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**OAG D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980; OAG D/A ltr 29
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (29 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682237 16 August 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th
Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)
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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDD-AC

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-68 (R1) (U)

SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

1. (C) GENERAL:

a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division Artillery continued its participation in Operation MACARTHUR. For a portion of the period, 1 February - 30 March, the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division which was under Operational Control of the Americal Division where it participated in Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA and Operation PATRICK.

b. Organizational Structure.

(1) Task organization for Operation MACARTHUR is at inclosure 1.

(2) The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from the beginning of the period until 30 March at which time the attachment was terminated and the unit returned to Division Artillery control.

(3) Organic units during the reporting period.

- (a) HHB, 4th Infantry Division Artillery.
- (b) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105T).
- (c) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105T).
- (d) 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105T).
- (e) 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155/8"SP).

(4) Supporting Artillery units during the period.

- (a) 52d Artillery Group.
- (b) 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105SP).
- (c) 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155T).
- (d) 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175/8"SP).
- (e) 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175SP).
- (f) Battery A, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175/8"SP).

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- (g) Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175/8"SP).
- (h) 237th Radar Detachment.
- (i) Radar Section, 26th Target Acquisition Battalion.
- (j) Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (H-42 & I-55).
- (k) 2d Platoon, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (H-42).
- (l) 1st Platoon, Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight).
- (m) 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105T), organic to end in direct support of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) which participated in Operation MacArthur from 1 February to 30 March.

c. Commanders and Staffs as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

d. Mission.

(1) The mission of the artillery was to support the 4th Infantry Division with available artillery, radar, automatic weapons, searchlights and meteorological resources.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General: The area of operations for the 4th Infantry Division Artillery during the reporting period was the Central Highlands of South Vietnam in Kontum, Pleiku, and Daklak Province. The area of Kontum and Pleiku Province is characterized by steep mountains covered with heavily canopied wooded areas of teak, mahogany, and bamboo trees and passes to rolling terrain in Daklak Province. The orientation of units moving on the ground through dense growth is difficult, although defoliation and fires have cleared many areas. Artillery was used to good advantage for land navigation by employing on call artillery marking rounds. Much of the firing was adjusted by sound as forward observers had limited visibility due to the undergrowth and hilly terrain. The weather during the reporting period was generally clear and sunny. Rain showers began in the latter part of April.

b. Kontum Province.

(1) The beginning of the reporting period saw major enemy attacks on population centers. Among them was Kontum City. The TET Offensive began on 30 January and the enemy's objectives were to destroy US and ARVN troops, overthrow the GVN and induce the populace to rally behind the communists. The prime targets were GVN HQ, airstrips and military installations.

(2) In mid-January, the 24th NVA Regiment moved from a base area in

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Tourorong southeast towards Kontum City. In late January, an informant reported the enemy's plans to attack Kontum. The 24th Regiment and local VC battalion were identified as the units to attack. The attack began with rockets and mortars on 30 January. VC elements infiltrated the city and were targeted against RVN buildings and the airstrip. North of the city, allied forces were in contact with a regimental size force. On 1 February, attacks by fire and street fighting continued. On 2 February, the enemy began to disperse in small groups. The six days of fighting resulted in heavy enemy casualties. Enemy units identified in the attack were the 24th Regiment, 304th LF Battalion, 406th Sapper Battalion and guerilla forces.

(3) Contacts continued in Kontum City and Tanh Canh until 9 February 1968 when the enemy withdrew to resupply and refit. After the failure of the TET Offensive, the enemy shifted his emphasis to the Dak To/Sen Het area. The 66th NVA Regiment and elements of the 174th Regiment conducted attacks by fire. Both units suffered heavy casualties in February and withdrew to Cambodia to resupply.

(4) On 17 February 1968, a major road complex was discovered in the Plei Trap Valley in southwestern Kontum Province. This was an indication that the 1st NVA Division intended to move elements from the tri-border area and conduct operations against Plei Klong and possibly Kontum City. In early March, elements of the 24th Regiment were contacted north of Plei Klong. Daily surveillance of the road complex indicated the enemy continued to improve it both to the south and east. On 26 March, elements of the newly infiltrated 320th NVA Regiment were confirmed in an attack on a FSB just east of the road complex. The enemy suffered a great many losses in the attack. The 66th NVA Regiment also moved south from the tri-border area in April to conduct operations in the Plei Klong area and Kontum City with the 320th Regiment. Because of US operations, the enemy was kept off balance through the end of April.

c. Pleiku Province.

(1) The TET Offensive began in Pleiku City on 30 January. Mortar attacks on New Pleiku, Camp Holloway and the 3d ARVN Cav were initiated in conjunction with a 122mm rocket attack on the 71st Evac Hospital. The mortar attacks were followed up with ground assaults employing small arms, machine guns and satchel charges against host installations throughout the city. On 31 January, the enemy attempted to attack from the northeast but was drawn back by gunships and artillery. On 1 February, the enemy followed an attack by fire and breached the Camp Holloway perimeter. A POL truck was set on fire and five US were wounded. On the same day, southwest of Pleiku, local forces attacked Thanh An District Headquarters resulting in 10 VC KIA and 23 CIA. Later that day, five kilometers southeast of Thanh An, US forces contacted an unknown size force, killing 200 enemy. On 2 February, action continued southeast and southwest of Pleiku. Elements of the H-15 Battalion were contacted as it prepared to attack Pleiku from two kilometers southwest of the city. Results were 140 enemy KIA and the capture of the battalion commanding officer. The POL area of Camp Holloway was hit as mortar attacks continued on 3 February. The units identified in ground assaults on Pleiku City include the 407th and 408th Sapper Battalions, H-15 Battalion, a K23 Sapper Unit

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and local guerrillas. The 31st, 40th Artillery Regiment is believed to be responsible for the rocket attacks.

(2) The enemy withdrew to base areas in early February, following TET. Elements of the 6th Battalion, 32d Regiment joined two companies of the 31st Battalion, 40th Artillery Regiment and moved to the hills, 16-18 kilometers southwest of Pleiku City. In late February, these elements moved north of Highway 509 and joined the 4th Battalion, 95B Regiment in the Chu Prong-Chu Kan area 25-30 kilometers west of Pleiku City.

(3) On 4 March, a platoon size element attacked Camp Enari with 120mm rockets from the east. On 16 March, a company sized element attacked Camp Enari from the southwest. It is believed both attacks were conducted by the 31st Battalion, 40th Artillery Regiment, which then moved back to the base areas near Chu Prong.

(4) Main elements of the 408th Sapper Battalion withdrew to the northeast of the city and operated in the general area of Le Chi since early February. From February to April, the 408th continued to attack by fire and ground assaults with company sized elements against Pleiku City and friendly installations in and around the city.

(5) The K-15 Battalion rallied in the Gatcha area after TET and then moved to base areas along the Dak Ayunh, approximately 20 kilometers east of Camp Enari, where they remained through April.

(6) In early February, the 5th Battalion 95B Regiment moved south, across Highway 19E and set up a base area east of the Dak Payon, approximately 35 kilometers east of Camp Enari. From this location, they conducted minor ambushes along Highway 19E on 7 February. Then again on 4-6 March, ambushes were executed along the Lang Yang Pass area.

(7) On 21 February, elements of the 174th Regiment were located eight kilometers northwest of Plei Prong and on 6 March they were located about 27 kilometers north of Pleiku City. The 1st and 3d Battalions along with the headquarters and regiment support elements setup base areas east of Highway 14N, 16-24 kilometers north of Pleiku City. In early March these elements conducted minor ambushes along Highway 14. On 13 March, 48 NVA were killed when they ambushed a US convoy on Highway 14. In mid March, documents revealed that the 6th Battalion, 32d Regiment had elements operating with the 174th Regiment.

d. Daklak Province.

(1) Ban Io Thuot was attacked on 30 January as were all major cities in the Division A0. The NVA and VC units commenced shelling the 23d ARVNs HQ, elements of the 29th Artillery and the city airstrip. The 1st Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment attacked from the south in small groups. The 301st VC Battalion attacked the province chief's house, while the 101st Battalion of the 33d Regiment attacked

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other installations in the area. The 39th Battalion, 33d Regiment advanced against the Radio Station and the RF/PP Training Center. Attacking from the north were the 401st VC Battalion, the 3d Battalion, 33d Regiment with the F-16 and H-5 Companies.

(2) On 1 February, the 1st Battalion, 33d Regiment continued to attack the small market place. On 3 February, friendly elements were shelled with 122mm rockets. Finally, on 5 February, the enemy was pushed from the city. The results of the TET Offensive in Ban Lie Thuot were 994 enemy KI and 26 CIA.

(3) After TET, both the 33d Regiment and the 301st Battalion retreated to the southwest of the city of Ban Lie Thuot. On 25 February, the 33d Regiment withdrew to the northwest approximately 12 kilometers from Ban Lie Thuot. On 1 March, the 4th and 5th Battalions of the 32d NVA Regiment came to Darlac Province and located near the Biowal Plantation until early April, then exfiltrated to Cambodia. Major ground attacks were expected in Ban Lie Thuot but were probably thwarted by the arrival of US forces in early March. Ban Lie Thuot did receive attacks by fire on six occasions in March and one in late April. The 33d Regiment, after extensive resupply in March and early April withdrew to a base area in Cambodia. The area north of Ban Lie Thuot was then left in the hands of local VC forces. Scattered, sporadic attacks continued throughout the area in late April. Although they were extremely light, reports continued that there would be large scale attacks early in the monsoon season.

c. Base Camp Defense.

(1) Visual reconnaissance of the TAOR was flown with one or more aircraft each morning at first light and each evening prior to darkness, weather permitting.

(2) Patrol activity was continued throughout the TAOR. Five to six moving patrols and two stationary patrols were employed on a daily basis.

(3) One platoon minus was committed to defense of the new hamlet in 2d Brigade's Sector of the TAOR. Another platoon minus was committed to a second new hamlet in the 2d Brigade Sector. Defensive barbed wire has been placed around both villages and both hamlets have 24 hour defense assistance from sector.

(4) During this period, "Nighthawk", a UH-1H helicopter with searchlight mounted, has been employed in the TAOR during hours of darkness. "Nighthawk's" mission is visual reconnaissance, locating patrols in the TAOR and airborne surveillance during critical periods of possible rocket attacks. This employment of "Nighthawk" has been effective.

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(5) Camp Enari came under attack by 122mm rocket fire on three occasions during the period. The dates of the rocket attacks were:

(a) 8 February 1968: 37 rockets (122mm). Results were eight WIA, one KIA, three buildings destroyed, one damaged, one UH-1H destroyed four damaged and three UH-1C damaged.

(b) 4 March 1968: 50 rockets (122mm) and unknown number of 57mm recoilless rifle fire. Results were seven slight WIA, none KIA, four buildings destroyed, 11 damaged, one UH-1H destroyed, 9 UH-1H damaged, two LOH damaged, two vehicles damaged.

(c) 16 March 1968: 12 rockets (122mm). All landed outside the perimeter. Results were negative casualties/damage.

f. Survey:

(1) Battalion survey sections continued conducting position area surveys to furnish control and direction to firing batteries and radar sections.

(2) The Division Artillery Survey Section continued to furnish battalion survey sections with survey control points. Division Artillery also provided IFFORCEV with security and assistance in establishing control between Camp Enari and Ban Me Thuot. Division Artillery operations were limited due to Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) being turned into support maintenance for repair because of non-available parts. Four DMEs have been shipped back to CONUS for replacement.

g. Metro Section:

(1) Five electronic metro sections were employed in the Division Area of Operations. During the period, the division realigned the Meteorological stations and added two new stations. They are located as follows: One at Oasis with 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (4th Infantry Division Artillery), one at Dak To with 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (52d Artillery Group), one at Kontum with 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (IFFORCEV OPCON to 52d Artillery Group), one at Ban Me Thuot with 8th Battalion, 26th Artillery TAB (IFFORCEV OPCON to 52d Artillery Group) and one at Suoi Doi with 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (52d Artillery Group).

(2) The Division Artillery Metro Section operated for a total of 1043 hours and was nonoperational for 37 hours for mechanical reasons. A total of 462 flights were made. The Metro Section transmitted 921 DATA and Computer type messages and had 11 aborts. The Division Artillery Metro Section moved from Camp Enari to its present location at Oasis on 12 March 1968.

h. Radar:

(1) The Division Artillery AN/TPS-25 (GSR) was located in Base Camp for the period and conducted ground surveillance of the TAOR and surveillance of fires within the TAOR. The AN/TPS-25 was operational 763 hours and nonoperational 348 hours due to mechanical and electrical failures and was

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finally replaced by a new AN/TPS-25.

(2) The Division Artillery AN/PPS-5, acquired in January, provided back-up for the AN/TPS-25; it was operational 926 hours and was nonoperational 20 hours. Total targets detected by both radars was 469. The AN/PPS-5 was moved from Base Camp to Dragon Mountain for better surveillance of terrain to the west. In so moving the PPS-5 covers the dead space of the AN/TPS-25.

(3) The AN/APQ-10 Counterbattery Radar, O-COM to Division Artillery, moved from Base Camp to Hocine in April. This AN/APQ-10 Radar was operational for 247 hours and non-operational for 120 hours for parts. There were negative contacts during the period.

(4) Four AN/APQ-4A Counter-mortar Radars were employed in the 4th Division Area of Operations during this reporting period; one from each direct support battalion and one from the 237th Radar Detachment. These radars are used for counter-mortar surveillance and artillery registrations. Data on the direct support battalion radars is as follows:

(a) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery AN/APQ-4A was operational 643 hours and had a total of 24 enemy sightings.

(b) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery AN/APQ-4A was operational 1621 hours and had a total of 62 enemy sightings.

(c) 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery AN/APQ-4A was operational 492 hours and had no enemy sightings.

i. Aerial Observers: Division Artillery provided Aerial Observers for the Division Visual Reconnaissance and Surveillance Program, artillery registrations and contact missions. The Aerial Observers flew 855 missions, logging 2025 hours of flight time during the period.

j. Searchlight: Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight), provided 13 23-inch Xenon searchlights in the AO during the period. All searchlights were operational during the period except for 48 searchlight-hours. Three of the lights were employed in support of Base Camp defense following prepared schedules, rotated on a nightly basis.

3. (C) Operations

a. Plans: During the period the 4th Infantry Division Artillery participated in Operation Mac Arthur. The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was detached from the Division until 30 March 1968.

b. Operations.

(1) Mac Arthur: 12 October 1967 - Still in progress

(a) Concept of Operation: Direct support artillery was provided on

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a maneuver battalion-artillery battery basis, with batteries changing OPCON from their parent battalions as the brigade task organization changed. Medium and heavy artillery were used in reinforcing and general support missions in order to weight critical areas. Artillery automatic weapons were used for convoy and firebase/base camp security. Artillery coverage was provided in the border areas, especially in the vicinity of the USSF/CSF Camps.

(b) Execution:

(1) The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was in direct support of the 1st Brigade; the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was in direct support of the 2d Brigade; the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was in direct support of the 3d Brigade; and Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was in direct support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the remainder of the 52d Artillery Group units were employed in general support and reinforcing roles.

(2) The TET Offensive by the VC/INA was in progress as the period began. Fire support bases in the Dak To and Pleiku area came under repeated weapons attacks while the enemy concentrated his ground attacks on the population centers of Pleiku City and Kontum City as well as several smaller district headquarters. TF 1/22 with Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery in Direct Support and Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155SP) reinforcing was positioned in Kontum City where the artillery was used extensively by both US and ARVN Forces to drive the enemy from the city and destroy him. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery provided a Liaison Section and Division Artillery provided a Forward Observer to support the 4th Engineer Battalion Reaction Force, which was dispatched to assist in the defense of Pleiku City. Artillery fires were provided by Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery and by Battery E, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155SP Provisional) (Base Camp Defense).

Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was placed OPCON to the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry.

(3) With the deterioration of the TET Offensive, a shift of enemy forces was met with a comparable shift of US Forces including artillery units. During the first weeks of March, task force 1/12 was organized and sent to the Ban Me Thuot area in Darlac Province. The headquarters of the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was the artillery control element for the task force. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was placed in direct support of the task force; battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155SP) provided reinforcing fires and Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175/8"SP) provided general support fires. The Artillery Batteries were utilized on numerous occasions to provide supporting fires for ARVN, CSF and NSC operations in the area as well as the joint US-ARVN Operations.

Operations were also started to the west of Kontum City during the latter part of February by the 173d Airborne Brigade. Task Force 1/2 came under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade and conducted

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operations in the area Northeast of Kontum City. The 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (-) was in direct support of the 173d Airborne Brigade and Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry.

(4) As activity increased in the area west of Kontum City the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was placed OPCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade and Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was placed OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery with the mission of direct support of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry. Also the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry was placed OPCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade and Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was placed OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery with the mission of direct support of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry. On 26 March 1968 Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery and the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry fire support base came under a ground and weapon attack by an estimated two NVA Battalions. Using flamethrowers, automatic weapons, B-40 rockets and small arms, the enemy overran the perimeter bunkers near the artillery position forcing the infantry to withdraw and forcing one howitzer section to move back to the next howitzer. The artillery fired direct fire with high explosive and beehive ammunition thwarting the enemy attack and inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers. A sweep of the firebase and perimeter the following day disclosed 135 NVA killed and numerous types and quantities of equipment were captured.

(5) On 30 March the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division with the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery returned to division control and relieved the 173d Airborne Brigade in place in Kontum City and the area of operations to the west. The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was detached from the 3d Brigade and returned to Division Artillery control with the mission of direct support of the 3d Brigade, 4th Division.

(6) In April Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery returned to its parent Battalion's control. During the latter part of April, TF 1/12 was terminated and the units returned from the Ban Me Thuot area. Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was placed in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and dispatched to the area west of Kontum where it became OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, moved to the Kontum area and became OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery returned to the control of its parent battalion.

(7) Medium artillery support in the Kontum area was provided by Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery both of which had the mission of general support reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (8"SP), Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175/8"SP) and Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175SP) provided heavy artillery support in the area.

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(8) During this reporting period the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery controlled and planned the fires of six light batteries, two medium batteries and three heavy batteries of artillery, and was at times supporting up to six maneuver battalions and one cavalry troop and two Air Cavalry troops. To assist in coordination a fire support element of the 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery was placed in Polei Kleng and controlled the heavy artillery in the area.

(9) Mutually supporting firebases were habitually used.

(10) Harassment and interdiction fires were considerably decreased during the period as more confirmed targets were detected and the dissemination of intelligence targets and information became more efficient. All units of Division Artillery also re-evaluated their targeting techniques resulting in improved targeting and a more practical attack of the target available. Intelligence targets were attacked rapidly with large volumes of fire. On occasion these fires have produced secondary explosions and intelligence indicates that this procedure has been responsible for inflicting damage on enemy personnel and equipment as well as materially decreasing his morale.

(11) Employment of the AN/MPQ-4A countermortar radars in the Dak To, Ben Het, Kontum City and Polei Kleng areas was very effective. Radars were able to locate 86 enemy weapons positions during the quarter. The rapid detection of the positions coupled with the speed of the artillery counterfires resulted in many secondary explosions as well as enemy weapons destroyed and personnel killed or wounded. The radars were also used extensively to register artillery batteries.

(12) All Division Artillery units continued to make excellent use of the observation posts established at each firebase. Mutually supporting firebases were able to conduct high burst registrations. Most significant, was the number (58) of visual sightings of enemy weapon's positions. Using oriented instruments the observers were able to adjust artillery fire to the enemy's positions.

(13) Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (W) and the 2d Platoon, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW), continued to provide automatic weapons support to the Division throughout the period. During daylight hours the M-42 "Dusters" and M-55 "Quad 50's" were effectively utilized for convoy security and highway strong points. The quad 50's were also lifted by CH-47 into otherwise inaccessible firebases to reinforce the firebase security. During the hours of darkness the automatic weapons were used for firebase security and also for H&I fires in conjunction with the 23 inch xenon searchlights provided by 1st Platoon, Battery B, 29th Searchlight.

c. Chronological Summary of Significant Activities (See inclosure 3)

d. Task Organization (See inclosure 1)

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e: Ammunition Expenditures - Operation Mac Arthur (1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
A/2/9	105T	6,506
B/2/9	105T	4,296
C/2/9	105T	7,223
A/6/29	105T	17,682
B/6/29	105T	14,768
C/6/29	105T	15,670
A/4/42	105T	8,741
B/4/42	105T	7,519
C/4/42	105T	22,917
D/4/42 (BC)	105T	6,092
A/3/319	105T	15,589
B/3/319	105T	6,260
A/3/6	105SP	3,262
B/3/6	105SP	6,320
C/3/6	105SP	8,614
TOTAL	105MM	<u>151,459</u>
A/5/16	155SP	8,834
B/5/16	155SP	8,013
C/5/16	155SP	11,829
E/5/16 (BC)	155SP	3,530
A/1/92	155T	10,597

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
B/1/92	155T	14,402
C/1/92	155T	19,420
TOTAL	155MM	<u>76,625</u>
D/5/16	8"SP	6,826
A/6/14	8"SP	2,940
C/6/14	8"SP	3,510
A/7/15	8"SP	535
C/7/15	8"SP	2,638
B/5/22	8"SP	305
TOTAL	8"SP	<u>16,754</u>
A/6/14	175SP	2,859
B/6/14	175SP	7,512
C/6/14	175SP	2,527
A/5/22	175SP	4,414
B/5/22	175SP	201
C/5/22	175SP	7,596
A/7/15	175SP	693
C/7/15	175 SP	600
TOTAL	175SP	<u>26,402</u>

GRAND TOTAL

RECAPITULATION

<u>105MM</u>	<u>155MM</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>175MM</u>
151,459	76,625	16,754	26,402

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4. (C) Training.

a. The Division Artillery continued with scheduled training as required by 4th Infantry Division Regulation 350-6. In addition to this program Division Artillery included a minimum of 15 hours per week to encompass MOS refresher training, safety during firing, and rules of engagement. The battalions further expanded their MOS refresher training to include MOS's other than those directly connected with the delivery of fire. Cross training proficiency continues to be emphasized in the units.

b. During the period the 4th Infantry Division Artillery conducted five Forward Observer training courses for 23 newly assigned officers. These courses served as an orientation on Vietnam to include techniques and procedures peculiar to our area of operations as well as safety procedures and precautions utilized. Lessons learned during previous operations were stressed. Major practical exercises in the adjustment of artillery fire by sound, the adjustment and utilization of battlefield illumination and a land navigation course were included into the program of instruction with a high degree of success.

1. Division Artillery also conducted six FADAC Schools enrolling 28 students. The primary FADAC instructor also made several visits to the units in the field to conduct training and to provide technical assistance.

2. The direct support battalions instituted training programs on observed fire and artillery adjustment for LRRP's and other non-artillery personnel. During the reporting period over 150 personnel received this training.

3 Division Artillery also utilized the IFFV Artillery Fire Direction Officer and Forward Observer courses. During the period three newly assigned officers attended the Forward Observer course and 21 officers attended the Fire Direction Officer course.

4. The training conducted during the period stressed both the reduction of artillery incidents and the improvement of individual and unit proficiency.

c. The Division Artillery inspection/instruction team continued to visit each of the firing batteries in the field on a monthly basis as the tactical situation permitted. The purpose of the team was to detect areas of deficient performance or knowledge and to provide assistance and/or instruction on improvement where applicable. Division Artillery also instituted an operations and training inspection team which visited both the battalion forward and rear areas.

d. The artillery battalions conducted training and assistance programs for Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Camp Strike Forces, Mobile Strike Forces, and Special Forces camps in the area of operations. A breakdown of assistance rendered is as follows:

(1) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery - In the Mac Arthur AO the battalion S-3/

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FDC section is providing aid to the ARVN artillery through metro messages and instruction on the use and computations of MET data.

(2) 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery - The battalion provided assistance to the 221st ARVN Artillery Battalion under the Associate Battery Program during the period. On several occasions battalion personnel have assisted in the training of ARVN firing sections, FDC sections and survey teams.

(3) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery - A complete program was established and initiated to train Special Forces Advisors from Ben Het, Dak Pek and Dak Seang in artillery fundamentals. Liaison visits were also made to the camps.

(4) 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery - The battalion made liaison visits to Special Forces camps at Duc Co and Plei Me periodically during the period. The battalion artillery mechanic made monthly inspections of the howitzers in the camps and made on the spot corrections whenever possible. Howitzers requiring major maintenance repairs were airlifted to Oasis for ordnance support. Howitzer crews at Duc Co were instructed in duties of the cannoneers, field fortifications and maintenance by a team from Battery B.

5. (C) Logistics.

a. Basic Loads of Ammunition.

(1) The basic loads of ammunition remain the same as through the initial portion of Operation Mac Arthur.

<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>TYPES AMMO</u>	<u>BTRY POSITION</u>
105mm How	HE	1200
	ILL	100
	WP	100
	SMK	50
155mm How	HE	800
	ILL	50
	WP	50
	SMK	50
8 inch	HE	600

(2) Variations of battery stockage due to heavy contact with the enemy were approved as the situation arose.

(3) During the month of April 1968, the Division Ammunition Officer opened the Base Camp ASP. The Base Camp ASP is a working ASP for the 4th Aviation Battalion and the Division Artillery Base Camp guns at the same time, the Base Camp ASP of the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery was closed.

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(4) Available supply rate of Artillery Ammunition (ASR) (105mm HE).

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRED</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVINGS</u>
241801 Jan-091800 Feb	39.3	61.6	-22.3
091801 Feb-241800 Feb	36.0	30.1	5.9
241801 Feb-091800 Mar	38.3	34.0	4.3
091801 Mar-241800 Mar	35.9	13.2	22.7
241801 Mar-091800 Apr	34.5	19.5	15.0
091801 Apr-241800 Apr	40.0	17.7	22.3

b. Equipment.

(1) Deadline Rates.

Div Arty Units-D/L per cent per day for period 1 Feb 68 to 30 Apr 68.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>D/L Units During Period</u>	<u>D/L %</u>
Trk $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	624 day units	6.5%
Trk $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	1124 day units	9.8%
Trk $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton	1749 day units	11.27%
Trk 5 ton	348 day units	11.7%
Trk 5 ton Wrecker	176 day units	35.4%
Carrier H 577	80 day units	12.5%
Carrier Cargo M58	181 day units	9.1%
Vehicle Rec M88	33 day units	36.2%
Vehicle Rec M578	44 day units	48.3%
Howitzer 105mm	147 day units	4%
Howitzer 155mm SP	226 day units	13.9%
Howitzer 8 inch SP	117 day units	32.5%

(2) Major Equipment Losses:

- 1 each $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck (5/16th) destroyed by mine.
- 4 each Howitzer 105mm M101A.
- 2 from 2d Bn, 9th Arty destroyed by rocket fire.
- 1 from 6th Bn, 29th Arty destroyed by flame thrower.
- 1 from 4th Bn, 42d Arty dropped by CH-47, destroyed in place by EOD personnel.

(a) The high deadline rate of the M109 howitzer was primarily due to age of the equipment. During this quarter, all M109 howitzers were replaced on a closed loop support program. There has since been a resultant decrease in deadline time.

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(b) The 32.5% rate on the M110 howitzers was caused by a complete breakdown of one of the four howitzers. This howitzer has also been replaced and the deadline rate should be reduced accordingly.

6. (C) Aviation.

1. General.

a. The Aviation Section experienced a change in aviator assignments during the past quarter. Four aviators were rotated to COUS for reassignment while one Aviator was re-assigned in-country. One Lieutenant and four Warrant Officers were assigned to the section as replacements. The Lieutenant and one Warrant Officer had flown in the area prior to their assignment to the section and required transition in the OH-23G. One Warrant Officer had flown the OH-23G prior to assignment to the section and required a local area checkout. Two of the Warrant Officers were new in country. One required 10 hours of instruction and the other 15 hours instruction, prior to being assigned operational missions. This proved sufficient for a local checkout in the OH-23G.

b. During the reporting period two additional aircraft were assigned to the section and three were destroyed. The section has eight OH-23G aircraft, one short of authorized strength.

2. Disposition of aircraft during reporting period.

- a. HMB, 4th Infantry Division Artillery: 8 OH-23G.
- b. 4th Aviation Battalion: 2 UH-1C.

3. Operations: The Aviation Section of 4th Division Artillery accomplished the following:

a. During the month of February, 564 combat support missions were flown and 1243 passengers were transported requiring 1210 sorties. A total of 489 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 54%.

b. During the month of March 560 combat support missions were flown and 1064 passengers were transported requiring 1147 sorties. A total 441 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 59%.

c. During the month of April, 852 combat support missions were flown and 1752 passengers were transported requiring 1781 sorties. A total 676 hours was logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 62%.

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d. The quarterly totals are as follows:

- (1) Missions flown - 1976.
- (2) Passengers transported - 4059.
- (3) Sorties required - 4138.
- (4) Hours logged on aircraft - 1606
- (5) Average aircraft availability - 58%.

7. (C) Personnel.

a. Summary of personnel daily and periodic strength reports:

• (1) Average assigned strength.

(a) February 68	- Officer	<u>186</u>	WO	<u>14</u>	EM	<u>2017</u>
(b) March 68	- Officer	<u>182</u>	WO	<u>12</u>	EM	<u>2114</u>
(c) April 68	- Officer	<u>188</u>	WO	<u>13</u>	EM	<u>2210</u>

(2) Average present for duty strength.

(a) February 68	- Officer	<u>176</u>	WO	<u>13</u>	EM	<u>1924</u>
(b) March 68	- Officer	<u>175</u>	WO	<u>12</u>	EM	<u>2002</u>
(c) April 68	- Officer	<u>177</u>	WO	<u>13</u>	EM	<u>2111</u>

(3) Summary of losses for the period.

• (a) Battle casualties.

1. February 68 - KIA 3 WIA 22
2. March 68 - KIA 1 WIA 43
3. April 68 - KIA 1 WIA 23

• (b) Non Battle casualties.

1. February 68 - INJ 31 SICK 234
2. March 68 - INJ 38 SICK 164
3. April 68 - INJ 53 SICK 204

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(c) DEROS and ETS.

1. February 68 - OFF 2 WO 1 EM 156
2. March 68 - OFF 2 WO 1 EM 104
3. April 68 - OFF 2 WO 0 EM 111

(4) Summary of replacements received.

- (a) February 68 - OFF 23 WO 1 EM 146
- (b) March 68 - OFF 19 WO 0 EM 331
- (c) April 68 - OFF 11 WO 5 EM 142

b. Summary of welfare and disciplinary activities.

(1) Non-judicial punishment.

- (a) February 68 - 30 cases.
- (b) March 68 - 31 cases.
- (c) April 68 - 18 cases.

(2) Courts Martials

- (a) February 68 - Summary 2 Special 1
- (b) March 68 - Summary 0 Special 2
- (c) April 68 - Summary 1 Special 1

(3) Rest and Recuperation Program.

- (a) During the period 611 quotas were utilized by Division
- (b) Breakdown of quotas is as follows (in country/out of country).

Artillery.

UNIT	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	TOTAL
HHC Div Arty	4/17	4/13	0/25	63
2d Bn, 9th Arty	4/24	4/28	4/43	107
5th Bn, 16th Arty	9/49	19/41	10/53	181

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UNIT	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	TOTAL
6th Bn, 29th Arty	5/36	7/44	8/38	138
4th Bn, 42d Arty	6/28	9/26	6/37	122
TOTALS	28/154	43/162	28/196	611

c. Summary of Re-enlistment activities.

UNIT	ELIGIBLE	REENLISTED
HHB, Div Arty	7	3
2d Bn, 9th Arty	7	4
5th Bn, 16th Arty	37	5
6th Bn, 29th Arty	7	5
4th Bn, 42d Arty	14	0

d. Chaplin Activities.

(1) During the past quarter, 1 Feb 68 - 30 Apr 68, the Div Arty Chaplain's Section, comprised of two chaplains and two chaplain's assistants functioned as follows:

(a) Conducted 204 Protestant Worship Services with a total attendance of 5,216.

(b) Conducted 274 Roman Catholic Masses with a total of 6,647 attendance.

(c) Made a total of 32 visits to the confirmed men of our units in the hospital.

(d) Made daily visits to troops located at base camp and an average of five visits weekly to men in the forward fire bases.

(e) In addition to regular religious coverage of Div Arty units the Protestant Chaplain provided coverage for:

1. 124th Signal Battalion
2. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry
3. Units of the 4th Division 1st Brigade
4. 4th Engineers Battalion
5. 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry
6. 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry

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7. 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery
8. 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery
9. Units of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Division
10. 70th Engineers Battalion

(f) In addition to regular religious coverage of Div Arty units the Catholic Chaplain provided coverage for:

1. 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry
2. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor
3. 20th Engineers Battalion
4. 4th Engineers Battalion
5. 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
6. 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery
7. 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery
8. Units of 1st Brigade 4th Division
9. Units of 2d Brigade 4th Division
10. Units of the 3d Brigade 4th Division
11. 173d Airborne Brigade
12. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry
13. 5th Battalion, 60th Artillery
14. 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery
15. 70th Engineers Battalion

(g) Conducted 15 Character Guidance Lecture for Div Arty troops.

(h) Assisted in several civic action programs on Division level.

(i) Assisted Div Arty Surgeon on three MEDCAPS.

(2) The Div Arty Chapel was also used for denominational services including:

26 Services of Latter Day Saints with a total attendance of 105.

16 Jewish Services with a total of 165 attendance.

13 Services of the Church of Christ with a total attendance of 130.

R: (C) Civil Affairs.

a. Division Artillery and 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery: During the quarter, Division Artillery S-5 had the responsibility for Civil Affairs activities in the Yellow Sector of the Camp Enari TAOR. Each of the 11 villages in the sector were assigned to one of the five Civil Affairs team working in Yellow Sector. Each team attempted to visit its villages five times each week to include two MEDCAPS visits. A list of units providing Civil Affairs teams and their villages of responsibility was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VILLAGE</u>
HHC, 4th Inf Div	Plei Ho Iumm (AR 802 277)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VILLAGE</u>
HHC, 4th Inf Div	Plei Ho Khinh (AR 802 268)
4th MP CO	Plei Ho My Klah (AR 819 243)
4th MP CO	Plei Ho Teng Lao (AR 820 225)
4th MP CO	Plei Ho La Boa (AR 833 230)
HHB, 4th Inf Div Arty	Phu My (AR 766 283)
HHB, 4th Inf Div Arty	Plei Klane Ngol #1 (AR 757 268)
124th Sig Bn	Plei Klane Ngol #2 (AR 785 263)
124th Sig Bn	Plei Klane Klah (AR 762 263)
5th Bn, 16th Arty	Plei Klane Ngol #3 (ZA 237 260)
5th Bn, 16th Arty	Plei Plan Dak (ZA 240 258)

Village visitations have continued to stress sanitation, health, and self help. Medical personnel treated a total of 2812 patients on MEDCAP visits. Commodities provided have included building materials, used clothing, soap and medicines. In addition, transportation has been provided periodically for villagers to travel to Pleiku to trade their produce and manufactured items for other necessities. A total of 987 man days were utilized in conducting the Civil Affairs activities in the villages.

During the TET Offensive numerous kidnappings by the VC occurred in the sector villages. The persons kidnapped were for the most part village chiefs and sub chiefs. All surviving persons have returned to the villages with instructions from the VC to hold no position of leadership for the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) as part of their indoctrination while in VC custody.

Civic action visits have been successful in their continued medical assistance programs, which villagers readily accepted. Through the regular visits, the CA teams have received limited reports and bits of intelligence information and there is evidence of improved organization within the villages. It is felt that progress is being made as a result of the civic action efforts in keeping the people aware that the GVN with the US assistance can better their way of life.

b. 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

a. During the reporting period, civil affairs action were administered under the direction of the Bn S-5/Commo section.

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b. In the Mac Arthur area of operations, the Battalion is assisting the Kontum leprosarium in its grounds and building improvement project. Recently the Communication Section installed a complete electrical lighting system in a new wing of the hospital building and instructed the staff in its use.

c. 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery.

This organization has been responsible for conducting civil affairs activities in two villages close to Dak To, Dak Robie (YB995224) with a population of 160 and Dak Tomboe with a population of 140. The Civil Affairs team made a total of 30 visits to these villages resulting in a total of 740 Medical cases and a total of 2180 instances of participation in the youth health program. In addition, the team taught the village youths such games as volleyball, stickball, and leapfrog. A special note of interest was disclosure of a case of smallpox. Immediate action was taken to inoculate the members of Dak Tomboe as well as the neighboring village of Dak Robie. The reaction of the villages has been most rewarding with a very good relationship established. As a result the people of the villages have been very cooperative, often reporting incidents that have proved to be valuable intelligence information.

In the Pleiku area, the Battalion conducts regular civil affairs activities in three villages; Plei Gyun (AR818325) with 350 inhabitants, Plei Le Anh (AR 824324) with a population of 250, and Plei Hlu Klah (AR840328) with 200 inhabitants. A total of 68 visits were made to these villages during the quarter at which time 216 personnel availed themselves of medical supplies. There was total of 2764 instances of participation in the youth health program. These villages have no serious health problems. Skin diseases are the most prevalent and villagers are instructed and encouraged to use proper hygiene.

d. 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery

(1) Assigned Villages:

- (a) Plei Peing AR869425.
- (b) Plei Dok Kong AR874426.
- (c) Plei Chop Dui AR877433.
- (d) Plei Komonor AR876425.

(2) During the month of February 230 MEDCAP patients were treated. The CA team constructed a spillway to serve Plei Dok Kong and Plei Komonor. Normal activities, such as instructing the children in games, taking the villagers to market, meeting with the chiefs, were conducted. The volume of activity was curtailed by the TET offensive.

(3) During March approximately 800 MEDCAP patients were treated by the team's medics. The main project was moving six villages (including all those assigned to the Battalion) to a central location at AR866419 to form a strong,

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fortified village. The CA teams provided transportation for the villagers, their houses and their goods. This was a massive project and took most of the month to accomplish. At the end of the month when the new village (Unnamed) was well established, the Battalion CA team (with two others) moved into the village on a full time basis. They advised and assisted the Montagnards in fortifying their new village, the main part of which was laying $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of barbed wire. The CA team also contributes directly to the defense with its weapons and by instructing the villagers in defensive techniques.

(4) During April 119 MEDCAP patient were treated by the Battalion medics. The barbed wire task, begun in March, was completed. The team is now engaged in a construction project to emplace field fortifications on the perimeter of the new village.

9. (C) Signal. To support tactical and administrative requirements within the TAOR and in defense of Camp Enari, Division Artillery used VHF, landline, FM radio, and AM/RATT radio communications.

a. VHF. The Division Artillery Operations Center utilized sole user circuits in the Division VHF System. These circuits terminated at Division Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Centers and the 52d Artillery Group. Division Artillery also used four common user trunk circuits in the Division VHF system to organic battalions and the 52d Artillery Group. These circuits provide common user trunk service between Division Artillery Headquarters and three direct support battalion tactical command posts located in forward areas and one to the 52d Artillery Group.

b. Landline. The Division Artillery Communications Section operated two switchboards during the period. The Division Artillery Operations Center using a triple stacked SB-22 operated 19 sole user tactical hotline circuits and 24 local circuits processing an average of 53 calls per hour. The Division Artillery common user switchboard operated 21 trunk circuits and 26 local circuits. Landlines are presently restricted to the confines of Camp Enari; therefore all outside circuits are furnished by VHF.

c. FM Radio. The Division Artillery Operations Center served as Net Control Station for the Division Artillery CF Net and the Base Camp Fire Request Net while monitoring the Division CF Net. Two radios were equipped with speech security equipment. The Installation Coordination Center served as Net Control Station for the Base Camp Defense Net and monitored the Sector Defense Nets and the Pleiku Sector Defense Net. With the completion of the new Tactical Operations Center all radios were relocated from Signal Hill to the TOC thereby omitting the requirement to remote the radios. Since the relocation of the Division Artillery CF Net radio reduced its range capability, a radio retransmission station was installed on Dragon Mountain on 30 April 1968. The retransmission station considerably improved the communications capability in that Division Artillery now has FM radio communications with all its organic battalions.

d. AM/RATT. The Division Artillery Radio Section operated as the Net

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
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Control station on the AM/RATT CF net. There are a total of six stations operating in this net. More extensive use was made of the RATT during this period to transmit operational administrative training messages to the battalions. This served a dual purpose by giving the units written as opposed to oral instructions and also provided excellent training for the operators. The radio section also monitors the Division Operations Net where it serves as alternate Net Control Station.

e. Another area of major activity for the Communications Section was the relocation of communication equipment and facilities to the new Tactical Operations Center. This included the rerouting of a 50 pair cable from the Division wirehead and reinstallation of the switchboard, telephones, radios, powerlines and antennas.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ISAAC W. HAWKINS JR.
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

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2-COST ANAL STUDY GP, USARV
6-CG, 1 FFORCE V
5-CG, 1 FFORCE V ARTY
1-CG, ROK V
1-COMDT, ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
1-COMDT, ARMY WAR COLLEGE
2-COMDT, USAAMS (ARTY SCH)
1-COMDT, C & GS
1-COMDT, ARMOR SCH
1-COMDT, AVN SCH
1-COMDT, INF SCH
1-COMDT, USMA
1-CG, 1ST AIR CAV DIV
1-CG, 4TH INF DIV
1-CG, AERICAL DIV
1-CG, ROK CAP DIV
1-CG, 9TH ROK INF DIV
1-CG, 173D ABN BDE (SEP)
1-DSA, II CORPS
1-SA, 24TH STZ
3-CO, 52d ARTY GP
1-CO, 937TH ENGR GP
1-CO, 52D AVN BN
1-CO, 20TH ENGR BN
1-CO, 5TH USSF GP
1-CO, Co. B, 5TH USSF
5-CO, 1ST BDE, 4TH INF DIV
5-CO, 2D BDE, 4TH INF DIV
5-CO, 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV
2-CO, DISCOM
2-CO, 2D BN, 9TH ARTY
2-CO, 5TH BN, 16TH ARTY
2-CO, 6TH BN, 29TH ARTY
2-CO, 4TH BN, 42D ARTY
1-CO, 1ST SQDN, 10TH CAV
1-CO, 2D SQDN, 1ST CAV
1-CO, 7TH SQDN, 17TH CAV
1-CO, 1ST BN, 69TH ARMOR
1-CO, 4TH AVN BN
1-CO, 704TH MAINT BN
3-CO, 29TH ML HIST DET

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SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recom-
mendations

A. (C) Personnel.

TITLE: Personnel Infusion.

OBSERVATION: Most units of Division Artillery still have an excessive number of personnel rotating in "hump" months. Battalions with a critical number of personnel rotating in a particular month submitted infusion lists to USARV. When these lists were submitted it was planned that USARV would arrange personnel infusion before the critical month arrived; however, this did not happen in all cases.

Some battalions waiting for infusion to be directed by USARV have been forced to make hasty infusion arrangements with locally situated battalions because USARV's workload precluded their reaction to the problem in sufficient time to resolve it.

EVALUATION: Rotational "humps" must be eliminated in order to maintain the effectiveness of units, however hasty exfusion and infusion are not desirable. A considerable amount of planning must go into coordination of processing, transportation arrangements and handling personal equipment in order to facilitate a smooth transition. Additionally, when only a short time is available to accomplish infusion, combat effectiveness of the units may be adversely effected. In some cases it has not been possible to find a unit able to co-operate.

RECOMMENDATION:

a. That units submit infusion lists to USARV as soon as possible after arriving in country.

b. That battalions be authorized and encouraged to negotiate with similar mission battalions to effect gradual infusion of small numbers of personnel in order to reduce the turbulence caused by a single large infusion or rotation.

c. That USARV advise battalions who have submitted infusion lists if they are not going to be able to arrange for the infusion 90 days before the critical month. Battalions concerned should be advised at least five months in advance of the critical month in order to permit local negotiations to begin in sufficient time to assure at least 90 days of use of infused personnel by the gaining unit.

B. (C) Operations.

1. TITLE: Frequency of Registration.

OBSERVATION: It has been observed that meteorological conditions for the same time of each day are seasonally quite consistent. The validity of registration data holds true for extended periods of time provided valid METS are available. This is particularly true in the use of the gun data computer, M18.

EVALUATION: Once a unit has conducted an initial registration in a position area and has available valid METS thereafter the need to register frequently is reduced considerably. In the case of registration by FADAC (M18), an initial registration with all charges to be fired in a position area is sufficient and the GFT setting can be kept current for a considerable period of time depending

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SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED (CONT)

on the rate of fire which may cause muzzle velocity changes.

RECOMMENDATION: That the requirement to register daily be relaxed to a frequency of three or more days in a FAAC FDC coupled with the firing of daily check rounds. Manual FDC's should continue daily registrations.

2. TITLE: Use of MET messages for the same time of day.

OBSERVATION: Due to the consistency of METs from day to day, a given MET differed very little from the MET for the same time of a previous day.

EVALUATION: It has been determined that, in the absence of a particular MET, the FDC could use a valid MET from a previous day - not necessarily the preceding day - update the GFT settings and still fire accurate data. This was confirmed by several test firings.

RECOMMENDATION: That in the absence of a current MET, a valid MET for the same time of day be used in the determination of GFT settings.

3. TITLE: Color-contoured vertical control map.

OBSERVATION: Determination of site for firing data was greatly facilitated by use of a color-contoured 1:50,000 map in established fire direction centers.

EVALUATION: During the reporting period, the vertical control map of the Camp Enari Base Camp FDC was color-contoured with a specific interval between the battery and the target. Although this technique is not new, it was found to have particular value in this part of Vietnam. Since the necessity for a horizontal check chart precluded the use of a conventional vertical control operator, the check chart operator had two responsibilities - checking horizontal data of the primary chart and determination of target altitude. The computer then determined the vertical interval and site. These added computations for the computer resulted in frequent delays of the fire missions processed. Once the vertical control map was color-contoured, determination was simplified to matching the target area plot to a color code. With this vertical interval code, the check chart operator could determine site with the graphical site table in a timely manner and ~~also~~ site (rather than target altitude) to the computer.

RECOMMENDATION: That the color contouring of the VCO map be accomplished in the process of the improvement of the fire direction center.

4. TITLE: Directional MET.

OBSERVATION: One battery of this unit observed that the computation of MET range and deflection corrections (including earth rotation effects) in eight directions based on registration in one direction produced valid firing data for 6400 mil coverage.

EVALUATION: Once a registration had been conducted in a position area, the unit FDC computed MET range and deflection corrections for each 800 mils change

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SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED (C)NT

in deflection that varied from the GFT setting at registration range and direction. The result was in effect, GFT setting on eight directions. Thus when a mission was received the unit computer merely inserted the GFT setting for the target's octant on his GFT and conducted the mission with this data as on any mission within transfer limits. The only variables in this computation were wind range, wind deflection, and earth rotation corrections. The advantages of this method over the use of wind cards are the consideration of the effect of earth rotation and the computation of firing corrections prior to receipt of a fire mission. The results of firing using this technique have been very successful and have reduced response times during the processing of fire missions.

RECOMMENDATION: That the eight Direction MET method be reviewed and adopted for use in unit FDC's.

5. TITLE: VT fuzed rounds.

OBSERVATION: During recent rocket attacks on Camp Enari counter-rocket fire with VT-fuzed projectiles was delayed by the time it took to unpack and mate the VT fuzes.

EVALUATION: It was determined that a prescribed number of projectiles could be pre-fuzed with VT as long as the round was fired within a 30 day period. This organization has prescribed that all firing elements keep five VT-fuzed rounds with each howitzer and mark each projectile with the date that the VT fuze was taken out of its can. The gun crew insures the fuzed projectile is fired within a 30 day period. If no suitable VT targets are engaged during the 30 day period, the unit commander coordinates the use of the fuzed rounds on H&I or some other targets. Once the fuzed rounds are expended, replacements are fuzed, thus insuring rotation of the fuzes while VT-fuzed projectiles are readily available at all times.

RECOMMENDATION: That all artillery units consider adoption of the pre-fuzing procedures outlined above to insure rapid response to enemy artillery fire.

6. TITLE: Countermortar fire.

OBSERVATION: Whenever possible a countermortar program should be planned prior to moving to a new fire base. Occasionally the tactical situation precludes prior reconnaissance and a countermortar program can not be determined in a timely fashion. An alternative program should be available for these situations.

EVALUATION: An alternative to the normal target program would be to assign the four flank howitzers a base direction and elevation for fire, and authorize these sections to fire a predetermined amount of ammunition in zone fire from this base. The base piece should be ready to fire self-illumination or lay on the reported enemy location. Normal clearance procedures are applicable to this type of temporary program.

RECOMMENDATION: Units should adopt this procedure to provide hasty countermortar fire.

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SECTION II. LESSONS LEARNED (CONT)

7. TITLE: Construction of personnel bunkers.

OBSERVATION: Upon several occasions, personnel in bunkers which collapsed after close or direct hits have been trapped because only one entrance/exit was built into the bunker during original construction. An alternate exit should be provided.

EVALUATION: The problem can be solved by SOP in construction of bunkers. The alternate exit should be offset from the main entrance so that fragmentation spray will not block both exits simultaneously; and each opening, whether it be a door or a window, must be protected by a blast wall.

RECOMMENDATION: All unit SOP's should be modified to include instructions on construction of bunkers with alternate emergency exits.

8. TITLE: Steep slope gun positions.

OBSERVATION: When an artillery firing battery occupies a hill with a steep slope, it is impossible for a level gun position to depress far enough to bring direct fire upon enemy forces attacking up the slope.

EVALUATION: If the gun position parapet were constructed with an opening and a ramp leading downslope, the howitzer could rapidly shift into a direct fire position. The ramp would require forward chocks for the howitzer wheels and adequate side parapets for protection of the crew.

RECOMMENDATION: Unit SOP's should be modified to include construction of direct fire extension ramps when the battery is positioned on a steep slope.

9. TITLE: Micrometer knob marking on M12A7 sights.

OBSERVATION: The white paint in the etched micrometer graduations on the M12A7 sight for the 105mm howitzers wears rapidly, making the setting extremely hard to read during night firing. Replacement of these markings is a support ordnance task and requires paint and a very fine brush applicator.

EVALUATION: The problem is easily solved by the use of a white "grease pencil" of the chinamarker type rubbed lightly over the micrometer graduations. The pencil material will rub into the small grooves, and will remain after buffing with a soft cloth has removed any excess material from the knob itself. These restored markings have been found to be far more durable than the original paint and more easily read.

RECOMMENDATION: All 105mm howitzer batteries should be made aware of this simple solution to an otherwise difficult situation.

10. Air-Ground Safety and Fire Coordination:

OBSERVATION: When an artillery observer is riding in the same aircraft with an Air Force FAC most of the coordination and safety problems inherent in a joint

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mission are resolved.

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EVALUATION: This unit has sent a qualified air observer with the Air Force FAC on numerous occasions when the FAC was directing air strikes. Several times the observer directed flak suppression with visual observation on active anti-aircraft positions concurrently with the air strike with considerable success. This method not only supplies an additional set of trained eyes, but it also provides a quick fire channel and instantaneous coordination between air and ground fires with rarely a question as to the possibility of a misunderstanding between the two parties concerned.

RECOMMENDATION: That the recently announced Air Force policy against passengers in FAC aircraft be reconsidered for a possible policy exception to be applied to Artillery Air Observer.

C. (C) TRAINING.

1. TITLE: FDC Training.

OBSERVATION: FDC personnel reporting to this unit are generally unfamiliar with the 6400 mil firing chart, M-18 Gun Direction Computer, high burst and radar high burst registrations and principles of resection.

EVALUATION: The 6400 mil chart is the only chart used by FDCs in this unit. The Gun Data Computer M-18 is the primary means for computing fire missions in Division Artillery. High burst and radar high burst registrations are conducted when a flash base can be established and when countermortar radar is available. Because of heavy foliage and the lack of distinguishable terrain features, forward observers have difficulty pinpointing their locations. After defensive targets have been adjusted and replotted, the FO's position is resected by the FDC to either confirm or change the given location.

RECOMMENDATION: An orientation course for FDC personnel emphasizing these topics should be given to them before their assignment to Vietnam.

2. TITLE: Distance Measuring Equipment.

OBSERVATION: Distance Measuring Equipment (D.E) is vital to any effective survey program in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Terrain and the security requirement severely limit traverse and triangulation when these instruments are not available.

EVALUATION: The delicate nature of D.Es and the lack of proficient repairmen has been a serious problem. In fact, the D.Es belonging to Division Artillery have seen negligible use since the Division has been in country because of this problem.

RECOMMENDATION: That modifications be considered which would make the instrument more durable and that the training of operators, repairmen and supervisors be intensified. An EIR has been submitted.

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33 SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED (CONT)

3. TITLE: Liaison Officer Orientation:

OBSERVATION: Many officers who assume the responsibilities of an artillery liaison officer lack the necessary professional background.

EVALUATION: It is apparent that most courses at the Artillery School do not prepare Artillery Captains for duty as liaison officers. The importance of the liaison function cannot be overemphasized, especially in this war which is fought usually in battalion actions. This is true not only with respect to the guidance and advice this individual must provide to the supported infantry commander and his maneuver elements, but also in coordinating the safety of artillery fires. Newly arrived or newly promoted Captains should be given an opportunity to receive this instruction in-country, on a selective basis, at schools set up in Camp Enogi at Division Artillery level.

RECO: EDUCATION:

- a. That more time be devoted to the study of this area in appropriate courses at the Artillery School with heavy emphasis on practical exercises.
- b. That capabilities and employment of organic infantry weapons also receive more attention in these courses.

D: (U) INTELLIGENCE: None.

E. (C) LOGISTICS:

1. TITLE: Bore Evacuator Valves.

OBSERVATION: The daily servicing of the M109 bore evacuator valves has caused howitzers to be called out of action for a period of time while the crew removes, cleans and replaces the bore evacuator valves.

EVALUATION: The availability of a second set of bore evacuator valves would greatly reduce maintenance down-time while the crew services the valves. If a second set is available, the gun crew can remove the old valves and immediately replace them with the clean valves. Once the old valves are removed they can be soaked in solvent and cleaned after the howitzer has returned to an operational status. The soaking valves would be cleaned properly and used the next day to replace the ones in use.

RECO: EDUCATION: That M109 units have on hand two sets of bore evacuator valves and that the valves be alternated each day with the un-used set being soaked in solvent. An EIR has been submitted.

2. TITLE: External Load Transport by Chinook Helicopter.

OBSERVATION: When preparing external sling loads for Chinook Helicopters, there is a tendency to limit the size of the load by bulk rather than weight. As a result many light sorties which could have been combined are transported singularly.

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SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED (CONT)

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EVALUATION: Careful preparation of slings to the weight limit c. 7000 lbs will reduce the number of Chinook sorties necessary to move a unit. In many cases double slings should be used for especially bulky but relatively light loads.

RECOMMENDATION: Unit SOPs should be modified to include specific instructions on preparation of Chinook sorties. Representative weights of items of equipment should be provided and all personnel fully familiarized with these weights.

F. (C) ORGANIZATION:

OBSERVATION: The MTOE-G series TOE was not implemented by the General Support Battalion of the Division.

EVALUATION: The failure to implement the modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 6-355-G for the General Support Artillery Battalion of the 4th Division Artillery reduced the unit's capability for 24 hour operations. The MTOE if implemented would increase the operations section by an additional Asst S-3 and a Liaison Officer. Each firing battery would gain one Assistant Executive Officer.

RECOMMENDATION: The MTOE 6-355-G should be implemented by the organic GS Battalion of the Division as soon as possible.

G. (C) SIGNAL:

1. TITLE: Expedient Antenna

OBSERVATION: A shortage of antenna RC-292 parts has been experienced. An expedient to gain height with a whip, for efficiency comparable to an RC-292, has been successfully utilized.

PROCEDURE: Separate the mast base AB-719/VRC from the matching unit. Mount the assembled base and whip on a pole for the desired height. Colocate the matching unit with the radio or place it at a distance from the radio compatible with the length of the matching unit cable. Join the matching unit with the mast base with an extension RF cable by coupling male and female connectors.

2. TITLE: Radio Interference.

OBSERVATION: Interference from friendly nets continues to be the major communication problem in this area. The interference ranges from occasional breaking of squelch to actual disruption of all transmissions. In some cases, air field from as far away as 150 miles have been received clearly.

EVALUATION: Interference is caused by the close frequency allocations and the large number of FM nets operating in a relatively small area. When new frequencies are requested and received they are normally worse than the one being used. It has been found that trimming the antenna elements of the RC-292 above or below the number of elements required in the manual will considerably reduce the interference and still allow a strong signal to be received or transmitted.

RECOMMENDATION: That unscheduled frequency changes be made as a last resort to eliminating interference. At all times, an effort should be made to work through the interference.

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35 AVDDH-GC (14 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 from 4th Infantry Division Artillery. (RCSOSFOR-65 R1) (U)

Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, APO 06262 7 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force VIETNAM, APO 06350

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from 4th Infantry Division Artillery.

2. (C) Ref Section II Lessons Learned, Para A, Personnel Infusion, Pg 26. The planned infusion for the 4th Infantry Division was preempted by the major combat action of the Battle for DAK TO, 25 October - 1 December 1967 and the TET Truce Offensive. The personnel turbulence which would have resulted from implementation of the infusion program was unacceptable in view of the tactical situation. The recommendation that internal infusion be authorized, and that new units begin infusion immediately upon arrival in country are valid.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER J. STEIN JR
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

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AVFA-GC-OT (14 May 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division Artillery
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 14 JUL 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam,
ATTN: AVIGC-DST, APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsement and makes the following recommendations or comments:

a. Reference paragraph B2 section 2, page 27, Use of MET
messages for the same time of day. Nonconcur. Information avail-
able at this headquarters shows large variations in MET messages
taken at the same time on different days. Study in this area is
continuing in order to determine trends which may result in methods
to provide accurate firing data in the absence of a valid MET.

b. Reference paragraph B9 section 2, page 29, Micrometer Knob
Marking on the M12A7 Sights. All units within IFFORCEV Artillery
will be notified of this recommendation.

c. Reference paragraph C1 section 2, page 30, FDC Training.
IFFORCEV Artillery has established a five day Fire Direction Officer
Training Course to familiarize newly assigned FDC personnel with
the procedures of fire direction peculiar to operations in the
Republic of Vietnam. Increased emphasis on these procedures in
COMUS schools would reduce the necessity for formal in-country
training of this nature.

d. Reference paragraph C2 section 2, page 30, Distance Measur-
ing Equipment. The Electronic DME, MRA 301, is programmed to replace
the DME Fairchild MC8, currently used by the 4th Division Artillery.
The MRA 301 is of more sturdy construction and greater reliability
than the MC8. No information is available concerning the MRA 301
date of issue.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROE GABBARD
1LT, AGC
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL

Copy furnished:
4th Inf Div

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10815

AVHGC-DST (14 May 68) 3d Ind (U) CPT Arnold/dls/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division Artillery for
period ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-68 (R-1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 4th
Infantry Division Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning infusion observations, page 26, paragraph A:
Nonconcur in the observation. As indicated in paragraph 2, 1st Indorse-
ment, the 4th Infantry Division requested that infusion be delayed because
of interference by major combat actions. Infusion actions are promptly
acted upon by this headquarters in order to assure the timely movement of
personnel inherent in last minute and hastily planned programs. Recom-
mendations, subparagraphs a - c, and paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement: Concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

nakatsukasa

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 4th Inf Div Arty
HQ I FFORCEV

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GPOP-DT (14 May 68) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

Officer
C.C. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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ARTILLERY TASK ORGANIZATION

1. Artillery Task Organization as of 1 February 1968 was:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>Div Arty</u>
6/29 Arty DS	5/16 Arty
A/6/29 DS 1/8 Inf	A/5/16 GSR 6/29 Arty
B/6/29 DS 3/12 Inf	B/5/16 GSR 3/319 Arty
C/6/29 DS 3/8 Inf	C/5/16 GSR 4/42 Arty
B/4/42 DS 1/12 (OPCON 6/29)	D/5/16 GSR 6/29 Arty
Pt B/29 Slt (OPCON 6/29)	D/4/60 AW (OPCON Div Arty)
B/4/60-AW (OPCON 6/29)	
<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>52d Arty GP</u>
4/42 Arty (-) DS	1/92 Arty GS
A/4/42 DS 2/8 Inf	A/1/92 GS
Pt B/29 Slt (OPCON 4/42)	B/1/92 GSR 6/29 Arty
Pt D/4/60 AW (OPCON 4/42)	C/1/92 GSR 6/29 Arty
<u>TF 1/22</u>	6/14 Arty GS
C/4/42 DS 1/22 (OPCON DIV ARTY)	A/7/15 GS
	C/5/22 GS
<u>TF Powerhouse</u>	<u>3/6 Arty GS</u>
3/319 Arty (-) DS	A/3/6 GS
A/3/319 DS 1/503 Inf	B/3/6 GS
B/3/319 DS 2/503 Inf	C/3/6 GSR 4/42 Arty
	<u>Base Camp Defense</u>
	HIB, Div Arty
	5/16 Arty (-)
	D/4/42 (3-105 4/42 3-105 6/29)
	E/5/16 (2-155)
	4-4.2 Mortars
	4-81mm Mortars

2. On 4 Feb 68 mission B/5/16 changed to GSR 4/42.
3. On 6 Feb 68 mission of C/5/16 changed to GSR 3/319(-).
4. On 8 Feb 68 mission of B/3/6 changed to GSR 4/42.
5. On 12 Feb 68 C/4/42 became OPCON 6/29 Arty. Mission Remained DS 1/22.
6. On 16 Feb 68 mission of C/5/16 changed to GSR 4/42.
7. On 19 Feb 68 mission of A/3/6 changed to GSR 4/42. A/7/15 departed the AO.
8. On 21 Feb 68 A/5/22 entered the AO and was attached to the 52d Arty GP. Mission was GS.

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9. On 23 Feb 68 C/4/42 was released OPCON 6/29.
10. On 28 Feb 68 mission of C/5/16 changed to GSR 3/319 (-).
11. On 2 Mar 68 C/7/15 entered the AO and was attached to 52d Arty GP. Mission was GSR C/3/6.
Mission of B/5/16 was changed to GSR C/3/6.
12. Mission of C/3/6 was changed to DS TF 1/12.
13. Mission of A/1/92 was changed to GSR 4/42.
14. Mission of B/1/92 was changed to GS.
15. B/4/42 was released from OPCON 6/29 to its parent battalion's control with the mission of DS 2d Bde.
16. On 8 Mar 68 C/6/29 became OPCON 3/319(-) while retaining the mission of DS 2/8.
17. On 9 Mar 68 C/4/42 was released from OPCON Div Arty to its parent Battalion. The mission remained DS 1/22.
18. On 12 Mar 68 mission of B/3/6 was changed to DS 1/10 Cav.
A/3/6 moved out of AO to east of Mang Yang pass to provide coverage of Hwy 19E.
19. On 13 Mar 68 A/4/42 became OPCON 3/319 (-) and continued mission of DS 2/8.
20. C/6/29 was released from OPCON 3/319 (-) to its parent battalion.
21. On 22 Mar 68 C/6/29 was placed OPCON 3/319 (-). Mission was unchanged.
22. On 30 Mar 68 TF Powerhouse and the 3d Bn, 319th Arty (-) departed the AO. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div entered the AO and assumed responsibility for the AO previously assigned to TF Powerhouse. The 2d Bn, 9th Arty was detached from the 3d Bde but continued the mission of direct support to the 3d Bde. Units OPCON 3/319 and GSR 3/319 changed to OPCON 2/9 and GSR 2/9. The transition covered the period 30 Mar - 1 Apr 68.
23. Artillery Task Organisation as of 1 April was:

1st Bde
6/19 Arty (-)
A/6/29 DS 1/8
B/6/29 DS 3/12

Div Arty
5/16 Arty GSR
A/5/16 GSR 6/29
B/5/16 GSR C/3/6

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Plt B/29 S1t (OPCON 6.29)	C/5/16 GSR 2/9
2Plt B/4/60 AW (OPCON 6/29)	D/5/16 GSR 6/29
	D/4/60 AW (OPCON Div Arty)
<u>2d Bde</u>	
4/42 Arty (-) DS	52d Arty GP
B/4/42 DS 2d Bde	3/6 Arty (-) GS
C/4/42 DS 1/22	1/92 Arty GS
Plt B/29 S1t (OPCON 4/42)	A/1/92 GSR 4/42
Plt D/4/60 Aw (OPCON 4/42)	B/1/92 GS
B/3/6 DS 1/10 (OPCON 4/42)	C/1/92 GSR 2/9
<u>3d Bde</u>	
2/9 Arty DS	6/14 Arty GS
A/2/9 DS 1/35	A/5/22 GS
B/2/9 DS 1/14	C/5/22 GS
C/2/9 DS 2/35	C/7/15 GSR C/3/6
Plt B/29 S1t (OPCON 2/9)	<u>Base Camp Defonso</u>
Plt D/4/60 AW (OPCON 2/9)	HHB, Div Arty
C/6/29 DS 3/8 (OPCON 2/9)	5/16 Arty (-)
A/4/42 DS 2/8 (OPCON 2/9)	D/4/42 (3-105 4/42, 3-105 6/29)
<u>TF 1/12</u>	
C/3/6 DS 1/12	E/5/16 (2-155) 4-4.2 Mortars 4-81mm Mortars

19. On 2 Apr 68 C/4/42 became OPCON 2/9.

20. On 3 Apr 68 C/6/29 returned to OPCON 6/29. A/6/29 became OPCON 2/9. Missions were not changed.

A/4/42 returned to OPCON 4/42.

21. On 7 Apr 68 the mission of D/5/16 was changed to GSR 2/9.

22. On 12 Apr 68 the mission of B/1/92 was changed to GSR 2/9. One Plt A/1/92 was given the mission of GS.

23. On 23 Apr 68 the mission of B/4/42 was changed to DS 1/12.

The mission of B/5/16 was changed to GSR 4/42.

The mission of C/3/6 was changed to GSR 4/42.

C/7/15 was released from its mission and departed the AO.

B/5/22 entered the AO and was assigned the mission of GS.


The mission of A/1/92 was changed to GS.

24. On 25 Apr 68 one Plt A/1/92 was given the mission of GSR 6/29.

25. On 27 Apr 68 A/6/29 returned OPCON 6/29. B/4/42 became OPCON 2/9.

4TH INFANTRY DIVISION AO

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43 CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES OPERATION MAC ARTHUR

This summary does not include the activities of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery for the period 1 February 1968 to 30 March 1968 during which the battalion was attached to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division which was OPCON to the Americal Division.

1 February 1968: At 0613 hours CSF elements at Kontum received a ground attack which destroyed the TOL storage area. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery in support resulting in 87 killed by artillery. At 1145 hours Thanh An District Headquarters and the Oasis came under ground attack. Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and Battery A, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery fired in support. Resulting in 10 VC killed by artillery by body count. Dak To FSB's received sporadic mortar fire throughout the day. Maneuver elements also made numerous small sporadic contacts.

2 February 1968: Holloway US Army Airfield came under mortar and small arms attack. FSB 1 and FSB 12 in the Dak To area received sporadic mortar fire and artillery fired counterfires. Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired in support of a contact Vic YB976149 resulting in two NVA KIA and many additional blood trails in the area. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired on AR775 904 resulting in 40 NVA killed by artillery, three NVA WIA were captured along with one 82mm mortar. NVA were confirmed to be from the 24th NVA Regiment.

3 February 1968: A patrol of 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one expended brass canister and 2 complete rounds with PD fuze for a 75mm pack howitzer Vic YB973149. This confirmed that this weapon had been used to attack Dak To in November 1967. At 1203 hours FSB 1 Dak To received three rounds of 82mm mortar. At 1300 hours an OH-23G helicopter of Division Artillery was on recon for the mortar position. As the helicopter approached the position a burst of AW fire was received killing the pilot, wounding the A0 and causing the helicopter to crash on landing. Artillery was fired on the position by Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery resulting in three NVA KIA. At 1805 hours FSB 1 Dak To received 38 rounds of 122mm rocket and 12 rounds of B-40 rockets resulting in four US KIA and 16 US WIA. Battery A, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery and the M-42 dusters counterfired on a radar location Vic YB959171 and on visual sightings by FO's of B-40 rocket positions. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Vic Kontum received five mortar and rocket attacks. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired counterfires.

4 February 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry which received several ground probes resulting in 27 NVA KIA. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery fired in support of Company C, D, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry resulting in 23 NVA KIA and one NVA CIA. Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired on an NVA squad Vic YB906128 resulting in 2 NVA killed by artillery confirmed. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with elements of 6th Battalion, 32d NVA Infantry Regiment Vic ZA090387. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired 958 rounds resulting in 38 NVA killed by

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artillery and numerous body parts and bloody bandages, equipment and blood trails, indicating many more casualties were inflicted. A sweep of the area also produced two machine guns, two 60mm mortars, 11 AK-47 rifles and two SKS rifles. FSB's in the Dak To area continued to receive sporadic mortar, recoilless rifle and 122mm rocket attacks. Artillery units in the area responded with counterfires.

5 February 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired in support of contact by Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry Vic AR802941. FSB 12 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Artillery fired counterfires.

6 February 1968: Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry contact with a company size force Vic ZA155355. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery and the Base Camp 155 Battery fired in support. Darkness prevented a sweep of the area after contact ceased. A sweep the following morning produced one NVA KIA by artillery, 70 bunkers with overhead cover partially destroyed, various quantities of 82mm mortar rounds, B-40 rockets, rifle rockets, rifle grenades and an abundance of bloody bandages and blood trails. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery fired in support of Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry contact resulting in one VC KIA and several bunkers destroyed. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry contact resulting in 11 NVA KIA by artillery. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three NVA killed by artillery Vic YB926203. FSB's around Dak To received sporadic mortar fire.

7 February 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry contact Vic AR805937 resulting in 40 NVA killed by artillery. FSB 12 received heavy mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket attack. Artillery fired counterfires on radar and visual sightings.

8 February 1968: Camp Enari came under attack by 122mm rockets at 0155 hours from ZA198352. Twenty Nine rockets were fired resulting in one US KIA, eight US WIA, eight damaged aircraft and three building destroyed. Base Camp 105 and 155 batteries, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, Battery A, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery and gunships fired counterfires on radar and visual sightings. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery received 13 rounds 82mm mortar and five rounds 75mm recoilless rifle resulting in one WIA from the battery. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery received 50 rounds 82mm mortar and four rounds 75mm recoilless rifle resulting in four WIA from the battery. Artillery counter fired in both attacks.

9 February 1968: Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired on four 122mm rocket sites resulting in several secondary explosions and destruction of all four positions. Dak To FSB's continued to receive sporadic mortar and recoilless rifle fire.

10 February 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was credited with four NVA KIA act. firing in support of Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 2d Artillery and Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery fired in support of con-

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tact by Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry with an unknown size enemy force. Battery A, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery, Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery fire in support of 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry contact with an enemy force.

11 February 1968: FSB's at Dak To continued to receive sporadic mortar fire and artillery continued to counterfire on radar and visual sightings. Activity in the Kontum area declined to small sporadic contacts and sightings. As of this date over 290 NVA KIA have been credited to kills by artillery in action around Kontum since 27 January and also the artillery has received numerous secondary explosions in areas which have not yet been searched.

12 February 1968: Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found three NVA killed by artillery Vic ZA083389.

13 February 1968:

14 February 1968:

15 February 1968:

16 February 1968: Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery received an 82mm mortar direct hit on the FDC conex resulting in one US KIA. Artillery fired counterfires.

17 February 1968:

18 February 1968: Eight NVA killed by artillery were found in the Dak To area by an artillery sweep.

19 February 1968:

20 February 1968:

21 February 1968:

22 February 1968:

23 February 1968:

24 February 1968: Recon 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found 2 NVA bodies killed by artillery Vic YB889273.

25 February 1968:

26 February 1968:

27 February 1968: Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired 100 rounds in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry resulting in 25 secondary explosions.

28 February 1968: 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry found seven VC bodies Vic AR788888 killed by air or artillery.

29 February 1968: FSB 12 and 24 received sporadic 82mm mortar fire.

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2 March 1968: Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three enemy KIA by air or artillery. Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one enemy KIA by artillery. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery fired 70 rounds in support of Company B and Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired 25 rounds in support of Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

3 March 1968: Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery expended 30 rounds in support of Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry at ZA36772. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery expended 22 rounds in support of FSB at 077607. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery expended 57 rounds in support of 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry. FSB 1 received 35-75mm recoilless rifle rounds resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA. FSB 12 received sporadic 82mm mortar rounds.

4 March 1968: LRRP Vic YB995273 found 11 NVA KIA by Battery A, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery. Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired 216 rounds in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry resulting in 26 enemy KIA. FSB 12 received sporadic 122mm rocket and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery expended 134 rounds at ZA177352 and ZA170360 and Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery expended 25 rounds at ZA152369 and ZA181381 in support of Camp Enari. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery expended 73 rounds in support of Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry. ARVN Vic ZA188918 found 50 VC KIA by Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery.

5 March 1968: Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery received a mortar attack resulting in 4 US WIA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Vic YB975274 found 2 NVA KIA by air or artillery. LRRP Vic YB978263 found 11 NVA killed by artillery. FSB 3, 12 and 13 received sporadic 82mm mortar fire. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery expended 219 rounds in support of Companies B and C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Vic ZA051723.

6 March 1968: Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery expended 421 rounds in support of Companies B and C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry resulting 24 NVA KIA. FSB 12 received sporadic 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Vic ZA056732 found 10 NVA KIA by Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery. Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery conducted a hip shoot and fired in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired on grid ZA215725 resulting in four enemy KIA. Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery fired on grid ZA215725 resulting in one enemy KIA.

7 March 1968: Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery conducted a hip shoot and fired in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade. FSB 12 received sporadic 60mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery and Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery fired 62 rounds in support of headhunter observation aircraft resulting in two secondary explosions.

8 March 1968: Company C, 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry Vic ZA106926 found 10 NVA killed by H&I fires of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery. FSB 12 received sporadic 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle. FSB 1 received a sapper attack resulting in four US WIA and one NVA KIA.

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9 March 1968: Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery conducted a hip shoot in support of 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

10 March 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired at ZA121559 and ZA117557 in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry resulting in two secondary explosions. FSB 12 received sporadic 82mm mortar fire. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Vic ZA059724 found eight NVA KIA by artillery.

11 March 1968: FSB 12 received sporadic 82mm mortar fire. One NVA KIA by artillery was reported Vic AQ810220.

12 March 1968: 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Vic ZA119553 one NVA KIA resulting from secondary explosion by fires from Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery. FSB received sporadic 60mm mortar rounds.

13 March 1968: FSB 1 received 13 - 122mm rockets.

14 March 1968: FSB 3 and 12 received sporadic 82mm mortar fire.

15 March 1968: FSB 6 received sporadic 102mm mortar fire. Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery received sporadic 82mm mortar fire and three US WIA.

16 March 1968: A total of 87 rounds were fired by Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery in prep of ZA230706 in support of Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. FSB 1 received 8-122mm rockets.

17 March 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery fired 392 rounds on routes of escape from the area of a B-52 strike bounded by grids AR780670, 78070, 88703, 788699. Company C, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry found 35 NVA KIA Vic ZA041988 by air and artillery.

18 March 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery fired a total of 24 rounds at grids ZA228682 resulting in one NVA KIA. Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery and Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery expended a total of 60 rounds on ZA037719.

19 March 1968:

20 March 1968: Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery fired a total of 130 rounds on probable escape routes from B-52 strikes area at AR785645. Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery fired a hip shoot in support 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

21 March 1968: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery expended 15 rounds in support of a CSF element resulting in one NVA KIA and four NVA WIA.

22 March 1968:

23 March 1968: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery expended a total of 110 rounds to cover escape routes from

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import area of an air strike at AR235635. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found one NVA by artillery Vic ZA130752. 48

23 March 1968: Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery expended 44 rounds in support of 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery expended 43 rounds Vic ZA073656 in support of CSF elements. Fires from Battery A, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery Vic YA943926 resulting in 15 NVA KIA's.

25 March 1968: 4th Division Artillery A0 spotted NVA in the open. Artillery and air strikes resulted in four NVA KIA.

26 March 1968: Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery fired a 28 round prep, 14C/8377 in support of Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. FSB 14 came under a heavy weapons attack consisting of B-40 rockets and approximately 180-82mm mortar rounds after which the NVA followed up with a concentrated ground attack consisting of approximately two Battalions of NVA. Using flame throwers the NVA succeeded in overrunning the west end of the perimeter and one howitzer which they attempted to turn and use on US troops. Using direct fire Battery C, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was able to secure the gun position. Fifteen rounds of beehive and 400 rounds of HE were used. The attack lasted from 0330 to 0730 hours. Results were 135 NVA KIA, four CIA and numerous weapons and equipment CIA along with five pounds of documents.

27 March 1968:

28 March 1968: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery fired a total of 633 rounds in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and CSF elements at ZA022715. FSB 6 received sporadic 82mm mortar rounds.

29 March 1968: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery expended 147 rounds in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, and CSF elements at ZA022715 resulting in seven NVA KIA, numerous documents, supplies, and weapons CIA.

30 March 1968: Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery firing in support of Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry resulted in three NVA KIA by artillery. A total of 41 rounds were fired by Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery in support of Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry.

31 March 1968: A total of 75 rounds were expended Vic ZA020701 by Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery and Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery in support of Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery conducted a hip shoot Vic AQ795168 in support of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry.

1 April 1968: Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry Vic YA937930 found 10 NVA KIA by air strikes and artillery.

2 April 1968:

3 April 1968:

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4 April 1968: Division Artillery Aerial Observers Firing Battery A, 22d Battalion, 9th Artillery and Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery on two separate targets Vic Y.878928 killed 6 NVA. Division Artillery H23 at FSB 14 was hit by incoming mortar round resulting in two US WIA. Artillery was crewed with three NVA KIA in the area west of Polei Kleng. Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery and Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery fired a total of 98 rounds in a preparation on ZA033675 for two CSF Companies. FSB 14 received sporadic mortar fire resulting in three US WIA.

5 April 1968: FSB 14 received sporadic mortar fire resulting in three US WIA. Artillery fires resulted in 44 NVA KIA and estimate 33 NVA WIA in the area west of Polei Kleng.

6 April 1968: Artillery fires resulted in four NVA KIA in area west of Polei Kleng. Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery fired 14 rounds Vic YA9844 in support of LRRP 28.

7 April 1968: FSB 14 received 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire resulting in one howitzer destroyed. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery fired a total of 45 rounds in support of Troops D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. Fire from the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery resulted in one secondary explosion.

8 April 1968: Artillery fire YA804912 from Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery resulted in 5 NVA KIA.

9 April 1968: Artillery fires resulted in 1 secondary explosion in area west of Polei Kleng.

10 April 1968: Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery fired on YB993003 resulted in one NVA KIA. Battery A, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery fire on AR871600 resulted in three VC KIA. Artillery fires resulted in one secondary explosion in area west of Polei Kleng.

11 April 1968: Artillery fires resulted in two secondary explosions in the area west of Polei Kleng. Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery at the air strip at Polei Kleng received 16-122mm rockets. Negative casualties or damage resulted.

12 April 1968: Artillery fires in the area west of Polei Kleng resulted in three secondary explosions. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery fired 43 rounds grid ZA0177 in support of 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and CSF elements.

13 April 1968: Infantry found one 57mm recoilless rifle hit by direct fire from Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

14 April 1968:

15 April 1968:

16 April 1968: Division Artillery H-23 crashed outside of FSB "Mile High" with no casualties.

17 April 1968:

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15 April 1968: Artillery fire by Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery in the area west of Polei Kleng resulted in one secondary explosion. A total of 45 rounds were fired by Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery in support of Polei Mrong CSF elements at ZA0177. 50

21 April 1968: Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found 1 NVA KIA by artillery Vic YB849168. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found three NVA KIA by artillery. FSB Vic YA943890 received sporadic 60mm mortar fire resulting in no WIA or KIA.

29 April 1968:

20 April 1968:

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ABBREVIATIONS

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List of abbreviations used in text (local, common usage, standard Army).

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AO	Area of Operations
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Available Supply Rate
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AW	Automatic Weapon
BC	Battery Commander
CA	Civic Action
CA	Combat assault
CAS	Close Air Support
C&C	Command and Control
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CI	Counterintelligence
CM	Countermortar
CMIT	Combined Mobile Instruction Team
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CP	Command Post
CR	Counter Rocket
CS	Tear Gas
CSF	Camp Strike Force (formerly Civilian Irregular Defense Group)
CSS	Combat Sky Spot
DAK TO	Brigade CP Location at ZB 007 216
DISCOM	Division Support Command

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DS Direct Support
DTOC Division Tactical Operations Center
FAC Forward Air Controller
FDC Fire Direction Center
FO Forward Observer
FRAGO Frag Order
FSA Forward Support Area
FSB Fire Support Base
FSCE Fire Support Coordination Element
FSE Fire Support Element
FWMAF Free World Military Assistance Force
GRREG Graves Registration
GS General Support
GSR General Support Reinforcing
GUN, GUNSHIP Armed UH-1 Helicopter
GVN Government of Vietnam
HA KEYE TEAM Four Man Hunter-Killer Team
H&I Harassment and Interdiction
HEATHHUNTER O-1E Aircraft used for Visual Reconnaissance
HOOK CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter
IFFORCEV I Field Force, Vietnam
INHA Injuries not the result of Hostile action
IPW Interrogation Person or War Team
IRHA Injuries the result of hostile action.
JACKSON HOLE Brigade CP area at Le Thanh, Yen 898 315.
JUSPAO Joint US Public Affairs Office
KBA Killed by air

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KIA	Killed in action
LF	Local Force
LRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, Reconnoiter Patrol
LLOC	Land Line of Communications
LZ	Landing Zone
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MF	Main Force
MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in action
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSR	Main Supply Route
MTOE	Modified table of organization and equipment
Nighthawk	UH-1 Helicopters with searchlights mounted and flares.
NVA	North Vietnamese army
NVAC	North Vietnamese army captive
OASIS	Prigade CP area at ZA 110 275.
OPCON	Operational Control
OPORD	Operation Order
POLWAR	Political Warfare (ARVN)
POW, PW	Prisoner of war
PP	Preplanned
PZ	Pick-up zone
RCA	Riot Control Agent.
RD	Revolutionary Development
REINF	Reinforcing
RL	Rocket Launcher

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RVN	Republic of Vietnam
S&D	Search and Destroy
SLICK	UH-1 Helicopter used primarily for Air Lift
SP	Self Propelled
SPOOKY	Air Force Minigun armed AC-47 Flareship
TAC	Tactical
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TOE	Table of Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VETCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VMC	Viet Montagnard Cong.
VMCC	Viet Montagnard Cong. Captive
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VT	Variable Time
VTR	Vehicle, Tank Recovery
IA	Wounded in Action

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Key Personnel

Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Division Artillery.

CO	McLISTER, Robert C.	COL
XO	Dewhirst, Sam T.	LTC
S-1	Hawkins, Isaac W.	MAJ
S-2	O'Grady, Edmund G.	MAJ
S-3	Godwin, Bobby J.	MAJ
S-4	Evans, Ralph C.	MAJ
S-5	Wolfe, Robert D.	MAJ
Commo off	Karl, Richard G.	MAJ
Avn off	Bacon, William G.	CPT
Surg	Abraham, Edward N.	CPT
BC, HNB	Asbury, Vadron	CPT
CSGM	Walker, Leslie J.	SGM

2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery.

CO	Bobzien, Gerald B.	LTC
XO	Kensett, Charles F.	MAJ
S-1	Barr, Dudley D.	CPT
S-2	Walker, Patrick E.	CPT
S-3	Eckelbarger, Donald E.	MAJ
S-4	Searles, Clarence	CPT
BC, HNB	Ward, John	CPT
BC, Btry A	Cummings, Joseph M.	CPT
BC, Btry B	Donovan, Patrick J.	CPT
BC, Btry C	Meier, Frank L.	CPT

5th Battalion, 16th Artillery.

CO	Hayward, Barton H.	LTC
XO	Wegemann, Ludwig	MAJ
S-1	Kurtz, Donald G.	CPT
S-2	Batchelder, Michael J.	CPT
S-3	Farrell, Francis W. Jr	MAJ
S-4	Jackson, Edward J.	CPT
BC, HNB	Wagner, Nelson R.	CPT
BC, Btry A	Sharpe, Hal M. Jr	CPT
BC, Btry B	Boyd, Gary A.	CPT
BC, Btry C	Morehead, Wayne E.	CPT
BC, Btry D	Wall, Kenneth E. Jr	CPT

6th Battalion, 29th Artillery.

CO	Akers, Albert B.	LTC
XO	Olson, Carl R.	MAJ
S-1	Johnson, Allan W.	CPT

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S-2	Schmid, Robert L. Jr	CPT
S-3	Crouse, Leslie D.	MAJ
S-4	Barrett, Robert W.	CPT
BC, HHC	Hiller, Robert B.	CPT
BC, Btry A	Luján, Armando	CPT
BC, Btry B	Wright, Richard H.	CPT
BC, Btry C	Frey, Robert M.	CPT

4th Battalion, 42nd Artillery.

CO	Boyd, William P.	N.J.
XO	Butler, Walter E.	CPT
S-1	Connor, John G.	CPT
S-2	Stephens, Bailey M.	CPT
S-3	Cramer, Rockwell C.	MAJ
S-4	Norton, Frank L. Jr	CW3
BC, HHC	Clausen, Linden E. Jr	CPT
BC, Btry A	Godwin, Edward	CPT
BC, Btry B	Peay, JH Binford III	CPT
BC, Btry C	Burke, William K.	CPT

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
		2b. GROUP 4
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division Artillery		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) <u>Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1968 (U)</u>		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 4th Infantry Division Artillery		
6. REPORT DATE 14 May 1968	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 53	7b. NO. OF REFS
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
9. PROJECT NO. N/A	682237	
9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
13. ABSTRACT		

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

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