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**MAS Sanders**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LT)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96219

**AVDU-BOC**

1 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Period 24 October thru 16 November 1967  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U).

TO: See Distribution

References: AR 1-19 dtd 26 May 1966, USARV Reg 1-19 dtd 8 Feb 1967

SECTION I

1. (C) Significant Unit Activities: Elements of the Brigade were involved in in-country orientation training and combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exception of 25 and 26 October 1967 when the Brigade moved from Chu Lai to Duc Pho, and 16 November when the Brigade moved from Duc Pho to Chu Lai. Training was integrated into the combat missions assigned to the Brigade. The purpose of the training program was to bring the Brigade to maximum combat readiness in a minimum amount of time.

2. (C) Combat Operations: A summary of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade's operations is given below:

a. (C) Operation Carentan.

(1) Dates: 24 October 1967 to 16 November 1967.

(2) Mission: To prepare defense of LZ Carentan, receive required South East Asia Indoctrination training and conduct operations in assigned Battalion Areas of Operation (AO).

(3) Location: Quang Nai Province, Mo Duc/Duc Pho Districts Republic of Vietnam.

(4) Commanders: Brigadier General Charles W. Ryder, ADC, Americal Division was in command of the Duc Pho area and coordinated the operations of the 198th Infantry Brigade (LT) and the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. In the absence of BG Ryder, the Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division assumed command of the area. All orders for operations in the Duc Pho area were coordinated through the staff of the 3rd Bde, 4th Infantry

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US: 198th Light Infantry Brigade 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Attachments and Detachments - See inclosure 1.

(b) Others: 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment, 2nd ARVN Division.

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Downgraded  
Intervals; Declassified  
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(6) Concept of Operation:

On 24 October 1967, the 198th Infantry Brigade implemented Brigade OPOD 7-67 and conduct the operation in (2) two phases:

Phase I (Deployment)

Combat and selected combat support elements of 1-46 Infantry executed movement to Duc Pho by tactical airlift and thence to Carentan (Coord. BS 841365) by surface mode on 26 October 1967. On order combat and selected combat elements of 1-6 Infantry and 1-52 Infantry deployed to Duc Pho and LZ Carentan by tactical air and surface transportation. Fire support elements, forward observers and control personnel of 1-14th Artillery remained at Chu Lai and prepared to received the battalions equipment. Late arrival of this equipment negated deployment of firing batteries to LZ Carentan. All units of 198th Brigade closed into LZ Carentan and initiated operations to secure assigned sectors of LZ Carentan.

Phase II (Training and Combat Operations)

The 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry released one company daily (beginning on 27 October until 29 October) to attend a day long refresher program conducted by the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in the vicinity of LZ Bronco. Upon completion of their training at LZ Bronco, the battalion established their fire base at LZ LIZ and initiated combat operations in AO DRAGON.

On 30 October, the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry released one company daily, until 1 November to attend the training conducted by the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Upon the completion of their training they established their battalion fire base at LZ THUNDER and initiated combat operations in AO THUNDER.

The 1st Battalion, 52nd Infantry released one company daily, 2-4 November, to attend orientation conducted by the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The battalion established a fire base at LZ OD and initiated combat operations in AO CONDOR. H Troop, 17th Cavalry was employed in (General Support) initially: one platoon provided convoy security to LZ Carentan and conducted limited offensive operations. The 555th Engineer Company while at LZ Carentan, continued base development and secured positions of the Brigade base. The 9th Support Battalion provided logistical support for Carentan operations and established a residual logistical base at Chu Lai.

(7) Execution:

(a) The operation was conducted as planned and the Brigade assumed responsibility for the Carentan AO (BS 843372) Duc Pho, 261000 October 1967. All infantry battalions conducted intensive training in squad, platoon and company size tactical operations throughout their sectors of operations. The Brigade training program for the maneuver battalions emphasized combat assaults, search and destroy operations, saturation patrolling and squad size ambushes. A special two hour block of instruction was conducted by the 2nd ARVN Division to broaden the Brigade's knowledge of Viet Cong guerrilla tactics. The presentation was conducted by 3rd Battalion, 6th Regiment 2nd ARVN Division.

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(b) On 28 October 1967, the Brigade began combat operations within the immediate vicinity of LZ Carentan. The maneuver battalions of the Brigade conducted S & D operations within their assigned sector. Night operations were scheduled for each battalion within a designated area. These operations were executed as a part of the Brigade's base area training program to prepare the battalions for subsequent tactical operations within their assigned areas of operations in the Duc Pho AO. Limited terrain restricted the infantry battalions to (3) three squad size or one platoon size daylight patrol(s). Night patrols were conducted in the Brigade AO by each battalion during specified periods; 1-46 Infantry, 28-29 October; 1-6th Infantry, 29-30 October; and 1-52 Infantry, 31 October - 1 November. Movement of all patrols was controlled by check points and recommended patrol routes which provided a minimum safe lane of 400 meters between friendly units, to allow coordination for artillery spotting rounds and searchlight. Throughout this phase of training, the 14th Artillery provided control personnel at Carentan to operate the Brigade fire support element. Forward observers and Liaison Officers were operating with companies of the Brigade and the Brigade's fire requests were processed by the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery and 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry. The Brigade's organic Artillery Battalion (1-14th Arty) was not able to participate in this phase of training due to late arrival in country of their 105mm howitzers.

b. (c) Operation Duc Pho Relief

(1) Dates: 31 October to 4 November 1967

(2) Mission: To relieve elements of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and to assume responsibility for the Duc Pho AO.

(3) Location: Quang Nai Province, Mo Duc/Duc Pho, Republic of Vietnam

(4) Commander; Colonel James R. Waldie.

(5) Forces involved:

(a) US: 198th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

(b) Others: None

(a) At the conclusion of base area training period, the 198th LIB prepared to relieve elements of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and to assume responsibility for the Duc Pho AO. The assumption of the operational control of the Duc Pho AO was accomplished by employing the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry in the northern AO to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry in place (LZ-LIZ) and employing the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry in the southern AO to relieve the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry in place (LZ-Thunder). The 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry and the 1st Battalion 46th Infantry were deployed by air and surface movement from Carentan to effect the relief operations; maximum use of surface transportation was made to move troops and equipment. The two battalions were placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the commanding officers of the units they relieved until 4 November 1967.

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(b) Phases of accomplishment.

1 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry: On 31 October and 1 November 1967, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry conducted air and surface movement to relieve the 2nd Battalion 35th Infantry in the assigned AO. Company C, 1-46 Infantry deployed by road movement (310945 Oct) from the Carentan area to LZ DRAGON: upon closing into LZ DRAGON the company was OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry. Company B moved by air on 311530 October from Carentan to LZ OD and was OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry upon closing. The RECON platoon, 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry moved by surface transportation to Duc Pho and secured bridges along Highway 1 under OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry. On 1 November Company A, the Battalion Command Post Group and Battalion mortars moved by air to LZ LIZ and was OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry until 02 November 1967 when the 1-46th Infantry assumed responsibility of the AO. See inclosures 3, 4 and 6 Combat Operations-After Action Reports.

2 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry: On 1 November the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry effected relief of 1-14th Infantry units with two companies securing the Sa Huynh Port complex and bridges 95 thru 108 (except 96, 98 and 101). By 021600 November Companies A, B and C were OPCON to the 1-14th Infantry. The companies were located as follows: Company A (-) BS 928220; 3rd Platoon, Company A - BS 9152345; 2nd Platoon, Company A - BS 8972268. Company B (-) BS 869337; Company C (-) BS 872322 and the 81mm mortar section of Company E was employed in General support of the Brigade base camp. On 3 November, the battalion (-) relieved element of the 1-14th Infantry on LZ Thunder. The 1-6th Infantry assumed operational control of the AO on 4 November.

3 1-52 Infantry. The 1-52 Infantry was employed within the Carentan base area of operations and assumed responsibility for security for the area on 1 November. On 5 November the battalion relieved elements of the 1-46 Infantry on LZ OD and conducted operations in the AO on the 6th of November. See inclosure #6 (Combat After Action Reports)

(c) Specific missions that the Brigade assumed within the AO were to:

- 1 Provide defense of the Duc Pho - Mo Duc area.
- 2 Conduct offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA units, main force units, local units, guerrillas, and Viet Cong infrastructure (direct coordination with 2nd ARVN Div was authorized).
- 3 Conduct operations as may be practicable for the harassment and interdiction of approaches to Duc Pho - Mo Duc and likely rocket firing sites threatening the base area.
- 4 Deny needed food stuffs to the enemy.
- 5 Protect Vietnamese Nationals from reprisals.
- 6 Counter-infiltration operations in coastal areas within AO.

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7 Defense and/or participation in the defense of other US and Gvn critical installations as directed by CG, Americal Division.

8 Secure Highway 1 within AO for tactical operations and vehicular logistical movement.

9 Secure logistical installations vic Sa Hyunh.

10 Be prepared to provide one (1) rifle company within 2 hours; and a second rifle company, if required, for deployment anywhere within the Div TAOR.

(d) Organization. The Brigade Organization is as shown in inclosure 1. No additional units were assigned or attached to the Brigade during the reporting period. The organization of the 9th Support Battalion changed when A Company 9th Support Bn was reassigned to the Americal Div.

(e) Psychological Operations.

1 General: During the reporting period there were no psyops personnel assigned to the Brigade, although authorized by MTOE 77-102T. On 31 Oct 67 the Brigade S-5 was given the additional duty of Brigade Psyops Officer (VOCO). TOE personnel and equipment were requested by the S-5, but neither was received during the reporting period.

2 Training: A briefing was organized between the Americal Division Psyops Officer and the Brigade S-5. Using information obtained during the briefing an austere program was established. The program consisted of leaflet drops and Aerial broadcasts within the limits of Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts Quang Ngai Province.

3 Operations: Targets for psychological operations were selected based on S-2 intelligence of enemy locations and S-3 plans and operations. Several targets were selected in coordination with the respective District Chief and their MACV Advisor.

## Leaflets Distributed

<u>Means</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Theme</u>	<u>Target</u>
Aircraft	10,000	Safe Conduct Pass	VC
Land	400	Safe Conduct Pass	*198 Inf Bde Troops
Aircraft	30,000	Sapper Defection	VC
Aircraft	30,000	Report Sapper Mining	Civilians
Aircraft	20,000	Chieu Hoi Rally	VC/NVA
Aircraft	100,000	Curfew, land and water w/locations and hours.	Civilians

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Leaflets Distributed (Cont'd)

<u>Means</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Theme</u>	<u>Target</u>
Hand	500	Curfew Posters, land and water, w/locations & hrs	Civilians
Aircraft	60,000	Don't Run from Allied Troops	Civilians
Aircraft	120,000	Report Road Mines	Civilians
Total	370,900		

\*Note: Distributed to Brigade Troops for information and identification.

(f) Broadcast Operations:

<u>Means</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Theme</u>	<u>Target</u>
Aircraft	2	Land Curfew	Civilians
Aircraft	2	Waterways Curfew	Civilians

(g) Support from external sources:

1 Americal Division: Provided leaflets, aircraft and broadcast tapes as requested by Bde S-5.

2 The 244th PSYOPS Company thru Americal Division, placed in direct support of this unit one two-man loudspeaker team with equipment on 5 November 1967. The team was used in the 196th LIB AO because means were not available to transport the team from Chu Lai to Duc Pho. The 244th PSYOPS Company, again through Americal Division, placed in direct support of this unit one two-man Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Team on 15 November 1967. The team was not used in this operation because the unit relocated the following day.

(h) Artillery

1 Mission: Elements of the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery provided artillery fire support coordination for the 198th LIB at Carentan during the reporting period.

2 Summary of Operations: Each maneuver battalion of the Brigade was provided with an attached Artillery Forward Observer Team for each Co and an Artillery Liaison Team at Bn to coordinate the efforts of the Artillery FO's and all the indirect fire means (including organic 81mm mortars) available to each Battalion Commander. A Senior Artillery Liaison Team was provided the Brigade Tactical Operation Center (TOC) to effect overall coordination of indirect fires that were available to the Brigade. The Brigade's artillery fire requests were executed by the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery (155) and 2nd Battalion, 9th

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Artillery. Political, air, and overall ground clearances for all indirect firing were coordinated thru the Infantry Battalions and the Brigade LNO with the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery.

(i) Intelligence

1 Enemy activity during the reporting period of in-country operations was limited to small scale guerrilla activities. The Viet Cong initiated a total of 33 incidents in the Brigade's AO by using harassing fire, booby traps, mines, and hand grenades. The majority of the incidents took the form of small arms harassing fire. The Viet Cong continued to harass by use of sniper fire and small scale hand grenade attacks but consistently avoided any decisive contact with U.S. Forces. The enemy was expected to continue this type of harassment and avoid significant contact.

2 The principal sources used to gather intelligence information were visual reconnaissance, low level agent reports, radar, interrogation of prisoners, and ground reconnaissance. Initially, some problems were experienced in obtaining and using aircraft for VR missions. Low level agent reports were generally not reliable although it was difficult to evaluate the sources because of the short period of time the Brigade operated in the area.

3 Enemy losses for the period 24 Oct 67 - 16 Nov 67.

VC KIA (C)	40
VC KIA (P)	0
VC PW	12
Civil defendant	6
Small Arms	4
Small Arms Ammo	72
Mortar rds	3
Grenades	6
Mines	17
Booby traps	9
Sampans	8
Rice (tons)	9.1
Structures	8

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#### 4 Problems

a A lack of sufficient interpreters hindered the efficiency of cordon and search and MEDCAP operations, especially when several such operations were being conducted simultaneously.

b No interpreters were assigned to the Brigade initially. The first interpreter arrived one week after the Brigade had assumed operational control of the AO and an additional interpreter was attached to the Brigade a week later. This made a total of two interpreters in the Brigade after two weeks of operations. Several days later six additional interpreters joined the Brigade, four assigned and two attached. This relieved the interpreter shortage problem for the last week of operations in the Duc Pho area.

c It is recommended that as a minimum one interpreter should be assigned to each battalion, one for the Brigade S-5, and one for the MID interrogation teams. These interpreters should be present with the unit as soon as operations begin.

#### (j) Personnel

##### 1. Unit strength:

a Brigade personnel strength at the beginning of the reporting period with attached units, was as follows:

Authorized	256 Off	24 WO	3798 EM
Assigned	259 Off	24 WO	3603 EM
Over/short	+3 Off		-195 EM

b Brigade personnel strength at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

Authorized	256 Off	24 WO	3798 EM
Assigned	253 Off	24 WO	3481 EM
Over/short	-3	-5 WO	-317 EM

c Of the Brigade's not present for duty strength 14 were on R&R, TDY/SD and 20 on leave.

d A decrease in the number of personnel occurred with the reassignment of the 116 man "A" Company, 9th Support to the Americal Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The majority of the remaining personnel losses were due to reassignment and medical evacuation of casualties.

e The Brigade arrived in-country with a shortage of (277) 11B MOS personnel. The unit was informed by DA, before deploying, that these personnel would join the unit in-country as replacements. However, the personnel

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shortages were not filled while the unit was at Duc Pho and personnel losses due to MEDAVAC continued to delete personnel. The Brigade was informed that it would receive 160, 11B40, E6 personnel to fill critical NCO platoon sergeant vacancies in the line battalions

## 2 Attached Strength:

a Personnel strength of units attached were as follows:

47th Mil Hist Det	1-0-1
48th PIO Det	2-0-3
49th Sig Det	2-0-41
87th Cml Det	1-0-4
265th Mil Police Plt	1-33
635th MI Det	12-0-20

b The assigned strength was 92% of the authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 88% of the authorized strength.

a Total casualties as result of Hostile action were 21 during the reporting period.

b Total casualties as a result non-hostile actions were 28 during the reporting period.

c The Brigade experienced the following number and types of casualties during the period 26 October through 16 November 1967.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF CASUALTIES</u>
ETHER KHA	2
FRIAR WHA	17
PUNCH MHA	5
COACH NBD	2
SMITE WHA-S, VS	2
CROWN NBD	0
MISC	15
REACH WHA TO DEAD	0
HINGE WHA TO DEAD	1
TOTAL:	<u>44</u>

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#### 4 Operations:

a The Brigade arrived in-country with a special staff capable of autonomous operation. Almost immediately the Adjutant General's section and finance section was taken from the Brigade and placed under the operational control of the Commanding General, Americal Division. The loss of the Adjutant General's Section to the Brigade had an immediate and disruptive effect on the personnel and S-1 section. When the AG section was pulled to Division they took the only complete set of reference publications with them.

b To compensate for the loss of the AG Section, the S-1 had to obtain personnel out of the Brigade's own personnel resources to operate a casualty reporting section, message center and reproduction activity. Additional personnel were required to augment the administrative staff of the S-1 section to handle the increased administrative requirements.

c Communications was a critical problem area because of the distances between companies, battalions and brigade. It was imperative that daily liaison be established and maintained between subordinate units their S-1's, and the Brigade S-1. On several occasions, important information regarding casualty reports was delayed due to a communication breakdown. Units and battalions often failed to make the required reports on time. Specifically, the Brigade S-1 had to call for strength reports and even when they were received, the units were not sure of their accuracy. It was a week or more after arriving in-country before a reasonably accurate Personnel Daily Summary (PDS) was reported to Division.

d Casualty reporting difficulty was experienced in obtaining timely casualty reports from the units. Because of the distances between units and their battalion S-1's, casualty reports were often received in the Brigade S-1 casualty reporting section through command channels. When battalion S-1's were called they either had not received the casualty report from their subordinate units or they had the information but had not forwarded it. Casualty reporting improved when the units and battalion S-1's realized the necessity for immediate casualty reporting.

e Awards and Decorations. Shortly after the unit arrived in-country, the Brigade Commander desired to award the CIB and Purple Hearts to deserving personnel. At that time there were no regulations, SOP's or command policies or criteria for making these awards in the command. A letter of instruction was published and distributed by the Brigade S-1 as guidance for the award of the CIB and Purple Heart. An agreement was reached between the Americal Adjutant General and the Brigade S-1 to allow the Brigade to maintain a stock level of CIB's and Purple Hearts on hand for presentation by the Brigade Commander, after which orders will be requested and published by the Americal Adjutant General. Several recommendations for the Purple Heart had to be returned to the battalion S-1's for a certificate by the attending physician which resulted in delays in making the award. Other awards for valor were also returned for inclusion of witness statements and proposed citations. These problems were encountered because the units did not have a regulation to abide by.

#### 5 Other Problem Areas.

a Transportation: The shortage of transportation compounded the communications problem. Vehicles for the Brigade had to be borrowed

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from other units in the Chu Lai area. This shortage placed an additional burden on the message center and post office in picking up distribution and mail.

b Logistics:

- (1) Shortage of Office Supplies
- (2) Critical shortages of typewriters when the AG section was transferred to Division
- (3) Non-availability to file cabinets, desks, chairs, and book cases. (These had to be made from scrap lumber and packing boxes).
- (4) Memograph paper was in short supply and not available through local supply channels.
- (5) The majority of the S-1 problems, shortages of supplies, lack of transportation, non-availability of blank forms, memograph paper etc. was not due to a lack of prior planning but due to the unforeseen delay in the arrival of the USS Columbia Banker carrying the most critically needed items.

6 Personnel Programs

a Special Services Activities.

Special Services was involved in movie accounts, equipment distribution and R&R programs for the most part. Movie Accounts were by a lack of projection equipment. Projectors were scarce and had to be borrowed until equipment arrived from Saigon. Equipment (i.e. television sets, tape recorders, A&A kits) were received and distributed to subordinate units. This was accomplished without difficulty and equipment was distributed as it was received.

b Red Cross activities.

During the reporting period a red cross office was established in a tent shared by the Brigade Aid Station. Communication facilities (phones) were not available and the Brigade was unable to provide a telephone. It was necessary to obtain a telephone from the field office at Chu Lai. Had this not been done, few if any telephone contacts would have been possible, between the sub station and the field office. No office equipment of any kind was available and could not be provided by the unit. It was necessary to improvise and construct office furnishing from available material. In spite of this unusual arrangement no problems of any consequence arose.

c Postal Activities

Postal activities for the most part were handled with a minimum of difficulties. The foremost problem proved to be transportation. On several occasions it was impossible for the base post office to get mail out to the field units at Duc Pho due to the operational necessity of diverting helicopters to support tactical operations. Required postal support was furnished satisfactorily by the Americal Division Postal Officer.

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d Morale.

The general morale of Brigade personnel remained high throughout the reporting period as a result of the long voyage to Vietnam. Brigade personnel were eager to get started after the long period of inactivity.

(K) Logistics

1 General. The Brigade's forward logistical support element (FSE) was operated by the 9th Spt Bn and included elements of HHC, B and C Companies. Highest strength figure reached was 11 Officers, 3 Warrant Officers and 126 Enlisted Men.

2 Direct Support Services Provided to the Brigade consisted of:

a Bath and Laundry: A laundry and Bath platoon was assigned by the Forward Support Area and located at LZ CARENT N near a water point operated by the Brigade's Engineer Company. Support was provided at both facilities by the 94th S&S Bn.

b Graves Registration: Four personnel and their equipment were attached from LZ Bronco and set up near the Brigade Clearing Station. A total of 7 deceased personnel were processed and evacuated. Graves Registration for the Brigade Rear was operated by 94th S&S Bn.

c. Water: The water point at Duc Pho was operated by the 555th Engr Co. Water point operations was a continual problem because of the inadequate storage capacity of units.

d Classes of Supply:

(1) Class I: Initial breakdown was done by FSA until FSE became operational on 1 Nov. Prior to this date 13 pallets of C-rations, 17 pallets of sundries and 4350 condiments were provided.

(2) Class II & IV, Majority of support for immediate requirements came from Chu Lai (BSO). Considerable station property was received at Duc Pho. Twenty AN/GRC-125 radios with installation kits were drawn from 3rd Spt Bn (Prov). An extremely high usage rate on certain batteries was experienced. Issues made were BA 30-3384 and BS 386-1150. Life of the BA 386 averaged about 18 hours. It is recommended that stockage objective be adjusted upward considerably.

(3) Class III: Received 7000 gal MOGAS and 5400 gal Deisel. Issued 6215 gal MOGAS and 4308 gal Diesel. Two 3000 gal pods were obtain from FSA and gravity flow method was used. No organic pumping equipment was available.

(4) Class V: Ammo was drawn from FSA, ASP at LZ Bronco Organic artillery was not operational during this period.

e Maintenance: Mechanics and Tech Supply personnel performed their work in the shops of B Co, 704th Main Bn.

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e Maintenance: Mechanics and Tech Supply personnel performed their work in the shops of B Co, 704th Main Bn.

f Transportation:

(1) Vehicular: Limited Brigade assets proved inadequate to meet requirements. Vehicles had to be borrowed to support daily requirements. Shortage of vehicles was due to the delay of the arrival of Columbia Banker with organic equipment of HHC and the 9th Support Bn.

(2) Air: Movement of personnel to and from CARENTAN was accomplished by AF C-130. Approximately 20 sorties were flown to CARENTAN and 13 sorties were flown from CARENTAN.

(3) Sea: Transportation of personnel from CARENTAN was attempted but could not be accomplished because of improper berthing facilities for the LST's at Duc Pho.

g Problems:

Transportation and Material Handling Equipment (MHE) during the initial phase of in-country operations. Due to changing locations of units, connex containers and WABTOC packages were required to be moved several times. This unit had a limited number of 2½ ton available and no MHE. MHE could not be provided from Division assets. Equipment was moved with borrowed terrain fork lifts and 5 ton wreckers. It is recommended that units deploying to RVN ship as many 2½ tons as possible and all of their MHE equipment with the advance party shipment.

h Publications: Local logistical publications are not readily available and reference material pertinent to this theater are practically non-existent. All of the necessary references used by the 198th were borrowed from units which have been in this theater for some time. Even these units are lacking in some necessary publications. The 198th shipped all of their logistical publications with the main body equipment. It is recommended that deploying units ship all of their logistical publications with the advance party equipment shipment. It is also recommended that the parent unit prepare and issue a packet for immediate distribution to advance party personnel.

i Expendable Supplies: Expendable supplies in this theater were inadequate for immediate needs. Such items as light bulbs, mimeograph paper, bond paper and other similar supplies are in short supply. It is recommended that deploying units bring a minimum of 30 days expendable supplies on the advance party shipment.

j Office Machinery: An insufficient amount of office machines and reproduction equipment was brought on the advance party shipment and Yellow Circle TAT.

k Mess Equipment: Infantry Battalions received their field mess equipment in CONUS. Since equipment received was in depot pack it was shipped in this manner. Upon arrival in country packs were opened and it was

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discovered that many items were missing and some items were in operable. It is recommended that units open depot packs to inspect equipment before shipping.

(1) Civil Affairs

1 General: During the reporting period the following civil affairs activities were conducted with results as listed:

a Medical assistance and treatment was extended to 255 civilians.

b Food, clothing, soap and candy were given to 106 needy civilians.

c Minor repair was made to the District Hospital. Expended were 50 civilian and 30 US man hours. Materials were supplied by the local MACV advisor.

d Commodities extracted from VC controlled areas were turned over to the proper District Chiefs.

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Unshelled Rice	13,100 pounds
Salt	70 pounds
Clothing	9 pounds of assorted items
Medical Supplies	
Chloroquine	55 cc
Cod Liver Oil Pills	850 ea
Multi vitamin pills	100 ea
Malaria pills	400 ea

2 Rice extraction was and continued to be a problem. Caches of rice were most often found many miles from useable roads; extraction by helicopter was the only feasible means. The Brigade Commander should be the only person authorized to make the decision to destroy or abandon food caches. This policy must be known by all levels of command and staff, and enforced from the outset of operations.

3 Personnel

During this period the S-5 Section was split most of the time between this AO and coordinating with the units and local officials in the adjoining AO. The Brigade S-5 made visits to nine hamlets, four district headquarters and two province headquarters. He supervised the CA program in the AO and worked in coordination with S-5 of the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div. He also coordinated with the S-5 of the 196th LIB and visited their three battalion S-5 officers. The S-5 Admin Sergeant departed the AO on 7 November 1967 to join the S-5 section of the 196th LIB. There he obtained information on CA operations and responsibilities. The section clerk assisted with reports and records. One Vietnamese

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Interpreter (ARVN) joined the section on 11 November 67. He spoke little English, but it was felt that we would benefit by his presence as he continued to improve. The interpreter is most effective in translating written documents.

4 Equipment Shortages. Due to the late arrival of the sections equipment the section had to operate without a vehicle. The lack of transportation hampered the Brigade's entire civic action program. Liaison visits and on-the-spot inspections were essential to the accomplishment of the civilian affairs mission. Operating without a vehicle made the accomplishment of this task almost impossible and delayed or aborted many civic action activities. Freedom of movement is a basic requirement in the field of civic action.

## (m) Engineer Operations.

1 General. Engineer support for the Brigade during the reporting period was provided by the 555th Engineer Company. The Engineer Company deployed as a part of the advance party and arrived in the Carentan area on 8 Oct 67. Upon initiation of combat operations two platoons of Engineers provided general engineer support. Another platoon, plus supporting equipment, remained in the Chu Lai area to support the Brigade's rear base.

## 2 Engineer Support.

a Engineer support for the combat battalions and other units of the Brigade was provided on a mission basis. This support included road sweeping and clearing, ordnance disarming and disposal, constructing field fortifications, establishing water points, constructing roads, installing culverts, constructing bunkers and CP's, operating sanitary sandfills, prefabricating showers and latrines, maintenance of barrier material and lumber yard, installing barriers, clearing surfaces, hauling fill material, manning perimeter defense bunkers, and constructing minor office facilities for the Brigade headquarters.

b As a mission was requested by the battalions the engineers were flown to the area on the battalion's resupply aircraft or C&C chopper. Using the engineers in this manner provided maximum flexibility. As soon as a job was completed the engineers were returned to central control for further tasks required. This manner of support did not affect the availability of support to the combat battalions since the reaction time was reduced by using aircraft to move the engineers.

c Engineer support was provided on one S&D operation, during which the engineers accompanied the infantry elements. Demolition squads accompanied infantry units whenever it was anticipated or known that a tunnel system would be encountered and destruction was desired. In most instances engineer support was requested after the unit had encountered or discovered a dud, tunnel, or booby trap. Whenever this occurred engineers were sent to the area by helicopter. Engineer support was also provided to the infantry battalions to assist in bunker construction in the battalion areas. In most instances engineer support for the battalions was in the form of demo teams.

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d Engineer support within the Brigade base camp was extensive. Initially the maneuver battalions were developing the Brigade base camp area. Engineer support during this period was at a maximum. Each battalion required bulldozer support. In the 1-46th area, a large beam for TOC was provided. In the 1-6th area a large area was cleared for a tent area. One road was constructed in the area, and a mine clearing operation was completed. In the 1-52 Inf area a major road construction and drainage project was planned and completed. In each area the engineers provided technical assistance in the construction of command bunkers. The engineers constructed prefabricated latrines for all units and delivered them to the units for assembly. A total of 30 - two hole latrines and 30 shower stalls were prefabricated. The engineers provided a water point, maintained all roads and drainage systems for the base camp. One accomplishment of significant note was the planning and construction of Brigade TOC (26' X 45'). Its construction afforded protection against a direct hit by a 105 shell. Road clearing operations in the base camp area were also conducted.

e As the operation came to an end the requirement for engineer support diminished. One platoon of engineers returned to Chu Lai three days prior to the closing of the base camp.

(n) Signal

1 General: Operations in the Carentan area required a two phase communications system. The initial phase was established prior to the arrival of the maneuver elements into the Carentan area. The second phase was established when the maneuver elements moved to their forward locations. In addition to the communication system in the area of operations, a communications system had to be maintained in the rear area (Chu Lai). This included telephone service, FM radio communication and motor messenger service. The operational communications systems for the Carentan area consisted of the following:

a Wire and Switchboard Service: The initial installation of the switchboard, wire lines to the battalion base areas and separate company locations and limited subscriber service was completed prior to the movement of the main body from Chu Lai to the Carentan area. Phase I multichannel radio trunks which included common user telephone trunks and sole user circuits were established and terminated during this time. When the Brigade's Main Body and the maneuver elements arrived, the trunk lines and sole user circuits to the maneuver elements arrived, the trunk lines and sole user circuits to the maneuver elements were terminated and common user subscriber service was expanded to the limit of the telephone assets available. At the beginning of Phase II, when the maneuver elements moved into forward locations in the area of operations, common user subscriber service was curtailed slightly to permit use of the available telephones to terminate additional sole user circuits between the forward locations of the maneuver elements and the Brigade TOC. Peak use of the wire and switchboard service assets for the Brigade portion of the communication system placed into service on SB-86 switchboard with additional TA-207 Jackfield Section capable of terminating 29 incoming lines and 67 TA-312 telephones terminating either common user subscriber lines or sole user telephone circuits.

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b. Communication Center Service: A one line secure tape and page printer teletypewriter service was installed. An additional tape poking and tape correction position was set up to speed outgoing message service and correct garbles on incoming message traffic. Message traffic averaged two messages per day outgoing and three messages per day incoming over the secure teletypewriter system. Air, motor and foot messenger service was also instituted to handle bulk message traffic. Due to limited personnel assets of both the Communications Detachment and the Brigade S-1 section, a consolidated internal/external messenger distribution point was established, using the personnel assets of both elements. This proved so satisfactory that it has been continued in current operations.

c. FM Radio: Base stations for the Brigade Command Net, the Brigade Intelligence Net and the Division Command Net were established prior to the move of the Brigade Main Body and the maneuver elements into the Carentan area. The base stations were established in the vicinity of the Brigade TOC. A field expedient aircraft command and control console was fabricated and placed in operation. This console consisted of two AN/GRC-125 Radio Sets with H-161 Headsets and an externally mounted antenna system and was powered by the helicopter power system. Additionally, portable radios were obtained and placed into operation to net remote Military Police Traffic Control Points with the Military Police Operations Center.

d. Multi-channel Radio (VHF): Two multi-channel radio systems were placed into operation prior to arrival of the Brigade Main Body and the maneuver elements at the Carentan area. One twelve channel system was established between ASTORIA (Carentan) and MULTNOMAH (Chu Lai) as a primary means of communication between the Brigade Forward location and the Chu Lai area. A second four channel system was established between ASTORIA and MONTEZUMA (Mount Bronco) as a primary means of communication between the Brigade Forward location and the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Circuits on both ends of the systems were extended into the switchboards or sole user telephone positions as required. In an attempt to upgrade the quality of the circuits on the ASTORIA - MULTNOMAH system, a relay was established on MONTEZUMA to obtain additional antenna height. This system was kept on the air as an alternate path while the Brigade remained in the Carentan location. Additionally, a twelve channel system was established between MULTNOMAH and ENTERPRISE (Chu Lai Beach) to upgrade the circuits between the main base at Chu Lai and the Brigade Rear and between the Brigade Forward the Brigade Rear locations. When the Phase II operation began, an additional twelve channel system was established between ASTORIA and MONTEZUMA and two existing systems, one a twelve channel system between MONTEZUMA and LZ LIZ and the second a four channel system between MONTEZUMA and LZ THUNDER, belonging to the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division were diverted to use by the Brigade to establish communications links to the forward locations of the maneuver elements. Cross patching was accomplished at MONTEZUMA to provide two sole user circuits and two common user trunks to each forward location. On termination of the operations in the forward locations, these systems reverted to use by the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

2 Additional Signal Support received from outside the Brigade: In addition to the use of multichannel radio systems established by the 509th Signal Battalion and the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division noted above, the following signal equipment was borrowed from the units indicated:

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a 509th Signal Battalion

- 2 Teletypewriter Sets AN/PGC-1
- 2 Reperforator Sets AN/GGC-3
- 2 Telegraph Terminal AN/TCC-22
- 1 Switchboard SB-86
- 1 Switchboard SB-22
- 17 Telephone TA-312
- 2 Cryptographic Equipment KW-7
- 2 28V DC Electrical Generator Set
- 1 Junction Box J-1077
- 5 Terminal Strip TM-184

b 196th Infantry Brigade

- 2 Radio Set AN/VRC-46
- 2 Antenna Ground Plane RC-292
- 2 Switchboard SB-22

c 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

- 4 Radio Set AN/PRC-25
- 1 Switchboard SB-22
- 1 28V DC Electrical Generator Set

Miscellaneous radio hardware and  
accessory items.

d 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Inf Div

- 5 Telephone TA-312

3 Lack of Equipment. This problem developed as a result of the requirement to provide communications at two Brigade CP locations (Chu Lai and Duc Pho). Sufficient communications equipment was shipped for support of the advance party. However, this equipment was not sufficient to support the Brigade in its operations at Duc Pho. The late arrival of the ship carrying the bulk of the Brigade's communication equipment compounded the problem. Additional communications equipment was obtained on temporary loan and maximum use was made of the Brigade's equipment on hand to accomplish the mission. Of significant importance was the shortage of power generating equipment. The shortage problem was solved by pooling borrowed equipment and Brigade assets into one DC power package in order to operate the FM Radio Sets. Additionally a battery pack from a multi-channel radio van was used as a float across the generating equipment. Use of the battery pack precluded damage to the radio sets (from power surge) and provided a source of limited emergency power while generators were being serviced.

(o) Chemical Activities.

1 The following operations and training were conducted by the Brigade Chemical Section and the 87th Chemical Detachment during reporting period.

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## a Training

(1) One officer and one EM from the 87th Chemical Detachment received two days training in proper maintenance techniques for the E-63 MPD (people sniffer) with the 98th Lt Maintenance capability for the E-63 MPD.

(2) All members of the 87th Chemical Detachment attended four hours of training conducted at the ARVN village on 6 November 1967. The members of the Brigade tunnel team attended the training conducted by the 3/4 Infantry Division. In addition the Brigade Chemical section spent approximately two days with the 3rd Bde, 4th Infantry Chemical section in informal training in tunnel clearing operations.

(3) Personnel of the Chemical Detachment spent two days training in CS Drum preparation and handling with the Chemical Section 3/4 Infantry.

## b Operations

(1) The 87th Chemical Detachment conducted two personnel detector missions in the Brigade TAOR in conjunction with the Chemical Section of the 3/4 Inf.

(2) Test firing and training, for the 87th Chemical Detachment, with the E-8 CS Tactical Launcher was conducted by the Chemical section.

(3) Training for the 555th Engineer Company and MP platoon in the proper use of the M25A1 CS grenade was conducted by the 87th Chemical Detachment.

(4) The Chemical Section coordinated with the 196th Infantry Brigade, and 1st Bde 101st for the transfer of Chemical operations in the 198th Brigade TAOR.

(5) The 87th Chemical Detachment tunnel team conducted a clearing operation with E Co. 1/6 Infantry to include searching and clearing four tunnel complexes.

(6) The Chemical Section and the 87th Chemical Detachment operated during this time with no TOE equipment because of the delay in the arrival of the Columbia Banker. The difficulties imposed by this complete lack of equipment slightly impaired the accomplishment of all training objectives during the operations at Duc Pho.

## (p) Information Activities:

1 General. Upon completion of deployment and the announcement of the Brigade's arrival in Vietnam, the following activities were conducted by the Brigade information office and were supported by the 48th Public Information Detachment.

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- a Escorting newsmen who desire to cover the arrival.
- b Distributing releases of the Brigade's arrival to media.
- c Screening and forwarding Home Town Releases to the Army Home Town News Center.
- d Covering the activities of the Brigade, as applicable to the unit's mission, with organic information personnel.

## 2 Problem

a Escorting news media. The biggest problem in escorting news media covering the arrival and subsequent operations of the Brigade was transportation. The transportation that exists is primarily air travel. In a tactical area of operations, air travel is generally flexible. Close and constant coordination was required to insure that newsmen covering the Brigade's arrival were at the right place at the right time. As most of the news media work out of the Da Nang Press Center in the I Corps area, information escorts travelled to Da Nang and arranged transportation from there to the news scene and back to Da Nang. Multiservice coordination is required on these escort missions. Point of Interest: The commander who can satisfy the news media's transportation requirements will receive a tremendous amount of favorable coverage of his command.

b Initial release. The main problem of preparing an initial release for clearance prior to the Brigade's arrival was lack of information. Nobody questioned by the Brigade information personnel was able to make an accurate statement on when, where, and how the Brigade would arrive until almost the last minute. The release must be prepared at least a week ahead of time. The initial release prepared prior to arrival served two main purposes. It provided background for the news media on the arrival and it also provided a story, once distributed, to media not covering the arrival.

c Home Town News Releases. A total of 1,348 Home Town News Releases (DA Form 1526) were forwarded to the Army Home Town News Center, after screening. The News Center made a total of more than 9,000 separate releases on Brigade soldiers from the forms submitted. Fifty-nine forms were returned. The main reason for return was personnel filling the rank section with E-4 instead of Corporal or Specialist. Careful screening is a constant requirement in processing Home Town News Releases. Another problem with these releases is being able to forward them to the Center within 21 days after the event. In forwarding the releases, a cover story is necessary.

d Photography. The photography problem is basically a lack of cameras and a lack of laboratory processing equipment. The Signal Corps photo section assigned to the Brigade was not designed to support the information office because of their type of cameras and lack of laboratory equipment. Most of the photography was and is being accomplished by information personnel with their personal cameras. The division laboratory is available for processing films and printing pictures. While the Brigade was operational at Duc Pho, the informa-

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tion office of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, furnished outstanding support by lending cameras and providing laboratory facilities. Presently, the information office is attempting to procure cameras through Imprest Funds. The Brigade Signal Office is attempting to obtain laboratory equipment by MTOE.

e Equipment and Supplies. The information section was handicapped by a lack of equipment and supplies. Equipment shortages, in addition to cameras, include tape recorders, filing cabinets, a mimeograph machine and a safe. The biggest shortage in the supplies category is mimeograph paper. Existing supply channels did not offer much relief on these shortages.

## SECTION 2

### Commanders Observations and Recommendations

#### Operations

a. Item: Shortage of interpreters hinders operations.

(1) Discussion: The absence of interpreters during the initial period of operations seriously hampered screening operations. The troops, having recently arrived in country, had no feel for sorting and screening indigenous personnel. This was corrected only by concerted command action to borrow interpreters from adjacent units.

(2) Observation: Interpreters should be procured early enough to join the unit as it arrives in country.

b. Item: Employment of aerial tapes in psychological operations at 3,000 ft.

(1) Discussion: With altitude at 3,000 feet for the two tapes, it was found the tapes were not fully being understood on the ground.

(2) Observation: The altitude was lowered over the base camp area to 2,000 feet and the message was understood.

c. Item: Rules of Engagement

(1) Discussion: Rules of engagement in RVN are unique and must be learned and promulgated with all maneuver elements at the earliest opportunity to insure timely response of artillery fire requests.

(2) Observation: Learning the Rules of Engagements will expedite the employment of artillery fires.

d. Item: Training Emphasis

(1) Discussion: Training in Air Clearances: ground clearance and political clearance must be emphasized to insure that employment of artillery fires are in accordance with the Rules of Engagement for RVN.

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(2) Observation: That guidance provided in the Americal Division SOP be emphasized thoroughly during the initial stage of in-country training.

**Part II RECOMMENDATIONS:**

Recommendations are contained throughout the report.

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**

**KENNETH A. PAYANT**  
CPT, AGC  
Asst Adjutant

**5 Incl**

1. Organizational Chart
2. OPLAN 7-67
3. Combat Operation After Action Report,  
Operation Final Sweep
4. Combat Operation After Action Report,  
Operation "Virgin"
5. After Action Report, 1st Bn, 52nd Inf

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1. TASK ORGANIZATION

HHC, 198th Inf Brigade

1st Bn, 6th Inf

1st Bn, 46th Inf

1st Bn, 52nd Inf

1st Bn, 14th Arty

9th Support Bn (-)

H Trp, 17th Cav (-)

555 Engr Co (-)

601st RR Det (-)

635th MI Det

265th MP Plat (-)

87th Cml Det

48th PIO Det

47th Mil Hist Det

49th Sig Plat

2. Units OPCON to Brigade

a. Troop C, 1st - 10th CAV

28 Oct - 16 Nov 67

b. Mobile Strike Force

04 Nov - 16 Nov 67

3. Detachment

H - Troop 17th Cav (-) Op Con 196th LIB

4. Units in General Support Reinforcing of the Brigade

2nd Bn 11th Artillery (155mm)

26 Oct - 16 Nov 67

2nd Platoon G Btry, 29th

Artillery Searchlight

29 Oct - 16 Nov 67

3rd Bn, 18th Artillery (175mm)

26 Oct - 16 Nov 67

5. Units in General Support of the Brigade  
Naval Gunfire

6. Units in Direct Support of the Brigade

2nd Bn, 9th Artillery (105mm)

26 Oct - 16 Nov 67

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