

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96219

AVDF-ECG

9 January 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

CAPE 2007

✓ D

Commanding General
Americal Division
ATTN: AVDF-GC (DOT)
APO San Francisco 96374

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation Burlington Trail.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 9 April 1968 - 11 November 1968.
3. Location: Map Sheets 6640II, 6640III, 6639IV, 6639I, 6739IV.
4. (U) Control and Command Headquarters: 198th Infantry Brigade (Lt).
5. (U) Reporting Officers:

COL Charles B. Thomas, CO, 193th Inf Bde (Lt)
LTC William D. Kelly, Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
CPT Robert D. Loines Sr., CO A Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
CPT Garland L. Reeves, CO, B Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
CPT Carl A. Grugel III, CO, C Co 1-6 Inf Bn
CPT James T. Price, CO, D Co, 1-6 Inf Bn
LTC Frederick Aarman, CO, 1-46 Inf Bn
CPT Larry R. Stanford, CO, A Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
CPT Paul E. Sims, CO, B Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
CPT Robert A. Jakes, CO, C Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
1LT Ronal M. Kidd, CO, D Co, 1-46 Inf Bn
LTC David K. Lyon, CO, 5-46 Inf Bn
CPT Herbert B. Erb II, CO, A Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
CPT Charles Lamb, CO, B Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
CPT Robert K. Johnson, CO C Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
CPT James T. Yannessas, CO, D Co, 5-46 Inf Bn
LTC Elbert E. Fuller Jr., CO, 1-52 Inf Bn
CPT John A. Bieder, CO, A Co, 1-52 Inf Bn
CPT Charles D. Ebert (d), CO, C Co, 1-52 Inf Bn
CPT Leonard G. Goldman, CO, B Co, 1-52 Inf Bn
CPT Peter L. Lawson, CO, D Co, 1-52 Inf Bn

*Left "A" Co @ LAST of April
Bobby Thompson our original
XO became our C.O.*

6. (U) Task Organization:

198th Inf Bde (Lt) (Control Hq)
1-6 Inf Bn
1-46 Inf Bn
1-52 Inf Bn
5-46 Inf Bn
1-14 Arty Bn

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*File
att*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

- a. D Btry, 1-14 Arty was assigned as the direct Fire Support Battery.
- b. 17th Avn Co (Air Mobile - Light), 171st Avn Co (Air Mobile - Light) provided supply, C&C, Visual Reconnaissance, and gunship support.
- c. Team C, 7th PSYOPS Battalion provided "Kit Carson" teams.
- d. B/26th Engineers provided one platoon in direct support.
- e. 7th Tactical Air Command provided TAC Air on call.
- f. 57th Inf Platoon (SD) provided scout dogs and handlers.
- g. A/3-16 and A/2-13 were used for indirect arty supporting fires.
- h. 49th Signal Platoon provided communications support.
- i. Chu Lai Dustoff (Helicopter Ambulance Company) provided Medivac aircraft.
- j. H Troop, 17th Cav provided M113A1 (A G.V) and crews.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Terrain: Coastal foothills border the eastern end of the area of operations, while the central and western sectors are predominantly hills and mountains with characteristic river valleys and inundated rice paddies. Vegetation varies from the ubiquitous rice paddies of the lowlands to the multi-canopied dense undergrowth that covers the slopes of foothills and mountains. Brushwood areas are relatively small and scattered throughout the area. Grassy areas are discontinuous and carpet a small number of the flatter slopes and tops of high ground. There are two main waterways in the area; the Song Tram and the Song Bong Mieu, which flows Northwest. The depth of the rivers vary from less than 5 meters to approximately 10 meters and have a velocity of about two miles per hour. The widths vary from a few meters up to 100 meters. Numerous smaller streams abound in the lowland rice paddies. There are three main foot hill trails, two of which run North-South in the eastern and western sectors respectively. The third runs East-West, perpendicular and South East-West, perpendicular and South of the former two. It interconnects with each of the other two at the respective east and west extremes. There are numerous smaller interconnecting trails throughout the entire AO. These smaller trails vary from a high density in the populated areas to considerably less density in the mountain regions. Most of the trails afford easy and speedy movement, even in wet conditions.

b. Weather: The prevailing weather is generally fair, characterized by scattered cloudiness, high ceilings and good visibility. Thunderstorm activity is high during the afternoon and evening hours and reduces visibility. The mean daily temperatures and relative humidity figures are as follows: Temperatures (°F) Maximum - low 90's Minimum - High 70's. Relative Humidity (%) mean - 91 minimum high 40's.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c. **Enemy:** Intelligence received through agent reports indicated that VC and NVA units were using this area for food supply and infiltration routes from the north. In the past the area has been relatively undisturbed by US operations. An estimated 100 local force guerrillas were reported scattered throughout the villages and at least 2 VC Battalions (409th Sapper and 70th MF) are within one day close-in time. Captured documents and prisoners indicated at least one NVA battalion (40th AK, 80th Bn) of the 1st VC Regt, 2d NVA Div in the area. Villagers in the area reported large NVA forces (200-300 men) evading contact and generally moving out of the AO toward the west. Intelligence reports had confirmed locations of the following units:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
70th MF Bn	BT0802
72nd LF Bn	BT1923
74th LF Bn	BT1818
V12 VC Co	BT2221
V13 VC Co	BT1612
V14 VC Co	BT1924
V16 VC Co	BT2014

9. (C) **Mission:** The mission for the 198th Inf Bde (Lt) was commencing on 9 April 1968 to conduct combat operations vic Tien Phuoc, employing 1-6 Inf, D/1-14 Arty, and 1-46 Inf(-) to destroy the enemy in zone and to support 1-1 Cavalry in opening the road from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc.

10. (C) **Concept of Operations:**

a. On 8 April 1968 a fire support base was to be established on Hill 68 (BT316131) with B Btry, 1-14 Arty and a security force from H Troop, 17th Cav and the HHC 198th LEB Rifle Platoon (Wolfpack). On the same day 2 Companies of 1-46 Inf were planned to combat assault into blocking positions along the east and southeast boundary of AO boundary. On 9 April one company from 1-46 was scheduled to relieve the security elements on Hill 68 while D Btry, 1-14 Arty and one company from 1-6 Inf with a platoon of B/26 Engr combat assaulting to Hill 218 (BT238142) to establish a second fire support base. Also on 9 April the remainder of 1-6 Inf was to combat assault into area of operation (AO) Randy. The 1-6 Inf was initially to operate in conjunction with 2d ARVN Div and 1-1 Cav to clear and secure the road from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc and also to destroy the enemy in AO Randy.

11. (C) **Execution:**

4 April 1968. All Brigade units received Frag Order 23 to OLCRD 9-67 initiating Burlington Trail. All units began planning and coordination was effected with Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry and elements of the 2d ARVN Division at Tam Ky.

3
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7 April 1968. By 1416 hours elements of H Troop, 17th Cav and the Wolfpack had secured Hill 68 and began preparations for the Fire Support Base there.

8 April 1968. By 1500 hours all elements of the 1-6 Inf except B Company were closed at Tam Ky Airfield (BT308188) in preparation for combat assaults on 9 April. D Btry 1-14 Arty also was at the Tam Ky Airfield while the battalion's B Btry completed movement to Hill 68. By 1619 hours 2 companies of the 1-46 Inf combat assaulted into the Burlington Trail AO with D Company landing at BT276213 and B Company at BT294123. At 1525 hours after receiving light automatic weapons fire, D Company assaulted the enemy position near BT276144 resulting in the capture of 2 M-1 carbines, and NVA equipment and documents, as well as probably wounding 2 VC. The company also evacuated 6 VCS of which 5 were classified as Civil Defendants.

9 April 1968. With an LMO on Hill 110 (BT233187) to coordinate artillery fires, 1-6 Inf combat assaulted into the Burlington Trail AO with the battalion command and control group, E Company, A Company, and B Company with a platoon of CIDG, landing on Hill 218 (BT239142), A Company landing at BT 256125, and C Company with a platoon of CIDG landing at 263127. All movements of troops were completed by 1230 hrs. A, B, and C companies moved toward their planned objectives while the other elements remained on Hill 218. D Btry 1-14 Arty was also lifted to Hill 218. There were 3 enemy killed at BT229145 when B Company, 1-6 Inf observed 7 enemy and called arty on them at 1925 hrs. 1-46 Inf had negative contact.

10 April 1968. At 1530 hours B Btry, 1-14 Arty's 1/4 ton truck hit a mine on Hill 68 inflicting wounds on 3 men who were evacuated and destroying the vehicle. At LZ Bowman (Hill 218) 47 rounds of mortar fire landed within the perimeter at 2210 hours resulting in 2 men killed and 8 men wounded. Counter mortar fire was employed. Information from a 1-1 Cav prisoner of war indicated that the 72d Local Force Battalion was located in vic BT1814 and an unknown size enemy force at BT20014. There were a total of 2 men killed and 11 men wounded by enemy fire.

11 April 1968. At 1107 hours when A Company, 1-6 Inf received sniper fire at BT217133 the attached CIDG platoon engaged the enemy and captured one weapon. At 1515 hours Blue Ghost gunships engaged and killed 1 enemy who was evading south after being observed by B Company, 1-6 Inf at BT202145. Twenty-five minutes later B Co had 2 men wounded by sniper fire near BT 206145. C Co, 1-6 Inf was placed under operational control (GICOM) of 1-1 Cav. The enemy lost 1 weapon and 1 man killed in the days action while friendly units had 1 man wounded.

12 April 1968. At 1103 hours B Co, 1-6 Inf engaged and killed 1 enemy in vic BT198146 while searching their assigned area, and at 1431 hours received 20 rounds of sniper fire at BT191144 wounding 1 man. Muskett gunships in support of B Co killed 1 enemy. There were 2 enemy killed and 1 US soldier wounded during the days action with several other mortar or sniper fire incidents causing no casualties or damage.

13 April 1968. A Co 1-6 Inf found a cache at BT185123 while searching their area. The cache consisted of 162 60mm rounds, 20 82mm rounds, 10

4
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4.2 rounds, 11 MG AK-53, 11 bolt action rifles, 50lbs of plastic explosives, 4 drums of AK48 rds, 3 AK 47, 4 RPG, 2 launchers, 18 B40 rockets, and 1 carbine. Recon 1-6 Inf, at 1615 hours engaged and killed 1 enemy wearing US jungle fatigues at BT251126, and at 1652 hours A Co engaged 30 to 40 enemy in black uniforms at BT185123 and killed 7 enemy. D Co 1-46 Inf evacuated 63 Vietnamese civilians from BT2708 by helicopter to Tam Ky. At 1433 hours B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 20 VC in a wood line at BT253058 and killed 2, capturing 2 Chicom carbines. At 2340 hours B Co and D Co received approximately 40 82mm mortar rounds and heavy automatic weapons fire from BT259089 wounding 22 men from B Co. During the day there were 10 enemy killed and 22 friendlies wounded.

14 April 1968. At 1110 hours A Co 1-6 Inf found 1 wounded VC in a cave at BT185117 and evacuated him. Seven minutes later at the same location the unit found a cache which included 2 60mm mortars complete, 1 82mm mortar tube and base plate, 100 cases of 50 cal rounds, 23 RPG 2 rounds, 1 AK43, 300 Chicom grenades, 2 57mm rocket rounds, and 15 cases of 7.62mm rounds. A Co moved to BT1812 where they found 19 enemy bodies which had been hit by the air strike on 13 April. Other elements had negative significant results.

15 April 1968. A Co, 1-6 Inf engaged 3 enemy soldiers at BT187110 resulting in two VC KIA and 1 AK47 and web gear captured. Later at BT181605 A Co again engaged and killed 1 VC. In the enemy's wallet was an ID card saying he was a member of the 72nd Battalion.

16 April 1968. While sweeping to the West, vic BT170109 B Co 1-6 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC in uniform. A Co engaged and killed 2 VC at BT148110 and captured 1 weapon. A Co also found 6 bodies in fresh graves at BT157108 which were evidently killed by an air strike.

17 April 1968. B Co, 1-46 Inf in light contact engaged and killed one VC who was carrying an NVA flag and VC propaganda. There was no other significant contacts.

18 April 1968. There was no significant contact in the area of operations.

19 April 1968. At 1210 hours B and D Co's 1-46 Inf received intense sniper fire resulting in 1 US WIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 VC CIA. At 1805 hours D Co engaged five VC near the RDP resulting in 3 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA and detained, and 4 AK47's CIA.

20 April 1968. A Co 1-6 Inf engaged 5 VC killing 1, and capturing 1 M-79 at BT170093. B Co 1-6 Inf became engaged with an enemy force at BT177107 resulting 2 WIA, 2 VC KIA, 1 carbine and 3 HK CIA. At 1400 hours B and D Co's 1-46 Inf were placed under the operational control of 1-6 Inf thus terminating Phase I of the 1-46 Inf Burlington Trail Operation.

22 April 1968. A and B Co's were extracted from the Burlington Trail AO and inserted into grid BT087294 to commence operating with Task Force Manassas. C Co 1-6 Inf was released from OICOM of 1-1 Cav and was airlifted to grid BT027293, also to join TF Manassas. B and D Co's 1-46 Inf already operating in the Burlington Trail AO came under 1-6 OICOM. A Co 1-52 Inf came under OICOM of 1-6 Inf and provided security for LZ Bowman.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5

24 April 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 2 VC and captured 1 weapon at BT186113.

25 April 68. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 5 enemy with small arms at BT187089 resulting in 4 enemy KIA. A Co replaced D Co 1-46 Inf in the AO.

26-27 April 68. Negative contact.

28 April 68. At 1402 hours B Co 1-46 Inf continued their combat sweep to BT211088, engaged 3 enemy with weapons resulting in 1 VC KIA.

29 April 68. B Co 1-46 Inf was released from 1-6 Inf OICON and replaced by C Co 1-46 Inf. While conducting search and clear operations C Co 1-46 Inf found an SKS rifle at BT211088, and D Co 1-46 Inf found a bolt action rifle at BT167072.

30 April 68. At 0221 hours LZ Bowman received a ground assault consisting of small arms, RPG 2 and hand grenades at the NE side of the perimeter. Gunships could not be used due to the low ceiling, but all defensive concentrations were fired. The results of the attack were 8 WEA, 4 VC KIA, 1 RPG 2, 1 AK47, 1 carbine, and 3 Chicom HG captured in action. At 0900 hours A Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC at BT125113. Continuing their sweep A Co found a dead enemy soldier in a hootch at BT165116. D Co 1-46 Inf received a mortar and ground attack on the NDP at BT165073 resulting in 8 WEA.

1 May 68. In an ambush from A Co 1-46 Inf engaged 3 VC at BT165117 resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1058 hours A Co 1-46 Inf conducted a combat assault into a hot LZ at BT136074 and engaged an unknown number of enemy personnel resulting in 12 VC KIA and 5 AK47 CIA. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC at BT160074 and captured his AK47. Continuing the sweep D Co engaged and killed a VC attempting to evade from the village, they were searching at BT154075. A Co 1-46 Inf, while searching the area of previous contact at BT136075, found 19 more enemy KIA, and captured 3 SKS, 5 AK47, 7 60mm mortar rounds and 8 loaded AK47 magazines.

2 May 68. A Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed a VC at BT135069, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 5 Chicom grenades CIA. While conducting a search and clear mission, D Co 1-46 Inf captured a bolt action rifle and a loaded AK47 magazine at BT163074.

3 May 68. A Co 1-46 Inf observed and engaged 2 VC at BT255095 resulting in 1 VC KIA, and 1 Chinese model 53 bolt action rifle captured.

4 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf was extracted from the Burlington Trail AO to be inserted into LZ East and become part of Task Force Manassas. C Co 1-46 Inf and A Co 1-52 Inf conducted a combat sweep into the AO. A Co 1-52 Inf received small arms fire which they returned killing 1 VC and capturing a bolt action model 53 rifle at BT279099.

5-7 May 68. Combat sweeps were conducted within the AO with negative results.

OUR C.O.
Bobby Thompson
was a STAR
Silver HERE. ALSO
I believe
Sgt. Roper
d.d. also.
THAT NIGHT
WE LAAGER
NOT FAR FROM
here I got
mortar
pretty good
MY 15
PURPLE
HEART.
B.C.

MAY 10th A 146 was sent to KHAM Duc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8 May 68. C Co 1-46 Inf received incoming hand grenades and mortar rounds in their NDP, BT21088, resulting in 4 KHL, 11 WHA, 1 VC WL, CL. Phase II of Operation Burlington Trail began with the insertion of the 1-46 Command Group to LZ Bowman releasing the 1-6 Inf to operate in Operation Wheeler Wallowa.

10 May 68. C Co 1-46 Inf found a weapons repair shop at BT187130 consisting of 25 small arms and crew served weapons, 2 US 3.5 rockets, 11 mortars and assorted weapons parts and repair tools.

11 May 68. A Co 1-52 Inf engaged and killed one VC carrying an M-26 hand grenade at BT260090.

12 May 68. G Co 1-52 Inf engaged 3 VC at their NDP, BT0130, resulting in 1 VC KHL, 2 VC CL.

13 May 68. Combat sweeps were conducted in the AO with negative results.

14 May 68. C Co engaged two VC resulting in 1 VC KHL (Chieu Hoi). The captured VC lead the company to a weapons cache at BT189117. The cache contained 1 82mm mortar round, 1 57 RR, 1 40mm rocket launcher, 2 Chicom AR's, and 4 US weapons.

15 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged 3 VC in a hut at BT205129 resulting in 1 VC KHL.

16-17 May 68. There were no significant incidents in the AO.

18 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf discovered a booby trapped cache of ammunition containing 19 mortar rounds, nine 57 RR rounds, and 2,500 small arms rounds at BT110130.

19 May 68. A Hoi Chanh lead D Co 1-46 Inf to a weapons cache consisting of 62 assorted small arms, semi and fully automatic, 8 cases of 9mm rounds, 1 case of CS crystals and 24 57 RR rounds with Russian markings.

20 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged 2 VC in a rice paddy at BT186112 resulting in 2 VC KHL and three radio receivers set on the Bn Command Frequency CL.

21 May 68. At BT188114, D Co 1-46 Inf found and destroyed a grenade factory. A new Chicom HG similar to the M-26 was included in the cache.

22 May 68. D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 1 VC and captured 1 AK-47. A patrol from C Co 1-46 Inf hit a booby trap near LZ Bowman resulting in 1 US KHL, and 2 US WHL.

23 May 68. A captured VCS lead D Co 1-46 Inf to a weapons cache at BT194137, consisting of 2 SKS rifles, 2 US grease guns, 1 .38 cal pistol, and 27 60mm mortar rounds.

24-26 May 68. No significant contacts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27 May 68. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 11 VC at BT248125 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

28 May 68. LZ Bowman received 6 122mm rockets at 0122 hours with no injuries. Investigation showed the VC employed a "Spoiler" ring to reduce the range of the rockets.

29 May 68. At 1200 hours the 1-6 Inf assumed the control of LZ Bowman and Headquarters 1-46, Operation Burlington Trail. The 1-46 Inf returned to the control of the Chu Lai Defense Command.

30 May 68. C Co 1-6 Inf engaged 1 VC wearing a green uniform at BT177121 resulting in 1 VC KIA, and was gear and 2 Chicom grenades CLA. A Co 1-6 Inf assaulted a bunker complex at BT177121. Results of the action was 1 KHL, 5 WH and two dogs wounded. The enemy broke contact and evaded south with unknown casualties.

31 May 68. C Co 1-6 Inf received heavy automatic weapons fire from bunkers at BT212103. Artillery and gunships were used in support while C Co assaulted the enemy positions. The action resulted in 7 enemy KIA and 4 AK-47 captured.

1 June 68. B Co 1-6 Inf came under ground attack in their NDP. The attack was repelled in 3 KHL and 23 WH. B and C Co 1-46 Inf were air lifted into an LZ at BT212092 and became OPCON to the 1-6 Inf.

2 June 68. Operations in the Burlington Trail AO were continued with no significant contact.

3 June 68. C Co 1-6 Inf received a mortar attack at BT210100 resulting in 4 KHL and 10 WH. D Co 1-6 Inf engaged 4 enemy in the open, resulting in 4 VC KIA and 1 weapon captured. A squad from B Co 1-46 Inf observed a fire and moved to check the area. As they neared the location they heard the enemy approaching, set up a hasty ambush, and engaged them at fifteen meters killing 1 and capturing a pair of binoculars and 1 AK47. B Co 1-52 Inf engaged 2 NV at BT254079, resulting in 1 NV KIA and 1 AK47 captured.

4 June 68. At 1100 hours a minuteman helicopter was shot down in grid BT0420. All personnel were safely extracted and the helicopter was destroyed.

5 June 68. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged 2 enemy at BT191103, resulting in 1 VC KIA, and 2 carbines and 1 pistol captured. A Co 1-6 Inf located a large weapons cache at BT186199. It consisted of 74 individual and crew served weapons, and ammunition. B Co 1-6 Inf observed and engaged one enemy evading resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 Chicom grenades CLA. B Co 1-46 Inf received and returned heavy sniper fire at BT213103, resulting in 4 VC KIA and 1 AK47 CLA. One of the night patrols of B Co 1-46 ambushed 2 VC at BT215103 resulting in 1 PRC-25 CLA. The frequency on the set was 32.45.

6 June 68. C Co 1-46 Inf was released from OPCON to the 1-6 Inf. B Co 1-6 Inf received heavy fire from BT202121 resulting in 3 WH, 1 KHL, 1 VC KIA and 1 AK47 CLA. At BT236073 A Co 1-52 Inf received 1 RPG, mortar fire, and heavy automatic weapons fire resulting in 6 KHL and 23 WH.

7 June 68. At 0830 hours 1-52 Inf assumed OPCON of B, C, & D Co's 1-46 Inf. B Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed 2 VC at 234072. The B Co recon platoon of 1-46 Inf engaged 1 VC at BS275105 resulting in 1 VC KL and 1 AK47 CL. C Co 1-46 Inf received semi-automatic weapons fire and one hand grenade at 1530 hrs. The fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KL, 1 AK47 CL and 2 SB.

8 June 68. 1-6 Inf assumed OPCON of B, C, and D 1-46 Inf. All units were issued orders to conduct night movements north of the Bong Mieu River. At 2305 hours D Co 1-46 Inf engaged and killed four enemy at BT222072, capturing their web gear and loaded AK47 magazines. At 2307 hours C/1-6 engaged 4 VC in a destroyed village at BT221076, killing 2 and capturing a M-1 carbine. B/1-6 engaged approximately 20 VC at a range of 25-30 meters, killing three and capturing 1 AK47 and 1 M-60 machinegun.

9 June 68. 1-46 Inf assumed control of LZ Bowman and their maneuver elements. 1-6 Inf command and control group assumed control of Kill 69 and the Chu Lai T.LOR. D/1-46 while moving at night, engaged and killed 2 VC at BT222052.

10 June 68. C/1-46 captured 1 wounded NV and his AK50 at BT226061. The prisoner stated that he was a member of the 80th Bn, 1st VC Regt, 2d NV Div. D/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NV at BT220063, capturing his web gear and 1 Chicom grenade.

11 June 68. Maneuvering elements continued to operate to the west of LZ Bowman concentrating on night ambushes and patrols of platoon size elements. At 1005 hours B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT212075, capturing 1 AK47.

12 June 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT207073 as they were leaving their ambush site. At 2325 hours C/1-46 received a mortar and ground attack by an estimated NV company. The enemy used CS type gas, 1 flame thrower and several automatic weapons in an attempt to overrun the NDP at BT207067. The enemy attack was repelled.

C Co
FLAME
Thrower
BT 207067

13 June 68. The attack on C/1-46 began again at 0025 hours along with a similar assault on B Co at BT209069. One dust off helicopter was shot down in the NDP during this action. Contact was broken at 0508 hours. Results 2 US KL, 22 US WL, 1 VC KL(C), 5 VC KL(p), 1 NV flame thrower, 1 gas mask and 5 Chicom grenades CL.

14-15 June 68. All activities were of a routine nature with no significant results.

16 June 68. B/1-46 engaged an USF at BT165169 resulting in 5 VC KL and 2 AK47 CL.

17 June 68. 1-46 Inf regain OPCON of A and D/1-52 Inf. At 0600 hours B/1-46 engaged 15-20 VC with weapons resulting in 4 VC KL, 2 AK47 and 1 SKS CL.

18 June 68. At 2400 hrs B & C/5-46; Trp H/17 Cav; A, B/1-52 were OPCON of 1-46 for operation in Burlington Trail.

19 June 68. At 0800 hrs B/5-46 Infantry found 1 VC KIA. One helicopter received S/F resulting in 1 US KHL (Co-pilot).

20 June 68. 1-52 Infantry concluded operations in Burlington Trail AO. The battalion minus A/1-52, which stayed to dismantle LZ Clifford, was airlifted to LZ Bayonet.

21 June 68. H/17 Cav discovered several 250 - 750 lbs bombs at BT210166. They are believed to have been used to mine the Tam Ky & Tien Phuoc Road. The bombs were blown in place and the craters filled. B/1-46 engaged 2 VC at BT126090 resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 K-50 and 1 ChiCom Submachine Gun CLA.

22 June 68. All elements of 1-52 Inf returned to their parent unit. Musket gunships engaged a sniper in a bunker at BT125076 resulting in 5 VC KIA.

23 June 68. At 1100 hours B/1-46 received 2 81mm rds in their NDE at BT134076 resulting in 4 KHL and 17 WHL. Further investigation revealed that C/1-46 had fired the rounds from BT142074. Co B was approximately 800 meters from the location they called in. Investigation was conducted and disciplinary action recommended.

24 June 68. The CIDG force from Tien Phuoc became OrCON to 1-46 at 0715 hrs. They were to conduct operations with A/1-46. H/17 Cav engaged and killed 1 VC at BT134074.

25-29 June 68. Activity in Burlington Trail was light and scattered. D/1-46 killed 1 VC at BT142105 and H/17 Cav discovered 1 NVL body.

30 June 68. D/1-46 captured 1 NVL with web gear and gas mask. His unit was the 155th Battalion, 4th NVL Regt. All other activities were of a routine nature.

1 July 68. All activities were of a routine nature with negative significant results.

2 July 68. C/1-46 had a Chieu Hoi at BT162075. He gave 4 locations of enemy troops.

3-9 July 68. Operations were conducted within the Burlington Trail AO with light contact and no significant results.

10 July 68. C/1-46 engaged 3 VC at BT227116 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WL/CLA. The enemy soldiers were carrying NVL sundry type items.

11 July 68. B/1-46 engaged 4 VC at BT212094 resulting in 1 VC CLA.

12 July 68. C/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC in cadre type uniform at BT179175. They also observed 15 VC 500 meters to their east.

13 July 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT231089.

14 July 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC carrying rico and an M-26 hand grenade. A second VC was wounded and escaped.

on 2 July
DA's REPORT:
A Co 1-46
killed by mortar fire
my second
Purple Heart

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
15-18 July 68. Operations were conducted in the Burlington Trail AO with light contact and negative significant results.

19 July 68. B/1-46 engaged 4 VC carrying AK-47's at BT223124 resulting in 2 VC KIA.

20-21 July 68. Contact in the Burlington Trail AO remained light with no significant results.

22 July 68. B/1-46 met a VC on a trail and engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA.

23 July 68. Gunships in support of B/1-46 engaged and killed 3 VC at BT133235.

24-25 July 68. Operations continued in a routine manner with no significant results.

26 July 68. D/1-46 was ambushed at BT107241. Results of the action were 2 VC KIA and 1 SKS and field equipment CLA. L/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NVL at BT173137, capturing his AK-47.

27 July 68. Activity in Burlington Trail was light and cattered with no significant results.

28 July 68. B/1-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT225083 wearing a gray uniform and US web gear. L/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NVL at BT169127. He was wearing green uniform and carrying a steel helmet and AK-47.

29 July 68. C/1-46 flew into an LZ at BT167088 where a com and detonated mine was set off and 60mm mortar fire received, resulting in 2 US KIL and 4 WEL.

30 July 68. D/1-46 engaged an estimated VC squad with artillery at BT 257145 resulting in 1 VC KIA. C/1-46 engaged and killed 1 NVL in green fatigues at BT168071.

1 Aug 68. B/1-46 engaged 3 VC at BT225073 killing 1 and capturing 1 AK-47.

3 Aug 68. C/1-46 discovered 1 VC killed by artillery HFI round. He was planting anti-personnel mines and had 10 CBU type on his body.

4-7 Aug 68. All units moved as planned and assumed control of AO with negative contact.

8 Aug 68. ER/5-46 had contact with 4 VC at BT050021. Results were 1 US WEL, 4 VC KIA, 4 detainees. Equipment captured included 2 AK-47's, 1 pistol and 1 rifle of unknown type.

9 Aug 68. D/5-46 captured 1 female VC at BT040090 carrying a M16-36 rifle and later found 1 dead NVL at BT075024.

10 Aug 68. Contact was light in the Burlington Trail AO with negative results.

11 Aug 68. D/5-46 sighted and engaged 4 VC at BT036014, killing 1 and capturing his web gear. A/5-46 became engaged with 3 VC at BT012083 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA.

12 Aug 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with no enemy contact. One large rice cache was discovered at BT015089.

13 Aug 68. C/5-46 engaged 3 VC at BT011089 killing all 3 and capturing 1 M-1 carbine.

14 Aug 68. A/5-46 received fire from BT002101 and returned fire with their organic weapons, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 SKS CIA.

15 Aug 68. C/5-46 engaged a USEF at BT997105 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 VC CIA. A/5-46 engaged and killed 1 NVA and captured his AK-47 at BT975126.

16 Aug 68. A hospital complex was located at BT961128 by C/5-46. Along with varied medical and food supplies 2 NVA nurses were captured and 1 VC KIA. The area had a large number of graves, many fresh, and a large pile of human bones.

17 Aug 68. Light contact continued throughout the AO. D/5-46 engaged and killed 1 VC at BT976123.

18 Aug 68. At BT953135 A/5-46 engaged a USEF resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA/CIA, 1 MA 536, 1 AK-47, 1 AK-44 and 1 M-1 Carbine CIA.

19 Aug 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with negative enemy contact. One VC KBA was found by A/5-46 at BT953135.

20-22 Aug 68. All operations within the AO were of a routine nature with negative significant results.

23 Aug 68. LZ Bowman received incoming mortars, small arms and grenades, R&G rounds, satchel charges and bangalore torpedos from an enemy force estimated to be 25-30 personnel. Results of attack were 5 US KIA, 26 US WIA, 1 VC KIA, and 1 VC WIA/CIA. LZ Young was also mortared resulting in 3 US WIA.

24 Aug 68. LZ Bowman again received a mortar attack with no casualties or damage.

25 Aug 68. B/5-46 sighted and engaged 5 NVA with artillery at BT 191185 resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 9mm pistol CIA.

26-27 Aug 68. All operations in the AO were of a routine nature with no significant results.

28 Aug 68. B/5-46 received a ground attack at BT207165 resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WIA. Later the CIDG's sweeping the same area discovered 8 NVA KIA and captured 8 individual weapons.

29 Aug 68. The 39th Engrs at LZ Young received a mortar attack with no casualties or damage. B/5-46 located 1 VC killed by SAF at BT201179.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
30 Aug 68. Operations continued within the AO with light contact. C/5-46 engaged 2 VC at BT168155 resulting in 1 VC KIA(U).

1 Sep 68. Local search and clear operations were continued in the AO with negative results.

2 Sep 68. At BT182100 C/5-46 engaged 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 VC critically wounded and CIA. All were carrying documents and aid kits.

3 Sep 68. As they were conducting their sweep A/5-46 engaged and killed 1 VC who was lighting signal fires as they approached vic BT174150.

4 Sep 68. D/5-46 came under a very heavy mortar attack at BT187093 resulting in 27 US WIA. The mortar tube was believed to be at BT191093. This area was engaged resulting in 1 secondary explosion.

5-8 Sep 68. Operations within the Burlington Trail AO were all of a routine nature with light contact and negative results.

9 Sep 68. F/8 Cav found 1 VC KIA at BT279114. He had been dead about 2 days and had apparently bled to death from leg wounds.

10 Sep 68. While searching a village at BT198172 B/5-46 engaged 2 VC attempting to evade. Results were 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA/CIA.

11 Sep 68. The CIDG working with D/5-46 located a large rice cache booby trapped with 2 M-26 hand grenades. The VN in the area stated a company size NVN force had passed there 24 hrs prior.

12 Sep 68. C/5-46 sighted and engaged 2 VC females with web gear and medical supplies resulting in 1 VC KIA.

13-17 Sep 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with light contact and negative results.

18 Sep 68. The 1-52 Inf assumed responsibility of the Burlington Trail AO at 1500 hrs and commenced offensive operations. There was negative contact during the day.

19 Sep 68. At 1530 hrs C/1-52 located a recently abandoned NVN base camp vic BT166158. In this area 5 NVN KIA were found along with 1 IW and 7 CSW. There were no significant contacts and no friendly casualties during the day.

20 Sep 68. At 0700 hrs C/1-52 captured 1 NVN vic BT166158. The Aero Scouts also engaged and killed 2 VC who were evading. In the abandoned base camp C/1-52 captured 12 IW and 1 CSW. B Co also located an abandoned base camp vic BT157151.

21 Sep 68. Offensive and security operations continued under the operational control of the 196th Bde with Co D/4-21 Inf attached. No significant contacts were made.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22 Sep 68. Activity throughout the day was characterized by numerous enemy initiated contacts. At 0447 hrs the 1-52 Inf resupply base at Hill 54 received incoming 60mm mortars causing 2 WHA. While moving east at 0837 hrs C/1-52 received sniper fire. The enemy were engaged with small arms, artillery and gunships. Contact was broken 1 hour later with 2 US KIA, 2 US WHA and unknown number of enemy losses. At 0910 hrs D/4-21 Inf began receiving automatic weapons fire. Gunships were brought on station and contact was initially broken at 1120 hrs. At 1210 hrs D/4-21 received 12 rds of 60mm mortars while gunships were in the area. Final results were 1 US KIA and 6 US WHA. Enemy losses were not known. During the day B/1-52 also had minor contact, however, at 1720 hrs they received SA, LW and RPG fire. One track was hit causing negative damage but 3 WHA. Again at 2030 hrs B/1-52 Inf received SA and grenades resulting in 1 US WHA.

23 Sep 68. Three rounds of 105mm artillery fire landed close to the D/1-52 perimeter at 0854 hrs resulting in 3 WHA and 1 KIA. Later in the morning D/1-52 began receiving SA and 60mm mortars. Gunships were called on station but there were negative friendly or enemy casualties. B/1-52 located a freshly dug position with firing positions and tunnels vic BT200180 at 1250 hrs. At 1320 hrs D/1-52 also located a large tunnel complex and recovered miscellaneous enemy equipment and 5 NVA KIA. At 1250 hrs D/4-21 located 1 US KIA and 1 US WHA vic BT200172 from a contact on 22 Sep 68. During the period LZ Bowman received 9 incoming mortar rounds while LZ Young received 15.

24 Sep 68. Offensive and security operations continued with the 1-52 Inf returned to the operational control of the 198th LIB at 1200 hrs and B/1-52 and C/1-52 becoming OPCON to 1-1 Cav at 2230 hrs. During the day no significant contact was made but LZ Young received 5 incoming mortars. Three individual weapons, 1 suspected mortar tube and 1 VC KIA were found during the operations.

25 Sep 68. Operations continued with B and C/1-52 OPCON to 1-1 Cav. At 1645 hrs the Aero Scouts reported 8 NVA KIA vic BT145073 and miscellaneous packs and equipment CLA.

26 Sep 68. A mortar and ground attack on LZ Young began at 0302 hrs resulting in one bunker being destroyed and 6 US WHA. Approximately 70 mortars and 20 RPG's were received. 14 VC KIA were found in the area and 1 RPG launcher was CLA. At 0600 hrs B/1-52 sustained 1 WHA when 2 grenades were thrown inside their perimeter. Later at 1240 hrs they found 3 NVA KIA vic BT245158. A major contact developed in the vic of BT1718 when the Aero Scouts inserted ground troops to investigate their sighting of 3 mortar tubes. The Aero Scouts engaged and killed 30 VC but sustained 3 WHA during attempted extraction bringing their total to 5 WHA for the morning. At 1245 hrs a gunship was shot down at BT176179 and D/1-52 was given the mission to move north from LZ Young to assist the downed Aero Scout. A LOH was also shot down vic BT190182. D12 was inserted vic BT185175 moving north on foot to reinforce the Aero Scouts. D12 sustained 5 WHA. At 1445 D15 and D25 linked with D12 vic BT177181. While conducting an air strike at 1645 hrs an F4C jet fighter was shot down vic BT178188. Finally at 1755 hrs D36 linked with the Aero-Scouts and prepared litters to move the wounded to the D15 and D25 positions where they were evacuated. At 1845 all personnel were present and accounted for after their extraction to LZ Young. During the day ground troops and artillery killed 40 NVA by SA and another 50 NVA were killed by air strikes and gunships. During the engagement D/1-52 sustained 6 WHA in addition to the Aero Scouts 4 WHA and 3 NVA. The 1-52 Inf total casualties for the period was 13 WHA.

27 Sep 68. Operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with D/1-52 and A/1-52 moving north from LZ Young to search the area of the previous days contact. While moving to secure the downed gunship D/1-52 engaged 1 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CL. The gunship was extracted at 1215 hrs and at 1430 hrs the 3 MHA Aero Scouts bodies were evacuated. In the vic of BT179183 D/1-52 found 5 CSW and 6 IW. A/1-52 moved to the area of the downed F4C fighter and recovered 1 Smith & Wesson Cal 38 pistol, some documents and the aircraft crews remains.

28 Sep 68. Operations continued with A and D/1-52 conducting search and clear operations northeast of LZ Young. There were no significant contacts or sightings.

29 Sep 68. Contact remained light as A and D/1-52 shifted their search operations towards the south. At 0930 hrs D/1-52 engaged 2 VN who were evading. Results were 1 VC KIA.

30 Sep 68. Offensive and security operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with negative contact.

1 Oct 68. Offensive and security operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO with platoon size patrols around LZ Young and LZ Bowman. A/1-52 and D/1-52 conducted search operations in the northwest portion of the AO. In the only contact of the day LZ Bowman received 7 rounds of 60mm mortar causing 1 WHA.

2 October 68. Throughout the period LZ Young received a total of 12 incoming mortar rounds and sustained 1 WHA. LZ Bowman also received 3 rounds of 82mm mortar at 1847 hrs. A and D/1-52 continued sweeping south along the Tue Phuoc CFZ boundary. At 1300 hrs vic BT162158 D/1-52 made contact with 3 VC resulting in 2 US WHA and unknown enemy losses. While in their NL D/1-52 also received incoming mortars and SAF with negative results.

3 Oct 68. Operations continued with d/1-52 replacing B/1-52 in a two company search of Hill 269 with A/1-52 vic BT158162. A squad ambush near D/1-52 night perimeter suffered 1 KHL and 8 WHA at 0030 hrs when 16 mortar rounds and incoming SAF was received. LZ Bowman also received 6 incoming mortar rounds at 1815 hrs which caused negative casualties and destroyed a 90mm RR. At 0820 hrs the Aero Scouts engaged and killed 7 NVA in Dau Area 117.

4 Oct 68. Contact was light throughout the AO. LZ Young received 4 incoming mortar rounds while LZ Bowman received 3 during the period. In the only significant enemy contact B/1-52 killed 1 NVA and captured 1 IW. The Aero Scouts also killed 2 NVA and a LRRP killed 1 NVA.

5 Oct 68. Throughout the day contact was concentrated around LZ Young. A total of 13 incoming mortar rounds were received causing 9 WHA and 1 KHL. SAF was also received sporadically. In the only other contact of the day the Aero Scouts engaged 5 VC at BT252124 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

6 Oct 68. Enemy activity was light throughout the AO. Operations for the day were directed to provide security for an Engineer Convoy between LZ Young and Tien Phuoc. During the only contact D/1-52 engaged 2 VC with

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

weapons resulting in 1 VC KIA. Four suspects were also detained in the area of contact. The Aero Scouts engaged and killed one VC vic BT173167. The CIDG operating in the AO killed 1 VC for a total of 3 VC KIA.

7 Oct 68. Security and offensive operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO without significant contact.

8 Oct 68. B/1-52 continued to search west of LZ Young along the Tien Phuoc road. A/1-52 returned to LZ Bowman and C/1-52 departed to search the area east of LZ Young. At 1050 hrs CIDG elements engaged 2 VC killing one and capturing 1 AK-47 vic BT165124. Approaching the night location C/1-52 received heavy M/F resulting in 2 WFL. Later at 1910 hrs a booby trapped ChiCom grenade was tripped while placing claymores resulting in 1 WFL.

9 Oct 68. All elements of the battalion not securing LZ Bowman and LZ Young moved into positions along the Tien Phuoc road to provide security for a convoy. There were no friendly or enemy casualties throughout the period.

10 Oct 68. Offensive operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO without significant contact or friendly losses.

11 Oct 68. Search operations continued with B/1-52 and C/1-52 operating south of LZ Young. Recon patrolling north from LZ Young engaged one VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1130 hrs B/1-52 received S/F and engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA.

12-13 Oct 68. Security and offensive operations continued in the AO without significant contact and no casualties.

14 Oct 68. In the only significant contact of the day D/1-52 engaged 6 enemy vic BT188122 killing 1 VC and capturing 2 AK-47s and 1 M-16.

15 Oct 68. At 1825 hrs C/1-52 fired artillery on 30 enemy in the open with negative results.

16 Oct 68. B/1-52 and C/1-52 continued company searches while A/1-52 and D/1-52 killed 1 NVA and captured 1 AK-47. Later 2 enemy engaged the rear element of C/1-52 causing 1 WFL.

17 Oct 68. In the only contact of the day a patrol from A/1-52 suffered 1 WFL from light sniper fire vic BT245158.

18 Oct 68. D/1-52 moved off LZ Young in search operation to the north and to the east while A/1-52 departed LZ Bowman to search to the east. During the day there were no enemy contacts. However 1 KHL and 3 WFL were received by D/1-52 when a mine exploded 30 meters of the Tien Phuoc Road.

19 Oct 68. At 1100 hrs D/1-52 became OPCON to the 1-46 Inf and continued their search east of LZ Young. Two platoons from B/1-52 search west of LZ Young where 3 NVA were ILL during the day. A/1-52 continued searching east of LZ Bowman with negative results.

20 Oct 68. Search operations continued with D/1-52 OPCON to 1-46 Inf. During the days only significant contact C/1-52 detained one VC female.

~~SECRET~~

21 Oct 68, to 23 Oct 68. Offensive and security operations continued without significant contact throughout the AO. On 21 Oct 68 D/1-52 returned to operational control of the 1-52 Inf.

24 Oct 68. A/1-52 and B/1-52 continued security of LZ Bowman and LZ Young while C/1-52 and D/1-52 searched the valley and hills south of LZ Bowman. At 0730 hrs C/1-52 received sniper fire resulting in 1 WHA. A second WHA was received by D/1-52 when they were engaged by an estimated enemy squad. At 1100 hrs one soldier was wounded by a booby trapped grenade.

25 Oct 68. In contact at 0800 hrs C/1-52 had 1 NVA KIA and 1 VC KIA while suffering 1 WHA. Recon also engaged 2 NVA at BT175125 resulting in 1 NVA KIA.

26 Oct 68. Offensive & security operations continued in the Burlington Trail AO. Recon and B/1-52 detained 1 male while Blue Ghost engaged and killed 3 VC. No friendly losses during this period.

27 Oct 68. Activity was light in AO. In only significant contact C/1-52 killed 2 VC attempting to evade.

28 Oct 68. Offensive operations continued as C/1-52 and B/1-52 searched in the central portion of AO. D/1-52 with one platoon from A/1-52 participated in security operations along the Tien Phuoc Road.

29 Oct 68. Two companies continued searching central portion of BA 117 where B/1-52 detained 1 male and 1 female. Recon killed 1 NVA while operating south of LZ Young. At 0745 vic BT215165 the 1-52 C&C received heavy AWF resulting in 1 WHA.

30 Oct 68. During operation A/1-52 replaced D/1-52 searching BA 117 with B/1-52 and R/1-52 moving further south. LRRP Team was also inserted and detained 1 female at 1613 hrs. No other contact in AO.

31 Oct 68. At 0220 LZ Bowman received 3 to 4 incoming mortars. At 0400 hrs an attack commenced. UHF Bunker was destroyed, 3 US KIA, 9 WHA. The enemy utilized RPGs, mortars, satchel charges and grenades. 2 VC were killed. At 0815 hrs R/1-52 engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Detained 1 female carrying medical supplies. LRRP Team engaged 2 enemy resulting in 1 VC KIA.

1 Nov 68. Activities light in Burlington Trail AO. LZ Bowman received 5 to 6 rounds of mortar fire at 0315 hrs, S&F and 10 to 12 grenades resulting in 1 US WHA. No significant contacts for the rest of the day.

2 Nov 68. Negative enemy contacts throughout AO during this period.

3 Nov 68. During the day of increased enemy contact D/1-52 observed 20 NVA southwest of LZ Young. They engaged resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1200 hrs B/1-52 received heavy S&F, requested an air strike, they checked area and found 4 VC bodies and 1 M2 carbine and 1 RPD MG. A/1-52 engaged 4 enemy with arty and S&F resulting in 3 VC KIA and 2 IW KIA. There were no friendly casualties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 Nov 68. B/1-52 while searching the northern portion of BA 117 engaged 2 NVL resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA and 1 pistol CIA. D/1-52 located 2 NVL and 1 VC KIA in vic of previous days contacts.

5 Nov 68. Before being extracted from field location and assuming security of Hill 54 A/1-52 returned fire on sniper location resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1650 hrs platoon of B/1-52 received fire while returning to company location. One US WHA and 3 NVL KIA and 1 IW CIA were the results of that contact. Platoon from D/1-52 that was southwest of LZ Young killed 4 VC with grenades and SAF at their NDP location.

6 Nov 68. In only contact B/1-52 while searching in BA 117 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US WHA.

7 Nov 68. There were no significant contacts. B/1-52 found 3 NVL KIA and 1 NVL WHA by artillery the previous day.

8 Nov 68. Activity increased as C/1-52 operating east of LZ Bowman engaged and killed 2 VC. At 1045 hrs C/1-52 received hand grenade while engaging the enemy resulting in 2 WHA and 2 VC KIA. A/1-52 captured 1 carbine after engaging small enemy force. B/1-52 engaged 3 enemy in area southwest of LZ Young. Recon observed a squad of enemy southeast of LZ Bowman, they engaged with artillery resulting in 3 VC KIA. During the day there were 2 US WHA, 2 NVL KIA, 7 VC KIA and 1 IW CIA.

9 Nov 68. No significant enemy contacts initiated by the enemy. Recon 1-52 engaged unknown size enemy force resulting in 2 NVL KIA and 1 AK47 CIA.

10 Nov 68. At 1213 hrs a platoon of C/1-52 engaged 3 VC within 1000 meters of LZ Bowman resulting in 2 VC KIA. In same vic D/1-52 engaged and killed one NVL.

11 Nov 68. At 0745 hrs B/1-52 detained 1 VC with pack and uniform. He accidentally walked into perimeter southwest of LZ Young. Ambush element of B/1-52 successfully engaged 1 NVL and 1 VC in two separate contacts. Operation Burlington Trail terminated at 2400 hrs the 11th of November 1968.

12. RESULTS:

a. Enemy equipment and personnel losses:

(1) Personnel:

- (a) 726 VC KIA
- (b) 1187 NVA KIA
- (c) 1264 Det
- (d) 20 PW/VC
- (e) 14 PW/NVA
- (f) 10 RTNEE/VC
- (g) 2 TRNEE/NVA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2) Weapons: INDIVIDUAL - 441 CREW SERVED - 104

(3) Equipment:

- (a) Radio, PRC-25: 3
- (b) Telephone, TL312: 2
- (c) Bear Traps: 12
- (d) Compasses: 7
- (e) Binoculars: 6
- (f) Mines (M-14, M-16 & homemade): 83
- (g) Food Stuffs: Rice - 12,000 lbs (approx)
Barley - 5,000 lbs (approx)
Tea - 1,500 lbs (approx)
- (h) Misc web gear: Approx 300 sets

(4) Ammunition:

- (a) .50 Cal: 20,000
- (b) Hand grenades (M-26 & Chicom): 2,700
- (c) RPG rounds: 700
- (d) 12.7mm rounds: 5,000
- (e) SKS rounds: 100,500
- (f) AK-47 rounds: 165,000
- (g) 60mm rounds: 9,500
- (h) 82mm rounds: 4,000
- (i) 122mm rounds: 7
- (j) 75mm RR rounds: 29
- (k) Explosives: 700 lbs
- (l) .30 cal rounds: 21,000
- (m) 7.62mm rounds: 9,000
- (n) 5.56mm rounds: 1,200
- (o) M-79 rounds: 400

b. Friendly personnel and equipment losses:

(1) **Personnel:** 129 KHA
747 WHA(E)
238 WHA(M)
33 NEK
9 NBW
1 MHA
1 ARVN WHA(E)

(2) **Equipment:**

(a) M-16: 5
(b) M-60: 1
(c) M-79: 2
(d) PRC-25: 2

13. **Administrative Matters:**

a. **Supply:** All units carried their normal basic load and their normal TOE weapons were employed. As all movement was by foot resupply was provided only when definitely necessary. In many areas dense vegetation and bad weather hampered resupply, which was all done by helicopter, but overall it was adequate.

b. **Maintenance:** No significant maintenance problems were encountered as only combat elements were involved in the operation. Normal first echelon maintenance was accomplished in the field.

c. **Medical:** The units medics displayed courage and proficiency during the entire operation. The dustoffs were accomplished in a truly outstanding manner and were very rapid.

d. **Transportation:** All transportation of casualties and supplies was conducted by helicopter.

e. **Communications:** Minor communication problems were encountered when rifle companies were using the short antenna with the AN/PRC-25. Rifle relays with adjoining units had to be established at LZ Clifford, but no further problems were encountered once the relay site was operational.

14. **Special Equipment and Techniques:** Starlight scopes were used with the point and flank elements. The value of the scopes was limited due to the heavy overcast, however; in the early evening and morning hours they were very useful in the observation of danger areas. Scout Dogs were also employed during the operation and the units alertness and security was greatly increased. Whenever possible panel markers or mirrors were used to pinpoint the ground units location to air observers, thus not compromising the units position.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15. Commanders Evaluation: Operations of this type offer the commanders the tactical capabilities to deploy his unit in a manner that is able to cope with any unforeseen enemy situation. These units were small enough to preclude being a vulnerable target, but large enough to prevent an enemy surprise attack. In addition they operate adjacent to each other so that within a minimum of time they may provide each other with support. A known enemy tactic is to withdraw while being pursued, thus, the enemy was unable to stop, regroup, aid, and organize to attack. Operations in the mountainous areas presented some problems due to the weather closing in the early afternoon. The practice was initiated of establishing a secure LZ as soon as one was located. Resupply was on standby and aircraft immediately diverted to resupply. This resupply procedure allows the commander to move into his night defensive position without being disclosed by resupply aircraft. It was found that the use of LRRP rations increased the flexibility of the ground commander. Class A rations should be planned for when the tactical situation permits rather than as a daily requirement. It is a great tactical disadvantage to have your location continually given away by resupply aircraft. Company sized night operations against a determined enemy force, who avoid decisive combat rely heavily upon mortar attacks, are capable of meeting with more success than daylight operations. The enemy's ability mortar positions is increased. Movement in open areas and astride trails can be accomplished at night with greater relative safety than during daylight hours. The increased difficulty in conducting aerial medevac at night is greatly off set by the ease in which wounded can be recovered from an enemy kill zone under the cover of darkness. All troops must be instilled with the necessary desire to develop enemy contact rapidly so that any friendly casualties can be covered by forward movement.

16. Recommendations: Operations of this type should continue and a greater emphasis should be placed on night operations of the rifle company. Saturation patrols in a smaller area, i.e. one grid, could produce effective results providing proper blocking forces were established.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Rodney E. Hurt
RODNEY E. HURT
CPT, LGC
Asst Adjutant