

# CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 198TH INFANTRY  
198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LT)  
APO San Francisco 96319

AV/1-11C-85

3 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer  
198th Infantry Brigade (LT)  
Attn: XO  
APO SF 96319

1. Popular force intelligence sources indicated that 450 V.C. were observed passing through the Hamlet of Van Tuong(1) in the vicinity of BS 698955. Equipment carried by the force was reported to be:

- (1) twenty M-79, (2) three 57 mm RR, (3) three 81 mm mortars, (4) three 60 mm mortars, (5) thirty-three MG's.

2. At 191215 Nov 67 the 2nd platoon of A Company 1/52 Inf began a sweep operation from BS 702974 to BS 692958. Contact with a squad size VC force was made at 191230 Nov 67 in the vicinity of BS 699959. Captured during the fire fight was one who was made a POW.

3. A search of the area after contact was broken revealed two VC KIA. Equipment taken was: (1) one M-1 rifle, SN3973504, (2) thirty-four rounds of 30.06 caliber ammunition, (3) one piece of 4' x 5' plastic cloth, (4) one 6" x 6" piece of nylon, (5) one M1A1 cleaning rod, (6) one leather belt 3/brass buckle 1"x2", (7) two leather ammunition pouches with a capacity of two M1 clips.

4. The 198th Infantry brigade (16) S-2 notified the 1st Battalion 52d Infantry S-2 that the aforementioned POW reported that ninety VC would return to the Hamlet of An Lee, BS 689959 to pick up rice at 191343 Nov 67. A second patrol from Company A went into an ambush in this vicinity. The patrol returned to base camp at 000735 without further enemy contact.

5. Terrain analysis: The ground operation control is hindered due to corn fields and other tall growing crops in the low areas. Plentiful vegetation exists along the slopes of the gentle sloping hills. Throughout the area, booby traps could be concealed from the ground soldier until it was sprung.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, 2 Dec 67

6. Recommendations:

a. The use of squad radios would enhance coordination of night ambush patrols.

b. Although information from popular force personnel and civilians is not always based on concrete evidence or completely reliable, it is important that it be evaluated and, if possible, acted upon.

c. Upon making contact with a small enemy force, the force must be immediately assaulted after evaluating the possibility of an ambush.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CLIFTON HOUSTON  
Cpt, Infantry  
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HQ, 1ST BATTALION, 52D INFANTRY  
198th Infantry Brigade (LT)  
APO San Francisco 96219

AVDF-XAC

5 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer  
198th Infantry Brigade (LT)  
ATTN: S3  
APO San Francisco 96219

1. General: The 1st Bn, 52d Inf, during the period 27 Oct 67 to 17 Nov 67 conducted extensive small unit search and destroy, search and clear, and ambush patrol operations within AO CARENTAN and AO OD of QUANG NGAI province, RVN. These operations were conducted on company, platoon, squad, and fire team size level. A total of 88 ambush patrols, and 24 search and clear operations, 6 CA's were conducted in the battalion TAOB during this period.

2. Operations:

a. During the period 27 Oct - 17 Nov 67 company, platoon and small unit operations were conducted in conjunction with operations by the other battalions of the brigade.

(1) FRAG 01 - OPLAN 1-67: Co B conduct CA on 030900 19 Nov to LZ RED vic BS 847407 LZ BLACK vic BS 841420. Co B conducted search and clear operation west and north from LZ RED to LZ GREEN vic BS 834420. Co B(-) conduct S/C operations and set up blocking position south of LZ GREEN. Set up NPD vic LZ GREEN.

(2) FRAG 02 to OPLAN 1-67: Co B secure LZ GREEN. Co C conduct CA to LZ GREEN 040900 Nov 67 vic BS 834420. Co C conduct S/C operation west and south to PZ vic 837408. Extraction 041700 Nov 67.

(3) FRAG 03 to OPLAN 1-67: Co B conducts CA from LZ CARENTAN to LZ vic 747384 070815 Nov 67 conducting S/C operations east to NPD site vic 758385. 08 Nov conduct S/C operations south to BS 759350 then swinging northeasterly returning to LZ OD 09 Nov 67.

Downgraded at 3 yr intervals; declassified  
after 12 yrs. DOD DIR 5200.10

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

(4) FRAG 0 4 to OPLAN 1-67: Co A conducts CA from LZ OD vic BS 787371 to AO OD vic BS 702400 09 Nov 67. Conduct 3 day S/C operations in Northwest sector of AO CD vic 7137. 09 Nov move Northeast to NPD site BS 736395. 11 Nov conduct S/C operations East to Hwy 1 (BS 795404) 111200 Nov air extraction to CARENTAN.

(5) FRAG 0 5 to OPLAN 1-67: Co C conducted CA to GAZA STRIP 110915 Nov 67 (BS 808488) conducted S/C operations North. Recon Plat conducted CA to GAZA STRIP 111000 Nov 67 (BS 777510) setting up a blocking position 500 meters East: on order units will unite and conduct joint S/C operations being extracted 111655 Nov to LZ CARENTAN. FRAG 0 6 to OPLAN 1-67 171000 Nov 67 Bn(-) departed CARENTAN by vehicle arr BRONCO 171400, departed BRONCO by C-130's. Elements closed their respective AO's within new TAOR as follows: B Co 171315, A Co 171400, Bn Headquarters 17400 Co C 171445. Bn prepared for relief-in-place of 4/31 and assumption of control of TAOR 180700.

3. VC Activity: The following incidents occurred during the period 27 Oct - 17 Nov 67 within the 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry TAOR. Information has been compiled from organic and attached units. Also indicated are VC fortifications, mines and booby-traps, and munitions plus US munitions and equipment captured and evacuated or destroyed.

a. Sniper Fire: 12 separate incidents of sniper fire were reported by elements operating in the TAOR. In most cases the fire was classified as ineffective and consisted of 1-8 rounds of semi-automatic fire.

b. Harrassing Incidents: There were 6 harrassing type incidents during the reporting period, which combined automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire, in most cases the volume of fire consisted of 10-15 rounds.

c. VC Sightings: On 8 different occasions groups of VC from 1-10 were sighted by friendly elements operating in the TAOR. In most instances the VC were 300 meters or more away from friendly elements and seemed to be more interested in putting distance between them than engaging them.

d. Major Incidents:

(1) 291950 Oct 67: M/1-52 19 man ambush patrol observed 3 VC coordinates BS 832394. Element engaged VC who broke contact. 292105 patrol was engaged by SA and grenades. AC-47, 81mm Illum, Arty, 81mm HE was called for and fired into enemy locations. Contact was broken 2230. One US WHA. Results friendly fire: 2 KIA.

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(2) 041830 Nov 67: B/1-52 13 man ambush patrol was crossing river vic BS 840386 when RTO fell in river. 4 persons ran back into water including platoon leader to assist man. Of these 4 only 1 returned to shore. The bodies of the 3 and the RTO were found 06 Nov. Results: 4 KIA. Patrol continued mission, received harassing fire from VC. Engaged, negative results. Patrol sent out following day found no US equipment or bodies but did find a fresh grave 051140 vic BS 838388. Results, 1 VC KIA.

(3) 092138 Nov 67: A/1-52 was attacked by estimated platoon size element BS 723386 at 50-150 meters. Received 500 rds SA and auto weapons fire and grenades. Artillery called for. Contact broken 100400. Results: one friendly WHA (not serious). Check of area revealed no known VC casualties.

(4) 112000 Nov 67 C/1-52 squad size ambush fired on estimated 6 VC who entered killing zone, BS 793477. Results 2 VC KIA. As ambush was about to retrieve bodies they were fired on by SA and grenades. Ambush withdrew to Co C perimeter. No friendly casualties.

(5) 121400 Nov 67: C/1-52 was making search of a shelter when an individual tripped, fell, and accidentally fired a round. The round struck another individual in the upper chest. Results: 1 WHA, later same individual died.

e. Booby-trap Incidents: There were no booby-traps tripped by US elements in the TLO. The majority of the booby-traps found were US hand grenades tied to the base of bushes with one or more trip wires affixed to them.

f. Bunkers, Tunnels, and Punji Pits Destroyed: during the reporting period 260 bunkers, 4 tunnel systems and 2 punji pits were destroyed. The tunnels and punji pits were well camouflaged but were not extensive in construction as found in WAR ZONE "C".

g. Five sampans were destroyed.

h. Items Captured and Destroyed:

(1)  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb TNT

(2) 2 ea CHICOM grenades

(3) 640 lb rice

(4) 470 lb potatoes

(5) US Supplies & Equipment: 2 ea 155mm rds which were destroyed by EOD.

(6) 1 lb documents (evacuated)

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i. Casualties Sustained by the VC Within the TAOR:

(1) VC - KLA - 5

(2) VC - WLA - 1

6. Personnel: The Battalion has 93% of authorized strength. There are many NCO shortages at the squad and team leader level.

7. Training: The only formal training during the period 27 Oct - 17 Nov was 215 EM and Officers attending the South Vietnam Orientation Center at BRONCO. The Battalion participating in no Battalion size operations but 7 company size operation were conducted. Other training consisted of that required from operational necessity.

Tab A: Summary of Logistical  
Data

Tab B: Personnel

*Paul A. Roach*  
PAUL A. ROACH  
LTC, Infantry  
Commanding

TAB A SUMMARY OF LOGISTICAL DATA

AVDF-XAC

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1. Supply and Maintenance

a. Class I: 13,128 meals of C rations were consumed by this organization.

b. Class II and IV:

(1) Major items of equipment received were 51 ea Starlight Scopes, 6 ea M60 machine guns, 4 ea Refrigerators and freezer units. Five each 10 KW Generators, 5 ea GRC - 125 Radios, 54 ea PRT 9/PRT 4 Squad radios. 2 ea night vision sights medium range. 1 ea Channel alignment Indicator.

(2) Vehicle Status:

TYPE	MODEL	AUTH	GREEN	AMBER	RED	REASON
$\frac{1}{4}$ AMB	M718	5	5			
Trk $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton	M151A1	22	17		1	(4 tdy
Trk $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	M37B1	6	5		1	(1 inop supt)
Trk $2\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	M35A2	9	8		1	parts inop supt

c. Class III: 2,420 gallons of gasoline, 7,330 gallons of Diesel oil. 130 gallons of OE 30. 35 lbs of 6AA was consumed for vehicle, mess and sanitary operations.

d. Class V:

Nomenclature	Qty Expended
Ctg, Ball 5.56	80,310
Ctg, Ball, 5.56 tracer	26,790
Ctg, 7.62mm tracer	45,800
Ctg, 81mm HE w/fuze pd	451
Ctg, 81mm Illumination	894
Ctg, 81mm WPPD	None
Grenade, fragmentation	971
Ctg, 40mm, HE	3,429
Grenade, Hand, smoke, Green	164
Grenade, Hand, smoke, Yellow	100
Grenade, Hand, smoke, Violet	200
Mine, AP, M18A1, Claymore	58
Flare - trip M49A1	130
Chg, Demo 1 lb blk (TNT)	300
Chg, Demo $2\frac{1}{2}$ lb blk comp C-4	200

2. Transportation: For the month of November. 10,750 miles were driven.

3. Construction: Minor repair to existing bunkers and buildings.

4. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization:

During the month of November there were 67 patients evacuated to Company C 9th Spt Bn, of these there were 5 hospitalized.

Illness: 42  
 Elective Surgery: 0  
 Non Combat Injury: 25  
 Combat Injury: 0

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GROUP 4

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	1. STRENGTH			ASGD			ATCH			PFD		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HHC	16	1	134	14	1	150	1	0	3	14	1	147
A	6	0	164	6	0	146	1	0	2	6	0	146
B	6	0	164	6	0	140	1	0	2	6	0	137
C	6	0	164	6	0	139	1	0	2	6	0	138
E	4	0	96	4	0	91	1	0	2	4	0	91
TOT	38	1	722	36	1	666	5	0	11	36	1	659

2. PERSONNEL LOSSES			
	OFF	WO	EM
HHC	0	0	0
A	0	0	3
B	2	0	4
C	0	0	3
E	0	0	0
	2	0	10

3. PERSONNEL GAINS			
	OFF	WO	EM
	1	0	0
	0	0	4
	1	0	2
	0	0	1
	0	0	0
	2	0	7

4. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: No civilian personnel were utilized during the period covered

5. DEVELOPMENT OF MAINTENANCE & MORALE:

a. During the reporting period the battalion suffered 4 KHA's, 2 WHA's, 5 Injuries, and 1 sick.

b. The battalion submitted one (1) recommendation for Bronze Star with "U" Device. Four (4) recommendations for Soldiers Medal. Six (6) recommendations for Purple Heart.

c. Religious Service: Religious services (Protestant & Catholic) were held in battalion area and at the company combat bases. One (1) memorial service was conducted for deceased members of the battalion.

d. Disposition of remains: All remains were evacuated through appropriate channels.

6. MAINTENANCE AND DISCIPLINE OF LAW AND ORDER:

a. Serious Incidents: One (1) EM was accidentally shot in left foot by an M-60 machine gun, one (1) EM received sucking chest wound by an M-16 rifle accidentally discharged.

b. Court-martials: None.

c. Safety: One (1) EM injured as a result of falling off a bunker as a result of careless handling of weapons. All injured personnel were dropped from morning report.

GROUP 4

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Declassified after 12 years

DOD DIR 5200.10

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 521 INFANTRY  
198th INFANTRY BRIGADE (LT)  
APO San Francisco 96219

ALF-1AC-85

5 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer  
198th Infantry Brigade (Lt)  
Attn: XO  
APO SF 96219

1. The task organization for Co E, 1st Bn 52nd Inf, 198th Inf Brigade (Lt) for its operation on 30 Nov 67 consisted of one platoon(-) element used as a blocking force in the vicinity of coordinates 83635972. One platoon (+) element composed of one Popular Force reinforced squad and one platoon from Company E.
2. Popular Force information and Army intel agency indicated that the VC had been operating in the area for a long time.
3. At 0845 Nov 67 the blocking force moved out by motorized sampans which the Popular Force had arranged from 83635981 to set up their position. Upon moving into position they spotted a centre on the high ground in vicinity of coordinates 8363974. At 0845 hours the assault team moved down the river in two Boston Whales armed with two(2) M-60 MG's. Prior to landing the Boston Whales placed suppressive fire on the landing zone. Upon landing at 0940 hours several rounds from small arms were received from the highground vicinity coordinates 8363974. Company E commander Cpt Ira F. Archer immediately moved his element on line while artillery fire was being called. At 0952 hours the firing ceased and the unit started a detailed search and clear operation in the vicinity of 83635972. At 1005 hours one person was injured by a bobby-trapped M-79 round. At 8363974 a squad found eight(8) tunnels each being from forty(40) feet to one hundred feet in length. A list of items found is attached as Incl 1. Seven women and three children were detained in the area and later taken to 198th Bde Headquarters. At 1443 Co E flushed four(4) males out of a small tunnel. As they ran away, two were shot. Search of the area revealed one(1) confirmed KIA. Apparently the other VC was carried away by the two other persons. Two males were also detained by the blocking force. Co E returned to base camp at 1800 hours.

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000101 After Action Report, 5 December 1967

4. Terrain analysis: The area has rolling hills traversed with numerous hedge rows. Movement and control of the unit is difficult. The low ground is swampy with deep water. The high ground is cluttered with hedge rows and thorn thickets. Vegetation in the area is extremely thick.

## 5. Recommendations:

a. Weapons, an antenna, radios and money would be tagged and returned to the Popular Forces once they have been processed.

b. Radios and web gear need to be unfastened and slung over one(1) shoulder in the event the boat capsizes; also boots should be unlaced.

c. Boston whalers should have a up-mounted machine gun as fire is hard to control in the bouncing boats.

d. Once the operation is completed, all persons in the vicinity of the departure site should be collected and used as cover for the extraction. The Boston whalers should be used to extract the last load since they are faster than motorized sampans and are capable of placing suppressive fires along any high ground.

e. To enhance a complete search of the area, two or three men of each squad should remove all combat gear while the remaining members of the squad provide security for the men digging through the area.

f. Blocking forces should be used in the search operation after two hours in position.

g. Popular Force personnel should be used in every operation. Their knowledge of the area and their ability to interview people in the area prove to be a valuable asset.

## 6. Assisting units:

a. Popular Force squad from Tan My 1, 40623005 led by a former VC. The Popular Force squad leader was the village chief of Binh Giang Village, Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province.

b. Local fishermen provided sampans. The pay was one(1) case of C rations.

c. C 87y 1st 14th arty.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

CLAYTON HODGSON  
Capt, Infantry  
Adjutant

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Reference page 3, List of equipment captured:

1. Three(3) devices to (detach wire size to (2 anchor pins).
2. Two unidentified metal clips (1/2" long).
3. One(1) US pistol magazine-empty.
4. Seven(7) US Carbine magazines with seventy-seven(77) rounds.
5. Three(3) sub-machine gun magazines with 23, 28 and 25 rounds (unknown caliber).
6. Six belts (1 US pistol belt, 2 leather belts, 3 canvas belts).
7. Four small bottles with an unidentified liquid content.
8. Three US first aid pouches with packets.
9. Two sub-machine gun leather magazine pouches.
10. Two curved leather carbine pouches.
11. Two small leather ammo pouches.
12. One grenade holder.
13. Three hand grenades.
14. One US pistol ammo pouch (double).
15. Three waterproof canvas pouches, 8" x 6" with straps.
16. One flag (Red-Blue with yellow star).
17. One trap door (metal).
18. Two antipersonal mines (unidentified).
19. One(1) M-1 49 French sub-machine gun, 9mm.
20. Four(4) US Carbines, .30 caliber (3 were turned in, 1 was taken by Popular Force on the scene, #340812).

Incl #1

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
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INCL 1

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# - AREAS OF CONTACT

• - VC KIA

INCL 2



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 52D INFANTRY  
198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LT)  
APO San Francisco 96219

AMDF-IAC-S5

12 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer  
198th Infantry Brigade (LT)  
Attn: XO AVOF-Xo  
APO SF 96219

1. There is no significant intelligence data pertinent to this action. This action developed in an area which the company commander believed there might be enemy activity and in an area where sniper fire had been received by elements of his company earlier.

2. Company A, 1st Bn 52nd Infantry had deployed four ambush patrols for the night of 3 Dec 67. Ambush 3 and ambush 4 departed company base camp at 031700 Dec 67 for their ambush positions. Ambush 3 was a squad size patrol which set up for the night in vicinity of coordinates BS703967. Ambush 4 also a squad size element went into position at coordinates BS69967. Ambush 3 made contact at 030235 Dec 67 when ten to twelve VC were observed coming towards them. The VC approached the ambush from its left flank and rear in such manner as they would not enter the ambush's kill zone. As an alternative to prevent the enemy from escaping any possible casualties, two men on the left flank were instructed to engage the squad of approaching VC. One of the men was armed with an M-16 and the other with an M-79. As the two men opened fire, the M-79's first round failed to fire. Before the second round could be loaded, the M-16 had used one twenty-round magazine. Results were that three VC had fallen to the ground and the other 7 to 9 had spread out taking two of the fallen VC with them. The M-79 fired one HE round at the fleeing personnel as the M-16 fired part of a second magazine. Search of the area, approximately 15 meters from the ambush location, revealed one confirmed enemy dead with his pistol belt, webgear, an unspent round and one M-16 with selector switch. Ref Incl 1. Ambush 4, BS 687967, continued observation throughout the night with negative results. As the patrol was returning, they approached three individuals in vicinity of BS718938 at 0630. When the Vietnamese national saw the patrol, one male turned and ran as the other two, one male and one female, surrendered. The fleeing male was told to stop. When it was evident that the male was not going to return to the patrol, he was fired upon and killed. The male who surrendered was 29 years old and had in his possession over \$201,000. He appeared to be a tax collector for the local units. The female admitted that she was a nurse for the Viet Cong.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, 12 Dec 67

3. Terrain analysis: Both areas of contact have abundant low growing weeds and shrubs with scattered tree thickets. Concealment for an ambush position is adequate. Approaches to the sites are fairly easy to cover provided the enemy uses the major trails. Friendly villages are safe from grazing fire because of the rolling terrain.

4. Recommendations: None.

5. Assisting units: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

CLIFFTON HOUSTON  
Capt, Infantry  
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 3RD INFANTRY  
198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LT)  
APO San Francisco 96219

AVDF-14C-55

18 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer  
198th Infantry Brigade (LT)  
Attn: AVDF-ED  
APO SF 96219

Following is after action report pertaining to night ambush patrol of 3rd Squad, 2nd Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 3rd Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade (IA):

1. Intelligence: For approximately two weeks prior to this incident, intelligence reports indicated that two reinforced VC platoons were operating in and around Thung Hoa 1, 28638973 and Thung Hoa 2, 28639973. All previous elements of the 1st Bn 3rd Infantry operating in this vicinity had received sniper fire, as a minimum, from this location, vicinity of coordinates 28639973. There had been no confirmed enemy losses. On 11 December 1967 an H River Patrol operating from Thung Hoa 1, 28638973, had received heavy small-arms and anti-aircraft fire while descending the river across the Song Tra Bong River, vicinity of coordinates 28639973. High Sea district chief and High Sea village chief consider the location of Thung Hoa to be under VC control.

2. Activities: The daylight mission of 2nd platoon, Company C, was to secure the road from 28638972 to 28638973. The platoon was instructed to conduct two(2) night ambushes. Plans were for the 3rd Squad to set up two HLA two mile ambushes along the southern portion of the trails from Thung Hoa 2, 28638973, to Thung Hoa 1, 28638972. These trails are believed to be VC communications and supply routes. The ambush sites were trail junctions at 28638972 and 28638973. (Jual 1). The ambush traveling as a squad arrived at 28638972 at approximately 1800 hours 18 December 1967. Upon arrival at the pre-selected location, 1st and 2nd Squad leaders, the patrol leader, decided that the location would be an ineffective ambush site due to the terrain and weather conditions. Upon making a reconnaissance for a new ambush site, the squad leader decided to reposition the ambush at Thung Hoa(1). To do this he established a fire team

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Oct 2 1967

security element on the southeast side of the village. An assault team, led by Sgt. [redacted] [redacted], would work their way around the hamlet and sweep southeast through it forcing any VC into the security force. The assault team moved out at approximately 1200 hours on October 1967. They were forced to enter into the hamlet before moving completely around it because of terrain factors. Upon entering the hamlet, at approximately 1215 hours on October 1967, the element sighted four (4) VC singing and drinking in an open area (Reference Incl 1), area of contact 1b. Weapons could be seen leaning against a house (Reference Incl 2, area 1) and other noises behind the house could be heard. As the team, led by Sgt. [redacted], assaulted from approximately twenty-five (25) meters, two VC were killed and another twenty (20) to thirty (30) VC started dispersing from the area. Realizing that they were out-numbered, Sgt. [redacted] called the security force for support. The fleeing VC, now beginning to return fire, were engaged by three men from the assault team, two men from the security team checked the houses, for more personnel, and Sgt. Adams' force began moving in on Sgt. [redacted]'s left flank. Sgt. [redacted] and the M-79 grenadier searching the houses killed two (2) more VC in house number 1, area of contact number 1. The squad elements united forces. Before the VC broke contact, 3-7 minutes later, another three VC had been killed and one female had been wounded. The squad captured the wounded female while moving on line across the open area in pursuit of the fleeing group. (Reference Incl 2, area 2). Sgt. [redacted] and one [redacted] his team moved after the enemy headed toward the high ground. Sgt. Adams and one [redacted] his team gave chase to enemy personnel headed toward the Song Ha Dong river. Before Sgt. Adams' team terminated pursuit, another VC had been shot while climbing a rock. Sgt. [redacted]'s team killed two more VC, which they placed on the trail, before terminating pursuit. Searching thoroughly, Sgt. Adams discovered that his element had less than 100 rounds of ammunition between them. Also, ten (10) to twenty (20) VC had escaped along the river and into the high ground. Immediately a request was made for reinforcements and a resupply of ammunition. The request for gunships and one command and control helicopter was sent to the 1st Infantry Brigade (AB) headquarters. Sgt. Adams was then instructed to secure a landing zone and be prepared to send back the wounded female on the first aircraft. Realizing the tactical situation of his element, Company C Commanding Officer, Captain Samuel Fisher, had deployed one squad of four from his company CP to reinforce and rejoin the element in contact. The remainder of the 1st platoon was instructed to move to the 1st Battalion 1st Infantry's 1st landing zone 000000Z for heli-lift to the 1st squad's location in the vicinity of 000000Z. At 1215 hours on October 1967, the first lift of personnel departed 000000Z for a night combat assault at 000000Z. The landing zone was secure. The wounded female was collected by the first helicopter and returned to the 1st Battalion 1st Infantry aid station, 000000Z, for emergency medical treatment. After all reinforcements and supplies were lifted to the landing zone, she was taken to the 1st Regional Hospital in Chu Lai by C & C ship. Gunships were instructed to move along the Song Ha Dong river where some VC were seen heading northwest. Flare-ships were used to illuminate the landing zone. The gunships did not identify any targets and did not fire.

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REMARKS: After Action Report, dated 18 December 1967

3. Recollected Search of the area revealed the following:

- a. Seven rounds of 40, 120,
- b. One female, age 40, 5'11", 120,
- c. Three individual weapons CIA:

(1) One 7.62 mm caliber type 53, Soviet 1943 carbine of Soviet design, serial number 03799,

(2) One 40 caliber type 53 rifle, serial number 112 712 20,

(3) One 120 carbine, serial number 13024,

d. Two hand grenades, CIA,

e. Three sets of web gear,

f. Two houses partially destroyed by fire from explosion of R-77 ammunition expended during fire fight.

4. The platoon searched around the village for duration of the night search of the market the following morning, 13 December 1967, revealed:

a. Six tunnels. One started from a large room with six doors and went to a tunnel approximately 100 feet long, 2 feet high, and 3 feet wide with three branches approximately 2 feet long.

b. Two sets of documents with Chinese writing. A civilian from the 1st platoon, who was assisting in the search operation, collected two sets of documents to contain names of VC in the area.

c. One .45 cal round of ammunition.

d. One set of web gear.

e. One set of iron shot tools used to produce VC traps.

f. One magazine, 120 carbine.

g. Eight sets of clothing with plastic raincoats.

h. 3 rounds of .30 cal ammunition.

i. 7 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition.

j. 1 round of 3.5 cal ammunition.

k. 1 spring-activated fire propelling rifle grenade.

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**SUBJECT: After Action Report, dated 18 December 1967**

5. **Terrain analysis:** Grid squares of concern are 84297 and 856377. The high ground has numerous hedgerows used to terrace the slopes. They are from four feet to seven feet in height. Vegetation within the hedgerows consist of small trees, shrubs, vines with thorns, and tall weeds. Large boulders, some of which used to conceal tunnel entrances, provide the enemy with excellent firing positions and cover for his escape. The low ground provides no great hindrance for troop movement. Numerous hedgerows and tall trees often block the view of adjacent elements. Dikes leading across the rice paddies provide no cover should hostile fire come from the high ground or across the river. The terraced slopes and numerous rock formations provide very possible locations for tunnels and fortified bunkers.

6. **Recon conditions:** It is desirable that each recon element carry at least three-hundred rounds of small arms ammunition. This patrol was carrying 350 M-16 rounds per man when they made contact. Due to the number of rounds it had taken to kill some of the VC, the patrol had less than three-hundred rounds of ammunition after the fire fight.

7. **Other US unit assisting in the 1st Battalion 5th Infantry's second night combat assault was the 176th Aerial Division aviation company.**

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**

**1. Incl  
2.**

**CLIFTON HENSTON  
CPT, Infantry  
Adjutant**

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