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FROM:

**Controlling DoD Organization. Assistant
Chief of Staff for Force Development
[Army], Washington, DC 20310.**

AUTHORITY

**DoDD 5200.10, Group-4, 28 Feb 1980; AGO
D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980**

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AGAM-P (M) (19 Apr 67) FOR OT-RD-670228

25 April 1967

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19) SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, II Field Force Vietnam (u) (s)
Headquarters

11) 15 Feb 67

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

9) Operational rep. for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.

10) FILE COPY

11) CDC

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for the period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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

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II

FIELD FORCE VIETNAM



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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65.)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 5 APR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters,
II Field Force Vietnam and forwards two copies of the Report.

2. (C) Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraphs 4f and 4g, Section I, Pages 22 and 23: Concur. The introduction of the 12 channel pulse code modulation system lightweight equipment will augment circuit capabilities presently furnished by the 4 channel systems of the AN/MRC-111 and 112's at division level. At Army and Corps level a medium capacity 12/24 channel subsystem will be introduced, and a high capacity 48/96 channel subsystem will be introduced in combat area battalions. The introduction of these new tactical multi-channel radio relay systems and a tactical troposcatter subsystem for use in Army and Corps signal battalions will augment channel capacity in tactical areas during the FY 68-70 time frame in Vietnam.

b. Reference Paragraph 4h, Section I, Page 23: The AN/VSC-2 Radio configurations are due in-country beginning April 1967. The equipment will be issued on a one-for-one replacement of the AN/VSC-1 and the AN/MRC-95. Presently validated quantities to be shipped to Vietnam will allow a certain quantity for issue in lieu of the AN/GRC-46 Radio-Teletype Terminal. This exchange will be accomplished on the basis of urgency of need and Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, will be queried concerning his views in this regard.

c. Reference Item Concerning Inadequate Personnel Authorization, Page 39: MTOE 45-500E for the 16th Public Information Detachment was not considered an emergency MTOE. It is being held in abeyance until the New Army Authorization Documents System project is completed and the moratorium on the submission of MTOE's is lifted by DA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bob K. Bowen
BOB K. BOWEN
Capt. AGC
Asst Adjunct General

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OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1967

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Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
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SECTION I**SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES****1. (C) COMMAND:**

a. II Field Force Vietnam has continued to increase in size since the last reporting period. The 2d Civil Affairs Company was assigned by General Order number 6751, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam with an effective date of 7 December 1966. The 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery (AWSP) plus D Battery, 71st Artillery (50 cal MG) were attached by General Order 6643, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam with an effective date of 27 November 1966. The 44th Army Postal Unit was relieved from attached and was in fact assigned to II Field Force Vietnam in November 1966. A comparison of the assigned/attached strength for Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam at the end of the last three reporting periods is as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
31 Jul 66	164	23	1024
31 Oct 66	205	29	1450
31 Jan 67	346	39	3107

In addition to the assigned/attached growth, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light) arrived in the Republic of Vietnam in December 1966 and the 9th Infantry Division arrived during December 1966 and January 1967. Both were placed under the operational control of this headquarters.

b. II Field Force Order of Battle to include location and the control headquarters is shown at inclosure 1.

c. Distinguished visitors received by this headquarters for the months of November, December and January are shown at inclosures 2, 3 and 4.

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2. (FOUO) PERSONNEL, HEALTH, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

a. The personnel situation within units assigned or attached to Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam remains excellent. During the past quarter, actions were taken to refine procedures and to formulate plans for a smooth transition during the period of the rotational hump. Through voluntary extensions and by continuing the personnel infusion program, an orderly transition is assured.

b. The 44th Army Postal Unit was assigned in November 1966, thus giving this headquarters a complete organic postal service for the first time. The unit became an efficient organization immediately after its establishment. It provided outstanding postal service during the holiday rush and continues to assist in the maintenance of morale by providing superior service.

c. The health of the command remains excellent. There has been no unusual incidence of disease during the past three months. Malaria cases have increased somewhat during this period with a total of 329 cases reported as opposed to 239 cases reported during the previous reporting period. The increase is attributed to extended operations in the field during the months of November, December and January. Continued command emphasis on sanitation and malaria prevention will be employed to maintain the health of the command at its present high state. During recent operations, medical evacuation capabilities were enhanced by utilizing CH-47 helicopters for the transfer of patients between hospitals. This was accomplished on a "mission" basis. Utilization of the CH-47 for rear area evacuation released the standard UH-1 "Dust Off" aircraft for other missions within the forward areas. The CH-47, in one sortie, can accomplish the same evacuation as six UH-1 sorties; however, close liaison is required between medical facilities and the Army Aviation Element (AAE) for maximum effectiveness. It is planned to continue this procedure in future operations.

d. Troop morale continues at a high level. Morale and welfare activities include:

(1) Organizing and supervising the Installation Softball League. With 12 teams participating, the program is considered to be most successful.

(2) Procurement of USO Shows to include: The Black Patches, Fun Time, Martha Raye Show and the Slippery Rock String Band. Total troop attendance was approximately 6,300.

(3) Acquiring the Bien Hoa Branch of the NASA Library.

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The complete library, consisting of approximately 2000 hard back books, over 200 magazines per month and 26 air mail subscriptions to state side newspapers, was moved to the II FFORCEV Base Camp during the month of December 1966.

e. Significant activities of the Office of the Provost Marshal for the period 1 November 66 through 31 January 67 are as follows:

(1) Evacuation arrangements were coordinated with the 89th Military Police Group for the movement of 133 Prisoners of War from US Forces PW Collecting Points in the ARVN III Corps Area to the ARVN III Corps PW Camp at Bien Hoa.

(2) A vehicle permit control system was established to control private and government contract vehicles operating within the base camp. Approval to operate a contract vehicle within the base camp, and only for designated areas, was given to 35 vehicle operators.

(3) On 19 November 1966 an eight position Vietnamese National Policemen Security Section was organized to help control and search Vietnamese Nationals (VN) at the base camp and to handle matters involving VN during convoy escorts. The National Policemen were obtained through the Directional Southeast Region National Police Headquarters at Honour-Smith Compound. The section operates from 0600 hours to 2000 hours daily with two policemen on standby from 2000 hours to 0600 hours. The section was established to provide a joint police effort to control and search VN when required.

(4) On 20 December 1966 a sixteen position Vietnamese Female Security Guard Section was organized to control and search Vietnamese females entering and departing II FFORCEV facilities. The females for the section were obtained through the Directional Southeast Region National Police Headquarters at Honour-Smith Compound. The section operates from 0600 hours to 2200 hours daily manning five posts at Honour-Smith Compound and two posts at the II FFORCEV Post Exchange. The section was established to provide adequate personnel for searching Vietnamese females.

(5) A traffic sign study was made on the existing road nets of the base camp and Honour-Smith Compound to identify the type and location of traffic signs needed to inform drivers of the rules of the road. Based on this study, more than 400 traffic signs were erected.

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f. In the areas of physical security, experience determined that large sandbag bunkers constructed with straight walls tended to fall apart within 2 to 3 months thus requiring complete renovation. To overcome this problem, subsequent bunkers were constructed with the walls sloping inward. These bunkers remained in a satisfactory and usable condition until such time as the sandbags themselves deteriorated. Old type construction is shown at inclosure 5. New type construction is shown at inclosure 6.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Intelligence Aspects and Results of Friendly Operations. There were three major operations initiated by direction of this headquarters during the reporting period. Summarized below is the intelligence information upon which each of these operations was based and the enemy losses reported at the completion of each operation.

(1) Operation ATTLEBORO.

(a) Intelligence aspects. Operation ATTLEBORO took place during the period 1 - 25 November 1966 in the area west of the Michelin Rubber Plantation and in the central portion of War Zone C. Large rice caches were found and heavy small unit contact was made by elements of the 25th Infantry Division and the 196th Lt Inf Bde west of Dau Tieng (XT4946). Intelligence gained as a result of these initial contacts indicated that the US Forces were in contact with main force units of the 9th VC Div. Reinforcements from the 1st Inf Div were added and the operation was continued to the north into War Zone C. Evaluation of documents captured revealed that the 271st, 272d and 70th VC Regiments and the 101st NVA Regiment were contacted in the operation. Initial interrogation of one captive indicated that there may also have been contact with 273d VC Regiment, but the information provided by the captive was tenuous. The prisoner was able to decypher an NVA identification tag and named, as his own leaders, men known to hold senior positions in the 101st NVA Regiment. While claiming to be a member of Q3 (aka 273d Regt), in all probability the man was a member of the 101st NVA Regiment.

(b) Results. Operation ATTLEBORO inflicted heavier personnel and equipment losses on the VC than they had ever encountered in South Vietnam to that time. The VC 9th Div was forced to disperse deep into War Zone C to refit and replace casualties. The extent of damage inflicted on this unit has been

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reflected in the lack of aggressiveness of all elements of the 9th Div since Operation ATTLEBORO. Following are total enemy losses for the operation.

1 Personnel. 1106 KIA (BC), 44 PW.

2 Equipment captured. 120 individual weapons, 19 combat support weapons, 2 M79 grenade launchers, 1 flare pistol, 1 cal .50 MG barrel, two 12.7mm HMG barrels, 5 heavy MG mount/carriers, 5 bipods for 82mm mortars, 5142 rounds SA ammo, 250 rounds cal .50 ammo, 34 M79 rounds, thirty 60mm mortar rounds, five 82mm mortar rounds, 9 RPG-2, 13 rockets (type unknown), 514 claymores, 12,288 hand grenades, 3176 frag grenades, 5685 rifle grenades, 1299 gas grenades, 825 large HE grenades, 2000 WP grenades, 2 handmade grenades, 5 flares, 5 AT mines, 6 AP mines, 11 floating water mines, 1075 lbs explosive, 1000 blasting caps, 3000 booby trap ignitors, 752 bangalore torpedoes, 500 fuzing devices, 80 grenade launchers, 500 rifle grenade adapters, 400 claymore mine stands, 1121 tons rice, 15 tons beans, 25 lb canned food, 820 cans milk, 32.5 tons salt, 2500 lbs peanuts, 123 lbs documents, 1 CW radio, 1 radio transmitter, 1 portable military radio, 3 transistor radios, 1 sampan engine, 1 bugle, 1500 ammo pouches, 500 back packs, 151 bicycles, 2 tons corrugated sheet metal, 760 sheets of sheet metal, 68 bolts of cloth, 50 bottles of medicine, 380 vials of medicine, 1000 pills (type unknown), 15 lbs sulfa drugs, 150 lbs epsom salts, 2 lbs medical supplies, 1 large medical kit (footlocker size), thirty-three 110 lb bags cement, 125 lbs clothing, 200 pioneer tools, 600 gal cooking oil, 98 batteries, 300 shovels, 10 green uniforms, 6 medical uniforms, 150 lbs soap, 104m WD-1 wire, 160 gal POL, 2 crosscut saws, 321 machetes, 1 VC flag, 1 chemical agent treatment kit, one 1/4 ton trailer, 4 gas masks, 1 farm tractor, 1 pig, 1 set scales, 1 pair binoculars, 2 refrigerators, assorted machine parts and tools, 29 motorcycle tires, 10 inner tubes, 125 gal tar, 24 quarts paint, 8 tire rims and miscellaneous motorcycle parts.

3 Equipment destroyed. 300 buildings, 502 bunkers, 92 tunnels, 1 rice silo (10' X 10' X 8'), 9 base camps, 1 claymore factory, 37 caves, 1 bridge, 12 sampans, 25 oxcarts, 1566 rounds SA ammo, 4 M79 rounds, 33 60mm mortar rounds, one 81mm mortar round, five 105mm rounds, two 155mm rounds, 117 hand grenades, 15 rifle grenades, 3 claymore mines, 12 AT mines, 15 AP mines, 49 booby traps, one 10 gal can TNT, six 1 lb blocks TNT, 2 blasting caps, 55 CBU, five 20 lb bombs, one 100 lb bomb, two 250 lb bombs, four 500 lb bombs, 1263.4 tons rice, 800 lbs wheat, 7955 lbs fish,

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40 large bags fish, 11.5 tons salt, 250 lbs canned food, 45 cans US "C" rations, 35 chickens and ducks, 1050 lbs fertilizer, 460 lbs clothing, eight 5 lb bags cement, 1 ton beans, 440 gal tar, 500 gal gasoline, 30 gal kerosene, 9000 lbs tobacco, 50 picks, 61 D handled shovels, 11 bicycles, 1 outboard motor, 10 beds, 5 storehouses, 2 trucks, 1 rice processing machine, one 55 gal drum CS, 176 gal acid, 2 arc welders, 23 rifle stocks, 1 set scales, 1 rice mill, 2 tool boxes, 400' electrical wire, 1 air pump, 4 water buffalo.

(2) Operation FAIRFAX.

(a) Intelligence Aspects. This operation was conceived as a combined US/GVN search, clear and destroy operation undertaken to increase the degree of security and GVN control within the Capital Military District (CMD). Prior to Operation FAIRFAX, deterioration of GVN control was evident from the increased freedom of movement which the VC were showing throughout the area, along with an increase in guerilla strength and an expansion of the infrastructure. With weak GVN control, large VC unit movements could take place with little chance of detection by US or GVN forces. This posed a major threat to the suburbs of Saigon and to major GVN and US installations within Saigon and the CMD. The operation began on 1 December 1966 and was still in progress at the close of the reporting period.

(b) Results to date. Enemy freedom of movement has been restricted in much of the area covered by US/GVN forces. As of 31 January 1967, there have been 247 VC KIA (BC), 72 PW, and 1574 detainees. The following equipment losses have been sustained by the VC.

1 Equipment captured. 58 SA, 1 C/S weapon, 1 M72 LAW (US), 6509 rds SA ammo, 15 M79 rounds, five 60mm rounds, one 55 gal drum mixed ammo, 79 grenades, 1 CS grenade, 18 AP mines, 6 claymores, 3 booby traps, 1 bayonet, 470 lb TNT, 133 lb documents, 1 sampan, 8 outboard engines, 933 lbs medical supplies, misc training aids, 3 homemade radios, 1 loudspeaker, 27 SA magazines, 1 film editing machine, misc radio parts, 17,490\$VN, 1 AN/PRC 10 radio, 5 typewriters, 3 sewing machines, misc clothing, 1 hand generator, 1000 lb rice.

2 Equipment destroyed. 229 buildings, 611 bunkers, 8 tunnels, 99 sampans, 1 foot bridge, 58.5 tons rice, 1437 rounds SA ammo, 72 grenades, 1 CS grenade, four 60mm rounds, one 155mm round, 34 AP mines, 11 booby traps, 16 CBU, 7 shovels, 1 gas

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mask, 8 bags cement, 752 lbs TNT.

(3) Operation CEDAR FALLS.

(a) Intelligence Aspects. Operation CEDAR FALLS was launched in the Thanh Dinh Forestry Reserve and Iron Triangle area of Binh Duong Province beginning 8 January 1967. This 19 day seal, search and destroy operation was undertaken to locate and to destroy military and political elements of VC Military Region IV, local VC infrastructure and VC/NVA forces; to clear the area of inhabitants. The area had long been an established VC stronghold and base area and had not been penetrated by large scale US/FWMAF operations within the past year. Agent reports plus recent increased commo-liaison activity between the operational area and Saigon led to the belief that the major portions of MR IV Headquarters were in the area. The destruction of MR IV Headquarters was considered vital as it had been responsible for numerous acts of sabotage and terrorism in and around Saigon and Gia Dinh Province. These incidents, together with attacks on isolated government outposts, constituted a serious threat to the stability of the South Vietnamese Government.

(b) Results. Operation CEDAR FALLS was the most lucrative operation conducted in South Vietnam to date. The VC infrastructure and those portions of MR IV Headquarters which worked from bases in and around the operational area were effectively disrupted or destroyed. Over 500,000 pages of documents were captured and are undergoing translation and exploitation. A total of 1436 personnel were lost by the VC including killed, captured and those rallied to GVN control. Equipment, structures and food destroyed or captured was of such quantity that a serious strain has been imposed on the VC resupply system. The following are detailed enemy losses for the operation.

1 Personnel. 720 KIA (BC), 227 PW and 606 returnees.

2 Equipment captured. 555 SA, 23 C/S weapons, 1 flare pistol, 1 MG barrel, 2 MG mounts, 7717 rounds SA ammo, 150 20mm rounds, two 82mm rounds, 3 rockets (type unknown), 4 lbs TNT, 7622 VC uniforms, 121 CHICOM gas masks, 5 US protective masks, 40 rolls of cloth, 6 bags nylon cloth, 100 rolls poncho material, 554 bolts cloth, one 6.15 HP engine, one 20 HP engine, 10 bicycles, 2 motor bikes, 7 bags mosquito netting, 15 lbs medical supplies, misc medicine and surgical equipment, 5 outboard engines, 1099

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grenades, 493.35 tons rice, 285 lbs documents, 260 flashlight batteries, 1500 lbs rolled tin, 56 rolls sheet metal, 700 sheets roofing metal, 1 rifle scope, 6 engines, 11 sampans, 3 tons QM stores, 600 lbs cement, 26 cargo straps, 20 rolls screen wire, 4 sewing machines, 5 typewriters, 6 civilian radios, 2 tape recorders, 74 sound tapes, 2 crosscut saws, 3 cameras, one 50mm lens, 11 rolls unexposed film, 15 film packs, darkroom equipment, 20,000\$VN, 15,000 NVN piastres, 1 forging kit, 2 rolls wire, 200 lbs salt.

3 Equipment destroyed. 509 buildings, 1111 bunkers, 424 tunnels, 334 sampans, 4 boats, 6 bridges, 3208.4 tons rice, 8800 lbs salt, 29 pressure type mines, 5 VC mines, 9 booby traps, 147 AP mines, 116 AT mines, 52,606 rounds SA ammo, 41 M79 rounds, 29 57mm rounds, 192 60mm rounds, seven 75mm rounds, 167 81mm rounds, one 82mm round, one 90mm round, 46 105mm rounds, two 4.2" rounds, ten 155mm rounds, one 175mm round, three 8" rounds, three RPG-2 rockets, one 3.5" rocket, six 2.75" rockets, 277 CBU, one 750 lb bomb, five 500 lb bombs, fourteen 250 lb bombs, 2 bombs (type unknown), 861 grenades, 58 claymores, two 50 kilo water mines, 4 Bangalore torpedoes, 1220 lbs TNT, 66 blasting caps, two 40 lb shaped charges, 300 lbs explosives, 24 ft detonating cord, 10.5 lbs C4, 46 bicycles, 110 batteries, 1500 gal fish sauce, 3 motors, 1 printing press, 1520 gal gasoline, 80 gal diesel fuel, 845 gal motor oil, 115 gal kerosene, 6 packages opium, 3550 lbs peanuts, 2 stoves, 2 machetes, 84 sleeping mats, 20 VC uniforms, 20 pr VN jungle boots, 55 gal carbide, 6 rolls barbed wire, 300 lb cement, 150 empty rice bags.

b. Intelligence Collection.

(1) Intelligence Collection Plan. A new approach was taken to the assignment of intelligence collection responsibilities in the III Corps Tactical Zone with the publishing of a II Field Force Vietnam Intelligence Collection Plan in January 1967. The plan assigned specific intelligence collection areas and intelligence collection tasks and responsibilities to US/FWMAF units within III Corps Tactical Zone. The objective of the plan is to achieve a closely integrated and coordinated intelligence collection effort by US/FWMAF, ARVN and GVN agencies. In this plan, unit collection responsibilities are assigned on the basis of geographic areas. Close liaison is envisioned in the intelligence collection effort between US/FWMAF units from division thru battalion level and between US advisors and corresponding commanders of ARVN units or province and district chiefs. The plan is designed to afford the collection of maximum information with minimum duplication of effort.

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(2) Source Control Program. A step was taken to improve the intelligence collection effort through the establishment of a Source Control Program in the III Corps Tactical Zone. When fully implemented, this program will administratively control and identify confidential informants and sources, assist in their evaluation, prevent utilization by more than one agency and avoid employment of undesirable types such as fabricators.

c. Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(1) Description.

(a) The major Viet Cong military/political headquarters in South Vietnam is known as the Central Office in South Vietnam (COSVN). The VC hierarchy is fully broken down into military regions. The primary military regions included in III Corps Tactical Zone are Military Region 1 (MR 1), also known as T 1, MR 7 or Eastern Nambo Military Region. Military Region IV (MR IV), also known as T 4 or Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone, like MR 1, is entirely within the III Corps Tactical Zone. There are indications that the Rung Sat Special Zone, the river delta area southeast of Saigon, is also a separate Military Region subordinate to COSVN. This region is known as T 10. VC Military Region 6 is largely in II Corps Tactical Zone. It does, however, include two provinces of III Corps area, Binh Tuy and Phuoc Long. Long An Province, in the southern part of the corps area, is included in Military Region 2, which is made up largely of territory in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. MR 2 was formerly designated MR 8. Geographical boundaries of these Military Regions are shown at inclosure 7.

(b) There have been two significant geographical changes during the reporting period. Captured documents and rallier interrogation reports revealed that the VC Phuoc Thanh and Binh Duong Provinces have been combined and redesignated Thu Dau Mot Province. Also the combining of VC Ba Ria Province and the southern part of Bien Hoa Province, forming Ba Bien Province, has been reported but not yet confirmed.

(c) There are two major VC base areas within the III Corps Tactical Zone. The first is the Duong Minh Chau or War Zone C in northern Tay Ninh Province. Located within this area is the headquarters of the Communist insurgent effort (COSVN). The second major base area is War Zone D, located largely in northern Long Khanh Province. This area contains the headquarters of MR 1. Within these two major areas, and scattered throughout III CTZ, are

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19 lesser base areas for the VC supply, rear services and training systems.

(2) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

(a) The 250th NVA Regiment and the Vinh Quang Main Force Battalion have been dropped from Order of Battle for lack of evidence of their continued existence.

(b) The regimental headquarters of the 165A Capital Liberation Main Force Regiment has been dropped from Order of Battle. The subordination of the 8 battalions is as follows:

1st Bn	MR 4
2d Bn	Go Man District/MR 4
3d Bn	Di An District/MR 4
4th Bn	Thu Duc District/MR 4
5th Bn	Nha Be District/MR 4
6th Bn	Binh Tanh District/MR 4
7th Bn	Cu Chi District/MR 4
8th Bn	MR 4

It should be noted that the battalions remain as the primary combat units of MR 4 but are attached to the various districts of MR 4 for operational purposes.

(c) Analysis of captured documents and rallier statements indicate that the 273d Main Force Regiment has assumed a separate mission and is presently located north of Tan Uyen. Also revealed by the same analysis is the fact that the 101st NVA Regt is now subordinate to VC CT 9.

(d) The most significant development of the reporting period was the confirmation of 7th NVA Division in north-eastern Phuoc Long Province. The 7th Worksite (Division) is composed of the 12th (aka 165th, Q12) NVA Regt, the 14th (aka 141st, Q14) NVA Regt, and the 17th (aka 52d, Q17) NVA Regt. Confirmation of the unit was made as a result of several troop contacts in the

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Bu Dop area plus analysis of captured documents containing the complete organization and subordination of the 7th Worksite. The 7th is the first all - NVA Worksite to appear in III CTZ.

(3) Recapitulation.

(a) The VC Provinces of Military Regions 1, 2, 4, 6 and T 10 control 34 local force companies and 27 local force platoons in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

(b) There are 5 confirmed local force battalions located in 4 VC provinces of MR 1 and MR 2, and there are 6 local force battalions subordinate to six different districts in MR 4. These battalions are:

<u>Local Force Bns</u>	<u>VC Province or District</u>
Phu Loi Bn	Thu Dau Mot Province (GVN Binh Duong)
2d Independent Bn	Long An Province
506 Bn	Long An Province
D14 Bn	Tay Ninh Province
D445 Bn	Ba Ria Province (GVN Phuoc Tuy)
2d Bn	Go Mon District MR 4 (GVN Hoc Mon)
3d Bn	Di An District MR 4
4th Bn	Thu Duc District MR 4
5th Bn	Nha Be District MR 4
6th Bn	Binh Tan District MR 4 (GVN Binh Chanh)
7th Bn	Cu Chi District MR 4 (GVN Hau Nghia)

(c) There are 4 VC main force battalions and 9 main force regiments operating the III Corps Tactical Zone. These units and their controlling headquarters are:

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<u>VC Main Force Bns and/or Regt</u>	<u>Controlling HQ</u>
Dong Nai Bn (aka D800)	MR 1
1st Bn/ MR 4	MR 4
8th Bn (combat support)/MR 4	MR 4
C44 Sapper Bn	MR 4
70th Security Regt	COSVN
Gp 69 Artillery Regt (aka U80)	COSVN
273 Regt	COSVN
680 Training Regt	COSVN
Dong Thap II Regt	MF 2
271 Regt	Cong Truong 9 (9th Div)
272 Regt	Cong Truong 9 (9th Div)
274 Regt	Cong Truong 5 (5th Div)
275 Regt	Cong Truong 5 (5th Div)

(d) There are four North Vietnamese Army Regiments operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone. These Regiments are:

<u>NVA Regiment</u>	<u>Controlling HQ</u>
101 NVA Regt	Cong Truong 9
Q 12 (aka 165 Regt)	Cong Truong 7 (7th Div)
Q 14 (aka 141 Regt)	Cong Truong 7
Q 17 (aka 52 Regt)	Cong Truong 7

(e) See inclosure 8 for sketch map of enemy locations as of 31 January 1967.

(4) Summary of Recent Activities.

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(a) During November, the 9th VC Division conducted countersweep operations in the War Zone C area. Elements of COSVN, the 70th Security Regiment and the 271 and 272 VC and 101 NVA Regiments of the 9th Division made contacts with US units on Operation ATTLEBORO. As a diversionary effort the 2d Battalion, 272 Regiment, and elements of the 14th Local Force Battalion of Tay Ninh Province unsuccessfully attacked a Regional Force outpost at Suoi Cau.

(b) The 5th VC Division ambushed two US convoys and attacked an ARVN training center during the period. The D265 and D800 Battalions, 274 Regiment, in November and the 1st Battalion, 275 Regiment, in December, attacked 11th Armored Cavalry supply convoys on National Highway 1. In December, the D265 Battalion, 274 Regiment, conducted a highly successful attack on the Van Kiep Training Center in Phuoc Tuy, inflicting heavy casualties on the friendly forces and capturing more than 100 trainees while taking light casualties.

(c) The presence of the 7th NVA Division was confirmed. Rallier Le Xuan Chuyen, assistant chief of staff of 5th Division, indicated as early as the summer of 1966 that another division was being organized in Phuoc Long Province. Documents captured in January 1967 identified the 2d Battalion, 165 NVA Regiment (aka Q 12) as an element of Worksite 7. Other documents revealed other major components of the division as the Q 14 Regiment (aka 141) and the Q 17 Regiment (aka 52d). Many units of the 7th Division are apparently understrength and suffer from disease and malnutrition. Tactical operations have been limited to small unit actions.

(d) Military Region 4 conducted acts of harassment, terrorism and limited countersweep operations with its eight battalions. Thirty-six men of the 6th Battalion attacked the air base at Tan Son Nhut in early December. In mid-January, two companies of the 6th Battalion countered an ARVN airborne operation in Binh Tan District, suffering 103 dead and ten captured. Other MR 4 units in contact during the period were the 4th Battalion and the 2d Battalion. Generally restricting itself to local small scale actions, the 4th Battalion had one platoon-size contact in Thu Duc District. The 2d Battalion engaged US units in several small but fierce skirmishes during the early part of Operation CEDAR FALLS in January, then apparently dispersed south of the operational area.

(e) The 506th and 2d Independent Local Force Battalions were active during the reporting period against Government

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outposts with mortar fire and sharp, intense attacks. Assaults were made on Bao Trai and in the vicinity of Duc Hoa. The D445 Battalion of Baria Province, the Phu Loi Battalion of Thu Dau Mot Province, and the 14th Battalion of Tay Ninh Province were all active in their respective areas.

(5) Tactics.

(a) In spite of the confirmation of the 7th NVA Division in northern Phuoc Long Province and the conduct of several regimental size operations, the most successful VC tactics continue to be hit and run guerilla actions, avoiding concentration of large numbers of men. Main Force units suffered heavy casualties during the period which may necessitate a change in long range VC plans.

(b) The combining of VC provinces and the rearranging of province boundaries into new administrative areas could be one means by which the VC are attempting to shore up manpower shortages in Province Party personnel. The move would permit the VC to more effectively coordinate and concentrate forces against increased friendly offensive activity. In addition, it would allow the VC to utilize experienced province level personnel in lower echelons.

(c) During Operation CEDAR FALLS, documents were found that indicated the VC had organized a new regiment in Military Region 4. The regiment, designated A189, included the 1st and 8th Battalions of the former 165A Regiment. The A189 Regiment was deactivated in December 1966 because the situation in MR 4 was not conducive to regimental sized operations.

(d) A new tactic employed during the period consisted of affixing claymore mines to the top of a 30 to 40 foot pole. Efforts would be made to attract the attention of low flying aircraft to the vicinity of the poles. When the aircraft approached the area, the mines would be detonated; however, the technique requires a direct hit to be effective. Another new tactic used by the VC was the use of English speaking persons to enter US radio nets to cause confusion, to disrupt communications and to obtain intelligence information. VC intercept of radio communications is not new in itself, but entering radio nets in this manner during a crucial situation to create confusion is relatively new in Vietnam because of the limited English language capability in VC ranks. The most notable use of this ruse was on 25 January at Nha Be, Capital Military District, when an unknown voice speaking fluent English

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21 entered a naval radio net and gave confusing statements and commands over a radio net. It was the third such incident in CMD and may indicate an increasing use of the tactic by the VC.

(e) For trends in other enemy tactics see inclosure 9.

d. VC Battle Losses.

<u>NOV 66</u>										
<u>VC KIA</u>	<u>VC KIA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>VCS</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>HV</u>	<u>RD</u>	<u>BLDG</u>	<u>TONS</u>		
<u>(BC)</u>	<u>(POSS)</u>				<u>WPNS</u>	<u>AMMO</u>	<u>M/D</u>	<u>DEST</u>	<u>RICE</u>	
1386	451	64	425	101	5	102,882	374	499	1569.76	
<u>DEC 66</u>										
635	645	196	1847	143	9	23,674	642	821	544.71	
<u>JAN 67</u>										
<u>1383</u>	<u>841</u>	<u>213</u>	<u>1813</u>	<u>660</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>67,048</u>	<u>3629</u>	<u>1150</u>	<u>3522.87</u>	
<u>3404</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>473</u>	<u>4085</u>	<u>904</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>193,604</u>	<u>4645</u>	<u>2470</u>	<u>5637.34</u>	

The total number of VC killed and captured cannot meaningfully be equated to main force unit strengths, as it must be supposed that the majority of enemy casualties were sustained among local and guerilla units. However, the heavy drain on manpower does have an adverse impact on the enemy's ability to recruit replacements among the populace. For example, a document captured in January 1967 published by HQ MR 4 stated that the recruiting goal in 1966 had been 5000 men for that region. The actual number recruited was about 600. With continued heavy losses, the VC ranks will become increasingly unattractive to youths of military age.

e. Enemy capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Possible Courses of Action at End of Period.

(1) Capabilities.

(a) Attack.

1 The enemy is capable of attacking in eastern Tay Ninh Province and in Binh Long Province with elements

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of two regiments, 272d and 101st NVA, of CT 9, supported in Tay Ninh Province by the 14th LF Bn.

2 The enemy can possibly attack in Binh Duong Province with elements of 272d Regiment, and possibly the 273d Regiment, supported by the Phu Loi Battalion.

3 The 273d Regt is also capable of attacking in Bien Hoa Province.

4 The 274th Regt is capable of attacking anywhere in southeastern Bien Hoa Province, western Phuoc Tuy Province or southern Long Khanh Province. In Phuoc Tuy Province this regiment could be supported by the 860th LF Bn and in Long Khanh or Bien Hoa Provinces by the Dong Nai Bn (aka D800).

5 In Binh Tuy Province, eastern Phuoc Tuy Province and eastern Long Khanh Province the enemy is capable of attacking with the 275th Regt.

6 All seven battalions of MR IV could be employed in attacks against GVN units, outposts and installations in MR 4.

7 The VC are capable of attacking in Long An Province with elements of the DT II Regt, 506th LF Bn, 2d Ind Bn, plus seven local force companies each operating under district control.

8 In Hau Nghia Province the enemy is capable of attacking with elements of the DT II Regt and two battalions of MR IV.

(b) Defense.

1 The enemy can defend in Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces with CT 9 and the 70th Security Regt.

2 The enemy can defend from present positions in Phuoc Long in division strength.

3 The enemy can defend in Phuoc Tuy and southern Long Khanh Province with CT 5 and the 860th LF Bn.

(c) Reinforce. The enemy can reinforce his attack or defense in northern III CTZ with three separate battalions

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from II CTZ and by one regiment from IV CTZ within three to ten days after commencing movement.

(d) Withdraw. The enemy can withdraw from combat and attempt to achieve his objective through political, psychological and economic means. He also has the capability to disperse his MF units and attempt to achieve his objective by guerilla and small unit operations.

(2) Analysis and Discussion.

(a) Operation CEDAR FALLS and other friendly operations have disrupted the VC offensive plans which should necessitate a definite change in VC plans and objectives. The interdiction of lines of communications, particularly Routes 1, 18 and 15, the Long Tau River in the Rung Sat, and GVN and FWMAF installations and bases remain primary enemy objectives. The enemy will probably not attack US and FWMAF units in strength, but can be expected to defend if attacked.

(b) Significance of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

1 The enemy has supported and directed activities from his previously secure base in Binh Duong Province designed to isolate and subjugate the GVN in the CMD. Operation CEDAR FALLS has destroyed the major portion of the enemy's 20-year investment in the development of that major command and control center, operating base, and logistics complex and separated his infrastructure from a subservient population.

2 Enemy facilities and fortifications throughout the greater portion of two base areas have been overrun and destroyed. The enemy sustained 720 killed and lost 555 individual and 23 crew served weapons, more than enough for a fully armed battalion. In addition, 1228 personnel have been detained.

3 Over 3700 tons of rice have been captured or destroyed. This is enough to feed five fully manned regiments for a year. More significant than the loss itself, is the resultant diversion of manpower to reconstitute his stores.

4 Over 5900 civilians have been evacuated from the objective area which effectively denies the VC a population base which has long been a source of food, manpower and revenue.

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5 Realization of the seriousness of these losses by the leadership in North Vietnam, COSVN and the VC dominated populace can not help but have a serious adverse psychological impact. Conversely, when these successes are properly portrayed to the population of South Vietnam, they should accrue advantageously to the GVN.

6 The enemy's capability to accomplish his plans in the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Sector has been seriously impaired by loss of personnel, food, weapons, supplies, facilities and fortifications. Relocation of the population base with its resources militates against MR IV regaining the operational effectiveness and security in central Binh Duong Province which it enjoyed prior to CEDAR FALLS.

7 The capture and exploitation of Crypto material provides access to certain information for the first time. The capture of over 500,000 pages of enemy documents compromised enemy security plans and programs, and destroyed his record continuity.

(3) Vulnerabilities.

(a) VC units remain vulnerable to artillery and air strikes and are restricted by a slowly improving but still inflexible logistical system.

(b) Enemy ambushes and raids are vulnerable to preemption by US/FWMAF spoiling attacks due to the inflexibility of enemy plans.

(c) VC units are vulnerable to psywar operations, particularly in the Operation CEDAR FALLS area.

4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING.

a. During the period 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967, significant progress was made against Viet Cong forces in III Corps Tactical Zone. A total of 63 military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against Viet Cong forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone, Gia Dinh Province and the Rung Sat Special Zone by units under the operational control of this headquarters. During the reporting period, two of the most significant operations to date took place.

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(1) Operation ATTLEBORO was initiated on 14 September 1966 by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. It was a wide-ranging operation designed to destroy Viet Cong bases, supplies and units in Tay Ninh Province. From the beginning, the 196th Brigade overran Viet Cong supply areas and large permanent base camps. The frustrated Viet Cong elected to fight and on 2 November massed the 9th Viet Cong Division and 101st North Vietnamese Regiment against the brigade. On 4 November, the 1st Infantry Division was ordered into the area and given operational control over all US forces engaged in the operation. As Viet Cong resistance continued in the face of sharply rising losses, Headquarters, II FFORCEV assumed operational control on 6 November and committed elements of the 25th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The attacking US forces were oriented north from the Dau Tieng, Soui Da and Tay Ninh areas to the Cambodian border through War Zone C. The operation resulted in severe damage to the 9th VC Division and 101st NVA Regiment. The contribution of this operation to the counter-insurgency effort is significant in two areas. First it struck a damaging and demoralizing blow to the VC regular and local forces in the area and second it resulted in a massive loss of VC war material. Operation ATTLEBORO terminated 25 November 1966.

(2) Operation CEDAR FALLS was initiated by II FFORCEV on 8 January 1967. This was a massive search and clear operation designed to destroy the headquarters of the VC Military Region IV, local VC infiltrations and VC/NVA forces and clear the area of inhabitants. The area of operation included the Thanh Dien Forest and the Iron Triangle formed by the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. Participating forces included the 1st Infantry Division reinforced by the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 2d and 3d Squadron of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 168th Combat Engineer Battalion; the 25th Infantry Division reinforced by the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor; ARVN participation included the 1st Airborne Task Force, elements of the 7th and 8th Infantry Regiments and the 35th Ranger Battalion. The concept of the operation called for all civilians to be evacuated from the area and the area turned into a free strike area. The deception plan for the operation directed US units to continue their routine operations along both sides of the Iron Triangle and the gradual buildup of ground forces in staging areas where they would be able to rapidly seal the area of operations. On D-1, the 1st Infantry Division conducted an airmobile assault inside the village of Ben Suc by landing 60 helicopters on seven landing sites in one and one-half minutes. On D-Day, the 25th

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Infantry Division sealed the western portion of the area with two brigades, the 1st Infantry Division sealed the eastern side of the area of operation with elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade and 1/4 Cavalry. On D+1, six battalion size air assaults were placed in the Thanh Dien Forest to seal the northern portion of the area. Two cavalry squadrons were moved from their staging area to split the Iron Triangle from the Thanh Dien Forest reserve. For the next nineteen days, detailed search and destroy operations were conducted throughout the area netting outstanding results.

b. Other special operations during the period were as follows:

(1) Operation ATLANTA: To move the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from the staging area vicinity of Long Binh (YT0712) to the base camp at Long Giao (YS4496).

(2) Operation CANARY: To phase in the 199th Infantry Brigade (Lt) (Sep).

(3) Operation DUCK: To phase in the 9th Infantry Division.

(4) Operation FAIRFAX: A combined US/ARVN operation designed to counter Viet Cong efforts to reestablish his influence within the areas surrounding Saigon.

(5) Operation GARDEN CITY: Designed to introduce elements of the 9th Infantry Division into the IV Corps area. At the close of the present reporting period, a brigade task force of two battalions has been established in the vicinity of Dong Tam (XS4244).

c. During the quarter, staff activities can be divided into actions pertaining to combat developments, distribution and employment of new equipment, force structure and development, and special studies. Staffing was completed and recommendations were forwarded on the following subjects.

(1) Combat Developments.

- (a) Field fabrication of decoy devices.
- (b) Lightweight countermortar radar.
- (c) Collapsible mortar carrier.

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(d) Lightweight mortar system.

(e) Platoon early warning system.

(2) New Equipment.

(a) Requirements for XENON Searchlights for base defense.

(b) Requirements for XM-47 Mine Dispensers and XM-27 mines.

(c) Requirements for XM16E1 Rifle and XM148 grenade launcher.

(d) Requirements for Starlight Scopes.

(e) Requirements for improving AN/MPQ4 Radar.

(f) Basis of issue for PRC 74 and PRC 64 radios.

(g) Recommendations for increased driver protection on M113.

(h) Recommendations on armament for M113.

(3) Force Structure.

(a) Reception and deployment of 9th Infantry Division and 199th Infantry Brigade (Lt) (Sep).

(b) Planning for deployment of Thai Forces.

(c) Maintenance of US Order of Battle and Station list.

(d) Deployment of US and ARVN Armor into IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(e) Deployment of the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force.

(f) Development of II FFORCEV MTOE.

(g) Development of Long Range Patrol MTOE.

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(h) Adjustment of planned deployments to RVN to provide proper force structure in II FFORCEV.

(4) Special Studies.

(a) Air base defense in III CTZ.

(b) Liaison requirements for riverine operations.

(c) Assistance to DA team on Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV).

(d) Defense of Long Binh Post.

(e) Defense of Saigon River bridges.

(f) Presentation on US Armor operations in Vietnam to Royal Australian Armored Center; Puckapunyal, Victoria.

d. As the troop strength of II Field Force Vietnam continued to grow, communications requirements for base camp and field CPs also grew. The arrival of additional Army signal units assisted in providing some of the base camp support for newly arrived units, but the lack of forward area signal platoons with two separate brigades imposed heavy demands on the tactical communications capability and allowed little flexibility to extend communications to forward CPs.

e. The tactical communications facilities of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam continued to expand during the period 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967. The radio relay site on Nui Chua Chan was established as a permanent facility with the construction of barracks, a messhall, and operations building.

f. Sufficient air transportable radio relay equipment configured to load aboard CH-47s is needed by the Field Force Signal Battalion to support three divisions, two separate brigades, the Australian Task Force and the Signal Detachment. A minimum of fourteen terminals are required. The AN/MRC-112 radio relay terminal is not suitable because it has a frequency range in the 54 to 70.9 mc band and limited channelization even though its configuration is very good.

g. There is a need to maintain spare channels in all tactical communication systems to provide alternate routing and emergency requirements without pre-empting circuits. An objective

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of one third capacity in spares is desirable. However, the heavy demand for sole user circuits between command echelons, between artillery batteries and FDCs and to clear artillery fires with sector headquarters leaves little spare capacity.

h. An urgent requirement exists for air transportable HF on-line radio equipment capable of being loaded aboard CH-47s. The AN/GRC-46 will meet this requirement by off-loading the shelter, but AN/VSC-2s would fill the requirement more fully. The Field Force Signal Battalion has no air transportable HF radios with on-line capability at this time.

i. Operation ATTLEBORO revealed a need for an operations code for information classified as SECRET to expedite requests for ARC LIGHT missions by voice communications. Transmission of ARC LIGHT requests by electrical means imposed excessive delays. This requirement has been met by issue of the KAC-172 operations code to the major OPCON units.

j. Frequency interference problems continued to be reported as additional units became operational. The limited number of FM frequencies available for use in III Corps Tactical Zone requires multiple use of most frequencies. In an effort to relieve frequency congestion for critical command nets, nineteen FM frequencies were obtained from the III ARVN Corps Signal Officer and distributed as discrete frequencies to the major OPCON units.

k. During Operation ATTLEBORO it was learned that routine or consistent use of automatic retransmission of FM radio nets from aerial or mountain top locations results in needless capturing of the receiver by distant stations operating on the same frequency. Use of automatic retransmission should be limited to situations where it is required to maintain the communications link.

5. (C) LOGISTICS.

a. Operations.

(1) Logistical Support for the Reporting Period. Logistical support for the reporting period was focused on the following major operations.

(a) Operation DUCK (18 Oct 66 - 1 Feb 67). The purpose of this operation was to support the deployment of the 9th Infantry Division into South Vietnam. The 1st Infantry Division was designated by II FFORCEV as the sponsoring unit with the Bear Cat

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and Phu My areas proposed for base camps; however the Phu My area has not been utilized. Personnel debarked at Vung Tau and were transported by vehicle to the Bear Cat base camp. Cargo, wheel and track vehicles were off-loaded at Saigon and convoyed to Bear Cat. Security of Route 15 was provided by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Australian Task Force and the 18th Military Police Brigade. This operation is continuing and will be recapped in the next quarterly report.

(b) Operation ATTLEBORO (14 Sep 66-25 Nov 66).

This operation required the establishment of two forward support areas (FSA) by 1st Logistical Command. It was decided to use Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng because of the closeness to the area of operation. Although the airfield at Dau Tieng was capable of receiving C123 traffic, this type of aircraft was unable to handle the required tonnage thus causing congestion of the air traffic into and out of the airfield. In addition, the airfield had to be closed for repair on two separate occasions because of the large tonnage of supplies required to support the operation. In the late stages of the operation, a land LOC was established between Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng which greatly facilitated the resupply of the area of operation for the 1st Infantry Division. With respect to responsiveness and professional management, the support rendered by 1st Logistical Command to II FFORCEV units was outstanding.

(c) Operation FORT NISQUALLY (20 Nov 66 - 22 Dec 66).

The purpose of this operation was to support the deployment of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to the vicinity of Dau Tieng and the establishment of a base camp at that location. On this occasion, the 25th Infantry Division was designated by II FFORCEV as the sponsoring unit. One of the first problems to arise was getting sufficient surface transportation for the move from Bear Cat to Dau Tieng. The 1st Logistical Command was hard pressed to meet the requirement. Also, a shortage of POL storage and dispensing equipment was found to exist. This latter problem was overcome by co-ordination between G4, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Logistical Command and G4, II FFORCEV.

(d) Operation CANARY (5 Dec 66 - 20 Dec 66).

This operation was to support the deployment of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade into South Vietnam. The unit was received at the ports of Vung Tau and Saigon with the base camp site located at Long Binh. Personnel were debarked at Vung Tau and transported by truck to Long Binh. Cargo and vehicles were off-loaded at Saigon and convoyed to the base camp. The 1st Infantry Division was designated as sponsor by II FFORCEV, the 18th Military Police

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Brigade, 1st Australian Task Force, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment provided route security and the 1st Logistical Command had the responsibility to preposition barrier material, Class III and V supplies. There were no major logistical problems in connection with this operation.

(e) Operation CEDAR FALLS (8 Jan 67 - 26 Jan 67). This tactical operation was conducted in the Iron Triangle. Units were given the mission of search and destroy, seal and search and revolutionary development support. The 1st Logistical Command established forward support areas at Lai Khe, Phu Loi and Cu Chi. Ammunition supply points were established and backup was planned by airlift. Ben Suc was evacuated of refugees by landing craft to Phu Cuong, and then to a refugee center established by United States Agency for International Development. As a result of prestocking of the forward support areas, no major logistical problems were encountered.

(2) Logistical Conference. Conference was conducted on 20 November 1966 with all OPCON, assigned and attached units represented. United States Army Vietnam, 1st Logistical Command, and II FFORCEV Staff representatives were also in attendance and participated in the conduct of the conference. The logistical accomplishments and improvements of previous months were pointed out. Maintenance and supply discipline and the stabilizing of our logistical procedures were stressed. The organization and missions of the II FFORCEV G4 were presented with emphasis on the "OPCON" relationship for logistical planning and supervision. A discussion ensued on methods of reporting supply and maintenance problems. Also discussed was a need for unit maintenance SOPs, and the airlift request system, with emphasis on correct procedures, accuracy, and timeliness. In closing, the G4 put emphasis on directing maximum effort toward getting a "firm grip" on the magnitude and location of our assets and regularizing our established supply and maintenance systems. Conferencees were reminded of the ever present requirement to keep commanders apprised of the logistical situation, a matter of paramount importance in all phases of counterinsurgency operations.

b. Transportation.

(1) General. The transportation officer continues to be a coordinator on all transportation matters between OPCON units, 1st Logistical Command and US Air Force.

(2) Specific Activities. Based on experience gained from Operation ATTLEBORO, it was recognized that a closer control

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of the III CTZ road network was going to be needed. MACV has established a Highway Traffic Center at II FFORCEV, and it will operate under the staff guidance of the G4. The center first began to issue convoy clearances on 1 February 1967. The operations of 3d Region Transportation Management Agency traffic control discontinued and are now performed by the Highway Traffic Center.

c. Maintenance.

(1) Mechanical Maintenance. During the reporting period, two letters were published emphasizing the need for command attention and supervision in the area of radio and generator maintenance. Additionally, a maintenance SOP for organizational level maintenance and two posters were published in furtherance of the Preventative Maintenance Program. The overall maintenance posture has improved over the last reporting period. This improvement can be attributed to the replacement of many items of equipment that require extensive maintenance due to age and use; also the availability of some repair parts that previously caused problems has improved.

(2) Materiel Readiness. The Materiel Readiness Program continues to be effective in that all assigned and attached units have continually maintained an exceptionally low deadline in all areas except aircraft. Aircraft maintenance is expected to improve in the coming weeks. During this reporting period, the USARV Materiel Readiness Officer addressed all material readiness officers of II FFORCEV assigned and attached units. His address was accomplished in conjunction with the regular monthly material readiness meeting and added considerable interest to the program. He indicated his satisfaction at seeing such an aggressive program in effect promulgated by obvious command interest.

d. Status of Primary Land LOC's as of 28 January 1967.

(1) For the purpose of this report, the following definitions are provided concerning the condition of LOCs.

(a) Condition I signifies that the route is capable of carrying up to Class 50 loads and therefore all division loads.

(b) Condition II signifies that the route is capable of carrying up to Class 30 loads and therefore the majority of logistical transport requirements; i.e., 5000 gallon POL tankers.

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(c) Condition III signifies that the route is capable to carrying up to Class 16 loads and therefore light tactical (APC) and logistical (2½ ton) loads.

(d) Condition IV signifies that the route is capable of carrying only light civilian traffic and is therefore open only to light military reconnaissance elements.

(e) Condition V signifies that the road is closed to all traffic.

(2) Route QL-1.

(a) Saigon (XS845915) to Cu Chi (XT628126), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(b) Cu Chi (XT628126) to Cambodian Border (XT284244), lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition III.

(c) Saigon (XS628126) to RJ 316 (YT072130), lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(d) RJ 316 (YT072130) to RJ (YT630085), lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(e) RJ (YT630085) to III CTZ Border (ZT179013), bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(3) Route QL-13.

RJ QL-1 (XS845914) to III CTZ Border (XS549655), lowest bridge capacity, Class 22, route condition III.

(4) Route QL-13.

(a) RJ QL-1 (XS878970) to Lai Khe (XT770380), lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(b) Lai Khe (XT770380) to Cambodian Border (XU683253), lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(5) Route QL-14.

Dong Xoai (YT079759) to III CTZ Border (YU590176), lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

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(6) Route QL-15.

(a) Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Long Binh (YT045097),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 30, route condition II.

(b) Long Binh (YT045097) to Long Thanh
(YS138920), lowest bridge capacity, Class 20, route condition III.

(c) Long Thanh (YS138920) to Phu My (YS254745),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 20, route condition III.

(d) Phu My (YS254745) to Ba Ria (YS380607),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 20, route condition III.

(e) Ba Ria (YS380607) to Vung Tau (YS276443),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 12, route condition III.

(7) Route QL-20.

RJ QL-1 (YT343101) to III CTZ Border (YT763572),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 16, route condition III.

(8) Route QL-22.

(a) Go Dau Ha (XT387251) to Tay Ninh (XT198508),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 45, route condition II.

(b) Tay Ninh (XT198508) to Trai Bi (XT114705),
bridge destroyed, route condition V.

(c) Trai Bi (XT114705) to Cambodian Border
(XT075897), lowest bridge capacity, Class 10, route condition IV.

(9) Route LTL-1A.

Phu Cuong (XT811140) to RJ QL-14A (XU960221),
lowest bridge capacity, Class 15, route condition III.

(10) Route LTL-2.

(a) RJ (YT437045) to RJ (YS440956), lowest bridge
capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(b) RJ (YS440956) to RJ (YS460775), lowest bridge
capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

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(c) RJ (YS460775) to Nui Dat (YS432675), lowest bridge capacity, Class 24, route condition III.

(d) Nui Dat (YS432675) to Ba Ria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity, Class 60, route condition I.

(11) Route LTL-5A.

Saigon (XS816890) to III CTZ Border (XS786568), lowest bridge capacity, Class 8, route condition IV.

(12) Construction Planned and Underway.

(a) The Ministry of Public Works is nearing completion of upgrading major bridges to Class 60 on Highway 15 from Bien Hoa to Phuoc Le. Necessary soil testing has been completed for the portion of Highway 15 from Phuoc Le to Vung Tau.

(b) The Ministry of Public Works will begin class 60 upgrading on Highway 13 from Phu Cuong to Ben Cat on 18 February 1967. Ministry of Public Works effort will be augmented by equipment and operators from the 1st Engineer Battalion at Di An, and the 86th Engineer Battalion at Phu Loi.

(c) The Ministry of Public Works, 18th ARVN Engineer Battalion, 202d ARVN Engineer Battalion and elements of the 79th Engineer Group will begin permanent type road repair work on Highway 20 o/a February. Highway 20 will be Class 20 all weather by mid-May.

(d) The Ministry of Public Works, 65th Engineer Battalion, elements of the 79th Engineer Group, and ARVN Engineer units will begin surfacing and bridge repair for Highways 1 and 22, Saigon to Tay Ninh, in mid-February.

(e) Highway 4, 6A and 25, Saigon to Dong Tam, will be upgraded to Class 50 by 20 February 1967. Efforts include redecking a RR bridge, reinforcing a DS panel bridge to double deck and placing a 180 foot DS panel bridge.

(f) Many communal routes in Gia Dinh Province are being opened as part of the Revolutionary Development program of Operation FAIRFAX.

6. (U) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

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a. The number of PSYOP air missions increased during the past quarter as a result of augmentation of Army aircraft and fewer maintenance problems. One thousand sixty six missions were flown as compared to 697 during the last quarter. With the addition of one division and one separate brigade into the III Corps Tactical Zone, requirements for aircraft are continuing to rise.

b. A total of 108,669,000 leaflets were disseminated in the III Corps Tactical Zone during the reporting period. The number of hours of loudspeaker broadcasts rose to 682 for the quarter as opposed to 447 for the previous quarter. Slightly less than forty four million leaflets were produced by 246th PSYOP Co, 1st Inf Div, and 25th Inf Div. The 6th PSYOP Bn supplied 6,770,000 and 85,403,750 were received from off shore agencies.

c. The 246th PSYOP Co supported US/FWMAF in III Tactical Zone with ten mobile loudspeaker teams and two audio visual teams. The company is authorized equipment for only four mobile loudspeaker teams; consequently, there is an acute shortage of equipment. Additional equipment is sorely needed to adequately support the US/FWMAF in the corps zone.

d. During the reporting period, 1419 Hoi Chanhs were reported in the III Corps Tactical Zone. This is a large increase over the 741 reported for the last reporting period. Of the total, 643 were from Binh Duong Province; 518 were a direct result of Operation CEDAR FALLS.

7. (U) INFORMATION.

a. During the reporting period, the Information Office set up a press camp in the field with excellent results. It has proved that the Information Office, augmented by the 16th Public Information Detachment, can successfully operate a press camp under combat conditions. While operating in the field, the Information Office had teletype communications with MACV-OI. A photo van from the 53d Signal Battalion processed photos in close support. During the months of December 1966 and January 1967, more than 150 members of the press visited OPCON units of II FFORCEV. These visits were coordinated or instigated by the Information Office. Many visits by leading correspondents were made to this headquarters.

b. The following fact sheets were published by the Information Office during the reporting period to support the Command Information Program.

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(1) Fact Sheet #13 "The Black Market and You" (24 Aug 66).

(2) Fact Sheet #14 "Foot Care" (25 Aug 66).

(3) Fact Sheet #15 "Rabies Control" (25 Aug 66).

(4) Fact Sheet #16 "The Vietnam Election" (30 Aug 66).

(5) Fact Sheet #17 "Armed Forces Voters Day 1966" (9 Sep 66).

(6) Fact Sheet #18 "Prevention and Treatment of Heat Casualties" (13 Sep 66).

(7) Fact Sheet #19 "Are You Safety Conscious?" (24 Sep 66).

(8) Fact Sheet #20 "Standards of Personal Conduct" (13 Oct 66).

(9) Fact Sheet #21 "It's Your Privilege" (31 Oct 66).

(10) Fact Sheet #22 "Venereal Disease" (Restricted Distribution).

(11) Fact Sheet #23 "Safety and Care in Handling of Firearms" (17 Nov 66).

(12) Fact Sheet #24 "Know Your Customs Laws" (29 Nov 66).

(13) Fact Sheet #25 "Guidelines to Support US Service Personnel" (1 Dec 66).

(14) Fact Sheet #26 "Personal Savings Program" (28 Dec 66).

(15) Fact Sheet #27 "Piastre Expenditure Reduction Program" (26 Jan 67).

c. Required orientations, films and directives have been shown, conducted and prepared.

d. A Stars and Stripes distribution change has resulted in the saving of many man hours each day by not having to pick up the

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papers in Saigon. II FFORCEV Hq distribution is delivered from Saigon.

e. The concept of this office is to give full support to all units under the operational control of this headquarters.

8. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

a. Significant activities for the Inspector General Section, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, for the period 1 November 1966 to 31 January 1967 are as follows.

(1) Six complaints and twenty-two requests for assistance were received. No unfavorable trends were indicated.

(2) Three investigations and eight special courtesy inspections were conducted during the period. These inspections were designed to assist units under operational control of this headquarters to prepare for Annual General Inspections by the USARV Inspector General.

b. No problems were encountered by this section during the period of this report.

9. (U) STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE.

Significant activities for the Staff Judge Advocate Section, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, for the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967 are as follows.

a. Tribunal appointed UF Article 5 of the Geneva Convention to process prisoners of war, and a command policy was established that II FFORCEV would convene tribunals for non-divisional units under our operational control but not under our GCM jurisdiction.

b. Following units were attached/assigned to II FFORCEV for GCM jurisdiction.

(1) 7th Howitzer Battalion (105mm) (towed), 9th Artillery, assigned to 54th Artillery Group effective 31 October 1966, GO 6254, USARV, 3 November 1966.

(2) 1st Battalion (8 inch) (SP), 83d Artillery, assigned to 54th Artillery Group effective 31 October 1966, GO 6254, USARV, 3 November 1966.

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(3) 5th Battalion (AW) (Self Propelled), 2d Artillery, attached to II Field Force Vietnam effective 27 November 1966, GO 6643, USARV, 2 December 1966.

(4) Battery D (MG), 71st Artillery, attached to II Field Force Vietnam effective 27 November 1966, GO 6643, USARV, 2 December 1966.

(5) 2d Civil Affairs Company assigned to II Field Force Vietnam effective 7 December 1966, GO 6751, USARV, 10 December 1966, and further attached to 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) effective 14 December 1966, GO 273, HQ, II FFORCEV, 22 December 1966.

(6) 2d Howitzer Battalion (155mm), 11th Artillery, assigned to 23d Artillery Group, effective 15 December 1966, GO 293, USARV, 19 January 1967.

c. Command letter published encouraging increased use of nonjudicial punishment in lieu of summary courts-martial, dated 10 January 1967.

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SECTION II: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Item: Infrared.

Discussion: During the dry season, there is a noticeable increase in the number of items detected by the infrared (IR) sensor. This increase is attributed primarily to numerous fires in the dried vegetation resulting from artillery and air strikes. Frequently such fires burn or smolder for several hours and are thus detected and reported by the IR sensor. Recent experience indicates that water-filled artillery and bomb craters often are reported as possible emissions. Inaccurate data is frequently obtained when emissions resulting from charcoal ovens, as well as agriculture fires are reported. Since the enemy is known to emphasize heat and light discipline, large numbers of infrared emissions should be carefully analyzed and evaluated in conjunction with location and season of the year.

Observation: Personnel at all echelons who are responsible for analyzing and recommending action based on IR results must be fully aware of the locations of charcoal ovens, agricultural fires, and areas of dense artillery and/or bomb craters. Aerial visual observation should be employed whenever feasible to assist in determining the validity of the IR readout.

Item: VC Base Installations.

Discussion: Analysis of the recorded locations of VC base camps, arms and supply depots, rice caches and troop unit contacts during Operations ATTLEBORO and CEDAR FALLS reveals the high incidence of such locations in close proximity to roads, trails and streams. Rarely are VC installations discovered deep in jungle areas away from sources of water supply and routes of communication.

Observation: Units engaged in search and destroy operations should focus their attention on areas offering good concealment for base installations, but not more than 500 meters from stream beds, trails and roads.

Item: Order of Battle Holdings.

Discussion: Comparison of installations discovered during Operation CEDAR FALLS with OB intelligence holdings prior to the operation disclosed a high degree of correlation. Of 177 separate enemy

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facilities found by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 156, or 88.1%, were found to have been located within 500 meters of the locations previously reported.

Observation: OB installation files are excellent guides for units planning search and destroy operations.

OPERATIONS/TRANSPORTATION

Item: Updating of inbound surface shipping.

Discussion: The data furnished by 1st Logistical Command provides a source of information to apprise the unit of incoming personnel and cargo.

Observation: There have been numerous changes in ships and arrival dates. This has developed a need for close liaison with the 1st Logistical Command and Saigon Port to keep the command updated on this important item of interest.

Item: Maintenance SOP for Troops.

Discussion: The increase in equipment in the command has increased the need for a strong maintenance policy.

Observation: The publishing of a maintenance SOP and the production of posters have been measures used during the reporting period to emphasize the importance of properly maintaining equipment.

Item: Use of land LOC.

Discussion: The impending heavy usage of roads in the command and the emphasis on land LOC make it necessary to control the flow of traffic.

Observation: Commanders have been enjoined to use the roads and to keep MSR in II FFORCEV open for resupply. A MACV Highway Traffic Center has been established to assist in the control of traffic flow. It will control all highways in the III CTZ to assist in the overall logistical planning.

Item: USAF Emergency Airlift System.

Discussion: The USAF placed rated officers down to brigade level to assist in airlift processing during a recent test of procedural changes.

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The time period, 1-25 November 1966, fortunately coincided with Operation ATTLEBORO. Over 125 emergency airlift requests were processed by this headquarters during the test period.

Observation: The tested system, which has been adopted by MACV, proved to be highly responsive and is tailored to the airlift needs. Only slight modifications were required to meet operational requirements in the Republic of Vietnam. The many benefits accrued include better flight following data and more informed commanders in the field as a result of improved Air Force/Army coordination at the Field Force and lower level.

Item: The 834th Air Division (Airlift).

Discussion: In early December 1966, a new Air Division was created and headquartered at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Under control of the 834th Air Division are all airlift assets in RVN. These include the C7A Wing, the 923d Wing, plus OPCON or "out-of-country" C130 Aircraft.

Observation: Since the inception of this new air division, specifically for airlift, the USAF responsiveness and total support has markedly improved. The results have been record breaking operations on the scale of ATTLEBORO and CEDAR FALLS.

Item: Changeover of CV-2s from US Army to USAF C-7As.

Discussion: On 1 January 1967, all CV2 Caribous were transferred to the USAF and redesignated C7A Caribou. The 483d Troop Carrier Wing (TCW) has control of all in-country USAF Caribous. The present system calls for a master breakout by priorities set by MACV to all major users; in turn, the users request aircraft from II FFORCEV, and a consolidated request (including aircraft itineraries) is forwarded to USAF daily. Headquarters, II FFORCEV has the capability to divert C7A aircraft by using a diversion code word.

Observation: Thus far the system has worked remarkably well and few trouble areas have been encountered. With a few additional refinements and better flight following, the system should become a model setup.

SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE

Item: Improvement in Food-Service.

Discussion: The food service program is receiving increased attention

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by the USARV Food Service Division. (G4). The "Food Service Information Series" published by USARV provides guidance to correct weaknesses or faults.

Observation: Units should use the "Food Service Information Series" to assist in strengthening areas of weakness or faults which may exist.

Item: Excess Equipment.

Discussion: Many "Request for Equipment in Excess of Authorized Allowances", USARV Form 47, and associated DA Forms 2765-1, are received without adequate review and coordination at the originator's headquarters; without sufficient justification to establish a firm requirement; and/or without indication that the requested equipment is combat mission essential and required on an emergency basis.

Observation: Everyone concerned must be made aware that this procedure is used only to request urgently needed combat mission essential equipment. Equipment which does not meet this criterion should be requested by MTOE or TDA action. CONUS units preparing for deployment should plan as far ahead as possible to effect liaison with a like unit in-country to get a list of general requirements over and above TOE so that action can be taken to obtain authority for additional equipment or a needed item prior to departing CONUS.

Item: Turn-in of Excess Equipment.

Discussion: Any item authorized by TOE or MTOE may be turned in if excess to present and known future requirements. Procedure is to request, through channels, turn-in authority from USARV. Equipment may be turned in when written authority is received by the unit. An MTOE deleting the equipment must be submitted.

Observation: Units must be made aware that they are authorized and encouraged to turn in equipment they do not need; however, they must also be warned that equipment so turned in will not be available for quick re-issue.

Item: Failure to justify excessive ammunition expenditures.

Discussion: At the completion of Operation CEDAR FALLS, units failed to report expenditures of ammunition in excess of ASR.

Observation: Under the credit allocation system, this headquarters

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is allocated specific amounts of each controlled ammunition item and is expected to conduct operations throughout the entire allocation period without exceeding these allocations. When ammunition issues, in excess of ASR, deplete the allocation before the end of the period, this headquarters can obtain additional allocations from USARV provided the additional issues are to support heavy expenditures demanded by critical tactical situations. When units, which have justifiably exceeded the ASR, fail to support this expenditure, this headquarters is deprived of its justification for a new allocation. At the end of an operation of phases of extended operations, a unit should report all expenditures in excess of ASR, the period of time over which expenditure occurred, the number of weapons supported and a description of the tactical situation which necessitated the expenditure.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Item: Coordination and planning for mass evacuation of refugees between US/FWMAF, RVNAF, GVN and Office of Civilian Operations (OCO).

Discussion: In an operation such as CEDAR FALLS that involves the evacuation of the civilian populace from an area of operations, advance planning must include the role to be played by US/FWMAF, RVNAF, GVN and OCO in the assembly, screening and evacuation of civilians. Responsibilities for providing security forces, transportation, screening, medical assistance, food, water and housing must be established as soon as security restrictions will permit.

Observation: Security restrictions on most operations of this nature will preclude prior coordination and planning with RVNAF, GVN, and OCO officials, thus requiring extensive coordination and rapid reaction during the first 2 or 3 days of the execution phase.

Item: Evacuation of Civilian Populace from a Tactical Area of Operation.

Discussion: Recent experience in the total evacuation of the civilian populace from the Iron Triangle involving movement of about 6,000 people and their personal belongings to include farm animals, required large quantities of military transport. The use of boats and trucks was essential because available aircraft were required for tactical purposes.

Observation: When tactical considerations require permanent evacuation of civilians from their homes, every effort must be made to

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provide sufficient transport to allow each family to bring out their personal property. Removal of household goods and livestock with evacuated families facilitates resettlement and reduces their desire to return to their former home.

Item: US Military Support to Refugee Camps.

Discussion: During Operation CEDAR FALLS, it was found that although GVN has the responsibility to establish refugee camps with support provided by OCO, US military units were required to provide tentage, wire, water trailers, field mess equipment, graders, dozers and trucks.

Observation: Large quantities of refugees generated in a short period of time overtax GVN, RVNAF and OCO capabilities thus necessitating support by US military units.

INFORMATION OFFICE

Item: Processing of Photographs.

Discussion: The processing of photographs by the 53d Signal Battalion continues to be a problem. The heavy workload placed on the film processing section by this office and units they support, results in a work backlog up to three and four weeks. As an example, the large number and frequency of VIP's visiting this headquarters causes an additional burden on the photo facilities.

Observation: This is a problem area that is receiving corrective action where possible through the cooperation of the Operations Officer of the 53d Signal Battalion. A weekly listing of all outstanding work orders is submitted by this office for his follow-up action. A priority for work orders by certain types of photo coverage and reduction, where possible, in the number of prints required and requested, should alleviate to some extent this situation.

Item: Inadequate Personnel Authorization.

Discussion: A submitted recommended change to the II FFORCEV TOE for the Information Office has not been approved and action is still pending. In addition, an MTOE for the 16th Public Information Detachment is still pending. These requested changes are felt necessary to support requisition for personnel to more fully support the objectives of the Information Program.

Observation: Justification for the requested changes were based on an experience factor.

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Item: Commander's Recommendations.

NONE

FOR THE COMMANDER:


J. D. HITZFELDER
CPT, AGS
Asst AG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam
 APO San Francisco 96266

AVFB-SGS

1 December 1966

SUMMARY OF VISITORS FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1966

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Adm	David L. McDonald	1 Nov	Chief of Naval Operations	II FFORCEV
Dr	T. W. McKnew		Chairman, Board of Trustees, National Geographic Society	
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges		DEPCOMUSMACV	
VAdm	I. J. Galantin		Chief of Naval Material	
RAdm	N. G. Ward		CNFV/CHNAG	
RAdm	G. E. Moore, II		SC, Deputy Commander for Supply Operations, Naval Supply System Command	
Capt	J. H. King, USN		Executive Assistant and Aide-de- Camp	
Maj	K. W. Accousti		Aide-de-Camp to DEPCOMUSMACV	
Brig Gen	Phillip B. Davidson	1 Nov	Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 USARPAC MACV J2	1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
Lt Cmdr	James E. Ward			
Maj Gen	Arthur L. West	1-2 Nov	Chief, MACOV Evaluation Team	11th ACR
Col	George S. Lundberg			25th Inf Div
Lt Col	Edward P. Hindman			1st Inf Div
Lt Col	Denny E. Edney			2d Bn, 34th Armor
Lt Col	Phillip B. Samsey		USARV G3	
Lt Col	H. E. Dill			
Maj	George P. Hanley			
Capt	Donald D. Turner		Aide-de-Camp	

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Gen	Surakij Mayalart	2 Nov	Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Army	25th Inf Div
Col	Stan White		MACTHAI	1st Inf Div
Capt	James R. Trailer		MACV Protocol	
Lt Gen	Abdul Hamid	2 Nov	Chief, General Staff, Malaysian Army	II FFORCEV
Col	Willis B. Scudder		Chief, MACV Protocol	1st Inf Div
Lt Col	A. L. Morrison	2 Nov	Instructor, Australian Staff College	25th Inf Div
Lt Col	N. M. Turner		Instructor, Australian Staff College	II FFORCEV
Maj	Carter		FWMAO	
Gen	William C. Westmoreland	3 Nov	COMUSMACV	173d Abn Bde
Capt	William Carpenter		Aide-de-Camp	25th Inf Div
Mr.	Ronald Nessen		NBC	11th ACR
Mr.	Jim Pickerall			3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	4 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	1st Inf Div
				Tay Ninh SF Det
				Ben Soi SF Camp
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	5 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	196th Lt Inf Bde
				Tay Ninh SF Det
Brig Gen	John C. Dalrymple	6 Nov	Director of Installations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, DA	II FFORCEV
			USARV	79th Engr Gp
Capt	Steve Gardner			

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<u>TANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Chap(Brig Gen)	Francis L. Sampson	6 Nov	Deputy Chief of Chaplains, DA	1st Inf Div
Chap (Col)	Walton G. Sugg		USARV	II FFORCEV
Capt	Samuel Sobles, USN		Chaplain	25th Inf Div
Chap (Lt Col)	Clayton Day		Office of Chief of Chaplains	54th Arty Gp
Mr.	W. Martens		Office of Chief of Chaplains	
Gen	Bruce K. Holloway	7 Nov	Vice Chief of Staff, USAF	II FFORCEV
Gen	Gabriel P. Disosway		Cmdr, TAC	
Lt Gen	Thomas P. Gerrity		DCS Sys & Log	
Lt Gen	J. P. Holzapple		DCS R & D	
Maj Gen	J. J. Catton		Dir, Aerospace Program	
Brig Gen	J. W. Baer		Asst DCS Ops, TAC	
Col	John French		Ex to VCS, USAF	
Col	Bishop Kilgore		PIO, USAF	
Col	Dewitt S. Spevin		IG, TAC	
Lt Col	Howard Unger		OS G3, USARV	
Maj	Henry Chin		ADC, VCS, USAF	
Maj	Ralph Albertazzie		Ex to Cmdr, TAC	
Maj Gen	John C. . Tillson, III	7 Nov	Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACV	II FFORCEV
Capt	Broadus		MACV J3	25th Inf Div
Mr.	Jack DeSilva	7 Nov	Primary Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia	1st Inf Div
Maj	Fagan		MACV Protocol	25th Inf Div
Col	William G. Marks	7 Nov	Security Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, USARPAC	II FFORCEV
Col	Frederick Sanders		USARV G2	III Corps
Maj	Jessie Joy		USARV G2	

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	8 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	10th ARVN Div 11th ACR 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div
Maj Gen	Tran Phong	8 Nov	Assistant Chief of Staff, J3, JGS, ARVN	11th ACR
Col	Arlin J. Kehe		Chief of Joint Operations Division, J3	
Lt Col Maj	Patrick Cullen Loi		Operations Branch, J3 JGS, ARVN	
Gen Capt	William C. Westmoreland William Carpenter	9 Nov	COMUSMACV Aide-de-Camp	1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	9 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	1st Inf Div
Lt Gen Brig Gen	Jean Engler Frank D. Miller	10 Nov	Deputy CG, USARV DCS (P & O)	PHILCAGV 196th Lt Inf Bde
Gen	William C. Westmoreland	11 Nov	COMUSMACV	93d Evac Hosp 3d Surg Hosp
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	11 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	III Corps
Lt Gen Lt Gen Col	Cao Van Vien Le Nguyen Khang Arndt L. Mueller	11 Nov	Chief of General Staff, ARVN CG, III Corps DSA, III Corps	1st Inf Div PHILCAGV
Brig Gen	Robert R. Ploger	11 Nov	CG, 18th Engr Bde	II FFORCEV

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<u>RAK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Col	John B. Kidd, USAF	11 Nov	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, CINCPAC Staff MACCOC	II FFORCEV
Col	D. E. Foster			
Maj Gen	William Jones, USMC	12 Nov	Director, MACV COC	1st Inf Div
Brig Gen	James A. Hebbeler	12 Nov	Director of CBR & Nuclear Operations, OACSFOR, DA	II FFORCEV
Lt Col	Robert Lane		Chief, Systems and Requirements Division, CBR & Nuclear Operations, OACSFOR, DA	25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	13 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	II FFORCEV
Gen	William C. Westmoreland	14 Nov	COMUSMACV	II FFORCEV
Col	Lawson Magruder, Jr.	14 Nov	MACV Inspector General	II FFORCEV
Col	D. L. Benton, Jr.		Deputy IG, USARV	173d Abn Bde
Col	G. B. Woodworth		1st Log Comd IG	
Lt Col	S. T. Porterfield		Chief, Inspection Division, USARV IG	
Lt Col	R. E. Labrode		USARV	
Dr.	Wilhelm Kotf		West German Ambassador to RVN	1st Inf Div
Mr.	Stearman		JUSPAO Representative	
Lt Gen	Lek Naemali	15 Nov	Director of Operations, Supreme Command, Thai Armed Forces	II FFORCEV
Col	Nark Narmsoongneon, RTA			
Col	Sombhund Ruangvaidya, RTA			
Col	Suraset Ramasompop, RTA			
Col	Luean Pongstabhon, RTA			

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Capt	Pleng Lowchalema, RTW			
Capt	Charn Nutamarn, RTW			
Gp Capt	Prasart Tongyoo, RTAF			
Gp Capt	Chamnan Phatarnyodhin, RTAF			
Maj	Sadabphong Soothivongsa, RTA			
Maj Gen	T. B. Whitehouse, USAF		MACTHAI	
Col	H. G. Lawrence, USMC		MACTHAI	
Col	D. E. Duvall, USA		MACTHAI	
Lt Col	F. Dstroy, USAF		MACTHAI	
Lt Col	R. G. Coffman, USMC		MACTHAI	
Cdr	C. W. Sear, USN		MACTHAI	
Maj Gen	Charles W. Eifler	15 Nov	CG, 1st Log Comd	III CORPS
Brig Gen	Harley L. Moore, Jr.	15 Nov	USARV Provost Marshal	II FFORCEV
Capt	Jon McFarland		Aide-de-Camp	III Corps
Col	James Peale	15 Nov	Director, Psychological Operations, MACV	4th Bn, 23d Inf
Capt	Forest		MACV	
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	16 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	25th Inf Div. 1st Inf Div
VAdm	William E. Gentner	16 Nov	Commander, US Defense Command, Taiwan	1st Inf Div
Brig Gen	Glenn D. Walker	16 Nov	Assistant Division Commander, 4th Inf Div	11th ACR 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	17 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	Loc Ninh SF Camp Song Be SF Camp Duc Phong SF Camp Dom Xoai SF Camp

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Major Gen	William B. Rosson	17 Nov	Chief of Staff, MACV	3d Bde, 4th Inf Div 11th ACR 1st Inf Div III Corps Soui Da SF Camp
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	18 Nov	DEFOCMUS MACV	173d Abn Bde
Col	Luther Jones	18 Nov	CO (Designate) 34th General Support Group	II FFORCEV
Col Lt Col	Edward L. Burchell Garrison G. Boyle		CO, 34th GS Gp CO, 765th TC Bn	12th Avn Gp
Brig Gen	Bernard W. Rogers	19 Nov	Assistant Division Commander (Designate), 1st Inf Div	II FFORCEV
Capt	George Hatch		USARV	3d Bde, 4th Inf Div 173d Abn Bde 25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde PHILCAGV
Col	Harold Yount	19 Nov	Project Manager, Individual Weapons for the Army	II FFORCEV
Lt Col Lt Col	Clifford Rutledge Owen R. Grogan		Weapons Command Rep to USARV Weapons Command Rep to USARV	
Lt Gen Col Col Col Col Mr.	L. D. Heaton W. A. Hamrick, MSC J. A. Weir R. L. Miller Thomas P. Caito Theodore P. Sloan	21 Nov	The Surgeon General, US Army Office of the Surgeon General USARV Surgeon CO, 44th Med Bde	196th Lt Inf Bde
Brig Gen	William G. Moore, Jr.	22 Nov	Commander, 834th Air Division	II FFORCEV

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Cong	Edward P. Poland, (D-Mass)	23 Nov	Member, House Appropriations Committee	II FFORCEV 25th Inf Div
Cong	Silvio O. Conte, (R-Mass)		Staff Member	
Mr.	Aubrey A. Gunnell		Treasury Department	
Mr.	Ernest Betts		CofS, US Coast Guard	
FAdm	Mark A. Whelan		Commander, Western Area Coast Guard	
RAdm	Theodore J. Fabik		Commander, Western Area Staff	
Capt	G. O. Thompson, USCG		14th Coast Guard District Staff	
Capt	H. J. Kelly, USCG			
Capt	Laforte, USCG		Western Area Staff	
Cdr	R. H. Scarborough, USCG		Asst Cong LNO	
Cdr	W. Kesler, Jr.		Aide-de-Camp	
Lt	J. T. McKean			
Gen	William C. Westmoreland	24 Nov	COMUSMACV	II FFORCEV 1st Inf Div
Brig Gen	Morgan G. Roseborough	25 Nov	Assistant Division Commander	II FFORCEV
Mr.	Harrison M. Holland	26 Nov	Deputy Director, Far East Region, OASD/ISA	25th Inf Div III Corps
Col	George B. Overby		Chief, Far East Branch, Policy Planning Staff, OASD/ISA	
1t Col	P. Dierauf, Jr.		MACV	
Maj	D. S. Weidemiller	26-28 Nov	B-52 Crew Members, 367th and 322d Bomber Squadrons	II FFORCEV 25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div
Capt	B. J. Shackelford			
Capt	D. E. Wheeler			
Capt	D. R. Reed			
Capt	E. L. Bauer			
Capt	A. J. Neiper			
1Lt	G. W. Burleson			
1Lt	D. F. Jasper			
1Lt	R. M. Martinez			
1Lt	J. W. Miller			
MSgt	R. D. Iler			
MSgt	K. P. Koval			

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	27 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	11th ACR 173d Abn Bde
Sen Col	Milton R. Young, (R-MD) Donald D. Rattan	28 Nov	Senate Appropriations Committee US Army Representative	1st Inf Div
Lt Gen	John A. Heintges	28 Nov	DEPCOMUSMACV	25th Inf Div Tay Ninh SF Camp
Lt Col	Denys B. Wood	28 Nov	Assistant British Military Attache to RVN	196th Lt Inf Bde
Maj	Anthony Bedford-Russell		Assistant British Military Attache to RVN	
Gen	William C. Westmoreland	29 Nov	CCMUSMACV	II FFORCEV

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BC	Charles W. Ryder, Jr.	1 Dec	CG, 199th Lt Inf Bde	196th Lt Inf Bde 25th Inf Div 173d Abn Bde
Adm	U. S. Grant Sharp	1 Dec	CINCPAC	PHILCAGV II FFORCEV
Rep	W. Pat Jennings, (D-Va)	2 Dec	Member, House Ways and Means Committee	25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	2 Dec	DEPCOMUSMACV	III Corps
COL	Edgar C. Wood	2 Dec	CONARC Liaison Team	II FFORCEV
COL	William O. Quirey	3 Dec	Deputy Director, COC, MACV	Ben Luc Nha Be
Mr.	Phillip C. Hobby	4 Dec	US Embassy Personnel (Vietnam)	25th Inf Div
Mr.	John Emerson			
Mr.	Teare			
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	4 Dec	COMUSMACV	11th ACR 1st Inf Div
Mr.	Hearst			
Mr.	Kaplan			
Mr.	Considine			
LTC	John A. Heintges	5 Dec	DEPCOMUSMACV	Ba Ria
Sen	Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash)	5 Dec	Senate Committee on Armed Services	196th Lt Inf Bde 25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
BG	Richard J. Seitz	6 Dec	Asst Dep CG/CofS, USARV	PHILCAGV
Mr.	John E. Davis	6, 8 Dec	Nat Cmdr, American Legion	1st Inf Div
Sen	J. Strom Thurmond (R-SC)	6, 7 Dec	Senate Committee on Armed Services	II FFORCEV 25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div
BG	C. J. Lang	7 Dec	Director of Logistics, J4, USSTRICOM	25th Inf Div
Dr.	Maurice Rossel	8 Dec	Medical Representative International Committee of Red Cross	PHILCAGV 45th MASH Hosp
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	6 Dec	COMUSMACV	II FFORCEV
Mayor	Victor Hugo Shiro	9 Dec	Mayor of New Orleans, Louisiana	1st Inf Div
Sen	Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC)	9 Dec	Senator	II FFORCEV 25th Inf Div
BG (Ret)	S. L. A. Marshall	10, 18 Dec	Free Lance Writer	1st Inf Div II FFORCEV
BG	J. J. Irvin	10 Dec	Asst Chief of Staff, G1, USARPAC	II FFORCEV III Corps 25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde
COL	Martin J. Bonaparte	11 Dec	Member, USCONARC Liaison Team	II FFORCEV 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
CPT	James O. Mayo (US Navy)	11 Dec	Political and Military Advisor, East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau, Dept of State	II FFORCEV 25th Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	11 Dec	DEPCOMUSMACV	Xom Cat Dong Xoai Chan Thanh Minh Thanh
MG	John H. Hay, Jr.	12 Dec	Department of the Army	II FFORCEV 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde 173d Abn Bde
COL	Larry W. Coker	12-13 Dec	ExO, USARV Surgeon's Office	II FFORCEV 173d Abn Bde 199th Lt Inf Bde 11th ACB 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde 3d Bde, 4th Inf Di.
COL	John E. Harbert	12 Dec	Dep of Army Special Supply Assistance Team	II FFORCEV
LTC	John A. Heintges	14 Dec	DEPCOMUSMACV	Dau Tieng An Loc Loc Ninh

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Cong	Cornelius E. Gallagner (D-NJ)	14 Dec	Congressman (D-NJ)	25th Inf Div
LTC	Floro Crisologo	14 Dec	Philippine Army (Congressman called to active duty)	II FFORCEV
MG	William K. Jones	15-16 Dec	Director, COC, MACV	III Corps II FFORCEV 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde PHILCAGV
COL	Jose Alberto Medrano	15-17 Dec	Cmdr, Presidential Military Staff, El Salvador	II FFORCEV 25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div
MG	William B. Rosson	15 Dec	CofS, MACV	11th ACR
Mr.	Leo Anderson	18 Dec	Nat Commander of American Veterans	1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	18 Dec	DEPCOMUSMACV	III Corps
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	20 Dec	COMUSMACV	II FFORCEV
Amb	Cecil Lyon	21 Dec	US Ambassador to Ceylon	25th Inf Div
COL	A. St. John	21 Dec	J3 Element, MACV COC	III Corps 11th ACR
MG	Robert R. Ploger	21 Dec	CG, 18th Engr Bde	II FFORCEV

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<u>RAK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Mr.	Russell Johnson	22 Dec	American Services Committee	4/9, 25th Inf Div
Dr.	Milly Graham	22 Dec	Minister	II FFORCEV 93d Evac Hosp
COL	William O. Quirey	22 Dec	Dep Director, COC, MACV	II FFORCEV 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
BG	Pham Quoc Thuan	22 Dec	CG, 5th ARVN Div	II FFORCEV 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
IIC	Tran Van Hai	22 Dec	Bien Hoa Province Chief	II FFORCEV 199th Lt Inf Bde
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	23 Dec	COMUSMACV	25th Inf Div
Premier LTC	Nguyen Cao Ky Cao Van Vien	23 Dec	Prime Minister, Republic of Vietnam Chief, Joint General Staff	II FFORCEV 93d Evac Hosp
BG	John R. Chaisson	23 Dec	Director, COC, MACV	Visited 7 ea Special Forces Camps
Cong	George W. Gridier (D-Tenn)	23 Dec	US Representative (D-Tenn)	II FFORCEV 173d Abn Bde 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde 93d Evac Hosp

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
BG	A. R. Brownfield	23 Dec	MACV, DCSOPS for ARVN/RF/PF Affairs	II FFORCEV III Corps
Cardinal	Francis Spellman	24 Dec	Archbishop of New York Military Vicar of US Armed Forces	II FFORCEV 196th Lt Inf Bde
GEN	Harold K. Johnson	24-26 Dec	Chief of Staff, US Army	II FFORCEV III Corps 199th Lt Inf Bde 173d Abn Bde 11th ACP 1st ATF 9th Inf Div 25th Inf Div 3d Bde, 4th Inf D ^r 196th Lt Inf Bde 45th MASH Hosp PHILCAGV 1st Inf Div SF Det "A" 323
Mr.	Bob Hope	25 Dec	Entertainer	25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	26 Dec	DEPCOMUSMACV	II FFORCEV
COL	Mildred I. Clark	26-27 Dec	Chief Army Nurse	25th Inf Div 7th Surg Hosp 12th Evac Hosp 45th Evac Hosp

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MG	K. L. Ware	27-29 Dec	Chief of Information, US Army	II FFORCEV 173d Abn Bde 11th ACR 25th Inf Div 196th Lt Inf Bde PHILCAGV 45th Surg Hosp 199th Lt Inf Bde 9th Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	27 Dec	DEPCOMUSMACV	Go Dau Ha 196th Lt Inf Bde PHILCAGV
Sen	Stuart Symington (D-Mo)	29 Dec	Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Near East Subcommittee	25th Inf Div
Cong	Joseph Y. Resnick (D-NY)	30 Dec	Congressman (D-NY)	II FFORCEV 199th Lt Inf Bde 9th Inf Div 11th ACR 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	31 Dec	COMUSMACV	II FFORCEV 173d Abn Bde 1st Inf Div 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div 25th Inf Div

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<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Place Visited</u>
MSJ	John J. Marsh	1-2 Jan	Congressman (D-Va)(on active duty)	II FFORCEV 25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div
Mr.	Joel Le Theule	2 Jan	Deputy of Governing Party, Vice President of National Assembly, Member of Defense Committee, France	II FFORCEV 93d Evac Hospital 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	3 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	199th Inf Bde (Lt) III Corps
BG LTC	Stuart C. Graham Andrew	4 Jan	Cdr, 1st ATF, HQ, AFV CofS, HQ, AFV	II FFORCEV 11th ACR 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
MG COL COL	Byron L. Steger Charles R. Wolf Edmund R. Kielman	4 Jan	Chief Surgeon, USARPAC MSC Deputy Surgeon, USARV	25th Inf Div 45th Surg Hosp
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	5 Jan	COMUSMACV	II FFORCEV
LTC	Guy K. Troy	7 Jan	PSYOPS Officer, PACOM	II FFORCEV 11th ACR 25th Inf Div
BG	Edward M. Flanagan, Jr.	7-8 Jan	ADC (Designate), 25th Inf Div	MACV USARV
LTC	John A. Heintges	8 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	9th Inf Div 1st Inf Div

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
GEN	Earle G. Wheeler	8 & 10 Jan	Chairman, JCS	II FFORCEV
Mr.	Daniel Z. Henkin		Director of Operations, ASD (PA)	9th Inf Div
COL	J. H. Elder		Executive to CJCS	199th Inf Bde (Lt)
COL	A. S. Edmunds		Executive to CJCS	1st Inf Div
				25th Inf Div
				173d Abn Bde
MG	Tran Phong	9 Jan	J3, JGS	II FFORCEV
COL	William O. Quirey		MACV, COC	1st Inf Div
COL	R. A. Downey		USAF, 7th Air Force	25th Inf Div
				196th Inf Bde (Lt)
				173d Abn Bde
LTC	John A. Heintges	10 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	III Corps
MG	William B. Rosson	10 Jan	CofS, MACV	II FFORCEV
				173d Abn Bde
				1st Inf Div
				196th Inf Bde (Lt)
				III Corps
BG	Edward M. Flanagan, Jr.	11 Jan	ADC, 25th Inf Div	II FFORCEV
LTC	John A. Heintges	11 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
Hon	Harold Brown	11 Jan	Secretary of the Air Force	II FFORCEV
GEN	James Ferguson		Commander, AFSC	
LTG	H. T. Wheless		Asst VCofS, USAF	
MG	G. B. Simler		Deputy Director of Op, USAF	
MG	E. B. Le Bailly		Director of Infc, USAF	
COL	F. Vetter		Mil Asst to Secy of the AF	
LTC	E. C. Cook		Mil Aide to Secy of the AF	
Mr.	J. Stempler		Asst to the SECDEF, Legislative Affairs	

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Mr. BG	S. Kenny F. A. Nichols		NSC, Executive Office of the President CofS, 7th AF	
COL Cdr LTC	William O. Quirey Glenn Ford M. K. Chase	11 Jan	Deputy Director, COC USNRC MACV Information Office	1st Inf Div
MG	Arthur L. West	12 Jan	MACOV	1st Inf Div
LTG BG COL	F. J. Chasarek P. S. Lindberg R. L. Wispel	12 Jan	Comptroller, US Army Chief, Exchange Service, Vietnam Secretary to Comptroller	25th Inf Div
BG	Charles M. Duke	12 Jan	CG, 18th Engr Bde	II FFORCEV
Hon BG COL COL MAJ	Stanley R. Resor Lloyd B. Ramsey C. W. Campf R. H. Groves J. S. Johnson	13-14 Jan	Secretary of the Army Deputy Chief of Information, DA Executive to SA Military Assistant to SA Military Assistant to SA	II FFORCEV 1st ATF 9th Inf Div 1st Inf Div 173d Abn Bde 11th ACR 25th Inf Div 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div 196th Inf Bde (Lt) PHILCAGV
GEN (Ret)	Wang	13 Jan	Army of the Republic of China	II FFORCEV
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	13 Jan	COMUSMACV	25th Inf Div 196th Inf Bde (Lt) 1st Inf Div

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MG LTC	Charles P. Brown S. Wesolowski	14 Jan	Director of Army Budget USARV Comptroller Office	1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div II FFORCEV
BG	Lloyd B. Ramsey	14 Jan	Deputy Chief of Information, US Army	25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div II FFORCEV
LTC	John A. Heintges	14 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	199th Inf Bde (Lt) 9th Inf Div III Corps
Mr.	Robert H. B. Baldwin	14 Jan	Under Secretary of the Navy	1st Inf Div
BG	William A. Knowlton	15 Jan	Director, RD Spt, MACV	9th Inf Div
MG	H. A. Vickery	15 Jan	Citizens Mil Forces, Member Australian Military Board	II FFORCEV
LTC	John A. Heintges	15 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	11th ACR 1st Inf Div
MG	Arthur L. West	16 Jan	Director of MACOV	25th Inf Div
BG	Robert B. Williams	16 Jan	Director of Army Aviation, ACSFOR	II FFORCEV
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	17 Jan	COMUSMACV	II FFORCEV
Mr.	Barry Goldwater	17 Jan	MG, USAF (Reserve)	II FFORCEV

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MG Cheng Pyc Hong	17 Jan	Military Attaché, Korea	II FFORCEV
COL A. P. Swineborne		Military Attaché, Australia	
Op CPT W. M. Coombes		Military Attaché, Australia	
COL Chen Yu-Ken		Military Attaché, Republic of China	
LTC Cheng Kuang Yu		Military Attaché, Republic of China	
LTC Alfred Seigner		Military Attaché, Germany	
MAJ H. J. Weste		Military Attaché, Germany	
COL Richard M. St. G. Kirke		Military Attaché, Great Britain	
Op CPT M. P. Stanton		Military Attaché, Great Britain	
LTC Enzo Cataldo		Military Attaché, Italy	
COL Hiromoto Fujii		Military Attaché, Japan	
LTC Si Yun Chang		Military Attaché, Korea	
COL Sisemonth Sananikone		Military Attaché, Laos	
COL R. H. J. Boreel		Military Attaché, Netherlands	
COL J. V. H. Banzon		Military Attaché, Philippines	
MAJ W. E. Federis		Military Attaché, Philippines	
SOL Suprom Vasantasing		Military Attaché, Thailand	
COL Robert F. Robens		MACV/J2/MATTLO	
LTC Sherman R. Strand		MACV/J2/MATTLO	
Mr. Vincent Huggard	17 Jan	Office of ASofA	II FFORCEV
MG H. A. Milry, Jr.		DCSLOG, DA	25th Inf Div
MG O. E. Harlbut		G4, USARPAC	9th Inf Div
BG H. A. Rasmussen		DCSLOG, DA	1st Inf Div
MG Carroll H. Dunn	18 Jan	J4, MACV	II FFORCEV
COL R. C. Coombs		J4 Office, MACV	199th Inf Bde (Lt)
LTC Bernard McCune		G4 Office, USARV	9th Inf Div
			25th Inf Div
			196th Inf Bde (Lt)
			1st Inf Div
			173d Abn Bde

SUMMARY OF VISITORS - JANUARY 1967
PAGE 6

31 January 1967

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
MG	John A. Wright, Jr.	19 Jan	Project Manager, ARCSA, Study II	II FFORCEV 12th Avn Gp 1st Inf Div
LTG	Nguyen Van Thieu	20 Jan	Chairman, Natl Leadership Council	II FFORCEV
LTG	Cao Van Vien		Chief, JGS, RVNAF	173d Abn Bde
LTG	Le Nguyen Khang		CG, III Corps	1st Inf Div
BG	Pham Quoc Thuan		CG, 5th Inf Div (ARVN)	196th Inf Bde (Lt)
COL	Johnson		Asst DSA, III Corps	
Mrs.	Evelyn Colvert	20 Jan	Dir, SEA Intel, Dept of State	25th Inf Div
GEN	Dwight E. Beach	21 Jan	CINCUSARPAC	II FFORCEV
LTC	Jack L. Leggett		Aide-de-Camp	1st ATF
COL	P. L. Dal Ponte		Deputy G3, USARPAC	9th Inf Div 199th Inf Bde (Lt) 25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	21 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	11th ACR 196th Inf Bde (Lt)
GEN (Ret)	Maxwell D. Taylor	21 & 24 Jan	Consultant to the President	II FFORCEV
Mr.	Patrick Coyne		Executive Secretary	1st Inf Div
LTC	Rolfe Hillman		Executive Officer	25th Inf Div
Mr.	Roy E. Jones		Assistant	9th Inf Div
BG	Joseph A. McChristian	22 Jan	J2, MACV	II FFORCEV
COL	Robert McMahon		Chief, IOD, MACV J2	1st Inf Div
COL	Junichi Buto		Chief, CID, MACV J2	173d Abn Bde 25th Inf Div

SUMMARY OF VISITORS
PAGE 7

31 January 1967


<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
Mr.	Claude L. Callegary	22 Jan	Past Cdr of Disabled American Veterans	II FFORCEV
Mr.	Fumihito Togo	23 Jan	Dir of Japanese Foreign Ministries, North American Bureau	II FFORCEV 9th Inf Div
Mr. COL BG	Seki Fuji George J. Hayes	23 Jan	Director, Professional Svc, Off of Surgeon General	
Dr.	Hendry G. Schwartz			
BG	Salve H. Matheson	23 & 25 Jan	CG (Designate), 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	II FFORCEV 173d Abn Bde 1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div 196th Inf Bde (Lt)
GEN Mr.	William C. Westmoreland Morley Safer	25 Jan	COMUSMACV CBS News	II FFORCEV 173d Abn Bde 25th Inf Div 1st Inf Div 11th ACR
Mr. Dr.	Leonard Sullivan William G. McMillan	25 Jan	Deputy Dir, Def, Rsch, and Engr, DOD Scientific Advisor to COMUSMACV	1st Inf Div 25th Inf Div
COL COL COL LTC	Frank J. Petrilli Thomas W. Anderson John F. Eddy Leo E. Bergerson	25 Jan	IG, USARV Chief, Inspection Div, USARV IG Chief, Complaint Div, USARV IG Flight Safety Inspector, USARV IG	II FFORCEV
Mr.	John C. Wilson	26 Jan	Executive Vice President, American Red Cross	II FFORCEV

SUMMARY OF VISITORS - JANUARY 1967
PAGE 8

31 January 1967

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>PLACE VISITED</u>
COL	P. L. Dal Ponte	26 Jan	Deputy G3, USARPAC	9th Inf Div
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	27 Jan	COMUSMACV	199th Inf Bde (Lt) 9th Inf Div
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	29 Jan	COMUSMACV	9th Inf Div 1st ATF
LTC	John A. Heintges	29 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	9th Inf Div 196th Inf Bde (Lt)
BG BG	Joseph M. Heiser John P. Traylor	30 Jan	Asst Deputy CofS for Logistics, DA	9th Inf Div
COL	Jasper J. Wilson	31 Jan	CofS (Designate) 25th Inf Div	II FFORCEV 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div 196th Inf Bde (Lt)
GEN	William C. Westmoreland	31 Jan	COMUSMACV	9th Inf Div
LTC	John A. Heintges	31 Jan	DEPCOMUSMACV	III Corps


STRAIGHT WALL BUNKER WITH RIGHT END BEGINNING TO PULL APART



5-1

77

NEW TYPE OR SLOPING WALL BUNKER CONSTRUCTION




6-1

CONFIDENTIAL

b4

VC PROVINCIAL
BOUNDARIES
IN THE III CTZ




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
- Int'l Boundary
- Provincial Boundary
- ... Mil Region Boundary
- Possible Future VC New Province

CONFIDENTIAL


18




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
Te. orism & Sabotage



Propaganda & Hamlet entries



Mines & Railroad incidents



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STATISTICAL SUMMARY
TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT
1 November 1966 - 31 January 1967


85

		SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
1. Total air sorties during period:	USAF USN VNAF	11,460 0 3,142	<u>14,602</u>
2. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of ARVN:		3,227	
3. Number sorties flown by VNAF in support of ARVN:		2,545	
4. Total number sorties flown in support of ARVN:			<u>5,772</u>
5. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of US Forces:		8,163	
6. Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of US Forces:		597	
7. Total number sorties flown in support of US Forces:			<u>8,760</u>
8. Number COMBAT PROOF missions flown in support of ARVN:			<u>105</u>
9. Number COMBAT PROOF missions flown in support of US:	1st Inf Div 9th Inf Div 25th Inf Div 173rd Abn Bde 1st ATF 11th ACR 199th Inf Bde Other	169 8 390 17 25 2 3 26	<u>642</u>
10. Results of air strikes:		11. Ordnance expended:	
KIA (BC)	256	Bombs	<u>30,717</u>
KIA (EST)	1,009	Rockets	<u>14,917</u>
Structures destroyed	2,811	CBU	<u>591,406</u>
Structures damaged	1,425	NAPALM	<u>15,669</u>
Secondary explosions	283	20mm	<u>2,001,500</u>

¹⁰⁻¹
CONFIDENTIAL


DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

II FIELD FORCE V



LOGISTICS NEWSLETTER

Vol I No 2 - 1 Dec 66



...". . .NOTHING COULD BE MORE IMPORTANT
THAN THAT THE WORK OF A SOLDIER SHOULD BE WELL DONE."....

- PLATO, THE REPUBLIC

THE II FIELD FORCE LOGISTICS NEWSLETTER IS PUBLISHED BY G4, II
FFORCEV FOR THE INFORMATION OF COMMAND AND SUPPLY PERSONNEL, UNDER
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HQ II FFORCEV AS WELL AS ASSIGNED AND ATTACHED
UNITS. ITS PURPOSE IS TO DISSEMINATE PERTINENT AND TIMELY ITEMS OF
INTEREST COVERING ALL PHASES OF LOGISTICS, TO FORWARD INFORMATION,
AND TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE. THE NEWSLETTER WELCOMES YOUR SUGGESTIONS,
IDEAS, AND COMMENTS.

THIS IS THE SECOND LETTER OF THE SERIES. HOPE YOU FIND IT HELPFUL.

TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

90

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G4 - AVFBD

Building 3, II FFORCEN Compound

	Ofc	Qtrs
G4		
COL Vernon C. Ramberg.....	204	BH259
DEPUTY		
LTC Thomas G. Woods.....	264	BH288
SERGEANT MAJOR		
SGM T. P. Farley.....	204	BH245
PLANS & OPERATIONS DIVISION		
LTC Thomas G. Woods (Chief).....	264	BH288
MAJ W. K. Murray (Asst P&O).....	262	BH249
CPT J. L. Campbell (Trans).....	335	BH245
SFC D. J. Rodgers (Trans).....	262/264	BH245
SUPPLY & SERVICES DIVISION		
LTC Darsey Mason (Chief).....	221/236	BH288
LTC Earl S. Cummings (General Supply).....	221/236	BH249
MAJ J. L. Baker (Maintenance & Mobility).....	221/236	BH249
MAJ J. A. Chernault. (General Supply).....	221/236	BH245
CPT F. R. Butler (General Supply).....	221/236	BH245
CPT S. E. Townsend (Maintenance & Mobility).....	221/236	BH245
MSG R. H. Garrett (Ch Sup Sgt).....	221/236	BH245

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CLASS I


HOLIDAY MEAL TIPS

93

BAKING POINTERS:

1. The pies should be baked in the early morning hours of the holiday.
2. Baking of the rolls should be accomplished as the last chore prior to the serving of the holiday meal.
3. Roasting the Turkey - The turkey should never be parboiled, nor should you begin cooking it the day before the holiday. The magic word when roasting is temperature. If temperature is too high, the meat becomes dry, tough and tasteless.
 - a. Place the turkey breast down on a rack in a shallow bake pan. (For a rack you may use an inverted pie pan.) The turkey will cook evenly in a shallow pan and the use of a rack prevents the bird from sticking to the bottom of the pan.
 - b. Preheat your oven to a temperature of 300 to 325 degrees Fahrenheit. Consult page 91 of TM 10-412-1 for the proper roasting time. This will vary with the weight of the turkey.
 - c. Brush the turkey thoroughly with oil or melted lard. Do not use bacon fat nor any other strongly flavored fat for basting. Do not add water. If the Food Advisor of the unit concerned determines that the turkeys are not sufficient quality to cook the standard method, he will authorize the use of aluminum foil. This procedure of wrapping the turkey in foil is optional and may be used if desired.
 - d. When the turkey is three-fourth done, turn the breast side up. Baste at regular intervals with the fat from the bottom of the pan. Roast the turkey until tender and done to the bone. Do not over cook! When done, the flesh will be slightly shrunken under the skin and drum-stick-thigh joints move easily to the touch. Do not pierce the meat with a fork or knife to test for tenderness and thoroughness of cooking, as each such cut allows the meat juices to escape and will dry the meat. When using a meat thermometer, place it in the center of the inside thigh muscle, the thermometer will register 190 degrees Fahrenheit when the turkey is done.

94
DON'T BUY FOOD FROM UNAUTHORIZED SOURCES



Prior to purchasing and using food from the local economy, consult
USARV Circular 40-1 dated 4 November 1966, entitled "Directory of
Sanitarily Approved Foods Established for US Procurement".

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THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF SAUCE AND GRAVY COOKING
(Other Than Desert Sauces)




1. ALWAYS FOLLOW THE APPROPRIATE RECIPE.
2. ALWAYS USE A DEFINITE RATIO OF FAT AND FLOUR.
3. MAKE A WELL COOKED ROUX.
4. WHEN AVAILABLE USE DRIPPINGS FROM MEAT IN PLACE OF FAT.
5. USE PROPER TEMPERATURE AND UTENSILS.
6. AVOID OVER SEASONING, AND USING OTHER SEASONINGS (I.E., STEAK SAUCES, HOT SAUCES, ETC)
7. ALWAYS SERVE SAUCES PIPING HOT.
8. NEVER SERVE TOO THICK OR HEAVY.
9. AVOID EARLY PREPARATION.
10. ALWAYS SERVE SAUCES WITH CARE.

CLASS II & IV

THOSE TASTY MCI'S

99

WICKED WILLY



Perhaps you have read our Newsletter Number 1 which describes the many disasters which "Wicked Willy" can cause to an individual. Wicked Willy could be in your prescribed load if you have MCI's on-hand with a date of pack 1962 thru 1964. If you have MCI's with these dates of pack you should consume them where operational requirements permits, or rotate the 1962 thru 1964 MCI's through your subsistence supply activity for MCI's with dates of pack 1965 and 1966.

UPDATE YOUR PRESCRIBED LOAD

CLASS II & IV

MAY I HELP YOU SIR?

98

YES! WHAT IN THE *?X- IS WRONG WITH THE SUPPLY SYSTEM? Have you ever heard that question before? What was your answer? Your answer was based upon the relative rank of the interrogator. Of course it wasn't meant to be a question, it was a form of lamenting. Well, what is wrong with our supply system?

Since it would take several quires of paper, to put all the faults in print, a Harvard graduate journalist to properly explain it, and a speed reader to wade through it during a Vietnam tour, let's attempt to analyze only one fault in this bi-monthly Newsletter, the one that is beginning to loom over the horizon breathing fire from both nostrils, "Equipment in Excess of Authorized Allowances," USARV Form 47.

The general theme seems to be "If I had just one doohickey I could do my job BETTER." No attempt will be made here to deny that fact because it is true. By the same rationale, "If my salary were a million dollars a year, I could live BETTER." But it ain't, so I draw my welfare check, spend it wisely, and my standard of performance is just as good as the millionair's.

Okay, here is what is wrong. The supply system cannot fill your requisitions for a water trailer, a radio, an M48 Tank or JUST a simple switchboard SB-86. Let's digress a bit now to make sure this fault is well covered.

Back a few years ago, several high ranking, well educated and experienced officers sat down and drew up a TOE, listing in section III, equipment required for that type unit to accomplish its missions. This TOE was further staffed through experienced hands, boarded by a very critical panel of experts and then forwarded to DA where it really got the business before going out to the field.

Based on this document, equipment was procured in the authorized quantities to do the job and based on equipment authorized, another board sat down and figured out the proportionate percentage of equipment required as back up stocks. This fact was passed on to appropriate authorities who saw that funds were appropriated to procure the back-up equipment, that it was procured and put in the supply system to be available when you need it. Now it doesn't take an Einstein to see that a lot of planning be a lot of experienced people under ideal conditions (without pressure) has gone into preparing the supply system to support you. And the supplies WERE there.

Having digressed, now let's come back to the problem. You bring your TOE to Vietnam, you get engaged in a battle, you are doing exceptionally well but if you just had one more doohickey you could do better. Well everyone wants to do better, so you call for an extra one. Houdini (the supply officer) doesn't have another one. In great anger and excitement you demand he get it. His only course of action is the good old stand-by: "SARV Form 47.

CLASS II & IV

MAY I HELP YOU SIR?

98

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
He rushes a hastily-prepared Form 47 through channels, except the "3" channels that is, and logisticians, being the gentle breed we are, bend over backwards to give the commander what he wants. So we dip into our float and give out the last doohickey. Knowing in advance that we cannot demand a replacement on this basis, we give it up anyway because it might save faith at least until we rotate. Unfortunately though, we can't take the problem with us. Any way, it makes the commander happy and he slaps us on the back and says what a great bunch of guys we are.

The next day the commander gets one of his doohickeys shot from under him while he is still unholstering. So he simply wants a replacement. Nothing extraordinary, just a replacement please. "No sweat Sir," says the supply officer, a Priority 02 is on the way. But would you believe it?, there are no more. The commander has no recourse except the old familiar "WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE SUPPLY SYSTEM?" Now don't kid yourself and think he has enough time to let you tell him. It is up to us to help the commander decide before hand, "HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH."

AVOID RUPTURE OF THE BLADDER

USE IT AS IT WAS DESIGNED TO BE USED

100



The Department of Army has granted all combat and combat support units authority to drop formal accountability of the 500 gal drum, fabric, liquid, fuel FSN 8110-753-4892 and 8110-824-1444. Expiration date of this authority is predicted upon the following conditions:

- a. Does not constitute requisitioning authority for drums in excess of TOE authorization.
- b. Quantity of drums maintained on hand will not exceed TOE authorization.

Exercise care in handling and use of the drums you have.

Ref: USARV Msg AVHOD-SP 32065 "DA Deviation Authority No. 538-65 (NLL)" Dtg 261441Z Oct 68

DID YOU KNOW?


That a repair part item obtained from cannibalization or from scrounging sources must be recorded on the DA Form 2527, Record of Demands, and computed in usage data same as if it came through regular supply channels? Ref para 6-4, AR 735-35.

102

CLASS III & IIIA

103

MARK SOCONY



A limited amount of this product was shipped with the improper container markings. The product was shipped with the container marked as indicated above.

The proper marking should have been SOCONY MOBILE 49491 OHT.

Product received and marked as indicated in the above diagram is suitable for use against lube orders specifying symbol OHT.

104

CLASS

105
CLASS V

HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

SHOOT! FIRE! SHOOT! #x-there MIGHT be some VC out there! FIRE! What an expensive way to make tooth picks. Well, there just might be some truth to that fable. Can we afford it though? As a nation rich in its resources, sound in its economy, and united in its efforts, yes we can afford it. But is it necessary? History and statistics will tell.

Ammunition and management are among our most important assets in this war and like every thing else they both have their limitations. The limitations on our ammunition availability, we can't do much about because they are based on our national production output which we exercise no control over.

Management of what is available to us is well within our means as well as scope and responsibility. As logisticians, our commander depends heavily upon us to keep him duly informed of supply situations that have an adverse effect on his operation. He ain't interested in all those little gems you have plenty of, they only add up to one phrase " I can support the operation." Now based on this bit of guidance, you ought to stop reading this right here, grab our message on ASR, and run and tell him that we have a few problems on ammunition.

Now that you have done first things first and are back with me, let's delve a little further into this management business. ASRs are established only on ammunition that is in short supply and are made by factoring available ammunition against weapons density, against number of days involved. This adds up to exactly how much you may expend each day from each tube before the well runs dry. This leaves the managers a lot of choices, some of which follows: fire maximum ASR through all tubes daily, fire double the ASR through half the total tubes daily, fire half the ASR through all tubes daily and save some for emergencies or he may simply shoot is all up in one day and divert his efforts to preventative maintenance the rest of the month. But the logical thing to do is, take what is available and plan operations accordingly. As the logisticians, we only need let the commander know what the limitations are and available alternatives, and I'll bet my jump boots that we don't have a single commander aboard who doesn't have the know-how to apply the management guidance where it does the most good. CEASE FIRE! Recon that area, Call for artillery if necessary!

MAINTENANCE

MAINTENANCE HIGHLIGHT

The hottest potato on the logisticians' laps about now-a-day is "Preventative Maintenance." In fact, judging from the number of commander-to-commander letters that were passed at the very top of the crust recently, one would be led to believe this hot potato might fall in the commanders' laps. Well there is one sure way of cooling this thing off and that is: GET WITH THE PROGRAM. You know something, this word "MAINTENANCE" affects many people in many differnt ways. Some it fascinates, some it amazes, and some it just plain scares hell out of. How about a little analysis of these different catagories of people. The group it fascinates are tinkerers. They are extremely interested and have very little or no responsibility. They can tinker around all day and create more problems than can be rectified in a month of Sundays. How about the group that is amazed? Well, these people don't really mean to harm you, but they have a little responsibility, a lot of interest, are long on imagination and terribly short on experience. Now this group doesn't gum up your equipment but it plays havoc with your plans and precious time. For that third group. It is composed of those with the ultimate responsibility and adequate resources but haven't the faintest idea of how to exercise either. PROBLEMS?--Yes. Problem one is to get rid of the first group. Problem two is to avoid the second group. Problem three is how to get to the third group. Once you figure this out, be sure to have a good sound maintenance plan to present. When the plan is approved, be sure to make it work. After your plan is truly working your maintenance problems are practically solved.

MAINTENANCE

AUTOMOTIVE

108

1. Direct Support Units are replacing numerous clutches that can be attributed to poor driving habits. Examples are "riding the clutch" and slipping clutch. Drivers should be instructed to fully engage and disengage the clutch when shifting gears.

2. Batteries which have been charged should not be placed on concrete floors. The batteries should be placed on wooden pallets to prevent charge loss.

3. Oil Filter Problems on 5 ton Multifuel Vehicles:

Information on oil filter replacement appears in notes of the lube chart on page 71 of TM 9-2320-211-10. This note states in part "Every 6,000 miles or 6 months," which ever occurs first. Lubrication problems encountered in RVN indicate oil should be changed in accordance with requirements stated in TM 9-2320-211-10 for operation under unusual conditions.

4. Fuel filter replacement by time or miles on the LSD 465-1 multi-fuel equipped trucks is not feasible due to variation in climatic and atmospheric conditions. Service procedures for the fuel filters are contained in para 839-8110 of change 1 to TM 9-2320-211-20. The majority of fuel filter problems are attributed to water contamination which stimulates fungus growth, particularly in hot, humid climates. Therefore it is essential that fuel filters be drained daily.

5. Tactical vehicles are experiencing cracked frames. These frames can be repaired as outlined in TB 9-2300-247-40 with change 2. Precautions should be taken to assure that heat is not applied to heat treated frames or outer reinforcement plates such as those used on 5 ton trucks. Also that when bolts are used for repairs, new SAE bolts and lock nuts must be used. Under no circumstances will used bolts be utilized. Grade 5 SAE bolts are preferred because of their great strength. If these are not available, grade 3 bolts with Class 2 bit will be acceptable.

COMBAT VEHICLES & WEAPONS

1. USATAC has advised that the problem of wheel hub, FSN 2550-715-3862, leaking under tropical conditions has been investigated with the conclusion that OE-10 Oil is satisfactory under prolonged jungle and field operations. Also, Seal, FSN 5350-679-9879, is adequate for its intended use.

a. The use of GAA Grease is impractical because the unit was not designed for grease lubrication. Early failure due to lack of lubrication would develop.

b. To prevent future failures of this nature, recommend 22-26 ft lbs of torque be maintained on wheel hub mounting studs. This will counteract the increased tendency for oil to seep out of the housing.

2. Due to subject failures, an engineering design was made whereby rosan inserts, FSN 5340-679-9819, cap screw, FSN 5305-297-0716 and idler arms spindle, FSN 2530-679-8018, were replaced with the following parts:

a. A larger rosan insert with stronger external threads, FSN 5340-679-9820.

b. A larger capscrew, FSN 5305-655-6765.

c. A new improved idler arm spindle, FSN 2530-587-5244.

In order to install the new parts the hull holes must be reborod and retapped to $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 12Ns. threads, in accordance with para 130, page 124 of TM 9-2300-224-34/3 (Direct and General Support Maintenance Manual) dated 16 June 1965.

It's permissible to remove severly damaged portions of armor plate and replace it with new aluminum having the same ballistic strength as the original section. The new piece must be cut and shaped to fit and be properly welded in place. Welds must be sound, have good appearance and dressed smooth with the adjacent areas. However, if the plate is not severly damaged the procedure for repair outlined in para 1a through c above is preferred.

A field fix has been developed to aid in prevention of mine damage. Also tests are now being conducted to possibly develop a DAMMO to modify all M113 in Vietnam, to aid in prevention of extensive mine damage. You will be advised upon completion of these tests as to action taken.

3. The USAWECOM has advised that the problem of rusting and sticking of trigger spring of the M-79 Grenade Launcher has been evaluated.

To strengthen the trigger spring and add greater clearance between the trigger and the sear will not eliminate the rusting factor. Compliance with good cleaning and lubrication practices will preclude corrosive action on metal parts in hot, humid environment.

The procedure for lubricating as provided in TM 9-1010-205-12 is believed adequate for all conditions if properly adhered to.

4. Units armed with the XM-16E1, rifle are issuing the new weapons without first cleaning or removing the excess oil prior to initial firing. As a result rapid accumulation of carbon build-up in the chamber causes the weapon to malfunction.

It is imperative that each unit armed with the XM16E1 rifle conduct an inspection to insure that subject weapons are properly cleaned and excess oil is removed prior to firing. /b

5. Due to conflicting information as to the interchangeability of Hydraulic fluids, the Army Petroleum Center has furnished the following information from DA Technical Bulletin, TB Ord 586, entitled Petroleum Base Hydraulic Fluids: "All mechanism should contain the prescribed fluid at all times. Mixing hydraulic fluids is prohibited, except in armament as noted in (1) and (2) below:

(1) Mil-O-56-6 (ONA) and Mil-O-6063A (OMC) (Note: Now designated as Mil-M-5606 and Mil-M-6083) can be mixed in recoil mechanisms and it will not be necessary to record the mixture.

(2) In an emergency, when the prescribed hydraulic fluid is not available and it is necessary that weapons remain operative, any petroleum base hydraulic fluid listed herein with the exception of Mil-M-13913 (ON), can be utilized."

RADIO MAINTENANCE

1. Deadline reports and maintenance inspections indicate a need for additional supervision in the performance of maintenance on radios.

2. In most cases deadlined equipment can be traced back to the operator. This is especially noticeable by the lack of records being kept to assure preventive maintenance is accomplished.

3. In order to reduce the possibility of premature failure of equipment, commanders should insure that the following procedures are placed in effect:

a. Supervisors and individual operators are aware of their responsibilities.

b. That radios are properly implaced and fuzed.

c. Radios are protected from the elements. Improper handling, dirt and moisture are the main causes of equipment failures.

d. Qualified operators are assigned to the equipment and daily preventive maintenance services performed. Deficiencies that are not correctable by the operator will be brought to the attention of appropriate maintenance personnel without delay.

e. Preventive maintenance schedules will be in accordance with TM's pertaining to the equipment and TM 38-750.

f. Responsible officers and NCOs frequently check their equipment to assure preventive maintenance is performed and the log book is up to date.

4. It of the utmost importance that proper maintenance of equipment be stressed at all levels of command. The weapon that won't shoot and the radio that won't allow you to communicate may cause needless loss of life.

AIRCRAFT

1. UH-1 Tail Rotor Hub Assembly

Hey TI's! Are you up to date? Reference Message AVGS-MM GS-7-109 says we shall disassemble and inspect UH-1 Tail Rotor Hubs every 100 hours. If you do this on PEs, well and good, but is the Tail Rotor Hub inspection due or overdue? Message AVGS-MM-GS-7-109 says every 100 hours not every PE. If you have been "Robbing Peter to Pay Paul" this time could and does differ. Also as this is an inspection requirement it should be based on your-18. Then you know exactly when that Tail Rotor inspection is due. It is a little more paperwork, but it is a lot safer for those who fly in Your birds.

2. AVCOM has provided a fix consisting of a larger retaining nut and using roll pins instead of cotter pins to safety the nut. In addition, two new Tail Rotor Hubs are being manufactured in quantity which will incorporate this modification and others. They will be identified as -19 and -21 hubs. Present plans are to have this kit in RVN by end of December. Once this model has been installed, the inspections will no longer be required. But, until said model is installed you will continue to inspect Tail Rotor Hubs every 100 hours, not necessarily every PE.

3. Fuel test for Water Contamination (Mogas, AVGAS & JP) "Hydrokit" Water Detection Kit for Aviation Fuel. Test for water in the fuel by taking a sample at the sump drains of the tank or from the nozzle at storage points in the field. Use a sample jar and water detection kit, FSN 6640-892-2264 (Reference TM 10-1101) directions on the kit are easy to read and takes 10 seconds. Kits can be easily obtained through supply channels or the local Air Force Fuel Testing laboratories at Bien Hoa. Recommend that one be kept on each aircraft (they are small) and one at each fueling dispensing site.

4. Introduction of T53-L-13 engines in Vietnam.

The following message is quoted for your information:

UNCLAS AVCG-S2 OR-10-128

Subject: Introduction of T53-L13 Engines in RVN

Reference: CG USARV Msg to AVHGD-MD 13421, Subject as above.

Quote 1: The first spare T53-L13 engines are scheduled for issue in December 1966. These engines have been scheduled to specifically support the UH-1 Cobra. Accordingly it is directed that requisitioning in support aircraft currently utilizing earlier versions of the T53 engine continue to call for the same type engine as removed. //2

Quote 2: Conversion of the current UH-1 aircraft from the T53-L11 to the T53-L13 is expected to begin in RVN during the first quarter FY-68. Initially, the conversion will be limited to thirty aircraft per month. More requisitions for conversion of current UH-1 aircraft will be submitted or filled prior to FY 68, and receipt of further instructions from this headquarters.

Quote 3: Commanders will take necessary action to insure that above information is disseminated so as to preclude attempts for the premature conversion of UH-1 aircraft to the T53-L13 configuration. Unquote.

5. Tail Boom Ballast on UH-1B (Standard and 540 Rotor System.)

Reference: CG, USARV Msg Unclassified AMSAV-EAA 1071515.

Quote: Uses of tail ballast up to 50 pounds at station 425 is authorized to maintain center of gravity of subject aircraft within center of gravity limits during flight. Unquote.

6. Helicopter, Armament Subsystem XM-3 2.75 Inch Rocket.

a. Some Module Assemblies, XM-3 Armament Subsystem, FSN 1055-973-4825 have been shipped to using units with tube retaining screw secured to the module instead of safety wire. This has permitted the screw to back out, causing the tubes to vibrate in the modules.

b. It is requested that screw cap, FSN 5305-995-4859, be installed with safety wire wherever the above condition exists in accordance with Military Standards 33540 procedures.

c. All modules in depot stocks are being inspected and the above change will be as required and all future production of modules will include the proper screw and lock wire.

d. Any additional information required will be furnished by this Command.

7. TM 55-1520-210-10P, dated 14 Feb 66, Repair and Special Tools List (UH-1B and UH-1D)

a. Figure 391, "Battery Installation" of reference manuals is in error. Screw P/N AN 537-1032M1, index number 36, should be installed in reverse of that illustrated. The screw head will be on the underside of the panel when correctly installed.

b. This correction will be reflected in the next revision to referenced manual.

PRESCRIBED LOAD LIST (PLL)

1. Maintenance of the Prescribed Load

a. List (PLL) in some units is unsatisfactory. This results from:

- (1) Untrained personnel
- (2) Insufficient command supervision of PLL at unit level.
- (3) Lack of publications
- (4) Failure to follow procedures outlined in AR 735-35

b. Units desiring assistance or training should submit a request to Headquarters USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-MR.

2. USARV Msg AVHGD-SP 28101, dated 2 October 1966, subject: Unit Prescribed Load List, states in part:

"(a) The authorized prescribed load for all units assigned or attached to USARV will be 15 days. Exceptions will be processed to Headquarters USARV under provisions of para 6-9, AR 735-35.

"(b) Repair parts on hand in excess of 15 day level will be reduced through attrition or turn-in to appropriate supply source. Demand data will be maintained when reducing PLL to the authorized level.

"(c) Requisitions placed on supply source to maintain a 30 day level will be cancelled or reduced to a 15 day level in accordance with MILSTRIP format.

"(d) PLL management will continue to be a subject of special interest by Army Inspector General and Readiness Assistance Teams from USARV.

"(e) The foregoing supercedes para 12b, USARV Regulation 750-3, dated 20 July 1966."

PROPERTY DISPOSAL

1. Units have been turning in unserviceable repairable items directly to the property disposal activities rather than to the collection and classification point as outlined in USARV Reg 750-6.

2. This practice results in the loss of items which could be returned to use through depot overhaul, and places an additional burden on the supply system.

3. A program has been developed which provides for rebuild of unserviceable items and assemblies. This program is completely dependent on the

systematic evacuation of unserviceables to the collection and classification points. 14

4. Authorization for cannibalization is outlined in USARV Reg 750-50: This authority is primarily vested in the collection and classification points established by 1st Log Comd and 34th Gp. Success of this effort is also dependent upon evacuation of unserviceables to the collection and classification point.

NEW AIRFORCE AIRLIFT SYSTEM

An Interim Emergency Airlift Request System was tested in the III CTZ from 1 to 25 November 1966. It employs the use of SSB radios and USAF Assault Airlift Coordinating Officers (AACO) down to Brigade level. The system proved to be highly responsive and successful for the processing of immediate type airlift requests (TacE, E/R, & C/E). This system gave greater flexibility to the airlift picture and allowed for diversion of aircraft for high priority missions. Over 125 requests were processed during the test period in II FFORCEV units alone.

ARRIVAL OF 15TH SUPPORT BRIGADE (TOE 29-55T)

The 15th Support Brigade (a COSTAR organization) which recently arrived in Vietnam is expected to be fully integrated into the existing logistical organization in III CTZ by the end of December. Although present "customers" of the 1st Logistical Command will continue to deal daily with the present supply agencies, and not come into direct contact with the new 15th Brigade, it is anticipated that the new organization, whose support mission is closely aligned with the support of a multi-division force, will appreciable enhance the overall responsiveness of logistical planning and support for II FFORCEV units.

II FFORCEV LOGISTICS CONFERENCE

Participation by unit representatives at the II FFORCEV sponsored logistics conference held 20 November was outstanding and contributed to the value and success of the meeting. A summary of the conference discussion topics was distributed to all units on 11 December and commanders and staff members are enjoined to be on the lookout for it. Your comments and inquiries on the conference write-up are invited.



WOULD YOU BELIEVE?

A. That any vehicle battery that is installed properly, wiped free of dust daily, filled to the proper level weekly, terminal clamps removed and acid deposit scraped from both the clamps and posts then securely reconnected bi-weekly, removed from its carrying case and thoroughly cleaned monthly, not required to provide radio power instead of the engine generator anytime, not discharged more than 30 continuous seconds while starting vehicle would give you at least 24 months trouble free, high efficiency service. Well if you don't believe it, try it and watch your critical vehicle battery shortage problem disappear. "EXPERIENCE TALKING," Better Listen.

B. That loose body bolts on a vehicle can cause more radio static interference on a vehicular mounted radio than a certified ASA jammer. They'll give your radio mechanic fits because every time he removes and tests it, she checks out "GO." Para 183, TM 9-8070.

SORRY 'BOUT THAT!!

But an unreconciled 3 month old requisition
is just about as valid as a common law marriage
in Massachusetts




117

111 (HAPPY
Chuot trung)

From 94,
IIFORCEV

Happy New Year





BY: 517 TH ENGR DET (TER)

CONFIDENTIAL12/
Units Attached/Assigned or under OPCON of II FFORCEV 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
HQ & HQ CO II FFORCEV (Assigned)	10 Jan 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
HQ & HQ Btry II FFORCEV Arty (Assigned)	17 Jan 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
1st Inf Div (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	DI AN	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
25th Inf Div (-) (OPCON)	22 Mar 66	CU CHI	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
173d Abn Bde (Sep) (OPCON)	22 Mar 66	BIEN HOA	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
12th Avn Gp (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
29th Chem Det (Attached)	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
23d Arty Gp (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	PHU LOI	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
7th Mil Hist Det (Attached)	1 Jun 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
16th PI Det (Attached)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
303d RR Bn (Attached)	8 Jun 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
16th Sig Det (Attached)	16 May 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
53d Sig Bn (OPCON)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
61st Med Det (Attached)	25 Jun 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67
219th MI Det (Attached)	20 May 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALUnits Attached/Assigned or under OPCON of II FFORCEV 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	
517th Engr Det (Attached)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	122
1st ATF (OPCON)	Jun 66	NUI DAT	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
196th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt) (OPCON)	8 Aug 66	TAY NINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
HQ & HQ Btry 8th TAB, 25th Arty (Assigned)	13 Aug 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
9th Trans Co (Car) (Assigned)	23 Aug 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
2d Bn, 34th Armor (Attached)	12 Sep 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
552d MP Co (Assigned)	23 Sep 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
11th ACR (OPCON)	26 Sep 66	XUAN LOC	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
44th APU (Assigned)	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
Det 32, 5th Weather Sqdn (Attached)	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
54th Arty Gp (OPCON)	1 Oct 66	XUAN LOC	1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
3d Bde, 4th Inf Div (OPCON)	16 Oct 66	DAU TIENG	16 Oct 66 - 31 Jan 67	
5th Bn, 2d Arty & D Btry, 71st Arty (Attached)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH	27 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67	
246th PSYOP Co (OPCON)	6 Dec 66	BIEN HOA	6 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67	

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1/23

Units Attached/Assigned or under OPCON of II FFORCEV 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>GAIN</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
2d CA Co (Assigned)	7 Dec 66	LONG BINH	7 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67
199th Inf Bde (Sep) (Lt) (OPCON)	10 Dec 66	LONG BINH	10 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67
9th Inf Div (OPCON)	14 Dec 66	BEAR CAT	12 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67

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