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Detachment A-105
Company C, 5th Special Forces (ABN), 1st SF
APO 96337

W.E.
13 Jun 67

SUBJECT: After Action Report of Mike Force and CIDG Encounter

TO: Commanding Officer
Co C, 5th SF GA, 1st SF
APO 96337

1. Time of Incident: 121300 Jun 67

2. Strength of Forces Involved:
a. 230 Mike Force
b. 132 CIDG
c. 135 SOG
d. 128 Trainees

3. Casualties:
a. USSF, USAF: None
b. CIDG: 2 KIA, 1 WIA
c. Mike Force: 4 KIA, 9 WIA
d. SOG: None
e. Civilians: None

4. Equipment Damage:
a. USSF, CIDG: 100 sheets roofing tin, 2 rolls of wire screen
b. USAF (20th TASS) *4 C-123s captured by Mike Force*
(1) 2 fuel bladders
(2) 3 barrels of 50 wt oil
(3) 1 1/2 ton pickup (I.H.)
(a) 1 tire
(b) 1 windshield
(c) 1 transfer case
(4) 2 OIE aircraft received minor damage
(5) 1 personnel para chute
c. USAF (ADF): 1 2 1/2 ton truck lost 1 tire and 1 windshield
d. SOG:
(1) 1 2 1/2 ton destroyed by rounds in radiator and engine block
(2) 600 rounds of HE and WP 2.72" rocket ammunition
(3) 150,000 rounds of 7.62mm MG ammunition
(4) 20 sheets of roofing tin
e. One (1) salvage C-123 on flight line received round in #1 engine
f. Village reported no damage

5. Details of Incident: At 121300 Jun 67 LIDB Lt SAU, Cpt WING, Sgt DEEG, and Sgt DODGE were called to the village. There were nine (9) Mike Force personnel in the village without weapons. The Mike Force personnel had been drinking and several of them were quite drunk. An argument arose between the Mike Force and CIDG when Mike Force personnel showed an interest in some of the CIDG dependents. There were approximately 25 CIDG with weapons in the village. Fifteen (15) were CRP who perform the duties of military police in the village. The nine (9) Mike Force personnel were told to leave the village and agreed to do so. As they started to leave Cpt WING, and Sgt DODGE returned to the CIDG Camp. Lt SAU and Sgt DEEG were loading the CRP onto the 1/2 ton truck to take them back to camp. During this time two (2) platoons of Mike Force personnel with weapons had sneaked out of the Mike Force training area on the southeast side of the airfield and met the nine (9) drunken personnel approximately 200 meters south of the village. The nine (9) drunken personnel then encouraged these two (2) platoons to enter the village.

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GROUP - 4
DOWNGRADED AT 100 INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AT 100 YEARS


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AMC

LLDB Lt SAU and Sgt DEEG were still in the village with the CRP. Lt SAU deployed the CRP and Sgt DEEG instructed them not to fire. The Mike Force continued toward the village and the lead elements fired upon the CRP. The CRP fought a delaying action through the village and the Mike Force continued after them. Sgt DEEG at this time had managed to return to the main CIDG camp. The entire CIDG camp and the SOG camp were alerted and their gates were closed. There were two Australians with the lead platoons of the Mike Force, but they had lost control and the Mike Force personnel eventually made them return to the bivouac area at gun point. The remaining two (2) platoons of Mike Force began moving toward the village on the west bank of the airfield. As the lead elements approached the flight line which is approximately 500 meters from the village they fired upon the CIDG camp and the SOG camp. Cpt WING gave the order to fire 81mm mortar in front of them. This did not stop them so all weapons were instructed to fire. These two (2) platoons then began to withdraw to their bivouac area. At approximately 1400 hours three (3) Air Force jets arrived on the scene. Cpt. WING instructed them to make three (3) dry runs on the village and also three (3) dry runs on the Mike Force bivouac area. Concurrent with these dry runs the ammunition on the flight line which had been set afire by one of the Mike Force personnel was exploding. This added to the psychological affect of the jets. After the jets had completed their runs we established communications with the Mike Force and with Lt SAU who was still in the village. Mike Force personnel said that they wanted to cease fire and return to their bivouac area. Cpt WING gave the order for the CIDG camp and the SOG camp to cease fire and also informed Lt SAU to cease fire in the village. The cease fire began at approximately 1430 hours, but sporadic sniper fire continued until approximately 1600 hours. Both sides began to regroup and gather their casualties. A MEDEVAC was called for and all KIA and WIA were evacuated to Da Nang by 1700 hours. At approximately 1615 hours 20th TASS personnel less two (2) men, departed for Da Nang. At approximately 1800 Hours Cpt BAUDESTELE arrived. He gathered his Australians and they, the SOG commander and the USSF detachment met to determine exactly what had happened. This meeting was conducted at 2000 hours. All circumstances concerning the incident were brought out at this time. A complete contact report was prepared at this time and was submitted to Company C at 2130 hours. Extraction of Mike Force personnel began at 131230 Jun 67 and was completed at 131635 Jun 67.

6. Recommendations and Conclusions:

- a. Recommend that Mike Force not be sent to this location for training unless sufficient personnel can be provided to them for control of their personnel. This would amount to a minimum of twelve (12) personnel.
- b. Recommend that Mike Force not be returned to this location for at least one (1) month to allow time for the hostile feelings to die.
- c. Recommend that if more Mike Force personnel must be sent to this location that they be comprised of Montagnards or Nungs.
- d. Recommend that LLDB Lt DAK be restricted from Kham Duc.
- e. Recommend that the SOG commander Cpt Monsees be commended for the outstanding manner in which he assisted and coordinated with the USSF detachment.


RAYMOND A WING
Captain, Infantry
Commanding

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