to Tay Ninh, reverted to CACON parent unit at 1200H.

(c) 2/2 1-1: Two 3n (e) stratified from Su Tong to Su Li in  
 direction to GUSP. They then stratified from Su Li to Li and record  
 at 1130h. S&D operations were conducted in 10 CCW33.

(e) 3/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh West Base Camp perimeter. B Co continued security mission for Tay Ninh Don Gravel Crusher. Co C continued security mission for FSB BANG and ITR 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ via count XTJZ423.

(c) C/A Eggs: Assisted in establishing FSB EOL.

(53) 23 APR 67 (D-50):

(1) 2/12 Inf: Continued move to 788 EAM and closed at 1215L. Agreed defense of 788 EAM, conducted. ELD in AO COMB.R. CP at 1217/169.



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(b) 2/22 Inf (M): All Bn elements performed maintenance until 0900H. At 0900H S&D operations were conducted in AO PARTNER. At 0935H Co A vic coord XT223719 discovered and destroyed one hut and one bicycle. They captured 1 model #8 rifle, 1 Phillips radio, 15 lbs of documents, 10 lbs miscellaneous ammunition, practice grenades, a pistol and various homemade items. At 1159H vic coord XT207730, Co C discovered and destroyed 1 hut and five 1 man bunkers. At 1300H vic coord XT22177 Co A discovered a VC base camp and captured 20 lbs of miscellaneous gear (clothing, parachute material and soap). All elements closed larger area by 1735H.

(c) 3/22 Inf: Co A continued security of Tay Ninh West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission for Hai Ba Don Gravel Cruiser via coord XT240574. Team Charlie continued security mission for FSB BLUE via coord XT372423 and secured LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ via coord XT372423.

(d) 2/77 Artys: Continued DS, 3d Bn.

(e) 2/34 Armer: Continued to secure Sami Bn.

(54) 14 Apr 67 (D-52):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued security of FSB EEN, conducted local S&D operations, destroyed one bicycle at XT290708.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0730H Co A departed its larger area for S&D operations. At 0737H Co C departed CP location for S&D operations. At 0910H Co B departed CP location for S&D operations. Prior to this time, this unit performed maintenance in the larger area. At 1040H vic coord XT229704 Co A discovered 1 hut which was destroyed. At 1110H CP Group secured by the Bn Recon plit displaced to vic coord XT212747. The Recon plit then conducted S&D operations in Bn AO. At 1220H vic coord XT087765 Co C found and destroyed 100 rds of cal .50 ammunition. At 1700H vic coord XT190714 the Bn Recon plit discovered and destroyed 1 hut, 2 bunkers and 1 fencehole.

(c) 3/22 Inf: A Co's 2d plit ambush patrol reported hearing movement via coord XT108526 at 0700H. At 0457H the patrol engaged movement with the following results: 1 VC KIA (MC), 2 VC KIA (Confirmed) and 1 AL-47 captured. Ambush patrol closed Tay Ninh West at 0710H and reported neg further contact. B Co continued security of Hai Ba Don Gravel Cruiser. Team Charlie continued security mission for FSB EEN and LTL 26 from Tay Ninh to BJ via coord XT372423.

(d) 2/34 Armer: Continued security of Sami Bn, no contact. A/2/34 Armer remained under OPON JC Bn for security Sami Bn, Bn reported OPON parent unit.

(e) 2/77 Artys (+): Moved FSB CAROLINE to XT307697, laid and ready to fire at 1000H. At 1930H A Fly received 75 rds 81mm mortar fire and small ground attack. Defensive fire and air strikes caused enemy to break contact. One howitzer was damaged, 1 US KIA, 14 GVN KIA.

(55) 15 Apr 67 (D-52):

(a) 2/22 Inf: Continued security of FSB EEN, conducted S&D operations locating a deserted base camp at XT25702, destroyed 6 rifle grenades with crisp cartridge, 2 rolls fuse wire.

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0800H Bn Recon plit began search and destroy operations. At 1100H vic coord XT190735 Bn Recon plit discovered a base camp surrounded by a trench system. Within the base camp they discovered 6 huts, 1 containing 20 bushels of unpolished rice. Other units of the Bn remained at the CP location, via coord XT212747, for maintenance, training and establishment of daylight patrol.

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(c) 2/77 Artyn Cont: 22, 34, 22.

(56) 16 APR 67 (D-53):

(b) 2/22 Inf (M): At 0730 hrs Co A departed the CP location for S&D operations. In conjunction with this mission, Co A was to prepare a crossing site via coord KTL86744. At 0755 hrs Co C departed the CP location for S&D operations. At 0800H Co B departed the CP location for S&D operations. At 1200H Co A had completed the creek crossing via coord KTL86744. At 1310H Co A via coord KTL83776 discovered three bloody game hangings. At 1425H they discovered an old base camp via coord KTL26773. The camp contained 8 huts, and 7 bunkers which were destroyed. It appeared the huts had not been occupied for a long period of time. At 1800H all Bn elements had closed the Bn CP location upon completion of S&D operations.

(1) 2/77 Artyn Continued DB, 3d Bn.

(57) 17 Apr 67 (D-94)

(a) 2/12 Inf: In (-) continued to secure FSB E24 and conduct S&D operations in C COUGAR. The Recon plt of the 2/12 Inf initially attached to C Bury 2/77 Army at FSB OAK at coord X128775. Co B was in contact with VC at coord X128400 resulting in 1 VC KIA and neg VC casualties. They also found a base camp at X128775 recently used including bunkers with trench system.

(b) 2/22 Inf (N): At 0825H units departed the GP location via coord XE210000 for S&B operations. The 2d Recon plt remained behind for CP security. At 1115H Co B reported burners over looking a trail, via coord XE223797 to XE24795 and females with overhead cover coord XE28797 and XE26000. At 1115H Co C reported sighting 3 VC in the open via coord XE30820. At the same time Co B reported discovery of a base camp via coord XE03017 which was approximately half destroyed by previous air strikes. At 1600H Co B sighted a complex of trench lines via coord XE21901.

(c) 3/28 Info: A Co continued security mission for Dry Wash West Base Camp while B Co continued security for Mai Su Den Gravel Crusher via coord KX260574. A reconnaissance patrol from Co F accompanied 1 AMDL ARVN, and 1 VCS via coord KX76657. Co C continued security mission for FSB CAROLINE via coord KX0529 and LHM 26 from Dry Wash to BN via coord KX27421.

(4) 2/77 Artyn Continued MB selection.

(98) 18 Apr 67 (D-25)u

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(1) 2/22 Inf: Continued security of FSB ENH and conducted IED operations. One small enemy mortar was destroyed by small arms fire while another was destroyed by a 105 mm mortar. No enemy activity was observed.

(2) 2/22 Inf (4): In continued S&B operations in 10 PAVN. In Recon pit provided CP activity. By 0730 all elements had cleared the CP location via coord IZ12000. At 0700H via coord IZ12000 Co B reported passing through a VC hospital complex which had been destroyed by Co A on 25 Nov 66. There were no signs of activity since that time. At 1005H via coord IZ143827 Co F received small arms fire from 2 to 3 VC resulting in 1 US MW. The enemy was engaged by fire with negative results. At the same time a Co B APC M113 detected a mine resulting in negative casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1055 hrs via coord IZ143827 Co B encountered a narrow detonated mine which exploded in front of the APC and caused no casualties or damage. At 1130 hrs via coord IZ143827 Co B received small arms fire while checking out a trench line. At 1130 hrs a Co F APC M113 detected a mine with no casualties and minor damage to the APC. At 1235H the CP Group 2/22 Inf and the Recon pit began displacing toward via coord IZ12000. At 1245H the lead element (A Recon APC M113) detected a mine and immediately received small arms fire and rounds from an RPG II. Results of the action were one US MW, five US MW, and unknown enemy casualties. 2 APC's had moderate damage caused by mine and RPG hits. At 1300 hrs via coord IZ143827 Co B received small arms fire while checking a hut resulting in 1 US MW. At 1400H via coord IZ143827 Co B discovered an extensive boom camp area containing approximately 15 huts, 3 classrooms, and documents which indicated the camp could be an old signal school. There was an estimated 500 feet of trench system in and around the complex. The VC employed approximately 12 command detonated explosives or booby traps as Co B entered the area. This included a rifle grenade which was used against an APC. An estimated 8 to 12 VC were in the area. At 1500H Co A was ordered to move West and link up with Co B. Upon link up at 1535 hrs both units completed a thorough search of the boom camp without incident and returned to the CP location via coord IZ143827 at approximately 1735 hrs. Co C linked up with the CP group and Recon pit at the area of contact, and proceeded to the new CP location via coord IZ143827 during the early afternoon.

(3) 1/22 Inf: Co A continued security mission for Tay Nhat West Base Camp. B Co continued security mission for Tay Nhat West Base Camp via coord IZ12000. Para Charlie continued security mission for FSB CANOLDE via coord IZ12000 and LZ 26 from Tay Nhat to SF via coord IZ12000.

(4) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS mission.

(5) 19 Apr 67 (D-46):

(a) 2/12 Inf: Continued S&B, security of FSB ENH with no contact.

(b) 2/22 Inf (4): 2/22 Inf (4) displaced to FSB ENH via coord IZ12000.

(c) 1/22 Inf: A Co continued security mission for Tay Nhat West while B Co secured Tay Nhat West Base Camp. Co C secured FSB CANOLDE via coord IZ12000 and LZ 26 from Tay Nhat to SF via coord IZ12000.

(d) 2/77 Arty: Continued IS mission.

(e) 20 Apr 67 (D-57):

(a) 2/12 Inf: The 1st (-) battalion from FSB ENH to Camp Baidon. Recon battalion from FSB ENH to Camp Baidon. The 1st (-) battalion at 0940 hrs.

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(3) Equipment Destroyed

Item	Unit	Item
119 1/2 lb. cans	20 1/2 lb. cans	125 lb. fish
71 1/2 lb. cans	20 1/2 lb. cans	20 lb. spice
119 1/2 lb. cans	20 1/2 lb. cans	20 lb. curry ; other
1 1/2 lb. cans	20 1/2 lb. cans	8 gal fish oil
20 1/2 lb. cans	20 1/2 lb. cans	260.8 tons rice
1 case rifle grenades	20 1/2 lb. cans	5 case boxes
1 triangular targets	20 1/2 lb. cans	1500 lb. peas
1 lb. 7th RM	20 1/2 lb. cans	20 gal pepper
1 lb. 7th RM	20 1/2 lb. cans	20 gal beans
1 lb. 7th RM	20 1/2 lb. cans	100 gal lard
1 200 lb. bomb	20 1/2 lb. cans	7 case structure
20 2.75m rockets	20 1/2 lb. cans	150 lb. assorted food
	20 1/2 lb. cans	10 gal milk
	20 1/2 lb. cans	77 lb. candy
	20 1/2 lb. cans	30 lb. sausage
	20 1/2 lb. cans	600 gal cooking oil
	20 1/2 lb. cans	45 gal shrimp
	20 1/2 lb. cans	40 gal macaroni
	20 1/2 lb. cans	20 lb. peas
	20 1/2 lb. cans	20 pigs
	20 1/2 lb. cans	26 chickens
	20 1/2 lb. cans	50 lb. tobacco
	20 1/2 lb. cans	1.1 tons salt
	20 1/2 lb. cans	30 lb. flour
	20 1/2 lb. cans	200 fish

**Structure:**

197 hats  
204 benches  
3000 parli sticks  
4 1st bridges  
3 latrines  
1000 square trench  
6 walls

**Transportation:**

4 bicycles  
175 lbs. also bicycle parts  
2 case bicycle parts  
5 maps  
1 bicycle carrying rack  
1 at camp

**Food:**

15 sheets tin  
200 bale fish  
50 1/2 lb. plates  
100 1/2 lb. bags  
42 gal tin  
1 stove  
4 crates soap  
25 1/2 lb. pots  
10 plastic bowls  
800 1/2 lb. carbon paper  
50 1/2 lb. cans  
1 flashlight  
1 stool pot  
4 case ink  
20 rolls printing oil

PAGE II

a. US Losses

(1) Personnel: 43 KIA, 224 KIA, 7 KIA (non-hostile)

(2) Equipment

US Losses

2 Qad 30 cal M1 destroy  
2 105mm howitzers destroyed  
9 105mm howitzers damaged  
1 5mm tube destroyed w/used  
5 M16 rifles  
20 M16 rifles

US Losses

1 475 1/2 lb. bomb  
1 1/2 lb. 1/2 lb. bomb  
1 1/2 lb. 1/2 lb. bomb  
2 1/2 lb. 1/2 lb. bomb  
2 1/2 lb. 1/2 lb. bomb

b. Enemy Losses

(1) Personnel: 471 KIA (US), 224 KIA (US), 12 KIA (US)

(2) Equipment Destroyed

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17 pigs  
1 cow  
1 horse  
100 lbs. of corn  
100 lbs. of beans  
100 lbs. of cooking oil  
5 lbs. of salt  
75 lbs. of dried fish  
100 lbs. of corn of manioc  
100 lbs. of  
100 lbs. of

**Q245R**

2200 lbs web gear and equipment  
5 mil PC2  
1 fork lift  
1 shov for - try  
55 gal GS gas  
2 gas masks  
3 cork stoves  
1 bicycle

## Measures

6 "arm" and receiver groups  
1 Service "gun" pistol  
1 7.62 rifle  
6 hand made body traps (1 lb  
TNT)

**Q100**

1 bicycle  
1 mg fish  
40 tons rice  
5 gal oil  
100 lbs web gear and equipment

**摘要**

b. Entry Number

6) Personal: 1 EA (20)

(2) Equipment: 20 traps, 11 bats, 10,000 lbs rice, 1 basket fish, 1 mug, 3 AT mace, 1 lb salt, 4 females, 1 bicycle, 6 rifle grenades, 6 crates + bridge, 1 pump, 2 rolls gun wire, 15 chickens, 1 175mm rd, 2000 ft. 12 cigarettes, 12 C&N matches, 3 more grenades, 1 box 50 cal ammo.

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(1) During the first phase of the operation, the 3-1 section maintained an office at the front of the operation with the forward command group. The office provided administrative support to the brigade and was located in the forward area. The section maintained a liaison with the forward command group, passing such information to the rear elements as was needed to support the operation. The majority of the 3-1 section was in the rear area, with only the necessary personnel in the forward area to support the operation.

**2. Administration**

**a. Personnel Administration**

**(1) Phase I, 1-15 April 1971**

During the first phase of the operation, the 3-1 section maintained an office at the front of the operation with the forward command group. The office provided administrative support to the brigade and was located in the forward area. The section maintained a liaison with the forward command group, passing such information to the rear elements as was needed to support the operation. The majority of the 3-1 section was in the rear area, with only the necessary personnel in the forward area to support the operation.

**(2) Phase II, 16 April - 7 May 1971**

During the second phase of Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 3-1 section maintained an office at the front of the operation with the forward command group. The office provided administrative support to the brigade and was located in the forward area. The section maintained a liaison with the forward command group, passing such information to the rear elements as was needed to support the operation. The majority of the 3-1 section was in the rear area, with only the necessary personnel in the forward area to support the operation.

**(3) Phase III, 8-20 April 1971**

In Phase III, the 3-1 section continued to support the brigade from the rear. Due to frequent contact with the enemy, security was maintained and no problems were encountered in casualty reporting. Actions required the brigade commander's signature or endorsement were forwarded by courier to the brigade commander.

(4) Comments: Since most administrative actions are accomplished in the rear, there does not appear to be any requirement to have more than one officer and one SM with the forward elements on operation. Casualty reports are more efficiently processed when they are sent directly to the rear than when they are sent forward.

**b. Supply: Operation JUNCTION CITY PHASE I, II and III.**

During Phase I of JUNCTION CITY all classes of supply were issued through the PM located at Trail 1. The Brigade Troop was also located at Trail 1. Distribution to the forward areas was made by jeep and air.

During Phase II of JUNCTION CITY all classes of supply except Class III and Class V (arty only) were issued from the PM by air. Class III and Class V (arty only) were issued from the PM by jeep. A survey was dispatched daily to the PM for pick up of necessary items.

During Phase III all supply was by air from the PM. No problems in the supply area were encountered during the operation.

**c. Maintenance**

(1) During Phase I of Operation JUNCTION CITY, a support element was located in the rear area. The support element provided maintenance support to the forward elements. The support element was located in the rear area and provided maintenance support to the forward elements.

(2) During Phase II & III of Operation JUNCTION CITY support was provided from the rear area. The support element provided maintenance support to the forward elements. The support element was located in the rear area and provided maintenance support to the forward elements.

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units requested items.

2. Status of each Class of Supply

(1) During Phase I a three day stockpile of C-ration and a one day stockpile of A-Rations was maintained at the FPL. During Phase II and Phase III all Class I was maintained at Dau Tieng with 5 days of C-Rations and one day of A-Rations.

(2) Class II's (Stockpile Level)

(a) IRGAS 7 days

(b) JFAC 5 days

(c) AVF 10 days

(d) FMF 5 days

(3) Class V: An ASP was maintained at Trui B during Phase I. During Phase II the 3d Bn withdrew from Class V (Army) area at Suoi Da, during Phase III all came over from Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh by air and overland convoy.

3. Hospitalization and Evacuations

(1) For Operation JUNCTION CITY, beginning 22 Feb 1967, it was decided to move Co A, 25th Medical Bn to the forward logistical base at Trui B. This company became operational on 24 Feb, replacing Co A, 1st Med Bn which had deployed a medical section at Trui B for Operation GADSDEN. Co A, 25th Med Bn was able to deploy a laboratory and dental capability with their medical section in Trui B. Two aeromedical B-119s were placed on standby at the medical company location at Trui B.

(2) Early in Operation JUNCTION CITY, the 3d Bn, functioning as a blocking force, was in a relatively static role. This operated from fixed CP locations in a fixed LOR. In this configuration, it was possible to locate the battalion aid station and surgery in the rear of the CP in direct support of the tactical units. At FOC 122, where the artillery and an infantry battalion were located, a single aid station was adequate for medical support. Evacuation was primarily by air, the routine and priority patients being returned to Trui B on resupply helicopters, and the less critical patients being sent by Dust Off. In the later phases, units of the brigade were in a more mobile role, moving from objective to objective through dense jungle foliage. Consequently it was impractical to maintain an aid station with the infantry units. There was increased reliance on the company aid men who often decided which of the wounded and sick required evacuation. Aid stations were maintained at the forward support base where the 3d CP and artillery were deployed.

(3) JUNCTION CITY II, beginning 28 Feb 1967, presented the brigade with its first mass casualty situation. Early in the battle of 21 March 1967, in anticipation of a large number of casualties additional Dust-Off helicopters were requested. A total of four Dust-Off ships were on standby, ready to enter the landing zone as soon as the tactical situation permitted. These ships plus four resupply ships were used for aeromedical evacuation. In addition, many casualties were returned to the FPL on the return flight of resupply helicopters which were taking ammunition and other supplies into the area of operations. Many patients were returned to duty after being treated at the battalion aid station in the forward area. Approximately 130 casualties were evacuated in the action, 9% requiring evacuation to hospitals, including the brigade's medical company in Dau Tieng.

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(4) Medical evacuations and treatment after the Battle of Ban Tri were routine and no significant or unusual situations were encountered. JUNCTION CITY, Phase III began 8 April 67 and presented little problem as to medical evacuation and treatment. The 4th Medical Battalion clearing company returned to base camp at Ban Triang as the need for its presence in the field during Phase III was not indicated. Adequate medical care and performance was given by the individual battalion aid stations. An additional Det-Off was assigned to Tay Ninh which alleviated the problem of an adequate number of helicopters for evacuation. There were no casualties evacuated during the last phase of the operation and no significant delays were encountered.

**The Special Regiment and Headquarters**

a. Special Regiment: Further defense of a fire support base may be greatly enhanced by the addition of personnel and equipment to the normal direct fire and support. These reinforcements are identified to the personnel manning the perimeter and are assigned to specific hard target sections for firing. Firing data is provided and kept at the gun positions. (See Lessons Learned, Battle of Ban Tri).

b. M-578 proved to be unsatisfactory for crew-servicing as even Jose Barrett housing and slant do used during OLBAMA. It was unable to stay with the M-113 and M-578. The use of an M-113 with fabricated hoist has proved adequate.

c. The diesel powered M-113 proved superior to the gasoline powered M-113 in all respects.

**d. Techniques:**

(1) An OH-230 helicopter was used to lay down wire between Phase II Fire Support Base and the Ban Tri CP. The helicopter barely dropped the wire across the top of the jungle canopy enabling the wire to be laid line communication very readily after establishing point defense.

(2) Construction of bunker, particularly for fire direct on center and CPs can be completed rapidly when helicopters are used for the initial evacuation. The bunker is then built with the top of ground level, greatly reducing the vulnerability of the bunker to flat trajectory fire.

(3) Speed was found to be most essential in the construction of CP and Fire Support Center Bunkers. Several extra personnel were brought to the field just to aid in the construction of the Ban and Ban CP. Once the bunker was complete they were sent back to base camp.

(4) The use of the counter-attacking guard proved effective. The working guard got an advance to the landing pads by night. The following day when the enemy mortar pad was fired; 1st Coy was usually close to the entrance defended by the guard who provided covering during the attack.

**15. Commander's Analysis:**

a. Operations within Bunkers and Control War Zone C during the three phases of Operation JUNCTION CITY are considered to have been highly successful.

The destruction of base camp facilities and capture of quantities of supplies, documents, arms and weapons seriously hampered enemy propaganda, morale and combat effectiveness. The extensive improvement of road and water and construction of landing bases will enhance future operations in the area.

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The pressure of the initial phase of Phase II, in conjunction with the overall pressure of Operation JUNCTION CITY, caused the enemy to commit his forces in a major battle resulting in the defeat and, to a large extent, the destruction of the combat power of one of the enemy's main force regiments. This was the first major battle in which the Brigade as a whole participated. It renewed the confidence of the Brigade in its ability to engage and defeat the best efforts of the enemy and proved the validity of the fundamental principles of security, firepower, and adherence to basic concepts of ground warfare.

B. Lessons Learned

(1) (a) Items: Engineer work party security.

(b) Discussions: Engineer work parties have been subjected to ambushes and sniping because security forces were too far away.

(c) Observations: Security forces must be with the lead element (usually mine clearing teams) and on either flank to be effective. Accompaniment by fire (artillery and small arms) works very well during road clearing operations.

(2) (a) Items: Mine Landmine Items.

(b) Discussions: Many II's and potential L's were badly trapped with command-detonated charges. Charges varied from bombs (up to 750 lbs), to claymore mines, to 155, 105, 81 and 60mm shells. Usually a small permanent force guards the II and is prepared to detonate the mine as helicopter land.

(c) Observations: A heavy artillery preparation frequently causes the party to leave or will destroy the wires of command detonated devices. When discovered command detonated mines should be destroyed in the following manner:

1. Cut all wires leading from charge, one at a time.
2. Tie wires together: Use "Western-union pig tail tie".
3. Blow charges in place by placing C-4 (Usually ribbon charge) on top so that main force of charge will be down into the ground.

4. For Lessons Learned, Battle of Sami Tre, See Annex D.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*James G. ...*  
JAMES G. ...  
Major, Infantry  
Adjutant

5 Annexes

- |   |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| Annex A - Operation Junction City - Phase I   | } Withdrawn at Hqs B4 |
| Annex B - Operation Junction City - Phase II  |                       |
| (C) Enclosures                                |                       |
| Annex C - Operation Junction City - Phase III | Withdrawn at Hqs B4   |
| Annex D - Lessons Learned, Battle of Sami Tre |                       |
| Annex E - Photographs, Battle of Sami Tre     | Withdrawn at Hqs B4   |
| (Selected copies only)                        |                       |

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE  
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO US FORCES 96268

AVDDC-C

31 MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned "Battle of Suoi Tre."

TO: CG, 25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: S-3 AVDDC-C

1. 3d Bn, 22d Infantry.

a. Item: "Stand to" Formation.

Discussion: In accordance with SOP the battalion conducted a 100% alert thirty minutes prior to EENT and began a perimeter sweep to clear the area of possible infiltrators. This action probably triggered the enemy attack. At the time, the Battalion was at 100% alert and this was critical in blunting the first assault.

Observation: Conducting stand to and perimeter sweeps continues to be one of the most important security measures.

b. Item: Conduct of security patrols.

Discussion: Around the base camp at FSB GOLD there were two reinforced squad size ambush patrols and OP/LP positions in front of each platoon. One patrol did hear and report noise at 0633 hours which alerted the battalion. More patrols observing the enemy would possibly have fixed the avenue of approach and enabled us to spoil his attack with artillery.

Observation: Saturation patrolling is necessary for early warning. A squad size patrol from each company, OP/LP's in front of each platoon, and platoon size ambush on the primary avenue of approach is recommended.

c. Item: Reaction force.

Discussion: The Bn reaction force consisted of the Reconnaissance platoon and elements from the 1d Bn, 77th Artillery. The enemy attack, once initiated, was vigorous and determined. There was little time for any reaction before the base camp was heavily engaged. The reaction force had been rehearsed the night prior to the attack. They were committed and were able to blunt one penetration and reestablish the perimeter.

Observation: A ready reaction force proved to be a vital asset. To be effective they must be rehearsed and available with equipment immediately at hand. Areas of responsibility and signals must be rehearsed.

d. Item: Planned artillery concentrations.

Discussion: Very quickly after the assault was initiated artillery concentrations were needed within 30 meters of the perimeter. There was some delay in getting this fire as there were no preplanned firing data.

DERIVED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 18 YEARS  
D-7 818 320C,1.

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Observation: Preplanned fire should be planned within 10 meters of the defensive perimeter. Preplanned fire should be adjusted as close as troop safety permits during initial organization of the defense and even closer concentrations should be plotted and on call.

2. 2d Bn, 12th Infantry.

a. Item: Fire coordination between units closing during relief of area under attack.

Discussion: During movement to PSB GOLD on 21 March 67 it was necessary for the lead element of 2/12 Inf to shift from its original course during final phases of units closing. There was some difficulty encountered in coordinating fires as the reinforcing elements closed on PSB GOLD.

Observation: Aerial observers can eliminate problems of fire coordination. It is advisable to have one per battalion.

b. Item: Use of established trails during movement to provide relief to units under attack.

Discussion: Upon receipt of warning order to provide a force to reinforce units under attack at PSB GOLD on 21 Mar 67, 2/12 Inf formed to move out. The battalion perimeter then came under attack by indirect fire from VC mortars (at that time it was of undetermined origin). Co C moved out immediately by the most direct route avoiding established trails. They were followed by the remainder of the battalion. Co C encountered sniper and mortar fire enroute to PSB GOLD but did not meet a large enemy force. By avoiding established trails units of 2/12 Inf were not effectively blocked in moving toward PSB GOLD. There is every indication from the mortar attack just when the battalion started to move that the enemy had located the 2/12 Inf and had anticipated their attempt to reinforce. If an enemy blocking force was used, they were not in the heavy jungle but were on the main avenues of approach. They were not able to significantly delay or block the advance of the 2/12 Inf.

3. 2d Bn, 77th Artillery.

a. Item: Artillery Inner Perimeter.

Discussion: Even with infantry support around the artillery element, an inner perimeter is developed within the infantry perimeter. This inner perimeter consists of fighting holes close to the howitzers and the FDC bunkers. This perimeter is not manned, but is available in case of ground attack for the artillerymen to fight from and protect their howitzers and FDC.

Observation: When the infantry was hit by the mass assaults, the inner perimeter gave the infantry a secondary position to fall back to. At the inner perimeter the artillerymen were also available to beef up the fighting line. Use of the howitzers in direct fire could also be effected when the inner perimeter was manned.

b. Item: Use of Beehive in Direct Fire.

Discussion: After coordination between the infantry security and the artillery, the time came when the need for beehive was essential to hold the enemy. The infantry had fallen back to the howitzer positions or taken cover into their own foxholes to avoid the blast and the flechette. Because of the close range of the enemy waves the fuses were set at mass action.

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Observation: The beehive round was extremely effective in stopping the assaulting enemy troops. Later there were numerous bodies found that had been killed by the flachettes of the beehive round. It stopped everything in its path. An after action was the preparation of preplanned beehive concentrations for all howitzers. If the infantry and the individual howitzer sections had the data for those concentrations, they would have called for them by target number depending on what portion of the perimeter needed them. Reaction time would have been reduced.

c. Item: Artillery Reaction Force.

Discussion: The artillery battalion had two (2) reaction forces of 10-15 men each for use in strengthening the perimeter, both were needed. During the attack both reaction forces were committed to strengthen the infantry perimeter. Everyone on the reaction force must know the signal to assemble, where to assemble, and exactly how to maneuver out to the weakened portion of the perimeter.

Observation: Rehearsals are essential in the assembly and deployment of the reaction force and the reaction force was rehearsed the evening before the attack of LZ GOLD. This rehearsal proved invaluable as both the assembly and deployment went very swiftly and smoothly. Also each group should be armed with several M-79 Grenade launcher and numerous hand grenades as both proved invaluable in holding off the assaults.

d. Item: Placement of Artillery for Mutual Support.

Discussion: Each artillery position should have artillery within range to support that position. The mutually supporting units can fire in the defensive concentrations for each other, fire the counter-mortar targets for each other, and fire in general support in case of ground attack.

Observation: The 105mm Howitzer battery within supporting range of the FSB provided the primary artillery support, firing nearly 1100 rounds in less than four hours with most of it in the first 70 minutes. It was instrumental in the defense of the artillery position, and may have been the extra punch needed to prevent an enemy penetration.

e. Item: Shields of the 105mm Howitzers.

Discussion: Because of the air-mobile concept in the movement of 105mm howitzers, shields have been removed to reduce the weight. During the attack on the artillery position the howitzers proved to be a prime target of the enemy. Both recoilless rifle rounds and small arms fire were used very extensively against the howitzers. Had the shields been on the howitzer, the crewmen would have been afforded more protection and there would have been fewer friendly casualties.

Observation: The extra weight involved with keeping the howitzer shields attached can be compensated for by leaving back several non-essential items of equipment. This policy has been initiated and one lift with shields has been made with no problems.

f. Item: Use of hand grenades and grenade launchers (M-79) in fighting off an attacking force.

Discussion: The most effective small arms weapon in stopping the attacking force was the M-79 grenade launcher. Hand grenades were also very effective. The terrain was extensively furrowed hence the enemy had natural cover in his approach to our position. The grenade launcher and hand grenades were used very effectively against the attacking enemy.

Observation: The small arms basic load of ammunition for the howitzer battery should be adjusted to double the number of M-79 grenade launchers and hand grenades. Extra grenades and small arms ammo should be stored where it is easily accessible and close to the fighting holes.



h. Item: Storage of ammunition adjacent to howitzers.

Discussion: All ammunition in an artillery position should be broken down and stored at the howitzer positions. Under heavy attack, it is very difficult to get to an ammunition storage area. The ammunition should also be placed in a bunker for protection. Much of our ammunition was ruined by fire and several rounds detonated at the gun positions.

Observation: As quickly as an ammunition resupply comes in it should be stored at the howitzer positions. Bunkers with overhead sand-bag cover should be constructed at each position to protect the ammunition.

4. 2d Bn 22d Infantry & 2d Bn 34th Armor:

a. Item: Speed and shock action in the attack.

Discussion: Once the enemy had committed himself to the battle the reinforcing armor and mechanized forces were employed with as much speed as possible. They entered PSB GOLD taking full advantage of their speed and shock action.

Observation: The tactic of firepower and shock action was again proved effective as all the mechanized elements were brought into use and none were neutralized despite the number of anti-tank weapons available to the enemy. (Over 50 RPG-11 weapons and nearly 11 rounds of ammunition).

3. General.

a. Item: Reinforcement time.

Discussion: Once ordered to move to reinforce PSB GOLD the commanders of the reinforcing battalions (2/12 Inf, 2/22 Inf (M), and 2/34 Armor) pressed to the attack without allowing their elements to get sidetracked, slowed down or engaged with enemy delaying actions.

Observation: The aggressiveness of the Battalion Commanders in moving to the scene of the battle enabled the Brigade to turn a well fought defensive action into a timely offense and substantial victory.

6. Summary:

With the exception of some techniques in the use of the Bee-Hive round there were no new or startling lessons learned as a result of the Battle of Suoi Tre. Rather, the value of the essentials of pre-planning, rehearsing, preparing positions, and proper training to insure that every man can properly accomplish his assigned mission constitute the lesson of the Battle of Suoi Tre. The principles of security, surprise, mass, and the importance of commanders at all levels remaining mission oriented are as applicable in guerrilla warfare as in conventional warfare.