



The Americal Division Veteran's Association is grateful to Mr. Rick Olson who provided the Operation Frederick Hill reports to the association in June 1995. These documents have been transcribed and scanned for the benefit of Americal Division Veterans and their families. Mr. Olson is a veteran of the 1/46th Inf. Bn..



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 23D INFANTRY DIVISION (AMERICAL)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96374

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
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
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report: FREDERICK HILL

Commanding General  
XXIV Corps  
ATTN: AVII-GCT  
APO 96308

In accordance with XXIV Corps Regulation 525-11, 28 January 1970, five copies of Combat After Action Report FREDERICK HILL, from the 196th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division are submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
DONALD E. ALSBRO  
OFT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General



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AVII-GCT (12 May 71) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report: FREDERICK HILL

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps APO 96349 26 MAY 1971

TO: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
APO 96222

Three copies of Combat After Action Report - FREDERICK HILL are forwarded  
without comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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nc

*W. H. Smith*  
W. H. SMITH  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 196th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96256

AVDE-BBSC

20 April 1971

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General  
23d Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96374

TO: Commanding General  
United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96222

1. (U) OPERATION: FREDERICK HILL
2. (C) DATES OF OPERATION: 180001 Mar 69 to 010600 Mar 71
3. (C) LOCATION: Quang Tin Province and Southern Quang Nam Province, Vietnam
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 196th Infantry Brigade
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICERS:

a. Brigade Commanders:

COL Fredrick J. Kroeson, Jr.	(18 Mar 69 to 15 May 69)
COL Thomas H. Tackaberry	(16 May 69 to 9 Nov 69)
COL James M. Lee	(10 Nov 69 to 30 Apr 70)
COL Edwin L. Kennedy	(1 May 70 to 24 Oct 70)
COL William S. Hathaway	(25 Oct 70 to 1 Mar 71)

b. Battalion Commanders: See Appendix A

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. 196th Infantry Brigade

(1) Organic

2d Battalion, 1st Infantry  
3d Battalion, 21st Infantry  
4th Battalion, 31st Infantry  
1st Battalion, 46th Infantry  
48th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)  
27th Chemical Detachment  
10th Public Information Detachment

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(2) Attached and supporting units

328th Radio Research Detachment  
A Company, 26th Engineer Battalion  
C Company, 723d Maintenance Battalion  
F Troop, 17th Cavalry  
C Company, 23d Medical Battalion  
B Company, 523d Signal Battalion  
2nd Platoon, 23d Military Police Company  
2nd Team, 635th Military Intelligence Company

b. 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry

c. Vietnamese Forces

5th Regiment, 2nd ARVN Division  
RF and PF Forces  
Biet Lap Popular Forces  
CIDG Forces

d. Artillery

(1) Direct Support: 3rd Battalion, 82d Artillery

(2) General Support: 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery

(3) General Support Reinforcing: B Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery

7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: Appendix C

9. (C) ORIGINAL MISSION: 196th Infantry Brigade, 1st Squadron 1st Cavalry, and 5th Regiment 2nd ARVN Division conduct combat operations in assigned operations zone to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces, base camps and equipment caches, and to deny VC/NVA forces the use of any portion of the operations zone for movement or for conduct of operations against the allied forces or local populace.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Maneuver: 196th Infantry Brigade, 1-1 Cavalry, 5th ARVN Regiment deploy in sector to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and material and deny the enemy use of the Area. 1-1 Cavalry conducts combat operations to secure population centers along the coastal plains and 196th Brigade conducts combat operations in the highlands. 5th ARVN Regiment conducts separate and joint operations with the 196th Bde and 1-1 Cav throughout the AO, with emphasis placed upon the eastern mountain area. Emphasis is placed on combat patrol techniques, day and night operations and the use of helicopter assaults to ensure wide coverage of the area and rapid reaction with maneuver elements to exploit positive intelligence.

b. Fire Support: Direct support artillery units were employed from fire support bases located, whenever possible, within mutual supporting distance of each other and at all times within range of the infantry maneuver

elements. The displacement of artillery batteries and often single howitzer platoons to assure that the infantry units are operating with light artillery support was standard practice. At all times the number of firebases were limited to an absolute minimum to assure that the maximum number of maneuver elements can be employed in patrol activity; however, every firebase established is protected by an adequate security force. In addition, general support artillery and tactical air are employed freely and on a regular and continuing basis. The general support artillery is displaced appropriately to provide maximum support throughout the area.

11. (U) EXECUTION: See Appendix D.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Operational. Operation FREDERICK HILL was successful in that its primary objectives were achieved. During the operation, the 196th Brigade successfully forced the withdrawal of the major portions of the 2d Regt 2d NVA Division from the TAOI. The remaining forces have been reduced and scattered to such an extent that they are no longer considered effective units. Enemy maneuver in the TAOI has been restricted to the clandestine movement of small forces conducting nuisance operations.

b. Pacification. GVN presence, control, and prestige was strengthened throughout Quang Tin Province. Particularly, the security of TAM KY, HAU DUC, TIEN PHOUUC, THANG BINH, HIEP DUC, AND NUI LAC SON has markedly improved. The boundaries of the pacified areas have been greatly expanded. At the beginning of the operation, 220 sq km were under GVN control; at the end, this had grown to 850 sq km. In addition, two major highways were opened: from TAM KY to NEW HAU DUC and from THANG BINH to NUI LAC SON. As a result of the increased GVN control, the amount of available land greatly increased. It is now estimated that 29,000 hectares are under cultivation in Quang Tin Province.

c. Enemy losses.

NVA/VC KIA	7514
NVA PW	40
VC PW	93
NVA returnees	12
VC returnees	99
IWC	1848
CSWC	192
Small arms ammo	
captured	108,776 rds
Other ammo	
captured	12,352 rds
Rice captured	2,733,064 lbs
Sampans/boats	
destroyed	303

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d. Friendly Losses

US Killed	572
US WIA (E)	3251
US WIA (M)	659
US MIA	2

13. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Appendix E
14. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None
15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

Operation FREDERICK HILL was an extended operation designed to pacify Quang Tin Province and increase the influence and control of the Government of Vietnam within the province. Through the operation, the productive lowlands and coastal plains of the area have been brought almost totally under GVN control.

The success of the pacification is primarily attributable to the continued combined US/GVN operations. During the operation, the effectiveness of the ARVN/Provincial forces steadily increased and the responsibilities on them were increased accordingly. At the present time it is felt that the GVN forces, guided by a capable and qualified leadership operating through efficient organizational channels, are fully capable of assuming pacification and security responsibilities within the area.

The strength and capabilities of the VC and NVA units within the province has been greatly reduced and their supply lines have been interdicted. At the beginning of the operation, enemy control in the province was estimated at 80%; by the end, this was reduced to 20%.

With the GVN units formed into a capable and effective fighting force and the enemy reduced and scattered, the prospect for increased GVN control in the future is considered excellent.

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16. (C) RECOMENDATIONS:

- a. That operations continue in the FREDRICK HILL tactical area of interest to maintain momentum in the area and population pacification program, to ensure against a rise in enemy activity and control, and to preclude the loss of already-pacified areas.
- b. That GVN presence and control within the area continue to be strengthened and the continuing employment of Vietnamese forces be encouraged to prepare for and ease the transition required by US National "Vietnamization" policy. An important adjunct to this program must be the increased training of Regional and Popular Forces small unit commanders to give them the knowledge and confidence required for the increasing conduct of combat operations.

WILLIAM S. HATHAWAY  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

Appendixes: A - Battalion Commanders  
B - Supporting Forces  
C - Intelligence  
D - Execution  
E - Administrative Matters

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APPENDIX A (BATTALION COMMANDERS) to Combat After Action Report:  
Operation ~~WEDDINGTON HILL~~

UNIT	COMMANDER	ASSUMED COMMAND
1-46 Inf	LTC G.R. Underhill LTC C.G. Coverdale LTC J.R. Foss LTC R.F. Carvell LTC W.P. Doyle	14 Jun 69 8 Nov 69 10 Apr 70 25 Oct 70
2-1 Inf	LTC S.L. Melner LTC C.P. Campbell LTC F.A. Neronne LTC A.H. Coleman LTC H.G. Watson	19 May 69 24 Nov 69 10 May 70 10 Nov 70
3-21 Inf	LTC J.N. Brandenburg LTC E.P. Howard LTC R.C. Bacon LTC J.M. Misch LTC C.P. Saint LTC L.W. Roberts	15 Jul 69 * KIA 18 Aug 69 20 Aug 69 15 Feb 70 10 Jul 70 19 Feb 71
4-31 Inf	LTC J.N. Longino LTC C.M. Henry LTC K.L. Skoer LTC T.A. Brown LTC W.O. Hemmill	4 Jul 69 27 Dec 69 14 Jun 70 28 Sep 70

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APPENDIX B (SUPPORTING FORCES) to Combat After Action Report:  
Operation FREDERICK HILL

1. (C) Artillery:

a. Participating Units.

- (1) Direct Support Artillery: 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery.
- (2) General Support Reinforcing Artillery: 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery.
- (3) General Support Artillery: B Battery, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery.

b. Nature of Targets.

(1) Direct support artillery fires were employed in support of the maneuver battalions, engaging enemy elements in contact with friendly forces, targets of opportunity, suppression missions, defensive concentrations, destruction missions, preparatory fires, and counter mortar/rocket fires.

(2) General Support Reinforcing and General Support Artillery supplemented the fires of the direct support artillery battalion. Types of fires employed were: Blocking fires, destruction missions, interdictory and harassing fires, defensive fires and preparatory fires.

c. Statistical Data.

(1) Missions

	Observed	Scheduled Fires	Total
105	13402	12294	30696
155	10512	7830	18342
175	139	2230	2369
8"	230	2718	<u>2948</u>
			<u>54,355</u>

(2) Expenditures

	105	155	175	8"
HE	327841	213979	12058	15961
WP	15353	16498		
Smoke	1015	1749		
Illum	13767	51794		
FC	964	1479		
BH	397			
	<u>359337</u>	<u>285499</u>	<u>12058</u>	<u>15961</u>

TOTAL: 672,855 rounds

d. Timeliness and Effectiveness.

- (1) Response to calls for fire were rapid and accurate. Ammunition

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stockpiles were maintained at adequate levels permitting maximum flexibility in responding to the observer's call for fire. Emphasis in fire support coordination with the appropriate political and ARVN agencies greatly contributed to the timeliness of fires.

(2) Surveillance

Enemy killed	1953
Structures destroyed	1140
Bunkers destroyed	674
Other Military Targets	788

2. (C) Engineer: Operation FREDERICK HILL gave A Co, 26th Engr Bn the opportunity to demonstrate the versatility of the engineers in a combat environment. During the operation, engineer support ranged from combat support in the jungle to firebase construction. The direct support engineer company was also involved in road improvement and upgrade, amphibious river crossings, demolition, and expedient bridge construction.

a. When the Bde moved from LZ BALDY to HAWK HILL, the new firebase was built by the engineers. In six months, over 200 bunkers were built and all the firebase facilities were completed. LZ MARYANN was opened in February, 1970. This firebase was originally opened only for a short while, but marked the beginning of a new series of firebases. In June, 1970, LZ MARYANN was reopened, expanded, and developed into a permanent firebase.

b. July, 1970 saw the engineers involved in the reopening of the Kham Duc airstrip. A/26 Engr, with a small element of the Navy Seabees, was assigned the task of clearing and repairing 5000 feet of runway in six days. This mission was successfully accomplished and through daily repair the air-strip maintained a continual operational status.

c. After Kham Duc, many temporary firebases were opened and reopened. Mine sweeps and clearing operations were conducted on LZs JUDY, MELLON, BOXER, KC JONES, and SHIRLEY. In addition, many one and two ship LZs and PZs were cut throughout the TAOI. A/26 Engr continued to make improvements of LZs WEST, CENTER, and SIBERIA. Some of these improvements were the construction of new bunkers, mess facilities, hot shower areas, maintenance of old bunkers, and technical assistance on installation of improved tactical wire.

d. The direct support engineer company provided support on other various types of missions. In December, 1970, A and E/26 Engr provided the operators and boats for an amphibious operation. Elements of 4-31 Inf were transported up and down river in operations in the GORGE area. Throughout FREDERICK HILL, demolition support was continually provided to the brigade. EOD teams supported the S-5 Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) and performed other EOD missions throughout the area.

3. (C) Tactical Air:

a. Tactical Air support consisted of forward air controlled preplanned and immediate air strikes, and BEACON and SKYSPOT drops.

b. Forward Air Controllers (FACs) of the 20th Tactical Air Support

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Squadron were available to the brigade on a daily basis. They performed the following services:

(1) Directed all preplanned and immediate air strikes.

(2) Acted as reconnaissance in observing, locating, and marking enemy movement and positions for friendly units.

(3) Determined Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA).

c. During the operation, 2032 FAC strikes and 1783 SKYSPOTS and BEACON drops were conducted, resulting in 2935 structures and 2478 bunkers destroyed, 1030 secondary fires and explosions, and 325 enemy killed.

4. (C) USA Aviation: Army Aviation played a major role in the conduct of Operation FREDERICK HILL. Fast reaction to positive local intelligence was achieved primarily through the use of the airborne combat assault. The wide dispersion of forces throughout the area was made possible by the extensive use of helicopters in the resupply role. Combat, intelligence, and PSYOPS missions each played their important part in the accomplishment of the FREDERICK HILL mission.

a. The Brigade's organic aviation support consisted of four OH-6 (LOH) aircraft. These aircraft were apportioned to the battalions on a daily basis, and primarily performed courier, visual reconnaissance and limited resupply missions.

b. Resupply missions were normally conducted on a two-step basis. Bulk supplies were airlifted to the forward fire support bases using CH-47 aircraft from division assets. Hold time for the CH-47s was allocated by Division to Brigade, who scheduled sorties at the request of the battalions. Supplies were airlifted from the fire support bases to field locations using UH-1H aircraft. These were allocated to Brigade on a daily basis, and were sub-allocated to the battalions, normally for from three to five hours per day.

c. Aircraft for combat missions were assigned by Division on a mission-by-mission basis. Airborne combat assaults were flown with 3 - 10 UH-1H aircraft as lift ships with UH-1C or AH-1G gunship cover as required. Air Cavalry missions were normally flown using one OH-6 (LOH), two Cobra gunships, and one UH-1H chase ship. Herbicide missions were conducted utilizing one UH-1H as a spray ship, two gunships, and a command and control UH-1H. Napalm and persistent CS drops were conducted using CH-47 aircraft with gunship escort. Non-persistent CS was delivered from a single UH-1H or LOH.

d. Intelligence missions were also allocated by Division on a mission-by-mission basis, with the exception of VRs (visual reconnaissance), which were flown when required using available aircraft. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) missions were flown with the APD machine mounted in a LOH, a UH-1H command and control ship, and two gunships for cover. Infrared (IR) missions were flown using a single OV-1 (Mohawk) aircraft. For Nighthawk missions, a searchlight was mounted on a LOH or UH-1H and gunships flew escort.

e. Fixed Wing aircraft from Corps assets, UH-1H aircraft from Division, and Brigade LOHs were used on a target basis for PSYOPS missions.

f. A command and control UH-1H was provided to the Brigade Commander each

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day.

5. (C) Chemical: Chemical support was provided to the Brigade by the 27th Chemical Detachment.

a. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) missions were flown utilizing the XM-3 APD mounted in an OH-6 (LOH). During Operation FREDERICK HILL, approximately 8 missions were flown per month. When significant readings were obtained, missions were followed up by artillery or ground exploitation. The results obtained from these follow-up actions verified the reliability of the APD as an effective intelligence collection means.

b. Prior to September, 1970, numerous defoliation missions were flown using the AGAVENCO spray rig mounted in a UH-1H. Agents white, blue, and orange were employed to destroy enemy food crops. Areas immediately around firebases were defoliated to remove concealment along possible avenues of enemy approach.

c. Riot Control Agent CS was employed in several ways throughout the TAOI. Persistent CS (CS-2) was dropped from CH-47 helicopters along the Dak, Rose trail to hinder enemy movement. Ground forces reported a limited usage of persistent CS for cave and bunker denial. Non-persistent CS was delivered on suspected sniper locations to permit movement of friendly troops, and was available for use in ground operations.

d. Thickened fuel (napalm) drops were infrequently made using a drum rack externally slung from a CH-47. Flame field expedients, principally fougasse, were used for perimeter defense on all firebases.

6. (C) War Dogs:

a. During the operation, numerous combat casualties were prevented by the continuing employment of Scout Dog teams with the tactical units. Working with Infantry companies and platoons, teams from the 48th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) provided early silent warning of foreign presence outside the main body. Specifically, the dogs provided:

- (1) Warnings against ambush and snipers.
- (2) Detection of enemy hideouts, caches and booby traps.
- (3) Warnings of enemy approach.

b. Scout Dog teams were employed on an average of 175 support days per month. Support was reduced during the heavy rains of the winter monsoon and during the hottest summer weather due to the dogs' sensitivity to climatic conditions.

c. During Operation FREDERICK HILL, the scout dogs have been credited with locating more than 20 tons of enemy rice and corn and caches containing more than 800 weapons and large amounts of ammunition, equipment and documents.

d. Mine and Tracker dogs from Division assets were employed on a regular basis when it was necessary to augment the capabilities of the Scout Dog Platoon.

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7. (C) Psychological Operations:

a. During Operation FREDERICK HILL, extensive use was made of all available PSYOPS assets. Propaganda was disseminated in the form of leaflets, audio-visual presentations, and loudspeaker broadcasts. Target audiences were both enemy and the local populace. Propaganda delivered to enemy audiences was of high impact and designed to demoralize and induce defection. Emphasis was placed on constantly targeting specific enemy units with specific messages, and on exploiting tactical successes. Propaganda delivered to the local populace was in the form of long-range campaigns, such as pro-GVN, anti-VC/NVA, rice denial, and Voluntary Informant Program (VIP). Emphasis was placed on maintaining a high degree of credibility.

b. Aerial delivery was the primary means of disseminating leaflets and making loudspeaker broadcasts. The majority of PSYOPS missions were flown by the 9th PSYOPS Bn; however, aircraft organic to the Division and Brigade were also used on a daily basis.

c. Ground Loudspeaker and audio-visual teams were used primarily for local populace audiences. Use of the ground loudspeaker against enemy audiences proved ineffective. Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) proved to be an effective means of increasing local populace support of the GVN. A squad sized APT was often used with a line company when working in populated areas. The APT conducted face-to-face communication with the local populace and any detainees. In many instances the team was able to ease fear of the American unit and obtain valuable information. The most effective use of the APT was during cordon and search operations. Here, the team controlled the populace by conducting propaganda sessions while the hamlet was being searched. This type of propaganda closely approximates communist armed propaganda techniques and proved to be one of the most effective PSYOPS tools employed by the Brigade.

8. (C) Sensors:

a. Beginning in November, 1969, the 23d Infantry Division Target Mission Force (TMF) provided four monitoring teams and an operations section to support the Brigade. One team was employed with each battalion.

b. Phase I sensor equipment was first employed with the mission of providing intelligence through surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation, with emphasis placed on intelligence collection. The middle months of 1970 saw a change in emphasis to target acquisition. Sensor activations were immediately acted upon by mortar, artillery, or armed aircraft fire, or by a maneuver element.

c. Problems initially encountered included a lack of knowledge, both in employment/monitoring and in operational analysis, and unsatisfactory equipment operation due to design limitations. Experience, equipment modification, and the introduction of Phase III equipment assisted in the alleviation of the initial difficulties.

d. The Phase III equipment, introduced in January 1971, brought an increase in sensor confirmation reliability due to extensive equipment redesign. Additionally, the Phase III SARS (Sensor Analog Relay System) alleviated the problems encountered with the former line of sight requirement and increased the area covered by sensors.

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APPENDIX C (INTELLIGENCE) TO COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT: OPERATION  
FREDERICK HILL

1. (C) Terrain and Weather:

a. Terrain. The 196th TAOR consists of three geographic regions: Coastal plains, piedmont and mountains. The coastal plains grade westerly into the piedmont and then into a steep rugged spur of the Annamite Mountain chain. The coastal plain varies in width from 8 kilometers north of Chu Lai to 30 kilometers in Thang Binh (D). Rice cultivation is dominate and the average elevation is 60 meters.

The relief in the piedmont is locally rugged with rocky outcrops common on the crown of the hills. Although the elevation varies widely, the average elevation is 100 meters with slopes varying from 20-75% and an average slope of 35%. A combination of rice cultivation, brushwood and multi-canopied jungles are the standard vegetation types in the piedmont.

Most of the western and central portion of the 196th TAOR is a steep, rugged, heavily dissected spur of the Annamite Mountains. The mountains are steeper and more rugged in the western portion of the TAOR with elevations reaching 2423 meters. Slopes average from 35-50% and the most common type of vegetation is multi-canopied forest with scattered areas of brushwood or bamboo.

b. Weather. The climate of the FREDERICK HILL TAOR is nonseasonal in nature. It is characterized by two major seasons; The southwest monsoon from mid-May until late September and the Northeast monsoon from early November until mid-March. Separating these two periods are two short transitional periods during which circulation becomes weak and weather indefinite. The area experiences its poorest weather during the November-March period with daily rainfall, generally poor visibility and low ceilings. This period has the greatest effect on friendly operations due to the restriction of air operations and flooding of the major lines of communication. The enemy is effected by the wet season in that there is extensive flooding and the rivers are deep and swift restricting foot movement to the hillsides and ridgelines. Many infiltration routes are blocked by mud slides that cannot be removed until dry weather. Enemy activity during the wet season is normally restricted to low level harassing and defensive actions. Due to the restricted friendly air activity, food production cells will be very active during the wet season. Enemy base camps will be located on much higher terrain due to the availability of water and the fact that the higher terrain features are cloud covered a great part of the time.

2. (C) Preliminary Intelligence.

a. General: In early 1969 enemy forces were thought to be conducting heavy resupply and staging activities along the Dak Rose trail and in Base Area 117. This theory was borne out by the co-ordinated attacks launched against friendly outpost in the Hau Duc area beginning 23 Feb 69. It was thought that the attacks had the primary purpose of denying friendly observation of the trail network leading into Base Area 117. Other enemy activity in the area was limited to light harassing attacks and attack by fire. Enemy units known to operate in and around the area in Feb 69 included the 3rd Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, 70th Local Force Bn, 72nd Local Force Bn, and the 74th Local Force Weapons Bn. Enemy anti-aircraft capabilities include 12.7mm heavy machine guns.

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positions along the route into the objective area will be selected and activities may be begun to build fortifications or upgrade existing bunkers. Intensive small unit recon operations will be conducted. The NVA unit will normally use the same routes and lines of communications as used for previous operations. Due to communication problems, the units ability to react to changing situations decreases as they near the objective area. Once committed, they will normally carry an attack to its conclusion in spite of odds or losses. During withdrawal, an intense rearguard action will be fought up to a predetermined point where they will fragment into platoon size elements to avoid contact and evade back to their base area. NVA units will normally conduct one or two offensive operations per year.

b. The 409th MF Sapper Bn is directly subordinate to MR-5 HQ. It is 100% NVA and will seldom conduct more than 2-3 attacks per year. The normal AO of the 409th is VC Quang Nam Province although it could be assigned to a target outside the Province by MR-5.

c. Units subordinate to Province and District HQ are normally committed to long term operations in a specific area. The local battalions are directly subordinate to Province HQ and may attack any target in the Province. The Local Force companies are subordinate to District HQ and normally operate within their district. They may be assigned by Province HQ to reinforce or support another district. The Local Force battalions are 90-100% NVA and the Local Force companies are approximately 25% NVA.

The Local Force units normal tactic is to conduct limited attacks by fire against isolated OP's and units. They will conduct ambush and sniper actions, plant mines and booby traps and conduct terrorist raids.

5. (FOUO) Military Intelligence: The second team from the 635th Military Intelligence Company supported the Brigade during Operation FREDERICK HILL.

a. The document translation and exploitation section of the team interpreted a total of 243,650 pages of captured documents, an average of over ten thousand pages of documents per month. Although many of the documents did not contain any information of tactical value, there were occasions which netted valuable intelligence information.

b. The interrogation section interviewed a total of 2078 detainees. Many of the interviewees revealed valuable tactical information ranging from the location of boobytraps to the location of a VC PW camp.

6. Summary:

a. The weather and terrain was as expected in the area. During the period Oct-Dec 70 extreme weather conditions were experienced due to above average typhoon activity. This created problems for enemy as well as friendly units. Due to the extensive floods resulting from the typhoon, the enemy suffered considerable loss in his cache system, resulting in a food shortage in the Jan-Mar 71 period. The terrain and vegetation in the piedmont and mountain areas is ideal for guerilla warfare and supported the enemy by providing excellent cover and concealment from friendly observation, while restricting friendly operations.

b. The enemy has demonstrated that he can move large amounts of men and

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## 3rd NVA Regiment

HQ	BT1411	250	PW	23 May 69
1st Bn	BT1317	150	PW	10 May 69
2nd Bn	BT0834	230	PW	9 Mar 70
3rd Bn	Tien Phuoc	200	PW	14 Jun 70

## 1st MF Regiment

HQ	BT2514	325	PW	17 Jun 69
40th MF Bn	AT9731	250	PW	21 May 70
60th MF Bn	BT2616	250	PW	20 May 69
90th MF Bn	BT2018	210	PW	11 Jun 69
409th MF Sapper Bn	Quang Tin	265	PW	26 Feb 71

With the exception of the 409th MF Sapper Bn, which is currently in the area, the last contact with the units of the 2nd NVA Division was in June 1970. After withdrawing from Hiep Duc, the Division moved to its base area in Laos. It is thought that the GK-31 AA Bn was re-structured and redesignated as a Local Force unit in Dec 70. Units of the 2nd NVA Div have been identified in contact in Operation Lam Son 719.

b. The following units subordinate to VC Province and District HQ operated in the 196th Bde TAOR during operation FREDERICK HILL. Strength is as of 25 Dec 70.

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH	SOURCE	DATE OF LAST CONTACT
VC Quang Nam Province HQ		1112	Document	25 Dec 70
74th Wpons Bn	BT1721	233	PW	4 Feb 71
70th LF Bn	BT1225	211	PW	10 Jan 71
72nd LF Bn	BT1619	130	PW	27 Jan 71
D-11 LF Bn	BT2209	174	PW	9 Feb 71
D-14 LF Bn	Thang Binh	130	PW	21 Feb 71
Thang Binh District	BT1026	99	PW	9 Jan 71
V-15	BT2048	28	PW	24 Feb 71
C-9	BT1528	14	PW	4 Dec 70
Que Tien District	AT9327	74	Document	26 Feb 71
V-11	BT0121	15	Document	17 Feb 71
Tien Phuoc District	Tien Phuoc (D)	76	Document	3 Feb 71
C-7	BT1615	38	PW	15 Feb 71
North Tam Ky District	N Tam Ky (D)	66	Document	3 Feb 71
V-12	BT1823	33	PW	23 Dec 70
South Tam Ky District	S Tam Ky (D)	117	Document	3 Feb 71
V-30	S Tam Ky (D)	27	Document	3 Feb 71
Misc Armed UNits				
V-18 LF Co	BT2712	21	PW	14 Jul 70
V-14 LF Co	BT3211	20	HC	1 Feb 71
706 LF Co	BT2410	0	HC	1 Feb 71

## 4. Enemy Tactics.

a. Units of the 2nd NVA Division normally stay in their base area in and near Laos until ordered to conduct an operation against a friendly area or location. After being assigned a mission the unit must first conduct a logistic build-up into the area. Concurrent with the logistic build-up, defensive

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b. Enemy composition, location and strength (Feb 69).

UNIT	COMPOSITION	LOCATION	STRENGTH
3rd NVA Regt, 2nd NVA Div.	NVA	BA117	250
70th Bn, 3rd Regt	NVA	BT0907	220
80th Bn, 3rd Regt	NVA	BT0914	250
90th Bn, 3rd Regt	NVA	BA117	250
70th LF Bn	NVA/VC	BT2120	150
72nd LF Bn	NVA/VC	BT1422	350
74th LF Hvy Wpn Bn	NVA/VC	BT3017	50

c. Reinforcement capabilities.

(1) The enemy could reinforce the area with the 1st MF Regt, 2nd NVA Div within 36 hours.

(2) The enemy could reinforce the area with 21st Regt, 2nd NVA Div within 4 to 7 days.

(3) The enemy could reinforce the area with the 409th Sapper Bn within 48 hours.

d. Enemy capabilities (Feb 69).

(1) Conduct regiment size ground attacks, supported by rocket artillery against Tien Phuoc-Hau Duc outposts and isolated units throughout the TAOR.

(2) Conduct indirect fire attacks against installations and units throughout the TAOR.

(3) Conduct sniper, booby trap and mortar attacks throughout the TAOR.

(4) Conduct terrorist activities throughout the TAOR.

3. (C) Enemy Forces encountered during operation FREDERICK HILL.

a. The following units subordinate to MR-5 HQ operated in the FREDERICK HILL TAOR. Strength and locations are as of last contact.

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH	SOURCE	DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2nd NVA Division				
GK-30 Signal Bn	Thang Binh	200	PW	7 Mar 70
GK-31 AA Bn	Thang Binh	300	PW	1 Mar 70
GK-33 Mortar Bn	BT2611	250	PW	16 Mar 70
GK-35 Sapper Bn	Hiep Duc	200	PW	2 May 70
GK-37 Trans Bn	BT2220	200	PW	14 Jun 69
GK-38 Med Bn	UNK	UNK	UNK	
GK-40 Eng Bn	UNK	UNK	UNK	

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supplies at night and during periods when there are no friendly troops in the area. He has proven to be extremely elusive and hard to fix.

c. Although operation FREDERICK HILL denied the populous areas to the enemy he still retains a limited operational capability in the mountains and remote areas. The Dak Rose trail net is still active although movement is restricted. An unnamed major trail from base area 112, in Quang Nam Province, to Hiep Duc, Quoc Son and northern Quang Tin Province is still very active. Activity in Base Area 117 has been restricted by Allied operations. The base area has probably been moved to the South and West, center of mass unknown.

d. Interrogation of PW; NGUYEN QUANG, MSG, 4th Co, 72nd LF Bn, captured on 28 Dec 70 indicated the following;

(1) During the latter part of 1968, VC Quang Nam (P) forces were well equipped, well trained and highly motivated. The VC controlled approx 80% of the population and it was generally felt that they would win the war and liberate South Viet Nam. Average Local Force battalion strength was 700 combat troops. They received all required supplies within a few days.

(2) During 1969, the combat units were still effective although they began to have difficulties obtaining supplies and replacements. The combat troops began to show signs of "Fear of Death" and some personnel deserted. The VC control of the populace fell to less than 50%, and the combat troops began to doubt that they would win the war.

(3) During 1970, the combat units were no longer able to conduct successful operations against the allied forces. The death rate from allied operations and disease increased and the units received only about 20% of the supplies required. Replacement personnel from NVN and local recruitment dropped to nil. Morale was very low and desertions were extremely high. The combat troops generally felt that they could not win the war. The average strength of the Local Force battalions was down to 150, and a large portion of this number were occupied with food production. The VC control of the people had reversed and the GVN controlled 80% of the population.

7. Document captured in February 1971 indicated that the Province received a total of 478 North Vietnamese and 290 South Vietnamese replacements and recruits during 1970.

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APPENDIX D (EXECUTION) to Combat After Action Report:  
Operation FREDERICK HILL

1. (C) DEPLOYMENT

- a. Location of Fire Support Bases: Tab A
- b. Operational Areas: Tab B

2. (C) EXECUTION

a. 18 March - 17 June 1969

(1) During the first weeks of Operation FREDERICK HILL, the maneuver battalions conducted company and platoon searches in their assigned areas, except for 2-1 Infantry, which moved to Tien Phuoc and conducted operations north of LZ PROFESSIONAL from 18 March - 6 April.

(2) The first pre-emptive operation of the period was launched on 8 April 69, when a three battalion task force (2 US and 1 ARVN) plus F Troop 17 Cavalry began operations to neutralize Antenna Valley and its surrounding mountain ranges and destroy troop formations of the 1st NCMF Regiment. 1-52 Infantry secured LZ IKE and began a steady maneuver to the south through the Nui Mat Rang Mountains. 4-31 Infantry, operating south of Antenna Valley in the Nui Chon Mountains, began detailed search operations maneuvering north toward the valley. F/17th Cavalry with 4-5 ARVN Battalion was deployed into the valley to conduct search operations in the valley itself and block routes of egress. Contact with the enemy forces was light as they tended to avoid contact. Small base camps and aid stations were uncovered and destroyed. On 20 April operations in Antenna Valley were ended, and 1-52 Infantry moved to Quang Ngai where CPCON of the battalion was assumed by 198th Infantry Brigade.

(3) On 25 April 69, 1-46 Infantry with 2 companies from 4-5 ARVN battalion launched a three-pronged attack against the 3d Regiment, 2nd NVA Battalion in the area south of LZ PROFESSIONAL. Two US companies with one ARVN company maneuvered southeast of the Song Tram River. One US company with the recon platoon maneuvered south through the Bi Su mountains along the 22 NS line. Contact was light and several caches were uncovered on 12 May.

(4) During the first 25 days of the operation, contact on the coastal plain remained at a low level as 1-1 Cav and ARVN elements continued area reconnaissance and detailed search operations in suspected enemy staging areas, notable Pinnacle Forest and Barrier Island.

(5) On the nights of 12 and 13 May, as part of the final phase of the enemy Spring offensive, VC/NVA forces struck US/GVN/ARVN fire bases and installations. Sappers, infiltrating defenses and hurling satchel charges, attacked LZs BALDY, CENTER and PROFESSIONAL, resulting in 12 US KIA and 81 US WIA. 96 enemy were killed in this action; as all attacks were repulsed.

At the Nui Yon OP, however, enemy forces attacked in strength and quickly over ran the defending RF company. This OP dominating major routes of approach to Tan Ky, had to be recaptured to eliminate the threat of a major enemy attack. Early on the morning of 12 May 1969, B and C Troops,

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1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry were committed to recapture Nui Yon. The VCMF/NVA forces were well dug-in and were able to effectively use mortar fire, RPGs, and heavy automatic weapons fire against the attacking cavalry. During two assaults, the cavalry was met with an intense volume of fire and pulled back as air strikes were processed on the OP. It became apparent that attacks by the cavalry alone were not sufficient to recapture the OP, and A, B, and C companies, 3-21 Infantry were combat air assaulted into the area to reinforce the armored forces. As the three infantry companies maneuvered into position during the late afternoon and early evening of 12 May, further air strikes and artillery fires were placed on the OP. The enemy positions had been skillfully prepared but were slowly being diminished by the superior American firepower. Sharp contacts were fought at the base of the hill on the thirteenth, and, once again, artillery and airstrikes were processed on the battered, enemy-held CP. Enemy forces, rapidly being destroyed by the heavy and concentrated use of Allied firepower, began to exfiltrate the area. On the afternoon of 14 May, C/3-21 Infantry and A/1-1 Cav engaged a large enemy force southeast of the OP, killing 11 NVA and 25 VC. With the approach of darkness, contact was broken and the combined forces formed night defensive positions blocking suspected enemy routes of egress from the area, resupplied, and readied plans for a final assault of the hill. On the morning of 15 May, the combined forces launched coordinated combat sweeps up the hill, engaging the fleeing enemy forces and recapturing the OP. Fifty-three dead NVA were found in the trenches at the top of the hill. Following the recapture of Nui Yon, 3-21 Infantry, in conjunction with 2-5 ARVN battalion, began a large scale sweep to the west and south of the area to eliminate further pockets of enemy resistance.

(6) Operation LAMAR PLAIN was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the southern portion of the 196th Brigade AO from 16 May through 13 August 1969, and resulted in the successful relief of enemy pressure on the GVN population in Tam Ky and Noc Hau Duc. 1-46 Infantry was OPCON to the 101st during the period of the operation.

b. 8 June - 9 August 1969

(1) On the evening of 11 June, the 3d Company, GK 35th Sapper Bn, 2nd NVA Division, attempted to infiltrate LZ B-5T, following a heavy attack by mortar fire and RPGs. Extremely heavy contact and instances hand to hand contact resulted as the attack was repulsed with heavy losses on both sides. Dawn found 27 NVA KIA within the wire, with US losses of 16 KIA and 33 WIA.

(2) Contact in the mountain areas throughout the remainder of June and during the month of July was light and was characterized by enemy avoidance of engagement.

(3) Barrier Island was the scene of four major preemptive operations designed to neutralize the area and increase the security of pacification operations on the costal plain.

(a) On 10 June 69, 1-1 Cav and elements of 2-1 Infantry initiated operations on northern Barrier Island to force suspected VCLF elements out of the area, destroy enemy bunker complexes and eliminate arms and supply storage areas. During this four day operations, 23 VC were killed, the immediate threat of enemy attack against Thang Binh District was reduced, and valuable intelligence was gathered which indicated that long-term operations were necessary in this area.

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(b) During the period 20 - 24 June, elements of A/1-1 Cav with fourteen Vietnamese companies (PFS, PPs, and Viet Sops) conducted a three pronged search operation on the southern portion of Barrier Island, targeting suspected elements of the 77th VCLF Battalion. Advancing rapidly from the north, west, and south, the Allied forces caused the VCLF units to rapidly exfiltrate the area. Contact remained light throughout the operation but the act of forcing the enemy out of the area eliminated the threat to Tay Ngu city.

(c) On 7 July, A and D/2/4, F/1/2nd Cav and the Three Pink PPs began systematic combat patrols sweeping through northern Barrier Island. Extensive search operations were conducted uncovering a number of bunker complexes and trench lines which were destroyed. On 14 July, enemy forces began to evade from the area and were engaged by artillery and airstrikes, resulting in 21 NVA KIA.

(d) Beginning on 20 July, operations were conducted with the assistance of A/2/2nd Cav to destroy the long built-up enemy positions. The first two weeks of August were occupied with 2-1 conducting operations in conjunction with RF and PP forces and US Marine units. Several staging and bypassing areas were destroyed and the northern portion of Barrier Island was neutralized as the operation concluded on 15 August.

c. 10 August - 13 September 1969

(1) On 10 August, 2-1 Infantry assumed responsibility for the area vacated by 1-1 Cav as they moved south to support the 106th and 11th Brigades.

(2) A two month lull in activity ceased on the evening of 11 August as the enemy launched a series of coordinated attacks on US forces, installations, and RVN repopulation centers. LZ WEST successfully repelled a ground probe on the 12th, killing 52 NVA. The same morning Tay Ngu was rocketed and mortared, and NAMK VIII was attacked by savars. 13 NVA were killed in the action, with 7 US NIA and 52 US wounded. On 13 August LZ WEST received incoming mortar rounds. Then followed a four day lull in the activity, during which the 7th Regiment, 1st Marine Division assumed the Quang Ngai portion of the 106th Brigade TAGI, establishing a new northern boundary.

(3) During the period 14 - 24 August, an NVA Contingent size force was engaged at two major areas of contact in the largest battle fought by Americal Division troops in 1969. Initial contact was made as D/4-31 engaged an unknown size enemy force 2 KM southeast of LZ WEST. A day long battle was fought on the ground and supported with a heavy concentration of artillery, gunships, and airstrikes. Over 1,200 rounds of 105 mm ammunition were fired to destroy the enemy's dug in positions. By the end of the day, over 90 NVA had been killed. Meanwhile, B/4-31 Infantry engaged an NVA force 6 KM northwest of LZ WEST, killing 91. The day's contacts established the two areas where extensive combat operations would be conducted. Near the first area of contact (SE of LZ WEST) a Command and Control helicopter from 3-21 Infantry with 8 persons aboard, including the Battalion Commander, his Command Sergeant Major, and an AF news correspondent, was engaged by 51 caliber automatic weapon fire, caught fire and crashed. A and D/2-31 combat air assaulted into the area on 19 August to recover the bodies. They were immediately taken under heavy small arms and automatic weapon fire and remained in contact until the next evening. On 21 August, two companies from 1-6 Infantry plus elements from 2/7 Marines were employed into the northern contact area and two companies from 2-1 Infantry were employed to

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the southern contact area to reinforce the combat operations already in progress. Two more days of fierce fighting ensued as all elements employed met continued enemy resistance. US Forces continued to conduct combat operations to drive the enemy out of the area until 29 August, when they no longer met enemy resistance. The ability to mass ground forces and make maximum use of artillery and air support led to the defeat of the enemy force with a confirmed count of over 540 NVA killed.

(4) During the early morning hours of 11 September 1969, the enemy launched a two pronged attack against FSB SIBERIA and Hiep Dic. Elements of 4-31 Infantry and Regional and Popular Forces in a night defensive position repelled the initial phase of the attack. The second phase of the attack centered on Hiep Dic in a day long battle fought with the defending Regional and Popular Forces. On the morning of 12 September 1969 2-5 ARVN Battalion was combat air assaulted into the area of contact from the previous day to provide reinforcements for the defending forces. Contact was established early and another day long battle was fought against the 60th MF Battalion. By noon on 13 September 1969, the allied forces had beaten back the enemy's attack killing over 50 of the enemy and completely eliminating enemy forces from Hiep Dic Controlled Fire Zone. This operation, conducted mainly by the 2d ARVN Division Forces supported only by US aviation and artillery assets, is one of many examples of the GVN forces ability to react to enemy attacks in support of local population centers.

d. 14 September 69 - 30 April 70

Light and sporadic enemy contacts continued through the end of September. On 30 September 69, 3-21 completed dismantling and evacuation of LZ EAST. The monsoon season started at the beginning of October. Continued rainfall throughout the month, with heavy downpours during the first half of the month, and scattered showers for the remainder of the month, resulted in limited combat operations. The beginning of the monsoon season also brought with it a sharp decline in enemy activity which continued through the end of February. During this season, operations were stressed to increase the level of security of the pacification operations near the costal area. On 14 October, the Brigade CP passed from LZ BALDY to HAWK HILL. The 196th Brigade conducted two operations in early November with the 5th and 6th ARVN Regiments to further secure the population centers of Que Son and Thang Binh. The ARVN units deployed forces into the two areas supported by one US Infantry company and one Cav Troop. The operations terminated with only light and sporadic contacts reported. In December, 1969, action was light throughout the area; the battalions conducted company and platoon search and clear operations in their assigned areas. Late in December, intelligence indicated a large scale enemy offensive during TET 1970, focused at Tam Ky city and South Vietnamese outposts in Thang Binh district. Acting on this intelligence, the Brigade, in cooperation with the 5th ARVN Regt and Quang Tin Province Headquarters, mounted a pre-emptive blocking operation along the Revolutionary Development line to prevent enemy staging activities. The block was established on 5 January 1970. On the 6th and 7th of January, two Infantry companies and two troops from 1-1 Cav encountered the 3d Battalion of the 3d NVA Regt in the flat area west of Tam Ky. In six days of continued contact, ground commanders employed basic maneuver formations with close air and artillery support to successfully rout the enemy from their positions and defeat them. 144 NVA were killed in the action. During the same period

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F/17 Cav killed 44 NVA from the 3d Regt in the flat area southwest of Hawk Hill. The remainder of the month passed with light contact. The level of activity during February was moderate, with frequent significant contacts throughout the area. From 13 - 27 February a joint operation was conducted by 1-46 Infantry and the 5th ARVN Regiment in the OLD HAU DUC area. Contact was light during the operation with one exception, this was the capture of the enemy's main QUANG TIN Province Hospital by the 5th ARVN Regiment. March and April reflected the same general level of activity as February - moderate activity with frequent significant contacts reported.

e. 31 April - 30 July 1970

(1) On the last day of April the enemy opened an offensive in the 196th Brigade area, the focal point of which was HIEP DUC. During the next two months, Charger Forces were to fight a grueling battle against an estimated two reinforced NVA Regiments. The operation started with a ground attack against C/4-31, 4 Kilometers NE of HIEP DUC. The enemy lost five NVA KIA in the attack, while aviation units accounted for 46 more kills. On 2 May, 123d Avn engaged an unknown size force one km east of HIEP DUC, killing 15. On 8 May, A/3-32 Arty caught an NVA company in the open and killed 25 before the enemy could scatter. In the face of heavy enemy pressure, additional US companies were combat air assaulted into the area, with three companies from 1-46 conducting operations in the valley to the north and west of LZ WEST and two companies from 3-21 to the south of LZ WEST. B/1-46 engaged an unknown size enemy force on the morning of 1 June. During the four hour contact, 33 NVA were killed. Contact remained moderate for the next week, and on 19 June 3-1 Infantry arrived to reinforce 196th Brigade elements. On the next day, C/3-1 seized Hill 482, 8 kilometers southwest of HIEP DUC, and established a fire support base for B/1-4 Artillery. The rest of the battalion combat assaulted into an area 4 kilometers to the south. Their operations were characterized by light to moderate contact, and on 2 July, the battalion returned to the 11th Infantry Brigade. On 26 June 1970 elements of 1-46 Infantry secured LZ MARYANN, and began operations in the area. Contact remained moderate to heavy in the HIEP DUC area, but diminished toward the end of the month. During the three month period, 196th Brigade forces counted 1166 kills, and 263 detainees, suffering 75 killed and 664 wounded.

(2) At 291200 June 1970, Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE commenced. In the operation, 1-1 Cav with F/17 Cav attached, assumed responsibility for the coastal terrain that was their normal operating area under FREDERICK HILL. This operation continued until its concurrent termination with FREDERICK HILL on 1 March 1971.

(3) Operation ELK CANYON was initiated at 121200 July 1970, with the mission of interdicting enemy lines of communication and supply to disrupt his logistics system. During the operation, 2-1 Infantry, in conjunction with the 6th ARVN Regiment, seized the old Special Forces camp at KHAM DUC as a logistics and fire support base. Operations around KHAM DUC were limited mainly to search and clear missions and numerous "Eagle Flights", which resulted primarily in small unit contacts. The operation, redesignated ELK CANYON I, ended on 26 August and resulted in 66 enemy KIA. That day, a CH-47 helicopter transporting troops to LZ JUDY was hit with small arms fire and crashed, killing 31 and wounding 9. Operation ELK CANYON II was begun on 26 August and 2-1 Infantry and 4-31 Infantry, working in conjunction

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with 2nd ARVN Division troops, conducted operations in the vicinity of LZs JUDY and MARYANN, making light contact until the termination of the operation on 19 September 1970.

f. 1 August - 1 October 1970

(1) Contact during August, September, and October was very light and was limited to small unit contacts by US patrols with three to five man VC/NVA units. Ambushes accounted for the majority of enemy KIAs. On 22 August, the last element of 1-46 left LZ PROFESSIONAL, and the FSB was closed.

(2) On 5 September, the Brigade initiated Operation NEBRASKA RAPIDS with 3-21 Infantry in conjunction with the 1st Marine Division, to search the common boundary and to open highway 534/535 from QL1 to Hiep Duc. The operation successfully terminated on 8 September.

(3) On 20 September, the elements of 2-1 Infantry combat air assaulted to and began deployment in a newly assigned AO to the southwest of LZ PROFESSIONAL, establishing a Battalion CP at LZ BOXER.

g. 2 October 70 - 1 March 71

(1) On 2 October 70, 1-1 Cav and 2-1 Infantry formed Task Force Saint. The task force was placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for Operation TULARE FALLS, which was conducted in the area to the west and southwest of LZ BALDY and terminated on 15 October.

(2) Severe tropical storms KATE and JOAN seriously curtailed operations during the period 15 - 26 October, and marked the beginning of the monsoon season, which lasted until early February. Commencing 18 October 70, 2-1 established a forward CP and deployed to NUI CHAP TRA, and conducted search and clear operations in that area. Task Force BURNETTE, composed of Headquarters and D Troop, 1-1 Cavalry and 2-1 Infantry (-) was formed on 27 October and placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division, for participation in Operation HOANG DIEU which terminated on 1 December 1970. This was a joint operation conducted with Quang Ngai Province units in the same area as Operation TULARE FALLS.

(3) In order to interdict enemy supply lines from base area 212 to the HIEP DUC area, an AO extension north of LZ SIBERIA was obtained from the 1st Marines. On 15 November, A/4-31 was deployed on the western bank of the gorge area, followed by B/4-31 on the east bank. A temporary fire support base, LZ PRATT, was established to provide supporting fires. During the last two weeks of November, several large weapons and food caches were found in the area. On 3 December, 2-1 Infantry moved into the northern part of the AO extension, establishing FSB SHIRLEY, and conducting operations for the next month in Antenna Valley. Contact was light to moderate throughout the operation. On 16 January 1971, 2-1 Infantry moved again, this time to the southern part of the Brigade area, reestablishing LZ MARGE and conducting operations south and west to Dragon Valley.

(4) January and February 1971, the last two months of Operation FREDERICK HILL, saw light contact throughout the area. On 3 and 11 February, elements of 1-46 Infantry, operating 7 kilometers southwest of LZ MARYANN,

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discovered 2 large caches, one of weapons and one of ammunition. On 12 February, C/4-31, led by a repatriate guide, captured an enemy POW camp, liberating nine Vietnamese prisoners.

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TAB A (Fire Support Base Location) to Appendix D (EXECUTION) to Combat After Action Report: Operation FREDERICK HILL.

Dolby	BT130455	Hickey	AS959999
Crotti	AT055470	Judy	AT014263
Ilce	AT930396	Mellon	AT802181
Ross	AT025342	Mai Lan	AT875175
Ryder	AT949345	Grunt	AT957112
Shirley	AT873285	Prep	BT009147
Crest	AT816278	(Anh Dao)	BT151265
Siberia	AT902232	Hawk Hill	BT987097
March	AT924226	Kala	XC987297
Center	BT059251	Khau Duc	ZC025080
West	AT990250	Irene	ZC108125
East	BT131203	Mirosa	ZC150124
Young	BT180157		
Tien Phuoc	BT111139		
Professional	BT172278		
George	BT485274		
Boxer	BS116979		

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
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
TAB B (Operational Areas) to Appendix D (EXECUTION) to Combat After Action Report: Operation FREDERICK HILL

During Operation FREDERICK HILL, the areas assigned to the battalions changed as required by the tactical situation. Shown on the attached pages are the operational areas for the battalions during selected months. These maps represent the principal changes and boundary adjustments and also show the current controlled fire zone boundaries and US firebases operated by the Brigade as of the time indicated.


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


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SHIRLEY

THANG BINH

OH

HIEP DUC

SIBERIA

4/31

WEST

NUI LAC SON

CENTER 3/21

SF/CIBG

TIEN GI PHUOC

YOUNG

MARGE

2/1

HAU DUC

BOXER

MAKYAN

AFCT

1:250,000

OPERATIONAL AREAS: MARCH 71

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APPENDIX E (ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS) to Combat After Action Report;  
Operation FREDERICK HILL.

1. (C) Supply: The 23d S & T Battalion supported the operations from Chu Lai with a forward supply point at Hawk Hill. Each major subordinate unit maintained logistical representation at both rear and forward supply points. All classes of supply were transported from Chu Lai to the forward distribution points via vehicle. Distribution to units at the forward fire support bases and company size field locations was accomplished utilizing the CH-47 and UH-1D helicopters.

a. Class I: Totals for issues of rations during the operations could not be obtained due to non-availability of records for the whole 2 year period.

b. Class II and IV: Stockage of high demand Class II and IV items at Chu Lai and Hawk Hill enabled the 23d S & T Bn to respond to the immediate requirements of the combat units.

c. Class III: Distribution was established at Hawk Hill.

Capacity is as follows:

(1) JP-4	70,000 gallons
(2) MOGAS	15,000 gallons
(3) DF-2 (Diesel)	25,000 gallons

d. Class V: Average monthly expenditure of major types of ammunition was as follows, based on CY 1970 expenditures:

(1) 5.56 mm	407,389 rounds
(2) 7.62 mm	241,196 rounds
(3) all 82 mm	9,374 rounds
(4) 4.2	5,974 rounds

e. Weapons, ammunition, and combat loads:

(1) All machinegunners and grenadiers were armed with and carried caliber .45 pistols for close in protection. All other personnel carried M-16 and M-14 rifles.

(2) Ammunition loads:

(a) M-60	1,500 rounds per gun or 9,000 rounds per company.
(b) M-16	20 magazines per rifle or 360 rounds per rifle.
(c) M-79	60 rounds per launcher or 1080 rounds per company.
(d) .45 Pistol	50 rounds per pistol or 1,200 rounds per company.
(e) Hand Grenades	4 per man.
(f) Smoke Grenades	180 per company.
(g) Flares	100 per company.

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- (h) Claymore Mines 30 per company.
- (i) Demolition 70 lbs per company.

(3) Combat Loads: The average equipment load carried by each fiflemen was 70-80 pounds. This includes TO&E Equipment, rations, and ammunition.

2. (C) Maintenance:

a. C/723d Maint supported the battalions from Hawk Hill and possessed the capability to repair all critical items of equipment. The approximate number of jobs completed by C/723d Maintenance for the entire operation was as follows:

(1)	Automotive	1,036
(2)	Artillery	308
(3)	Small Arms	3,016
(4)	Signal	6,366
(5)	Engineer	904
(6)	Service & Evacuation	2,910
(7)	Fire Control	656
(8)	Track	586

b. Repair parts in short supply which hampered maintenance were:  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton engines, transmission, differentials, and clutches; 3/4 ton engines and transmissions; 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  ton engines, transmissions, front axles, rear axles, and transfers; 5 ton engines, transmission, transfers, front axles, and rear axles; M113 and M548 engines, transmissions, and transfers; M551 engines and transmissions; M88 engines; 3KW Generator engines, rotors, starter housings, and voltage regulators; 1.5 KW Generator engines and rotors; RT 505/A-10 and A-9; RT 525/K-301 A-4200, A-5200, A-5300, R-404, A-9000, A-1100, A-1200, A-1400, and A-1500; TA 3-12 ringers, buzzers, earphone elements, microphone elements, and cord assemblies; short handles for mine detectors; and Oscillation for starlight scopes.

3. (U) Medical: Casualties were immediately treated on the battlefield by unit aidmen. Each battalion operated an aid station on its firebase. Casualties that could not be effectively treated and cared for within the Brigade were evacuated to the surgical hospitals in Chu Lai. Medical evacuation was normally accomplished by aerial medical evacuation teams (HUST OFF). The average time per evacuation was approximately 30 minutes. This includes a span commencing with the man being wounded until he was in an established medical facility. A Brigade Clearing Station was established at Hawk Hill.

4. (U) Civic Action::

a. General: During Operation Frederick Hill, civic action projects were designed to complement GVN pacification and development objectives. Emphasis has placed upon providing materials, technical assistance, and MEDCAPs in a manner which promoted the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and assured indigenous participation by requiring that the people helped provide the labor. No major project was started without full approval of hamlet, village, district, and province.

b. Projects: In accordance with Province and Division priorities, building materials were obtained to repair three schools and construct a fourth, a fish pond was dug and stocked, and materials and engineer assistance were provided for road and bridge repair to enhance economic development and military resupply. Other projects included material assistance for the construction of three libraries and a dormitory for an orphanage, repair of 5th ARVN Regiment family quarters and school, repair of a Buddhist temple, and ground preparation and technical assistance for a school. Brood stock and technical assistance were provided for two swine and one poultry raising project, and six sewing machines were purchased and distributed to an orphanage and school.

c. Food: Nearly three million pounds of food stuffs were captured during the operation, and that which was edible was extracted from cache sites and delivered to the nearest district headquarters or a district which demonstrated the most need at the time. The battalion and brigade S-5s were each authorized to store up to five thousand pounds of food for emergencies, but this generally proved to be unsatisfactory due to limited and inadequate storage facilities. Rice, in particular, tended to sprout or spoil if stored for any length of time.

d. MEDCAPS: Medical assistance provided by the 196th Infantry Brigade served two purposes: the treatment of patients and training of indigenous medical personnel medical personnel. In 1970, 41,917 patients were treated by combined US and indigenous MEDCAPS. Of this number, 148 patients resulted from hostile action and 56 were treated for dental problems. At the time of this report, 1969 records were not available; the statistical data would be similar to 1970 figures except that patients resulting from hostile action would be greater as a result of the conflict at that time. MEDCAPS have been the most eagerly sought and appreciated civic action service provided by the Brigade.

e. Problem Areas: The multitude of headquarters and agencies with which coordination must be effected for materials and assistance have had a tendency to inhibit or restrict civic action project even when a real need was demonstrated. To enhance Vietnmarization, however, this is a problem which must be lived with.

##### 5. (C) Signal:

a. During Operation FREDERICK HILL, communications support was received from the Brigade HHC Signal Platoon and the 523d Signal Battalion. Initially, each firbase was supported with a 12 channel VHF system between the firbase and the Brigade CP. In August, 1968, AN/GRC 163 4 channel FM radio systems were issued to the battalions and the Brigade Signal Platoon. The four channels to each firbase were allocated as follows:

- (1) 1 Channel from Brigade TOC to Battalion TOC.
- (2) 1 Channel from DS Artillery FDC to Battalion Artillery LNO.
- (3) 2 channels (common user) from Brigade to Battalion Switchboards.

b. In September, 1968, AN/GRC 142 radio sets were issued and a Radio Teletype Net was established for transmission of messages classified up to and including SECRET to each firbase. The Brigade also operated Command and Secure EM nets. (Prior to the establishment of the radio teletype net, an EM admin-log net was operated.) Each battalion had the capability of Secure radio down to company level.

[REDACTED]

c. During the operation, it was necessary many times to establish radio relays to overcome line-of-sight restrictions. Relays were established at LZs Center, Prep, Mellon, Professional, Ryder, Baldy, West, and Tam Ky at various times.

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