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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

(2) F/8 Cav and Division Aero Scouts were made available on a mission basis.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: ANNEX C.

9. (C) MISSION: TF GALLOWAY conducted combat operations in area of responsibility to find, fix and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Div, intercept supply routes to QUANG NGAI and to eliminate threat of an attack on QUANG NGAI City.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. PHASE I: (4-12 Sep 68) Task Force GALLOWAY attacks 040600 Sep 68 with 4-3 Inf, conducting combat assaults into LZ's north of TRA KHUC River and drives east to link up with elements of the 6th ARVN Regt (TF LUAT). 3-1 Inf attacks east to link up with elements of the 4th ARVN Regt (TF LUAT). Upon linkup, 3-1 Inf conducts multiple air assaults west of HA THANH Special Forces Camp.

b. PHASE II: (13-14 Sep 68) TF GALLOWAY assumes OPCON of the 1/1 Cav, and attacks west with 1/1 Cav and 4-3 Inf on two axis. 1-20 Inf moves by airlift to HA THANH Special Forces Camp and commences operations to the west in conjunction with 3-1 Inf. 3-1 Inf continues operations to the west.

c. PHASE III: (14-24 Sep 68) continues operations west and south of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp. Release OPCON of the 1/1 Cav. 4-3 Inf moves by air to LZ BRONCO. 3-1 Inf and 1-20 Inf continue operations west and south of HA THANH. Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE terminated 242400H Sep 68.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 4 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: 041158H Sep 68, A, C and D Companies conducted CA's from QUANG NGAI Airfield to LZ's vic BS439764 and BS446752 respectively. The CA's were completed by 1242 hrs, and both LZ's were cold. C Co conducting recon in force to the NE of the LZ engaged and killed one VC evading north. A and D Co's made no contact through the day. At 1530 hrs the C&C ship of the 4-3 Inf spotted 3 VC with packs attempting to evade across the river (BS489750). The C&C engaged with M-60's at 100 ft and killed 3 VC. The bodies and packs were not recovered.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a CA to BS540716. B Co was airlifted into the same LZ. C Co conducted a CA into BS425715 to establish FSB CHEVY.

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D Co reinforces with E-1 Cav (-) crossed LD vic BS570710 and moved west to join with elements of the 1/1 Cav, operating separately west of QUANG NGAI City. All LZ's were cold and no casualties were sustained. At 1540 hrs at BS555722 B Co discovered four VC in graves dressed in black and with web gear. The 4 VC KIA were killed earlier by gunships. A, C, D, and Recon reported no contact.

b. 5 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a recon in force operation to BS483767 with negative contact. B Co conducted a CA into a LZ at BS44816 and conducted patrolling with negative contact. C Co moved SE and at BS449755 detained 1 NVA attempting to hide in a spiderhole. The NVA was evacuated to LZ PRCNCO for interrogation. D Co moved SE on a sweep mission. At 1415 hrs at BS478725 the lead element of D Co became heavily engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Aero Scouts were called and expanded on the area from which the fire was received. The C&C helicopter attempted to extract a wounded man but was shot down by heavy AW fire from BS472723. D Co moved to and secured the downed helicopter. 1 US was killed and 2 WMA from the helicopter. Artillery was directed on all suspected enemy locations and the unit maneuvered to destroy the enemy force. The enemy broke contact at 1745 and withdrew to the NW. At 1145 hrs Recon Plt reported heavy contact at BS545788. The fire was returned and artillery called on the enemy location. The enemy force broke contact and evaded SW.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted clover leaf patrols out from their NDP. B Co conducted recon in force operation west of their NDP and returned. C Co and Recon Plt continued patrolling vic BS425714 and maintained security of FSB CHEVY. D Co and E-1/1 (-) conducted a sweep west of their NDP. At 0235 hrs A Co received fire from west of their NDP resulting in 1 WMA. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

c. 6 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept from BS482773 to BS494765 then south to vic BS495759 with negative contact. B Co continued operations SW. At 2225 hrs an ambush from B Co engaged and killed 1 VC at BS537776. C Co swept north with negative contact. D Co swept north with negative contact. RCN Plt swept north from BS540715 and at 1410 hrs vic of BS548773 engaged an estimated NVA Co. Artillery and gunships were called and the fight continued for 2 hours. Results: 43 NVA KIA, 11 US KIA & WMA. Aero Scouts working for the 4-3 Inf engaged 10 VC with weapons in vic of BS552772. Their organic infantry platoon was inserted and captured 1 AK-50, 1 RPG and 1 US Carbine. Results: 10 VC KIA, 3 weapons captured. At 1718 a lift ship working for the 4-3 Inf received .50 cal fire vic BS505765 resulting in 1 WMA. At approx 1700 hrs gunships engaged an unk number of VC with weapons vic BS557770 resulting in 1 VC KIA, 2 US WMA.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued a recon in force south from BS540715. At 1230 hrs A Co received AW fire & 4 60mm mortar rounds vic BS533703 resulting in 1 WHA by SA fire. At 1400 hrs A Co engaged 3 VC near a tunnel complex vic BS538697 resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's captured. B Co moved from their NDP and swept SW to vic BS535711. At 1605 vic BS524712 B Co engaged 2 VC attempting to evade resulting in 2 VC KIA. C Co and Rcn Plt continued security of LZ CHEVY and local patrolling. D Co and E-1 Cav conducted a sweep from BS578708 SE to BS609671 then SE to BS622622. At 0650 E-1 Cav engaged 1 VC attempting to evade resulting in 1 VC KIA.

(3) Aircraft working in the AO made these separate contacts. At 1020 hrs a helicopter of the 174th AVN engaged 1 VC killing him. At 1330 hrs an Aero Scout observed a VC attempting to evade; engaged resulting in 1 VC KIA.

d. 7 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co swept NE from BS495578 to BS544787. B Co moved from BS495578 to BS544787. C Co conducted a CA from PZ vic BS474765 to LZ vic BS548783. D Co conducted a CA from vic BS475755 to LZ vic BS562762. No 4-3 Inf units made contact. The only contact was made by an Aero Scout supporting the 4-3 Inf in the vic BS560787 when at 0950 hrs they observed 2 VC evading; engaged resulting in 2 VC KIA. Rcn Plt returned to Chu Lai.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A & B Co moved NE from BS540715 on a two company sweep operation. At 0850 vic BS550758 contact was made with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of a tunnel complex. A & B Co engaged the enemy and with the aid of Aero Scouts maintained contact until 1700 hrs at which time the enemy broke contact. The fight resulted in 26 VC KIA, 1 US Carbine, 1 AK-47, 1 82mm mortar base plate, 2 82mm bipods and misc equipment captured. US losses were 1 KHA, 13 WHA(E), 1 WHA(M), and 1 gunship shot down (recovered). C Co secured LZ CHEVY. D Co moved with E-1 Cav north through QUANG NGAI then west to vic BS556771 with negative contact. RCN continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY. At 2304 hrs D Co received 6 rds of 60mm mortar vic BS560763 resulting in 1 WHA(E).

e. 8 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BS546788 to BS492776. B Co swept west from BS545784 to BS484775. C Co moved west from BS560773 to BS522778. D Co moved west from BS555782 to BS524783. Rcn Plt located in Chu Lai. Negative contact was made by the ground units. At 1150 hrs the C&C helicopter spotted 1 VC killed by artillery at BS474777. At 1210 hrs, gunships working for the 4-3 Inf engaged 3 VC evading resulting in 3 VC KIA.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's conducted sweeps around NDP locations and closed back on NDP sites. D Co was airlifted from QUANG NGAI Airfield to LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt continued patrolling west of LZ CHEVY. The 3-1 Inf had negative contact.

f. 9 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved from BS492776 west to BS473776 then SE to BS489775. At 1258 hrs vic BS483775. A Co found 1 Soviet 7.62mm Pistol under the floor of a burned hootch. At 1845 hrs vic BS493784 A Co engaged 7 VC with weapons evading north killing two. No weapons were found. B Co moved SW from BS545784 to BS465778 then south to BS465768. At 1105 B Co received sniper fire vic BS465777. They returned fire resulting in 3 VC KIA. C Co moved SW from BS522778 to BS509775 then south to BS493754 with negative contact. D Co moved SW from BS555782 to BS510760. Rcn Plt located at Chu Lai. At 1745 the C&C helicopter of the 4-3 Inf was shot down by SA fire at BS488775 with negative casualties. The helicopter was secured by A & D Co's.

(2) 3-1 Inf: At 0030 hrs A & B Co's received 7 or 8 rounds of 82mm mortar and SA fire in their NDP's vic BS548739 resulting 1 US WHA (M). They observed 1 VC near the perimeter and engaged resulting 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. At daylight, A Co moved SW from BS550750 to establish a blocking position at BS523719. B Co moved from BS552758 to establish a blocking position vic BS514734. At 1100 B Co engaged 1 VC hiding in a spider hole vic BS523740 resulting in 1 VC KIA. C Co moved from LZ CHEVY to establish a blocking position at BS443726. D Co secured LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt continued patrolling vic LZ CHEVY.

g. 10 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from vic BS488775 to a cold LZ vic BS495718 and made negative contact on their recon in force throughout the day. B Co conducted a CA from vic BS465767 to a cold LZ vic BS495718 also making negative contact. C Co conducted a CA from BS494754 to LZ vic BS470710. D Co conducted a CA into the same LZ. The LZ was cold but C Co did receive some sniper fire on their PZ with negative casualties. On the subsequent sweep of the area, C Co had 2 WHA from punji stakes vic of BS470710. At 0800 C Co found 1 VC killed by artillery during the LZ preparation. At 1545 hrs vic BS476717 C Co found 1 K-44 Rifle and at 1630 hrs vic BS474718 they found 2 .45 cal sub-machine guns in the brush behind a hut. D Co had negative contact all day. The Rcn Plt remained located at Chu Lai.

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with negative contact. C Co conducted a CA from BS472728 to a cold LZ via BS500705 then searched south to BS505692 with negative contact. D Co conducted a CA from BS472717 to the same LZ and swept the area with negative results. C & D Co were following up on an intelligence report of a possible VC base camp with well camouflaged huts. Rcn Plt was airlifted from Chu Lai to LZ BUFF.

(2) 3-3 Inf: A Co moved from NDP vic BS355699. At 1210 in vic of BS372686 A Co engaged an unknown size enemy force at about 100 - 150 meters. A Co quickly picked up a base of fire and maneuvered against the enemy force. The enemy force broke contact which resulted in 3 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 captured. Friendly losses were 1 KIA and 2 WIA. A Co continued to sweep the area and, at 1645 hrs vic BS373698 found 1 AK-47 and 1 RPG hidden in some bushes. A Co had no further contact. B Co moved SE from BS355699 to BS371683 with negative contact. C Co ran cloverleaf patrols in the vic of BS380691 with negative contact. At 1845 hrs C Co received 3 122mm rockets in their NDP vic BS380691 resulting in 1 KIA and 3 WIA. Artillery returned fire on suspected enemy location at BS368684 with negative assessment. D Co continued security of LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt continued security of LZ CHEVY and conducted local patrols around the fire base.

(3) Aero Scouts made most of the contacts in the AO on 12 Sep 68. At 0840 hrs vic BS556782 engaged 3 VC evading resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 0853 hrs they engaged an evading VC in vic BS43716 results = 1 VC KIA. A VCS was snatched at 1100 hours vic of BS558782. The VCS, wearing blank shorts with blood on them, was trying to evade. The VCS himself was not wounded and was moved to the rear for questioning. At 1230 hrs vic BS373697, five evading VC were engaged resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1505 hrs in vic of BS370693 another evading VC was engaged adding another 1 VC KIA. The Aero Scouts received fire at 1645 hrs in vic of BS373698. They returned fire with the results of 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA.

3. 13 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co conducted a CA from BS494717 to a cold LZ at BS721757. The area was swept but negative contact was made. B Co moved NW to BS515711 then SW to BS510707 then east BS522707. Several tunnels were found, but they were empty. B Co did find 1 B40 rocket rd, 1 60mm mortar rd, 1 rdcs, and misc equip in a hole vic BS510707. C Co conducted a CA from BS506698 to a cold LZ BS505677. A search of the area was made with negative contact. D Co swept from BS513711 north to BS511731 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ BUFF for security.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved from BS383685 south to BS383675. B Co moved from BS383686 southeast to BS389679 then south to BS389665. C Co moved from BS380692 south to BS372673 the SE to BS374668. D Co provided security of LZ CHEVY. Rcn Plt provided security of LZ CHEVY and conducted patrols in the area around LZ CHEVY. None of the 3-1 Inf units made contact with the enemy.

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(3) 1/1 Cav: On 12 September 1968, the 1/1 Cav with B/1-46 Inf attached became OPCON to TF GALLOWAY. They road marched to QUANG NGAI based on intelligence reports which indicated the city would be attacked by elements of the 3d NVA Div. On 13 Sep 68 at 1200 hrs, A Trp with B/1-46 Inf began a zone recon west of QUANG NGAI. At 1430 hrs a plt of A Trp made contact with a well entrenched NVA force vic BS566715 supported by AW, AT and AA weapons. Immediately the remainder of A Trp assaulted the enemy positions right flank. In the assault, A Trp became mired in untraversable terrain but continued to place effective fire into the enemy's positions. C Trp was ordered to attack through the south flank of A Trp and assume OPCON of B/1-46. F Trp 8th ACAV provided an aerial block to south and west; immediate airstrikes were called on the enemy position as C Trp moved into position. C Trp and B/1-46 Inf assaulted the enemy position, overrunning the forward trenches and penetrating the major defenses. By 1830 hrs the position was consolidated and secured, but darkness prevented further exploitation or complete reports of results.

(4) Aero Scouts working in support throughout the AO had the following contacts:

0830 ~ Vic BS492755 engaged 4 VC evading ~ 4 VC KIA

1135 ~ Vic BS389679 engaged 1 VC evading ~ 1 VC KIA

1158 ~ Vic BS392668 engaged 15 to 20 NVA in green uniforms ~ 3 NVA KIA

1415 ~ vic BS392669 engaged 1 NVA in green uniform evading ~ 1 NVA KIA.

k. 11 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A Co moved NW with B/1-1 Cav to BS604786 then SW to BS525764. At 0930 hrs vic BS604785 A Co engaged 1 VC attempting to evade resulting in 1 VC KIA. In vic of BS517766 at 1500 hrs a shallow grave was found containing 4 NVA KIA. B Co moved north to BS510731 then conducted a CA to a cold LZ at BS482778 and moved south to BS508668 making negative contact. C Co conducted a search east from BS502676 to BS512673 then SW to BS508668 where they found the entrance of a large well-camouflaged cave. Upon searching the cave the following enemy equipment was captured: 8 IW, 1 CSW, 5 122mm Rockets, 22 60mm mortar rounds, 115 B-60 Rocket rds, 22 RPG rds, 1 mortar sight, 98 57mm RR rds, 14 82mm mortar rds, 562 blasting caps, 1 US made Collins Radio, 1 US Starlight Scope, misc small arms ammo and 16 medical supplies. C Co continued SW to a NDP at BS502678 with negative contact. D Co moved N across the river from BS517745 to BS504777. At 0945 hrs vic BS514744 a man stepped on a M-14 anti-personnel mine resulting in 1 WIA. D Co had no further contact. Recon Plt remained at LZ BUFF for security.

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(2) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved south from BS384675 to BS375655. B Co swept south along the river from BS389665 to BS385617. C Co searched SW from BS374668 to BS369645. D Co continued security of LZ CHEVY and Rcn Plt conducted local patrols around LZ CHEVY. 3-1 Inf units made no contact.

(3) 1/1 Cav: On 14 Sep 68, A Trp and C Trp with B/1-46 Inf continued recon in zone toward the west and northwest along probable avenues of withdrawal as a follow-up to the contact of the previous day. At 1410 hrs, A Trp was engaged by an NVA force vic BS522750 supported by AW and AT weapons. A Trp immediately assaulted the enemy's position and C Trp with B/1-46 Inf was ordered to assist A Trp by attacking along A Trp's eastern flank. The attacks dispersed or destroyed the enemy and A Trp, C Trp with B/1-46 Inf established night blocking positions along a line from BS493745 to BS532764. Results of the contacts on the 13th and 14th of Sep were as follows:

Friendly - 3 KHA, 22 WHA, 1 Track destroyed, 2 Tracks damaged.

Enemy - 112 KIA, 1 CIA, 17 IW, 11 CSW.

1. 15 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: A, B and D Co's converged on a staging area located in vic BS492762 for subsequent airlift to the Duc Pho AO on 16 Sep and release from Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. C Co was airlifted to LZ THUNDER and Rcn airlifted to LZ BRONCO.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's moved to the vic of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp for a short stand down before continuing Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security. At 1910 hrs B Co received 15 rds of 82mm mortar inside their perimeter resulting in 4 WHA.

(3) 1/1 Cav: No contact was made with enemy and at 1500H 1/1 Cav and B/1-46 were ordered to move to assembly areas vic BS645763 preparatory to movement to their base camp at HAWK HILL and release from Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

(4) 1-20 Inf: D Co was airlifted into the HA THANH Special Forces and became OPCON to Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

2. 16 Sep 68:

(1) 4-3 Inf: Completed airlift to Duc Pho AO and was released from OPCON to Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE.

(2) 3-1 Inf: A, B, and C Co's continued stand down at HA THANH SF Camp in preparation for continuing operation. D Co and Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

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(3) 1-20 Inf: The remainder of the battalion was airlifted into HA THANH SF Camp to join D Co in preparation for operations under TF GALLOWAY.

o. 17 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co conducted a recon in force SW from HA THANH to BS356686 with negative contact. B Co airlifted to LZ CHEVY to replace D Co and provide security. C Co conducted a CA from HA THANH to a cold LZ vic BS365648 then swept northwest. At 1710 hrs vic BS383717 they received heavy AW fire and received 1 WHA. Fire was returned resulting in 5 NVA KIA and contact was broken. C Co then moved to vic BS364655 and set up their NDP. D Co after being airlifted to HA THANH swept to BS366687 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0541 hrs a squad ambush from A Co was hit by an estimated enemy platoon near the A Co NDP vic BS383717. The ambush called for help and A Co moved to reinforce but did not reach the location in time. Arriving at 0645 hrs A Co found that the ambush had been overrun leaving 4 KHA and 3 WHA. A Co pursued the enemy to the southwest. At 1215 hrs vic BS378736 an evading NVA was engaged at 50 meters resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47. Five minutes later 2 more NVA threw a HG and tried to evade but were engaged resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 RPG CIA. A Co had 1 WHA from the thrown grenade. A tunnel was discovered at this location, BS378736, containing 1 RPD, 2 AK-47, 6 RPG rds and 2,200 rds small arms ammunition. A Co continued the search of the area with negative results. B Co swept NW from vic HA THANH to BS385730 with negative contact. C Co swept from vic of HA THANH north to BS395754 with negative contact. D Co conducted a recon in force to the southeast. At 1759 hours vic BS368653 D Co received sniper fire resulting in 1 WHA. Fire was returned with negative results and they moved on to their NDP.

(3) Aero Scouts working in the AO had two contacts:

0900 hrs vic BS431772 engaged 1 VC evading, res: 1 VC KIA, 1 Carbine CIA.

1330 hrs vic BS420758 engaged 1 VC evading, res: 1 VC KIA.

o. 18 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved SW from BS456688 to vic BS42654. At 0845 hrs vic BS338653 A Co engaged 4 VC at approx 75 meters. The enemy quickly broke contact and tried to evade but were brought under effective fire. The results of the skirmish was 4 VC KIA and 2 US WHA. B Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security. C Co swept from BS363655 NW to BS352670 with negative contact. D Co made no contact on a recon in force from BS367688 SW to BS352670. The Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

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(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0120 hrs vic BS349709 a LP from D Co received 2 bursts of AW fire resulting in 2 WHA. The LP pulled back into the D Co perimeter. At first light A, B, and D Co conducted a recon in force SW to the built up area in the valley vic BS3467. C Co and Rcn Plt conducted a CA to BS323702 then swept SE toward the valley. At 0730H vic BS348708 D Co engaged two evading NVA at 100 meters resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1255 hrs vic BS352691, A Co received AW fire resulting in 3 WHA. Fire was returned but the enemy broke contact. At 1336 vic BS335702 the Rcn Plt found a tunnel, heard voices and threw in grenades resulting in 2 VC KIA and 2 VCS CIA. At 1355 hrs vic BS339690 C Co engaged 1 NVA evading resulting in 1 NVA KIA. All units continued to converge toward the built up area in the valley. At 1421 vic BS351701, D Co received mortar and AW fire resulting in 2 US WHA. Fire was returned but the enemy broke contact. At 1445 hrs vic BS358692, the point man of A Co was wounded and contact was made with an unknown size enemy force. Fire was returned and artillery called. The contact continued until dark when the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Darkness prevented assessment of enemy losses and A Co set up their NDP. A Co's losses were 3 KHA 6 WHA. In the meantime, D Co continued to sweep toward the valley. At 1605 hrs vic BS350695, D Co received heavy SA and AW fire from an unknown size enemy force well dug in along the base of the hills on the eastern side of the valley. Fire was returned and maximum use made of supporting fires. The enemy broke contact during darkness and D Co held in position for further exploitation at daylight. US losses were 10 KHA, 19 WHA. Four of the KHA could not be recovered at this time. Darkness prevented enemy assessment.

p. 19 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co moved NE from BS342655 to BS368674 with negative contact. At 1400, B Co conducted a CA into multiple LZ's at BS343763, BS343743 and BS345754 and conducted a sweep of the area adjacent to the LZ's. At 1505 hrs an element of B Co engaged 1 VC in a spider hole resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1700 hrs, B Co was extracted back to LZ CHEVY for security. C Co conducted search operations SE from BS352670 to BS355668 without contact. D Co moved NW from BS362660 to BS355670 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: A Co swept the area of the previous day's contact with negative results. B Co also swept the area adjacent to A Co's contact and found 21 NVA KIA at BS349693 which had been killed by artillery and airstrikes. C Co sweeping in the same general area found 60 spider holes vic BS346694 containing 10 NVA KIA. D Co began sweeping the area of their contact of the previous afternoon. At 0915 hrs vic BS345695, D Co received 2 rds of mortar fire resulting in 2 WHA. D Co continued to search the area and at 1045 hrs vic BS349692 found 5 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47. At 1320 hrs vic BS346690 they found 5 NVA KIA killed by SA floating in a river. Rcn Plt swept the area vic BS345694 with negative contact.

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q. 20 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A, C and D companies were airlifted back into HA THANH SF Camp. A Co was picked up at HA THANH and B Co was picked up at LZ CHEVY and conducted a two company CA into BS448612 to establish FSB Cork. The LZ was cold enabling the airlift of C & D Co's from HA THANH into LZ Cork. A Co remained LZ Cork for security. B Co moved west BS442612. C Co moved SE to BS463595. D Co moved south to BS450595 and at 1645 hrs received sniper fire resulting in 1 KHA. All companies established NDP's in their respective areas around LZ Cork and prepared for further operations. The Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: A, B, C & Rcn Plt were airlifted into HA THANH SF Camp to prepare for future operations. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(3) Aero Scouts working in the AO engaged 1 VC evading vic BS390648 resulting in 1 VC KIA.

r. 21 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: A Co continued security of LZ Cork. B Co conducted patrols in the vic of their NDP (BS442613) with negative contact. C Co moved from BS462595 southeast to BS468583 with negative contact. D Co moved SW from BS455595 to BS452583 with negative contact. Rcn Plt remained at LZ CHEVY for security.

(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0737 hrs A Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS459665. A recon in force was conducted east to a PZ at BS495665. At 1505 hrs A Co was extracted and airlifted back to HA THANH with negative contact. At 0922 hrs, B Co conducted a CA into a cold LZ vic BS388601. C Co was then airlifted into the secure LZ. B Co swept to the southwest and C Co swept to the southeast of the LZ. At 1110 hrs vic BS395593, C Co found 1 VC in a hole who would not come out. A HG was thrown in resulting in 1 VC KIA. At 1432 hrs vic BS378580, B Co engaged 2 VC resulting in 2 VC KIA. At 1515 hrs vic BS382592, B Co engaged 3 VC in a tunnel resulting in 3 VC KIA. At 1640 vic BS375586, they engaged 1 VC evading resulting in 1 VC KIA. B & C Co's established NDP's as darkness fell on their operation. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security and Rcn Plt was airlifted to HA THANH SF Camp for security.

s. 22 Sep 68:

(1) 3-1 Inf: All units airlifted from field locations back to LZ Cork then airlifted back to Duc Pho AO to LZ's LIZ, DRAGON and BRONCO. 3-1 Inf has terminated operations in CHAMPAIGN GROVE AO and is preparing for future operations.

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(2) 1-20 Inf: At 0440 hrs, three OP's in the vicinity of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp came under fire and enemy ground attack. A Co in a NDP adjacent to the SF Camp was given the mission to move to the OP's as a relief force. At 0625 hrs vic BS376695, A Co engaged 1 NVA evading west west, could not see the body but would try to find when the fire lifts. HA THANH was occassionally receiving B-40 rocket fire at this time and A Co would try to locate the fire. At 0710 hrs when A Co approached the area where they engaged the NVA they found 2 NVA playing dead. The NVA attempted to evade, were engaged resulting in 2 NVA KIA, 1 carbine CIA. A Co continued to move toward the OP. At 0721 hrs vic BS376694 A Co engaged 1 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. They continued to move toward OP 7 and upon approaching the hill location of the OP at 0813 hrs vic BS377698 they were taken under SA fire and had HG's thrown at them. A Co had 1 KHA and 4 WHA but returned fire and assaulted the hill. At 0813 hrs, the C&C Helicopter for 1-20 Inf received an RPG round which hit the tail rotor resulting in 4 WHA(M). The helicopter was forced to set down at HA THANH. A Co continued their assault to regain the hill and succeeded in pushing the enemy off of the hill. At 0846, while pursuing the enemy into a small group of huts at the northern base of the hill (BS380696) 3 NVA who were evading were taken under fire resulting in 3 NVA KIA. A few minutes later, A Co found 1 NVA hiding in a hole at the same location: 1 NVA CIA. Fifteen minutes later, in the same area, A Co was taken under fire by an unknown size enemy force in bunkers and tunnels. Fire was returned and the fire fight continued for approx: 2½ hrs. A Co dispersed the enemy and found 10 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47's, 1 RPG MG and 1 57mm RR. A Co had one WHA(E). A Co searched the area of contact then started to sweep further east through the huts. At 1130 hrs vic BS382695 they again engaged an NVA force in bunkers and tunnels and were very successful in routing the enemy without friendly casualties. Enemy losses were 15 NVA KIA and captured equipment is as follows: 1 US .45 cal Pistol, 2 Chi Com flare pistols, 8 AK-47's, 1 RPG-2 Rocket Launcher, 1 field telephone, 1 PA set, 1700 AK-47 rds, 15 57mm RR rds, 28 Chi Com HG's, 1 Bangalore Torpedo, 6 B40 Rockets and 5 boosters for B40 Rockets. A Co set up their NDP at the base of the hill. B Co conducted a CBT sweep from BS390579 to vic BS394625 with negative contact. D Co remained at LZ CHEVY for security. RCN Plt conducted a combat sweep to vic BS3770 then returned to HA THANH for security.

t. 23 Sep 68:

(1) 1-20 Inf: A Co moved back to HA THANH and along with RCN Plt were airlifted to LZ DOTTIE. B & C Co's were airlifted from BS395625 to LZ DOTTIE. D Co secured LZ CHEVY until all Brigade elements had departed, then was airlifted to LZ DOTTIE. 1-20 Inf transitioned operations in the CHAMPAIGN CRIME AO and assumed responsibility for the southern Dac Pao AO at 1415 hrs.

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AVD-E-BA-OP

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

(2) At 1045 hrs vic BS380560 a gunship flying air cover in the A0 was shot down. The Aero Scouts were scrambled to give covering fire and engaged the enemy resulting in 6 VC KIA.

(3) TF GALLOWAY was disbanded and all elements airlifted out of LZ Chevy. At 1925 hrs TF GALLOWAY had been evacuated and control of the Brigade units assumed by CO, 11th Inf Bde.

u. 24 Sep 68: Request to Division for termination of Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE. Permission granted - 242400 hrs Sep 68 Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE terminated.

12. (c) RESULTS:

- a. Friendly: 41 KHA, 166 WHA.
- b. Enemy: (Annex C, Intelligence).

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Logistics: (See Annex B),
- b. Communications: (See Annex D).

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: TOE equipment, standard tactics and techniques normally related to counterinsurgency warfare were used during this operation.

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE was designed initially as a relief operation of the HA THANH Special Forces Camp. Due to the threat on QUANG NGAI and the impending attack on HA THANH, the concept of the operation was broadened and changed to an operation designed to fix and destroy all enemy forces in the West QUANG NGAI area. By employing ARVN Forces in the mountain areas, enemy forces were cut off and prevented from massing for attacks on HA THANH and QUANG NGAI City.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: Operations of this nature should be initiated immediately whenever sizeable enemy forces are defined and located and intelligence indicates the enemy plans an attack on a major RVN installation or city. By denying the enemy the opportunity to consolidate his forces and mount an offensive, he is denied the military and propaganda benefits derived from a successful offensive.

4 Incl.

ANNEXES :

A-Opn Overlay

B-Logistics (6th Spt Bn)

C-Intelligence

D-Signal

JOHN W. DONALDSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

1. (C) The logistical support for Operation CHAMPAIGN GROVE is best understood if broken down into four general areas:

- a. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Minh Long.
- b. Establishment and stockage level for the FSE located at Quang Ngai.
- c. Resupply of rifle battalions and artillery batteries.
- d. Establishment and maintenance of Brigade CP at LZ CHEVY.

2. (C) MINH LONG:

a. The FSE at Minh Long was established on or about 15 July in anticipation of CHAMPAIGN GROVE. It was established primarily to provide refueling and rearming of helicopters and for emergency resupply of C-Rations. Provisions were made to establish a Forward Clearing Station, if required, utilizing fixed wing aircraft to evacuate mass casualties. The stockage objectives at Minh Long were as follows:

| <u>DODAC</u> | <u>ITEM</u> | <u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE</u> |
|--------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| A137 | CTG 7.62mm MLE 4-1 | 100,000 |
| A165 | CTG 7.62 Mini | 100,000 |
| H490 | RKT 2.75" | 1,000 |
| B572 | CTG 40mm Linked | 800 |
| G955 | Green HD Smk (Violet) | 144 |
| G950 | Green HD Smk (Red) | 144 |
| L407 | Flares Acft (MK-24) | 100 |
| N/A | JP-4 | 20,000 gallons |
| N/A | LPGAS | 500 gallons |
| N/A | C-Rations | 6,000 meals |
| N/A | Water | 500 gallons |

b. S-4, 6th Support Battalion, monitored the stockage on hand at Minh Long and effected necessary coordination to maintain the stockage objectives until the FSE was closed 24 September 1968. Twenty-four (24) hook sorties were required to back haul remaining items to Duc Pho.

3. (C) QUANG NGAI:

a. The FSE at Quang Ngai was established on 25 August 1968. This FSE received replenishment of stockage objectives and its initial stockage from Chu Lai. A Forward Clearing Station was established on the air strip and was utilized effectively. A water purification point was established by the 26th Engineer Battalion at this location. Division Support Command

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

maintained the stockage at Quang Ngai transporting supplies from Chu Lai by road. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were as follows:

| <u>DODAC</u> | <u>ITEM</u> | <u>STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES</u> |
|--------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| A137 | CTG 7.62mm MLB 4-1 | 100,000 |
| A165 | CTG 7.62mm Mini | 100,000 |
| H490 | RKT 2.75" | 1,000 |
| B572 | CTG 40mm Limited | 1,000 |
| 0955 | Gren H2 Smk (Violet) | 144 |
| 0950 | Gren H2 Smk (Red) | 144 |
| L407 | Flare Acft (MK-24) | 96 |
| N/A | CTG 105 HE | 3,400 |
| N/A | CTG 105 WP | 200 |
| N/A | CTG 105 Illum | 200 |
| N/A | CTG 105 Smoke | 100 |
| N/A | JP-4 | 30,000 gallons |
| N/A | C-Rations | 6,000 meals |

b. The stockage objectives at Quang Ngai were maintained by coordination of Brigade S-4 with Division Transportation Office and Division Ammunition Office.

4. (C) The rifle battalions were supported logically primarily from LZ Bronco, FSB Chevy, FSB Cork for 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and from Chu Lai and LZ Dottie for the 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry.

5. The material requirements for the establishment of an Infantry Battalion Fire Support Base were as follows:

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>QUANTITY</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| Sandbags | 50,000 each |
| Engr Stakes 8" | 555 each |
| Engr Stakes 6" | 555 each |
| Gulverts 60" | 10 each |
| Concertina Wire | 12 rolls |

b. The daily average requirements for resupply of Infantry Battalions were as follows:

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>QUANTITY</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|
| C-Rations | 125 cases |
| Water | 1,000 gallons |
| A-Rations | 5,000 pounds |

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(C) ANNEX B (Logistics) continued.

5. (C) Ammunition resupply for the Artillery Batteries was accomplished from Quang Ngai Air Strip via Chinook sling load to separate battery locations. Artillery Battalions average daily requirements for resupply were as follows:

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>QUANTITY</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|
| Ammunition | 600 rounds |
| C-Rations | 83 cases |
| Water | 1,000 gallons |

6. (C) Brigade CP at LZ Chevy:

a. Establishment of the FSB was initiated on D-1. HHC Executive Officer and designated individuals and 15 Chinook loads of equipment and materials were dispatched from LZ Bronco to LZ Chevy.

b. The HHC Commanding Officer coordinated the resupply of one hot meal a day flown from LZ Bronco. Sixty (60) cases of C-Rations and 1500 gallons of water were flown from Quang Ngai to LZ Chevy on daily basis. These C-Rations and water were utilized by both HHC and the unit providing security of LZ Chevy.

7. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. When a unit having organic track vehicles is attached/opcon to an infantry unit, the unit having track vehicles must make provisions for Class III and unusual Class V resupply as well as maintenance of the track vehicles.

b. A conscientious effort must be made by individuals on forward LZ's to insure that empty water blivits, water trailers and sling equipment are handled carefully and expeditiously back hauled to the source of resupply.

c. All units must continually inspect slinging equipment for serviceability and quantity available. A shortage of slinging equipment can slow down an otherwise efficient operation.

d. There were no significant changes to the normal combat loads, ammunition or weapons carried by line units.

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20 December 1969

(C) ANNEX C (Intelligence) to After Action Report (Task Force Callaway)

1. (C) WEATHER AND TERRAIN.

a. Weather: During the course of the operation, weather was generally favorable from mid morning until dusk. Skies were generally clear, though there were occasional cloudy periods, and visibility was good. Visibility was temporarily restricted on several days by rainstorms and ground fog in the early morning.

b. TERRAIN:

(1) The major portion of the operational area was composed of mountain, hill masses covered by dense underbrush, and single canopy forest. The low hills, draws and valleys were covered mainly by undergrowth, grassland, and rice crops.

(2) Effects of enemy course of action: The operational area in the mountains and the foothills offered the enemy the capability of conducting safe movement free from observation. Natural cover and concealment in the areas added to the enemy's capability to avoid friendly forces. In the lowland areas, cover and concealment was only available to a limited extent along dikes, road embankments, and river banks.

(3) Effects on friendly courses of action: In the mountains and foothills, the terrain restricted movement of friendly forces. Movement in this area was necessarily slow and visibility, observation and firing of fire severely restricted. In the lowland areas friendly forces could move with ease and visibility was good to excellent.

2. (C) PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Available intelligence, based on PV reports, indicated that the 3rd NVA Division was in the area of operations with the capability of launching an attack on friendly military installations in the area.

b. Agency reports, VR, SLAR, and LR indicated a concentration of enemy units in the Seung Ro Valley and south of the Seung Tern Khor lowlands.

c. Available intelligence indicated the possibility that a VC battalions in vicinity of Quang Ngai city would attack that city. In such an event, the 3rd NVA Division could be used to reinforce the attacking VC forces.

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4. Divulgando Inteligencia. The Report is to be distributed to the appropriate Agency offices, Commanders, and other personnel involved in the preparation and conduct of legislative and operational plans and in the conduct of major force assembly areas.

3. Army Repellents:

(1) Divulgando Inteligencia via Army Staff Office.

(2) Divulgando Inteligencia via MC Headquarters and MC Staff Office.

(3) Divulgando Inteligencia via MC Staff Office.

(4) Conducting attacks by MC and commando units against VC installations and areas of concentrations.

4. Army Dispersals and Mortality:

| NAME | LOCATION | TIME |
|---|-----------|------|
| 22nd AR Div, 10th MIA Div Regional Force and Support, 3rd MIA Div | ASSEMBLED | 1000 |
| | ASSEMBLED | 1000 |

5. (C) Considerations of Operation Chayapalgu Grove:

a. Operation Chayapalgu Grove was conducted for the purpose of dispersing personnel dedicated to the area of Army assembly areas.

b. Attacks on the both VC and NVA personnel were to be conducted after the assembly areas had been secured and that he neutralized before attacking the assembly areas.

c. It is preferable that this operation be conducted in the early morning hours or at dawn and to maintain a surprise factor.

6. (C) Report of Results:

| NAME | TIME |
|---------------------|---------|
| 22nd AR Div | 2207155 |
| VC CAMP, CHAYAPALGU | 2/0 |
| MC, 10th MIA | 1/1 |
| CP | 24 |

7. (C) Appendix:

| NAME | TIME | LOCATION |
|-------------|------|--------------|
| 22nd AR Div | 07 | CHAYAPALGU |
| VC CAMP | 17 | MC, 10th MIA |

COMPILED ON 10/20/72

COMPILED ON 10/20/72

Commo Equipment:

| | |
|---------------------|----|
| Field Phone | 1 |
| Portable PA Set | 1 |
| Collins Type Radios | |
| BA-30 Batteries | 56 |
| VC-Radio | 1 |

Miscellaneous:

| | |
|-----------------|-------|
| 57RR Sight | 1 |
| NVA Helmet | 4 |
| Soviet Gas Mask | 3 |
| 1st Aid Packets | 4 |
| Sniper Scope | 1 |
| Starlight Scope | 1 |
| Mortar Sight | 1 |
| Binoculars | 5pr |
| MG Mount 12.7 | 1 |
| US Steel Helmet | 3 |
| Pleasers | 2,720 |
| Wire Cutters | 2pr |
| Lighters | 2 |
| Med Supplies | 50lbs |
| VC Pack | 1 |
| Pistol Belts | 2 |
| NVA Canteens | 8 |

| | |
|--------------------|----------|
| NVA Packs | 7 |
| Ponchos | 3 |
| Billifold | 1 |
| US Poncho | 1 |
| Poncho Liner | 1 |
| RPG Carrying Case | 4 |
| RFD MG Drums | 3 |
| AK 47 Ammo Pouches | 2 |
| US Ammo Pouches | 2 |
| Aust. Poncho | 1 |
| Marijuana | 47 offic |
| Japanese Camera | 1 |
| 82MM Base Plate | 1 |
| 82MM Mortar Bipods | 2 |
| Entrenching Tools | 3 |
| Documents | 500lbs |

(2) Destroyed

Ammo:

| | |
|---------------|------|
| AK-47 | 4550 |
| M-60 | 1100 |
| M-79 | 1 |
| B-40 | 144 |
| 82MM | 15 |
| Carbine | 2090 |
| 57RR | 119 |
| 60MM | 34 |
| RPG-7 | 138 |
| M-16 | 816 |
| 122MM Rockets | 5 |
| Cal 50 | 400 |
| Mixed S/A | 2300 |
| 12.7MM | 450 |
| .50 CHICOM | 500 |
| Bangalore | 4 |
| Xtrip Flares | 2 |
| CHICOM B/Gren | 104 |

Food:

| | |
|------|--------|
| Rice | 850lbs |
|------|--------|

Clothing:

| | |
|--------------|----|
| NVA Uniforms | 30 |
| PJ'S | 1 |
| Trousers | 3 |

Miscellaneous:

| | |
|------------------|----|
| Sampans | 42 |
| Picks | 2 |
| Packs | 3 |
| NVA Packs | 7 |
| Mines, CHICOM AP | 1 |
| B/T Kit | 1 |
| Pistol Belts | 9 |
| Holsters | 1 |

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| | | | |
|---------------|-----|--------------------|----|
| M-26 H/Gren | 1 | Ponchos | 6 |
| 60MM Fuses | 24 | VC Sundry Pack | 1 |
| 60MM Charges | 28 | AK-47 Mags | 24 |
| B-40 Boosters | 5 | Canteens | 4 |
| Blasting Caps | 567 | M-16 Mags | 3 |
| 82MM Fuses | 6 | 82MM Cleaning Kit | 1 |
| | | 82MM Aiming Stakes | 2 |
| | | VC Gas Masks | 4 |
| | | Sewing Machines | 2 |
| | | Cal 45 Mags | 1 |
| | | Hammock | 1 |
| | | Entrenching Tools | 5 |

c. Structures:

Huts and Bunkers Destroyed 228
Trenches 612 Meters

Secondary Explosions/Fires from Airstrikes or Artillery:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| 21 Sep | BS346587 | 2 Secondary Fires |
| 20 Sep | BS450595 | 1 Secondary Expl |
| 20 Sep | BS434634 | 1 Secondary Expl w/gray smoke 200' |
| | | 1 Secondary Expl w/ orange smoke |
| 20 Sep | BS335639 | 1 Secondary Expl |
| 17 Sep | BS364653 | 2 Secondary Expl |
| | | 2 Secondary Fires |
| 16 Sep | BS469678 | 1 Secondary Fire w/gray-white smoke |
| 16 Sep | BS326666 | 1 Secondary Fire |
| 15 Sep | BS449750 | 1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire |
| 15 Sep | BS554784 | 1 Secondary Fire |
| 15 Sep | BS557783 | 2 Secondary Fires & 4 Secondary Expl |
| 14 Sep | BS473682 | 1 Secondary Expl |
| 14 Sep | BS473728 | 1 Secondary Expl w/orange smoke |
| 14 Sep | BS394644 | 1 Secondary Expl |
| 14 Sep | BS526756 | 1 Secondary Expl |
| 12 Sep | BS435815 | 1 Secondary Fire w/white smoke |
| 12 Sep | BS370698 | 1 Secondary Expl w/gray-white smoke |
| 11 Sep | BS360730 | 2 Secondary Expl w/white smoke |
| 11 Sep | BS479729 | 1 Secondary Fire |
| 10 Sep | BS353672 | 1 Secondary Expl 100' |
| 8 Sep | BS434828 | 1 Secondary Fire |
| 8 Sep | BS444796 | 1 Secondary Fire |
| 8 Sep | BS452817 | 1 Secondary Expl w/white smoke 250' |
| 6 Sep | BS552702 | 1 Secondary Expl (200' - 300') |
| 6 Sep | BS476715 | 1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire |
| 6 Sep | BS476711 | 1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire |
| 6 Sep | BS478711 | 1 Secondary Expl & 1 Secondary Fire |
| 4 Sep | BS557722 | 2 Secondary Fires |

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(D) ANNEX D (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

1. (D) Communication Mission.

The Communication Mission was to install, Operate, and maintain communications facilities in support of 17 Galloway and 11th Inf Bde during conduct of Champaign Grove.

2. (D) The Communications Means.

a. The primary means of communications to higher Headquarters and to the 11th Inf Bde Main was via telephone over VHF systems. The primary means of communications to subordinate units within the Bde was via FM Radio.

b. The secondary means of communications to higher Headquarters and the 11th Inf Bde Main was via radio teletype and teletype. The secondary means to subordinate units within the Bde was via single side band.

3. (D) Execution.

The Bde Sig Officer and the Radio Officer conducted a communications reconnaissance at LZ Chevy at 041100 Sep 68 in order to determine locations for signal facilities (including 523rd Sig site). At 050700 the Radio Officer arrived at LZ Chevy as the advance signal element. His purpose was to guide hooks with signal loads to the appropriate site. 523rd Sig VHF and SSB secure teletype teams arrived on the afternoon of the 5th and proceeded to ready equipment for operation. The 11th Bde communications equipment arrived between 0800 and 1300 hrs on the 6th. VHF equipment, switchboard, and the communications center were operational by 1800 hrs. There were no major outages of equip related to the telephone system (Swbd, VHF). FM nets, including secure, were also operational by 1800 hrs on the 6th and remained operational throughout the operation. SSB secure teletype presented a problem initially. The team was not able to establish communications with Americal with the issued whip antenna. On the morning of the 9th a double antenna was improvised and communications were established. The Communications Center (secure teletype via VHF) was closed out on the 18th because it was not needed. Approximately three messages were sent and received by it each day. The SSB secure radioteletype provided the same service as the Comm Ctr, and took over the additional load when the Comm Ctr closed. All communications systems were closed by 1400 hrs on the 24th.

4. (D) The following appendices will indicate telephone circuitry and type of system utilization in the Champaign Grove exercises.

Appendix 1-VHF Systems Diagram

- 2-Carrier System Record Charts and Circuit Register
- 3-Telephone Traffic Diagram
- 4-Telephone Routing Diagram
- 5-Dedicated Circuits
- 6-Americal Radio Nets
- 7-TF/Brigade Radio Nets
- 8-Retransmission Facility

5. (D) Results

a. All systems were operational throughout the operation. There were only two deviations from the plan. First the Compt Ctr closed out on the 13th as previously stated, and secondly circuit 5606 (Incl 2) from MDOC went to TF Galleon G+3/avn Officer was concealed on 12 Sep 68 because the AVN Officer conducted his operations from 11th Inf Bde Main at LZ Bruno. This circuit was reactivated on the 14th to provide a path for telephone communication between 3/1 Inf Bn Fwd and 3/1 Inf rear.

b. Signal plans provided by 523rd Signal Battalion were very effective.

c. Signal maintenance support provided by the 6th Support Battalion was also very effective.

6. (D) Lesson Learned

a. Personnel on the various wire teams within the Brigade and other joining units need more training on the installation of 26 pair cables.

b. Operation Champaign Grove greatly enhanced the state of proficiency and preparedness of all signal personnel.

c. That continuing emphasis must be placed on the readiness posture of signal equipment and capability.

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Administration:

a) During operation Champagne Grove the following recommendations for awards were submitted:

3 Distinguished Service Cross
7 Silver Star
11 Distinguished Flying Cross
5 Bronze Star for Valor
12 Bronze Star for Service
2 Army Commendation Medal
4 Air Medal for Valor

b) The Battalion received a total of 2 officer and 18 Enlisted replacements.

c) During their operation the Battalion lost the following personnel:

| KHA | WHA | DEROS |
|-----|-----|-------|
| 13 | 20 | 19 |

d) This period saw a return of the Battalion to the operational control of the 11th LIB. All administration actions normally going through Brigade were forwarded to the 11th LIB.

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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 1 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

CARRIER SYSTEM RECORD CHART

| SYSTEM | CHANNEL | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| 50A-56 | 5601 | 5622 | 5616 | 9121 | 5644 | 5643 | 5671 | 5641 | 5642 | 5654 | | 5600 |
| 56A-70 | 5606 | 5615 | 5621 | 5623 | | 5651 | | 5652 | 5653 | | 5699 | |

CIRCUIT REGISTER

| CIRCUIT NO,TYPE CKT | FROM | TO |
|---------------------|---|-----------------------|
| 5600 s/u | DIV SYSCON, PATCH TO SYSCON 26 Pr. cable Pr. 21 | TF GALLOWAY SIG 0 |
| 5601 s/u | DIV DTOC, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. | TF GALLOWAY TOC |
| 5606 s/u | DIV DTOC SWBD, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. | TF GALLOWAY G-3/AVN 0 |
| 5615 s/u | DIV FSE SWBD, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. | TF GALLOWAY FSCC |
| 5616 s/u | DIV TACP, PATCH TO DTOC 200 Pr. cable Pr. | TF GALLOWAY ALO |
| 5621 s/u | TF GALLOWAY TOC 11TH BDE TOC, PATCH TO 50 Pr. cable Pr. | |

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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 1 (cont.) (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report (CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

CIRCUIT REGISTER, Cont.

CIRCUIT NO, TYPE CKT

FROM

TO

| | | | |
|------|-----|---|--|
| 5622 | c/u | DIV SWBD, Long Local 416 | TF GALLOWAY |
| 5623 | c/u | TF GALLOWAY FSCC | 11TH BDE FDC |
| 5641 | c/u | DIV SWBD | TF GALLOWAY SWBD |
| 5642 | c/u | DIV SWBD | TF GALLOWAY SWBD |
| 5643 | c/u | DIV SWBD | TF GALLOWAY SWBD |
| 5644 | c/u | DIV SWBD | TF GALLOWAY SWBD |
| 5651 | c/u | TF GALLOWAY SWBD | 11TH BDE SWBD |
| 5652 | c/u | TF GALLOWAY SWBD | 11TH BDE SWBD |
| 5653 | c/u | TF GALLOWAY SWBD | 11TH BDE SWBD |
| 5654 | c/u | TF GALLOWAY SWBD | AMERICAL SPT SWBD PATCH TO 26 Fr. cable Pr. tot-1a patch to cb1. Pr. at T-1 TF GALLOWAY C/C D 1/02 ARTY FDC |
| 5671 | TT | DIV C/C | |
| 9121 | s/u | 1/82 ARTY FDC, Patch to Sys. 50A-70/s ch. Sext- tend on present sp-4 cb1. from arty to 1/82 arty | |
| 5699 | s/u | DIV SYSCON, PATCH TO SYS- CC, 26pr, cb1, pr, 16 Patch to Sys. 50A-70 ch 3 | TF GALLOWAY VHF GUP |


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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 2 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)




GROUP 4
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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 3 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)


Telephone Traffic Diagram



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(b) *RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE AGENT*—The principal may, at any time, terminate the authority of the agent.



ANSWER
Dwight Davis after 2 Years Interrogation
Declassified after 12 Years

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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 5 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

DEDICATED CIRCUITS

- (1) TF GALLOWAY TOC to DTOC
- (2) TF GALLOWAY AVNO & G-3 AIR to DTOC SWBD
- (3) TF GALLOWAY FSOC to DTOC FSE SWBD
- (4) TF GALLOWAY ALO to DIV TACP
- (5) TF GALLOWAY TOC to 11TH BDE TOC
- (6) LONG LOCALS DIV SWBD (AMERICAL) to TF GALLOWAY, CG (AMERICAL 416 FWD)


GROUP 4
Downgraded at 5 Year Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 6 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report
(CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

AMERICAL CMD AND DIVISION SECURE (FM)



DIV CMD OPNS/INTEL(SSB/RATT) (SECURE)


FREQ. #1 3308.5 #3 10511.5
#2 7994.5 #4 13436.5



NOTE: OTHER STATIONS WILL ENTER
NET AS DIRECTED IN CURRENT SOI.

DIV SPECIAL PURPOSE (SSB/VOICE) (ON CALL)

FREQ.: (P) 7045
(A) 2383.5



NOTE: UNITS WILL USE VOICE CALLWORDS ASSIGNED
IN SOI ITEM 22A 1-(1). ACTIVATED WHEN REQUIRED.



GROUP 4
Downgraded At 3 Years Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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(D) Annex D Appendix 7 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report (CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

TF/BRIGADE COM AND SECURE (FM)

TP/BDE SPECIAL PURPOSE (SSB/VOICE)
FREQ.: 13461.5

NOTE: UNITS WILL USE VOICE CALLWORDS ASSIGNED IN SOL ITEM 22A 1 (1).

GROUP 4
Downgraded At 3 Year Intervals
Declassified After 10 Years


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(D) ANNEX D APPENDIX 8 (Signal) to Combat Operations After Action Report (CHAMPAIGN GROVE)

BDE CND NET RETRANSMISSION FACILITY
(USE AS REQUIRED)



GROUP 4
Downgraded At 3 Years Intervals
Declassified After 12 Years

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