

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 198th INFANTRY, 100 INFANTRY
108TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LT)
APO San Francisco 96219

NOV-2-67

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

To: Commanding Officer
198th Infantry Brigade (LT)
Attn: XO
AIO SF 96219

1. Popular force intelligence sources indicated that 450 V.C. were observed passing through the Hamlet of Van Tuong(1) in the vicinity of BS 698955. Equipment carried by the force was reported to be:

- (1) twenty M-79, (2) three 57 mm RL, (3) three 82 mm mortars,
- (4) three 60 mm mortars, (5) thirty-three M6's.

2. At 191215 Nov 67 the 2nd platoon of A Company 1/52 Inf began a sweep operation from BS 702974 to BS 697956. Contact with a squad size VC force was made at 191230 Nov 67 in the vicinity of BS 699959. Captured during the fire fight was one who was made a POW.

3. A search of the area after contact was broken revealed two VC KIA. Equipment taken was: (1) one M-1 rifle, SN3373504, (2) thirty-four rounds of 30.06 caliber am uniton, (3) one piece of 4" x 5" plastic cloth, (4) one 6" x 6" piece of nylon, (5) one M1AI cleaning rod, (6) one leather belt 3/brass buckle 1"x2", (7) two leather am uniton pouches with a capacity of two M1 clips.

4. The 198th Infantry brigade (1) S-2 notified the 1st Battalion 52d Infantry S-2 that the forementioned POW reported that ninety VC would return to the Hamlet of An Loc, BS 689959 to pick up rice at 191230 Nov 67. A second patrol from Company A went into an a bush in this vicinity. The patrol returned to base camp at 190735 without further enemy contact.

5. Terrain analysis: The ground operation control is hindered due to corn fields and other tall growing crops in the low areas. Plentiful vegetation exists along the slopes of the gentle sloping hills. Throughout the area, booby traps could be concealed from the ground soldier until it was sprung.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, 2 June 67

6. Recommendations:

- a. The use of spread radios would enhance coordination of night ambush patrols.
- b. Although information from popular force personnel and civilians is not always based on concrete evidence or completely reliable, it is important that it be evaluated and, if possible, acted upon.
- c. Upon making contact with a small enemy force, the force must be immediately assaulted after evaluating the possibility of an ambush.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CLIFTON HOUSTON
Cpt, Infantry
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HQ, 1ST BATTALION, 52D INFANTRY
(198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LT))
APO Sanfransisco 96219

AVDF-XAC

5 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
198th Infantry Brigade (LT)
ATTN: S3
APO San Fransisco 96219

1. General: The 1st Bn, 52d Inf, during the period 27 Oct 67 to 17 Nov 67 conducted extensive small unit search and destroy, search and clear, and ambush patrol operations within AO CARENTAN and AO OD of QUANG NGAI province, RVN. These operations were conducted on company, platoon, squad, and fire team size level. A total of 88 ambush patrols, and 24 search and clear operations, 6 CA's were conducted in the battalion TAOR during this period.

2. Operations:

a. During the period 27 Oct - 17 Nov 67 company, platoon and small unit operations were conducted in conjunction with operations by the other battalions of the brigade.

(1) FRAG O 1 - OPLAN 1-67: Co B conduct CA on 030900 19 Nov to LZ RED vic BS 847407 LZ BLACK vic BS 841420. Co B conducted search and clear operation west and north from LZ RED to LZ GREEN vic BS 834420. Co B(-) conduct S/C operations and set up blocking position south of LZ GREEN. Set up NPD vic LZ GREEN.

(2) FRAG O 2 to OPLAN 1-67: Co B secure LZ GREEN. Co C conduct CA to LZ GREEN 040900 Nov 67 vic BS 834420. Co C conduct S/C operation west and south to PZ vic 837408. Extraction 041700 Nov 67.

(3) FRAG O 3 to OPLAN 1-67: Co B conducts CA from LZ CARENTAN to LZ vic 747384 070815 Nov 67 conducting S/C operations east to NPD site vic 758385. 08 Nov conduct S/C operations south to BS 759350 then swinging northeasterly returning to LZ OD 09 Nov 67.

Downgraded at 3 yr intervals; declassified after 12 yrs. DOD DIR 5200-10

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

(4) FRAG O 4 to OPLAN 1-67: Co A conducts CA from LZ OD vic BS 787371 to AO OD vic BS 702400 09 Nov 67. Conduct 3 day S/C operations in Northwest sector of AO OD vic 7137. 09 Nov move Northeast to NPD site BS 736395. 11 Nov conduct S/C operations East to Hwy 1 (BS 795404) 111200 Nov air extraction to CARENTAN.

(5) FRAG O 5 to OPLAN 1-67: Co C conducted CA to GAZA STRIP 110915 Nov 67 (BS 808488) conducted S/C operations North. Recon Plat conducted CA to GAZA STRIP 111000 Nov 67 (BS 777510) setting up a blocking position 500 meters East: on order units will unite and conduct joint S/C operations being extracted 111655 Nov to LZ CARENTAN. FRAG O 6 to OPLAN 1-67 171000 Nov 67 Bn(-) departed CARENTAN by vehicle arr BRONCO 171400, departed BRONCO by C-130's. Elements closed their respective AO's within new TAOR as follows: B Co 171315, A Co 171400, Bn Headquarters 17400 Co C 171445. Bn prepared for relief-in-place of 4/31 and assumption of control of TAOR 180700.

3. VC Activity: The following incidents occurred during the period 27 Oct - 17 Nov 67 within the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry TAOR. Information has been compiled from organic and attached units. Also indicated are VC fortifications, mines and booby-traps, and munitions plus US munitions and equipment captured and evacuated or destroyed.

a. Sniper Fire: 12 separate incidents of sniper fire were reported by elements operating in the TAOR. In most cases the fire was classified as ineffective and consisted of 1-8 rounds of semi-automatic fire.

b. Harrassing Incidents: There were 6 harrassing type incidents during the reporting period, which combined automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire, in most cases the volume of fire consisted of 10-15 rounds.

c. VC Sightings: On 8 different occasions groups of VC from 1-10 were sighted by friendly elements operating in the TAOR. In most instances the VC were 300 meters or more away from friendly elements and seemed to be more interested in putting distance between them than engaging them.

d. Major Incidents:

(1) 291950 Oct 67: M/1-52 19 man ambush patrol observed 3 VC coordinates BS 832394. Element engaged VC who broke contact. 292105 patrol was engaged by SA and grenades. AC-47, 81mm Illum, Arty, 81mm HE was called for and fired into enemy locations. Contact was broken 2230. One US WHA. Results friendly fire: 2 KIA.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

(2) 041830 Nov 67: B/1-52 13 man ambush patrol was crossing river vic BS 840386 when HTO fell in river. 4 persons ran back into water including platoon leader to assist man. Of these 4 only 1 returned to shore. The bodies of the 3 and the HTO were found 06 Nov. Results: 4 KIA. Patrol continued mission, received harassing fire from VC. Engaged, negative results. Patrol sent out following day found no US equipment or bodies but did find a fresh grave 051140 vic BS 838388. Results, 1 VC KIA.

(3) 092138 Nov 67: A/1-52 was attacked by estimated platoon size element BS 723386 at 50-150 meters. Received 500 rds SA and auto weapons fire and grenades. Artillery called for. Contact broken 100400. Results: one friendly WIA (not serious). Check of area revealed no known VC casualties.

(4) 112000 Nov 67 C/1-52 squad size ambush fired on estimated 6 VC who entered killing zone, BS 793477. Results 2 VC KIA. As ambush was about to retrieve bodies they were fired on by SA and grenades. Ambush withdrew to Co C perimeter. No friendly casualties.

(5) 121400 Nov 67: C/1-52 was making search of a shelter when an individual tripped, fell, and accidentally fired a round. The round struck another individual in the upper chest. Results: 1 WIA, later same individual died.

e. Booby-trap Incidents: There were no booby-traps tripped by US elements in the T10R. The majority of the booby-traps found were US hand grenades tied to the base of bushes with one or more trip wires affixed to them.

f. Bunkers, Tunnels, and Punji Pits Destroyed: during the reporting period 260 bunkers, 4 tunnel systems and 2 punji pits were destroyed. The tunnels and punji pits were well camouflaged but were not extensive in construction as found in WAR ZONE "C".

g. Five sampans were destroyed.

h. Items Captured and Destroyed:

(1) $\frac{1}{2}$ lb TNT

(2) 2 ea CHICOM grenades

(3) 640 lb rice

(4) 470 lb potatoes

(5) US Supplies & Equipment: 2 ea 155mm rds which were destroyed by EOD.

(6) 1 lb documents (evacuated)

3
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SUBJECT: After Action Report

i. Casualties Sustained by the VC Within the TAOR:

- (1) VC - KIA - 5
- (2) VC - WIA - 1

6. Personnel: The Battalion has 93% of authorized strength. There are many NCO shortages at the squad and team leader level.

7. Training: The only formal training during the period 27 Oct - 17 Nov was 215 EM and Officers attending the South Vietnam Orientation Center at BRONCO. The Battalion participating in no Battalion size operations but 7 company size operation were conducted. Other training consisted of that required from operational necessity.

Paul A. Roach

Tab A: Summary of Logistical
Data

PAUL A. ROACH
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

Tab B: Personnel

TAB A SUMMARY OF LOGISTICAL DATA

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

1. Supply and Maintenance

a. Class I: 13,128 meals of C rations were consumed by this organization.

b. Class II and IV:

(1) Major items of equipment received were 51 ea Starlight Scopes, 6 ea M60 machine guns, 4 ea Refrigerators and freezer units. Five each 10 KW Generators, 5 ea GRC - 125 Radios, 54 ea PRT 9/PRT 4 Squad radios. 2 ea night vision sights medium range. 1 ea Channel alignment Indicator.

(2) Vehicle Status:

TYPE	MODEL	AUTH	GREEN	AMBER	RED	REASON
1/2 AMB	M718	5	5			
Trk 1/2 Ton	M151A1	22	17		1	(4 tdy
Trk 3/4 Ton	M37B1	6	5		1	(1 inop supt)
Trk 2 1/2 Ton	M35A2	9	8		1	parts
						inop supt

c. Class III: 2,420 gallons of gasoline, 7,330 gallons of Diesel oil. 130 gallons of OE 30. 35 lbs of 6IA was consumed for vehicle, mess and sanitary operations.

d. Class V:

Nomenclature	Qty Expended
Ctg, Ball 5.56	80,310
Ctg, Ball, 5.56 tracer	26,790
Ctg, 7.62mm tracer	45,800
Ctg, 81mm HE w/fuze pd	451
Ctg, 81mm Illumination	894
Ctg, 81mm WPPD	None
Grenade, fragmentation	971
Ctg, 40mm, HE	3,429
Grenade, Hand, smoke, Green	164
Grenade, Hand, smoke, Yellow	100
Grenade, Hand, smoke, Violet	200
Mine, AP, M18A1, Claymore	58
Flare - trip M49A1	130
Chg, Demo 1 lb blk (TNT)	300
Chg, Demo 2 1/2 lb blk comp C-4	200

2. Transportation: For the month of November. 10,750 miles were driven.

3. Construction: Minor repair to existing bunkers and buildings.

4. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization:

During the month of November there were 67 patients evacuated to Company C 9th Spt Bn, of these there were 5 hospitalized.

Illness: 42
 Elective Surgery: 0
 Non Combat Injury: 25
 Combat Injury: 0

GROUP 4

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	1. STRENGTH			ASGD			ATC H			PFD		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HHC	16	1	134	14	1	150	1	0	3	14	1	147
A	6	0	164	6	0	146	1	0	2	6	0	146
B	6	0	164	6	0	140	1	0	2	6	0	137
C	6	0	164	6	0	139	1	0	2	6	0	138
E	4	0	96	4	0	91	1	0	2	4	0	91
TOT	38	1	722	36	1	666	5	0	11	36	1	659

2. PERSONNEL LOSSES		
OFF	WO	EM
HHC	0	0
A	0	3
B	2	4
C	0	3
E	0	0
	2	10

3. PERSONNEL GAINS		
OFF	WO	EM
	1	0
	0	4
	1	2
	0	1
	0	0
	2	7

4. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: No civilian personnel were utilized during the period covered

5. DEVELOPMENT OF MAINTENANCE & MORALE:

a. During the reporting period the battalion suffered 4 KIA's, 2 WIA's, 5 Injuries, and 1 sick.

b. The battalion submitted one (1) recommendation for Bronze Star with "U" Device. Four (4) recommendations for Soldiers Medal. Six (6) recommendations for Purple Heart.

c. Religious Service: Religious services (Protestant & Catholic) were held in battalion area and at the company combat bases. One (1) memorial service was conducted for deceased members of the battalion.

d. Disposition of remains: All remains were evacuated through appropriate channels.

6. MAINTENANCE AND DISCIPLINE OF LAW AND ORDER:

a. Serious Incidents: One (1) EM was accidentally shot in left foot by an M-60 machine gun, one (1) EM received sucking chest wound by an M-16 rifle accidentally discharged.

b. Court-martials: None.

c. Safety: One (1) EM injured as a result of falling off a bunker as a result of careless handling of weapons. All injured personnel were dropped from morning report.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
108th INFANTRY BRIGADE (LB)
APO San Francisco 96219

AMF-SAC-55

5 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
108th Infantry Brigade (LB)
Attn: XO
APO San Francisco 96219

1. The task organization for Co E, 1st Bn 52nd Inf, 108th Inf Brigade (LB) for its operation on 30 Nov 67 consisted of one platoon(-) element used as a blocking force in the vicinity of coordinates 06335973. One platoon (+) element composed of one Popular Force reinforced squad and one platoon from Company E.

2. Regular force information and Army intelligence indicated that the VC had been operating in the area for a long time.

3. At 06045 Nov 67 the blocking force moved out by motorized sapper which the Popular Force had arranged from B3633581 to set up their position. Upon moving into position they spotted a sentry on the high ground in vicinity of coordinates 0633974. At 0645 hours the assault team moved down the river in two Boston Whales armed with two(2) M-60 MG's. Prior to landing the Boston Whales placed suppressive fire on the landing zone. Upon landing at 0650 hours several rounds from small arms were received from the highground vicinity coordinates 0633974. Company E under Cpt Ira F. Trotter immediately moved his element on line while artillery fire was being called. At 0652 hours the firing ceased and the unit started a detailed search and clear operation in the vicinity of 0633972. At 1005 hours one person was injured by a booby-trapped M-72 round. At 0611974 a squad found eight(8) tunnels each being from forty(40) feet to one hundred feet in length. A list of items found is attached as incl 1. Seven women and three children were detained in the area and later taken to 108th Bde Headquarters. At 1443 Co E flushed four(4) males out of a small tunnel. As they ran away, two were shot. Search of the area revealed one(1) confirmed KIA. Apparently the other VC was carried away by the two other persons. Two males were also detained by the blocking force. Co E returned to base camp at 1800 hours.

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Subject: After Action Report, 3 December 1977

4. **Environment:** The area has both rolling hills intermixed with numerous hedge rows. Movement and control of the hills is difficult. The low ground is swampy with deep water. The high ground is cluttered with hedge rows and thorn thickets. Vegetation in the area is extremely thick.

5. Recommendations:

- a. Weapons, ammunition, radios and money should be tagged and returned to the Popular Forces once they have been processed.
- b. Radio and web gear need to be unfastened and slung over one(1) shoulder in the event the boat capsizes; also boats should be unladen.
- c. Boston whalers should have a pre-arranged meeting point as fire is hard to control in the bounding boats.
- d. Once the operation is completed, all persons in the vicinity of the departure site should be collected and used as cover for the extraction. The Boston whalers should be used to extract the last last since they are faster than motorized sampans and are capable of placing suppressive fires along any high ground.
- e. To enhance a complete search of the area, two or three men of each squad should remove all contact gear while the remaining members of the squad provide security for the men digging through the area.
- f. Blocking forces should be used in the search operation after two hours in position.
- g. Popular force personnel should be used in every operation. Their knowledge of the area and their ability to interview people in the area prove to be a valuable asset.

6. Assisting units:

- a. Popular force squad from Tan Ky 1, #62305 led by a former VC. The Popular Force squad leader was the village chief of Ninh Giang Village, Binh Son District, Quang Nigia Province.
- b. Local fishermen provided sampans. The pay was one(1) case of C rations.
- c. C Battery 1st 14th arty.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

CHARLES H. HARRIS
Capt, Infantry
Adjutant

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See separate para 3, List of equipment captured:

1. Three(3) deviates to flannel traps wire to (3 anchor pins).
2. Two unidentified metal clips (11" long).
3. One(1) 90 pistol magazine-empty.
4. Seven(7) US Carbine magazines with seventy-seven(77) rounds.
5. Three(3) sub-machine gun magazines with 23, 26 and 25 rounds (unknown caliber).
6. Six belts (1 90 pistol belt, 2 leather belts, 3 canvas belts).
7. Four small bottles with an unidentified liquid content.
8. Three US first aid pouches with packets.
9. Two sub-machine gun leather magazine pouches.
10. Two curved leather carbine pouches.
11. Two small leather ambo pouches.
12. One grenade holder.
13. Three hand grenades.
14. One 90 pistol ambo pouch (empty).
15. Three waterproof canvas pouches, 8" x 6" with straps.
16. One flag (red-blue with yellow star).
17. One trap door (metal).
18. Two antipersec hel mines (unidentified).
19. One(1) M7 49 French sub-machine gun, 9mm.
20. Four(4) US Carbines, .30 caliber (3 were turned in, 1 was taken by Popular Force on the scene, 72b(3)(2)).

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 52D INFANTRY
198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LT)
APO San Francisco 96219

ADTF-1AC-S5

12 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
198th Infantry Brigade (Lt)
Attn: R-AvOF-XG
APO SF 96219

1. There is no significant intelligence data pertinent to this action. This action developed in an area which the company commander believed there might be enemy activity and in an area where sniper fire had been received by elements of his company earlier.

2. Company A, 1st Bn 52d Infantry had deployed four ambush patrols for the night of 3 Dec 67. Ambush 3 and ambush 4 departed company base camp at 0200 Dec 67 for their ambush positions. Ambush 3 was a squad size patrol which set up for the night in vicinity of coordinates N07039007. Ambush 4 also a squad size element went into position at coordinates N07039007. Ambush 3 made contact at 030235 Dec 67 when ten to twelve VC were observed coming towards them. The VC approached the ambush from its front, sides and rear in such manner as they would not enter the ambush's kill zone. As an alternative to prevent the enemy from seeking any possible assistance, two men on the left flank were instructed to engage the squad of approaching VC. One of the men was armed with an M-16 and the other with an M-79. As the two men opened fire, the M-79's first round failed to fire. Before the second round could be loaded, the soldier had used the round's round magazine. Reports were that three VC had fallen to the ground and the other 7 to 9 had opened out taking two of the fallen VC with them. The M-79 fired one M-16 round at the fleeing personnel as the M-16 fired part of a second magazine. Search of the area, approximately 15 meters from the ambush location, revealed one confirmed enemy dead with his pistol bullet, web-belt, an uniform and one M-16 with selector switch. Capt. [redacted] I, ambush 4, N07039007, continued observation throughout the night with negative results. As the patrol was returning, they observed three individuals in vicinity of coordinates at 0430. When the Vietnamese soldiers in rear the patrol, one male turned and ran as the other two, one male and one female, surrendered. The fleeing male was told to stop. When it was evident that the male who was not going to return to the patrol, he was fired upon and killed. The male who surrendered was 29 years old and had in his possession over VN\$1,000. He appeared to be a tax collector for the local militia. The female admitted that she was a nurse for the Viet Cong.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, 12 Dec 67

3. Terrain analysis: Both areas of contact have abundant low growing weeds and shrubs with scattered tree thickets. Concealment for an attack position is adequate. Approaches to the sites are fully open to fire. provided the enemy uses the major trails. Friendly villages are safe from grazing fire because of the rolling terrain.

4. Recommendations: None.

5. Assisting units: None.

FOR THE COM. ASSTG:

1. Dated

2. 12 Dec 67

**CLIFFORD HEDGES
Cpt. Infantry
Adjutant**

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18 February 1992

Project After Action Report

DD: Commanding Officer
195th Infantry Brigade (LI)
Actions: AVN-ED
AFN: 07 00010

...and being is after action report pertaining to night mission patrol of 3rd Squad, 2nd Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry, 199th Infantry Brigade (USA).

104

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, 1st Inf Regt, 1967

Security element on the northeast side of the village, a security team, led by 2nd Lt. (Sgt) C. Smith, would work their way around the hospital and sweep eastward through it forcing any VC into the security force. The security team moved outside of residential buildings, however, they were forced to enter into the hospital before moving perimeter around it because of terrain factors. Upon entering the hospital, at approximately 171000 Zulu on 27 Dec, the assault sighted four (4) VC walking and drinking in an open area (Reference Area 1), area of contact 1. Weapons could be seen. Walking and two (Reference Area 1), area 2, area 3, and other males behind the house could be heard. As the team, led by 2nd Lt. C. Smith, assaulted from perimeter, twenty-five (25) meters, two VC were killed and another twenty (20) to thirty (30) VC started streaming from the area, realizing that they were outnumbered, 2nd Lt. C. Smith called the assault force for support. The floating VC, now beginning to return fire, were engaged by forces out from the assault team, but not from the assault team around the hospital, for they responded, and got away from their position to an art battery's left flank. 2nd Lt. C. Smith had the 1-73 gunner supporting the forces killed two (2) more VC in house number 1, area of contact number 1. The assault perimeter exited hospital. Before the VC forces departed, 2nd Lt. C. Smith, another three VC had been killed and two fossils had been wounded. The assault perimeter had secured hospital with a sweep on line contact the open area in front of the floating enemy. (Reference Area 1, area 2, area 3, area 4, and area 5). His team moved after the enemy had a toward the high ground. 2nd Lt. C. Smith and men from his team gave chase to enemy personnel. 2nd Lt. C. Smith had been shot while climbing a ridge. 2nd Lt. C. Smith had been shot in the head, which they placed on the trail, before he continued his assault perimeter. 2nd Lt. C. Smith was shot in the head and more than two pounds of ammunition between them. Also, two (2) VC were killed. 2nd Lt. C. Smith continued along the ridge and into the high ground. Immediately a medical personnel, two reinforcements and a member of command. The command, the personnel and one medical and control instructor was sent to the 1-73, Infantry Company (IC) command center. 2nd Lt. C. Smith was then instructed to return a floating team and be prepared to send back the wounded fossils on the first priority. Realizing the tactical situation of his element, the command, 1-73, Infantry Company (IC) personnel and members the element to command. The members of the 1-73, Infantry were instructed to move to the left and follow 2nd Lt. C. Smith's left leading team without fire believed to be the last possible location in the vicinity of hospital. At 171000 (December 1967) the first WIA of the medical personnel personnel for a right contact a total of 200000. The leading team was secured. The wounded fossils was extracted by the 1-73, Infantry and referred to the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry and medical 100000, for emergency medical treatment. After all reinforcements and medical were taken to the leading team, who was taken to the 1st Company. Received in the lead by C. A. C. Smith. Instructions were instructed to cover about the hospital. The Long river where some VC were seen taking position. Please advise were were to illuminate the leading team. The gunner did not illuminate any targets and did not fire.

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PROBLEMS AFTER ACTION REPORT, dated 14 October 1967

2. Details concerning the items recovered are following:

- a. Seven pieces of C-4, 1 lb.
- b. An M16 rifle, 409 M, 11.1 lbs.
- c. Three individual weapons (IWA)

- (1) one P-60 or similar type ST, serial no. number of Soviet gun, no serial number P-60.
- (2) one M-16 and P-60 rifle, serial number 112 P-60.
- (3) one M1 carbine, serial number 1924.
- d. Two hand grenades, C-4.
- e. Three sets of web gear.

f. Two tanks partially destroyed by fire due to explosion of 409 ammunition recovered during fire fight.

g. Two tanks destroyed around the village for destruction of the village. One of the tanks the following morning 15 October 1967, recovered.

h. One tank, this tank from a large house with windows and walls of a house approximately 100 feet long, 8 feet high, and 3 feet wide with floor thickness approximately 6 feet long.

i. Two sets of uniforms with military uniforms. A soldier from B-100, approximately, who was operating in the current operation, suffered two bullet wounds to right knee at 100 m from enemy.

- j. One .45 and round of ammunition.
- k. One set of web gear.
- l. One set of web gear.
- m. One set of uniforms.
- n. One set of uniforms.
- o. One set of uniforms with military uniforms.
- p. 10 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition.
- q. 1 round of 5.56 mm ammunition.
- r. 1 anti-aircraft gun propelling rods, gun.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, dated 18 December 1967

3. Terrain analysis: Grid squares of concern are 016297 and 026397. The high ground has numerous hogbacks used to terrace the slopes. They are from four feet to seven feet in height. Vegetation within the hogbacks consist of small trees, shrubs, vines with thorns, and tall grass. Large boulders, some of which used to conceal tunnel entrances, provide the enemy with excellent firing positions and cover for his escape. The low ground provides no great hindrance for troop movement. Numerous hogbacks and tall trees often block the view of adjacent elements. Trees lining across the river banks provide no cover should hostile fire come from the high ground or across the river. The terraced slopes and numerous rock formations provide many possible locations for tunnels and fortified positions.

4. Armor conditions: It is conceivable that each an enemy small element used at least three-hundred pounds of mail over an outfit. The patrol was carrying 300 half pounds per man when they made contact. Due to the nature of rounds it had taken to kill some of the VC, the patrol had less than three-hundred pounds of ammunition after the fire fight.

5. Other US unit and time in the 1st Battalion 52nd Infantry's combat night combat assault was the 175th Aviation Division aviation company.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Colonel
USA

CLIFFORD ROBERTSON
CPT, Infantry
Adjutant

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