

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division  
APO San Francisco 96217

AVIF-BA-CO

30 January 1969

6011  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 11th Infantry Brigade for the Period  
Ending 31 January 1969. (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI)

Commanding General  
Americal Division  
CINCPAC: AVIF-HL

**SECTION I, OPERATIONS  
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES**

**OPERATION VERNON LAKE II:**

1. Operation Vernon Lake II was initiated 2 Nov 68 with 2 Infantry Battalions conducting combat assaults to interdict the 3D NVA Division and the QUANG NGAI Provincial Base Areas, and perform Bomb damage Assessments for Arc Lights placed on known enemy areas. Of most significant is the fact that the enemy's sustaining power has been severely damaged by destroying his supply capabilities and disrupting his vital rear service elements. Fire Support Bases Cork and Amy were established. Operation Vernon Lake II continues with the following enemy losses having been assessed from 2 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69:

KIA NVA/VC	136/180	SMALL ARMS AMMO	23,200
BASE C/MPS DISC	77	GRENADES	83
CIA NVA/VC	6/6	RICE	121 TONS
IWC	128	SALT	2 TON
CSMC	3	BICYCLES	76
AMMO CACHE	2	UNIFORMS	963
WPNS CACHE	2	PACKS	168
MORTAR RDS	1190	POW COMPOUND	1
RPG-7 RDS	43	SURGICAL HOSPITAL	3
ROCKETS	196	1ST AID BRENSING	54
57MM	115	PLASMA	28 CANS

**GROUP 1**  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years

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SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS 2 CASES

SEWING MACHINES 7

MEDICINE

578 BOTTLES

TYPEWRITERS 2

2. In addition the 11th Brigade has conducted numerous combat assaults to interdict enemy escape routes and locate enemy base camps. Combat assaults and resupply missions were accomplished in spite of monsoon weather conditions with minimal incidents concerning helicopter accidents. During the period 2 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 69 the following combat assaults were conducted in Operation Vernon Lake II:

BRIGADE 2

BATTALION 11

COMPANY 21

3. The success achieved to date in Operation Vernon Lake II was a result of:

- a. Numerous Combat Assaults.
- b. Timely employment of Arc Light strikes and artillery concentrations on suspected enemy locations and base camp areas.
- c. Determined helicopter support even under marginal conditions.
- d. Ability of 11th Brigade troops to operate independently for weeks and being resupplied under adverse conditions by air only.
- e. Resourcefulness and ingenuity of US Soldiers to adapt to a new environment.

4. BATTLE OF THE TRIANGLE (CHAU NHAI 2) 20-26 JAN 69: On 20 January 1969, Companies A and B of the 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry conducted combat assaults into four landing zones and began pushing toward the hamlet of Chau Nhai 2 (085680). This operation was ordered by CO, Americal Division to attempt to locate 800 villagers kidnapped from a hamlet 8 kilometers to the north. The landing zones were cold; however, as the units moved toward the village they became heavily engaged with an undetermined size enemy force. Indications from the battle area of an NVA company or larger in the village required airlifting Companies B and C of the 3d Battalion 1st Infantry into the action. By late afternoon the decision was made to place a tight cordon on the village and illuminate the area all night. The following morning airstrikes and heavy artillery barrages were directed against the fortified enemy stronghold. Attempts were made to move into the village but fierce resistance was met. B Troop, 1st Squadron 1st Cavalry and one plt of E Troop, 17th Cavalry were placed under the operational control of 4-21 Inf and joined the cordoned area. Again illumination from air force flare ships was employed all night. During the night attempts were made to breach the cordons; however, both were turned back. On 22 Jan 69 the units again tried to move into the village but this time with armored Personnel Carriers. Resistance was again heavy and

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forces were receiving RPG rounds and mortar fire. Additional immediate air strikes were employed and all units were moved back to the cordon. A NVA soldier taken prisoner indicated that his communication company and the 9th Bn, 22d NVA Regt with CP were within the cordon. Illumination was maintained throughout the night and no attempts were made to escape. On 22 Jan a request was sent forward to G3 Air to divert all 1000 lb. and 2000 lb. bombs with delayed fuzes to the cordoned area. Early morning of the 23d Psychological Warfare was employed by dropping Chieu Hoi leaflets and broadcasting to the unit to surrender prior to the heavy air strikes. After a suitable period of time had elapsed to allow surrender, sortie after sortie of delayed bombs were employed against the tunnel complexes and bunkers system with devastating results. Elements of the 4th Battalion 21st Infantry with tracks moved into the village and completely sept the area with no further resistance. The 24th, 25th and 26th were spent in digging out the area, gathering equipment and identifying tunnels and destroying them. The 11th Brigade employed 51 air strikes into the village dropping a total of 648,000 pounds of bombs and 2000 rounds of artillery. The following were the enemy losses that could be excavated from the collapsed tunnels and from under tons of displaced earth:

NVA KIA ~ 41	VC KIA ~ 6	RPD MGs ~ 3
RPG 2 ~ 1	RPG 7 ~ 1	AK 47 ~ 3
AK 44 ~ 2	THOMPSON SUB ~ 1 MACHINE GUN	MORTAR & ROCKET AMMO ~ 10

Documents identifying the 9th Bn, 22d Regt, 3d NVA Div.

Although the number of bodies actually discovered was relatively small the number of KIAs and weapons buried under tons of earth was impossible to verify. All large tunnel complexes were caved in and although NVA were discovered in the first 10 feet of the collapsed tunnels it was impossible to further excavate due to depth of tunnels and danger to US Forces. All agencies are convinced that many enemy soldiers also with weapons and equipment are still buried under the tons of earth in the village. Intelligence sources believe that at least the major portion of the 9th Bn, 22 Regt has been destroyed.

**SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED  
COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- A. Personnel See Inclosure 1.
- B. Operations See Inclosure 2.
- C. Training See Inclosure 3.
- D. Intelligence See Inclosure 4.
- E. Logistics See Inclosure 5.
- F. Organization NONE
- G. Other (Signal) See Inclosure 6.

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
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SECTION 3

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION

No Department of the Army survey was conducted this quarter.

- 6 Inclosures
1. Personnel
  2. Operations
  3. Training
  4. Intelligence
  5. Logistics
  6. Other (Signal)



John W. DONALDSON  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry  
11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division  
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BA-TH-OP

25 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Report (Lessons Learned)

Commanding Officer  
11th Infantry Brigade  
ATTN: AVDF-BA-OP  
APO San Francisco 96217

1. Reference letter your headquarters subject as above, dtd 7 Jan 69.

2. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline.

a. Observation: Many times the "Dustoff" is extremely slow in locating positions in unfamiliar terrain during periods of poor visibility.

(1) On four (4) different occasions, this battalion has experienced an unacceptable delay in getting Dustoff aircraft into the casualties location. This is often caused by bad weather which forces the pilot to fly at lower elevations which requires navigation by ground reference. Due to the present rotation system and the infrequent flights into extended operational areas, particularly in mountainous terrain, unfamiliarity with the terrain often negates the superior flying abilities of the dustoff pilots. On two occasions this battalion has had wounded personnel extracted by pilots other than dustoff pilots, who were familiar with the area, only after the dustoff pilots had become misoriented and subsequently forced to return due to weather. In both cases there was clear weather at the location of the casualties. This is not to imply that the dustoff pilots did not make a maximum effort and that they are not extremely capable. The pilot who did make the extractions had flown in the area quite frequently as this battalions command and control or utility ship pilot. This was possible because this pilot was able to use known reference points, i.e., streams, prominent hills, old friendly locations and many terrain features, to enable the pilot to fly under the low clouds and successfully extract the wounded personnel.

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The basic reason this pilot was capable of doing this was that he knew the terrain. Had the pilot had to rely on his instruments or map reading abilities, he, like the regular dustoff pilots, would also have been unsuccessful.

(2) Recommendations: That Dustoff pilots be rotated less often and that when a new dustoff pilot is assigned to a new area, that he spend a minimum of one day with each supported battalion, flying with the Battalion Commanding Officer in the command and control aircraft. Then when he is required to fly a dustoff mission in an extended AO or mountainous terrain, a pilot from the local support element could accompany him and assist in locating wounded personnel in the event of inclement weather.

b. Observation: That each infantry Battalion has a need for a lightweight rope ladder for use in mountainous terrain.

(1) Discussion: Experience in mountainous terrain has proved that there is a definite need for a means to insert personnel onto the ground, as well as make extractions when the situation does not permit the preparation of an LZ. Specific situations experienced are:

(a) A helicopter crashed in an area of high trees. The command and control aircraft had a doctor on board, but had no facilities to get him on the ground to tend to injured personnel.

(b) The Battalion Commander has had numerous occasions where he needed to visit unit commanders on the ground but was forced to wait until an LZ could be prepared, or a suitable site was encountered.

(c) Often times troops need to be extracted for various reasons, i.e., medical appointments, R&R, DEROs, etc..

(2) Recommendations: That each infantry battalion be issued a rope ladder of 100 feet in length to be used from a UH1 type aircraft to meet the above requirements.

c. Observation: A need exists to equip all infantry units down to platoon level with a small strobe light to mark night helicopter landing zones.

CC

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Incl 1

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AVDF-BA-TH-OP

SUBJECT: Operations Report (Lessons Learned)

25 January 1969

(1) Discussion: We have often had difficulty bringing in helicopters at night due to lack of proper marking equipment. The small strobe lights issued to pilots in the survival kits have been used by some of our units with great success. However, the quantity we have been able to obtain is not sufficient to support our elements.

(2) Recommendations: That these small strobe lights be issued to all infantry battalions in sufficient quantities to equip each platoon with at least four (4) lights and the battalion headquarters with twelve (12) lights.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Wyland W. Hopkins  
/t/ WYLAND W. HOPKINS  
CPT, INF  
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry  
11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division  
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-B4-XX-OP

14 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry for the period ending 31 January 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1).

TO: Commanding Officer  
11th Infantry Brigade  
ATTN: AVDF-B4-OP  
APO San Francisco 96217

## SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED

### COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### a. OPERATIONS:

Caravan of suspected VC village.

a. The 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry has found an effective method to clear an a suspected VC village quickly and efficiently.

b. Six lift ships, one Command and Control helicopter, and two gunships are required. At the initial PZ, each of the three distinct elements ignite a different color smoke grenade (red, yellow and green). Two lift ships land at each color smoke, pick up seven men in each ship, and then proceed to the suspected VC village. While the lift ships are approaching the LZ, the Command helicopter marks the vicinity of the LZ's with the same colored smoke used at the PZ. Each set of lift ships land and discharge it's troops, then return to the PZ and begin shuttling the remainder of the troops to the LZ. (See Inclosure 1).


c. When air movement is conducted between two points utilizing numerous sorties, colored marking panels can alleviate the excessive use of smoke. Lift ships generally do not used an attention device (Smoke) after the first lift is completed.

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ENCLOSURE 1

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LEGEND:

- Initial Flight Path
- Shuttle Flight Path

Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery  
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BA-AT-CO

20 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period  
(1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969)

TO: Commanding Officer  
American Division Artillery  
ATTN: S-3  
APO San Francisco 96374

SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED:

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Personnel.

None.

B. Operations.

1. Subject: Colocation of a platoon of 155mm howitzers with a battery of 105mm howitzers.

a. Observation. In the counterinsurgency environment too often the capability to reinforce direct support artillery is lost because the direct support units are too remote from general support or general support-reinforcing artillery.

b. Evaluation. To provide the direct support artillery with reinforcing fires, a platoon of 155 howitzers can be attached to each "direct support" battery and, not only provide reinforcing fires, but also extend artillery coverage to provide the supported battalion more maneuver room. This colocation of artillery also reduces requirements for the establishment of fire bases to support raids and short term operations outside the 105mm range fan.

c. Recommendation. When "direct support" batteries are outside of reinforcing artillery range, consideration should be given to attaching a platoon of 155mm towed howitzers from Division Artillery to them.

2. Subject. Artillery adjustment training for infantry units.

a. Observation. When short range patrols, long range patrols,

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or small infantry units are deployed to the field without FO's or commanders trained in the use of artillery adjustment many lucrative artillery targets are lost.

b. Evaluation. Service practice for all infantry units within the supported brigade can be conducted to insure that all members of the chain of command, from company commander to platoon sergeant, are well versed in all aspects of artillery adjustments. Short range patrols and long range patrols likewise can be thoroughly schooled, to include an extensive briefing by the direct support artillery battalion S-3 as to the location and availability of artillery units. This training can be accomplished as rifle companies rotate through fire bases and as short range patrols and long range patrols prepare for field operations.

c. Recommendation. As many members as possible of infantry companies, to include short range patrol and long range patrol units, should be well trained by their supporting artillery battalion on artillery fire adjustments.

3. Subject. Firing of accurate prep's in mountainous terrain.

a. Observation. Due to nonavailability of local met stations, firing batteries in mountainous terrain sometimes must depend on met data flown in coastal areas. Thus, preparation fires may not be on target as would be expected.

b. Evaluation. In order to minimize having to adjust preparatory fires because of the met problem, each prep can be updated by firing an observed smoke or HE check round to indicate if corrective action need be taken. If this is not done on prep's planned as extended zone sweeps, it is extremely difficult to adjust the prep after it has begun since there is no one specific grid from which to adjust.

c. Recommendation. All planned preparatory fires in mountainous terrain should be updated by firing an observed check round at the center of the area to be prepped and adjusting from that round as necessary.

*Talbott Barnard*  
TALBOTT BARNARD  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

1-Enclosure

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Incl 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery  
APO San Francisco 96217

AVDF-BA-AT-CO

20 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period  
(1 November 1968 ~ 31 January 1969)

TO: Commanding Officer  
American Division Artillery  
ATTN: S-3  
APO San Francisco 96374

SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED:

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Personnel.

None.

B. Operations.

1. Subject: Colocation of a platoon of 155mm howitzers with a battery of 105mm howitzers.

a. Observation. In the counterinsurgency environment too often the capability to reinforce direct support artillery is lost because the direct support units are too remote from general support or general support-reinforcing artillery.

b. Evaluation. To provide the direct support artillery with reinforcing fires, a platoon of 155 howitzers can be attached to each "direct support" battery and, not only provide reinforcing fires, but also extend artillery coverage to provide the supported battalion more maneuver room. This colocation of artillery also reduces requirements for the establishment of fire bases to support raids and short term operations outside the 105mm range fan.

c. Recommendation. When "direct support" batteries are outside of reinforcing artillery range, consideration should be given to attaching a platoon of 155mm towed howitzers from Division Artillery to them.

2. Subject. Artillery adjustment training for infantry units.

a. Observation. When short range patrols, long range patrols,

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~~or small infantry units are deployed to the field without FO's or commanders trained in the use of artillery adjustment many lucrative artillery targets are lost.~~

~~b. Evaluation. Service practice for all infantry units within the supported brigade can be conducted to insure that all members of the chain of command, from company commander to platoon sergeant, are well versed in all aspects of artillery adjustments. Short range patrols and long range patrols likewise can be thoroughly schooled, to include an extensive briefing by the direct support artillery battalion S-3 as to the location and availability of artillery units. This training can be accomplished as rifle companies rotate through fire bases and as short range patrols and long range patrols prepare for field operations.~~

~~c. Recommendation. As many members as possible of infantry companies, to include short range patrol and long range patrol units, should be well trained by their supporting artillery battalion on artillery fire adjustments.~~

See Incl 3

3. Subject. Firing of accurate prep's in mountainous terrain.

a. Observation. Due to nonavailability of local met stations, firing batteries in mountainous terrain sometimes must depend on met data flown in coastal areas. Thus, preparation fires may not be on target as would be expected.

b. Evaluation. In order to minimize having to adjust preparatory fires because of the met problem, each prep can be updated by firing an observed smoke or HE check round to indicate if corrective action need be taken. If this is not done on prep's planned as extended zone sweeps, it is extremely difficult to adjust the prep after it has begun since there is no one specific grid from which to adjust.

c. Recommendation. All planned preparatory fires in mountainous terrain should be updated by firing an observed check round at the center of the area to be prepped and adjusting from that round as necessary.

  
TALBOT BARNARD  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

~~4. Inclusions~~

Incl 2

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EXTRACT

AVDF-BA-AT-CO

20 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period  
1 November 1968 - 31 January 1969

Subject. Training for infantry units in artillery adjustment.

a. Observation. When short range patrols, long range patrols, or small infantry units are deployed to the field without FO's or commanders trained in the use of artillery adjustment many lucrative artillery targets are lost.

b. Evaluation. Service practice for all infantry units within the supported brigade can be conducted to insure that all members of the chain of command, from company ~~commandor~~ to platoon sergeant, are well versed in all aspects of artillery adjustments. Short range patrols and long range patrols likewise can be thoroughly schooled, to include an extensive briefing by the direct support artillery battalion S-3 as to the location and availability of artillery units. This training can be accomplished as rifle companies rotate through fire bases and as short range patrols and long range patrols prepare for field operations.

c. Recommendation. As many members as possible of infantry companies, to include short range patrol and long range patrol units, should be well trained by their supporting artillery battalion on artillery fire adjustments.

(Extracted from Operational Report Lessons Learned, 6th Battalion,  
11th Artillery - dtd 20 Jan 69)

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AVDF-BA-XX-OP

12 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry for the period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI).

2. INTELLIGENCE:

Tremendous advantages are to be gained by inserting small elements (LRRP) into the high ground two or three days in advance of a company size sweep through the area. Equipped with binoculars, night sighting equipment and communications, these units can report enemy movements, adjust artillery to block and exodus and help guide the movements of friendly troops into the battle area.

A TRUE EXACT COPY

*Stephen H. Cobb*  
STEPHEN H. COBB  
1LT, Armor  
11th Brigade Historian

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Section II

AVDF-BA-IN

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned:  
Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

29 January 1969

1. (U) Reduction in force of CI Section

a. Observation: During November 1968 the number of personnel assigned to the CI section of MIF 11th Brigade was reduced by 100%. As a result, the intelligence collection effort has decreased substantially over the past three months.

b. Evaluation: Situated 25 to 40 miles south of Chu Lai and separated from the rest of the Americal Division by the 2nd ARVN area of operations, the 11th Brigade derives little or no benefit from the increased intelligence collection capability of Americal MID. Because of its relatively isolated location, the 11th Brigade has a unique requirement for internally produced tactical intelligence.

c. Recommendation: Increased 1 MIT section by two special agents.

2. (U) Reduction in force of IPW Section 1 MIT

a. Observation: During November 1968 the number of personnel assigned to 1 MIT IPW section was reduced by approximately 100%. As a result, the production of tactically valuable intelligence by the IPW section has decreased substantially over the past 3 months.

b. Evaluation: Situated 25 to 40 miles south of Chu Lai and separated from the rest of the Americal Division by the 2nd ARVN area of operations, the 11th Brigade derives little intelligence of tactical value from detainees interrogated by IPW sections of the other brigades in the Americal Division. Because of its relatively isolated location, the 11th Brigade has a particular need to be self reliant in the production of tactical intelligence from prisoner interrogation. During the past three months IPW section has processed a disproportionately large number of detainees.

Since 2 November:	PW	CD	IC
11TH BDE:	20	230	730
196TH BDE:	10	102	415
197TH BDE:	10	10	347

c. Recommendation: That the 1 MIT IPW section be augmented by the addition of three American interrogators and three Vietnamese interpreters.

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AVDF-BA-IN

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

January 1969

3. (U) Necessity for Montagnard interpreters.

a. Observation: Numerous Montagnard VCS were detained by 11th Infantry Brigade units during the last quarter.

b. Evaluation: It is often quite difficult if not impossible for 11th Infantry Brigade interpreters who speak Vietnamese to question Montagnard detainees effectively, it has often been necessary to transport such detainees to Ha Thanh Special Forces Camp for proper interrogation.

c. Recommendation: One interpreter who can speak Montagnard as well as Vietnamese should be assigned to the 11th Infantry Brigade IPW section.

*John D. Veach*  
JOHN D VEATCH  
MAJ, INF

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Logistics

Subject: Requisition Follow Up Time

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(a) Observation: Follow up time, set by regulation on repair part requisitions, are not realistic when the ROAD Division Forward Support Company is physically separated a considerable distance (60 KM) from the HQ & Main Support Company of the Division Direct Support Battalion.

(b) Evaluation: Due to physical separation and bad road conditions, requisitions passing through the Forward Support Company cannot be given to the HQ & Main Support Company when received. For the same reasons the Forward Support Company does not receive the HQ & Main Support Company requisition document numbers on a timely basis. In many cases the supported units are submitting follow-ups on their requisitions before the Forward Support Company receives the document requisition number from the HQ & Main Support Company. This is defeating the purpose of the follow-up system and creating additional paper work for all concerned.

(c) Recommendation: When the Forward Support Company is physically separated from the HQ & Main Support Company more realistic follow-up time be established by the authorized authority.

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End 5

LESSONS LEARNED

Logistics

Subject: Destruction of Unserviceable Small Arms Ammunition

(a) Observation. Brigade units have on hand large amounts of unserviceable small arms ammunition. At the present time there is no authorization or area available to destroy this ammunition. This ammunition must be collected from the different landing zones, transported to and turned in to an ammunition supply point at LZ Bronce. Then it is forwarded through proper channels where it can be destroyed or termed servicable again.

(b) Evaluation. Transportation of this unserviceable ammunition remains the number one problem. Packing materials are in short supply. The labor needed to pack, transport and mark ammunition is unavailable. Space for this ammunition is critical and due to improper storage and protection is becoming quite dangerous.

(c) Recommendation: Authorize the destruction of small arms ammunition at the battalion level or at Forward Ammunition Supply Points. Actual destruction to be performed, after classification as unserviceable, by EOD personnel. Suitable destruction sites could be constructed or are naturally available.

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Incl 5

LESSONS LEARNED

Logistics

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Subject: Weapons Accounting for Casualties

(a) Observation. Casualties evacuated from the field directly to a Chu Lai hospital take their weapon and field equipment with them. If they are returned to duty from Chu Lai they recover their weapon and equipment. Those personnel who are further evacuated are separated from their equipment and are unable to maintain any control over it. At this point, the whereabouts of the weapon and equipment becomes extremely confused and difficult to track down. Because of Duc Pho's remote location in relation to Chu Lai, it is not possible for the unit supply sergeants to stop by the hospital and check on the man's equipment as a routine course of action.

(b) Evaluation. It appears that there is no set procedure at the hospital facilities in Chu Lai for notifying units of weapons and equipment belonging to evacuated personnel to be picked up. At the present time, whenever a unit discovers that the man is no longer in Chu Lai or in-country, a lengthy series of phone calls must be made to discover where the man's weapon and gear is and who must be seen to claim these items back. If the weapon and equipment cannot be tracked down, a report of survey must be initiated.

(c) Recommendation. Recommend that hospital units in Chu Lai initiate a standardized list of field gear and weapons. This list should be used to check off the items of gear brought with the patient, then sent through regular correspondence channels to the man's unit so that the unit supply personnel would be aware of the weapon and equipment that they have at which hospital and hereby simplify equipment accountability, especially of weapons.

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Inc 5

LESSONS LEARNED

Logistics

Subject: Closed Loop Items

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(a) Observation. At present closed loop items are positioned at depot level.

(b) Evaluation. Since the closed loop items are being positioned at depot level, the using units are not turning in closed loop items which need over-haul or rebuild for mileage or hours. The reason for this is that the units cannot get replacement items within a reasonable period of time.

(c) Recommendation. This situation can be remedied by either:

(1) Positioning closed loop items at the direct support level and allowing the units to direct exchange with direct support which would then direct exchange with the depot.

(2) Allowing the units to requisition closed loop items and keep the old items on hand until a replacement arrives. The old item would be retrograded upon receipt of the replacement items.

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Incl 5

Logistics

Subject: Refrigeration Repair

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- (a) Observation: The refrigeration repair section in the division maintenance battalion cannot adequately provide service to all of the refrigerations within the division.
- (b) Evaluation: The division maintenance battalion presently has a refrigeration section with a few qualified people and it is inconceivable for them to perform contact maintenance at all the landing zones. It is just as inconceivable to assume to the LZ's can evacuate their refrigeration equipment to the division base camp everytime there is a minor problem since their only access to many base camps is by air. The climate in Vietnam makes refrigeration equipment vital since no fresh food can be kept for more than a few hours before spoiling.
- (c) Recommendation: Suggest that all forward support maintenance companies modify their TOE, to include a refrigeration section. They could then provide contact maintenance to the refrigeration equipment at the LZ's and eliminate the need to evacuate this equipment.

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## Logistics

Subject: Gasket Failure in Drum, Collapsible, Fuel, 500 gallon

(a) Observation. It has been observed that the gaskets used in 500 gallon collapsible drums are of such quality that they lose their sealing capability very rapidly. These gaskets are in the dust cap, the check valve assembly and the hand valve. Apparently the gaskets were designed for stateside usage, not conditions encountered in Viet Nam. Because a fuel residue is constantly in the drums and climactic conditions in Viet Nam, the gaskets are extremely vulnerable to corrosion.

(b) Evaluation. Five hundred gallon drums are used in the supply of forward support elements. Since these drums are, to a large extent, hard to obtain in supply channels, failure of the gaskets adversely affects the support of these elements.

(c) Recommendation. It is recommended that the manufacturers of these gaskets improve upon their composition. Until that time, these gaskets should be extensively stocked in supply channels in order to enhance their replacement.

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LESSONS LEARNED

Logistics

Subject: Fender Brace

- (a) Observation. The 5 ton tractor right front fenders are breaking in four to five places.
- (b) Evaluation. The weight of the air filters on this fender is too heavy for the fender to support by itself. Therefore it is breaking loose from the body and at the curves of the fender.
- (c) Recommendation. To prevent the fender from breaking a supporting brace should be installed. The frame of the truck has two holes that can be utilized for mounting a short piece of angle iron. Another angle iron can be bolted to the fender. A steel pipe brace can be welded between the two angle irons to provide the required support for the air filter and thus prevent the fender from breaking.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS WERE PROVIDED IN REFERENCE TO HEADQUARTERS,  
6TH SUPPORT BATTALION OPERATIONS REPORT-LESSONS LEARNED, DATED  
25 JANUARY 1969, BY THE 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE S-4:

Reference Inclosure: Requisition Follow-up Time. Rather than extend  
the time element, the use of telephone or radio should be investigated.

Reference Inclosure: Weapons Accounting for Casualties. Weapons should  
not be evacuated with wounded or dead. The squad leader should insure  
that all equipment, to include arms, is evacuated to the rear area  
through the use of the Charlie Charlie and/or the resupply ship. In  
extreme cases, the equipment might have to be destroyed in place. Cost-  
wise, destruction of equipment in the field is more economical than  
having to survey the equipment at a later date. It is further believed  
that the hospitals should accept, inventory and store equipment on the  
person of casualties. The equipment could be evacuated to appropriate  
units or returned to the individual when he is released.

Reference Inclosure: Fender Brace. This information should be submitted  
on DA Form 2407 as an equipment improvement recommendation.

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period ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1).

## 2. INTELLIGENCE:

Enormous advantages are to be gained by inserting small elements (LRU) into the high ground two or three days in advance of a company size sweep through the area. Equipped with binoculars, night sighting equipment and communications, these units can report enemy movements, adjust artillery to block an exodus and help guide the movements of friendly troops into the battle area.

## 3. SIGNALS:

## a. Numerical (KAC-Q) Codes and Point of Origin.

(1) The proper use of numerical (KAC-Q) codes has created problems in this unit. The high degree of emphasis that higher headquarters places on the "AUTORET" encoding of friendly locations forces a critical time lapse which may negate the effective use of supporting fire. The situation occurs when a moving enemy element is sighted in the same general vicinity of a moving friendly element. Indirect fire support can not be called until the friendly position is pin-pointed, resulting in a delay which allows the enemy element to escape.

(2) Use of point-of-origin on a one time basis in situations where time is critical would facilitate timely and accurate reporting of positions without compromise. Each company or smaller size unit could give one or two points of origin, which are known and recorded at the battalion TAC. After a point of origin has been used, a new one could be be re-specified; then at a more convenient time, it could be sent to the forward units. The system could be set up and implemented by the many experienced battalion tactical operations personnel and would greatly assist the small unit commanders.

## b. Retransmission Cable Kit MK-44/GRG.

(1) Units operating in thick jungle areas, mountainous terrain, and/or over extended areas often find themselves without communications with their battalion TAC. Normally, however, they can communicate with at least one sister company which in turn does have radio communications with battalion. While AN/VRC-49 sets are usually available for retrans purposes, their use is often precluded by the nonavailability of an acceptable antenna size, the time involved in setting up the station and/or the one night stand tactics of the maneuver units. The problem has been partially solved by the development of the Retransmission Cable Kit MK-44/GRG (PSN 5995-973-154) which provides a retransmission capability by interconnecting two AN/PRC-25 radios. This cable kit,

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AVDF-BA-XX-OP

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although in the supply system, has reached few potential users. A temporary substitute can easily be jury-rigged by connecting two five pin audio receptacles to the ends of a five conductor audio cable. The following connections must be made:

A of receptacle #1 to A of receptacle #2

B of receptacle #1 to D of receptacle #2

C of receptacle #1 to E of receptacle #2

D of receptacle #1 to B of receptacle #2

E of receptacle #1 to C of receptacle #2

The cable is connected to one audio receptacle on each of the two AN/PRC-25's or PRC-77's. Handsets are used to monitor volume adjustments on the retrans sets. The sets are both placed in the "RETRANS" modes of operation. The volume on each set should be turned down completely and then adjusted separately for the lowest understandable audio reception on each radio. Final volume adjustment is made in each retrans radio while it is receiving an audio signal from the other.

(2) The retrans system described above works extremely well when proper retrans frequencies are selected (frequency interference charts PRC-25) and an effort is made to adjust the retrans sets volume for a low but audible level. One of these cables issued to each forward company provides an instant retransmission capability any time or under any circumstances.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. Incl

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