

File 07

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BACF

1 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report- Lessons Learned A. 11th Infantry
Brigade, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCI CSFO2-64
(R3)

Commanding General
23d Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDF-VL
APO San Francisco 96374

SECTION I: OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

On 7 March 1971 Col. Warner S. Goodwin, Jr. assumed command
of the Brigade from Col. John L. Insani.

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Personnel:	See Inclosure 1
B. Operations:	See Inclosure 2
C. Training:	See Inclosure 3
D. Intelligence:	None
E. Logistics:	None
F. Organization:	None

FOR THE COMMANDER

- 3 Incl
1. Personnel
2. Operations
3. Training

Kenneth W. Hogan
KENNETH W. HOGAN
CPT Infantry
Adjutant

GROUP-4

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, 23D Infantry Division
APO San Francisco, 96217

AVDF-BAOP

21 April 1971

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report- Lessons Learned

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference, 23D Infantry Division Reg 525-15, dated 8 April 68, subject as above
2. IAW above reference addresses will submit an Operations Report- Lessons Learned (ORLL) for the period 1 Nov 1970 - 30 Apr 1971. Report should be prepared in seven (7) copies and submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: AVDF-BAOP as to arrive NLT 1700 hrs, 28 Apr 1971.
3. ORLL should include lessons learned in one or more of the following areas: personnel, operations, training, organization, intelligence, logistics and/or other pertinent areas. Format for the report should follow that as indicated in Appendix II of the above reference.
4. Brigade staff sections will submit feeder reports to the Brigade S-3 NLT 1700 hrs, 28 Apr 1971, in three (3) copies.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Kenneth W. Hogan
KENNETH W. HOGAN
CPT, Infantry
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, 3-1 Inf Bn
CO, 4-3 Inf Bn
CO, 1-20 Inf Bn
CO, 4-21 Inf Bn
CO, 59th Inf Plt (Sgt Dog)
Bde Signal Officer
Bde Chemical Officer
S1
S2
S4
S5

2-12

File

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry
11th Infantry Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BCJ

26 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL)

Commanding Officer
11th Infantry Brigade
ATTN: AVDF-BAOP

1. Reference:

a. 23rd Infantry Division Regulation 525-15, dated 8 April 1968, subject as above.

b. 11th Infantry Brigade letter, subject same as above, dated 21 April 1971.

2. This unit submits a negative report.

John S. Peppers
JOHN S. PEPPERS
MAJ, Infantry
Commanding

2-12

File
AK

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 347-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

AVDF-BA-HH

SUBJECT

Semi-Annual Report - Lessons Learned

TO
Commanding Officer
11th Infantry Brigade
ATTN: AVDF-BAOP
APO SF 96217

FROM
Commanding Officer
59th IPSB
APO SF 96217

DATE 28 April 1971 CMTI

This unit submits a negative report on the above subject.

Jose M. Rodriguez
JOSE M. RODRIGUEZ
PSG, Infantry
Acting Platoon Commander

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Personnel Learned

Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

PERSONNEL

1. (U) Subject: Rotation "hump" of Communications Personnel.

a. Observation: During the reporting period, 30 communications personnel departed the 11th Infantry Brigade's Communication Platoon on Deros or re-assignment. Since this unit is only authorized 28 personnel, this represents more than 100% turnover of communications personnel in a six month period or twice the normal rate for RVN.

b. Evaluation: Since continuity of operations and the development of expertise among assigned personnel is one of the paramount considerations in an efficient/responsive communications organization, the rotational "hump" described above should not have been allowed to occur. While such a "hump" is detrimental to the combat effectiveness of an infantry unit, it is by no means as critical because there is only one dominant MOS, 11B20, as apposed to the Brigade Communications Platoon where a considerable cross section of communications MOS's are represented. Accordingly, current signal operations in this brigade suffer from a marked shortage of experienced operator personnel. This situation is magnified considerably when senior personnel leave without replacement, thus creating a void at the supervisory level. A "PFC in charge" can never hope to replace the NCOIC, unless he has prior service/experience and/or extraordinary formal training on the equipment he operates and in the operational area he supervises. If newly assigned communications personnel are allowed a normal break-in/training overlap with more experienced personnel, this expertise can be developed internally. When denied this opportunity the experience factor suffers, efficiency declines, and the subscriber/user of organic communications gets less than he deserves in terms of quality and continuity of communications.

c. Recommendation: That Communications personnel losses be monitored very closely to ensure continuity of operation and supervision. When it develops that more than 25% of assigned personnel will DEROS or be re-assigned during any three month period, the records of all communications personnel to the Brigade or even Division should be screened to determine where internal reshuffling of personnel might be used to break up an impending rotational "hump" to the mutual benefit of all communications elements concerned.

d. Command Action: The records of assigned personnel are being screened to determine where internal reshuffling of personnel might be used to break up rotational "humps".

2. (U) Subject: Expanded operations without personnel augmentation.

a. Observation: The 11th Inf Bde Communications Platoon mans two operational areas for which no personnel are provided by TOE or current MTOE: a MARS station and a four terminal 4-Channel VHF site (using AN/GRC 163 radios). No less than 8 personnel would be considered normal to man these operational areas.

Inclosure I.

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b. Evaluation: The operation of the expanded communications systems without personnel augmentation placed an additional strain upon a communications organization. When an already understrength unit is forced to bare an additional operational burden utilizing only assigned personnel, all communications suffer proportionately. Personnel operating continuous 12 hour shifts seven days a week cannot be expected to maintain peak proficiency. What's more, one operational area has been left with only one operator to man the NCS in the Bde RTT Net on a 24 hour "on-call" basis.

c. Recommendation: Immediate action be taken to develop an MTOE consistent with the expanded operations of the Bde Communications Platoon. If MTOE action is deemed inappropriate, then a personnel augmentation team drawn from division assets be attached for the duration of the period of expanded communications operations.

d. Command Action: The feasibility for modifying the MTOE to augment the Brigade Communications Platoon will be studied during the Phase II TAADS update of the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company MTOE.

3. (U) Subject: Briefing for newly arrived personnel.

a. Observation: During early January 1971 the 4th Battalion 21st Infantry, as with other battalions of this brigade, received a substantial number of both "in-country" transfers and newly arrived CONUS replacements.

b. Evaluation: Because of the wide range of acquired skills assimilated by the in-country transfers as opposed to the newly arrived stateside transfers, the battalion instituted an orientation program designed to satisfy the needs of both groups. Both groups were initially briefed by the Battalion Commander normally in the battalion rear area. This initial briefing was one generally attuned to welcoming the new personnel, outlining the battalion history and a general procedural orientation. Both groups were then transported to the Battalion's Forward Fire Base for a thorough Operations/Intelligence Briefing. This was followed by a general briefing aimed at familiarizing all of the new arrivals with the personnel, religious, and recreational facilities available at both the Brigade and Battalion permanent fire bases. The two groups were then broken down. A general review of Do's and Don't's regarding booby traps, artillery procedures, NDP security and rucksack discipline was given to the in-country transfers. Also, and probably the most important aspect of the in-country transfer briefing, was the assurance made by the Battalion Commander himself that their promotion list status, R & R applications, pending award recommendations and associated personnel actions would be honored by the battalion. The group of newly arrived personnel were given a thorough indoctrination into the Battalion R & R/Leave policies, promotion policies and additional orientation on those essential military subjects of booby traps, mechanical ambush employment, NDP security, and rucksack discipline. All personnel, subsequent to their company assignments were always picked up by the respective Company First Sergeant or in his absence, a senior noncommissioned officer. At the company level, the new personnel were given a similar orientation to that received at battalion level, but on a reduced scale and specifically oriented to the company.

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The differentiation was made at the company level between newly arrived personnel and in-country transfers other than those associated with immediate personnel actions such as pending R & R, promotion list status, etc. Generally this orientation period lasts (for both groups) from three to five days. Whenever possible a new arrival joined his company when it arrived on the Forward Fire Support Base for its normal refit period, thus allowing a reasonable period of adjustment and "shake down" especially for the new stateside arrivals.

c. Recommendation: A reasonable, practical orientation for newly arrived personnel pays dividends in both combat effectiveness and unit esprit. To be meaningful for all new personnel it should be broken down into those who are new to Vietnam and those who have had a degree of in-country experience. While this double approach is slightly more time consuming and requires additional preparation it has proven to be more attuned to the groups needs, less boring and repetitious and has facilitated immediate intergration, especially for in-country transfers, to the Battalion.

d. Command Action: Detailed briefing of in-country transfer personnel will continue to insure proper integration into this brigade.

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LESSONS LEARNED

Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

OPERATIONS

1. (C) SUBJECT: Proper use of Mechanical Ambushes.

a. Observation: Those units who consistently use mechanical ambushes in an offensive manner, at least 300-400 meters from their locations invariably produce more enemy casualties.

b. Evaluation: Mechanical Ambushes should be placed out 300-400 meters along known enemy routes of movement. This makes the mechanical ambush a separate ambush and as such has less chance of being detected by the enemy. The possibility of compromise by sight, smell or noise is eliminated and the chance of the enemy being caught unaware in a mechanical ambush is immeasurably increased.

c. Recommendation: That commands concerned place increasing emphasis on employing mechanical ambushes offensively.

d. Command Action: N/A

2. (C) SUBJECT: Use of Montagnard RF Soldiers as Guides and Interpreters.

a. Observation: Subsequent to January 1971 the 4th Battalion 21st Infantry has been responsible for conducting operations in the mountainous terrain well to the west of Duc Pho, RVN. The area is characterized by extremely rugged terrain with few inhabitants. Contact has been sporadic, but once gained was difficult to maintain due to both the ruggedness of the terrain and the Battalion's inexperience in operating in that locale.

b. Evaluation: To facilitate the battalion's orientation in the area and to provide a capability to interrogate any personnel the battalion may capture, an arrangement was made with PT TO District to attach 8 to 10 Montagnard soldiers with a US MCOV Advisor to a company operating in the area. It has immeasurably helped the ground unit commander in planning his search and clear operations. The Montagnard RF soldiers have easily adapted to eating US rations, have caused no additional resupply requirements and in every case have proven extremely useful in orientating a unit to thoroughly search and clear a given area.

c. Recommendation: When operating in unfamiliar territory, and especially one with a populace of a different ethnic background, it is helpful to integrate RF or PT soldiers of the same ethnic background into the ground unit. Scouts are normally of Vietnamese ethnic background and are rarely helpful in the mountainous terrain of Vietnam. Obtaining the use of these RF/PT soldiers is easily coordinated

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 2

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and is recommended as a means to increase the combat effectiveness of units operating in these areas.

d. Command Action: N/A

3. (C) SUBJECT: Ambush Tactics.

a. Observation: Due to a recent change in 3d Battalion 1st Infantry's ambush tactics, the unit has been able to deceive the enemy and gain a decisive advantage.

b. Evaluation: By breaking the units down to section or half platoon size and staying under the thick foliage in the many ravines and small valleys in the AO, the Battalion has increased friendly initiated contacts by 50% and the number of confirmed enemy killed by 65%. This unit by employing this tactic, plus restricting movement during daylight hours to the early morning or late afternoon, and enforcing a strict noise discipline, has achieved a marked increase in tactical successes.

c. Recommendation: That commands concerned place increasing emphasis on small unit operations that are characterized by stealth and movement and noise discipline.

d. Command Action: N/A

4. (C) SUBJECT: Pen and Ink SOI Changes.

a. Observation: In order to effect a smooth transition upon change of frequencies, call signs and other SOI material, sufficient time must be allowed for dissemination to the lower operational level.

b. Evaluation: Pen and Ink changes to the Division SOI are usually transmitted by message to the brigade. This information must then be retransmitted in the brigade RTT Net or passed to the Battalion rear. The information must then, depending upon how extensive the change and the availability of secure means, be transmitted by secure radio or hand carried to the units in the field. In the past, there has often been insufficient time between the initial notification and the effective date/time to accomplish the dissemination process. This results in confusion, unnecessary extremes to accomplish distribution and could result in the compromise of the material contained in the change.

c. Recommendation: A realistic time frame be established between release and implementation of Pen and Ink Changes.

d. Command Action: N/A

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LESSONS LEARNED

Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

Training

1. (C) SUBJECT: Snipers

a. Snipers are required to go to Chu Lai monthly for a period of approximately 5 days to clean and rezero their weapons. Counting travel time back and forth, snipers are often not available for employment for approximately one week each month.

b. Snipers are skilled and highly trained individuals whose time is very valuable to the battalion. It is a waste of a valuable asset to have each sniper gone from the unit for approximately one week of each month.

c. It is recommended that a mobile team be formed at Division level to travel to each unit that has snipers on a monthly basis. This team should spend approximately 2 days at each unit cleaning and repairing the snipers weapons and working with the sniper to rezero his weapon. The team could also issue ammunition as required. Only snipers with serious maintenance problems would be sent to Chu Lai. This would increase the available time of the snipers by 25 to 40 per cent, and should serve to improve the sniper program within the Division.

d. Command Action: N/A

2. (C) Use of Training Ranges.

a. Observation: The average US soldier does not receive proper training to remain tactically proficient in the field.

b. Evaluation: The men tend to be over-confident due to lack of contact while in the field, thus the unit tactical proficiency deteriorates. The results are enemy initiated contacts followed by a poor reaction by the maneuver element.

c. Recommendation: That units establish a training program that enables each man to employ his weapon against a variety of realistic targets. Emphasis, in this type of training, should be placed on the individuals gaining enthusiasm, aggressiveness and the immediate response to fire. Additional results are improved marksmanship, familiarity with the individual weapon and the development of team work within the squad.

d. Command Action: Quick fire and squad reaction training are incorporated into battalion training during Refit and Retrain periods.

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Inclosure III.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE, AMERICAL DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96217

AVDF-BACA

26 April 1971

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report - Lessons Learned

TO: Commanding Officer
11th Inf Bde
ATTN: S-3
APO 96217

1. Reference, letter dated 21 Apr 71 subject as above.
2. For the reporting period this section has a negative report.

Jon A. Watson
JON A. WATSON
CPT, INF
S-5

2-12

File

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry
11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BAT-CP

25 April 1971

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report - Lessons Learned

Commanding Officer
11th Infantry Brigade
ATTN: AVDF-BAOP
APO San Francisco 96217

1. REFERENCE: Ltr, HQ, 11th Inf Bde, Subject as above, dtd 21 April 1971.

2. PERSONNEL:

a. Observation: Briefing for Newly Arrived Personnel.

b. Evaluation: During early January 1971 this battalion, as others within the Brigade, began receiving a substantial number of both "in-country" transfers and newly arrived CONUS replacements. Because of the wide range of acquired skills assimilated by the in-country transfers as opposed to the newly arrived stateside transfers the battalion instituted an orientation program designed to satisfy the needs of both groups. Both groups were initially briefed by the Battalion Commander, normally in the battalion rear area. This initial briefing was one generally attuned to welcoming the new personnel, outlining the battalion history and a general procedural orientation. Both groups were then transported to the Battalion's Forward Fire Base for a thorough Operations/Intelligence Briefing. This was followed by a general briefing aimed at familiarizing all of the new arrivals with the personal, religious, and recreational facilities available at both the Brigade and Battalion permanent fire bases. The two groups were then broken down. A general review of "Do's and Don't's" regarding booby traps, artillery procedures, NDP Security and rucksack discipline was given to the in-country transfers. Also, and probably the most important aspect of the "in-country" transfer briefing, was the assurance made by the Battalion Commander himself that their promotion list status, R&R applications, pending award recommendations and associated personnel actions would be honored by the Battalion. The group of newly arrived personnel were given a thorough indoctrination into the Battalion R&R/Leave policies, promotion policies and additional orientation on those essential military subjects of booby traps, mechanical ambush employment, NDP security, and rucksack discipline. All personnel, subsequent to their company assignments were always picked up by the respective Company First Sergeant or in his absence, a senior noncommissioned officer. At the company level, the new personnel were given a similar orientation to that received at battalion level, but on a reduced scale and specifically oriented to that company. No differentiation was made at the company level between newly arrived personnel and in-country transfers other than those associated with immediate personnel actions such as pending R&R, promotion list status, etc. Generally this orientation period lasts (for both groups) from three to five days. Whenever possible a new arrival joined his company when it arrived on the Forward

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Fire Support Base for its normal refit period, thus allowing a reasonable acclimatization and "shake down" period, especially for the new stateside arrivals.

c. Recommendation: It has been this Battalion's experience that a reasonable, practical orientation for newly arrived personnel pays dividends in both combat effectiveness and unit esprit. To be meaningful for all new personnel it should be broken down into those who are new to Vietnam and those who have had a degree of in-country experience. While this double approach is slightly more time consuming and requires additional preparation it has proven to be more attuned to the groups needs, less boring and repetitious and has facilitated immediate integration, especially for in-country transfers, to the Battalion.

3. OPERATIONS/INTELLIGENCE:

a. Observation: Mission Briefings.

b. Evaluation: This Battalion has found that a thorough mission briefing is essential for a company prior to that company moving off the Battalion Fire Base into an operational area. While this type of briefing as it pertains to the operational aspects is normally SOP in any unit, we have attempted to add all the useful intelligence available in a given area. While much of this intelligence is gleaned from AFD, Night Hawk and Air Cavalry missions in the area we have found that a thorough evaluation of previous unit locations, points of previous contacts, mechanical ambush detonation locations, unoccupied way stations and base camps to be extremely useful information. This procedure requires the Battalion Tactical Operations Center to plot and record in some detail NDP's, MA locations, points of contacts, way stations, etc. This information can then be transferred on a daily basis to a map "flip" or overlay and quite graphically reflects how an area has been worked over the course of a number of months. It points out old NDP positions to be avoided and conversely where previous units have had results with MA's. It is not intended to, and does not replace hard intelligence, but it does provide a useful orientation to a particular area and the battalion's experience in that area over a period of time.

c. Recommendations: None.


4. OPERATIONS:

a. Observation: Use of Montagnard RF Soldiers as Guides and Interpreters.

b. Evaluation: Subsequent to January 1971 this Battalion has been responsible for conducting operations in the mountainous terrain well to the west of Duc Pho, RVN. The area is characterized by extremely rugged terrain with few inhabitants. Contact has been sporadic, but once gained was difficult to maintain due to both the ruggedness of the terrain and the Battalion's inexperience in operating in that locale. To facilitate the battalion's orientation in the area and to provide a capability to interrogate any personnel the battalion may capture, an arrangement was made with BA TO District to attach 8 to 10 Montagnard soldiers with a US MACV Advisor to a company operating in the area. This arrangement has provided the unit on the ground with an instant interrogation capability with the ethnic group in the area. It has immeasurably helped the ground unit commander in planning his search and clear operations. The Montagnard RF soldiers have easily adapted to eating US rations, have caused no additional resupply requirements and in every case have proven extremely useful in orientating a unit to thoroughly search and clear a given area.

c. Recommendation: When operating in unfamiliar territory, and especially one with a populace of a different ethnic background, it is helpful to integrate RF or PF soldiers of the same ethnic background into the ground unit. KCS's are normally of Vietnamese ethnic background and are rarely helpful in the mountainous terrain of Vietnam. Obtaining the use of these RF/PF soldiers is easily coordinated and is recommended as a means to increase the combat effectiveness of units operating in these areas.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



BILLY J. ORR
1LT 1NF
Adjutant

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AVDF-BA-SIG

Quarterly Report - Lessons Learned

TO S-3

FROM Bde Sig Off

DATE 27 Apr 71
jdw

CMT 1

1. Reference: Ltr, HQ, 11th Inf Bde, AVDF-BA-OP, dtd 21 Apr 71, Subj: as above
2. The following is the Brigade Signal feeder report for the ORLL covering the period 1 Nov 1970 - 30 Apr 1971.

A. Personnel

1. Subject: Rotation "Hump" of Communications Personnel.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period, 30 communications personnel departed this command on DEROS or reassignment. Since the 11th Brigade Communications is only authorized 28 personnel, this represents more than a 100% turnover of communications personnel in a 6 month period or twice the normal rate for RVN.

(b) Evaluation: Since continuity of operations and the development of expertise among assigned personnel is one of the paramount considerations in an efficient/responsive communications organization, the rotational "hump" described above should not have been allowed to occur. While such a "hump" is detrimental to the combat effectiveness of an infantry unit, it is by no means as critical because there is only one dominant MOS, 11B20, as apposed to the Brigade Communications Platoon where a considerable cross section of communications MOS's are represented. Accordingly, current signal operations in this brigade suffer from a marked shortage of experienced operator personnel.

This situation is magnified considerably when senior personnel leave without replacement, thus creating an intolerable void at the supervisory level. A "PFC-in-Charge" can never hope to replace the NCOIC, unless he has prior service/experience and/or extraordinary formal training on the equipment he operates and in the operational area he supervises. If newly assigned communications personnel are allowed a normal break-in/training overlap with more experienced personnel, this expertise can be developed internally. When denied this opportunity the experience factor suffers, efficiency declines, and the subscriber/user or organic communications gets less than he deserves in terms of quality and continuity of communications.

(c) Recommendation: That Communications personnel losses be monitored very closely to ensure continuity of operation and supervision. When it develops that more than 25% of assigned personnel will DEROS or be reassigned during any three month period, the records of all communications personnel assigned to the Brigade or even the Division be screened to determine where internal reshuffling of personnel might be used to break up an impending rotational "hump" to the mutual benefit of all communications elements concerned.

DA FORM 1 FEB 62 2496

REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.

27 Apr 71
jdw

SUBJECT: Continued

2. Subject: Expanded operations without personnel augmentation.

(a) Observation: The 11th Inf Bde Communications Platoon mans two operational areas for which no personnel are provided by TOE or current MTOE; a MARS station and a four terminal 4-Channel VHF site (using AN/GRC-163 radios). No less than 8 personnel would be considered normal to man these operational areas.

(b) Evaluation: The operation of extraordinary communications systems without personnel augmentation places an intolerable drain upon a communications organization. When an already understrength unit is forced to bear an additional operational burden utilizing only assigned personnel, all communications suffer proportionately. Personnel operating continuous 12 hour shifts seven days a week cannot be expected to maintain peak proficiency. What's more, one operational area has been left with only one operator to man the NCS in the Bde RTT Net on a 24 hour "on-call" basis.

(c) Recommendation: Immediate action be taken to develop an MTOE consistent with the expanded operations of the Bde Communications Platoon. If MTOE action is deemed inappropriate, then personnel augmentation team drawn from Division assets be attached for the duration of the period of expanded communications operations.

B. Operations

1. Subject: Extended operations are a "drain" on organic equipment.

(a) Observation: During the recent operation Lam Son 719, the 11th Bde Communications Platoon was required to support a fwd TOC, a TAC CP or "jump" TOC, and certain requirements for the "stay behind" element at its permanent base, FSB Bronco. This created a serious overextension of organic equipment assets.

(b) Evaluation: The expanded operations described above required stretching organic resources to the limit. Normal equipment failures often created a requirement for special runs by organic air assets to redistribute communications equipment just to maintain continuity of operations. Standard communications doctrine calls for a reasonable amount of back-up equipment of each type to held on site to provide continuity of operations. If this doctrine is violated, it can only result in a diminution of communications posture and possibly cause a mission to fail or be aborted.

(c) Recommendation: That any future operations requiring communications in excess of authorized quantities, with reasonable back-up, be supported by temporary loan equipment from Division or higher assets.

27 Apr 71
jdw

SUBJECT: Continued

2. Subject: Pen and Ink SOI Changes

(a) Observation: In order to affect a smooth transition upon change of frequencies, call signs and other SOI material, sufficient time must be allowed for dissemination to the lowest operational level.

(b) Evaluation: Pen and Ink changes to the Division SOI are usually transmitted by message to the brigade. This information must then be retransmitted in the Bde RTT Net or passed to the Battalion rears. The information must then, depending upon how extensive the change and the availability of secure means, be transmitted by secure radio or hand carried to units in the field. In the past, there has often been insufficient time between the initial notification and the effective date/time to accomplish the dissemination process. This results in confusion, unnecessary extremes to accomplish distribution and could result in the compromise of the material contained in the change.

(c) Recommendation: A realistic time frame be established between release and implementation of Pen and Ink SOI Changes.

3. Subject: Lack of Power Generating Equipment for Montezuma Signal Site.

(a) Observation: An unsatisfactory power source is currently used to power Montezuma Signal Site. A power generating system equal to the demand must be found to satisfy the requirements.

(b) Evaluation: Montezuma Signal Site is the backbone of most 11th Infantry Brigade and subordinate unit communications. The major signal commitment on the hill is that of the 11th Bde (FM relay, 4-channel VHF, and MARS) and 523rd Signal (VHF radio and carrier terminals), but a number of other units operate communications terminals and/or relays in support of their mission. The power for this site is currently provided by feeder lines off Philco Ford power generating equipment located at the base of the hill. This arrangement provides power for both the operational and administrative electrical requirement on Montezuma Hill. Historically, three 30 KW generators had been used to satisfy the operational site requirements, but these were removed when the USASTRATCOM unit (62nd Signal) vacated the area.

(c) Recommendation: That a separate and independent power generator system be developed for the operational load on Montezuma Signal Site. The current power requirement would easily justify the commitment of 45 KW generators. Such generators would require a full-time generator man assigned for operations/maintenance.

27 Apr 71
jdw

SUBJECT: Continued

4. Subject: Frequency Limitations of Aircraft Radios.

(a) Observation: The frequency range covered by the FM radios in regular use by the infantry is 30 to 75.95 MHz. The range of the FM radios used in Army helicopters is only 30 to 69.95 MHz. The dependence of ground combat forces upon aircraft for close support makes the apparently minor discrepancy in frequency range very significant.

(b) Evaluation: The assignment of frequencies in the Division is a very laborious and critical process. Because of the limited number of frequencies allotted to the Division, the inability to assign even a small number of frequencies, because they are not compatible with aircraft type radios, only serves to further congest an already crowded frequency spectrum. Ironically, the frequencies excluded, 70 to 75.95 MHz, are actually the best in the entire band covered by the Infantry radios; they have the least interference and allow transmission for the greatest distance.

(c) Recommendation: Aircraft FM radios be modified to conform exactly to the expanded frequency band of the Infantry. An interim solution being the development of an SOP for frequency assignment to infantry units which would exploit the full potential of the FM band from 70 - 75.95 MHz while still assuring a complete coordination capability for aircraft operating in close support of ground elements.

C. Training - NoneD. Intelligence

1. Subject: Use of homing (directional finding) antennas.

(a) Observation: Battalions are often bothered by interference of unknown origin. These interfering signals may well be deliberate jamming or accidental joint use of a "bootleg" frequency by an enemy force.

(b) Evaluation: While the above is the case in only infrequent instances, it can still not be ignored as an invaluable intelligence gathering vehicle and extend the capability of other agencies as an additional means to find and fix the enemy. A triangulation performed by two or more Bde/Bn elements could easily pinpoint the origin of an unknown radio signal. This information could be used to call in artillery, air strikes and/or plan future operations and the deployment of more sophisticated surveillance media. Care would, of course, be required to get clearance from all allied forces operating in the area to confirm the intruding signal were, in fact, that of an enemy transmitter.

Even if found to be a station operated by friendlies, there could be beneficial by-products. For instance, coordination could be affected to eliminate mutual interference or friendly forces uncertain of their location could be reoriented.

27 Apr 71

SUBJECT: Continued

(c) Recommendation: Homing antennas (AT-784/PRC) be placed in the hands of Battalion/Company personnel operating in the field; such an authorization currently exists, but not organic battalions have this equipment on hand. Also, that an SOP be developed Division wide for performing triangulations in response to all reported radio frequency interference.

2. Subject: Compromise of USKAC materials, Operations Codes, and classified information concerning U.S. operations.

(a) Observation: The practice of severely restricting the distribution of USKACs and Operations Codes is self-defeating. In the absence of the aids for passing classified or non-perishable information, unauthorized practices are followed which can only result in the compromise of information which requires protection.

(b) Evaluation: USKAC material and Operations Codes were developed to end the use of unauthorized shackle codes, point-of-origin codes, double talk messages and other ineffective means contrived to pass information. These new devices have proven extremely effective and, when properly used, meet all criteria established by the various security agencies for survivability. Because of the administrative headaches involved when a compromise of such material does occur, higher headquarters are prone to unduly restrict the distribution of these items; this is essentially like the ostrich with his head in the sand. In the absence of authorized material/devices, a G.I. is powerless below company level (the lowest echelon authorized the KY-38 secure device) to do anything except pass information in the clear or devise unsatisfactory alternative means. Such feeble attempts at deception can be easily broken to plain text by a trained analyst. When this information is ultimately encoded for further dissemination as prescribed, it only manages to compromise the system intended to protect it. This places in jeopardy all information encoded thereafter using that system.

(c) Recommendation: A more realistic approach be taken on distribution of USKAC's and Operations Codes. Although administrative problems result from the increased distribution, anything that protects information at the lowest operational level is in the best interest of all concerned.

E. Logistics

1. Subject: Direct Support Maintenance.

(a) Observation: Direct Support Maintenance as currently conceived, does not meet the needs of the organization it is intended to support.


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SUBJECT: Continued

(b) Evaluation: Except for certain select items of equipment, the maintenance company supporting this Brigade conducts a sort-and-forward operation. As a result, major end items may be deadlined for extended periods of time for the absence of a relative minor item of equipment which could best have been repaired on-the-spot. There is no better test bed for checking a troublesome item of equipment, than its normal mode of employment. What's more, the transportation and handling of loose equipment often causes more damage and misalignment than the original equipment fault.

(c) Recommendation: That, whenever possible, repair personnel make "house calls" to repair items comprising an integral part of a major end item. This should minimize the down time and eliminate unnecessary exposure of equipment to possible damage during shipment to and from the centralized maintenance facility. Decentralization of repairman of all types could further enhance the response time of Direct Support Maintenance activities.

F. Organization:- None



RICHARD M. DODSON
CPT Sig C
Bde Sig Officer

(c) Recommendation: That commands concerned place increasing emphasis on employing mechanical ambushes offensively.

(d) Command Action: This unit requires that classes on the proper employment of mechanical ambushes be given each time a unit is available for training.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training:

(1) Use of training ranges:

(a) Observation: The average US soldier does not receive proper training to remain tactically proficient in the field.

(b) Evaluation: The men tend to be over-confident due to lack of contact while in the field, thus the unit tactical proficiency deteriorates. The results are enemy initiated contacts followed by a poor reaction by the maneuver element.

(c) Recommendation: That units establish a training program that enables each man to employ his weapon against a variety of realistic targets. Emphasis, in this type of training, should be placed on the individual's gaining enthusiasm, aggressiveness and the immediate response to fire. Additional results are improved marksmanship, familiarity with the individual weapon and the development of team work within the squad.


(d) Command Action: This unit now has in operation an individual quick fire and squad reaction range.

f. Logistics. None.

g. Communications. None.

h. Material. None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOSEPH GRANO
CPT, Infantry
Adjutant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry
11th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BAS

28 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned

TO: Commanding Officer
11th Infantry Brigade
APO San Francisco 96217
ATTN: AVDF-BAOP

Reference: 23d Infantry Division Regulation 525-15 and letter (AVDF-BAOP) HQ,
11th Infantry Brigade dated 21 April 1971.

A. Personnel

1. Subject: Special Duty Personnel

a. A number of personnel assigned to the battalion are being utilized by higher headquarters as special duty personnel.

b. This results in an inflated battalion strength on which replacement and promotion are determined.

c. It is recommended that permanent special duty personnel be re-assigned to the headquarters in which they are being utilized.

B. Intelligence

1. Subject: Snipers

a. Snipers are required to go to Chu Lai monthly for a period of approximately 5 days to clean and rezero their weapons. Counting travel time back and forth, snipers are often not available for employment for approximately one-third of each month.

b. Snipers are skilled and highly trained individuals whose time is very valuable to the battalion. It is a waste of a valuable asset to have each sniper gone from the unit for approximately one-third of each month.

c. It is recommended that a mobile team be formed at Division level to travel to each unit that has snipers on a monthly basis. This team should spend approximately 2 days at each unit cleaning and repairing the snipers' weapons and working with the sniper to rezero his weapon. The team could also

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AVDF-BAS

28 April 1971

issue ammunition as required. Only snipers with serious maintenance problems would be sent to Chu Lai. This would increase the available time of the snipers by 25 to 40 per cent, and should serve to improve the sniper program within the Division.

C. Operations

1. It appears that due to a recent change to ambush tactics, this unit has been able to deceive the enemy and gain a decisive advantage.

2. By breaking the units down to section or half platoon size and staying under the thick foliage in the many ravines and small valleys in the AO, we have increased our friendly initiated contacts by 50% and the number of confirmed enemy killed by 65%. This unit by employing this tactic, plus restricting movement during daylight hours to the early morning or late afternoon, and enforcing a strict noise discipline, has achieved a marked increase in tactical successes.

D. Organization: None


E. Training: None

F. Logistics: None

G. Communications: None

H. Material: None

I. Other: None


JOHN B. LUKE
LTC, Infantry
Commanding