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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AGAM-P (M) (16 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 684224

22 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 9th Infantry
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1968 (U)

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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APO San Francisco 96370

AVDE-AO

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CFFOR-65 (R1) (U)

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1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Introduction. During the reporting period, the 9th Infantry Division Artillery participated in four major operations while providing combat support in DINH TUONG, LONG AN, GO CONG, KIEN HOA, KIEN PHONG, KIEN TUONG, VINH DINH, VINH LONG, GIA DINH, HAU NGHIA, PHONG DINH, CHUONG THIEN, KIEN GIANG, and BIEN HOA Provinces. The 9th Infantry Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), is extremely large and this fact, coupled with the enemy's tactic of dispersing his forces to avoid decisive contact, required the Division to continue decentralized operations. Although the brigades seldom operated in close coordination with each other, they conducted coordinated operations in their TAOIs with Army of Vietnam (ARVN), Regional Forces (RF), and Popular Forces (PF). In order to provide adequate support for the Division's dispersed operations, the units of the 9th Division Artillery were located in fire support bases of permanent or semi-permanent nature (See Inclosure 1); however, from these locations they displaced frequently to provide support. The dispersion and decentralization of the Division's operations forced the artillery to degrade its capability for massing fires. Usually, infantry battalion-sized operations were supported with a minimum of one light and one medium battery. When a major contact with the

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enemy was achieved, additional batteries were brought to bear whenever possible. Unfortunately, it was always difficult, and sometimes impossible, to bring additional artillery into play because of the dangerous situation inherent in stripping unengaged maneuver units of immediately available artillery support. The lack of adequate bridges and the requirement for engineer mine clearing support on many roads further complicated this problem. Because airmobile movements, under other than emergency conditions, must be requested a day in advance of the movement, it was necessary to make careful assessments as to which maneuver battalion operations were most likely to achieve major contact with the enemy. A further difficulty is created by the frequent last minute changes of airmobile battalion areas of operations based on late developing intelligence. Sometimes referred to as "jitterbugging" operations, this valuable infantry tactic creates significant problems for the artillery commander. As discussed below, the coverage problem was particularly difficult in the 2nd and 3rd Brigade areas.

b. (C) Operations. Confirmed target assessments, number of missions, and rounds fired is at Inclosure 3 in tabulated format. Because of the decentralized nature of the Division's operations, the following discussion of the 9th Division Artillery's operations is keyed to the activities of each of its battalions.

(1) 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery

(a) General. Throughout the reporting period, the 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery was in direct support of the 1st Brigade in Operation TOAN THANH II. Operating in Long An Province, the Brigade's mission was to conduct strike operations against the enemy, block major infiltration routes, provide road, bridge, and convoy security along Highway 1, and overwatch the Saigon and Nha Be rocket belts south of Saigon. The Brigade's operations were characterized by daily strike operations utilizing airmobile assets to conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations, eagle flights, cordon and search, and checkerboard operations along infiltration routes or in the vicinity of intelligence targets. The 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery supported these operations from permanent bases at LINH PHUOC, TAN TRU, and RACH KIEN supplemented by frequent moves to temporary fire support bases. Long An Province has the best road network in the Division's AOI and, therefore, airmobile movement of the firing units was relatively infrequent. Battery A (155mm SP), 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery, continued with the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery. Additionally, II Field Force Artillery positioned from two to four firing batteries in or near Long An Province with the mission of General Support Reinforcing (GSR) the 9th Division Artillery. The relatively good road network, the reinforcing 155mm SP battery, the generally oval configuration of Long An Province, and the positioning of non-divisional artillery in its area provided the 1st Brigade with the best artillery coverage in the Division's AOI. During the first half of the period, the Brigade continued to have

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excellent success with its "pile on" encirclement tactic. Encirclement operations during August and early September netted a total of 332 VC killed, 56 PWs, and large numbers of individual and crew served weapons. Artillery played a major role in the destruction of the enemy within the encirclements. The special procedures which the artillery employed in these operations are discussed in Section 2, paragraph 2b(1). As the period drew to a close it became apparent that the enemy had fragmented his forces and probably was operating only with units of platoon size or smaller.

(b) Operation TOBSTONE. On 18 October, Battery E, 2nd Battalion, 14th Artillery, minus two tubes, displaced by CH-47 helicopter to the PLAIN OF REEDS in the vicinity of grid XS 334848. It was planned that elements of an air inserted infantry battalion and the artillery would react to targets located by two AN/PDS-5 radars operating from 50 foot towers. Unfortunately, on the morning of 19 October before the operation was in full stride, the Division was warned that a severe tropical storm would move into the area in the late afternoon. Because the Area of Operations (AO) was subject to flooding, it was decided to extract all elements immediately. All heavy lift helicopters available to the Division were employed; with the last sorties of the extraction operating in marginal flying weather. The importance of considering weather in planning airmobile operations was clearly illustrated. Because of this diversion of assets to the 1st Brigade on 19 October, followed by two days of no air assets due to weather, other planned artillery moves were delayed. A medium battery (-) and a light battery were stranded in positions which could be left only by airmobile movement, resulting in three full days of significantly reduced support for the 3rd Brigade's operations in Binh Tuong Province.

(2) 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery

(a) General. The 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery supported the 3rd Brigade in operations TRUONG CONG DINH, QUYET CHIEN, and TOAN THANG II. Operation TRUONG CONG DINH terminated on 3 August and the Brigade moved into Operation QUYET CHIEN. In this operation the Brigade's TAOI increased to include all of Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces. Its missions were generally to destroy VC/NVA capabilities by maintaining constant pressure on Main Force VC units, striking into base areas and interdicting infiltration routes. Additionally, the Brigade took part in Operation TOAN THANG II from 20 August through 11 September. The Brigade's missions during this period were to seek out and destroy VC units in Long An Province which were preparing for an offensive against Saigon. These varied missions, coupled with the vast area of the TAOI, made the fire support mission extremely difficult. To a far greater extent than in Long An, the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Brigade was required to plan his operations in close coordination with his direct support artillery commander to insure adequate fire support. Moreover, the use of temporary fire bases, frequently in isolated areas, required the Brigade to provide infantry for

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security, further limiting the Brigade's capabilities. The batteries frequently operated as far as 50 kilometers apart. It was also necessary to split the firing batteries often and for relatively extended periods in order to provide adequate coverage for the maneuver elements. Battery E, 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery, was GSK to the 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery and was of great assistance in providing coverage. Once again the problem of distance was encountered and this battery was required to operate in a split configuration for the majority of the period. The road network in the western TAOI is extremely limited with only one major road extending east to west and none north and south. Although this road is heavily depended upon by the artillery, the 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery was required to airlift elements into firing positions more than any other battalion. In addition to these problems, the battalion is usually required to provide one battery in defense of the Division base camp. Despite these obstacles, the 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery provided adequate fire support to the 3rd Brigade during the period. The most significant action occurred on 4 October when Brigade elements engaged the VC 261 B Main Force Battalion. The contact terminated on 6 October and resulted in 120 VC KIA, eight Hoi Chanh, and large quantities of supplies and equipment. During the remainder of the period the enemy generally kept his forces dispersed and avoided contact.

(b) Reorganization. The 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery was organized on 1 October 1968 under the Riverine Artillery MTOE. This MTOE assumes operations exclusively from gun barges, therefore it is extremely austere. The riverine TOE eliminates personnel, including vehicle maintenance, countermortar radar, and communication personnel. The Brigade's TAOI in Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces requires mostly road and airlift movements rather than water movements. In order to support effectively the maneuver elements the battalion has requested authorization to retain the AN/APQ-4 radar and equipment required for overland movement pending revision of its TOE. A proposed revision of the Riverine Artillery MTOE is currently under preparation; however, it appears certain that other battalions in the Division Artillery will be required to absorb some of the space cuts to allow the 1st Battalion, 11th Artillery sufficient personnel for its DS mission.

(3) 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery

(a) General. The 3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery is the artillery component of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). Operating from gun barges, LCMs, and land based positions, it was in direct support of the 2nd Brigade, the infantry component of the MRF. On 3 August Operation THUONG CONG DINH terminated and the 2nd Brigade participated in Operation QUYET CHIEN throughout the remainder of the period. Starting in the lower Mekong Delta in early August, the Brigade conducted operations in the U MINH FOREST. From there they moved to the AP BAC area and BASE AREA 170. From 14 September to date, it conducted operations with Fien Hoa Province as its TAOI. The Brigade's mission during

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the entire period was four-fold:

1. Destroy VC main and local force offensive capability
2. Destroy enemy training and replacement activities
3. Deny the enemy refuge in previously safe areas
4. Deny the enemy access to major population centers

Supported by its barge mounted DS artillery battalion, the Navy's Task Force 117, and air assault assets, the Brigade used beach and air assaults to insert its water based troops in the accomplishment of its mission. However, during September and October, the enemy dispersed and fragmented his forces preventing decisive engagement.

(b) The VI THANH Campaign. During the period 1 to 8 August, the MRF conducted operations in Chuang Thien Province. These operations were the deepest penetration of the Delta by U.S. forces to date. In support, the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery deployed two of its organic batteries by barge, an attached 8 inch platoon by LCM-8s, and its other organic battery plus an attached medium battery by air. The campaign netted 249 VC KIA, 18 POWs, 278 small arms, 24 machine guns, one 120mm mortar, one 75mm pack howitzer, one 106mm recoilless rifle, and 832 grenades. At the conclusion of the campaign, on the night of 8 August, the waterborne convoy was repeatedly ambushed. The convoy's last serial was composed of the artillery elements. Having heard reports of the ambushing of the earlier serials, the artillerymen were fully prepared as they approached the ambush sites. Unfortunately, the enemy positioned his ambushes in populated areas. When the artillery serial was attacked, it returned the enemy's fire with .50 cal. machine guns and 105mm beehive and white phosphorous ammunition. Many civilian casualties resulted from the fire of the artillery and the earlier serials. In order to minimize civilian casualties, while retaining the right of self defense, strict fire discipline is essential. Presented below are the applicable portions of the 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery's policy letter on Rules of Engagement, dated 12 August 1968:

"5. (C) Direct Fire Procedures. It must be remembered at all times that this battalion and associated units employ direct fire for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the unit, only. Our objective is to suppress enemy fires to permit passage through waterways.

a. It is a fundamental rule that no direct fire of any type will be employed without permission of the S-3 or Bn Cmdr unless the senior person on the boat has made the conscious judgment that there is a clear and immediate threat and time does not permit seeking approval.

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b. All fire will be aimed fire against specified targets as directed by the senior person in the area. Short bursts of aimed fire have a greater suppressive effect than large quantities of area fire and result in far fewer civilian casualties. No gunner will open fire until the senior person in the area identifies the target and directs the gunner to open fire.

c. High explosive and white phosphorous howitzer ammunition, will not be used without explicit authority of Pn Cmdr or S-3. M-79 grenades will be used with care to insure that fire is directed against specific targets only. One man should be designated as grenadier and should be under the direct control of the senior person on the boat.

d. Within the above guidance, the following will apply when returning fire:

(1) When receiving light and sporadic small arms fire it is a general rule that personnel will seek cover and no fire will be returned.

(2) When receiving concentrated small arms and/or automatic weapons fire which threatens severe casualties or damage, an appropriate return would be automatic weapons fire from the unit receiving the enemy fire. This fire would be delivered under conditions set forth above.

(3) When receiving rocket and/or recoilless fire an appropriate return would be a limited number of beehive rounds (generally not more than 3) and automatic weapons fire delivered from the element receiving fire. This fire would be delivered under conditions set forth above.

e. It is emphasized that only elements under attack will return fire. In no case will other elements open suppressive fire unless against clearly identified targets."

(c) MTOE 6-156G and 6-157G, USARPAC 2/68 (Riverine). It became increasingly clear during the reporting period that the Riverine Artillery TOE was ill-conceived. The elimination of vehicles and other support elements deprives the battalion of an overland movement capability. Barge mounted artillery is certainly necessary if the battalion is to provide adequate support in many parts of the Delta. However, the water mobile capability should not be provided at the expense of a total loss of road mobility. Additionally, the riverine TOE deletes the countermortar radar capability. This reduction in capability is unwise, particularly in a counterinsurgency environment. The battalion has retained its AN/MPQ-4 radar and enough of its original issue of vehicles to maintain a capability for land movement of one battery. However, the lack of authority for supporting personnel (mechanics, drivers, and radar operators) constitutes a serious problem. Although it is highly unlikely that additional

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spaces can be obtained due to personnel ceilings in Vietnam, a revised MTOE is being prepared.

(4) 6th Battalion, 77th Artillery. This battalion, assigned to 54th Artillery Group and attached to 9th Infantry Division for administration and logistics, performs a General Support mission to ARVN elements in IV Corps Tactical Zone. The battalion is under the Operational Control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone. Its firing batteries are normally located in Phong Dinh and Vinh Long Provinces in support of the 9th and 21st ARVN Divisions, a considerable distance from Division Artillery. The battalion draws supplies from a local supply agency in Can Tho, but requisitions for replacement items and personnel matters are handled through the 9th Division Artillery. The battalion has participated in several operations, successfully reinforcing the fires of the artillery of both divisions.

(5) 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery

(a) General. The 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery provides General Support to the Division. Firing elements of the battalion were General Support Reinforcing or Reinforcing to the direct support battalions during the entire period. Employed in this manner the firing batteries participated in all Division operations and provided invaluable augmentation to the fires of the light battalions. Due to tactical necessity, Batteries B, C, and D operated in a split configuration approximately seventy-five percent of the time. The most significant problems facing this battalion are administrative control and resupply. No fully satisfactory solution has been developed for these problems because of distances and varied modes of movement.

(b) Direct Support Mission. The 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery, the Division's General Support artillery, is unique in that it also performs a direct support role in the Division base camp defense. The commander of Division Support Command (DISCOM) has responsibility for operations in AO KUDZU. This AO encircles the Division base camp for several kilometers. In order to accomplish the mission, one infantry battalion is under the operational control of DISCOM at all times. Fire support is provided by a minimum of one battery of 105mm howitzers from one of the DS battalions and by infantry mortars located in and around the base camp. Fire support coordination throughout the AO is performed by the 1st Battalion, 84th Artillery, which controls and coordinates all fires in defense of the base camp, to include countermortar fire and fire for offensive operations of the infantry battalion in AO Kudzu. In addition, the battalion is responsible for the Air Warning Control Center at DONG TAM which includes all of Dinh Tuong and parts of Kien Hoa and Go Cong Provinces. The success of the operation was shown by a significant reduction of mortar attacks and other enemy initiated incidents in the AO during the period.

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b. (C) Organization.

(1) As of the end of the reporting period, the artillery organization for combat, location of headquarters of the artillery, and mission assignment was as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
Division Artillery	XS 4143	
Btry A, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	XS 5565	GSR, 9th Div Arty (Priority to 2d Bn, 4th Arty)
Btry C, 5th Bn, 42d Arty	XS 8271	GSR, 9th Div Arty (Priority to 2d Bn, 4th Arty)
6th Bn, 77th Arty	XS 8310	GS, IV Corps Arty
2d Bn, 4th Arty	XS 5565	DS, 1st Brigade
Btry A, 1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 5470	GSR, 2d Bn, 4th Arty
Btry D, 1st Bn, 84th Arty (2T)	XS 6663	GSR, 2d Bn, 4th Arty
1st Bn, 11th Arty	XS 4143	DS, 3rd Brigade
Btry B, 1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 2650	GSR, 1st Bn, 11th Arty
Btry D, 1st Bn, 84th Arty (2T)	XS 2650	GSR, 1st Bn, 11th Arty
3d Bn, 34th Arty	XS 4143	DS 2nd Brigade
Btry C, 1st Bn, 84th Arty (3T)	XS 5132	GSR, 3d Bn, 34th Arty
Btry C, 1st Bn, 84th Arty (3T)	XS 4735	GSR, 3d Bn, 34th Arty
1st Bn, 84th Arty	XS 4143	GS, 9th Inf Div

(2) Attached at Inclosure 2 is a roster of Commanders of the Artillery.

c. (C) Personnel and Administration.

(1) The enlisted personnel strength situation in Division Artillery was generally good (See b below). These figures however do not show the serious shortages in certain critical grades and MOS. The grade structure was also seriously out of balance (See 3 below). Key NCO positions were filled by

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personnel of lower grade than that authorized. In other positions, i.e., cooks, mechanics, etc., positions were filled by assigning personnel out of their MOS with dependence on an OJT program to train them. These methods were required to continue mission accomplishment without serious degradation to unit efficiency and proficiency in some cases.

(2) Personnel strength (average for period):

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
(a) Officer	246	218
(b) Enlisted	2564	2577

(3) Critical Grade & MOS shortages:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
(a) Officer		
1. Captain	85	61
2. Lieutenant	132	140
(b) Enlisted		
1. 1SG	22	11
2. Mess SGT	28	16
3. Supply SGT	33	17
4. Section Chief (13B40)	114	49

d. (C) Intelligence. The Division Artillery continued to employ its AN/TPS-25 radar throughout the TAOI. The radar, elevated 50 feet on portable AB 216 Signal Tower sections remains the most productive target acquisition means in the Division. This radar averages between 40-80 sightings per night of operation. To fully exploit the capability of engaging these potential targets, a control group from the Division Artillery operations section accompanies the radar. This control group consists of one officer, one NCO and four enlisted men. They are equipped with sufficient communications and equipment to plot the targets, obtain necessary clearances, and pass the targets to artillery units designated to support the radar. Because of the results obtained with the AN/TPS-25 and two similarly employed AN/TPS-33 radars, and the

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difficulties encountered by Division with the operation and maintenance of the infantry's PPS-5 radars, the Division Artillery was required to hand receipt all PPS-5 radars within the Division. Division Artillery also assumed responsibility for placing them in and out of maintenance and delivering them to the infantry crews at the sites. In order to obtain centralized control and to cope with the problems encountered in maintenance in the movement of the radars it was necessary to appoint a Division Artillery field grade officer as the Division Radar Officer. Close liaison was established and maintained with technical support agencies to insure that radars were non-operational for maintenance as briefly and infrequently as possible. Frequent assistance was obtained from technically qualified Department of the Army Civilians. Experience has shown however, that even with the intensified maintenance effort, the expected operational rate for the AN/TPS-33 and PPS-5 radar is approximately sixty percent. An effort is now being made to increase the effectiveness of operators and mechanics in 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance. This effort will be commented on in the next report. The radars and their towers were moved in response to the tactical situation and it became apparent that, from both a maintenance and operational viewpoint, radars should displace by air. Results obtained from the program are illustrated in the following table:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF RADARS</u>	<u>SIGHTINGS</u>	<u>SIGHTINGS FIRED</u>
AN/TPS-25	1	4421	1932
AN/TPS-33	2	2420	650
AN/PPS-5	5	1529	583
TOTAL	8	8370	3165

Most of the 5205 sightings not fired were either in populated areas or denied clearance by U.S., ARVN, or RVN agencies. Occasionally, targets were not fired in order to strike them with a Cobra Flash (discussed in the last report) or to avoid disclosing a planned brigade operation.

e. (U) Training.

(1) Radar. In addition to its responsibility for maintenance and delivery of ground surveillance radar, the Division Artillery also was charged with the task of training the radar crews, many of which were unqualified to use their radars effectively. A training program was instituted under the supervision of the Division Artillery S-2. The few qualified operators available were used to provide unqualified personnel with on-the-job training. When a modicum of skill was achieved, trainees were tested during daylight hours with aerial observers confirming their sightings of friendly patrols, workers, and

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water buffalos. Intensive on-the-job training and operator maintenance was also conducted. Some improvements resulted; however, Division Artillery was charged with the training of the crews, but not their operations, so effective follow-through was difficult.

(2) Chronograph. During October, two enlisted men were trained in the operation of the newly-received M-36 radar chronograph. Additional personnel were given on-the-job training to insure a future supply of qualified operators.

(3) During the period 28-30 September, a course on organizational maintenance of FADAC was conducted by civilian technical representatives for appropriate personnel in the 9th Division Artillery.

(4) Other training. All elements were engaged in combat operations throughout the period, therefore unit training consisted predominately of on-the-job training. (See para c, Section 2)

f. (U) Logistics. None.

g. (U) Civic Action. The Division Artillery civic action program is summarized in tabular form at Inclosure 4.

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel. None.

b. (C) Operations.

(1) (C) Encirclement Operations ("Pile On")

(a) OBSERVATION: Extremely accurate artillery fire is required when firing in close support of encirclement operations.

(b) EVALUATION: New techniques were developed by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery. Properly utilized, these techniques minimize the possibilities of errors which could result in friendly casualties. The techniques were developed through firing for 13 encirclement operations. The average size of the encircled area was 600 by 700 meters. The techniques are described below:

1. Measures taken to enhance the accuracy of fires in support of the encirclement maneuver:

a. Supporting batteries are laid, or re-laid, on an azimuth to the

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approximate center of the area of contact to minimize aiming post (or collimator) displacement.

b. Supporting batteries are registered within normal transfer limits of the area of contact and the sheafs are checked if time and the situation permit.

c. Careful, deliberate checks are made at each step in the determination, transmission, and application of firing data within the firing batteries.

d. Only experienced observers of proven ability are used to adjust fire into the encircled area.

e. When there is a choice of batteries to fire into the encircled area, the selection is based upon consideration of range probable errors and the relationship of gun-target lines to target and troop orientation. Because of dispersion considerations, a battery is not fired into the encircled area if the target is near its maximum range.

2. Procedure for adjusting artillery into the encircled enemy position:

a. Positive communication is established with all forward observers and artillery liaison officers with the supported maneuver forces. Normally a single FM frequency is used to coordinate and control all artillery firing into and adjacent to the encircled area.

b. The exact location of supported maneuver forces is determined. During daylight hours panels, or occasionally smoke, are used to mark the flanks of each platoon size element; at night, strobe lights are used.

c. If artillery has not been adjusted previously into the exact area during development of the encirclement, the grid of the center of the encircled area is normally sent in the initial fire request. A "Danger Close" warning is always included in the fire request. One gun, firing shell white phosphorous to burst 200 meters above the ground, is normally used to commence the adjustment.

d. Adjustment is continued with the white phosphorous marking round until it is precisely above the center of the encircled area. The air observer uses appropriately located ground observers to assist him in determining the alignment of the marking round.

e. After the marking round is centered, the observer requests that the adjusting gun fire one round, shell high explosive "on the deck" with fuze delay. Delay fuze action is used to minimize the fragmentation effect should the round land close to or among the supported troops. The delay-fuzed projectile's impact will seldom be visible to the air observer. He must rely on

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

visual or sound sensing from ground observers to learn if the shell impacted at a safe distance from all elements. Should the delay-fuzed projectile impact too close to a friendly position, adjustment is continued with fuze delay until all observers report a safe impact.

f. Once a safe delay fuze impact is achieved (normally the initial delay fuze round) the air observer requests one gun, one round, fuze quick. The air observer can normally see the impact burst achieved with fuze quick. Adjustment is continued, if necessary, to center the adjusting piece.

g. The observer is now ready to bring in the remaining tubes of the battery. He requests a battery one round, right by piece, by piece at his command, thus causing each piece to fire individually. A closed sheaf is normally requested if the encircled area is particularly small. The observer senses the impact of each round in relation to the last round fired by the adjusting gun. Individual piece corrections may be made at this time but are seldom necessary.

h. The battery is now adjusted into the target area and may be further adjusted by the air observer or a ground observer to neutralize or destroy the enemy position. Each battery required to fire into the encircled area is adjusted using the described procedure. A forward observer on the ground may adjust a battery into the encircled area in coordination with the other forward observers on the ground around the circle, but the process is more time consuming and involves a higher degree of risk to the supported force.

i. Should a firing battery exhaust its supply of the lot of ammunition used to commence firing into the encirclement, the observer will be notified. The observer will then give an appropriate correction from the last rounds observed to bring the center of impact near the center of the encircled area. One gun will then fire one round of the new lot with fuze delay. If all ground observers report a safe impact, one round with fuze quick is fired. If the air observer senses this round near the center of the encircled area, he will request a battery volley and continue the mission with the new lot.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That these techniques be disseminated to other organizations and to appropriate artillery training agencies for information and possible utilization.

(2) (U) Airmobile Artillery Firing Platforms

(a) OBSERVATION: Airmobile artillery firing platforms ("paddy platforms") are aerodynamically unstable when airlifted.

(b) EVALUATION: The light weight of the platform relative to the area presented to the wind causes the platform to oscillate in flight and to "float"

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during descent. On 28 September a platform severely damaged a CH-47 helicopter causing the pilot to jettison the platform. The light weight of the platform is a design feature and should not be degraded because of this difficulty. It is believed that at relatively low air speeds the platform may be stable. However, the 9th Infantry Division has adopted the procedures recommended below to preclude accidents of this type.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the platform be transported by CH-54 helicopter with an M102 howitzer in place. As an alternative, and always for the ammunition storage platforms, eighty rounds of ammunition are loaded on the platform to provide added weight for necessary flight stability.

(3) (C) Waterborne Artillery in Tidal Areas

(a) OBSERVATION: Riverine artillery must often go into position over extensive mud flats in support of infantry activities in the coastal tide lands and swamps.

(b) EVALUATION: Access to position areas in these locations must be accomplished at high tide. A unit inserted under these conditions will be aground at low tide and will be immobilized until the next high tide, 10 to 12 hours later.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maneuver commanders must be aware of the constraints imposed by tidal conditions and be prepared to adjust maneuver plans to fire support capabilities. The alternative, to retain mobility, is to await adequate tides for successive operations.

c. (U) Training. Duties of the Cannoneer

(1) OBSERVATION: Daily dry-fire training is required to attain peak proficiency in the service of the piece and in safety double check procedures.

(2) EVALUATION: Although firing batteries may handle many missions and fire hundreds of rounds daily during combat, their accuracy, safety, and speed do not improve beyond certain limits because the battery XO and chief of firing battery cannot interrupt firing to critique mistakes on the spot. This can be done only during lulls in firing, at which time the XO drills the battery in dry-fire missions. The XO and chief of firing battery each observe a section closely through several sets of fire commands originated at the fire direction center; then, after commanding "to the rear of the piece, fall in", they check the sight picture and accuracy of setting of the other sections. The exercise includes emphasis on the positive execution of independent double checks. This training should be conducted vigorously, for not more than 30 minutes at each period. The objective is nearly error free performance, with the rare error immediately detected by the double check system.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all firing units incorporate dry-fire exercises in their daily training routine.

d. (C) Intelligence. Liaison Visits to ARVN/GVN Officials

(1) OBSERVATION: An aggressive and well trained team consisting of an intelligence NCO and an interpreter, working together in the same geographical area for an extended period of time made significant contributions to the intelligence collection effort.

(2) EVALUATION: The artillery battalion intelligence NCO and an interpreter were dispatched daily to visit village chiefs, local police, RF/FF outposts, ARVN outposts, and local officials within the brigade's permanent TAOI. Frequent visits with the same officials over a period of time built a rapport between the informants and the team which resulted in the acquisition of significant intelligence.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the intelligence NCO/interpreter team concept be utilized in all permanent AO's to establish contact with those local officials who are potential sources of information concerning VC activities.

e. (U) Logistics. None.


f. (U) Organization. None.

g. (U) Other. None.

3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

None.

4 Incl
as
Incl 2 W/D, Hqs, DA


R.G. GARD, JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVDE-MH (1 Nov 68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1) (U)

Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, APO San Francisco 96370

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE-H,
APO 96222

1. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report
Lessons Learned from Headquarters 9th Infantry Division Artillery for the
period ending 31 October 1968.

2. Two copies of this report have been sent to the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JOHN B. TOWER
Lieutenant Colonel, GS
Acting Chief of Staff

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AVFBC-RE-H (1 Nov 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 28 DEC 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational
Report-Lessons Learned of the 9th Infantry Division Artillery for the period
ending 31 October 1968, with the following comments.

2. (C) Reference Section 2, para 2b(1), Encirclement Operations ("File On").


a. This is a well-conceived technique. Its complexity requires very
careful and thorough coordination both within artillery elements and between
the artillery and the maneuver force. That this technique has been employed
on numerous occasions with consummate success is a credit to both those who
planned it and those who have executed it.

b. Because of the singular success of the artillery's contribution to
these operations, a thorough explanation of the technique was presented to
commanders of artillery in III Corps Tactical Zone at a recent Commanders'
Conference held at this headquarters.

c. This information will be disseminated to all artillery units in a
compilation of lessons learned being prepared by this headquarters.

3. (U) Reference Section 2, para 2b(2), Airmobile Artillery Firing Platforms;
para 2c, Duties of the Cannonier, and para 2d, Liaison Visits to ARVN/GVN
Officials. These lessons learned are also of sufficient value that they
will be included in the compilation of lessons learned to be distributed to
all artillery units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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
AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 68) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 9th
Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the report as modified by
the 2d Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. C. ARNETZ
CPT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFV
HQ 9th Inf Div Arty

GPOP-DT (1 Nov 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 9th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

6 JAN 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Inclosure 1 to Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for
Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

1 November 1968

PERMANENT AND SEMIPERMANENT FIRE SUPPORT BASES

UNIT	NORMAL LOCATION
1st Battalion, 11th Artillery	
Battery A	Dong Tam XS 4143
Battery B	Dong Tam XS 4143
Battery C	FSPB Moore XS 2650
	Dong Tam XS 4143
2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery	
Battery A	Tan An XS 5565
Battery B	Rach Kien XS 7469
Battery C	Binh Phuoc XS 6155
	Tan Tru XS 6663
3rd Battalion, 34th Artillery	
All batteries barge mounted. No land positions normally.	Dong Tam XS 4143
1st Battalion, 84th Artillery	
Battery A	Dong Tam XS 4143
Battery B	Thu Thua XS 5470
Battery C	FSPB Moore XS 2650
Battery D	Ben Tre XS 5132
	Dong Tam XS 4143
6th Battalion, 77th Artillery	
Battery A	Can Tho WS 8310
Battery B	Vinh Long XS 0733
Battery C	Can Tho WS 8310
	Soc Trang XR 0662

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1 November 1968

Inclosure 3 (Missions Fired, Rounds Expended and Target Surveillance) to
Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending
31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R:) (U)

1. Missions fired and rounds expended by battalion. Rounds and missions are indicated by category of target according to the following classification:

a. Confirmed: Location is known and presence of enemy determined by contact or by observation of activity by air or ground observers. Includes hard targets such as bunker complexes.

b. Acquired: Location is based on SLAR, SPAR, Red Haze, ground surveillance radar, airborne personnel detectors and other detection devices. Fires are based on timely reaction and meet all of the following conditions:

- (1) Detection by one or more of above sensory devices.
- (2) Validation by analysis of enemy pattern of operations.
- (3) Terrain analysis by competent targeting agencies.

c. Counterbattery: Known or suspect locations fired on immediately before, during, or immediately after enemy rocket/mortar/artillery attacks.

d. Preparations: Fires placed on LZ's, beachheads and objectives or areas prior to air assault or occupation by friendly forces. Includes reconnaissance by fire and blocking missions.

e. Interdiction: Fires delivered for the purpose of denying the enemy the use of an area or point. Includes targets fired as a result of agent reports which are not sufficiently reliable to fall in the Confirmed category.

f. Special Purpose: Registrations, marking missions, navigation missions, calibrations, adjustment of defensive concentrations, and illumination missions.

h. Others: Fires for training, demonstrations, service practice and other categories not listed.

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1 November 1968

Inclosure 3 (Missions Fired, Rounds Expended and Target Surveillance) to Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2. (C) Missions Fired and Rounds Expended:

MONTH	UNIT	CONFIRMED		ACQUIRED		COUNTER BTRY		PREPARATION		INTERDICTION		SP PURPOSE		OTHER	
		Mens	Rds	Mens	Rds	Mens	Rds	Mens	Rds	Mens	Rds	Mens	Rds	Mens	Rds
Aug	1-11	91	6668	519	10761	56	3713	37	1402	142	2076	125	1420	4	72
Sep		76	5553	385	10540	12	708	13	1351	15	625	130	1369	0	0
Oct		<u>58</u>	<u>5035</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>11715</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>1566</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>2225</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>302</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>1161</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL		225	17856	1072	33016	148	5987	73	4978	170	3003	333	3950	4	72
Aug	2-4	105	8263	264	5509	32	1549	18	611	101	3395	183	3725	4	51
Sep		67	10026	177	2255	30	1373	8	500	105	2136	131	2706	0	0
Oct		<u>94</u>	<u>6523</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>4657</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>916</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>473</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>2320</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>3043</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>157</u>
TOTAL		266	24812	657	12421	83	3838	41	1593	261	7851	460	9474	15	208
Aug	3-34	129	10106	400	11228	55	1951	19	2349	47	834	137	1987	0	0
Sep		92	7806	146	4343	39	561	25	1798	38	735	281	3475	0	0
Oct		<u>135</u>	<u>7415</u>	<u>425</u>	<u>10129</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>1445</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>4121</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>2329</u>	<u>295</u>	<u>4290</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL		356	25327	971	25700	158	3957	103	8268	226	3898	713	9752	1	6
Aug	6-77	75	4063	645	2085	25	960	19	447	1276	3931	23	325	0	0
Sep		157	7384	167	2084	80	779	24	1188	1687	5893	225	1494	8	132
Oct		<u>125</u>	<u>4392</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>2143</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>651</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>386</u>	<u>1201</u>	<u>4800</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>459</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>112</u>
TOTAL		357	15839	940	6312	129	2390	55	2321	1164	14624	293	2278	18	244
Aug	1-84	132	3015	385	4572	65	1070	14	301	90	1039	228	2518	0	0
Sep	(155)	81	2327	610	7495	82	598	11	130	156	2160	226	2263	2	28
Oct		<u>88</u>	<u>2755</u>	<u>634</u>	<u>9052</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>1072</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>304</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>1056</u>	<u>177</u>	<u>1758</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>52</u>
TOTAL		301	8097	1629	21119	196	2740	37	1035	309	4245	631	6539	4	80

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Inclosure 3 (Missions Fired, Rounds Expended and Target Surveillance) to Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2. (C) Missions Fired and Rounds Expended:

MONTH	UNIT	CONFIRMED		ACQUIRED		COUNTER	BTRY PREPARATION		INTERDICTION		SP PURPOSE		OTHER		
		Msns	Rds	Msns	Rds		Msns	Rds	Msns	Rds	Msns	Rds	Msns	Rds	
Aug	1-84	37	606	206	1623	37	312	3	75	0	0	26	328	0	0
Sep	(8")	31	584	68	605	28	76	2	44	3	11	26	330	1	64
Oct		<u>31</u>	<u>1205</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>174</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>210</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>40</u>
TOTAL		99	2395	370	3078	65	388	7	152	35	185	77	868	6	104

3. (U) Target Surveillance. The following target information includes only confirmed damage assessment of targets fired on by the organic units of the 9th Division Artillery:

VC
Killed

304

Bunkers and
Other Military
Structures
Destroyed

507

Sampans
Destroyed

52

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Inclosure 4 (Civic Action Report) to Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

	<u>HMB DIV ARTY</u>	<u>2/4 ARTY</u>	<u>1/11 ARTY</u>	<u>3/34 ARTY</u>	<u>6/77 ARTY</u>	<u>1/84 ARTY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MEDCAPS: <u>1</u>							
NUMBER HELD	7	30	24	8	8	7	84
PATIENTS TREATED	968	1480	2953	773	1239	663	8076
I CAPS: <u>2</u>							
NUMBER HELD	4	16	11				31
PATIENTS TREATED	187	844	296				1327
							<u>TOTAL</u>
							<u>MANHCURS</u>
<u>CONSTRUCTION:</u>							
CHURCHES	2-Pagoda repair						
	1-Catholic						520 Hrs.
	Church repair						
SCHOOLS	Repaired 3						200 Hrs.
	classrooms						
ORPHANAGE		Built 2					400 Hrs.
		rooms					
DISPENSARIES					1-Isolation		180 Hrs.
					Ward built		
OTHER	Built RF/PF	Built 50' \$150 dona-	Lepers-\$300				\$450 Donations
	Latrine	wooden	tions	donations			290 Manhours
	(24 hrs.)	span (240	hrs.)				

84

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1 November 1968

Inclosure 4 (Civic Action Report) to Operational Report of 9th Infantry Division Artillery for Period Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

	<u>HQB DIV ARTY</u>	<u>2/4 ARTY</u>	<u>1/11 ARTY</u>	<u>3/34 ARTY</u>	<u>6/77 ARTY</u>	<u>1/84 ARTY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>COMMODITIES</u>							
<u>DISPENSED</u>							
<u>MATERIALS (lbs)</u>							
				Sand & gravel 2000 lbs.	Clothing 300 lbs.		2300 lbs.
HEALTH KITS	100						100 ea.
SCHOOL KITS	175		360		200		735 ea.
FOOD (lbs)	200 lbs.		1800 lbs.		150 lbs.		2150 lbs.
LUMBER	150 BF.		1500 BF.				1650 BF.
CEMENT	40,000 lbs.			2500 lbs.		2200 lbs.	44,700 lbs.
TIN	520 Sheets					140 Sheets	660 Sheets

FOOTNOTES:

1. A MEDCAP is civic action activity in a secure area where civilian personnel are provided medical treatment without intelligence or other military objectives.
2. An ICAP is any civic action conducted in a contested or insecure area. ICAPs are conducted in conjunction with intelligence, psyop and security personnel, each performing their customary duties.

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		4
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13. ABSTRACT		

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Security Classification

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The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE _____
** FOR OT RD # _____
***PAGE # _____

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.