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AAR
23d Inf Div
11th Bde
Quang Ngai
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96217

U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

AVDF-BAOP

5 October 1971

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Commanding General
23d Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDF-GCHL
APO San Francisco 96217

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BY RAKERS ON 24 May 55

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: None
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 011200 July to 042400 October 1971.
3. (U) LOCATION: Quang Ngai Province from the Tra Bong river south to the MRI/MRII boundary; from the South China Sea west to the Quang Ngai/Kontum provincial boundary. Map, Vietnam, 1:100,000, Series L607, sheets 6639, 6739, 6738, 6638.
4. (C) COMMAND AND CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Warner S. Goodwin, Jr., Commanding Officer, 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division.
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. 1 July - 1 September 1971:
11th Infantry Brigade Control
HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade
6-11 Artillery (DS)
D/26th Engineers (DS)
3/B/523d Signal Battalion
Det/328th Radio Research Unit
TM 1/635 MI Detachment
90th Chemical Detachments
59th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

3-1 Infantry
A/3-1
B/3-1
C/3-1
D/3-1
E/3-1

1-20 Infantry
A/1-20
B/1-20
C/1-20
D/1-20
E/1-20

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GROUP-4

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Declassified after 12 years.

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1-52 Infantry

A/1-52
B/1-52
C/1-52
D/1-52
E/1-52

TF 23d Cavalry

E Trp, 1st Cav (OPCON 198th Bde
effective 29 August 1971)
H Trp, 17th Cavalry

b. 1 September - 4 October 1971

11th Infantry Brigade Control

MHC, 11th Infantry Brigade
6-11 Artillery (DS)
D/26th Engineers (DS)
3/B/523d Signal Battalion
Det/328th Radio Research Unit
TM 1/635 MI Detachment
90th Chemical Detachment (1-11 September 1971)
59th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (1-13 September 1971)
H Trp, 17th Cavalry (1-15 September 1971)

3-1 Infantry

A/3-1
B/3-1
C/3-1
D/3-1
E/3-1

1-20 Infantry (OPCON 198th Bde eff 12 Sep 71)

A/1-20
B/1-20
C/1-20
D/1-20
E/1-20

1-52 Infantry

A/1-52
B/1-52
C/1-52
D/1-52
E/1-52

7. SUPPORTING FORCES: Artillery fire support was provided by elements of 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery and by 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery operating in direct support of the 11th Infantry Brigade. Elements of the 1st Battalion, 82nd Artillery supported the Direct Support Artillery Battalions in the General Support Reinforcing role. Air Cavalry support was provided by B Company, 123d Aviation Battalion. Helicopter support for combat assaults, air moves, and routine resupply was provided by the 14th Aviation Battalion. Tactical Air Support was requested thru 23d Infantry Division on an as needed basis. Air strikes were targeted against enemy base areas, known or suspected enemy locations, and in support of ground troops in contact. Throughout the entire operation all forms of fire support were responsive to the needs of the Brigade.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: Annex A (Intelligence)

9. (C) MISSION: To conduct unilateral and combined operations with ARVN forces to locate and destroy the VC Quang Ngai Provincial Headquarters and the 21st NVA Regiment. Additionally, to assist in the GVN pacification and revolutionary development program by conducting combat operations in conjunction with RF/PF forces to destroy VC/NVA elements and to assist in the Rice Denial Program.

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c. 18-24 July 1971: Action picked up sharply this week with B/123 AVN making numerous contacts in the western portion of the Brigade TAOI. On 18 July at BS 275444 they engaged two NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. Also on 18 July snipers from 3-1 engaged three NVA resulting in three NVA KIA. On 19 July B/123 AVN engaged two NVA vic BS 293538 resulting in two NVA KIA. TAC Air was called in and two additional NVA were killed. Snipers from 1-52 engaged two VC at grid BS 552806 killing one. On 20 July B/123 AVN engaged six NVA vic BS 161763 resulting in six NVA KIA. They inserted the aerial rifle platoon and found a large weapons and supply cache. On 21 July at BS 173753 B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA. At BS 153755, 143773, and 159750 they engaged and killed nine NVA. Again on 22 July B/123 engaged six NVA at BS 175667 resulting in six NVA KIA. D/1-52 engaged three NVA at BS 161759 resulting in one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. On 23 July B/123 AVN engaged and killed ten NVA at grids BS 245726, BS 226722, and BS 231722. On 24 July B/123 AVN engaged 15 NVA at BS 229656 resulting in 13 NVA KIA. TAC was called in and three additional NVA were killed.

d. 25-31 July: Enemy activity remained heavy this week with B/123 AVN accounting for most of the action. On 25 July B/123 AVN had numerous engagements with the enemy vic grid BS 243740 and the total results for the day were 20 NVA KIA. On 26 July, TAC air was employed at grid BS 244646 resulting in three NVA KIA. D/1-1 Cav engaged three NVA at grid BS 271664 resulting in one NVA KIA. On 27 July the aerial rifle platoon from D/1-1 Cav was inserted at grid BS 193671 to check a bunker complex. They engaged and killed one NVA. On 28 July the aerial rifle platoon from B/123 AVN found 35 boxes of medical supplies at grid BS 195718. On 29 July B/123 AVN engaged three NVA in sampan at grid BS 642572 killing all three. On 30 July B/123 AVN engaged two NVA at BS 217567 resulting in two NVA KIA. B/123 AVN on 31 July killed 23 NVA in four different engagements.

e. 1-7 August 1971: Action in the Brigade TAOI decreased this week as the enemy forces avoided contact whenever possible. On 1 August A/1-52 ambushed and killed one NVA at grid BS 358806. On 2 August B/123 AVN engaged and killed two NVA at BS 247785. On the same day C/1-52 found one NVA KBA at grid BS 354807 and A/1-52 found four NVA KBA at BS 354807. On 3 August B/123 AVN engaged and killed nine NVA at BS 122496. On 4 August B/17 Cav engaged six VC at grid BS 846506 resulting in three VC KIA and one weapon CIA. B/123 AVN killed one NVA at BS 133538. There were no significant actions on 6 or 7 August.

f. 8-14 August: Action remained light for this week with B/123 AVN accounting for most of the Brigade's kills. On 8 August B/123 AVN engaged and killed six NVA at grid BS 202565. On 9 August E/1 Cav received a heavy volume of RPG fire at BS 686535 resulting in four US WIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. On 11 August B/123 AVN killed two NVA at BS 199605. On 13 August B/123 AVN engaged and killed eight NVA; two NVA at BS 135615, one NVA vic BS 154582, two killed at BS 145599, one NVA KIA at BS 148701, and two NVA KIA at BS 159599. TAC Air was employed at BS 146599 resulting in four NVA KBAS. C/1-52 engaged two NVA at BS 215558 killing one and capturing the other. On 14 August B/123 AVN engaged and killed four NVA at 218677.

g. 15-21 August: Action was very light this week with the only contacts taking place on 18 and 19 August. On 18 August B/123 AVN at grid BS 751324 engaged and killed one NVA. The aerial rifle platoon was inserted and engaged five NVA, killing two. Artillery was fired resulting in two NVA KIA. On 19 August B/3-1 found one NVA KBA at BS 753327.

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h. 22-28 August: Action picked up slightly this week as the 11th Brigade continued to conduct operations in the western portion of the TAOI. On 22 August TAC Air was employed at BS 25446 resulting in nine NVA KBAS. B/123 AVN engaged and killed two NVA at BS 224868. On 25 August FSB Snoopy received 8-10 rounds of 82 mm mortar fire with negative damage. A/3-1 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in one US KIA and three US WIA. On 27 August A/3-1 again made contact with the enemy resulting in three US WIA. Enemy casualties for both engagements are unknown.

i. 29 August - 4 September: Action increased in the Brigade area of operation this week as the enemy increased his activity in the TAOI. On 30 August snipers from H/17 Cav engaged three VC at grid BS 774555 killing one and capturing three weapons. On the same day snipers from 3-1 killed one VC at grid BS 537761. B/1-20 had a mechanical ambush detonate at BS 673434 resulting in two NVA KIA. On 31 August B/123 AVN had a LOH hit by an RPG round resulting in one LOH destroyed and two US WIA. On 1 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA at BS 220608. On 2 September they killed five NVA at the following grids: BS 289693, 268693, and 109705. On 3 September TAC Air was employed at grid BS 634493 resulting in one NVA KBAS.

j. 5-11 September: Action was light this week with only three small engagements reported. On 5 September gunships from B/123 AVN engaged and killed two VC at grid BS 475775. Snipers from 3-1 engaged three VC at grid BS 501744 killing two and wounding one. On 11 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed seven NVA at grid 337801. TAC Air accounted for one NVA KIA at grid BS 337790.

k. 12-18 September: On 13 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed three NVA at grid BS 136749. On 14 September TAC Air was employed at grid BS 233782 resulting in four NVA KBAS. B/123 AVN engaged and killed nine NVA vic grid BS 233782. On 16 September D/3-1 made contact with an unknown size enemy force at BS 334796 resulting in four US WIA. Enemy casualties are unknown. On 17 September B/123 AVN engaged three NVA in a sampan resulting in two NVA KIA. On 18 September A/1-52 found six NVA killed by gunships at BS 311808. B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA at BS 171612.

l. 19-25 September: Action continued at a low level again this week in the 11th Infantry Brigade's TAOI. On 19 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA at BS 190624. Snipers from 3-1 Infantry at BS 520750 engaged one VC/NVA resulting in one VC/NVA KIA. The next action took place on 25 September when 176 AHC aircraft engaged and killed one VC while covering a flame drop in Mo Duc District. At grid BS 592795 aircraft from 116 AHC received SAF. They returned fire resulting in five VC KIA. C/1-52 at grid BS 624522 engaged six VC/NVA resulting in three KIA and two weapons CIA.

m. 26 September - 4 October: Action for the last week of the reporting period remained light in the Brigade's TAOI. On 26 September C/1 - 52 at grid BS 630529 engaged and killed one VC and captured one SKS. On the same day B/3-1 killed one VC and captured one AK-47 at BS 611577. The only action on 27 September came at grid BS 531648 when B/123 engaged and killed one VC. On 28 September B/123 AVN engaged and killed seven NVA at grids BS 387803, BS 236796, and 234782. On 1 October B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA at grid BS 173702. On 2 October B/123 AVN and airstrikes accounted for nine NVA KIA and two NVA WIA/CIA at grid BS 390802. On 3 October B/123 AVN engaged and killed three NVA at grid BS 502433. Negative events on 4 October.

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12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Enemy

KIA	324
CIA	3
IWC	39
CSWC	3

b. Friendly

KIA	6
WIA (E)	93
WIA (M)	28
MIA	0

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13. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: During the period of this operation, logistical support to units' fire support bases was accomplished by vehicle convoy and helicopter. UH-1H helicopters were the primary aircraft used for resupplying the units in the field, however, fire support bases received the bulk of their resupply by vehicle convoy. The exception to this was in those areas where the fire support base could not be reached by road. The CH-47 (Chinook) was utilized for the resupply of such bases. The troops in field locations were generally resupplied from the Battalion fire support bases. CH-47s were used primarily for hauling Class I, II, IV, and V items to the battalion fire support. From the fire support bases the resupply was carried to the rifle companies by UH-1H helicopters. No major problems were experienced in the field of logistics during this operation.

b. Maintenance: The 11th Brigade was supported by D Company 723d Maintenance Battalion for the first stays of the operation, then Headquarters and A Company 723d Maintenance Battalion assumed the support requirement. For both units, the primary maintenance mission involved vehicles, weapons, and radios. Lack of an adequate supply of repair parts caused some delays in getting equipment repaired, however, these delays caused no serious problems.

c. Treatment and Evacuation of Casualties: Due to the size of the Brigade's TAOI, it was necessary to position evacuation helicopters in Quang Ngai City to support the operation requirements. By placing the evacuation helicopters in Quang Ngai the response time was greatly reduced. All combat casualties were treated in field locations and if required, evacuated to 91st Evacuation Hospital in Chu Lai. If the tactical situation required, additional medical evacuation helicopters could be obtained from Chu Lai Dust Off.

d. Transportation: Brigade units relied almost exclusively on organic transportation to meet the vehical requirements throughout the operation. When additional transportation assets were required, units could request support from the 23d Supply and Transportation Battalion. Requests for additional transportation were forwarded to the brigade S-4 for approval and then submitted to 23d S&T Battalion.

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e. Communications: Due to the extreme size of the Brigade's TAOI and the far reaching operations conducted during the reporting period, it was necessary to establish "relay stations" at key points within the Brigade area to maintain effective communications. FM radio was the primary means of communications from company to battalion to brigade and brigade to division. A VHF system provided "land-line" communications between brigade and division and for much of the operation between brigade and battalions. RTT nets were also used during the operation to provide "hard copy" of important messages. All units down to company level were equipped with "secure" radio capability and these systems were used extensively during the operation.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Extensive use was made of war dogs during the reporting period. Scout and tracker dogs were used to detect the presents of enemy personnel and base areas, while mine dogs were used to detect the presence of enemy mines and booby traps. Flame drops from CH-47 aircraft, were used to clear booby trapped areas and proved to be quite successful. The brigade also tested several new items of equipment during this operation. The claymore triggering device was used to set up mechanical ambushes. This item of equipment was considered to be less than satisfactory by most units of the brigade. The half-size smoke grenade and ground illumination flare was also tested. These items were more favorably received by field units, however, problem areas were identified and reported.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. Operations during the reporting period were generally characterized by widely dispersed units utilizing saturation patrols and ambushes to reduce the enemys' ability to move. Snipers were employed along key lines of communications and met with tremendous success. The last two months of the reporting period the brigade launched a series of operations in the western portions of the TAOI in support of the 4th and 6th ARVN Regiments. These operations were designed to disrupt the enemy supply routes and interdict his lines of communications. A battalion forward CP and 105 mm Howitzer were established on a forward fire base, while the rifle companies conducted security operations around the position. Extensive use of eagle flights was made to increase the range and effectiveness of local patrolling. The western operations proved very effective in disrupting enemy lines of communication and kept the enemy from launching any major offensive during the reporting period.

b. Armored Cavalry was employed in the lowlands in conjunction with RF/PF forces. By using the mobility and fire power of the armored cavalry to install confidence in the RFs and PFs the overall security of Quang Ngai Province was increased. These combined also contributed greatly to the success of the brigade rice denial program. Intelligence reports indicated that the rice denial program was so successful in Quang Ngai Province that the 21st NVA Regiment was forced to commit an entire battalion to the mission of rice procurement.

c. Overall the operation must be termed a success. The Brigade successfully restricted the enemy's ability to maneuver. The combined operations conducted

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with the ARVN Regiments were highly successful in interdicting enemy supply routes and lines of communication. The training assistance and operational support given to the PF/RF forces also contributed to the success of the operation.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that US units continue to conduct joint operations with ARVN and RF/PF forces. These operations should require the Vietnamese forces to assume the major role, while US forces should be used to provide additional support as required.

Warner S. Goodwin, Jr.
WARNER S. GOODWIN, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

ANNEXES:

- A - Intelligence
- B - Map and Overlay

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ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) to Combat After Action Report Period 1 JUL-4 OCT 1971

1. (C) THE AREA OF OPERATION:

a. Weather: With the exception of a Tropical Storm in mid-July, the weather during the 1 JUL-4 OCTOBER operation was generally good, with little or no adverse effect upon the execution of combat operations. During the later part of August and through September, air operations in the late afternoon and evening in the mountainous regions were limited due to thunder showers.

b. Terrain:

(1) This area of operation is part of the northern highlands of South Vietnam and is characterized by three types of terrain; the wide belt of mountains in the west, a narrow transitional piedmont in the central portion of the AO, and the coastal plains in the east.

(a) The western portion of the AO consists of rugged, jungle covered mountains rising to elevations in excess of 4,000 feet and intersected by numerous small river valleys. This area offers maximum concealment while at the same time hindering foot movement of friendly forces making complete searches of the area extremely difficult.

(b) The narrow piedmont consists of undulating hills compartmented by numerous river valleys. These waterways extend like fingers from the eastern highlands through the piedmont into the coastal plains. Throughout the piedmont, the hills range from 30 to 70 meters in elevation, with slopes between 10 and 20 degrees.

(c) The coastal plains are a relatively flat strip, extending the length of the AO. The plains are interspersed with isolated hills and ridges and are sectioned in many areas by rice paddies, bounded by dikes two to five feet high and eight to ten feet wide. The eastern edge of the coastal plains consists of beaches covered by scattered scrub brush.

(2) The principle rivers are the Song Tra Bong, Song Tra Khuc, and Song Ve which flow from West to East, and the Song Re and Dak Selo which are in the western portion of the TAOL and flow North-South. The Nouc Ong in the northeastern portion of the TAOL flows Northwest - Southeast and is the major infiltration route into the TAOL.

(3) Evergreen secondary forests are predominant in the mountains. Areas of grass and deciduous trees are interspersed throughout the area and dry cultivation is widespread. Trees range in height from 25 to 30 meters, with a few as high as 50 meters. Tree canopy is continuous in large areas. In the coastal plains, rice and dry crops are the main vegetation. Rice fields are flooded to depths of 6 to 18 inches and are drained just prior to harvest in March and August. When mature rice forms a dense green grass, three to four feet tall. Villages and hamlets are often surrounded by dense vegetation including thick hedges between houses.

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ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) to Combat After Action Report Period 1 JUL-4 OCT 1971

(4) In the highlands, the key terrain is generally those sections of high ground from which control can be exerted over the valleys, the cultivated areas and the road or trail networks on the valley floors. In the piedmont area, the key terrain is the high ground which controls the valleys opening out to the east. On the coastal plains, key terrain features include the high ground and those locations which control waterways, roads, and ports of entry.

2. (c) ENEMY SITUATION:

(a) Estimated strength, location and disposition of enemy forces at the start of the operation:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
21st NVA REGT HQ	300	BS 4646
4th NVA BN	150	BS 6349
5th NVA BN	150	BS 4154
6th NVA BN	150	BS 4440
402nd RF SAPPER BN	250	BS 4092
403rd NVA SAPPER BN	150	BS 7924
406th RF SAPPER BN	200	BS 7525
40th NVA SAPPER BN	100	BS 7429
107th NVA HVY WNS BN	138	BS 4969
21st LF SAPPER CO.	70	BS 4361
38th LF BN	160	BS 7045
40th LF BN	200	BS 5107
61st LF SAPPER CO.	40	BS 5674
95th A LF SAPPER CO.	20	BS 6390
95th B LF SAPPER CO.	40	BS 5393
506th A LF SAPPER CO.	65	BS 5377
506th B LF SAPPER CO.	50	BS 5575
120th MONTAGNARD BN	200	BS 3134
C-18 LF CO.	20	BS 6558
C-19 LF CO.	10	BS 7457
C-25 LF CO.	55	BS 3666
C-45 LF SAPPER CO.	25	BS 7056
C-65 LF SAPPER CO.	09	BS 5265
C-75 LF SAPPER CO.	40	BS 7270
C-120 LF CO.	30	BS 8634
C-212 LF CO.	70	BS 5337
C-219 LF CO.	50	BS 7841
K-51 LF HVY WNS BN	UNK	BS 6989
P-31 LF CO.	20	BS 6390
T-20 LF CO.	25	BS 7286

(b) Enemy Situation Anticipated:

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ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) to Combat After Action Report Period 1 JUL-4 OCT 1971

- (1) A continuation of the current policy of limited scale offensive activities utilizing NVA and Local Force units was anticipated in the TAOI. The activity was to be directed toward disruption of voting during the Lower House and Presidential elections and against the GVN pacification program. It would be characterized by enemy entrance into the densely populated areas to propagandize to the people, collect taxes, terrorize the local population and the kidnap and assassination of GVN officials.
- (2) A continuation to conduct harassing, stand-off attacks by indirect fire against both US and ARVN installations as well as other government controlled areas. Such attacks could employ 60 and 81/62MM mortars, 57 and 75MM recoilless rifles, and 107, 122, and 140MM rockets.
- (3) A continuation to deploy mines and booby-traps against US and ARVN personnel, primarily in the coastal districts but also in protection of food and munition caches in the western areas of the AO.
- (4) A continuation to initiate and return fire against US aircraft, particularly in protection of rear base areas and supply caches. Enemy anti-air weapons range from small arms to 51 call MG's and RPG's.
- (c) Enemy Situation Found: Several significant contacts were made during this operation. All were combined operations, with 4th and 6th ARVN Regiments participating. These contacts were with elements of the 240th Transportation Regiment and were centered around the Dak Selo River and Nuoc Ong River Corridor. These operations in the West netted over 15 tons of captured ammunition in a 60 day period, most of which was captured by ARVN troops. The enemy in the coastal lowlands and piedmont region avoided contact with US troops, as much as possible. The enemy concentrated almost entirely on food resupply during the operation and used the Song Ve and Song Tra Khuc Rivers extensively to haul rice from the lowlands to cache sites in the mountains. Primary targets for enemy activity continued to be RF/PF OP's, refugee camps and ARVN installations. Assassination of GVN officials, Terrorist incidents and attacks by fire increased slightly during the Lower House Elections in late August and the Presidential Election in early October. The election period was also marked by numerous student and veterans demonstrations against the War. These demonstrations occurred frequently in population centers along QL-1. Enemy units showed a slight decrease in strength during this operation and there was one major unit move; that of the 406th NF Sapper Bn from Northern Quang Ngai Province to Southern Quang Nam Province via grid BS 7525. It is believed that this move was for food procurement.

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ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) to Combat After Action Report Period 1 JUL-4 OCT 1971

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

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a. Leaflet Drops: Leaflet drops were increased as contacts with the enemy grew more sporadic. Development of the pacification program provided an opportunity for the creation of new themes in both leaflets and psychological broadcasts. Leaflet themes were oriented toward the area of operations; for example, the mountainous areas, with small populations were saturated with "Chieu Hoi, Fair Treatment of Prisoners, and Demoralization" leaflets, all targeted against the specific enemy force known or thought to be operating in the area. In the heavily populated lowlands, leaflets messages were primarily "Rice Denial, Family Reunion, Pro-GVN," and those targeted against a specific local force VC element. The Volunteer Informant Program (VIP), a plan where by persons turning in weapons or ammunition or providing information leading to the capture of military hardware would be paid, was also a major theme of the leaflet drops.

b. Broadcast: "Early word" broadcast, featuring tapes emphasizing themes similar to those used in leaflet drops, were flown by helicopters and fixed wing aircraft throughout the 11th Brigade AO. As with the leaflets, their themes were varied according to the area in which the mission was flown. Whenever possible, a recent rallier was recruited to make a broadcast targeted against his old unit. He was usually asked to fly with the psyops helicopter to pinpoint the location of his unit.

c. Medcaps: During 1 JUL-4 OCT Operation the brigade continued an effort to train Vietnamese medical personnel. One of the methods used was to require Vietnamese medical personnel to conduct all medcaps, with U.S. personnel acting only as advisors. This method proved effective in giving the civilian population confidence in their native medical personnel. The majority of the medical supplies had to be supplied by the U.S. due to a shortage in the Vietnamese supply system.

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10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Maneuver: The concept of ground operations during the reporting period remained essentially the same as in the past, except that more of the combat role was assumed by ARVN forces. The primary mission of US battalions was to secure fixed US positions and support the ARVN as required. To accomplish this mission each battalion normally maintained one rifle company on its fire support base for security and three rifle companies operating in the assigned area of operations blocking avenues of approach and infiltration. The technique of saturation patrols and ambushes was used to restrict enemy movement throughout the Brigade TAOI. Joint operations were conducted throughout the operational period, with ARVN and US forces operating in close proximity to each other. Flexibility in operations was maintained through the use of combat assaults and night movements. Rice Denial Operations were conducted in conjunction with RF/PF forces to further enhance the GVN Pacification Program. The success of the Rice Denial program was shown by the enemy being forced to employ one entire battalion of the 21st NVA Regiment for food production during August and September of this year.

b. Fires: During the operation each maneuver battalion was supported by a 105 mm artillery battery in direct support. In addition, the fires of 155 mm, 8 inch, and 175 mm guns were available on request. When the tactical situation dictated, artillery was repositioned by road or air movement to better support ground operations. Both tactical air support and helicopter gunships were available to all maneuver battalions when needed.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 1-10 July 1971: The Brigade began the operation by assuming attachment of 1-52 Infantry effective 011200 July 1971. On 1 July Recon 3-1 engaged three VC at grid BS 526647 resulting in one VC KIA and one 9 mm pistol CIA. On 5 July B/123 AVN engaged two NVA with packs and weapons resulting in one NVA KIA at grid BS 209713. Later that day they observed and engaged three NVA at BS 209712. They then inserted the aerial rifle platoon and killed another NVA and captured one AK-47. On 6 July at BS 349809 B/1-52 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. Recon 1-20 made contact with four VC on 8 July resulting in one VC KIA and one LAW CIA. On 9 July A/1-52 engaged three NVA at BS 365807 resulting in one NVA KIA. Later at BS 532443 B/123 AVN engaged and killed one NVA. B/1-20 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in one NVA KIA at BS 663516. On 10 July B/1-52 ambushed and killed three NVA and captured two AK-47 rifles. Snipers from 3-1 killed one VC at grid BS 506746 to end the contacts for this week.

b. 11-17 July 1971: Enemy activity remained unchanged this week with numerous small engagements being fought. On 11 July B/1-20 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. On 13 July engaged two NVA moving vic grid BS 728445 resulting in one NVA KIA and one weapon CIA. On 14 July B/123 AVN inserted the aerial rifle platoon at grid BS 553432 to conduct a BDA. They found six NVA KBAS. The platoon then made contact with unknown size enemy force resulting in five NVA KIA and one US KIA. On 15 July B/123 AVN had two small engagements resulting in two NVA killed by gunships.

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