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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BA-GP

9 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
Americal Division
ATTN: AVDF-GC DOT
APO San Francisco 96374

TO: Commanding General
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACJ 343
APO San Francisco 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: VERNON LAKE I.
2. (C) DATES OF OPERATION: 25 Oct 68 to 2 Nov 68.
3. (C) LOCATION: Phase I: Song Va Valley; Phase II: DA LO-BO DINH Mountain area West of Quang Ngai City. (Map Sheets: 6738I and 66393, Series L7011).
4. (C) COMBAT HEADQUARTERS: 11th Inf Bde, Americal Division.
5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: Col John W. Donaldson.
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

Phase I:	3d Battalion, 1st Infantry	Plt C-26 Engr
	4th Battalion, 3d Infantry	
Phase II:	3d Battalion, 1st Infantry (-) B Co	
	4th Battalion, 3d Infantry	
	1st Battalion, 20th Infantry (-) C Co	
	A, B, and C Troops, 1st Cavalry Squadron (+) B Co,	
	3d Battalion, 1st Infantry	

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7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery:

(1) Direct Support Artillery for Vernon Lake I.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO:</u>
25 OCT	B-6-11	LZ DOTTIE	LZ BULLDOG (BS633557)
25 OCT	D-6-11	LZ DOTTIE	LZ DANCER (BS675402)
29 OCT	B-6-11	LZ BULLDOG	LZ PEPPER (BS495716)
30 OCT	D-6-11	LZ DANCER	LZ PEPPER (BS495716)

(2) The direct support artillery batteries of the 6-11th Artillery deployed on 25 Oct 1968. D Battery moved from LZ DOTTIE (BS631854) at 0800 hrs and closed LZ DANCER by 1200 hrs. B Battery moved from LZ DOTTIE at 1200 hrs to LZ BULLDOG and closed 1600 hrs. On 29 Oct at 0800 hrs B Battery moved by CH-47 to LZ PEPPER and closed by 1200 hrs. On 30 Oct at 1300 hrs, D Battery was airlifted to LZ PEPPER and closed at 1800 hrs.

(3) ROUNDS EXPENDED:

(a) Battery B 1172

(b) Battery D $\frac{847}{2019}$

(4) NATURE OF TARGETS: Scheduled fires and support targets were fired by both batteries of 105 Howitzers throughout the operation. Support missions were in the form of LZ preps and contact missions. Acquired targets were plotted by the Brigade S2 on known and suspected enemy base camps and on infiltration and exfiltration routes leading into the plains area west and southwest of Quang Ngai City.

(5) TIMELINESS AND EFFECTIVENESS:

(a) Response to calls for fire and forward observer adjustments to include adjustments made by aerial observers was accurate and rapid throughout the operation. Quang Ngai airfield was used as a forward supply point, and ammunition was moved by CH-47 from this location to the Fire Support Bases thereby reducing resupply time. Because of the adequate amounts of ammunition maintained on the Fire Support Bases (FSB) there were no emergency resupplies flown during the operation. There were no friendly casualties caused by artillery fire during Vernon Lake I.

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(b) The only difficulty arose when two batteries were co-located on FSB PEPPER. Due to the fact that each battery was in direct support of different infantry battalions, check fires were frequent, and at times, increased the rounds on target time.

b. AIR SUPPORT: 7th Air Force.

(1) Air support consisted of 6 B-52 Strikes and 69 forward air controlled preplanned and immediate air strikes.

(2) The 11th Bde's Tactical Air Control Party consisted of Forward Air Controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron.

(3) Both preplanned and immediate air strikes were timely and effective assisting immensely in the success of the Operation.

(h) Results: KBA 28, structures destroyed 23, secondary explosions 10, bunkers destroyed 98, tunnels 5, fox holes destroyed 53.

c. ARMY AVIATION:

(1) The 14th Combat Aviation Battalion provided helicopter support for Operation Vernon Lake I. 17th Assault Helicopter Company supported the operation with lift helicopters (UH1H) for air assault and command and control helicopters for each battalion throughout the operation. CH-47 aircraft were used extensively for troop movement, artillery movement and resupply of fire support bases (FSB). These aircraft provided the mobility and flexibility essential to the operation.

(2) Aero Scouts of the 123d Aviation Bn were used extensively for reconnaissance.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex C.

9. (C) MISSION: 11th Inf Bde realigns forces in the DUC PHO AO and employs two infantry battalions in the Song Ve Valley and subsequently in the mountain area west of Quang Ngai City to find, fix and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

Phase I: (250600H Oct 68 to 290700H Oct 68) Following six B-52 Strikes on 24 Oct the 11th Bde attacks at 250815 Oct 68 with 3-1 Inf conducting multiple combat assaults (CA) into LZ VOLUNTEER, LZ MOUNTAINEER, LZ WILDCAT and LZ BULLDOG and establishes FSB on LZ BULLDOG. 4-3 Inf conducts multiple combat assaults (CA) 250700H Oct 68 into LZ LONGHORN, LZ RAZORBACK and LZ DANCER to exploit B-52 Strikes and establish FSB on LZ DANCER. 2d ARVN Division

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blocks north end of Song Ve Valley with one infantry battalion vicinity BS6590585. All LZ's prepped with air strikes and artillery fires (See Overlay 1, Annex A).

Phase IX: (290700H to 012400H Nov 68) A-3-1 Inf conducts CA into LZ PEPPER to secure for FSB. Companies C and D, 3-1 Inf conduct CA's into LZ APPLE and sweep east. B-3-1 Inf OPCON to 1-1 Cav. 4-3 Inf conducts multiple CA's into LZ GRAPE, LZ PLUM, LZ PEAR and sweep east. 1-1 Cav and B-3-1 OPCON to 11th Bde sweeps west in zone. 2d ARVN Division cooperates by conducting operations south of 1-1 Cav. All LZ's prepped with air strikes and artillery fires (See Overlay 2, Annex A).

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 25 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from LZ DRAGON to LZ BULLDOG (BS633557). The LZ was cold and A Co remained as security for FSB BULLDOG. B Co conducted a CA from LZ IEZ to LZ MOUNTAINEER (BS620548). The LZ was cold and B Co started to sweep north. At 1112 hrs vic BS614551 B Co engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. B Co had no further contact throughout the day and established a Night Defense Position (NDP) at BS623522. C Co conducted a CA from LZ IEZ to a cold LZ VOLUNTEER (BS655505) then conducted a search mission SW to their Night Defense Position (NDP) via BS630527 with negative contact. D Co conducted a CA from LZ DRAGON to LZ BUTTERFLY (BS657529), which was cold and conducted a search mission west to a Night Defense Position (NDP) BS613527 with negative contact. RON Plt moved by air from LZ IEZ to FSB BULLDOG and assisted in the security of the Fire Support Base.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from LZ BRONCO to LZ LONGHORN (BS665475). The LZ was cold and A Co swept NW to a NDP vic BS655475 with negative contact. B Co conducted a CA from LZ BRONCO to LZ DANGER (BS675402). The LZ was cold and B Co established a perimeter securing the area for the establishment of FSB DANGER. C Co conducted an air move from LZ BRONCO into the secured LZ LONGHORN, then moved south to a NDP vic BS665466 with negative contact. D Co conducted a CA from LZ BRONCO into LZ RAZORBACK (BS635445). The LZ was cold, but as the lift ships were leaving the area they received some ground fire from an undetermined location. D Co's subsequent move to a NDP vic BS630435 produced no contact. RON Plt was flown into LZ RAZORBACK while D Co was securing it then patrolled south to BS630430 with negative contact.

b. 26 Oct 68:

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(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co remained as security of FSB BULLDOG. B Co conducted a recon in force to BS615540 then conducted a CA to a cold LZ vic BS615483. From the LZ, D Co moved west to a NDP vic BS602482 with negative contact. C Co moved SW from previous NDP. At 1150 hrs vic BS624505, C Co engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC Flag and some documents captured. At 1255 hrs vic BS626507, C Co engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA and the capture of more documents. Continuing to search the general area, C Co engaged 1 VC evading at 1311 hrs vic BS625508 resulting in 1 VC KIA. Moving on toward the West, C Co engaged 4 VC vic BS613503 resulting in 4 VC KIA and the discovery of 2,000 lbs of rice. C Co burned the huts in the area experiencing two secondary explosions. Shrapnel from the secondary explosions wounded (minor) one soldier in C Co. C Co closed into a NDP vic BS602502. D Co moved west from the previous NDP vic BS644528. At 1510 hrs vic BS629530 D Co found what appeared to have been an enemy base camp with 40 foxholes. They also found several rounds of 60MM mortar ammunition in canisters in the area but made negative contact. D Co closed into a NDP vic BS633528. RCN Plt provided security for FSB BULLDOG and conducted localized patrols with negative contact.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved NW from BS655475 to a NDP vic BS632483 with negative contact. B Co continued security mission of FSB DANGER. C Co moved SW from BS665466. At 1300 hrs D Co and RCN Plt conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS613474 and then continued the combat sweep. At 1355 hrs vic BS632479 D Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. The VC was wearing a green uniform, pistol belt and carried 3 AK-47 magazines. D Co and RCN Plt occupied a NDP vic BS635477.

c. 27 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued the security mission at FSB BULLDOG. B Co moved east to assist in the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) of B-52 (Arc Lite) strikes with negative results then moved to a NDP vic BS612499. C Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. C Co continued to move with no further contact and established a NDP vic BS612492. D Co moved NW along a stream bed from BS644528 to a NDP vic BS625535 without making contact. RCN Plt continued local patrolling and security of FSB BULLDOG. The CC helicopter at 1325 hrs vic BS660576 engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA and at 1550 hrs vic BS653484 found 1 VC KIA and one M-16 Rifle.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A, C, D Co's and RCN Plt conducted sweeps to determine BDA from B-52 strikes. The following was found:

0820 Hrs vic BS630477 D Co found 1 VC KBA
0930 Hrs vic BS628473 D Co found 1 VC KIA in a grave
0935 Hrs vic BS630478 RCN Plt found 1 VC KBA

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1100 Hrs vic BS628473 A Co found 6 NVA KBA and 3 VC KBA
1200 Hrs vic BS634479 A Co found one K-44 Rifle
1515 Hrs vic BS634479 A Co found 8 NVA KBA
1516 Hrs vic BS627424 AERO Scouts found 3 NVA KBA and 1 VC KIA
1530 Hrs vic BS634476 D Co found 3 NVA KIA

B Co continued security of FSB DANGER.

d. 28 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued security of FSB BULLDOG. B Co moved to a PZ vic BS615505 then air moved to Quang Ngai and became OPCON to 1-1 Cav. C Co searched North from BS612496 to BS615514 with negative contact. D Co moved south from BS625536 to BS615517 with negative contact. RCN Plt conducted localized patrolling and security of FSB BULLDOG. At 0945 hrs vic BS649560, RCN Plt engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co continued BDA of D-52 striders moving southwest from BS633483. At 0845 hrs vic BS639484 A Co found 1 NVA KBA in a cave, and 1530 hrs vic BS638467 discovered 1 NVA KBA in a shallow grave with miscellaneous SA ammo and equipment. B Co continued security mission of FSB DANGER. C Co moved NW from BS637459 along the river with negative contact. D Co and RCN Plt moved together initially NW to BS629482 then changed the direction of their search to the Southwest. At 1110 hrs vic BS637476, RCN Plt found a weapon cache containing 8 SIGS Rifles, 6 M-1 Carbines, 2 French Submachine guns, and 1 AK-47.

(3) Supporting Aircraft: At 0930 hrs vic BS578421, the Aero Scouts engaged 5 NVA evading resulting in 5 NVA KIA. At 1255 hrs vic BS525750 F/8 Cav received SA fire from several positions. Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA.

e. 29 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS447715 and established FSB PEPPER. B Co OPCON to 1-1 Cav. C Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS445745 and began a combat search of the area. At 1400 hrs vic BS445742, C Co engaged 2 VC hiding in a hole resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1602 hrs vic BS448755 an element of C Co engaged a VC in a tunnel resulting in 1 VC KIA. An hour later at BS445763 an evading VC was engaged by C Co resulting in 1 VC KIA. D Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ at BS445765. At 1600 hrs vic BS4453757, D Co engaged a VC in a tunnel resulting in 1 VC KIA. RCN Plt air moved to FSB PEPPER to provide security.

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(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BS623474 Southeast on a combat search. At 1100 hrs Vic BS634452, A Co found 1,000 lbs of rice and miscellaneous equipment which they destroyed. B Co conducted security of FSB DANCER. C Co conducted an airmove to BS445745 and was placed OPCON to 3-1 Inf. D Co & RCN Plt moved from BS623474 South to BS624469 then SE along the river with negative contact.

(3) 1-1 Cav: A, B and C Trps with B-3-1 Inf OPCON crossed LD vic Hill 10(BS6972) at 0830 hrs and conducted a combat sweep to the West. The following contacts were made:

1215 hrs B-3-1 vic BS556753 engaged 2 VC evading 2 VC KIA

1250 hrs B-1-1 vic BS584751 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1335 hrs B-1-1 vic BS584751 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1330 hrs C-1-1 vic BS569752 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1535 hrs B-3-1 vic BS541760 found 1 BAR

1615 hrs A-1-1 vic BS528715 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

1645 hrs B-1-1 vic BS550742 found 1 homemade mortar tube.

1743 hrs D-3-1 vic BS546543 engaged 1 VC evading 1 VC KIA

(4) Supporting Aircraft: At 0840 hrs, F/8 Cav vic BS585738 had a helicopter shot down by SA fire. Gunships provided air cover immediately and the crew was extracted with no casualties. The Infantry Platoon of F/8 Cav was inserted to secure the aircraft and at 1206 hrs the aircraft was extracted without complications. At 1015 hrs vic BS575572, gunships of F/8 Cav engaged 10 VC with weapons resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1040 hrs Aero Scouts engaged 1 VC evading vic BS488766 resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1105 hrs the Aero Scouts engaged another VC evading vic BS445772 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

f. 23 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co and RCN plt continued to secure FSB Pepper. C and D Co's with C-4-3 Inf OPCON conducted a combat sweep east through grids BS4575 and BS4576. At 1045 hrs vic BS454763 C-3-1 Inf engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. C-3-1 Inf engaged another evading VC at 1107 hrs

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resulting in 1 VC KIA. C-4-3 Inf engaged a VC vic BSH51763 resulting in 1 VC KIA and at 1140 hrs vic BSH52763 D-3-1 Inf discovered 4 VC KRA. No further action was experienced on the combat sweep. At 1801 hrs the C-2C helicopter of 3-1 Inf engaged 2 evading VC vic BSH59743 resulting in 2 VC KIA.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA to a cold LZ at BSH45795 then conducted a combat sweep to the East. At 1617 hrs vic BSH57782, A Co detained 14 VCS, one of which was wounded. B Co conducted a CA from FSB DANCER to a cold LZ at BSH47772 then conducted a combat sweep SE. At 1214 hrs vic BSH47768 B Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1505 hrs vic BSH46776, B Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. D Co conducted a CA from BS637443 to a cold LZ at BSH43787 then conducted a combat sweep east with negative contact. RCN Plt was air moved from BS637443 to FSB DANCER for security during the day. At 1830 hrs RCN Plt was airlifted to LZ BRUNCO thus, terminating operations at FSB DANCER.

(3) 1-1 CAV: A Trp conducted a combat sweep from BS520725 through grids BS5273 and 5373. At 1730 hrs vic BS535731, A Trp engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. B Trp conducted a combat sweep from BS557746 to grid BS5474. At 1546 hrs vic BS540746, B Trp engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA and at 1645 hrs vic BS535745 had 2 US MIA from enemy SA fire. C Trp, with D-3-1 Inf, conducted a combat sweep from BS544751 through grids BS5275 and 5274. At 1000 hrs vic BS520751, C Trp engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1222 hrs vic BS522753 engaged another evading VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. C Trp engaged 2 VC trying to evade at 1045 hrs vic BS532753 resulting in 2 VC KIA.

(4) Supporting Aircraft: At 0900 hrs vic BSH57768 the Aero Scouts discovered 1 VC KRA. At 1005 hrs at BS518753, F/8 Cav engaged 2 VC evading resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1040 hrs the Aero Scouts engaged 1 VC evading vic BSH53762 resulting in 1 VC KIA. F/8 Cav engaged an evading VC at 1547 hrs vic BS525753 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

G. 31 Oct 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co and RCN Plt secured FSB PEPPER. B Co was released from OFCON to 1-1 Cav and was airlifted from BS505740 to LZ BRUNCO. The airlift was complete at 1750 hrs. C Co conducted a combat sweep east through grids BSH4773, 4772, 4872, 4873. At 1530 hrs vic BSH80725, C Co received SA fire resulting in 1 US MIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. D Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BSH674, 4672, 4775. At 1358 hrs vic BSH80725, D Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA.

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(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BSL4577, 4878 and 4978. At 1035 hrs vic BSL460779 A Co captured a wounded VCS. At 1855 hrs, A Co received SA fire from BSL494779 resulting in 1 US KIA. B Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BSL4577 and 4777 with negative contact. C Co conducted a combat sweep through grids BSL4674 and 4775. At 1235 hrs, vic BSL468722, C Co received SA fire resulting in 1 US KIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. D Co conducted a combat sweep in grid BSL4777 and at 1420 hrs vic BSL472784 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade resulting in 1 US KIA. No further contact was made. The RCI Plt was airlifted from LZ BRONCO to FSB PEPPER, then conducted a CA into a cold LZ at BSL453773. A combat sweep was made of the area with negative contact.

(3) 1-1 Cav: A Trp conducted a combat sweep from BS515734 to the Vic of BS5373 with negative contact. B Trp conducted a combat sweep from BS525755 to grid BS5375. At 0806 hrs vic BS518752 B Trp engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. C Trp conducted a combat sweep from BSL485745 to grid BS5174 with negative contact. 1-1 Cav terminated operations in Vernon Lake I as of 1900 hrs.

h. 1 Nov 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: 3-1 Inf concluded operations in Vernon Lake I and conducted an airlift to the DUC PHO AO to assume responsibility for that AO.

(2) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a combat sweep from BSL492784 to BS505760 with negative contact. B Co conducted a combat sweep from BSL472779 to BSL498760 with negative contact. C Co conducted a combat sweep from BSL472750 to BS500764. At 1930 hrs vic BSL498762, C Co engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. D Co conducted a combat sweep from BSL472776 to BS505760 with negative contact. The RCI Plt conducted a combat sweep from BSL472776 to BSL498760 with negative contact.

(3) 1-20 Inf: The 1-20 Inf conducted an airlift from DUC PHO AO into the Vernon Lake I AO ceasing responsibility for the DUC PHO AO and commencing operations Vernon Lake I. The battalion minus C Co was airlifted into LZ PEPPER and the movement was complete 1500 hrs. All units of 1-20 Inf prepared for future operations. At 1642 hrs vic BSL475765, D Co engaged several VC evading resulting in 2 VC KIA. There was no further contact in the 1-20 Inf Area.

i. 2 Nov 68:

Operation Vernon Lake I terminated 020600 Nov 1968.

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12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly casualties for Vernon Lake I:

3-1 Inf		1 WHA (E)
4-3 Inf	1 KHA	3 WHA (E)
1-1 Cav		2 WHA (E)

b. Enemy cumulative results for Vernon Lake I. (See Annex C, Intelligence)

13. (C) LOGISTICS: See Annex B.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: TOE Equipment, standard tactics and techniques normally related to airmobile counterinsurgency warfare were used during this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: Operation VERNON LAKE I was envisioned as a spoiling attack against a concentration of enemy forces who's apparent mission was an attack aimed at Quang Ngai City. Intensification of intelligence seeking operations in the form of Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and Sniffer missions narrowed the area of troop concentration and enabled the selection of primary targets for B-52 ARC LITE strikes. VERNON LAKE I commenced, immediately following the completion of the final ARC LITE, by combat assaulting elements of two battalions into the area suspected of being the enemy troop locations. It was apparent that the enemy was staging in a forward base for deployment in the immediate future. The ARC LITE Strikes were well plotted and one of the bases almost completely destroyed an occupied enemy battalion base camp. After completely evaluating the ARC LITE area both battalions pressed on to find and fix the remaining enemy forces. However, the enemy elected to avoid contact and only sparse contacts were made throughout the remainder of the operation.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: It is highly recommended that when intelligence sources indicate a buildup of enemy force in a given area extensive intelligence gathering operations such as IREP or Sniffer flights be immediately employed to pin-point the enemy location and then systematically employ ARC LITE Strikes followed by troop employment in the area to assess the effects. It is further recommended that if enemy forces concentrate

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
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in a given area spoiling attacks be employed to destroy his forces and to disrupt his schedule. The maximum use of mobility through combat assaults enables US Forces to outmaneuver the enemy whenever he can be located.

4 Incl
ANNEXES:
A-Opn Overlay
B-Logistics
C-Intelligence
D-Signal


JOHN W. DONALDSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(VERNON LAKE I)

1. (C) The logistical support for Operation VERNON LAKE I is best understood if broken down into three general areas:

- a. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Quang Ngai.
- b. Resupply of infantry battalions and artillery batteries.
- c. Establishment and maintenance of 11th Infantry Brigade CP at LZ Bulldog and LZ Pepper.

2. (C) QUANG NGAI:

a. The FSE at Quang Ngai was established on 14 October in anticipation of Operation VERNON LAKE I. The FSE received replenishment of stockage objectives and its initial stockage from Chu Lai. A water purification point was established by Company C, 26th Engineer Battalion. Also, a brigade clearing station was planned for should it be required. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were as follows:

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u>
A131	CTG 7.62mm MLB 4-1	100,000
A165	CTG 7.62mm Mini	200,000
H490	Rkt 2.75mm	500
B572	CTG 40mm/Linked	18,000
G955	Gren Hd Smk (Violet)	144
G950	Gren Hd Smk (Red)	144
IL07	Flare Acft (MK24)	96
CH45	CTG 105 HE	3,400
CH49	CTG 105 I11	200
CH52	CTG 105 Smoke	200
CH54	CTG 105 WP	200
D544	CTG 155 HE	1,200
D550	CTG 155 WP	100
D505	CTG 155 I11	100
N/A	CTG 155 I11	100
N/A	JPL	20,000 Gal
N/A	MOGAS	1,000 Gal
N/A	C-Rations/LRP Rations	9,000 meals

b. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were maintained by coordination of the 6th Support Battalion with Americal Division Transportation and Ammunition Officers.

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) Continued.

3. (C) The infantry battalions were supported logistically, primarily from LZ Bronco; FSB LZ Dancer for 4th Bn, 3d Inf and FSB LZ Bulldog for 3d Bn, 1st Inf.

a. The materiel requirements for establishing an infantry battalion fire support base were as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Sandbags	25,000 ea
Concertina	3 sleeves ea
Pickets 8'	555 ea
Pickets 3'	222 ea
Culverts 60"	60 ea

b. The average daily resupply for each infantry battalion was as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
C-Rations	127 cases
A-Rations	1,000 lbs
Water	1,000 gal

c. Ammunition resupply for the two artillery batteries (D, 6/11 at LZ Dancer and B, 6/11 at LZ Bulldog) was accomplished primarily from the Quang Ngai FSE by Chinook sling load. Back-up resupply for the units was handled from the 1st Logistical Command ASP located at LZ Bronco (these figures are not available). However, the daily average resupply for the artillery battalion from the Quang Ngai FSE was as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Ammo	480 rounds
C-Rations	32 cases
Water	1,000 gal

4. (C) Brigade CP at LZ Bulldog:

a. The 11th Infantry Brigade CP was established at LZ Bulldog on 25 October by elements of HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade and other designated individuals.

b. The 11th Infantry Brigade CP was moved from LZ Bulldog to LZ Pepper on 29 October 1968, by elements of HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade.

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

d. HHC was responsible for resupply of C-Rations for personnel of the 11th Infantry Brigade CP. Other supplies were furnished by the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade.

5. (C) Individuals were required to deploy with $1\frac{1}{2}$ basic load of ammo and battalions were required to transport a modified basic load to new firebases (modified by unit, based on experience factor).

6. (C) No major logistical problems were experienced during Operation VERNON LAKE I. However, continued use of pre-packaging materials and pre-cut bunkers reduces waste as well as helicopter sorties. Blivits (500 gal and 250 gal) are indispensable on fire bases, especially during inclement weather conditions. Every effort should be made to pre-stock a minimum of seven (7) days of supply on all fire bases.

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(C) ANNEX C (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Vernon Lake #1)

1. (C) WEATHER AND TERRAIN:

a. Weather: The weather during the operation was generally favorable from mid morning to dusk. Skies were generally cloudy to partly cloudy and visibility was good. Precipitation occurred as follows: on 26 Oct very light rainshowers from 0600H to 1000H; on 29 Oct occasional very light drizzle from 0900H to 1000H; on 31 Oct very light drizzle from 0600H to 0700H and light rainshowers from 1300H to 1800H; on 1 Nov very light drizzle from 0600H to 1000H and occasional very light rain from 1300H to 1800H.

b. Terrain:

(1) First phase of Vernon Lake #1 (exploitation of AEC Light boxes vicinity BS6347).

(a) The major portion of the operational area was composed of rugged mountains with steep ravines covered by dense undergrowth and single and double canopy forest. Movement was restricted except in the valleys and along trails.

(b) Effect on enemy courses of action: The operational area afforded the enemy the capability of movement relatively free from observation. The dense undergrowth and sharp ravines provided the enemy numerous areas in which to hide to avoid contact.

(c) Effect on friendly courses of action: The nature of the terrain restricted ground movement of friendly forces. Movement was necessarily slow and visibility, observation and fields of fire were restricted by the nature of the terrain.

(2) Second phase of Vernon Lake #1 (attempt to make contact with the 2nd Regiment vicinity BS5270).

(a) The terrain in this area is flat and broken by dense hedgerows in the vicinity of hamlets. There are large numbers of rice paddies, many of them abandoned, which makes rapid movement in the area possible.

(b) Effect on enemy course of action: Due to the flat and relatively open terrain enemy movement during daylight hours was extremely restricted. Hedgerows around hamlets provided excellent cover and defensive positions for units.

(c) Effect on friendly courses of action: The terrain offered no major obstacle to friendly movement; however, the numerous hedgerows made sweeping operations through villages difficult to control and tended to force actions into numerous equal size engagements.

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2. PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence indicated the presence of several VC/NVA units (see 2d below) in this area prior to the initiation of the operation. It is probable that these units were effecting resupply and consolidation in preparation for operations along the coastal plains to their east and north during the monsoon season. Probable objectives were Quang Ngai city and Nghia Hanh city.

b. Intelligence indicated the presence of fortified positions and base camps within the general area. Heavy trail activity leading into the area was observed 7 - 10 days prior to the operation.

c. Enemy Capabilities:

(1) Conduct resupply and consolidation in preparation for attacks on Quang Ngai and Nghia Hanh.

(2) Conduct attacks and ambushes against friendly forces and LZs.

(3) Evade friendly forces and avoid contact.

d. Enemy disposition and strength:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
2nd VC Regt, 3d NVA Div	BS5269	1325
81st LF VC Battalion	BS6154	210
83rd LF VC Battalion	BS6451	250
618 LF VC Company	BS6560	100
506B LF VC Sapper Company	BS6653	65

3. (C) Development of Intelligence:

a. The first phase of Vernon Lake #I (25 Oct to 28 Oct) consisted of the exploitation of six Arc Light boxes which were struck in the Song Ve Valley vicinity BS6347 on 24 Oct. The boxes were struck because intelligence sources during the previous four (4) weeks indicated the presence of a VC/NVA base camp in the area. A VC/NVA base camp located in the target area was 95% destroyed. 170 four to five man bunkers, 50 foxholes, and numerous tunnels were destroyed. The ledge on a mountain was sheared off and buried portions of the base camp under tons of rock and soil. 18 NVA and 6 VC bodies were found in the base camp.

b. The second phase of Vernon Lake #I (29 Oct to 2 Nov) consisted of an attempt to make contact with major elements of the 2nd regiment, 3rd NVA Division believed to be located in the Song Tra Khuc river valley vicinity BS5270. No significant contacts were made.

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4. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Though Operation Vernon Lake #1 was conducted in an area which intelligence indicated to be an enemy resupply and consolidation area, there were no significant contacts established nor were large food or weapons caches discovered.

b. The willingness of VC/NVA forces to allow sweep operations to be conducted in such an area indicated an overriding desire on his part to avoid contact.

c. This operation caused the VC/NVA to relocate large numbers of troops and supplies thereby disrupting his timetable for offensive actions along the coastal area during the monsoon season.

5. (C) ENEMY LOSSES:

a. Personnel:

NVA/VC KIA	27/68
NVA/VC PW	2/0
Civil Defendants	6

b. Equipment:

(1) Captured:

Weapons:

Individual	23
Crew Served	1

Miscellaneous:

82MM Mortar Sight	1
82MM Bipod	1
82MM Rounds	8
Rice	5000 lbs
Documents	50 lbs

(2) Destroyed:

Weapon: 1 Homemade Mortar Tube

Clothing:

Ammunition:

105MM Rounds	2
82MM Rounds	10
75MM Rounds	2
AK-47 Rounds	1017
M-60 Rounds	4
CHICOM H/Gren	23
M-26 H/Gren	1

NVA Uniforms	5
Black Pajamas	17

Food: Rice	5300 lbs
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Miscellaneous:

Ammunition Boxes	4	AK-47 Ammunition Pouches	3
Pistol Belts	2	AK-47 Magazines	6
NVA Canteens	3	M-16 Magazines	3
NVA Mess Kits	3	57RR Canisters	13
NVA Packs	5	60MM Canisters	6
NVA Helmets	2	Hammocks	3
Ponchos	2	Shovels	12
Rucksacks	10	Sampans	1

c. Structures:

Huts Destroyed	23	Bunkers Destroyed	98
Tunnels Destroyed	5	Foxholes Destroyed	53

d. Secondary Explosions/Fires from Airstrikes or Artillery:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
25 Oct	BS621458	2 Secondary Explosions
25 Oct	BS615460	2 Secondary Explosions/2 Secondary Fires
26 Oct	BS613503	2 Secondary Explosions
27 Oct	BS662405	1 Secondary Explosions with white smoke
30 Oct	BS464766	1 Secondary Explosion
31 Oct	BS454803	1 Secondary Explosion/1 Secondary Fire
01 Nov	BS498782	1 Secondary Explosion

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(D) ANNEX D (Signal) to Combat Operations Communications Mission (After Action Report, VERNON LAKE I)

1. (C) COMMUNICATIONS MISSION: Install, operate, and maintain communications facilities in support of the 11th Inf Bde during conduct of VERNON LAKE I.

2. (C) THE COMMUNICATIONS MEANS:

a. Phase I: FM was the means of communications to 11th Inf Bde Main, and to the Inf Bns. The C&C aircraft augmented FM radio by providing courier service as required.

b. Phase II. Telephone via VHF was the primary means of communications to 11th Inf Bde Main, with FM radio as the secondary means. FM was the means to the Inf Bns. C&C aircraft were used by all echelons to augment previously stated communications.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Phase I. A signal recon was not conducted. The Bde Radio Officer and 2 EM from HHC Radio Section arrived LZ Bulldog at 290600 Oct 68 and assisted in installing the TOC radios. Bde Fwd operated in the following FM radio nets:

- (1) Bde Cmd.
- (2) Bde Secure.
- (3) Inf Bn as Required.

b. Phase II:

(1) FM: All FM nets from Bde Fwd at LZ Pepper were operational to Div, Bde Main, and to the Inf Bns by 290800 hrs Oct 68. An FM retransmission team was airlifted to LZ Buff on 240800 Oct in order to insure the reliability of FM communication from Bde Main to Bde Fwd. The following nets were in operation at LZ Pepper:

- (a) Div Cmd.
- (b) Div Secure
- (c) Bde Cmd.
- (d) Bde Secure.

GROUP 4
Downgraded At 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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(D) ANNEX D (Signal) continued.

(2) Telephone Communications: Telecom via VHF was established by 291930 Oct 68 between Bde Main and Bde Fwd. Circuits were also established for 3/1 and 4/3 Inf Bns for telephone communications from the forward location and to the Bn Rear of each Bn and to Duc Pho Switch (see Appendix 1). On 31 Oct, 3/1 Inf Bn was replaced by 1/20 Inf Bn, and at 311300 hrs, the telephone circuits which were used by 3/1 Inf Bn were given to 1/20 Inf Bn. A Bde Fwd switchboard was not established. All circuits were dedicated (point to point), or long locals off the Duc Pho Switch.

4. (C) RESULTS: All systems were operational throughout the operation, and no significant problems were encountered. A Communications center was not used and was not needed.

a. A signal plan was not prepared prior to this operation. Time permitted only verbal instructions and notes. This did not have an adverse effect on communications support.

b. Signal maintenance support provided by the 6th Support Battalion was very effective.

4 Appendixes

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Appendix I (Signal) To Annex D Combat After Action Report, VERNON LAKE I

Phase I 281930 Oct

Channel:

1. Open *
2. Bde Fwd TOC to BDE TOC
3. Bde Fwd TOC to Duc Fho
4. Bde CO (van) to Bde TOC
5. Bde CO (van) to Duc Fho
6. 3/1 Fwd TOC to Bde TOC *
7. 3/1 Fwd TOC to 3/1 Rear -
8. 4/3 Fwd TOC to Bde TOC
9. 4/3 Fwd TOC to 4/3 Rear
10. B-6/11 FDC to 6/11 FDC
11. D-6/11 FDC to 6/11 FDC
12. Bde Fwd VHF to Bde Patch

pt/pt Fwd TOC to Bde CO (van)

*Phase II- 311300 Oct


Channel

1. 1/20 TOC to Duc Fho
6. 1/20 TOC to Bde TOC
7. 1/20 TOC to 1/20 Rear

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
APPENDIX II (Signal) To Combat Action Report, VERNON LAKE I



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
APPENDIX III (Signal) To Combat Action Report, VERNON LAKE I



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Appendix IV (Signal) To Combat Action Report, Vernon Lake I



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