

HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION 20TH INFANTRY
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE AMERICAN DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BA-XX-IN

8 June 1969

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT

Commanding Officer
11th Infantry Brigade
ATTN: S2
APO 96217

1. At 2230 hrs, 7 June 1969 at LZ Liz, B/1-20 reported spotting 11 NVA with a starlight scope moving toward the outermost protective wire at grid coordinate BS 757430. B/1-20 engaged with machine gun & automatic weapons fire. The enemy file formation scattered into a nearby tree line. Mortar and Artillery fire were adjusted.
2. At 2330 hrs, bunker 21 on LZ Liz saw 11 NVA in the protective wire. They were engaged with 81mm mortar, machine gun and small arms fire. Mortar illumination enabled soldiers on the bunker line to observe 3 NVA dead lying in the wire.
3. At 0030 hrs, a six man patrol led by the company executive officer, 1LT William Castille from Fort Arthur, Texas, was sent from the B/1-20 CP to reconnoiter the contact area. As 1LT Castille moved down a path toward the wire, he stepped on the arm of an NVA sapper who sprang out of a small ditch and evaded. 1LT Castille killed the NVA with his M16 and the rest of the patrol killed three other NVA who were hiding in the same trench. At the same time, bunker 4 engaged one NVA with small arms, believing they wounded him. B/1-20 continued to rake the southern slopes of LZ Liz with machine gun, quad 50, and M79 fire. A search uncovered 2 RPG #2's 2 AK47's, approximately 10 woven baskets filled with Chi Com hand grenades and B-40 rockets, 100 meters of commo wire and satchel charges. During most of the contact a flare ship was on station except when the flare supply at LZ Bronco became critical. Shadow 47 (a C119) provided illumination after the flare ship departed from 0500 to daylight. A 3/4 ton truck and 1/4 ton jeep from C/1-82 Arty were moved so that their headlights kept the breached wire under illumination.
4. On the northern side of the perimeter C/1-82 Artillery reported a generator destroyed by a B-40 rocket at 0330 hrs, approximately two

hours after the last action of B/1-20. A maintenance technician, hearing there was a problem with the generator, was wounded by AK47 fire while walking on the Battery street toward the generator. The primary target appeared to be the commo bunker which was completely destroyed. The switchboard was knocked out, some WDL wire, DR 8's and several TA-312 telephones were lost. No radios were damaged. PFC Lurth fought tenaciously from the commo bunker but was killed. The Battery Commander, CPT Jerry Dixon from Provo, Utah, was responsible for killing 2 NVA single-handedly. Upon hearing the explosion at the generator, CPT Dixon headed toward the commo bunker and managed to gain a flanking position from the Chapel. CPT Dixon drove off the main assault with frag and thermite grenades with strong assistance from SP5 Lee, PFC Daise and 1LT Phillips. CPT Dixon also captured a slightly wounded NVA hiding in a small trench near the commo bunker.

5. The POW stated that an 18 man force divided into three, six man teams had composed the sapper attack. Each team had one RPG #2 gunner, one rifleman armed with an AK47 and four ammo bearers carrying baskets of B-40 rockets, grenades, satchel charges and commo wire. A thorough recon had been conducted six days prior by key leaders. The POW was an ammo bearer and had been shown a sand drawing of LZ Liz. The plan was for two teams to attack from the south and his team was to attack from the north. This was his first combat action. He was a member of the 2d squad, 2d platoon, 5th Company, 14th Battalion, 22d NVA Regiment, 3d NVA Division.

6. At 0800 a tracker dog team of five men from the 63d Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker) swept the breach in the wire and quickly picked up a blood trail and a strong scent. As they swept, 2 NVA were flushed and engaged. One NVA was wounded by small arms, but both eluded the pursuit in a nearby village where the blood trail stopped. There was also evidence that a water buffalo had been used to drag off wounded from the previous night's action. A thorough search of the surrounding villages and terrain was conducted by ground troops with negative results. A number of VCS were detained from an adjoining village. 2 VCS stated they had seen the NVA on the night of the attack. Several were evacuated to MI as association members.

7. In summary, US forces suffered 1 KIA and 12 WIA, only 4 of which required evacuation, and one being immediately returned to duty while three were further evacuated to Chu Lai, none serious. All casualties were from C/1-82 Arty. Out of the 18 man assault force, 12 were killed and confirmed by body count, one slight WIA was captured and three more were wounded without positive confirmation. It was convincingly proven that an alert, disciplined bunker line equipped with starlight scopes, reinforced by clearing patrols, dogs and aggressive leadership can soundly defeat a sapper penetration.

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8. This action also vividly portrays the diverse elements available to a unit to defeat a sapper attack. Quad 50's with good fields of fire, preregistered mortar and artillery fires, illumination from mortars and flare ships, plus available light from unit vehicles were successfully utilized. Combat Tracker Teams were employed to track and demoralize the remaining sappers.

9. The POW captured also points out the prior reconnaissance and thorough preparation taken by the VC in conducting a sapper attack. Aggressive patrolling and frequent changes of defensive positions and automatic weapons will confuse and disrupt many well rehearsed sapper attack plans and deny him the principle essential for his success; surprise.


1 Incl
Diagram of Action

/s/Alfred N. Webb Jr.
/t/ALFRED N. WEBB, JR.
CPT, Inf
S2

LZ LIZ
BS 753433



- # LT CASTILLE'S ACTION
- X CPT DIXON'S ACTION
- O TRACKER DOG'S ACTION
- △ PSYOPS BROADCASTS



Inclosure 1