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AUTHORITY

31 Dec 1979 per document marking; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (22 Jun 73) DAFD-OTT

1 February 1973

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Combat
Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April 72 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
3. Information of action initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Verne L. Bowers
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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(Continued on page 2)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11th COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO San Francisco, 96349

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AVBATS-C

10 MAY 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (OR-LL) of the 11th
Combat Aviation Group for the period ending 30 April 1972,
RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2) (U).

CINCUSAR PAC, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558 (2)
CG, USRV, ATTN: AVHOG O DSE, APO 96375 (3)
CG, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, ATTN: AVEAGC, APO 96384 (2)
CG, FIRST REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND, ATTN: G-3 ADVISOR, APO 96349 (2)

1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities

a. Command and Organization

(1) Command

(a) Colonel Robert A. Holloman III commanded the 11th Combat Aviation Group during the period 1 November 1971 - 29 April 1972. Colonel James M. Leslie assumed command of 11th CAG on 30 April 1972.

(b) The Deputy Group Commander, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Reiser departed this command on 25 March 1972. This position remains vacant.

(c) On 20 March 1972, all assigned US operational missions and functions were passed from XXIV Corps to First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC). 11th Combat Aviation Group is now under operational control of FRAC and receives all mission tasking from FRAC headquarters.

b. Organization

(1) 11th CAG aviation assets available to support activities in Military Region I were reduced significantly during the reporting period with the departure of the aviation units listed below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STANDDOWN DATE</u>
220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company	24 Nov 1971
116th Assault Helicopter Company	24 Nov 1971
282nd Assault Helicopter Company	5 Jan 1972
173rd Assault Helicopter Company	1 Mar 1972
178th Assault Support Helicopter Company	5 Feb 1972
203rd Assault Support Helicopter Company	1 Apr 1972

(2) The loss of aviation assets also necessitated a reduction in operational headquarters as the HHC, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion and HHC, 223rd Combat Aviation Battalion also entered standdown during the reporting period.

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Inclosure

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1979

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(3) Aviation units attached to the 11th Combat Aviation Group at the end of the reporting period include the 48th Assault Helicopter Company, 131st Military Intelligence Company (Aerial Surveillance), 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) and a platoon of the 478th Heavy Helicopter Company. The 62nd Company was modified in February to provide 20 UH-1H's, 10 OH-58's and 6 OH-47's. Fixed wing augmentation to the 62nd Company is provided by two U-21 airplanes attached from the Command Airplane Company, 12th Combat Aviation Group.

(4) Organizational structure and unit locations are at Inclosure #2.

c. Mission Related Activities

(1) During the reporting period the 11th Combat Aviation Group was engaged in combat operations throughout Military Region I, Republic of Vietnam. Operations were conducted in support of United States/Free World Military Forces, and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Combat support provided by the 11th CAG included aerial transport of personnel and equipment, aerial weapons support to ground forces, visual and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance and other missions as assigned by higher headquarters.

(2) Although the primary mission of the 11th CAG did not change during the reporting period organizational restructuring resulted in a significant change in capabilities. While unit standdowns decreased available aviation assets within 11th CAG the area of operations greatly increased with standdown/redeployment of the 16th Combat Aviation Group (23rd US Division) and the 101st Combat Aviation Group (101st US Division). This turbulence required the 11th CAG to assign aircraft to missions in order of priority, as all requests for aviation support could no longer be met, and to maintain a great degree of flexibility in utilization of remaining assets. Response to priority missions continues to be timely and efficient.

(3) The Group and subordinate units authorized and present for duty strength are on Inclosure #3.

(4) Type aircraft, number authorized and on hand for 11th CAG and subordinate units are on Inclosure #4.

(5) Results of operations conducted by subordinate units during the reporting period are on Inclosure #5.

(6) A summary of significant enemy engagements is on Inclosure #6.

(7) Decorations awarded to members of the 11th CAG are listed on Inclosure #7.

(8) Events of Historical Significance

On 26 November 1971 an OV-10B of the 131st MIG leaving on an early morning SLAR mission crashed on takeoff from the Phu Bai Airfield. Both crewmen received fatal injuries.

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On 24 December 1971 HHC, 212th Combat Aviation Battalion was inactivated. Subordinate units of the 212th CAB were reassigned to 223rd CAB or reassigned directly to 11th CAG.

Between November 1971 and January 1972 the 131st MIC received 14 OV-10 models of the Mohawk aircraft. The new aircraft with improved sensor systems and associated support equipment were fully operational by 1 February 1972.

Beginning on 10 January 1972 the 131st MIC began leaving its location at the Hue/Phu Bai airfield and redeploying to Marble Mountain Army Airfield, Da Nang. The 75 mile move was completed by 1 February 1972.

On 13 February 1972 a UH-1H from the 48th AHC crashed in the South China Sea near Hoi An. One crewman and 3 passengers were killed. The aircraft was completely destroyed.

On 25 February 1972 a UH-1H from the 62nd Aviation Company hit a railing while taking off from the U.S. Navy Destroyer Craig in Da Nang Bay. The aircraft inverted and crashed in the water. Two crew members and four passengers were killed. One passenger is missing and presumed dead.

In early March the 48th AHC participated in two combined Air Mobile Insertions (AMI's) with elements of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). In southwest Quang Tri Province, the VNAF supported 10 UH-1H's and 4 AH-1G's from the 48th AHC with 9 UH-1H's and 4 UH-1H(G)'s for the insertion of two infantry battalions. In the second operation, in support of the 1st ARVN Division operating in central Thua Thien Province, the 48th AHC supported VNAF assets with 5 UH-1H's and 2 AH-1G's. The VNAF, in both cases, proved its ability to plan and execute significant air mobile operations without the aid or guidance of US personnel.

On 1 March 1972 HHC, 223rd Combat Aviation Battalion entered standdown operations. 11th Group assumed direct control of all remaining aviation companies.

On 31 March the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) began the offensive which is continuing through the end of the reporting period. Action centered initially in the area immediately south of the DMZ as ARVN forces evacuated a number of fire support bases (FSB) and fell back on a defensive line along the Cau Viet River. Action in Thua Thien Province escalated in the second week of April as attacks against FSB Bastogne resulted in its eventual evacuation after stubborn resistance. Continuing action in the last part of April forced evacuation of FSB's West and O'Connor in northern Quang Tin Province and a massive assault in the last week of April pushed ARVN forces out of Dong Ha and Quang Tri City. As of 30 April 1972 almost all of Quang Tri Province is in enemy hands and ARVN forces are attempting to establish defense lines in Northern and Western Thua Thien Province for the defense of Hue. 11th CAG responded during this offensive by increasing air mobile support to ARVN 3rd and 1st Infantry Divisions by providing emergency resupply aircraft and conducting emergency extraction of US advisors and other direct support.

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missions as required while maintaining the general support missions throughout Military Region I.

On 1 April 1972 a CH-47 from the 62nd Aviation Company while on an emergency resupply mission to an ARVN fire base received 16 hits from enemy ground fire and was forced to land at Quang Tri Airfield. The crew was evacuated due to enemy indirect fire at the airfield. The aircraft was recovered later in the month. Additionally a UH-1H from the 48th AHC was forced down in Quang Tri Province by enemy ground fire sustaining 30-40 hits. The crew was extracted by a VNAF UH-1H while under intense fire with 1 US crewman wounded. The crew of the VNAF slick exhibited exceptional gallantry during this operation. A total of six aircraft were hit during the day.

On 2 April 1972 a CH-47 from the 62nd Aviation Company made a successful low level extraction at Camp Carroll north of Quang Tri. The aircraft was hit numerous times but managed to rescue the 3 US advisors and about 40 ARVN soldiers just as the outpost was being surrendered to the NVA.

On 3 April 1972 F Troop, 4th Air Cavalry closed Phu Bai Airfield and came under the operational control of 11th CAG. F/4 had been conducting operations in MR III. They were initially employed in direct support of 3rd ARVN Division.

On the night of 15 April 1972 Marble Mountain Army Airfield received an attack by fire. An estimated 22 rounds of enemy 82mm mortar fire impacted damaging 20 aircraft belonging to the 62nd Aviation Company which were parked in revetments. All but two aircraft were repairable.

On 28 April 1972 an AH-1G from F/4 Cav while flying an armed VR east of Quang Tri City engaged PT-76 tanks. 3 enemy tanks were destroyed, however, the Cobra was shot down by a 37mm AAA gun and the pilot and copilot were killed.

Colonel Robert A. Holloman III, 11th CAG CO was wounded in the foot during a daring rescue attempt on 29 April 1972. His wound required medical evacuation to CONUS. Colonel James M. Leslie assumed command of 11th CAG on 30 April 1972.

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendation.

a. Personnel:

OBSERVATION: Aviation units continue to experience shortages in the following MOS: 100B0 (Rotary Wing Aviator; Warrant Officer), 67N20/40 (UH-1 Helicopter Repairman), 71H20 (Personnel Specialist), 71P20 (Flight Operations Specialist), 67V20 (OH-58 Helicopter Repairman), and 68H20 (Senior Hydraulic Repairman).

EVALUATION: Due to the variety of aircraft assigned and units varied missions, it is essential that personnel critical to mission comple-

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tion be maintained at or near authorized strength level. Present shortages will become increasingly critical in the next 90 day period.

RECOMMENDATION: A redistribution of USARV and 1st Aviation Brigade assets should be made, if appropriate, consistent with standdown timetables.

COMMAND ACTION: Continue to advise higher headquarters on unit personnel shortages.

b. Intelligence:

OBSERVATION: Timely, accurate intelligence information is extremely difficult to obtain.

EVALUATION: There are no intelligence distribution channels direct to 11th CAG. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the increasing sophistication of enemy air defense weaponry, a lack of timely intelligence is acutely apparent.

RECOMMENDATION: A daily summary of the preceding days significant events and enemy activities be provided 11th CAG from higher headquarters for redistribution to subordinate units.

COMMAND ACTION: Group S-2 in conjunction with the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) glean as much information as possible from available information agencies. This information is posted on the TOC situation maps and update, as required.

c. Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: There are no procedures for the coordination and planning of resupply missions to fire bases or installations which are under active enemy threat.

EVALUATION: Currently, the aircraft commander accomplishing the resupply is given a sketchy intelligence briefing while enroute to the drop location. By the time it can be determined if a threat exists it is oftentimes too late to make detailed coordination and planning for suppressive fires. Thus the mission is either aborted or in an extreme emergency the aircraft attempts the mission at great risk to aircraft and crew.

RECOMMENDATION: Once it has been established that a resupply mission must be made to an active or potentially active hostile fire area, detailed planning and coordination should be made to increase the survivability of the aircraft and mission accomplishment. Every effort should be made to locate and suppress known or suspected enemy firing locations. All available assets should be used, i.e. TAC air, naval gunfire, helicopter gunships, etc. The use of smoke for screening and even the use of CS gas should be considered to achieve the safe accomplishment of the mission.

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COMMAND ACTION: At present every effort is being made by the 11th CAG to stay aware of the installations currently providing refueling facilities for Army aircraft within the areas our aircraft are flying.

(4) **OBSERVATION:** There is a propensity for higher headquarters to "dedicate" aircraft to certain missions or staff sections rather than to schedule aircraft daily on an as-required basis.

EVALUATION: In the past when there were sufficient aviation assets in Military Region 1, certain aircraft were assigned to specific missions or staff sections at XXIV Corps Headquarters on a regular basis to allow both the supported and the supporting unit better coordination and continuity on missions. With the vast reduction in aviation assets and corresponding increase in priority missions throughout MR 1, this procedure is no longer feasible. The practice of having certain aircraft on immediate stand-by severely limits unit capabilities to provide support to missions which have a greater priority.

RECOMMENDATION: That higher headquarters reevaluate its standing mission requirements and attempt to reschedule them on a task basis.

COMMAND ACTION: 11th CAG continues to provide aircraft as requested and has on numerous occasions recommended improvements which could provide better aircraft utilization and flexibility in accomplishing the missions assigned.

(5) **OBSERVATION:** ARVN units habitually use web "donuts" rather than metal clevises to hook up even their heaviest loads to the CH-54 helicopter.

EVALUATION: Loads above 10,000 lbs. should only be hooked up with the metal clevis. The heat caused by friction between hook and "donut" can cause the "donut" to fail.

RECOMMENDATION: ARVN units should be instructed to use the metal clevis on all CH-54 loads. Clevises should be made available through ARVN supply channels.

COMMAND ACTION: A letter has been sent to higher headquarters requesting all ARVN advisory teams inform counterparts of the requirement to use metal clevises rather than "donuts" on CH-54 loads.

(6) **OBSERVATION:** The film processing kit that is to be used with the AN/APS-94D SLAR system is designed for a one time use. Due to the difficulty in obtaining the kits through supply channels to meet unit needs on a timely basis, the unit was forced to derive better system utilization from those processing kits on hand.

EVALUATION: It was determined that the film processing kits could be used on more than one mission, providing the developer, developer tray

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and film were not removed from the film magazine and the film magazine was reused within two and one half hours. By changing film magazines between mission aircraft, it was possible to cut the usage factor in half without the loss of clarity in the SLAR imagery.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the procedure of reuse of SLAR film processing kits be utilized until such time as the availability of the kits is increased on RVN.

COMMAND ACTION: 11th CAG presently reuses the SLAR film kits.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics:

OBSERVATION: The OV-1 aircraft is equipped with an oxygen system capable of performing at altitudes above 20,000 feet. AR 96-1, Para 4-5 B, restricts the OV-1 to a maximum of 10,000 feet if oxygen is not being used by the crew members. Frequently mission requirements dictate flight over territory well within range of enemy anti-aircraft systems, and the use of oxygen and higher altitudes would all but eliminate this hazard. Frequently SLAR missions are aborted because the tops of the clouds in the mission areas extend above 10,000 feet. Acceptable SLAR imagery without resolution loss can be obtained at altitudes to 15,000 feet. Most Infrared (IR) missions are flown at night, and a pilot's night vision suffers at least a 5% loss for every two thousand feet above four thousand feet. The breathing of oxygen even at these comparatively low altitudes would be an obvious safety factor. All aircraft have had the internal oxygen systems empty of oxygen for months and need thorough purging of the systems soon before the entire systems are ruined by souring.

EVALUATION: The 131st MIC needs adequate oxygen support, not only in the interest of safety and mission accomplishment, but for crew survivability.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the 131st MIC be provided oxygen servicing equipment, service all aircraft with oxygen after landing, and educate pilots, technical observers, and crew chiefs on proper utilization of oxygen.

COMMAND ACTION: The technical supply officer of the 131st MIC spoke to AMMC in Saigon on 28 April 1972. They indicated that a request for an oxygen cart would be approved. A letter requesting this equipment was forwarded to higher headquarters in early May. It was also requested that additional items be initiated into Army supply from the Air Force on a reimbursable account. These items will be necessary for servicing aircraft and are not available through Army supply channels. On requisition are more oxygen bottles, servicing lines, connectors, and purifiers.

g. Communications: None.

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COMMAND ACTION: Resupply aircraft are given helicopter gunship cover whenever there is active hostile fire on the landing zone. The aircraft commander coordinates in the air with the ground unit and requests fire in the areas deemed potentially hostile. Normally no pre-planned artillery preparations or air strikes are planned and these are accomplished only if the assets happen to be in the area at that time. Usually, if the aircraft receives fire the mission is aborted and attempted later.

(2) **OBSERVATION:** The artillery/naval gunfire air warning centers have become ineffective with the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

EVALUATION: With the increasing role being played by ARVN artillery, its facilities for air advisory has decreased. The ARVN units seem to have difficulty in passing firing information to advisory facilities. Many published ARVN artillery advisory facilities are non-operational. Aircraft of 11th Group have observed artillery impact while in flight and were unable to gain information as to gun-target line, impact grid, or height of trajectory.

RECOMMENDATION: That ARVN artillery advisory facilities be kept informed by firing units of all firings. That all published frequencies for artillery advisory facilities actually be monitored by responsible personnel.

COMMAND ACTION: ARVN artillery commanders be informed of the dangers involved for aircraft in combined airspace with artillery projectiles, and the need to pass firing information on to artillery advisory facilities. Insure published artillery advisory facilities are manned.

(3) **OBSERVATION:** Due to the reduction in U.S. installations in Vietnam, refueling points for Army aircraft are becoming increasingly scarce.

EVALUATION: Many installations previously occupied by U.S. military forces have been either closed down or turned over to the ARVN. For the most part, these installations provided aviation fuel (JP4) for Army aircraft that were flying in their areas. With the turn over of these installations, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain POL. Specifically, if any of the several existing coastal refueling points is closed down it will become impossible for Army helicopters to traverse certain regions of Vietnam. This would mean that aircraft from one end of the country would have to be transported by surface means, if the aircraft has to go to the other end of the country. Cross country trips for Army helicopters are hazardous at the present time without the additional difficulty of being stranded without fuel should one of the remaining points be closed without warning.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That a network of published permanent refueling facilities be established to allow Army aircraft to maneuver about the country. The installations should be manned and secured at all times. Once they have been established as permanent installations, their locations and the type of facilities available should be given the widest possible dissemination.

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h. Material:

(1) **OBSERVATION:** During the months of January and February, extreme difficulties were encountered with CH-54A aircraft. Cracks were discovered on the inlet guide vanes of 7 engines. These cracks rendered the engine unserviceable. Cracks were found generally on engines that had been in service under 200 hours, but on some occasions cracks were found on initial inspection of an engine prior to installation.

EVALUATION: Delays encountered in receiving satisfactory replacement engines impaired the capability of the 478th Avn Co to perform its mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That inlet guide vanes on CH-54 engines be strengthened.

COMMAND ACTION: Equipment Improvement Requests (EIR) were submitted on faulty engines. Information has been received through channels that the recommendations made on EIR's are being implemented. EIR's submitted were H68109, H69110, K31705, K31700, H08195, H08194, and H08073.

(2) **OBSERVATION:** Authorized individual weapons are insufficient due to possibility of extended ground time in remote hostile areas in the event of precautionary/forced landing.


EVALUATION: The need to sufficiently arm crewmembers was evidenced during the recent enemy action in northern Military Region I. The sophisticated anti-aircraft capabilities that the enemy possess make it increasingly difficult to extract downed crews; therefore, the crewmembers need to be armed with weapons that are suitable for defense as well as stowing in the aircraft when in flight.

RECOMMENDATION: All crewmembers be authorized pistols. Each enlisted crewmember without machinegun and each officer crewmember authorized additionally one submachinegun 5.56, M177.

COMMAND ACTION: Presently arming crewmembers with M16 and requesting that M177's be issued in lieu of M16's for crewmembers.

1. Other: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES J. DAVIS
MAJ, IN
Adjutant

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7 Inclosures

1. Organizational Structure/Location
2. Change of Command and Staff Positions
3. Authorized/Assigned Strength
4. Aircraft Authorized/Assigned
5. Operational Statistics
6. Summary of Significant Enemy Engagements
7. Awards and Decorations

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**ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AS OF 30 APRIL 72**

**11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO, 96349**

**HHC, 11TH CAG
APO, 96349**

**46TH ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY
APO, 96349**

**62ND AVIATION COMPANY (CORPS)
APO, 96349**

**519TH MEDICAL DETACHMENT
APO, 96349**

**131ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY (AERIAL SURVEILLANCE)
APO, 96349**

**321ST AIRFIELD DETACHMENT (DIVISION)
APO, 96308**

**322ND AIRFIELD DETACHMENT (DIVISION)
APO, 96349**

**476TH AVIATION COMPANY (HEAVY HELICOPTER)
APO, 96349**

**THIRD PLATOON
APO, 96291**

**F TROOP, 4TH AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON*
APO, 96308**

***UNIT TROOP TO 11TH CAG 1 APRIL 1972 - 30 APRIL 1972.**

INCLOSURE #1-A

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11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP CHANGE OF COMMAND AND STAFF POSITIONS 1 NOVEMBER 1971-30 APRIL 1972

UNIT OR STAFF POSITION	DATES	NAME
GP Commander	1 Nov 71-29 Apr 72 30 Apr-	Robert A. Holliman, III 240-41-5750, COL, IN James M. Leslie 517-24-1651, COL, IN
Deputy Commander	1 Nov 71-25 Mar 72	Reiser, John D. 498-22-2920, LTC, PA
Executive Officer	1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72 1 Jan 72-27 Apr 72 27 Apr 72-30 Apr 72	Mullen, Gordon R. 032-22-4990, LTC, IN Lovett, John A. 296-23-0472, LTC, IN Reeder, Zane K. 413-54-2705, MAJ, PA
S-1	1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72 1 Jan 72-	Casey, Douglas E. 424-42-4639, MAJ, IN Davis, James J. 453-46-0377, MAJ, IN
S-2	1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72 1 Jan 72-20 Feb 72 21 Feb 72-30 Mar 72 1 Apr 72-	Knickerbocker, Larry D. 551-60-2613, CPT, IN Easton, Jack E. 484-40-1489, CPT, IN Hall, George R. 473-34-0824, MAJ, IN Pederson, Richard W. 141-40-3799, CPT, PA
S-3	1 Nov 71-1 Apr 72 1 Apr 71-	Livingston, Claudie G. 421-36-5585, LTC, SC Smith, Roger M. 269-36-3692, MAJ, IN
S-4	1 Nov 71-23 Nov 71 24 Nov 71-	Boswell, George W. 085-30-9576, CPT, IN Brooks, Carter D. 226-46-4653, MAJ, IN
CO, 48th AHC	1 Nov 71-	Kingman, Dan G. Jr. 505-46-5522, MAJ, IN

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CO, 62nd Avn Co

1 Nov 71-12 Dec 71

13 Dec 71-

Klose, John D. G.
486-36-4623, MAJ, FA
Wright, Wayne W.
465-56-5851, MAJ, FA

CO, 131st MI CO

1 Nov 71-

Davis, Marion L.
278-28-2298, MAJ, MI

CO, 478th HHC

1 Nov 71-1 Jan 72

2 Jan 72-

Wall, Daniel D.
536-38-6429,
Walton, Benny R.
267-62-8983, CPT, FA

INCLOSURE #2

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21st COMBAT AVIATION GROUP AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH AS OF 30 APRIL 1972

UNIT	OFFICERS		WO		ENLISTED		TOTAL	
	AUTH	ASSD	AUTH	ASSD	AUTH	ASSD	AUTH	ASSD
MAC, 11th CAG	26	25	1	10	66	158	93	153
48th AHC	18	27	48	38	213	190	279	255
62nd Avn Co	20	37	54	26	246	190	320	250
131st MI Co	13	18	13	5	214	196	240	219
521st AD	3	3	0	0	36	22	39	25
52nd AD	1	2	0	0	13	13	14	15
478th HHC	10	10	9	7	107	96	126	113
519th Mod Det	1	1	0	0	7	8	8	9
TOTALS	92	120	125	86	902	833	1119	1039

INCLOSURE 3

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11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED AND ON HAND
AS OF 30 APRIL 1972

SUBORDINATE UNIT	CH-58		UH-1H		AH-1G		CH-47		OV-1		CH-54		TOTAL	
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H
HHC, 11th CAG	2	0	0	2									2	2
48th ABC			23	23	6	6							29	29
62nd Avn Co	10	11	20	21			6	6					36	38
131st MI Co									12	14			12	14
478th HHC (-)*											4	4	4	4
TOTALS	12	11	43	46	6	6	6	6	12	14	4	4	83	87

* Does not include 3rd Plt at Vung Tau.

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
ENCLOSURE 4

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14TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP OPERATIONAL STATISTICS 1 NOVEMBER 1971-30 APRIL 1972

HOURS FLOWN:	NOV 71	10,618
	DEC 71	7,657
	JAN 72	7,064
	FEB 72	6,570
	MAR 72	5,503
	APR 72	6,190
CUMULATIVE HOURS:		43,602
SORTIES FLOWN:		95,895
TROOPS LIFTED:		136,741
CARGO LIFTED (TONS):		27,858
ENEMY KBH:		43
STRUCTURES DAMAGED:		40
STRUCTURES DESTROYED:		17
SAMPANS DAMAGED:		5
SAMPANS DESTROYED:		2
AIRCRAFT DAMAGED:		63
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED:		11

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* THIRD PLATOON, 478TH HHC ATTACHED TO
76TH TRNS CO, VUNG TAI, RVN.

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SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ENGAGEMENTS 11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP 1 NOVEMBER 1971 - 30 APRIL 1972

On 20 November an OH-58 from HHC, 223rd CAB while on a last light VR received heavy ground fire vicinity BT047683. The A/C took seven hits and was forced down. There were no casualties and the A/C was later recovered.

On 29 November a CH-47 of the 176th ASHC while on a logistics resupply mission took six hits from small arms fire vicinity BT230515. One crew-member was WIA, however, the A/C continued its mission.

On 14 December a UH-1H from the 48th AHC took seven hits from enemy ground fire vicinity BT175567. The A/C was forced to return to MMAAF.

On 13 January MMAAF received 21 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. There were negative casualties nor damage.

On 21 January a UH-1H from the 173rd AHC was shot down vicinity XC973362 while on a combat assault mission. The A/C crashed in a river and one passenger was drowned. The A/C was later destroyed to prevent capture.

On 8 March gunships from the 48th AHC received small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon at AT980330. Fire was returned and 4 enemy were killed by helicopter (KBH).

On 10 March a UH-1H from the 48th AHC while on a resupply mission vicinity AT910510 received intense automatic weapons fire and was forced to land. There were no personnel injured and the A/C was recovered.

Increased enemy activity in Quang Tri Province resulted in battle damage to several 11th CAG A/C on 1 April. A CH-47 on an emergency resupply mission to an ARVN FSB sustained 16 hits from enemy small arms and 51 cal. machinegun fire. A/C was forced to land at Quang Tri and was recovered later in the month. A UH-1H, also, on a resupply mission, was shot down vicinity YD280670. The crew was engaged by the enemy in the ground and one man was slightly wounded. A VNAF slick braved intense enemy fire to extract the crew. A CH-47 from the 203rd ASHC received numerous hits while on another emergency resupply mission and was forced to land at Quang Tri. The A/C received shrapnel damage while on the ground but was later repaired and flown back to MMAAF. Another CH-47 took 8 hits and was forced to return to MMAAF. The 11th CAG had six A/C hit by hostile fire on 1 April.

On 2 April a CH-47 from the 62nd Aviation Company rescued 3 US advisors and 40 ARVN from Camp Carroll just prior to its being overrun by the enemy. The CH-47 and 2 of its 3 gunship escort sustained battle damage during the extraction.

On 3 April the 11th CAG C.O. controlled 2 Light Fire Teams (LFT's) in defense of FSB Anne. 15 probable KBH's were reported.

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On 5 April gunships from F/4 Cav. were committed 4000 meters west of FSB Bastogne to aid an ARVN armored unit attempting to break enemy contact. 1 ARVN tank and 2 APC's were able to break out before the operation terminated due to weather.

On 8 April a F/4 Cav. team was engaged by an estimated 7 51 cal. machineguns vicinity YD620120. Gunships returned fire resulting in 3 confirmed KHH's and 5 probables.

On 14 April an AH-1G in support of the 2nd ARVN Division engaged a platoon size enemy force at AT950880. Results were 5 probable KHH's and 1 secondary explosion.

At 0240 hours, 15 April MMAAF received an attack by fire consisting of 25 82mm mortar rounds. 20 A/C were damaged, however there were no personnel injured.

On 19 April MMAAF again sustained a mortar attack. 15 82mm mortar rounds destroyed 1 truck lift, damaged 1 A/C and three trucks.

On 21 April gunships from the 48th AHC were fired upon while escorting some slicks on an emergency resupply mission for 2nd ARVN Division. One AH-1G was shot down vicinity BT000280. The crew was successfully extracted but suffered severe burns as a result of the crash. Gunships were credited with 22 KHH's and numerous secondary explosions.

On 23 April MMAAF received an attack by fire consisting of 8 107mm rockets. 11th CAG had no injuries or damage. Fortunately 3 of the rockets were duds and were destroyed by EOD teams.

On 28 April an AH-1G from F/4 Cav. was shot down by 37mm fire vicinity YD360550. Both the pilot and gunner were killed, however, they destroyed 3 enemy tanks before being shot down. A total of 7 11th CAG A/C were hit during the day, all in Quang Tri Province as the enemy offensive again gathered momentum.

On 29 April a 62nd Aviation Company UH-1H was shot down by enemy small arms fire vicinity YD420440. Colonel Holloman, 11th CAG C.O., tried to rescue the crew of the downed A/C, but during the attempt his A/C was also shot down. A1-E's were used to suppress the enemy ground fire as the NVA went after the 2 downed crews. An AH-1G from the 48th AHC was diverted from a VIP escort mission and also provided suppressive fire at the site. 2 UH-1H's from the 62nd and 1 UH-1H from the 48th finally managed to extract the 2 crews, however, Colonel Holloman was wounded during the extraction and had to be evacuated to CONUS. All A/C received intense enemy fire during the extraction. Four personnel of the 11th CAG were wounded and a passenger in one of the rescue A/C, a US LTC was killed.

Also, on 29 April an AH-1G from F/4 while on an armed VR was shot down vicinity YD420500. The A/C crashed but the crew was safely extracted.

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**11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
1 NOVEMBER 1971-30 APRIL 1972**

Silver Star	8
Distinguished Flying Cross	30
Legion of Merit	1
Soldiers Medal	3
Bronze Star	134
Air Medal	322
Army Commendation Medal	173
RVN Cross of Gallantry	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	658

INCLOSURE 7

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AVBAGC (15 May 72) 1st Ind

5 July 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL of Headquarters 11th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30
April 1972.

DA Headquarters, 1st Avn Bde, APO San Francisco 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam/MACV Support Command, ATTN:
AVHOG-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

1. After review of the ORLL for the 11th CAG the following comments are submitted.
2. Comments on paragraph 2a are as follows:

a. The 11th CAG does not have all of the warrant officers, MOS 100B0, authorized, but company grade commissioned officers were assigned in lieu of the warrant aviators. During the reporting period covered by this OR-LL, the 11th CAG had over 100 per cent fill of company grade/warrant aviators authorized. The distribution of warrant aviators has been equitably distributed to all groups. Current aviator assets of the 11th CAG are at the 96 per cent fill level currently authorized.

b. Shortages of enlisted personnel in MOS's 67N20/40, 71H20, 71P20, 67V20 and 68H20 do exist in USARV and the 11th Aviation Brigade. Strengths of these critical skills are continually redistributed to maintain an equitable fill between groups with less than 2 per cent disparity. It has been observed that several personnel with these critical MOS skills are being utilized in other less critical skill areas. Reassignment of existing assets within the group will provide additional relief. Emergency requisitions have been submitted to obtain the necessary fill of these skills.

c. The schedule and phasing of unit stand downs will continue to cause undesirable imbalances in MOS skills.

3. Reference: OR-LL, 11th CAG

Paragraph 2f, page 7, discusses the oxygen system used on the OV-1 aircraft. It was determined that the OV-1 aircraft did need a functional oxygen system. To accomplish this, action was taken by the 131st MIC to acquire the necessary equipment. O/A 8 May 72 this office received a letter from the 131st MIC requesting personnel lowering devices and oxygen fittings. On 13 May 72 a 1st Indorsement to this letter was sent to USARV, ATTN: AVHPLTD-S requesting an ISSA with the Air Force be initiated to procure the required oxygen fittings. Once the fittings are procured they will be shipped to the 142nd TC who will in turn issue them to the 131st MIC. In addition to this action a message to USAAMC, St Louis, Mo. is being prepared to inquire if there is a possibility that these fittings could be obtained in a more expeditious manner than thru Air Force channels. This message will be dispatched as soon as additional information is received.

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AVBAGC (15 May 72) 1st Ind 5 July 1972

SUBJECT: ORLL of Headquarters, 11th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April 1972.

4. Reference: OR-LL, 11th CAG

Paragraph 6h(1) page 9 discusses difficulties encountered with the turbine engines used on the CH-54 helicopter during the months of January and February. The T73 engine is still a problem area. Informal investigation has revealed that the major problem has been cracked inlet guide vanes, which was caused in most cases by flux under the weld. This information together with a request for assistance to eliminate the problem was forwarded to CG, USAAVSCOM by AVHAV-LOG message 260906Z May 72.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


BETTY L. NEMYER
CW2, USA
Assistant AG

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AVMOC-00 (10 May 72) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) of the 11th Combat
Aviation Group for the Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65
(R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam/MACV SUPCOM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GICP-PD, APO San
Francisco 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the subject ORLL and submits the following
comments:

a. Nonconcur with paragraph 2a, and concur with paragraph 2, 1st Ind.

This Headquarters continues to work with Department of the Army to obtain
personnel in shortage MOS. Standdown/drawdown unit assets are screened to
insure needed personnel are reassigned within this command.


b. Concur with paragraph 2b.

As US forces withdraw from the RVN, the collection, production and dis-
semination of timely intelligence, especially at the lower level, will remain
an ever increasing problem.

c. Concur with paragraph 2h(2).

INOC's should be modified to reflect new individual weapon authorization.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


D. A. KERRAN
Captain, AGC
Asst AG

CF:
2- ACSFOR, DA, Wash, DC 20310

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GPOP-FD (10 May 72) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 11th
Combat Aviation Group, Period Ending 30 April
1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 SEP 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah
M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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