

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD392230

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is  
unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies  
and their contractors;  
Administrative/Operational Use; 10 MAY 1968.  
Other requests shall be referred to Assistant  
Chief of Staff Force Development, Army,  
Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

31 Dec 1973, Group-4, per document marking,  
DoDD 58200.10; AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

# GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

## THIS DOCUMENT IS:

CLASSIFIED BY

Subject to General Declassification Schedule of  
Executive Order 11652-Automatically Downgraded at  
2 Years Intervals. DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 73.

BY

Defense Documentation Center

Defense Supply Agency

Cameron Station

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

# **SECURITY**

---

# **MARKING**


**The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.**  
**Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.**

---

**THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.**

**NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.**

# DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST  
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY  
FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED  
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF  
PAGES WHICH DO NOT  
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (7 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682336

23 August 1968

**AD392230**

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)**

**SEE DISTRIBUTION**

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM**  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command

US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants

US Army War College

US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Adjutant General School

US Army Air Defense School

US Army Armor School

US Army Artillery and Missile School

US Army Aviation School

SEP 6 1968

Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

3

AVIC-WE 10 May 1968  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

	Page
Section I - Operations	
Introduction	1
Organization	2
Intelligence	2
Combat Operations and Training	10
Combat Support	16
Combat Service Support	20
Personnel and Administration	23
Psychological Operations	27
Civic Action	27
Information	30
Base Camp Development	31
Section II - Lessons Learned	
Operations	33
Intelligence	34
Logistics	35
Organization	36
Communications	37
Medical	38
Base Camp Development	38

# CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

5  
AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

INDEX OF INCLOSURES

1. Organizational Structure
- \* 2. ~~Roster of Commanders and Key Staff Officers~~
3. OPCON Status of Units
4. Army Aviation Statistical Summary
5. Air Force Statistical Summary
- \* 6. ~~Post Exchange Statistical Summary~~
- \* 7. ~~Standards of Evaluation of RF/PP Outposts~~
8. Sketch, Order of Battle
9. Sketch, Operations
- \* 10. ~~Map, 1:250,000, Area of Operations~~
- \* Withdrawn, Hq, DA

**CONFIDENTIAL**

7

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96257

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RUS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION I - OPERATIONS

Significant Activities

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 February through 30 April 1968. During this period the Blackhorse Regiment conducted operations within its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI), and in the provinces of Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Long. (See Map, Incl 10.)

The regiment conducted operations throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone while under the operational control of Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam. Operations were characterized by a continuous parcelling out of squadrons and troops at various times to the 1st, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, 101st Airborne Division, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 18th and 25th ARVN Infantry Divisions. During the quarter the Regimental Headquarters was successively located at Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Blackhorse Base Camp, Phuoc Vinh, and again at Bien Hoa as the quarter closed.

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted three regimental size operations: ADAIRSVILLE (1 Feb - 23 Mar), ALCORN COVE (21 Mar - 7 Apr), and TOAN THANG (8 - 30 Apr). Operation ADAIRSVILLE was a reconnaissance in force and security operation directed to counter the ambitious TET offensive in the Saigon/Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. Operation ALCORN COVE was a continuation of the security operations in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area and the area around the Blackhorse Base Camp as well as a reconnaissance in force operation in coordination and cooperation with the 18th and 25th ARVN Infantry Divisions in Hau Nghia Province. Operation TOAN THANG was initially an extension of all missions of ALCORN COVE followed by a reconnaissance in force operation in Phuoc Long Province and War Zone D and finally a security operation in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. Units of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were continuously engaged with enemy forces throughout this quarter.

FOR OT RD  
682336

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Continued emphasis was placed on support of the Revolutionary Development program and on strengthening RF/PF outposts in the Regimental TAOI.

On 12 Mar the Regimental Commander, Colonel Jack MacFarlane was wounded in battle while directing a 3rd Squadron action against a reinforced enemy battalion 15 miles west of Saigon. The Executive Officer, LTC John F. McArdle, assumed command and was replaced by Colonel Leonard D. Holder on 15 Mar. Colonel Holder was killed in an accidental helicopter crash near Long Binh on 21 Mar. Again, LTC McArdle assumed command of the regiment and was replaced on 22 Mar by Colonel Charles R. Gorder, who was in command when the period closed.

On 21 Apr Colonel Gorder briefed General Harold K. Johnson, the Chief of Staff, on the regiment's operations.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION: The basic structure of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment remained the same throughout the reporting period. However, there were five changes in the assignment of supporting units since the last reporting period. The 46th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) was reassigned 15 Feb to the 25th Infantry Division. The 11th AA Platoon, 2nd Civil Affairs Company, was reassigned on 1 Mar to MACV. The 33rd Chemical Detachment was reassigned on 17 Mar to Provisional Corps, Vietnam. The 398th Transportation Detachment and the 9th Signal Detachment were attached to the Air Cavalry Troop on 8 Apr. (See Organizational Structure, Incl 1.) There were numerous personnel changes of commanders and key staff officers. (See Roster of Commanders and Key Staff Officers, Incl 2.)

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

a. General: During the reporting period, the regiment was employed over a large part of the III Vietnamese Corps Tactical Zone. Operations were conducted in the following Viet Cong areas:

- (1) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-1
- (2) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-2
- (3) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-4
- (4) Viet Cong Sub-Region E-5
- (5) Viet Cong Ba Bien Province

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

9

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(6) Viet Cong U-1 Province

(7) War Zone "D"

b. Order of Battle: (See Sketch—Order of Battle, Incl 8.)

(1) The enemy's ambitious 1968 TET offensive caused the regiment to move to the vital Long-Bien-Bien Hoa area at the beginning of the quarter. To counter the enemy aggression, the squadrons fanned out into the VC Sub-Region E-1, VC Sub-Region E-2, VC U-1 Province, and VC Ba Bien Province. Initial contacts were made in VC U-1 Province on 1 Feb when L Troop, 3rd Squadron, flushed an unknown size, unidentified enemy force on the outskirts of Bien Hoa City. E Troop and F Troop, 2nd Squadron, contacted enemy units north and northwest of Bien Hoa Air Base on 3 Feb. A prisoner of war stated that the opposing force was the 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment.

(2) By mid-February, elements of the 11th ACR had expanded the counteroffensive to VC Sub-Region E-2 and VC Sub-Region E-4. Enemy intentions to initiate an expected second-wave attack were characterized by two major requirements: maintaining lines of communication for mandatory resupply and maintaining advantageous positions near the population centers. The 2nd Squadron, operating east of the Long Binh Post on National Highway 1, was astride a known enemy line of communication near the Hung Nghia Village. This route links enemy activity between War Zone D and the Hat Dich Secret Zone. The 3rd Squadron, operating with elements of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division west of Saigon near Duc Hoa Village, encountered various enemy units which displayed surprising aggressiveness by initiating several contacts against superior forces. Enemy units identified in these actions were elements of the 272nd VC Regiment, the 267th Main Force Battalion, and the 269th Main Force Battalion. The enemy also displayed a surprising anti-aircraft capability. This support probably came from units of the 69th VC Artillery Command and from a newly identified 12th AA Battalion, which a prisoner of war indicated was working with the 267th MF Battalion and the 269th MF Battalion. Enemy actions were initiated from well-fortified positions.

(3) At the close of the reporting period, the regiment moved to VC Military Region 10 to interdict a newly constructed enemy logistical route running south from Cambodia just east of Song Be. Important logistical losses were imposed on the enemy. Most notable was the capture and destruction of 155 pack bicycles, probably from the Transportation Battalion, 86th Rear Service Group, which operates in the area. The regiment then turned south and attacked through the length of War Zone D. Various

3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

base camps were overrun, but elements of the 5th VC Division situated in the area elected not to contest the raid into their established enclave.

(4) Although most contacts occurred with unidentified enemy forces, throughout the quarter, these enemy units were identified in contact:

- (a) 1st Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division
- (b) 2nd Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment, 9th VC Division
- (c) 1st Battalion, 274th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division
- (d) 2nd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division
- (e) 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment, 5th VC Division
- (f) 267th MF Battalion
- (g) 269th MF Battalion

c. Major Engagements: There were 18 major engagements involving elements of the regiment. (See OPCON Status of Regimental Units, Incl 3)

(1) 011334H Feb 68, YT010120: L/3/11th ACR and B/2/506th Inf received sniper fire from an unidentified VC force. Fire was returned and an unknown number of VC responded with small arms, artillery, and RPG fire. A light fire team supported US troops. Contact was broken at 011615H. Results: 8 US WIA; 36 VC KIA (BC).

(2) 031220H Feb 68, YT003178 - YT003185: E/2/11th ACR was notified by the VN National Police that an estimated 100 VC located at the above coordinates desired to surrender. The enemy resisted with heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. E/2/11th ACR returned fire, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Results: no friendly casualties; 47 VC KIA (BC).

(3) 180335H Feb 68, XT720960: L/3/11th ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from elements of the 272nd VC Regiment. Fire was returned, and artillery and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 180902H. Results: 3 US WIA; 24 VC KIA (BC), and 1 VC POW.

4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(4) 231800H Feb 68, XT720000: L/3/11th ACR received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 231945H. Results: 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA; 37 VC KIA (BC).

(5) 291615H Feb 68, XT926172: F/2/11th ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from elements of the 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment. Fire was returned, and artillery supported. Results: 1 US KIA, 8 US WIA, 2 ACAV destroyed, 1 tank damaged; 23 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC POW; 1 SA weapon, and 8 grenades were captured.

(6) 090110H Mar 68, YS4497: Blackhorse Base Camp received 40 rounds of 81mm mortar fire resulting in 9 US WIA and one building slightly damaged. All rounds impacted in the areas occupied by the 27th Engineer Battalion and the 551st Light Maintenance Company. Firing ceased at 090129H. Light fire teams and counter mortar fire were employed with unknown results.

This mortar attack was believed to have been a deception to cover the attack on Cam My Village which began at 090045H Mar. This attack by an unidentified VC force of unknown size succeeded in overrunning the RF Observation Post resulting in 4 RF KIA, 2 RF WIA and 29 RF MIA. The VC captured 2 crew-served weapons and 19 small arms weapons. The enemy also destroyed 4 radios. Most of the RF MIA returned either to the village or Blackhorse Base Camp. The Xuan Loc Sector Adviser reported that the RF Observation Post apparently radioed for help once, but the transmission was either misunderstood or garbled. Thus, no reaction force was dispatched, and news of the attack was not obtained until the following afternoon. Additionally, two civilian trucks detonated AT mines on Interprovincial Route 2 on 10 Mar. Both trucks were destroyed, and three Vietnamese were killed. These mines were undoubtedly intended to delay a reaction force from Blackhorse Base Camp to Cam My Village.

(7) 120940H Mar 68, XT560009: M/3/11th ACR apprehended 10 VC POW, detainees, and evacuated 1300 pounds of rice. At 1255H, M/3/11th ACR received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from elements of the 267th MP Battalion and the 269th MP Battalion. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. I/3/11th ACR reinforced. Sporadic contact continued into the early morning hours. Results were: 1 US KIA, 25 US WIA, and 4 tanks damaged; 36 VC KIA (BC), 10 VC POW; 31 RPG rounds, 12 RPG boosters, 1 ton tetracol, and 400 pounds rice evacuated; 30 bunkers destroyed. COL Jack MacFarlane, Regimental CO, was one of the wounded in this engagement.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-NE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSPOR-65 (R1)

(8) 121230H Mar 68, YT310055 - YT309052: G/2/11th ACR, H/2/11th ACR, and B/3/187th Inf received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. Fire was returned, and TAC Air and artillery supported. Contact was broken at 121650H due to a forest fire initiated by friendly munitions. Results were: 12 US WIA; 14 VC KIA (BC).

(9) 130010H Mar 68, YT305096: F/2/11th ACR received 60mm and 120mm mortar fire and a probing attack from elements of the 3rd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment. Fire was returned, and artillery and light fire teams supported. Results were: 1 US KIA, 8 US WIA; 8 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 1 M60, 18 AT rounds, 870 rounds of small arms ammunition, and  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound of documents captured.

(10) 151000H Mar 68, XT 595068: M/3/11th ACR engaged elements of the 272nd VC Regiment. The enemy returned small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. The 2/49th ARVN Inf reinforced. Contact was broken at 151903H. Results were: 7 US WIA, 5 ARVN KIA, 14 ARVN WIA; 1 ACAV destroyed, 2 tanks moderately damaged; 81 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 3 ATRL, 8 AT rounds, 5 crew-served weapons, and 13 small arms weapons captured.

(11) 161110H Mar 68, XT621032: 51st ARVN Ranger Battalion engaged an unidentified estimated VC battalion. The enemy returned with small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. I/3/11th ACR and L/3/11th ACR reinforced. Contact was broken at 161930H. Results were: no US casualties; ARVN casualties are unknown but were reported as light; 95 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 5 crew-served weapons and 13 small arms weapons captured.

(12) 171505H Mar 68, XT600063: M/3/11th ACR and two companies of the 49th ARVN Inf Regiment received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unidentified, estimated VC company. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Heavy contact was broken at 171845H. Light, sporadic contact continued until 172152H. Results were: 5 US WIA; 4 ARVN KIA, 2 ARVN WIA; 50 VC KIA (BC); 1 small arms weapon captured.

(13) 201150H Mar 68, XT606056: L/3/11th ACR, M/3/11th ACR, and elements of the 4/49th ARVN Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 272nd VC Regiment. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 201921H. Results were: 1 US KIA, 5 US WIA; 7 ARVN KIA, 13 ARVN WIA; 142 VC KIA (BC); 8 small arms weapons, 3 crew-served weapons, 34 AT rounds, 2 mines, and 1 pound of documents captured; 57 bunkers were destroyed.

# CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

13

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(14) 281207H Mar 68, XT434125: L/3/11th ACR, M/3/11th ACR, and elements of the 3/49th ARVN Infantry and 34th ARVN Rangers received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from the 1st Battalion, 272nd VC Regiment. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Contact was broken at 281940H. Results were: 2 US KIA, 5 US WIA, 15 ARVN KIA, 21 ARVN WIA; 57 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC POW; 3 crew-served weapons, 14 small arms weapons, and 24 AT rounds captured.

(15) 011256H Apr 68, XT625057: I/3/11th ACR and the 2/49th ARVN Infantry received small arms, and unidentified mortar fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. Sporadic contact continued into the early morning hours. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. Results were: 2 US KIA, 4 US WIA; 5 ARVN WIA; 3 ACAV slightly damaged; 73 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC POW; 11 small arms weapons, 6 crew-served weapons, 24 AT rounds, and 4 pounds documents captured; 10 structures and 5 bunkers were destroyed.

(16) 190145H Apr 68, YU342170: B/1/11th ACR and the 1/18th US Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire from an unidentified VC force of unknown size. TAC Air, artillery, and light fire teams supported. The enemy broke contact at 191055H and withdrew to the north. Results were: 3 US KIA, 21 US WIA; VC casualties are unknown.

(17) 262358H Apr 68, YT313264: G/2/11th ACR, 1/18th US Infantry (OPCON to the 11th ACR), and A/168th Engineer Battalion received small arms, automatic weapons, RPG, and mortar fire from the 1st Battalion, 274th VC Division. Fire was returned, and TAC Air, artillery, light fire teams, and flareships supported. Contact was broken at 260050H. Results were: 2 US KIA, 27 US WIA; 1 bridge boat sunk, 1 bridge truck destroyed, 1 bridge heavily damaged, 2 bridge trucks moderately damaged, 2 bridge trucks lightly damaged, 1  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck destroyed, 1  $3\frac{3}{4}$ -ton moderately damaged, 1 5-ton truck moderately damaged, 2 low-boy trucks moderately damaged, 1 ACAV moderately damaged; 9 VC KIA (BC), 16 VC KIA (Poss), 2 VC POW; 5 small arms weapons, 2 crew-served weapons, 27 AT rockets, 800 rounds small arms ammunition, and 22 grenades captured.

(18) 290105H Apr 68, XT593148: I/3/11th ACR and elements of the 25th Engr Bn received 22 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 24 US WIA. Counter mortar was fired with unknown results. I/3/11th ACR swept the area at first light on 30 Apr with negative results.

## d. Intelligence Sources:

(1) General: The extensive areas covered by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the reporting period required a large amount of intelligence from higher headquarters and from units which had previously

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

operated in the areas. Consolidated intelligence data from II Field Force, Vietnam, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) provided a sound basis for operations in VC Sub-Region E-1 and VC Military Region 10.

(2) Agent Reports: This source usually comprised the most voluminous source of intelligence information during operations in remote areas, notably Military Region 10. Although agent reports declined as a potential source of intelligence in central and southern III CTZ, they remained the major source of intelligence information. As in the past, these reports were largely inconclusive unless substantiated by other intelligence sources.

(3) Casual Reports: In the wake of the TET offensive, reports from casual civilian informants increased markedly. This obviously stemmed from the threat to civilian life and property. Casual reports tended to be highly exaggerated. As with agent reports, this source was largely unreliable unless confirmed by other intelligence outlets.

(4) Airborne Sensor: Infra-red camera and Side-looking Airborne Radar was integrated into a pattern map that traced intelligence information from various sources. Infra-red was often unreliable as a reconnaissance sensor because of numerous local fires. SLAR was effective in isolating enemy movement, although most patterns which developed were not in the immediate regimental area of operation or interest. The E-63 Personnel Detector continued to be employed extensively with effective results. The People Sniffer was primarily employed to confirm or deny intelligence information. Additional uses were missions conducted over and adjacent to objective areas just prior to reconnaissance in force operations, as well as missions to precede march columns to detect possible ambush sites.

(5) Visual Reconnaissance-Photography: These intelligence sources were primarily responsible for uncovering a newly-constructed enemy supply route extending south from Cambodia, just east of Song Be. Once this route was discovered, HQ II Field Force Vietnam ordered the 11th ACR to interdict it. Visual reconnaissance continued to provide indications of enemy movement and base areas. This information was integrated with other portions of the intelligence collection cycle, as reported by the Air Cavalry Troop and the Forward Air Controllers. B/3/17th Cavalry was OPCON to the 11th ACR for a short period and provided data on Interprovincial Route 322 and the Dong Nai River in preparation for operations in War Zone D. Photography was used extensively for planning purposes. The Regimental Hand-held camera program (541st MI Det) also aided the reconnaissance and planning effort.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

15

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

(6) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol: The 11th ACR LRRP missions again provided reliable intelligence data. Various base areas and indications of enemy movement were noted on two occasions. One significant sighting of approximately 100 enemy provided conclusive evidence of Viet Cong logistical activity and movement in the vicinity of Hung Nghia Village.

e. Enemy Losses:

(1) The following enemy losses were credited to regimental units while operating under regimental control:

- (a) 267 VC KIA (BC)
- (b) 87 VC KIA (Poss)
- (c) 14 VC POW
- (d) 39 Detainees
- (e) 35 Small arms weapons captured
- (f) 13 Crew-served weapons captured
- (g) 2 mortar rounds, 14 artillery rounds, 1604 small arms rounds, 81 AT rounds, 45 grenades, 34 mines captured/destroyed.
- (h) 145 structures, 47 sampans, 1536 fortifications destroyed.
- (i) 5.5 Tons grain captured
- (j) 30.25 Pounds documents captured

(2) The following enemy losses were credited to regimental units while under the operational control of other US units or in direct support of ARVN units:

- (a) 651 VC KIA (BC)
- (b) 10 VC KIA (Poss)
- (c) 16 VC POW
- (d) 8 Detainees

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

16

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

- (e) 68 Small arms weapons captured
- (f) 38 Crew-served weapons captured
- (g) 15 Mortar rounds, 27 artillery rounds, 1074 small arms rounds, 193 AT rounds, 113 grenades, and 38 mines captured/destroyed.
- (h) 10 structures, 146 fortifications destroyed
- (i) 2.1 Tons grain captured
- (j) 14.25 Pounds documents captured

4. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation:

(1) The troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment inflicted heavy losses on the enemy during Operations ADAIRSVILLE, ALCORN COVE, and TOAN THANG, conducted from 1 Feb through 30 Apr 68. The enemy suffered significant losses of personnel, weapons, food, and ammunition supplies as the result of continuous pressure brought to bear by the combat power of the regiment. The Blackhorse Regiment amply demonstrated the flexibility and mobility of its organization by furnishing combat elements OPCON to various units throughout III Corps Tactical Zone to include bolstering the combat power of the 101st Airborne Division, the 1st Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. In addition various resources of the regiment were placed in direct support of the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) and the 25th Infantry Division (ARVN). Working in close coordination and cooperation with these allied units greatly benefited both the ARVN and US units involved while inflicting heavy losses on the insurgent enemy forces.

(2) The enemy, though badly beaten in the initial phase of the TET offensive, continued to mount offensive operations against the regiment. These operations were carried on simultaneously with sporadic sniping, claymore, and mining operations against friendly forces. In addition, the enemy stubbornly defended his base areas when attacked, especially in Hau Nghia Province. Indications were that, though he suffered a large setback from his losses in late Jan and early Feb 68, the enemy had not been completely defeated or demoralized.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

17

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

b. Area of Operations: Operations this quarter were conducted entirely within the III Corps Tactical Zone and covered six different provinces (Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Phuoc Long). (See Operational Map Sketch, Incl 9 and 10)

c. Operations:

(1) Operation ADAIRSVILLE (1 Feb - 23 Mar) was conducted as a continuation of actions begun with the enemy TET offensive. On 31 Jan 68, the regiment was redeployed from positions in War Zone C to reinforce the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex which was under heavy attack. Initial missions on 1 Feb were for the 1st Squadron to secure Hq, II Field Force, Vietnam; 2nd Squadron to secure III Corps Prisoner of War compound (YT0413), Troop G OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade; and for 3rd Squadron to secure ARVN III Corps Headquarters and Honour Smith Compound. The 1st Squadron continued security missions in and around Hq, II Field Force from 1-15 Feb with negative enemy contact. In addition Troop A was placed in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 18th ARVN Infantry Division, from 3-5 Feb to drive the VC from positions around Thu Duc vicinity XT9299. Troop B was placed OPCON to II Field Force Forward CP at Tan Son Nhut Air Base from 5-10 Feb and OPCON to the 9th Infantry Division from 10-20 Feb. On 15 Feb the 1st Squadron minus moved to Blackhorse Base Camp to release elements of the 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, from security in and around the base camp. Squadron missions included security of Blackhorse, convoy security between Long Binh and Blackhorse, security of II FFV in Long Binh, security of the rock quarry at Gia Ray vicinity YT6211, security of engineer work parties on National Highways 1 and 2, and direct support operations with the 18th ARVN Division. Troop K was placed OPCON to the 1st Squadron on 22 Mar to assist in securing the land clearing teams along National Highway 1. On 2 Feb the 2nd Squadron became OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division and remained in that status until Mar 6 when they became OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. On 22 Mar the 2nd Squadron was released from the 199th and became OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division and remained so until 6 Apr. Throughout the period of OPCON to these various units, the squadron had numerous encounters with the enemy, inflicting heavy personnel and materiel losses on the insurgents. The 3rd Squadron minus conducted security operations in and around the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex from 1 Feb until 24 Feb. Troop K remained at Loc Ninh OPCON to the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division until 11 Feb when the troop returned to squadron control at Long Binh. Troop I became OPCON to the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, on 5 Feb and moved to Phu Loi (YT8615), remaining OPCON until 17 Feb. On 7 Feb the squadron minus became OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and remained in that status until 23

11

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

Feb when they became OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division. On 1 Mar the squadron minus was released OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and placed in direct support of the 25th ARVN Division. The squadron established Fire Support Base Buffalo vicinity XS5697 and began working in close coordination and cooperation with the 25th ARVN Division, conducting reconnaissance in force operations and joint ambush patrols nightly. The squadron continued to operate in this general location throughout the remainder of Operation ADAIRSVILLE, releasing Troop K OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade from 10-17 Mar. On 18 Mar Troop K was placed OPCON to 1st Squadron, 11th ACR. The 3rd Squadron, conducting operations jointly with elements of the 25th ARVN Division, had almost daily contact with varying size enemy forces inflicting heavy losses of personnel and equipment on both local force and main force VC units throughout the remainder of Operation ADAIRSVILLE. The harmony and cooperation with which the two forces worked together in combat indicated the proficiency which can be attained by US and ARVN units working together.

(2) Operation ALCORN COVE (21 Mar - 7 Apr) involved security operations in and around Blackhorse Base Camp (YS4496) and the Long Binh/ Nien Hoa complex and providing regimental units in direct support of the 18th ARVN Infantry Division and the 25th ARVN Infantry Division. The 2nd Squadron became OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division at 220600H Mar 68 and remained OPCON until 6 Apr. Missions of the 1st Squadron reinforced included providing one troop minus in direct support of the 18th ARVN Infantry Division, providing screening forces for the security of Blackhorse Base Camp, conducting offensive operations against enemy forces in areas adjacent to Blackhorse Base Camp, providing one platoon for security of Gia Ray Rock Quarry (YS6211), providing reaction forces for convoys on Highway 1 between Blackhorse Base Camp and Long Binh, providing one troop for conduct and security of land clearing operations along Highway 1, providing one platoon OPCON to Hq, Commandant, II FFV, as a reaction force in defense of Hq, II FFV, and providing one platoon for security of the Dong Nai River bridge at YTO15055. The 3rd Squadron was placed in direct support of the 25th ARVN Infantry Division to conduct operations in the 25th ARVN Division TAOI in close cooperation and coordination with ARVN forces. During ALCORN COVE security operations, the 1st Squadron had no significant contact with enemy forces. Sporadic sniping and mining incidents continued to occur in the Regimental TAOI in addition to sporadic contacts with squad size VC forces. The major accomplishment during Operation ALCORN COVE in the Blackhorse TAOI was the clearing operation along National Highway 1. More than 1,100 acres of jungle vegetation were cleared from the sides of the highway by land clearing teams of the 20th Engineer Brigade. Troop K OPCON to the 1st Squadron provided security for the en-

# CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11  
AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

gineer Rome Plow teams. The clearing operation denied the VC use of the road for taxation purposes by removing any concealment they may have gained from the vegetation. The operation also denied the VC ambush sites and enhanced overall security of the highway from Long Binh to Xuan Loc. The 3rd Squadron operating in close cooperation and coordination with the 25th ARVN Infantry Division dealt heavy blows to the enemy in several contacts during Operation ALCORN COVE. ALCORN COVE was a successful operation. Simultaneously clearing routes and conducting offensive operations against the enemy, the regiment made good progress in opening roads and establishing rapport with ARVN units in joint operations while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.

(3) Operation TOAN THANG (8 - 30 Apr) was initially an extension of all missions of ALCORN COVE. The 2nd Squadron returned to Blackhorse Base Camp on 6 Apr under regimental control and subsequently assumed all missions of the 1st Squadron (see para (2) above) on 10 Apr. The 1st Squadron conducted maintenance and training in preparation for future operations from 10-14 Apr. On 11 Apr the 3rd Squadron was released from the mission of direct support to the 25th ARVN Division and conducted a tactical road march during the hours of darkness from Fire Support Base Buffalo vicinity Duc Hoa (XS5996) to Blackhorse Base Camp (YS4396) via Saigon and Long Binh. From 11-14 Apr the squadron conducted maintenance and training in preparation for future operations. At 150200H Apr the Blackhorse Regiment minus the 2nd Squadron commenced a move that covered over 115 miles through dense jungle, bamboo thickets, and unimproved roads for operations targeted on enemy forces and logistical activities deep into VC Military Region 10. Moving along an axis through Long Binh, Phu Cuong (XT8214), Phuoc Vinh (XT9548), Dong Xoai (YT0375), Bunard (YT2789), the regiment minus moved at will through enemy dominated areas, seizing objective 1 at Tap Tak (YU2000) and objective 2 at Bunard. The regiment minus, reinforced with the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, then began reconnaissance in force operations in AO Allons, having daily contact with small groups of enemy of no significant size. Numerous enemy base camps were located and destroyed in the area of operations. Operating in extremely rough jungle terrain, the Cavalry again demonstrated its determination to accomplish the mission. Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges were continuously employed to cross streams and ravines in the area. A major VC supply road was located and as plans were being formulated for its permanent interdiction, the regiment received orders from Hq, II FFV, changing its mission. Again demonstrating the inherent mobility and flexibility of armor, the regiment minus quickly evacuated stockpiled supplies assisted by C-130 aircraft, CH-47 helicopters and CH 54 Sky Cranes and commenced the move to the new AO. The 3rd Squadron on

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

22 Apr departed on a mission OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division and moved rapidly to Phu Loi (XT8616) for future operations. The regiment minus attacked south from Dong Xoai (YTO375) to destroy VC/NVA forces in the new area, AO Peach, deep in War Zone D. After penetrating War Zone D with negative enemy contact, the Regimental Forward CP was relocated on the banks of the Dong Nai River vicinity YT253280. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, conducted an airmobile assault into AO Peach vicinity YT310260 and secured the southern bank of the Dong Nai River in preparation for a deliberate river crossing by the Blackhorse Regiment minus. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, reinforced by elements of the 2nd Squadron which moved into AO Peach from Blackhorse Base Camp via Highways 1 and 20, secured A Company, 168th Engineer Battalion, bridging operations across the Dong Nai River. The 1st Squadron conducted reconnaissance in force operations in AO Peach locating eight enemy bunker complexes and capturing valuable equipment and ammunition supplies. On 25 Apr the 900-foot float bridge was completed and at 0605H the Blackhorse Regiment minus began crossing and continued its march into the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area to provide security and ready reaction forces in the wake of intelligence information indicating a renewed offensive by major VC/NVA units. Missions included securing Widow's Village (YT0511), III Corps Prisoner of War Compound (YT0412), the Dong Nai River bridge (YTO105), and providing ready reaction forces to Hq, II FFV, for employment anywhere in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. On 26 Apr Task Force 1-18th Infantry was released OPCON, and operations in AO Peach ceased. The regiment minus remained in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex continuing OPCON to II FFV as part of Campaign TOAN THANG. The 3rd Squadron minus remained OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division at Phu Loi with I Troop OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division vicinity XT607148. The 2nd Squadron continued operations from Blackhorse Base Camp as the reporting period ended.

(4) Operation KITTYHAWK (15 Feb 67 - 21 Mar 68) was a continuing operation consisting of the pacification and security of Long Khanh Province, the security of Blackhorse Base Camp, and the escort of logistical convoys within the Blackhorse TAOR. This operation, which was initiated 15 Feb 67 under guidance provided by II Field Force, Vietnam, Campaign Plan for 1967, was terminated on 21 Mar. The missions listed in previous Operational Reports - Lessons Learned under Operation KITTYHAWK were incorporated in Operations ALCORN COVE and TOAN THANG during this reporting period.

d. Training:

(1) Unit training, maintenance, on the job training, and weapons familiarization and zeroing were conducted throughout the quarter. A spe-

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

21  
AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

cial course of instruction was conducted to familiarize the tank crews with the M48A2 tanks which arrived during the quarter.

(2) Replacement training was conducted throughout the quarter to prepare new replacements to assume their duties as cavalry troopers. The training was conducted in a six-day cycle. Monthly attendance during the quarter was as follows:

February	176
March	221
April	281

(3) In addition to the normal replacement school training, tenant units of Blackhorse Base Camp sent personnel to familiarization classes in the function and operation of the Cal. .50 machinegun. This instruction was offered to improve the operation and maintenance of the Cal. .50 machineguns used in perimeter defense.

(4) A special course of instruction on the M16 rifle was conducted during the month of March for unit armorers. Fifty-five personnel attended.

(5) Specialized Training:

(a) Recondo School: The regiment sent 12 personnel from the Air Cavalry Troop (Aero-Rifle Platoon) to the MACV Recondo School.

(b) NCO Academy: The 9th Division NCO Academy provides basic techniques of military instruction and leadership traits to the NCO's and potential NCO's of the regiment. During the quarter, 33 Blackhorse personnel attended the academy.

(c) Jungle Environment Survival School: A three-day course conducted at Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands, was made available to aviation personnel of the regiment. During the quarter, three aviators attended the course.

(d) Aircraft Maintenance: The Army Maintenance Technical Assistance Program (AAMTAP) School, 765th Transportation Group, Vung Tau, administered in-country training to 17 mechanics from the regiment and attached units during the quarter.

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

5. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Artillery

(1) General: The organic howitzer batteries of each squadron provided close and continuous artillery support throughout the quarter. In addition reinforcing artillery support was utilized on the following occasions: Elements of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery at Lai Khe provided convoy coverage along National Highway 13 during the regiment's tactical road march of 31 Jan - 1 Feb to the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area in response to the TET offensive; the 199th Light Infantry Brigade also provided artillery support in the Long Binh area; the organic artillery elements of the 25th Infantry Division (ARVN) supported the 3rd Squadron during Operation ADAIRSVILLE; the 54th Artillery Group provided continuous coverage for the logistical convoys between Long Binh and the Blackhorse Base Camp.

(2) Missions: The following type missions were fired during the reporting period:

- (a) Defensive Concentrations
- (b) Observer Adjusted
- (c) Harassing and Interdicting
- (d) Navigational (Marking) Rounds
- (e) Preparations
- (f) Preplanned Fires on Call
- (g) ARVN Support

(3) Ammunition Expended: 155 ammunition expended by organic batteries during the quarter was:

	<u>HE</u>	<u>Illumination</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>Smoke (Yellow)</u>
February	8324	5	140	34
March	7943	579	410	130
April	8052	1084	255	278

16

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

23  
AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

(4) New Technique: During this quarter, maximum benefit was derived from coordination visits to ARVN and Province Headquarters obtaining Specified Strike Zones for the 11th ACR Area of Operations. Using Specified Strike Zones, the need for ARVN or Province Civil Clearance was eliminated, allowing fires requested by the supported commander to be delivered with minimum delay.

b. Army Aviation:

(1) Employment: The army aviation elements supported the regiment with 15 OH-23G, 12 UH-1D, and 19 UH-1C. The OH-23G support was that of command and control, reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and liaison between the regiment and the squadrons. The UH-1D aircraft were employed primarily for command and control, the insertion and extraction of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, and the daily Blackhorse courier flight. The UH-1C gunships were deployed to all areas where elements of the regiment anticipated or were experiencing enemy contact. In addition, these aircraft provided convoy cover and reconnaissance and strip alert for mortar retaliation.

(2) Training: In-country orientation and training of newly-assigned aviators was completed before these personnel were released for operational missions. Instrument training was conducted in the UH-1D when mission commitments permitted. Nine aviators completed the USARV qualification course on the OH-6A aircraft at Vung Tau. At the end of the quarter, each squadron had two qualified OH-6A pilots, and there were four qualified OH-6A pilots in the Air Cavalry Troop.

(3) Construction: Significant new construction during the quarter included the new ten-point POL facility located at the edge of the airstrip and the parking apron on the northeast side of the taxi-way.

(4) Safety: Safety and correct pilot and crew techniques were stressed during the quarter. The limitation of one passenger per OH-23G aircraft was maintained. Emphasis was placed on the hazards of approaches and landings in rough, hastily cleared locations which were frequently encountered in the areas of operation. Dust was a particular hazard during the reporting period, and much command emphasis was placed on methods of overcoming its dangers.

(5) Results: (See Army Aviation Statistical Summary, Incl 4.)

c. Chemical:

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

24

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFQR (R1)

(1) General: The chemical support of regimental operations was provided by the 33rd Chemical Detachment until 15 Mar 68 when the detachment was reassigned to the Provisional Corps, Vietnam. The regimental chemical section (1 CPT, 1 E-7, and 1 E-5) was augmented with two additional personnel (E-3), two E-63 personnel detectors (modified), and two M9 power driven decontaminating apparatuses.

(2) A total of 11 E-63 Personnel Detector missions were conducted.

(3) During the reporting period, 150 hectares of the base camp perimeter were defoliated.

(4) On 10 Apr 68 three E-158 CS Canister Clusters were employed (with unknown results) in conjunction with a sniffer mission.

d. Air Force: During this quarter, the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) provided continuous support to the Blackhorse Regiment. While providing support to the 3rd Squadron on Operation ADAIRSVILLE, great success was realized in using tactical aircraft to route entrenched enemy troops. While supporting the regiment during Operation TOAN THANG, the Forward Air Controllers developed numerous targets for destruction by artillery and air. They also provided close support when required. During this quarter, the FAC Command track remained co-located with the Regimental Command Post while the pilots flew out of Blackhorse using Song Be as a refueling stop. (See Air Force Statistical Summary, Incl 5.)

e. Engineer Activity:

(1) General: During the reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operations ADAIRSVILLE, ALCORN COVE, and TOAN THANG, while providing direct combat engineer support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) Operations:

(a) ADAIRSVILLE: With the outbreak of the TET offensive, the elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) moved with the 11th ACR into the Long Binh-Bien Hoa area. The 1st Platoon, 919th Engineers, was given the mission of emplacing 3,000 meters of barrier material around "Widows Village", (YT0511), consisting of one belt of triple standard concertina. The 3rd Platoon gave direct support to the 2nd Squadron while it conducted operations north of Bien Hoa along the Dong Nai River. The platoon built approaches and assisted in one of the largest assault river

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

21  
AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

crossings to date on 17 Mar at YTO41186. The platoon assisted in the crossing of some 150 vehicles through the use of Landing Craft Medium (LCM) boats. Both track and wheeled vehicles were enabled to cross the river. The 3rd Platoon participated in operations with the 3rd Squadron east of Long Binh and south of Highway 1 and destroyed some 50 enemy fortifications. Elements of the 919th Engineers provided continuing combat support on Operation ADAIRSVILLE while participating in reconnaissance in force operations.

On 3 Mar the 3rd Squadron, accompanied by the 2nd Platoon, 919th Engineers, moved west of Saigon to Vinh Loc and then farther west to Duc Hoa, to support the 25th ARVN Infantry Division. During reconnaissance in force operations, the platoon destroyed over 1500 enemy fortifications. The platoon also received the mission of building helicopter revetments. During this period, the 3rd Platoon, accompanying the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, was on operations in the Iron Triangle. The platoon discovered and destroyed 100 enemy bunkers and 115 feet of tunnel complexes. The platoon prepared and supervised the launching of Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges at some 30 sites. During this period, the 1st Platoon conducted mine sweeping operations south of Blackhorse Base Camp, in the vicinity of Cam My. The platoon found seven anti-tank mines, which were destroyed. The roads and culverts between Blackhorse Base Camp and Cam My were repaired.

(b) TOAN THANG: On 15 Apr the Headquarters, 1st and 2nd Squadrons, and elements of the 919th Engineers moved to conduct operations in the Song Be area. This operation was unique in that 75% of the route from Phuoc Vinh to the Regimental Alternate Command Post (Bunard), in the Song Be area, had not been traveled in more than 15 years. Several obstacles were encountered, including blown bridges and bomb craters. The 1st Platoon, utilizing the company's organic M48A3 tank-dozer, prepared sites and supervised the launching of three AVLB's on the initial move into the area. In conjunction with this operation, the 2nd Platoon prepared sites and supervised the launching of two AVLB's. The regiment moved 130 miles in less than 20 hours, on a road that had not been used in over a decade. The elements of the company provided direct combat engineer support in reconnaissance in force operations, destroying over 300 enemy fortifications. With the movement of the 11th ACR back through War Zone D, the company was given the mission of negotiating all obstacles, and moving the regimental elements through with speed. The 1st Platoon assisted in launching 14 AVLB's as well as preparing two ford sites.

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

26

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(3) Regional Force/Popular Force Upgrading and Training: The company continued its upgrading support by releasing over 300 rolls of concertina and provided technical assistance in the placement of this material.

(4) Base Camp Development: The rear detachment during this period accomplished extensive work on the perimeter of Blackhorse Base Camp. The barrier materials were replaced and over 1000 meters of field of fire were cleared around the perimeter.

f. Signal

(1) One significant organizational change took place during the reporting period with the formation of a Regimental Message/Communications Center. This has provided the regiment with better control in handling all incoming and outgoing messages.

(2) Upon receipt of the first increment of the AN/GRC-106 SSB Radios (17 each), the Regimental Command/Air Request Net (Voice) and the Regimental Administrative/Logistical Net (Voice) were established. These two nets provided a long-range voice radio capability and have reduced the voice traffic volume on the FM radio nets. The formation of the Administrative/Logistical Net (Voice) also provided the squadrons with the capability of contacting base camp from their field locations.

6. (C) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. General: During this quarter, the 29th Support Group continued to provide logistical support to the regiment. The 551st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Service Company provided point distribution of Classes I through IV of supply. Class V was supplied by the 3rd Ordnance Battalion. During Operation ADAIRSVILLE, water and ice were obtained from the Long Binh Post, and Class III was drawn from the 266th Supply and Service Battalion. During Operation TOAN THANG, Class III was drawn from the 229th Supply and Service Company at Phuoc Vinh.

b. Supply and Maintenance:

(1) Class I:

(a) Support was generally excellent during the reporting period. Minor problems were encountered in the procurement of fresh

**CONFIDENTIAL**

27  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

vegetables, coffee, and certain condiments, but these difficulties were resolved.

(b) During Operation TOAN THANG, field units received A rations for the noon meal only.

(c) Water for the Forward Command Post during Operation TOAN THANG was provided by a 600-gallon per hour portable purification unit located at Bunard.

(2) Class II and IV

(a) During this quarter, the regiment replaced the M48A3 tanks with the M48A2 series. A total of 54 M48A2 tanks were drawn.

(b) In order to facilitate the refueling of the M48A2 replacements, one 749C fuel truck was also drawn by each squadron.

(c) Twenty-three M113A1 vehicles were received during the quarter to replace combat vehicle losses sustained.

(d) During Operation TOAN THANG, barrier materials were flown to Bunard in C130 aircraft. 30,000 sandbags, 4 sleeves of concertina wire, and 24 sections of culvert material arrived to be utilized by troops in the forward area.

(3) Class III and V:

(a) Operations made during Operation TOAN THANG revealed that an M48A2 tank consumed only one-half the amount of fuel during a reconnaissance in force mission than originally calculated. Approximately 2,500 gallons of Mogas were consumed daily instead of the 5,000 gallon projected figure.

(b) 7.62 linked ammunition, cal. .50 ammunition, and 90mm canister rounds were the Class V items in greatest demand during the quarter. Resupply of Class V items was satisfactory during the reporting period.

(4) Aerial Resupply:

(a) The regiment averaged very few sorties during Operations ADAIRSVILLE and ALCORN COVE as wheeled vehicles resupplied all elements. However, during Operation TOAN THANG, an average of 39 sorties was flown

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

28

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

each day, as the 1st and 3rd Squadrons were in areas inaccessible to wheeled vehicles. The wheeled vehicles were located in the trains area in Phuoc Vinh. All resupply from Phuoc Vinh to Bunard was accomplished by air. CH-47 helicopters and C130 aircraft were utilized and were immediately responsive to the needs of the regiment.

(b) Five CH-54 Skycrane missions were flown during Operation TOAN THANG. Two damaged ACAV's were retrieved, and three flame-thrower service units were lifted out to Bunard.

(5) Maintenance:

(a) Maintenance support was provided by the 551st Light Maintenance Company during the entire period. Contact teams remained with each squadron during all field operations.

(b) Problem areas during the quarter were the unavailability of filters (fuel, oil, air) for combat vehicles, the unavailability of replacement generators of less than 15 KW capacity, and the unavailability of M60 machineguns and replacement parts.

c. Medical:

(1) The health of the command was excellent throughout the quarter. No abnormalities pertaining to the morale or psychological effectiveness of the men were noted. This was particularly noteworthy since the majority of the command had been on continuous field operations during the reporting period.

(2) The regiment sustained 94 injuries as a result of hostile action and 104 injuries not as a result of hostile action.

(3) There were 8 cases of malaria (1 Vivax and 7 Falciprium) during the quarter. Seven of these cases occurred in February.

(4) Throughout the quarter the 45th Air Ambulance Company provided the regiment with smooth and efficient air evacuation service. Of significant note was the outstanding dust off service provided to the Blackhorse Base Camp. This service which was reinstated on 23 Mar having been discontinued in Dec 67 was particularly appreciated by the regiment.

(5) The facilities of the 12th, 24th, 36th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals as well as the 3rd Field Hospital and 7th Surgical Hospital were util-

22

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

ized by the regiment during the quarter. The medical companies of the 1st Medical Battalion and the 326th Medical Battalion provided support to the units in Field locations.

(6) A preventive dentistry program (in conjunction with the Combat Rehabilitation of All Platoons - CRAP) was initiated in each squadron aid station to insure regular and adequate dental care.

7. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. General: At the close of the quarter the operational strength of the regiment was 101% of authorized strength. Replacements were generally well qualified. The shortage of Armored Personnel Specialists (MOS 11D) was somewhat relieved through the replacement stream and the reclassification of personnel MOS, particularly 11B and 11D. The infusion program operated smoothly. Approximately 254 EM in grades E1 through E6 were infused with the 9th Infantry Division and the Americal Division.

b. Strength:

(1) Strength figures by the month were as follows:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PDY</u>
February	4157	4239	4133
March	4123	4182	4076
April	4126	4187	4091

(2) Hospital Returnees: During the quarter, 237 personnel were returned to duty after being hospitalized. This figure does not include those personnel who were treated and released immediately.

(3) Casualties:

	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>NED</u>	<u>NEW</u>
February	73	13	0	0	9
March	177	12	0	2	8
April	77	9	0	0	21

23

CONFIDENTIAL

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

50

c. MOS Shortages: During the reporting period, shortages existed in the 11D series. To offset this, 11B and 11D MOS were substituted with successful results and without impairing the combat readiness of the regiment. Many of these personnel were reclassified as 11D after serving 60 days in this MOS.

d. Replacements: The quality of the replacements remained at an acceptable level. The training cycles conducted by the replacement training school provided thorough indoctrination of replacements who were being used in other than their primary MOS. A primary purpose of the replacement training school was acclimating personnel to their new environment and conditioning their initial apprehensions of being in a combat zone. The basic program was designed to provide refresher training in basic skills and an orientation which emphasizes troop leading procedures, tactics, and safety procedures.

e. Services:

(1) Religious: During the quarter, a total of 364 religious services were conducted with total attendance of 8768. In addition to the religious services, 142 confessions, 229 communions, and 12 memorials were conducted. The 364 services were divided as follows: 217 Catholic services and 147 Protestant services. Jewish services were centered around trips to Bearcat for recent Jewish holidays. The chaplains, along with the S-1, coordinated with the Jewish Center at Bearcat for the three-day observance. A memorial service was held on 12 April in memory of the men who had died since 1 November 1967. The 9th Division Band participated in the service. The five chaplains made 70 hospital visits, 207 visits to men's quarters, 241 visits to the troop training and duty areas, and conducted 448 interviews and counseling sessions. The increase over the last quarter in visits to the troop training and duty areas was due primarily to the Easter Season.

(2) Red Cross: For the three month period ending 30 April, the Red Cross Field Unit at Blackhorse handled 1210 cases. In addition, three loans for a total of \$350.00 were made. No grants were made during the quarter. A total of 112 emergency cases were processed.

(3) Red Cross Clubmobile: The Red Cross Clubmobile made 107 visits in February, 105 in March, and 117 in April. These visits included trips to the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals in Long Binh as well as visits to the wards of the 7th Surgical Hospital and 37th Medical Company.

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

Throughout the quarter the Clubmobile continued its program of obtaining the birthdates of men in each unit who had birthdays during the month. From this list the Red Cross girls prepared and delivered the cards.

A program was initiated during the quarter in which the Red Cross girls attended the Blackhorse Replacement Training School for one hour each week to inform the new personnel of the Red Cross facilities and services available.

(4) Postal: The 7th APU handled 904 pouches of incoming mail to include 4632 sacks and 1162 oversized packages. Outgoing mail included 1003 pouches, 1234 sacks, and 788 oversized packages. A total of \$1,660, 606.82 worth of money orders were sold for a total fee of \$8,585.50. Stamp sales totaled \$26,310.60, and a total of 1180 pieces of registered mail and 847 pieces of insured mail were processed.

(5) Special Services: During the quarter Special Services provided seven theatres with movies. Approximately 600 movies were shown with an average attendance of 150 per showing. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, movies were sent to the field locations.

Ed Begley conducted a well-received handshake tour on 24 Mar. The RFC Hollywood Country and Western Show was presented on 21 Apr in the Amphitheatre attended by approximately 600 personnel.

The Special Services conducted a volleyball tournament among the six supporting units of Blackhorse Base Camp, which was won by the 27th Engineer Battalion.

(6) Post Exchange: During the quarter the Blackhorse Post Exchange was greatly improved. Security was increased and warehousing facilities were expanded. The PX was remodeled to present a cleaner and neater appearance. A ventilation system was installed to provide customer comfort. The snack bar increased its variety of foods and beverages. (See PX Sales Figures Inclosure 6.)

f. Morale: A high level of morale continued throughout the quarter. The improved PX, snack bar, and Special Services activities directly contributed to the men's high morale.

g. Awards and Decorations:

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVIC-WE

31  
10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>Approved</u>	<u>Pending</u> (This Qtr)	<u>Pending</u> (Last Qtr)
MOH	1	0	1	0
DSC	1	1	1	0
DSM	1	0	1	0
LM	4	1	3	0
SS	22	11	14	1
DFC	7	5	4	0
SM	13	2	14	0
BS	225	189	91	8
AM	350	367	195	18
ACM	241	192	141	5

In addition, 149 Purple Hearts were awarded.

h. Prisoners of War: The Blackhorse detachment of the 720th Military Police Battalion processed 12 detainees during the quarter. Of these none was deemed a prisoner of war.

i. Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order:

(1) Courts Martial: During the quarter, the following courts martial were processed:

	<u>Tried</u>	<u>Pending</u>
General	2	2
Special	5	0
Summary	7	1

(2) Serious Incidents: There were no serious incidents reported.

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

33

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

(3) During the quarter, the largest number of MP reports concerned traffic violations, with larceny second. Formal MP patrols continued around the base camp. No change in incident statistics was noted during the quarter.

j. Problems: There were no significant problems noted during the quarter.

## 8. (FOUO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: The PSYOP program supported regimental combat operations in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh, Hau Nghia, and Phuoc Long Provinces during the quarter. There were fewer missions than usual due to the fact that during the TET counteroffensive in February and much of March, the regiment had no area of operations, and squadrons were under the operational control of other units.

b. Fifty-eight aerial leaflet missions were flown, during which 3,599, 600 leaflets were dropped in support of operations. These leaflets consisted primarily of rally appeals (Chieu Hoi Program), safe conduct passes, reward leaflets, and announcements concerning the Viet Cong mining of civilian vehicles during and immediately after the TET offensive. Two ground missions distributed 9000 JUSPAO Newsletters, safe conduct passes, rally instructions, and sanitation leaflets during MEDCAPS. During 57 of the aerial missions, a combined quarterly total of 40 hours and 15 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts were made. Most tapes were produced by the supporting PSYOP Field Team and regimental interpreters and covered specific incidents or situations. Ten and one-half hours of ground loudspeaker broadcasts were also made during MEDCAF missions.

c. Only one rallier reported to the regiment during this quarter; he was a returning ARVN soldier who had been captured by the Viet Cong a short time before.

d. The attitude of the majority of the population of Long Khanh Province remained generally favorable toward the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. However, fear of the Viet Cong or apathy continued to hamper efforts of collecting detailed information of immediate tactical value. The regiment did not operate in Binh Tuy Province during this quarter.

## 9. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: Extensive operations outside the provinces of Long Khanh

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

34

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

and Binh Tuy, the Regimental Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) caused a reduction in the civic action projects during this quarter. Because of operations in relatively unpopulated areas and the intensity of operations during the VC TET offensive, the number of MEDCAP missions conducted was limited. During the quarter, 35 MEDCAP were conducted, treating 2,250 patients.

b. Civic Action:

(1) During the quarter, the following commodities were distributed:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Fertilizer (captured)	19,000 lbs
Rice (captured)	11,536 lbs
Foodstuffs	10,280 lbs
Sandbags	2,300
Scrap lumber	172,550 board ft
Clothing	30 lbs
Used tin sheets	2,507 sheets
School kits	200
Bulger wheat	1800 lbs
Cement	68 bags
Culverts	40 - 18" sections

(2) The majority of these materials were used for the relief of TET offensive refugees without food or housing. Revolutionary Development Teams and local villagers performed the actual construction.

(3) The regiment supported the 52nd Ranger Battalion Dependent Housing Project with quantities of tin and cement. This project was begun in July 1967 and had progressed slowly until February 1968 when the TET offensive halted all construction. Since March the regiment provided

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

35

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

50,000 VN\$ per month from its civic action fund to purchase cement for this project. Used tin was also supplied as roofing material. This aid will continue until all the projected houses are completed. All actual construction labor was performed by the ARVN Rangers.

(4) The regiment provided 200 sheets of tin to victims of an accidental Vietnamese Air Force bombing of Xuan Loc on 5 Apr 68. Other material for the rebuilding of homes came from Long Khanh MACCORDS.

(5) On 24 Apr the regiment provided 60,000 VN\$ from the civic action fund to drill four wells for new RF outposts on National Highway 1.

(6) The regiment collected 35,750 VN\$ for the TET Aggression Relief Project (TARP), of which 7,000 VN\$ were spent. The remainder of the funds will be reserved for future civic action projects since it was not needed in Long Khanh or Binh Tuy Provinces at this time.

## d. Impact Program:

(1) General: Support and improvement of RF/PP outposts continued during the quarter. The VC TET offensive had one beneficial result: it improved the receptiveness of provincial outposts toward regimental support. A shortage of sandbags throughout the quarter hindered the repair of outpost bunkers.

(2) The following types and amounts of building material were devoted to the Impact Program during the Quarter:

<u>Barbed Wire (rolls)</u>	<u>Concertina (rolls)</u>	<u>Pickets</u>	<u>Sandbags</u>	<u>GP Tents</u>
174	493	1,333	95,400	2
<u>Tin Roofing (sheets)</u>	<u>Trip Flares</u>	<u>Lumber (bd ft)</u>	<u>Claymores</u>	<u>M-79</u>
984	315	37,500	176	432
<u>55-gallon Drum</u>	<u>155mm Ammo</u>	<u>155mm Illum</u>	<u>Grenades</u>	<u>M-72 LAW</u>
62	800	184	253	45

(3) Status of RF/PP Outposts: At the beginning of the quarter (1 Feb) and at the end of the quarter (30 Apr) the following number of RF/PP outposts were classified as shown: (See Standards of Evaluation

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

36

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)  
of RF/PF Outposts, Incl 7.)

	<u>Long Khanh Province</u>		<u>Binh Tuy Province</u>	
	1 Feb	30 Apr	1 Feb	30 Apr
Category A	3	8	0	0
Category B	16	19	7	8
Category C	14	8	1	1
Category D	5	2	1	1

## 10. (U) INFORMATION:

### a. General:

(1) The events of the quarterly period provided the best news material available to the 17th Public Information Detachment since the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived in Vung Tau in the fall of 1966. The detachment provided a quantity of printed and photographic releases far excelling any other quarterly period.

(2) Operating in the regimental field location, the detachment provided escort for civilian newsmen representing the press, radio and television. Because of this outside coverage, and as a result of daily operational summaries provided to USARV Information Office by the detachment, the regiment's activities were reported in numerous major and local stateside newspapers.

(3) A feature story on the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's move into Operation ADAIRSVILLE, written upon request from the II Field Force Information Office, appeared in the April 1968 Hurricane magazine and has been accepted for future publication in Armor and Army Digest, both army-wide publications.

(4) 17th Public Information Detachment photographs from Operation ADAIRSVILLE were featured in double-page spreads in both The Army Reporter and The Saigon Post newspapers, as were individual photographs.

### b. Statistical Summary:

30

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*37*

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

- (1) A total of 527 hometown news releases (DA Form 1526) were forwarded by 17th PID to the Army Home Town News Center.
- (2) A USARV tape team interviewing Blackhorse troopers reached their goal of 150 interviews conducted, all of which were forwarded to the Army Home Town News Center.
- (3) A total of 44 news releases and 68 photo releases were given general distribution.
- (4) A total of 30 news representatives were provided support.
- (5) A total of 20 formal press interviews or briefings held by commanders and key staff officers were arranged for the benefit of these visiting news personnel.

II. (C) BASE CAMP DEVELOPMENT:

a. Development:

- (1) The Blackhorse Regiment was absent from base camp during the reporting period. The 27th Engineer Battalion (C) continued to provide horizontal construction for self-help billets and other construction up to mid-March when the battalion began preparation for PCS movement on 30 Mar. The other major engineer projects and their status follow:
  - (a) Airfield parking apron - 50% complete.
  - (b) Airfield drainage basin - completed by PA&E.
  - (c) Ten-point helicopter refueling station - constructed by 27th Engr Bn and put into operation by the 506th S&S Co.
  - (d) Supply warehouses - completed one each for the engineer battalion area and the 1st Squadron.
  - (e) Service club - site prepared.
  - (f) Two-story billet - began as a pilot model for future self-help building by two units on base camp.
  - (g) Concrete maintenance pads - suspended.

31

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFCR (R1)

31

(2) In order that development would not come to a complete standstill, a platoon of the 36th Engineer Battalion (C) was stationed at Blackhorse until the arrival of the 31st Engineer Battalion (C) on 20 Apr. The platoon, with limited equipment, provided some horizontal construction enabling units to continue the self-help billet program and in addition continued the vertical construction of the two-story billets.

(3) PA&E completed 63 job order requests in the amount of \$58,128.00 and applied asphalt surface treatment to 70% of the interior road network. In addition the drainage system was improved with work on ditches, culverts, and headwall.

(4) The 27th Engineer Battalion was permitted to employ no more than 25% of the total battalion effort on base camp development. For the first two weeks of March this effort increased to approximately 35% but fell off sharply on receipt of PCS orders to less than 20% and in the last week of March, to less than 10%.

32

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

39

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: Contact in jungle areas.

EVALUATION: An assessment of the strength and disposition of an enemy in a heavily forested area when contact is made is extremely difficult. All combat power available cannot be concentrated on the area of contact, and the enemy is able to make excellent use of tank-killer teams to delay the advance of armored units. Dismounted infantry should be employed to precede, flank, and be integrated throughout an advancing armor formation to: provide necessary security, reduce the possibility of an ambush, nullify the effectiveness of enemy tank-killer teams, and give a better estimate of the enemy's disposition.

(2) OBSERVATION: The troop/company-sized night ambush.

EVALUATION: When intelligence indicates that there are numerous VC resupply activities at night, it was determined that an aggressive ambush plan will disrupt this activity. The technique used was to position an ACAV troop and an ARVN company astride the known resupply route. This force would not move into position until dusk. Upon arrival at a preselected patrol base, the ARVN infantry would establish platoon-sized ambush patrols. An ACAV platoon would be assigned as a reaction force for each ambush, and four to six US personnel equipped with a PRC-25 radio and a starlight scope would be sent with each ambush platoon to maintain US communication with the patrol base.

RECOMMENDATION: This technique, which proved successful on nine different occasions, should be used more frequently to counter VC night resupply movements.

(3) OBSERVATION: Use of the armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) in the dry season.

EVALUATION: On occasion in certain areas during the dry season

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

46

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

there is a limited need for the organic AVLB. The following field expedients were used successfully. One bridge and its launcher were located with a squadron CP. The bridge was positioned to provide overhead cover for the underground TOC. This partially eliminated the need to carry excessive quantities of fortification materials. The launcher was then equipped with a towbar and used to assist in the battlefield recovery of disabled vehicles, allowing the combat vehicles to remain in battle. To conserve tank combat strength another AVLB was used to precede squadron resupply convoys between Duc Hoa and Tan Son Nhut. It was used because intelligence indicated that any mines encountered along the route would be small but sufficient to destroy a wheeled vehicle. The launcher would detonate the mine with minimum damage.

(4) OBSERVATION: Problem of forcing CS gas into VC tunnels.

EVALUATION: When checking VC tunnel complexes with CS gas, it is often difficult to get gas to flow through the tunnel. One solution is to throw one CS grenade into the tunnel and follow it with a fragmentation grenade which lands between the CS grenade and the tunnel entrance. The ensuing explosion will cause the gas to be blown through the tunnel complex.

c. Training: None

d. Intelligence:

(1) OBSERVATION: Intelligence indicators.

EVALUATION: During the 3rd Squadron 11th ACR operations while in direct support of the 25th Infantry Division (ARVN) near Duc Hoa, there were several indicators available to the aerial observers in determining whether fortified hamlets were occupied by the VC. Some of the indicators which suggested the presence of VC were: the lack of cattle around the hamlet; makeshift houses in the rice paddies surrounding the hamlet; the presence of chickens without people tending them.

RECOMMENDATION: That aerial observers be alerted to the foregoing indicators of enemy activity.

(2) OBSERVATION: Tide data for inland rivers.

EVALUATION: Elements of the regiment have conducted river crossing operations on inland rivers in the II Field Force area twice during

# CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

41

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

the past quarter. In both operations, the rivers had tidal changes of three to four feet that greatly influenced the speed and manner in which the crossings were conducted. The nearest tidal information was for the Saigon River at Saigon. Although both rivers flowed into the Saigon River, the Saigon tidal chart bore no correlation to the tides at the crossing sites.

RECOMMENDATION: That a study of the river tides in the II Field Force Area be made and disseminated down to regiment level.

e. Logistics:

(1) OBSERVATION: A need exists for a full-tracked vehicle to transport the flamethrower service unit for each organic M132A1 Flamethrower.

EVALUATION: On Operation TOAN THANG while the regiment was operating in terrain untrafficable to wheeled vehicles, it was found that the employment of the flamethrowers was extremely limited. The track-mounted flamethrower could not be accompanied in combat operations by its service unit which was mounted on a 2½-ton truck. The wheeled vehicles were located in the trains area in Phuoc Vinh during the operation and could not negotiate the terrain into the battle areas around Buanard. It was necessary to airlift the service units by C-130 aircraft or CH-54 helicopters to a forward support area. This was a time-consuming and costly manner of resupply. In order to fully utilize the combat capability of the flamethrower, a service unit must be immediately responsive for resupply. The M548 Cargo Carrier which has the capacity to negotiate the same terrain as the M132A1 Flamethrower can best be utilized to provide this resupply.

RECOMMENDATION: That nine M548 Cargo Carriers each equipped with a flamethrower service unit be issued to the 11th ACR.

(2) OBSERVATION: The level of fill of the Prescribed Load List (PLL) has been inadequate.

EVALUATION: In the past several months, the fill for the PLL has remained at approximately 50%. Each squadron has about 1500 line items; during this quarter, about 750 lines were at zero balance. During this period of extensive field operations, the need was ever present for adequate PLL. Far too many vehicles were deadlined because of the lack of PLL items. With only half of the PLL on hand, sustained combat operations were

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

hampered.

RECOMMENDATION: That immediate attention be given to raising significantly the level of fill for PLL items.

(3) OBSERVATION: Self-service supply.

EVALUATION: The Self-service Supply Store for Blackhorse Base Camp is operated by the 506th Supply and Service Company. The store carries 720 separate items of supply. At the end of the quarter, 536 of these items were at zero balance. As a result, the units of Blackhorse Base Camp were without the very basic office supplies necessary for day to day operation. Requisitions for the needed items have been submitted to the 506th Field Depot but have remained unfilled. The service provided by this store during this quarter showed little improvement over the service provided in July 1967 when the store was first opened.

RECOMMENDATION: That immediate action be taken to fill the outstanding requisitions of the Self-service Supply Store.

f. Organization:

(1) OBSERVATION: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment has a definite requirement for a support battalion such as those organic to all other separate brigade-sized organizations in Vietnam.

EVALUATION: While this void may have been partially filled by the assignment of a 1st Logistical Command Supply and Service Company and a Light Maintenance Company to the Blackhorse Base Camp, this solution is not satisfactory. The regiment has no control over the staffing of these two organizations, nor can it direct the efforts of the companies into areas of priority based on the regiment's assessment of its requirements. These are area support units which support other organizations in addition to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and, therefore, are limited in what they can send to the field to support the regiment during field operations. When separated by distance from the Blackhorse Base Camp, all logistical paperwork must be returned from the field location for processing. Spare parts supply, salvage of equipment, and pickup of issue all become major transportation problems under this concept. Personnel, finance, and other administrative matters should be coordinated in an organic administrative company. The need for an immediately responsive support battalion was especially prevalent during this period of extensive field operations. The lack of such a support battalion seriously limits the mobility of the regi-

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

43

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

ment.

RECOMMENDATION: That a support battalion comparable to those organic to other brigade-sized organizations in Vietnam should be assigned to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

(2) OBSERVATION: There is a need in a Tank Company, Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, for a M577 Carrier Command Post.

EVALUATION: The experience of over a year and a half of combat operations by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in RVN proves that the tank company commander needs a M577 Carrier Command Post. Habitually, squadrons operate with four teams formed by cross-attachment among troops. Lacking a M577 Carrier, the tank team commander is severely handicapped in comparison to the commander of an Armored Cavalry Troop. During this quarter infantry companies were frequently attached to the cavalry squadrons. The lack of a M577 Carrier in the tank company not only handicapped the tank company commander but limited the flexibility of the squadron commander.

RECOMMENDATION: That the request for a M577 with crew in proposed MTOE 17-27G for Tank Companies, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, submitted to the Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, on 21 Oct 67 be given immediate favorable attention.

g. Communications:

(1) OBSERVATION: The AN/VRC-29 RATT equipment is not satisfactory for long-distance communications over 25 miles.

EVALUATION: The power (100 watts) of the AN/VRC-29 coupled with the poor operating frequencies available make it extremely difficult to operate at distances over 25 miles. The only way communications can be maintained is with the doublet antenna and by constant transmissions to keep the frequency clear.

RECOMMENDATION: The AN/VSC-3 radio should be issued as soon as possible and a quick erect antenna be adapted, possibly a 32-foot crank-up whip antenna.

(2) OBSERVATION: A requirement exists to retransmit secure voice communications.

EVALUATION: The regiment often operates at great distances

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

44

AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

from the control headquarters, thereby requiring FM radio retransmission facilities. At the present time, no facilities exist to retransmit secure voice. As ever increasing emphasis is being given to communications security and the use of secure voice FM equipment, this limitation becomes constantly more serious.

RECOMMENDATION: That a secure voice retransmission capability be provided the 11th ACR as soon as possible.

h. Medical:

(1) OBSERVATION: Inability to carry vaccine into the field due to lack of portable refrigerators.

EVALUATION: Regimental and squadron aid stations are in need of a portable refrigeration unit which would allow carrying vaccines in the field during combat operations. Based on experience gained on long field operations, mass immunizations can best be coordinated and administered from the forward area aid station and not through base camp medical facilities.

RECOMMENDATION: A field vaccine refrigeration capability for the regimental and squadron aid stations should be immediately provided.

i. Base Camp Development:

(1) OBSERVATION: There is a critical shortage of generators 60 KW and above at Blackhorse Base Camp.

EVALUATION: In the past eight months, P&E has submitted job order requests for 17 generators, 60 KW and above. During the quarter, one 150 KW, one 100 KW, and two 60 KW generators have been turned in for repair or replacement. To date no action has been taken to replace these generators. The 7th Surgical Hospital does not have sufficient power to operate mission essential equipment. The Class I refrigeration facility is operating with a generator in need of overhaul. One water point is not operating due to a lack of power. The other overworked water point is powered by a generator on a temporary loan basis. The entire base camp is provided with less than 1000 KW of power.

RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken immediately to provide adequate power for Blackhorse Base Camp.

(2) OBSERVATION: A need exists for an engineer light equipment

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

45  
AVIC-WE

10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

company with an asphalt distributing capability to be attached to the 31st Engineer Battalion (C).


EVALUATION: The dust problem at Blackhorse Base Camp is severe and has had an adverse effect on aircraft availability. The requirement for surface stabilization is urgent for maintenance areas, refueling point, taxiway, and parking apron. The base camp road networks need extensive maintenance work for sanitation and safety reasons for both wet and dry seasons. In addition such a company would be invaluable to the regiment's civic action program and for (when available) assisting in upgrading the routes of communication in the Xuan Loc - Blackhorse area.

RECOMMENDATION: That the 31st Engineer Battalion (C) be augmented by an engineer light equipment company with asphalt distributing equipment.

(3) OBSERVATION: A need exists to complete the program of horizontal and vertical construction prior to the rainy season.

EVALUATION: The 27th Engineer Battalion (C) provided horizontal construction for self-help billets and other construction until it departed Blackhorse Base Camp on 30 Mar. At present there is a 10-12 battalion-month backlog of authorized and directed engineer effort at Blackhorse. Unless this backlog is eliminated, all units will again have a large percentage of personnel in tents throughout the entire rainy season. Further, such engineer constructed facilities as the service club, aircraft maintenance hangars, and track vehicle maintenance areas will continue to be postponed.

RECOMMENDATION: That Headquarters, 31st Engineer Battalion (C) remain at Blackhorse Base Camp and a minimum of two engineer companies be utilized full time to reduce the engineer backlog at Blackhorse.

  
JOHN F. MC ARDLE  
LTC, Armor  
Acting Commander

39

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

47

AVFBC-RE-H (10 May 68) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 JUN 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.

2. (C) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons  
Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with it with the  
following exceptions:

a. Para li (2), Section II. The attachment of a light equipment  
company cannot be justified based upon the reasons cited. Blackhorse Base  
Camp does have unusually severe dust problems due to the large amount of  
tracked vehicle traffic on post. Paving of extensive on-post areas is not  
considered justified at this time in light of the backlog of LOC paving  
on National routes. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment could increase its  
organic capability to control dust by obtaining an asphalt distributor or  
similar equipment through one or a combination of the following means:  
the ENSURE Program, a modification to the TOE or a temporary loan.

b. Para li (3), Section II. While 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's  
self help construction capability is less than that of other combat units  
because of frequent requirements to operate away from its base camp, the  
backlog at Blackhorse Base Camp is not seriously greater than at other  
base camps. Base camp construction must continue to be of lower priority  
than combat support and LOC construction and repair. There are insufficient  
engineer assets in the force structure to assign an engineer battalion (-)  
to the sole mission of base development support.

3. (C) With reference to para li (1), Section II, it should be noted  
that generators continue to be in short supply throughout Vietnam. Base  
camp demands have outstripped planning figures primarily because of a  
continued growing demand for air conditioning, refrigeration and cooking  
equipment. Maintenance capability of R and U contractor has also not  
always lived up to expectations with the result that equipment failure  
has exceeded normal US Army experience factors.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

98 *[Signature]*  
O. R. FORY  
46 1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

48

AVHGC-DST (10 May 68) 2d Ind (C)

CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (RL)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 **8 JUL 1968**

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning tide data for inland rivers, page 34, paragraph 1d(1): Concur. The following actions have been taken to obtain the required data.

(1) On 24 January 1968 the USARV Hydrographic Survey Team #1 (HST #1) was activated.

(2) Tide staffs and recording tide gauges are being installed at critical points in the inland waterway system.

(3) A plan is being formulated to perform hydrographic surveys of inland waterways on a systematic basis. This data is being plotted on 1:25,000 scale monochrome pictomap bases suitable for Ozalid reproduction and distribution to using units. The hydro data will also be incorporated into future editions of the printed pictomaps.

(4) The responsibility for collection and dissemination of tide data currently rests with the US Navy but the subject is presently under study by MACV.

b. Reference item concerning M548 Cargo Carriers M132A1 flame thrower service unit, page 35, paragraph 2e(1). MTOE action has been taken as part of Phase II Standardization to include the M548 carrier with service unit in the flame thrower section of the HMT of each Armored Cavalry Squadron. Approval of the MTOE will provide requisition authority.

47

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

49

AVHGC-DST (10 May 68) 2d Ind (C)

3 JUL 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

c. Reference item concerning the level of fill of the PLL has been inadequate, page 35, paragraph 2e(2): Concur. Repair parts support to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment is rendered by the 551st Light Maintenance Company (DS), a 1st Logistical Command unit. A letter is being prepared to 1st Logistical Command requesting an investigation of the high level of zero balances and correction of the problem if responsibility is within DSU or Depot; plus comparison of PLI's and ASL and reconciliation of requisitions.

d. Reference item concerning self-service supply, page 36, paragraph 2e(3): Concur. The self-service supply store is operated by the 506th Supply and Service Company, a subordinate unit of the 1st Logistical Command. A letter will be sent to the 1st Logistical Command informing them of this situation and directing them to take necessary action to insure that adequate supplies are on hand at the self-service supply store.

e. Reference item concerning a requirement for a support battalion, page 36, paragraph 2f(1). A requirement for additional combat service support is recognized for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. However, the suggested support battalion configuration is considered excessive for the needs of the ACR. It is suggested that a survey be conducted to determine the essential support required. Upon completion of the survey available assets should be screened to satisfy the requirement.

f. Reference item concerning M577 carrier command post, page 37, paragraph 2f(a). The tank company is authorized two M48A3 tanks in the headquarters section, plus three APC M113 in the company. Redistribution of assets should accommodate the requirement.

g. Reference item concerning unsatisfactory long distance communication using the AN/VRC-29, page 37, paragraph 2g. The family of HF RATT radio equipment with which Army units in RVN are equipped is in the process of being replaced. The 100 watt AN/VRC-29 is scheduled to be replaced by the 400 watt AN/VSC-3. Based on present shipping schedules and the current priority of issue in USARV units, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment should receive the AN/VSC-3 equipment during the period August and September, 1968. It should be noted, however, the AN/VRC-29, is capable of operation over distances far greater than 25 miles. Lack of successful operation over greater distances than reported indicates a major frequency interference problem of long standing, a maintenance problem and/or a lack of

42

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

50

AVHGC-DST (10 May 68) 2d Ind (C)

8 JUL 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period  
Ending 30 Apr 68 RCS CSFOR (R1)

operator proficiency. Interference problems are to be reported in accord-  
with USARV CEI item 56-4; none are known to have been reported by this  
unit.

h. Reference item concerning secure voice retransmission facilities,  
page 38, paragraph 2g(2). The KY-8 used in conjunction with the AN/VRC-12  
family of FM radio equipment has provided USARV units an FM secure voice  
capability since the latter part of 1966. The introduction of the HYL-  
3/TSEC into this command is planned for late FY-69 and early FY-70, based  
on current service testing.

i. Reference item concerning inability to carry vaccine into the  
field due to lack of portable refrigerators, page 38, paragraph 2h(1).  
Action has been taken to authorize the issue of FSN 4110-707-2550, Refrig-  
erator, Mechanical Biological. This 2.85 cubic foot capacity refrigerator  
will adequately satisfy the requirement for refrigeration of vaccines when  
units are deployed during combat operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*

C. S. NAKATSUKASA

Major, AAC

Acting Adjutant General

Copies furnished:  
HQ, 11th ACR  
HQ, II FFORCEV

48

**CONFIDENTIAL**

51

GPOP-DT (10 May 68) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cav Regiment  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*OK/Short*

44

**CONFIDENTIAL**

53

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop  
Air Cavalry Troop  
919th Engineer Company (Armored)  
37th Medical Company  
506th Supply and Service Company (Support)  
551st Light Maintenance Company (Support)  
1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion  
7th Army Postal Unit  
17th Public Information Detachment  
28th Military History Detachment  
398th Transportation Detachment  
9th Signal Detachment (Avionics Maintenance)  
409th Radio Research Unit  
541st Military Intelligence Detachment  
5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSYOP Battalion  
202nd Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop  
A Troop  
B Troop  
C Troop  
D Company  
Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop  
E Troop  
F Troop  
G Troop  
H Company  
Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop  
I Troop  
K Troop  
L Troop  
M Company  
Howitzer Battery

Inc 1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

55

OPCON STATUS OF THE 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

During the reporting period (1 Feb - 30 Apr) HQ, 11th ACR remained OPCON to HQ, II Field Force, Vietnam.

The OPCON status of the squadron and subordinate units follows:

HQ, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OPCON HQ</u>
1 Feb - 30 Apr	11th ACR

Subordinate Units  
(When Not OPCON to HQ, 1st Sqdn)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OPCON HQ</u>
2 - 5 Feb	Trp A	1/18th Inf, 1st Inf Div
5 - 10 Feb	Trp B	II FFV
10 - 20 Feb	Trp B	4/39th Inf, 9th Inf Div
21 Feb - 8 Mar	Trp C	11th ACR
8 - 14 Mar	Trp C	199th Lt Inf Bde
26 Mar - 10 Apr	Trp A	11th ACR
26 - 27 Mar	Trp B	11th ACR
27 - 28 Mar	Trp B	101st Abn Div
28 Mar - 10 Apr	Trp B	11th ACR

HQ, 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OPCON HQ</u>
1 - 2 Feb	11th ACR
2 - 18 Feb	101st Abn Div
18 Feb - 6 Mar	3rd Bde, 101st Abn Div
6 - 22 Mar	199th Lt Inf Bde
22 Mar - 6 Apr	1st Inf Div
6 - 30 Apr	11th ACR

Subordinate Units  
(When Not OPCON to HQ, 2nd Sqdn)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OPCON HQ</u>
2 - 4 Feb	Trp F	2/506th Inf

Incl 3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

76

# CONFIDENTIAL

56

4 - 7 Feb	Trp F	3/187th Inf
7 - 9 Feb	Trp G	2/502nd Inf
7 - 13 Feb	Trp E	3/327th Inf
24 Feb - 5 Mar	Trp G	199th Lt Inf Bde
9 - 16 Mar	Trp E	4/12th Inf
21 Mar - 6 Apr	Trp F	1/26th Inf

## Hq, 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OPCON HQ</u>
1 - 7 Feb	11th ACR
7 - 23 Feb	199th Lt Inf Bde
23 Feb - 1 Mar	25th Inf Div
1 Mar - 21 Apr	11th ACR
21 - 30 Apr	2nd Bde, 1st Inf Div

## Subordinate Units (When Not OPCON to Hq, 3rd Sqdn)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OPCON HQ</u>
1 - 11 Feb	Trp K	1st Bde, 1st Inf Div
5 - 17 Feb	Trp I	2nd Bde, 1st Inf Div
17 - 24 Feb	Trp L	2nd Bde, 1st Inf Div
10 - 17 Mar	Trp K	199th Lt Inf Bde
18 - 31 Mar	Trp K	1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
1 - 10 Apr	Trp K	1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
16 - 18 Apr	Co M	1st Sqdn, 11th ACR
18 - 21 Apr	Co M	1st Bn, 18th Inf
23 - 30 Apr	Trp I	2nd Bn, 39th Armor

# CONFIDENTIAL

47

**'CONFIDENTIAL**

57

ARMY AVIATION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. Sorties Flown:

	<u>Command &amp; Control</u>	<u>Troop Lift</u>	<u>Cargo Lift</u>	<u>Casualty Evacuation</u>
OH-23G	2750			
UH-1D	635	555	70	40
	<u>Aerial Fire Support &amp; Reaction Forces</u>		<u>Administrative</u>	<u>Reconnaissance</u>
OH-23G			290	46
UH-1C	2140			8
UH-1D			1790	82
	<u>Number of Passengers</u>	<u>Tons Cargo</u>	<u>Hours Flown</u>	<u>Fuel Consumed (in gal.)</u>
OH-23G	1360		1410	23,970
UH-1C			1315	96,000
UH-1D	5170	75	1600	78,900

2. Results of Fire:

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
VC killed-confirmed	8	13	11	32
VC killed-estimated	31	93	24	148
Structures damaged	21	26	14	61
Structures destroyed	17	13	9	39

3. Ammunition Consumed:

7.62mm      2.75 inch      40mm  
1,052,800 rounds    4070 rounds    7595 rounds

4. Aircraft Availability: (Expressed in percentages of assigned aircraft)

Incl 4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

48

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	OH-23G	UH-1D	UH-1C
Feb	58	59	81
Mar	52	57	69
Apr	46	68	73

51

49

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

54

AIR FORCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. O-1 Sorties:

<u>VR</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Hours</u>
285	281	566	1160

2. Tactical Air Sorties:

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Number of Sorties</u>
F100	274
F4C	16
B-57	4
C-47	4
A-1	4
A-37	70

3. Ordnance:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number of Rounds</u>
M-65	12
M-117	242
M-82	625
M-81	36
NAP	453
20mm	76,900
7.62	6,000
CBU	30
Rockets	78

4. Bomb Damage Assessment:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
KBA	104
KBA (Poss)	84
Truck Bridge destroyed	1
Footbridge destroyed	1
Road plow destroyed	1
Bulldozer destroyed	1
Fuel barrels destroyed	6
Cal. .50 positions destroyed	8
Machinegun positions destroyed	4

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Intel 5

50

**CONFIDENTIAL**

46


Secondary fires	4
Secondary Explosions	15
Trails uncovered (in meters)	100
Bunkers destroyed	117
Bunkers uncovered	31
Spider holes opened	12
Trench opened (in meters)	430
Military structures damaged	7
Military structures destroyed	36
Hooches destroyed	16
Sampans destroyed	8
Structures destroyed	71
Structures damaged	10
Tunnel entrance uncovered	1

51

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

61  
VIET CONG ORDER OF BATTLE



\* VC SUB-REGION E-2


Tac 8

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**MAP OF 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT OPERATIONS**

(1 Feb - 30 Apr)



53

Inc! 9

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) DACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Confidential
		2b. GROUP 4
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) <u>Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations.</u> 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68 (U)		
5. AUTHORISER (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment		
6. REPORT DATE 10 May 1968	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 54	7b. NO. OF REPS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 682336	
9. PROJECT NO. N/A	10. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned (to report))	
11. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
12. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		13. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY DACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
14. ABSTRACT		

65  
The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

\* SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\* FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

\* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

\*\* FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

\*\*\*Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

- - - FOLD - - -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OACSFOR

Washington, D.C. 20310

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

STAPLE

**OFFICIAL BUSINESS**

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
ATTN: Operational Reports Branch  
Headquarters, Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

STAPLE

DA Label 10, 1 Apr 80 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE.

16-78643-1

- - - FOLD - - -

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD392143

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: **unclassified**

FROM: **confidential**

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

**Approved for public release, distribution  
unlimited**

FROM:

**Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.  
agencies and their contractors;  
Administrative/Operational Use; 09 MAY  
1968. Other requests shall be referred to  
Office of the Adjutant General,  
Washington, DC 20301.**

AUTHORITY

**AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980**

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

# **SECURITY**

---

# **MARKING**

**The classified or limited status of this report applies  
to each page, unless otherwise marked.  
Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.**

---

**THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF  
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,  
U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF  
ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY  
LAW.**

**NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other  
data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi-  
nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government  
thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and  
the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any  
way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not  
to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing  
the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights  
or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that  
may in any way be related thereto.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (29 Jul 68) FOR OT RD 682061 15 August 1968  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th  
General Support Group, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

**AD392143**

SEE DISTRIBUTION

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals  
US Continental Army Command  
US Army Combat Developments Command  
Commandants  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
US Army Ordnance School  
US Army Quartermaster School  
US Army Transportation School

DDC  
REF ID: A65115  
AUG 30 1968  
REF ID: A65116

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army  
Deputy Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Engineers  
Chief of Research and Development  
Assistant Chiefs of Staff  
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)

Regraded unclassified when separated  
from classified inclosure.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS;  
DOD-DIR 5200.10  
DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;

CONFIDENTIAL

3  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 29TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP  
A&O US FORCES 96491

AVCA SGN SG 0

9 May 1968

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal (U)

Deputy Commanding General  
US Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHCC-DST  
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief  
US Army, Pacific  
ATTN: GPOF OT  
APO 96558

(U) The Operational Report of this headquarters for the quarter period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded in accordance with Department of the Army Regulation 1-19 and US Army Vietnam Regulation 870-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Roy J. Farmer*

ROY J. FARMER  
MAJ, AGC  
Adjutant

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

CONFIDENTIAL

5

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 29TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP  
AFO US FORCES 96491

AVCA SGN SG 0

9 May 1968

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968

(RCS-CSFOR-65)

7  
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARAGRAPH	PAGE
SECTION I, SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	
A. COMMAND	1
B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE, AND DISCIPLINE	1
C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	3
D. PLANS AND OPERATIONS	5
E. LOGISTICS	7
F. SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS	13
1. JUDGE ADVOCATE	13
2. CIVIL AFFAIRS	14
3. S-4	15
4. COMMUNICATIONS	17
SECTION II, COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	
A. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE	18
B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	22
C. PLANS AND OPERATIONS	22
D. LOGISTICS	23
E. JUDGE ADVOCATE	27

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVCA SGN SG O

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS  
CSFR05 (U)(S)

9  
THRU:

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Forces Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

A. COMMAND:

(U) The 29th General Support Group was engaged in its operational mission for 90 days of the reporting period.

B. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

1. (U) The personnel strength of the 29th General Support Group at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

a. Authorized (includes augmentation from USASUTCOM, Saigon).

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
279	117	6994	7390

b. Assigned (includes augmentation from USASUTCOM, Saigon).

211	99	5629	5939
-----	----	------	------

2. (U) The following awards and decorations were processed for members assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period.

a. Legion of Merit: 1

b. Bronze Star Medal: 3

c. Army Commendation Medal: 5

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

FOR OT RD  
682061

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

d. Purple Heart: 0

e. USASU COM, Saigon Certificate of Achievement: 5.

10

3. (U) The R&R spaces to areas indicated below, were utilized by personnel of HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period:

<u>AREA</u>	<u>NO SPACES UTILIZED</u>
Australia	4
Bangkok	8
Hawaii	20
Hong Kong	1
Kuala Lumpur	0
Manila	0
Penang	1
Singapore	1
Taipei	4
Tokyo	0

4. (U) Military police citations were issued to 22 individuals of HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period. Offenses included traffic, off-limits, and curfew violations.

5. (U) Promotions of enlisted personnel assigned to HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period were as follows:

To Pay Grade:	<u>E7</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>Total</u>
No. of Allocations Received	1	1	13	16	31
No. of EM Promoted	1	1	13	16	31

6. (U) Reenlistment data for HHC, 29th General Support Group during the reporting period:

a. Number of EM who reenlisted: 25

b. Number of EM who redeployed to the CONUS for separation and were eligible for reenlistment: 53

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

c. Number of EM who redeployed to CONUS for separation and were not eligible for reenlistment: 0

7. (U) Changes of Key personnel:

a. COL Thomas J. McDonald, OrdC, replaced COL Milton S. Hochmuth, OrdC, as Group Commander on 6 April 1968.

b. The Executive Officer, LTC Anthony Zarkovich, QMC, was replaced by LTC Edward M. Ridlehoover, OrdC, on 6 February 1968.

c. The Logistics Officer, LTC William A. Alfonte, OrdC, departed on 28 February 1968. The position of Logistics Officer was held temporarily by Major John Lewis until LTC Robert W. Wagers, QMC, arrived on 19 March 1968 and was appointed the Logistics Officer.

d. LTC Selvyn H. French, CE, was assigned as Chief, Administrative Division on 11 February 1968.

e. CPT George F. Bentley, AGC, replaced Major Gordon A. Czawa, QMC, on 4 April 1968 as Civil Affairs Officer.

C. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (C) Enemy activity during the reporting period was highlighted by the TET Offensive, a renewed offensive on the 18th of February, and indications of development of another mass offensive during the latter part of April. As of the close of the period this new offensive had not been initiated, but was still expected for the near future. Harassing and probing actions, and stand-off rocket and mortar attacks also characterized the enemy effort.

2. (C) A new development during the period was the use of 122mm rockets against the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. On 18 February, 5 March, 13 March, and 1 April the ASD received rocket attacks. On 18 February a pad was hit by a rocket, causing explosions and extensive destruction. On 1 April several rockets landed in the 3rd Ordnance Battalion Cantonment Area resulting in 4 KHA and 2 WHA. The principal threats to the ASD are stand-off

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

12

attacks, penetration by sapper teams, and large ground attacks by VC or NVA forces.

3. (C) Major incidents occurring at locations of interest to this command during the reporting period were:

a. At 100300 February 1968 Tan An, XS5565, received approximately 250 rounds of mortar fire, followed by a ground attack. An estimated 120 rounds impacted in the vicinity of the 483rd Field Service Company laundry site. Results: 483rd casualties - 1 KHA and 3 WHA; damage - 2 Eidal units destroyed and one bath unit damaged. There were a total of 16 friendlies KHA and 123 VC KIA in the attack of Tan An.

b. At 180106 February 1968 the LBASD received 6 rounds of 122mm rocket fire and possible mortar fire. One rocket hit Pad I-8 (dynamite) causing a tremendous explosion and starting many fires. At 0145 an estimated 50 ~ 100 VC were sighted to the front of Tower 15, YT 097098. The VC blew the first two rolls of wire. Friendly ground fire and gunships prevented a penetration and drove the VC off. Results: 4 US injured; 8 ammunition pads destroyed (value ~ \$2.7 million). 3 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA (PW); captured 2 AK 47's, 3 RPG-2 launchers, assorted ammunition, grenades and individual equipment and food.

c. At 140048 March 1968, Di An basecamp, vicinity XT 910057, received 27 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. A total of 15 US personnel were wounded at the basecamp. Four (4) rounds impacted in the 3rd Maintenance Company area, wounding three (3) 3rd Maintenance Company personnel and damaging 1 messhall.

d. At 010140 April 1968, the 3rd Ordnance Battalion cantonment area and the ASD received 12 rounds of 122mm rockets. Ten (10) rounds landed in the ASD and 2 impacted in the cantonment area. There were 4 US KHA and 2 WHA. Three (3) BOQ's were destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

13  
CONFIDENTIAL

e. At approximately 062220 April 1968 a  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton vehicle from the 185th Maintenance Battalion was traveling North on Highway 15, vicinity YT 090028 when it was hit by a claymore or some type of mine. Results: 2 US KIA.

4. (U) The 524th Military Intelligence Detachment conducted Counter-intelligence Inspections of the 185th Maintenance Battalion and 550th Ordnance Detachment during the reporting period. Counterintelligence measures were found to be satisfactory in both of these units.

5. (U) The weather during the reporting period was characterized by the end of the dry season and the transition to the Southwest Monsoon. Weather had little effect on the operations of the Group.

D. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. (C) Support of Combat Operations: During the reporting period the 29th General Support Group provided Logistical Support to the following operations: Yellowstone, San Angelo, and Toan Thang.

a. Operation Yellowstone began on 8 December 1967 and terminated 6 February 1968. This operation was covered in the previous report ending 31 January 1968, and no new information was developed during the last 6 days of the operation.

b. Operation San Angelo began on 5 Jan 68 and terminated on 9 February 1968. This operation was covered in the previous report ending 31 January 1968, and no new information was developed during the last 9 days of the operation.

c. Operation Toan Thang began on 8 April and continues at the cut-off for this report. This large scale operation is being supported by supply point distribution from permanent logistical support activities throughout III CTZ. 29th General Support Group augmented 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division Class V point at Phouc Vinh by 2 RT forklifts, operators and 4 Class

CONFIDENTIAL 5

CONFIDENTIAL

V handlers to provide Class V support for the 11th ACR. The USA at Phouc  
Vinh provided Class I & III support to 11th ACR on a supply point distribution  
basis. 14

2. (C) Headquarters, Long Binh Post Operations Order Number 1-68, dated 15 April 1968 assigned the Commanding Officer, 29th General Support Group the responsibility of Sector Commander for the eastern portion of Long Binh Post. This sector is approximately 15 kilometers long and includes the 277th Supply and Service Battalion 203 Storage Area and FDO Yard, the 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot (LBASD), the 79th Maintenance Battalion (GS), and the 185th Maintenance Battalion (GS). Since the last report the following construction has been accomplished to upgrade Long Binh Post defense. All perimeter construction was performed by the 159th Engineer Group.

- a. A double row concertina wire fence, each row consisting of 3 rolls of concertina wire.
- b. Fighting bunkers, one bunker approximately every 150 meters, for a total of 59 bunkers in the 29th General Support Group Sector.
- c. Three (3) each fifty (50) man quick reaction force bunkers.
- d. Access roads to bunkers.
- e. Phase IV of Long Binh Post perimeter construction will extend the bunker line to include the 277th Supply and Service Battalion, 203 Storage Area, and Hcnii North Storage Area. When this phase is completed all of Long Binh Post will be surrounded by a barb wire fence.

3. (U) Unit Arrivals and Departures

2. During the reporting period two units were attached. The 48th ARU personnel and equipment arrived in-country on 27 March 1968 with duty station at Bear Cat. The 378th Maintenance Support Company arrived in-country

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

15.

on 25 April 1968 attached 29th General Support Group, VNNG pending publication of a General Order, duty station Long Binh.

b. The 67th Light Maintenance Company (NS) (DIV) was attached to the Da Nang Support Command (PROV) by USASUPCOM, Saigon General Order 318, dated 27 March 1968.


c. On 2 February 1968 the 40th Ordnance Company (AMMO) was relieved of attachment this command and further attached to the Da Nang Support Command (PROV) less the 2nd Magazine Platoon (Reinforced) which continues to operate the ammunition supply point at Tay Ninh LSA.

d. On 26 April 1968, the 41st APU moved from its location at Xaun Loc to Tay Ninh.

**E. LOGISTICS**

1. (C) The Group continued to perform its assigned mission of providing logistical support to non-divisional and certain divisional troops in AREA A and B of the III Corps Tactical Zone. However, the volume of supply support rendered was down from the previous quarter as shown by the following comparison:

AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE




**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

16


Class III Issues

GAL ISSUED IN THOUSANDS



Class V Issues

S/TONS ISSUED IN THOUSANDS



8

CONFIDENTIAL

17  
CONFIDENTIAL

2. (U) The decrease in average daily issues was due to:

a. The transfer of tactical and support units, personnel and equipment from III to I Corps Tactical Zone. The build up of the I Corps Tactical Zone and the establishment of the Provisional Support Command at Da Nang took place during this reporting period.

b. There was a general decrease in offensive operations during the present quarter as compared to the previous quarter. For the first month of this quarter, US Forces were basically in a defensive posture due to the TET offensive by the enemy. Interdiction of roads prevented the movement of convoys and normal traffic and as a result POL consumption was reduced.

3. (C) During the reporting period, the Supply and Service Companies within the Group received a total 71,693 requisitions for Class III and IV items. Some 30,290 or 42% of these were ASL requisitions. The initial fill from stockage was 12,459, or 41%. Data by month was as follows.

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Requisitions Received	21,481	28,672	21,500	71,693
Number of ASL Requisitions Received	10,912	10,656	8,722	30,290
Percent of Demand Accommodation	51%	37%	40%	42%
Number of Requisitions Filled from Stock	3,320	4,765	4,374	12,459
Percent of Demand Satisfaction:	30%	45%	50%	41%

4. (C) The direct support maintenance units throughout the Group received a total of 254,612 requisitions for repair parts during the reporting period. Of this total, 185,289 were authorized stockage list (ASL) items. There was an initial fill of 62,289 (34%) of the ASL requisitions. Data by month was as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

B L A N K

**CONFIDENTIAL**

19

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>Total</u>
Number of Requisitions Received	70,991	103,361	80,260	254,612
Number of ASL Requisitions Received	52,203	75,939	57,147	185,289
Percent of Demand Accommodation	73%	73%	71%	72%
Number of Requisitions filled from Stock	20,507	23,406	18,376	62,289
Percent of demand satisfaction	39%	31%	32%	34%



5. (C) Logistical support to Operation Yellowstone ended on 6 February and to Operation San Angelo on 9 February. Only one other combat operation was directly supported by the 29th General Support Group during the reporting period. This was Operation Toan Thang in which the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted a search and destroy operation from 15 - 22 April. Logistical support for this operation was provided from the Long Binh and Saigon area by use of dedicated air shipments from Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut Airbase and from the 29th General Support Group Logistical Support Activity at Phouc Vinh.

6. (U) In the area of retrograde, there was a decrease in the tonnage shipped from the previous quarter - 21,568 S/Tons versus 27,711 S/Tons. This decrease of 6,143 S/Tons was due primarily to - (1) the general inability to move materiel to the port during the first part of February as a result of the TET Offensive, and (2) the lack of assets at the Collection, Classification and Salvage point. This condition improved during the last two months of the quarter as indicated by the upward swing in tonnage shipped as shown on the following charts.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

20



CONFIDENTIAL

12.

21

**CONFIDENTIAL**

7. (C) There is presently a command wide program to up date the armored personnel carrier fleet. During this reporting period 206 vehicles were exchanged. The program will be completed when the vehicles of the 25th Infantry Division, 199th Light Infantry Brigade and float vehicles for the 1st Infantry Division have been exchanged.

8. (C) Field maintenance deadline rates have shown a 9 percent drop during the reporting period. The deadline rate for combat vehicles and artillery is exceptionally low (4 per cent and 2 per cent respectively.) This achievement is especially significant when it is considered that demand satisfaction during the same period was only 34 per cent. This low deadline rate in spite of poor supply performance can be attributed primarily to (1) intensive management of Red Ball and O2 priority requisitions, (2) the extensive use of the 218th CC&S Company cannibalization point as a source of repair parts, (3) increased local fabrication of repair parts, and (4) the recent exchange programs for M43 tanks, M113 armored personnel carriers, and M109 self propelled 155MM howitzers.

9. (C) There was a marked decrease in production during February 1968 at the PA&E maintenance facility which was not operational 1 - 14 February 1968 following the TET Offensive. On 15 February 1968 the facility became operational with 61% of the work force present. On 26 February 1968 normal operations were resumed with 87% of the work force present.

10. (C) During the past quarter the units of the 29th General Support Group were directly responsible for providing the following services:

- a. Laundry: 3,560,719 pounds
- b. Bath: 262,381 showers
- c. Bakery: 2,483,252 pounds
- d. Graves Registration: Handled and processed a total of 730 remains.

**CONFIDENTIAL** 13.

CONFIDENTIAL

22

- (1) US Forces: 623
- (2) Free World Forces: 77
- (3) Civilians and CIDG: 30

11. (C) The total of 730 remains processed represents a 200% increase in the numbers of remains handled, over the past quarterly report. This rise in remains can be attributed to the TET Offensive conducted in this area.

12. (U) The Services Section was responsible for the coordination of airlift support for operation Toan Thang. This operation was in support of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and involved a total airlift requirement of over a million pounds of supplies and equipment. Twelve dedicated aircraft were utilized on a daily basis. This system of utilizing dedicated airlift in support of major operations again proved to be the only effective method of supply for an air-loc operation.

F. SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. On 22 April 1968 the legal clerk for the past year, SP4 William C. Wohlers, rotated. He was replaced by SP4 David M. Drucker.

b. Non-Judicial Punishment for the Command:

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
HHC, 29th General Support Group	1	8	2
3rd Ordnance Battalion	11	19	21
79th Maintenance Battalion	19	30	27
185th Maintenance Battalion	26	11	37
266th Supply and Service Battalion	51	51	45
Tay Ninh LSA (PROV)	6	12	6
610th Maintenance Battalion	12	12	22
	<u>126</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>160</u>

GRAND TOTAL: 429

14

CONFIDENTIAL

23

c. Personnel within the command tried by courts-martial:

(1) General Courts Martial: One member of the command was tried by General Court Martial during the reporting period. It was convened by the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command.

(2) Special Courts-Martial:

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
HHC, 29th General Support Group	0	0	1
3rd Ordnance Battalion	3	4	1
79th Maintenance Battalion	2	1	4
185th Maintenance Battalion	2	3	1
266th Supply and Service Battalion	0	2	2
Tay Ninh LSA (1-ROV)	0	0	2
610th Maintenance Battalion	0	1	1
	<u>7</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>

GRAND TOTAL: 30

(3) Summary Courts Martial:

	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>
HHC, 29th General Support Group	0	0	0
3rd Ordnance Battalion	0	1	0
79th Maintenance Battalion	1	1	0
185th Maintenance Battalion	3	0	0
266th Supply and Service Battalion	4	1	0
Tay Ninh LSA (7-ROV)	0	0	0
610th Maintenance Battalion	0	0	0
	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>

d. Legal assistance rendered totaled 176 actions, including 121 interview, 41 instruments drafted and other miscellaneous services.

e. During the reporting period this office supervised claims administration and investigation within the Group. Five Article 32 Investigations were conducted by the command.

2. (U) Civil Affairs

a. Civilian Labor:

(1) Permanent Hire: During the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 this section administered an average of 1409 Local National (Direct

15

CONFIDENTIAL

24

Hire) Employees. These personnel were employed in fifty six different job descriptions. An augmentation to the TDA WCAYMA99 for Local National Employees was developed and submitted for approval on 2 May 1968. If this is approved the number of Local National Employees will be increased from 1389 to 1650.

(2) The USARV Program 5 Civilianization (Local National Substitution Plan) was terminated. It was not deemed practicable at this time.

(3) AIK (Daily Hire) Laborers: This section administered an average of 493 AIK (Daily Hire) Laborers per month during the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 with an average payroll of 1,179,200 \$VN per month.

b. Civic Action: (1) This office collected from HHC, 29th General Support Group and all subordinate battalions of the Group a total of 1,637.30 MTC and 35,240 \$VN during the TET Aggression Relief Program Fund drive. This money is in the process of being distributed to Local National Employees who suffered property loss or damage during the TET Offensive.

(2) The village Bau Hang was relocated and is in the process of being rebuilt with assistance from the 19th Light Maintenance Company of the 185th Maintenance Battalion

(3) The Civic Action Programs coordinated by this section during the period 1 February 1968 to 30 April 1968 furnished the monetary equivalent of approximately 136,200 \$VN in aid and assistance

3. (C) S-4

a. Significant activities in 29th General Support Group base development include:

(1) The construction of a new work point for the 218th CC&S Company

CONFIDENTIAL

16

25

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(2) The move of the 185th Maintenance Battalion into their new facilities in the M&S Area.

(3) The construction of a retail POL point on Route 15 for operation by the 266th Supply and Service Battalion.

b. The 507th Engineer Detachment, the R&U Engineer Detachment from USASUTCOM, Saigon, nearly completed the wash rack for the wash rack for the 218th CC&S Company. The point is located south of Bradley Street in the M&S Area of Long Binh Post. The point consists of a hard stand of 7000 square yards with a 2400 square feet wash rack in the center of the hard stand. Presently two steam cleaners are being used at the wash rack but these will be replaced by a steam boiler fabricated from a 100hp boiler. The point became operational the week of 28 April 1968.

c. The 185th Maintenance Battalion began its move into their new maintenance area just south of the 79th Maintenance Battalion area. The seven 70' X 140' buildings and surrounding hard stand were constructed by RMK Corporation with assistance on the hard stand from the 159th Engineer Group. As of 30 April 1968, HMSC less the tech supply section, 140th Heavy Maintenance Company and the 61st Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company had moved into their new facilities. Except for the 19th Light Maintenance Company facilities for the remaining companies of the 185th Maintenance Battalion are still in the planning stage.

d. The 507th Engineer Battalion in conjunction with the 266th Supply and Service Battalion began construction of a retail POL point on Route 15 between Bradley Street and Marshall Street. The facility includes three 500 BBL POL Tanks and will be used to alleviate the load on the present retail POL point near gate number three.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

19

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*26*

4. (C) Communications

a. During the reporting period the communications section continued to operate the internal communications systems, providing command and control facilities to subordinate elements. (See Inclosure 3)

Traffic processed at Group Headquarters:

(1) Land-Line Teletype	738 messages
(2) Radio Teletype	917

b. With the establishment of a new ground defense system at Long Binh Post, a communications network was initiated to include both voice radio and telephone communications (See Inclosure 4).

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*15*

SECTION IIA. PERSONNEL, AUTHORITY, MAN. HAB. & DISCIPLINE

## 1. (U) Item: Personnel

OBSERVATION: a. In the officer area the 29th Group authorization has increased by four to 279 since the last report, but of some concern is the fact that the assigned officer strength has decreased by 22 to 211 assigned or a percentage of 75. In particular the current shortage of 5 officers in the grade of O-4 leaves a void in experienced officer to fill critical staff positions at the Headquarters and as Battalion Executive Officers.

b. The total authorization for ~~21~~ decreased from 7,219 to 6,994 while the assigned strength decreased from 6,398 to 5,629 leaving the Group at 81% of enlisted strength.

EVALUATION: a. On the surface 81% doesn't appear to be critical what with the demonstrated ability of the Group to adequately perform all missions. But it should be noted that the 218th CC&S Company of the 79th Maintenance Battalion, must be maintained at approximately 250% of authorized enlisted strength to accomplish their increased mission in the field of retrograde. These additional personnel are drawn from other units both within the 79th Maintenance Battalion as well as from other Battalions.

b. The manning level for the 218th CC&S when coupled with specific MOS shortages throughout the 29th Group does present a critical problem. Among the more serious MOS shortages are:

Electrical Repairman

Field Radio Repairman

Weapons Support Repairman

Fire Control Computer Repairman

28

Electrical Instrument Repairman

Artillery Repairman

Baker

Engineer Equipment Repairman

POL Storage Specialist

Ammunition Handler

c. Although the missions are adequately accomplished it is felt that there are far too many instances of "too little arriving a little too late", all because of the shortage of personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS: a. There must be constant analysis of the personnel situation at all levels (both military and civilian) in order to shift personnel to the areas of the greatest need, such as the 218th in the particular case cited above. Skills as well must be considered as the requirements may call for cross training of personnel.

b. As far as the officer situation is concerned and the probability of having great voids in experience because of the stretch between O-3 and O-5 strong consideration should be given to ignoring technical service lines in order to fill key staff positions, to include Battalion Executive Officers, with available officers who have the overall experience in terms of years of service.

2. (U) Item: Administration

OBSERVATION: The internal affairs of the Group, as divorced from the operational areas of supply and maintenance, are complex to say the least. There is the Adjutant to include military personnel; S-4 for internal supply, organizational maintenance, base development and food service; Chaplain activities; Civil Affairs (to include indigenous civilian labor) which has an effect on military personnel; and Staff Judge Advocate activities.

EVALUATION: These sections represent far too great a sphere of control for the Group Executive Officer when it is considered there is the SP&O, HQ & HQ Company as well as the "bread and butter" of the organization, i.e., logistics and maintenance to be controlled and coordinated by the Executive Officer.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The assignment of a branch or division chief (this headquarters has installed a Chief, Administrative Division) to supervise and coordinate the internal activities will result in more effective control and permit the Executive Officer the opportunity to adequately perform those functions normally associated with the Executive Officer who is in effect a Deputy to the Commander and rates the subordinate battalion commanders.

(NOTE: This has proved most effective within this command during the period of this report, with an officer assigned to the duties of Chief Admin, there has been a marked degree of improvement which has resulted in more effective planning and policies. This is particularly true in the areas of Civil Affairs and the analysis of the personnel situation).

### 3. (U) Item: Morale and Discipline

OBSERVATIONS: a. The morale of the command is good. However, it should be noted that since the TET offensive many areas have been off-limits and severe curfews established. As an example, the city of Bien Hoa was the most popular city for off duty recreation for the troops at Long Binh, where this headquarters and four assigned Battalions are situated. The placing of this city and adjacent villages off-limits has had a deleterious effect on the morale of the troops. A direct result of this is the increase in the number of delinquency reports, i.e., the rate for February was 12.9 per thousand; for March it increased to 29.8 per thousand and an April rate of 24.4 per thousand.

30

This resulted from the long period after TET when it appeared that actual attacks and contacts with enemy in this immediate vicinity were so infrequent as to seem remote. With this interpretation by the troops more chances were taken at stopping in off-limits areas, violating curfew restrictions, etc, the natural consequence being the increased rate.

b. This trend is also reflected in the steady increase in non-judicial punishment and Special Court Martials (see Section I para F). The decrease in Summary Court Martials is due solely to 1st Log Regulations which prohibit Summary Courts except in cases where Article 15 action is refused.

EVALUATION: a. On the plus side the reenlistment program, as reflected below, is outstanding in all areas except AUS Indictees which is difficult at best.

<u>First Term RA's</u>	<u>Career RA's</u>	<u>AUS Indictees</u>	<u>NG USAF Reserve</u>
Feb 0/0 Enl	Elig	12/12 Enl	Elig 2/2 Enl
Mar 5/5 Enl	Elig	5/5 Enl	Elig 0/0 Enl
Apr 0/0 Enl	Elig	17/17 Enl	Elig 1/1 Enl
		31/3 Enl 15/1 Enl 4/0 Enl	

b. Extensive Chaplains coverage throughout the Group is another item worthy of note. As an indication of this coverage the Group Chaplain accomplished the following during the period covered by this report:

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Total</u>
Staff Visits	61
Conferences, retreats and councils attended	80
Worship services conducted	32
Holy Communion celebrated	7
Character Guidance classes taught	5

Hospital visits	7
Stockade visits	6
Counselling Sessions	153
Interviews	786

RECOMMENDATIONS: Added emphasis should be placed in the areas of E&I Clubs, A&R Programs, Day Rooms and the R&R Program in order to provide more wholesome outlets for off duty recreation. Although the morale is good, an overall analysis of the morale and discipline within the command indicates that more should be done for the soldier and consequently programs should not be of the stop-gap variety but continuing in nature.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

NONE

C. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

1. (U) Item: Support of Combat Operations (Operation Yellowstone and San Angelo - see after action reports attached as Inclosure 1 & 2)

OBSERVATION: These operations were covered in the previous quarter. They are included now because the operations terminated on 6 Feb 68 and 9 Feb 68. No new observations were developed.

EVALUATION: NONE

RECOMMENDATIONS: NONE

2. (U) Item: Return of FJA Personnel and Equipment

OBSERVATION: The subject of dedicated aircraft in support of tactical operations has been discussed in previous ORLL's, and Operation Toan Thang proved this system to be effective. In the planning stage, aircraft are set aside on a daily basis to initially pre-stock forward support areas with personnel, equipment, and supplies. Daily airlift is scheduled, based on anticipated demands and is usually very satisfactory.

EVALUATION: A problem results upon termination of an operation when the dedicated airlift ceases. It is then the responsibility of the operating elements, i.e., FSA Commander to request airlift for return transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies back to their parent unit. This request must go in on an O1 priority, and sometimes a unit will wait two to three weeks before its personnel and equipment are finally returned. This results in a tremendous loss of man power and equipment hours.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that when planning for a major tactical operation involving the deployment of an FSA, consideration be given to dedicated retrograde airlift upon termination of the operation, and that the re-deployment of logistical support personnel and equipment be included in the plan which provides transportation for the tactical unit supported.

D. LOGISTICS:

1. (U) Item: Tanks, M-48A2C received in exchange program required installation of vision rings.

OBSERVATION: The M-48A2C tank was programmed to replace the M-48AC tanks assigned to the 11th ACR. The replacement vehicles were received minus vision rings. The rings were shipped separately and were installed by maintenance personnel of this group.

RECOMMENDATION: That equipment for replacement of exchange program be shipped with all equipment and devices installed.

2. (U) Item: Return to user program of M-48A3 tanks.

OBSERVATION: The program was established as a result of the exchange of M-48A3 tanks with M-48A2C tanks. Technical Inspection revealed that approximately 400 man hours per tank would be required to return these vehicles to a ready for issue condition. The program is further complicated since no

33

ASL exists at General Support level. The 79th Maintenance Battalion recently received the authority to repair ballistic drives, infrared systems and articulate periscopes. However, the required fixtures to facilitate repairs are not on hand, but are on requisition. The lack of the required fixtures results in the 79th Maintenance Battalion having to retrograde unserviceable fire control components to CONUS and the requisitioning of replacements.

EVALUATION: Experience has shown that repair parts receipts are slow and as such delays in the repair of the 23 M-48A3 tanks can be expected. The present General Support Program published by 1st Logistical Command does not include the repair of M-48A3 tanks. The introduction of this repair program will adversely affect published General Support Programs.

RECOMMENDATION: Programs of this nature must be programmed far in advance so as to allow for proper maintenance planning. It is further recommended that the 23 M-48A3 tanks presently on hand in the 79th Maintenance Battalion be evacuated to a Maintenance facility adequately equipped and staffed for General Support repairs of M-48A3 tanks.

3. (U) Item: Five Ton Multifuel Engines

OBSERVATION: Recently the Army Audit Agency conducted an inspection of retrograde procedures as practiced with five ton multifuel engines. The findings of this inspection included: some of the retrograded engines were uneconomically repairable and should not have been retrograded; some engines had parts removed without a like part being replaced; and many of the engines were not properly secured in the shipping containers which allowed them to be damaged during transit.

EVALUATION: The 218th CC&S Company has a limited capability to inspect each of these engines prior to retrograding them. The most efficient

25

34

means for insuring that the circumstances mentioned above are not perpetuated is to require the originators of the shipment to meet certain standards.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that standards be set and stated in a certificate to accompany the engine container. The certificate should state that the engine is beyond direct support repair capability; that no parts are missing from the engine; and that the engine has been firmly secured in its container so as to preclude damage during shipment. A sample certificate is shown below:

C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that engine, serial number \_\_\_\_\_:

1. Is beyond DS repair capability
2. Has no missing parts.
3. Is firmly secure in its container so as to preclude damage during shipment.
4. Has been drained of all fuels, lubricants, and coolants.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Printed name)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Grade)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Position)

35

4. (U) Item : Saving of Personnel and Equipment. Laundry Operation.

OBSERVATION: A duplication of effort between Services. A survey conducted by the 7th Air Force showed that a duplication of effort was being expended between the Army and Air Force on various Air Bases throughout Vietnam. It was suggested by the Air Force that some of these activities be consolidated to provide better utilization. A laundry site on the Bien Hoa Airbase was picked as one of the Army facilities to close. This was accomplished on 30 April 1968.

EVALUATION: The results of eliminating this laundry site are greater utilization of government resources, and reduction of personnel and equipment required to do the job.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all service functions performed by Army units on Air Force installations be reviewed to determine if they are being duplicated by the Air force.

5. (U) Item: Precaution Against Increased Reliance on Indigenous Personnel and Vendors in Vietnam.

OBSERVATION: The TET Offensive dramatically highlighted the danger of relying on significant numbers of local nationals to perform vital services in a Vietnam type military operation. A case in point was the processing of personal laundry, a service which has always been largely performed by Vietnam nationals. The TET Offensive effectively reduced this service to near zero and normally adequate Quartermaster laundry facilities were not able to absorb the additional workload. The situation could have been even worse if an authorized IN civilianization program had been fully implemented in the QM laundries. Fortunately, only a few spaces were converted prior to 31 January 1968.

36

EVALUATION: The breakdown in laundry service resulted in a series of health and morale problem. Although many soldiers did their own laundry, many more wore the same clothing several days in a row due to either their degree of involvement in the tactical situation or a lack of ambition and initiative.

RECOMMENDATION: In the interest of insuring continued operation of vital services and recognizing that the civilianization of non-combat functions is an important part of nation building, recommend that contingency plans be developed to insure continuation of vital services in the absence of local national facilities, and/or personnel. These contingency plans would primarily identify these non-essential services or less essential services that would be closed or reduced in scope to permit adequate military staffing of the essential services. Individuals should be assigned to a specific contingency slot by name and crosstrained in that job to at least a familiarization level.

E. JUDGE ADVOCATE

1. (U) Item: Publication Shortages

OBSERVATION: Many forms and publications necessary for the administration of military justice are in short supply. Orders have been placed repeatedly since October for essential forms and publications and to date only one order has been filled.

EVALUATION: Shortages of forms have reduced the timely administration of military justice. For example, total exhaustion of the supply of DA Form 2627-1 virtually stopped the imposition of punishment under Article 15, UCMJ; and the unavailability of DA Pamphlet 27-10 has impeded the ability of trial and defense counsels to do an optimum job in their assigned duties.

(28)

37

RECOMMENDATION: Command emphasis on the processing of publication requests, at effective levels, would contribute significantly to the timely and intelligent administration of Military Justice.

4 Incl  
as

7/10/68  
THOMAS J. McDONALD  
COL, OrdC  
Commanding

29

39

AVCA SGN GO (9 May 68) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
(RCS CSPOR-65) 29th General Support Group

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO San Francisco 96491 16 May 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96394

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, APO 96553

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report-lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968, of the 29th General Support Group, is forwarded in accordance with AR 1-18.

2. Reference: Section II, Para D2: The selection of items on the General Support Production Program has been based on estimates rather than supply planning data. Many items on the General Support Production Program were later found to be excess to theater requirements. In addition many crash programs and a heavy DS back-up support mission has further detracted from the GS program. This command is presently conducting a full review of the GS Production Program based on technical supply activity experience.

3. Reference: Section II, Para D3: Instructions received from 1st Logistical Command required all multifuel engines to be retrograded regardless of condition. It would be advantageous to send uneconomically repairable engines to PDO as many needed parts could be recovered for repair at DS or in the GS Production Program. The responsibility of securing the engine properly in its container is with the ISU making the turn-in. With the number of engines received daily by the 218th CC&S Co it would be an excessive workload to check each and every engine; however, adequate inspections must be made to insure compliance.

4. Reference: Section II, Para D5: It is the command policy to convert additional military manpower spaces to IN. This civilianization program will continue to be implemented and will probably continue at an ever increasing rate. In the event of the development of another situation like TET, the 29th Gp does have organic capability to provide sufficient military manpower to operate QM laundries to satisfy bulk laundry requirements. As for the laundering of personal clothing, it is the individual's responsibility to maintain minimum health and sanitation standards.

AVCA SGN GO (9 May 68) 1st Ind (U)

16 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
(RCS CSFOR-65) 29th General Support Group

40  
5. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions noted above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided to the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER

TEL: LB 2604

4 Incl  
nc

*Frederick R. Huck*

FREDERICK R. HUCK  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GO-0 (9 May 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

28 MAY 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 29th General Support Group for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent Comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, paragraph A1. Concur. Personnel assignments are based on mission requirements; therefore, the percentage of assigned to authorized will be higher in some units than in others. Officer personnel are assigned by branch and grade. Grade is given primary consideration. Officer assignment procedures recommended in basic report are in effect. No further action is required by higher headquarters.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph A2. Concur. It is the group commander's perogative to organize his headquarters to best accomplish the mission consistent with prescribed manpower authorization.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph A3(b). The statement that "the decrease in Summary Courts-Martial (SIC) is due solely to 1st Log Regulations wh'ch prohibit Summary Courts except in cases where Article 15 action is refused" is patently incorrect. Paragraph 5(b), LC Reg 27-1, dated 12 December 1966, merely requires a convening authority to consult with the Staff Judge Advocate prior to referring a case to a Summary Court-Martial when an accused has not been offered non-judicial punishment pursuant to Article 15. There is no outright prohibition against trial by Summary Courts-Martial under such circumstances.

d. Reference Section II, paragraph C2. Concur with recommendation that re-deployment of logistical support personnel and equipment be included in the plan for withdrawal of tactical forces from the area of operation when operating under Air-LOC. Current procedure of requesting Priority 01 air has resulted in unnecessary delays in extracting logistical forces and equipment. Future planning conferences with Field Forces on Air-LOC operations will include plan for withdrawing logistical forces simultaneously with withdrawal of tactical units.

32

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA GO-0 (9 May 68) 2nd Ind

18 May 1968

42

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
(RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

e. Reference Section II, paragraph D1. Vision rings would normally be installed on tanks prior to shipment. M48A2C tanks were issued to the 11th ACR on a one time basis to alleviate the tank shortage following the TET Attack, and were issued to a single unit to facilitate supply support. Due to the time limitations of delivery dates established by DA, it was not feasible to install the vision rings prior to shipment.

f. Reference Section II, paragraph D2. Concur with the recommendation that maintenance programs be initiated as far in advance as possible to allow for proper maintenance planning. See paragraph 2h below for comment on the remainder of the recommendation.

g. Reference Section II, Paragraph D3. Concur. The procedure for certifying the condition of unserviceable engines is best determined by the maintenance personnel making the engine exchange. This procedure does not, however, relieve the CC&S unit of the responsibility for performing inspections on a sampling basis to insure that multifuel engines are properly packaged for shipment. Recommend this procedure be implemented country-wide by higher headquarters.

h. Reference Section II, paragraph D5 and paragraph 4 of 1st Indorsement. Nonconcur that the processing of personal laundry is a vital service in a Vietnam type military operation. The lack of convenient facilities may have a deleterious effect on morale, however maintaining morale and insuring proper sanitation and personal hygiene standards are command responsibilities. Concur that lessons learned during any activity should be reviewed and when necessary appropriate contingency plans developed by each unit.

i. The recommendation to evacuate 23 tanks in paragraph D2 and paragraph E1 in its entirety are considered inappropriate for inclusion in the ORNL and should be the subject of separate action.

3. (U) Concur with basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR TEL COMMANDER

TEL: LBN 2634

4 Incl  
nc

Copy Furnished  
29th Gen Sup Gp  
USASUPCOM, SGN

*Robert W. Munson*  
ROBERT W. MUNSON  
1 LT AGG  
Asst AG

33

CONFIDENTIAL

43

AVHGC-DST. (9 May 68) 3d Ind

CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS CSFOR (U) (RL)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 29th General Support Group as indorsed.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning five ton multifuel engines, page 24, paragraph D3; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 3; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2g: Concur. Determination of condition of multifuel engines must be made at the DSU level. This headquarters will publish instructions that engine cans will be spot checked to insure that engines have been properly secured in shipping containers to preclude damage in transit. USARPAC has directed that all multifuel engines, regardless of condition will be evacuated.

b. Reference item concerning savings of personnel and equipment. Laundry Operations, page 26, paragraph S4: Nonconcur. A Joint Army-Air Force Logistical Survey Team conducted a detailed survey throughout RVN during the period September through November 1967 to determine where logistical functions were being duplicated. In cases where functions could be consolidated or performed by either Army or Air Force, recommendations were made by the team to do so. Recommend those findings and recommendations made by the team be implemented, rather than initiating another survey of this type.

c. Reference item concerning publications shortage, page 27, paragraph E1: Concur. Command interest in adequate and timely publications support has been, and will continue to be emphasized. For a period of approximately 60 days during March and April 1968, DA Form 2627-1 was in critically short supply throughout Vietnam. As a result commanders having offset press reproduction and facsimile camera equipment have now been delegated authority to reproduce DA, DD, and SF blank forms to meet emergency needs. DA Pamphlet 27-10 is

AVHGC-DST (9 May 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968,  
RCS CSFOR (U) (RL)

44

available through publications supply channel and should be requisitioned  
by the unit concerned from the USA AG Publications Center, Baltimore,  
Maryland.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl  
nc

Copies furnished:  
HQ, 1st Log Cmd  
HQ, 29th Gen Spt Gp

*C. S. Nakatsukasi*  
C. S. NAKATSUKASI  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

35.1

45

GPOP-DT (9 May 68) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 29th Gen Spt Gp,  
for Period Ending 30 Apr 68, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed..
2. Reference 3d Indorsement, paragraph 2c: The problem of publication shortages will be a matter of command attention to preclude future short supply.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*Officer*

4 Incl  
nc

C.E. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst. AG

36

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
TAY NINH LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY (PROV)  
APO US Forces 96216

47 AVCA SGN SG TN O

14 February 1968.

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Task Force Merritt,  
Forward Support Activity, Katum, RVN

THRU: Commanding Officer  
Tay Ninh LSA (PROV)  
APO US Forces 96216

Commanding Officer  
29th General Support Group  
APO US Forces 96491

TO: Commanding General  
USASUF COM, Saigon  
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO  
APO US Forces 96491

1. (U) References:

- a. Letter, Headquarters, Saigon Support Command, subject Combat Operations, dated 26 July 1967.
- b. 29th General Support Group Regulation 210-7 subject Establishment and operation of Forward Support Areas (FSA) dated 9 Aug 1967.
- c. OFORD, 25th Infantry Division, codename "Operation Yellowstone".

2. (C) Nature of the Operation: Search and destroy missions conducted by elements of the 25th Infantry Division in northern part of Area A, III Corps Tactical Zone, vicinity of Katum, RVN.

3. Units Supported:

HQ, 1st Brigade	: Bn 77 Arty
HQ, 2nd Brigade	7 Bn 11 Arty
2 Bn 14 Inf	3 Bn 13 Arty
4 Bn 9 Inf	65 Engr Bn
3 Bn 22 Inf	588 Engr Bn
2 Bn 12 Inf	B Co 25th Med Bn
2 Bn 22 Mech	1 En 49th Inf (ARVN)
1 Bn 5 Mech	FSA, Katum

Inc 1

39

**CONFIDENTIAL**

14 February 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Task Force Merritt,  
Forward Support Activity, Katum, L.

48

4. (U) Length of FSA Support: 14-17 December 1967 was spent in setting up operational areas. FSA provided support from 17 December 1967 through 6 February 1968. 7-10 February 1968 was used for back hauling of supplies, equipment and personnel.

5. (C) Problem Areas

a. Arrival of Equipment: Convoys were initially limited to only 5 ton vehicles and under without trailers. This required the majority of FSA equipment to be scheduled for air lift. Delay in acceptance of airfield by Air Force Inspection Team resulted in four days being lost in setting up equipment for operations of various areas. During period when equipment was not available personnel built protective bunkers and the bulldozer was used to build berms for C1 III and C1 V storage, road network for supply areas and cleared jungle from perimeter of base camp

b. Stockage Objectives: Stockage objectives received thru initial coordination with 25th Inf Div Supply and Transportation Battalion were used as basis for planning and selecting equipment to operate FSA. One day prior to operation, stockage objectives received thru 29th GS Gp determined by 1st Log Cmd were different in Class III area. Later changes to stockage objectives were made by G-4 25th Inf Div to FSA, Katum for C1 III & V. These were not excepted since changes to stockage objectives was retained at 1st Log Cmd. These changes submitted were relayed through 29th General Support Group as recommended changes. At one time C1 III stockage objectives maintained by various headquarters is shown below.

	<u>FSA Katum</u>	<u>25th Inf Div</u>	<u>1st Log Cmd</u>
JT-4	65,000	35,000	45,000
Avgas	6,000	6,000	6,000
Mogas	15,000	15,000	12,000
DF-2	15,000	35,000	24,000

c. Resupply by Airlift: After initial period of air lifting equipment and some supplies to Katum, air lift of supplies decreased were experienced due to diversion of aircraft to other critical areas and refusal of aircraft to land because of ground fire and mortar attacks. While this initially hindered the FSA, once land LOC were used for resupply no further problems existed.

6. (U) Lessons Learned

a. That FSA'S should be controlled at the lowest possible level of command, by the logistical base nearest the location of the FSA.

38

CONFIDENTIAL

14 February 1968

49

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Task Force Merritt,  
Forward Support Activity, Katum, EWPb. That land LOC is the only way to properly resupply an FSA.  
Air LOC is too undependable.

c. That necessary transportation must be attached to the controlling headquarters of the FSA so that the commander not only controls the supplies but also the means of getting them to the FSA.

7. (U) Statistical Data: See Incl 1

8. (C) Task Force Organization:

SECTION	OFFICERS	WO	EM
Command & Control	2	0	9
Class I	0	0	9
Class II & IV	0	0	4
Class III	0	0	13
Class V	1	0	21
Laundry & Bath	0	0	11
DS Maintenance	0	1	13
Graves Registration	0	0	3
Transportation Sqaurd (Prov)	0	0	4
TOTAL	3	1	97

See Incl 2 for Organization Chart

9. (U) Layout of FSA Areas: See Incl 3

"A TRUE COPY"

  
 R.H. ROTH  
 MAJ, TC  
 Ch, SP&O
SYLVESTER A. MERRITT JR.  
MAJ, QMC  
FSA, Commander

CONFIDENTIAL

397

## CONFIDENTIAL

Class I (Rations)	Received	Issued	On Hand	50
Total A Rations	145,060	144,088	-	
Average per day	2,790	2,771	9,013	
Total C Rations	79,856	65,356	-	
Average per day	1,536	1,257	15,843	
TOTAL Rations	224,916	209,444	-	
Average per day	2,163	2,014	24,846	
Total Sundry Packs (Each)	1,330	1,330		
Average per day	25	25		
Class II & IV (Tons)				
Total Construction	516.75	516.75	-	
Average per day	9.94	9.94	52.37	
Total Fortification	1264.00	1264.00	-	
Average per day	24.31	24.31	72.81	
Total II & IV	1780.75	1780.75	-	
Average per day	17.12	17.12	62.59	
Class III (Gallons)				
Total JP-4	390,800	340,500	-	
Average per day	7,515	6,548	44,930	
Total Avgas	21,300	18,000	-	
Average per day	410	346	4,890	
Total Mogas	167,700	167,700	-	
Average per day	3,225	3,225	12,290	
Total Diesel	232,800	232,800	-	
Average per day	4,477	4,477	17,190	
Total POL	792,600	759,000	-	
Average per day	15,242	14,596	20,075	
Class V (Tons)				
TOTAL				
Average	6395.711	4081.336	-	
	121.264	76.949	1281.319	
Laundry (pounds)				
TOTAL Processed - 116,360				
Average per day - 2,238				
Bath (showers)				
TOTAL Showers - 21,570				
Average per day ~ 415				

DEGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Inc 1 to Inc 1

CONFIDENTIAL

40

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Graves Registration (remains processed)


51  
TOTAL - 36  
US - 33  
ARVN - 3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

41

CONFIDENTIAL

52



Incl 2 to Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL



**CONFIDENTIAL**

55  
TASK FORCE SCHRACK  
550 GSU RAY SUPPORT GROUP  
ARD VUNG TAU SUB-AREA COMMAND  
AFO US FORCES 96291

AVCA SGN VT SB

22 March 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report FSA, Song Be

TO: Commanding Officer  
Headquarters, 53d General Support  
Group and Vung Tau Sub-Area Command  
AFO US Forces 96291

1. References:

a. 1st Log Cond Reg 525-1, dtg 3 July 1967 with changes, subject: Combat Operations.

b. Ltr, HQ USAUSFORCOM, Sgn, dtg 26 July 1967, subject: Combat Operations.

2. Nature of Operation: Operation "San Angelo" was a brigade size operation conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division with supporting elements of the division. The operation in general was a clearing and blocking action with its base elements located at Song Be with areas of operation extending northward to the vicinity of the Cambodian border. The FSA Commander with selected personnel made reconnaissance of the Song Be airstrip on 13 and 29 December 1967 to select areas and determine what was necessary to prepare the areas for occupancy. The FSA moved by air (C 130s) from Vung Tau and Binh Hoa on 5 January 1968 utilizing 30 sorties. Personnel and equipment closed at Song Be on the evening of 5 January 1968. Immediate priorities for work accomplishment included erection of tentage in the cantonment area, digging and construction of protective and fighting bunkers, and area clearance for reception of supply stockage. These jobs were sufficiently completed on the 5th of January to permit receipt of supplies at the rate of 30 aircraft daily commencing on 6 January 1968. The FSA maintained a five day level of supplies in Class 1, III, IIIA and fast moving Class II & IV items. Additionally, the FSA provided personnel augmentation to the Brigade operated ASP (21 EM), laundry, bath, graves registration and fire fighting detachment.

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Incl 2

## 3. Problem Areas

a. The deployment date for the FSA did not allow II Field Force Engineers (Co D 168th Engr Bn) sufficient time to prepare logistical areas for use, i.e., primarily clearing and construction of three steel 10L tanks, clearing and building up the Class I area and the cutting of a road network to facilitate receipt, storage and issue of supplies.

b. Initial receipt of supplies and equipment coming into Song Be were in many cases not clearly identified as to consignee. As a number of units with equipment and supplies were moving into Song Be during this period it resulted in some confusion. This was corrected shortly after arrival and did not re-occur.

c. The arrival of supplies to stock the FSA was scheduled by higher headquarters and did start coming in within 24 hours after arrival of the FSA. This, coupled with comment (a) above caused considerable backlog at the airstrip, and subsequent reshuffling of supplies to facilitate clearing and building of storage areas. It is recommended, time permitting, that an FSA be given sufficient time after arrival on site to organize its facilities prior to receipt of supplies.

d. "Operation San Angelo" terminated on 9 February 1968. The FSA submitted its aircraft requirements and TCM's for extraction of personnel, equipment, and supplies to Binh Hoa and Vung Tau. An estimated 37 sorties (C 130) were required to extract the FSA. With a #1 priority for aircraft, the first plane load of equipment and personnel departed Song Be on 16 February and the last on 8 March; for a total of 28 days to extract the FSA after the operation was terminated. This resulted in the loss of critical skills and essential equipment to both the 29th and 53d GS Groups for an excessive period of time. It is recommended, where possible, that selected personnel and items of equipment considered critical be upgraded for priority shipment.

## 4. Lessons Learned;

a. That an FSA (Air Loc), must plan on being self-sustaining in all areas for a minimum of five (5) days. This is particularly important in planning requirements for Cl IV barrier materials for protective and fighting bunkers.

b. Advance coordination between supporting and supported elements must be specific and in detail as pertains to areas of responsibility. If possible, these agreements should be in writing to preclude later misunderstanding. Some of these coordinating areas are as follows:

- (1) Stock levels on all items to be held by the FSA.
- (2) System of maintenance.

AVCA SGN' ET GO

**CONFIDENTIAL**

22 March 1968

SUBJECT: After Action Report FSA, Song Be

57.

- (3) Responsibilities regarding movement of supplies.
- (4) Services to be provided and their locations.
- (5) Method of control (stock movement, etc).
- (6) Defense arrangements.
- (7) Liaison arrangements.
- (8) Division of responsibilities.
- (9) Restrictions (movement, foliage destruction, etc).
- (10) Daily routine.
- (11) Local procedures.
- (12) Priorities of engineer effort.

c. When large amounts of supplies in variety are being moved by air, it is imperative that the FSA Commander establish priorities of shipment and that these priorities be adhered to at the base airfield. This will insure that items most needed are on hand in sufficient quantities for operations and will preclude the build-up of relative excesses.

d. In conjunction with reconnaissance of the supported unit, the FSA Commander should in addition to other considerations, keep the following points in mind when selecting the FSA location:

- (1) Current or likely enemy threat.
- (2) Topography.
- (3) Location of units to be supported.
- (4) Routes available.
- (5) Communication facilities.
- (6) Weather.
- (7) Defense arrangements available.
- (8) Air strip capabilities.
- (9) Movement of supplies.

746

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCA SGN VT GO

SUBJECT: After Action Report FSA, Song Be

22 March 1968

58

- (10) Services required.
- (11) Engineer effort available.
- (12) Safety Distances applicable.
- (13) Local labor (if used).

5. Statistical Data: See Incl 1.

1 Incl  
as

LOY V. SCHRACK  
LTC, Infantry  
Commanding

"A TRUE COI Y"

  
E. V. ROTH  
MAG IC  
Chief, SFIO

42

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATISTICAL DATA

1. Receipts and Issues: 107113 ISSUES

Total Average Daily Total Average Daily

Class I (Rations)

A	107.837	2.630	97.076	2.367
B	1.600	.39	1.600	.39
C	68.214	1.663	57.410	1.400

Class III (Gallons)

JP-4	529.8	13.6	508.8	13.0
AVGAS	18.9	.48	16.1	.41
MOGAS	104.0	2.6	99.8	2.5
DIESEL	136.8	3.5	136.8	3.5

Class V (Short Tons) Requisitioned and controlled by tactical unit.  
ASR Augmented by FSA personnel.

Class IV 512.73s/t 13.4s/t 512.73s/t 13.4s/t

Unit of issue as  
appropriate

2. Size of FSA Force: 4 Officer, 0 WO, 121 EM, as follows:

Command and Control:	2	19
Class I:		21
Class II & IV		5
Class III:		15
Class V:		21
Services:		23
Maintenance:		5
Engineer:		12

Incl 1 to Incl 2 49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Services Rendered:

Baths: 40,000

Laundry: 123,000 lbs

Grave Registration: 21 processed

4. Maintenance Performance: Supported FSA only.

5. Forces Supported:

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Div

2/17 Cav, 101st Airborne Div

501st Sign Bn, 101st Airborne Div

326th Engr Bn, 101st Airborne Div

Co D, 168th Engr, II Field Force

Btry 6/27 Field Arty

Btry 2/23 Field Arty

MACV, Song Be

60


49

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

29TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP  
COMMUNICATION NETWORK

61




Incl 3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

62

29TH GENERAL SUPPORT GROUP  
GROUND DEFENSE SECTOR COMMUNICATIONS



— SOLE USER TELEPHONE



FM VOICE RADION

51

Incl 4

CONFIDENTIAL

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be on even when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
		1b. GROUP 4
2. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 29th General Support Group		
3. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 April 1968 (U)		
4. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 29th General Support Group		
5. REPORT DATE 9 May 1968	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 52	7b. NO. OF REFS
6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 682061	
7. PROJECT NO. N/A	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
8. a. b. c. d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
13. ABSTRACT		

52

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD839138

NEW LIMITATION CHANGE

TO

Approved for public release, distribution  
unlimited

FROM

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.  
agencies and their contractors;  
Administrative/Operational Use; 15 AUG  
1968. Other requests shall be referred to  
Office of Chief of Staff for Force  
Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AD839138

ACAM-P (M) (6 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682316

15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 79th  
Engineer Group (Const), Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance  
with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should  
be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days  
of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the  
Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent opera-  
tions.

3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned  
Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons  
Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the  
reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the  
attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion  
in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided  
at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command

US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants


US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Engineer School

US Army Infantry School

US Army Chaplain School

Protective marking cancelled when  
separated from inclosure.



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 79TH ENGINEER GROUP  
APO 96491

EEG-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

THRU: Commanding General  
20th Engineer Brigade  
ATTN: AVBI-OPN  
APO 96491

Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHEN-MO  
APO 96307

Commanding General  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army (ACSFOR DA)  
Washington, D. C. 20310

### Section I. Significant Organization Activities

#### A. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 79th Engineer Group

1. General: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 79th Engineer Group (Construction) remained stationed at the "Plantation Compound" in Long Binh throughout the reporting period.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
682316

PROTECTIVE MARKINGS MAY  
BE REMOVED 4 JULY 1969

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4

EOE-60

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

This reporting period literally started with a bang, as the 79th Engineer Group spent the first few days defending its perimeters while the enemy's Tet Offensive brought all units within the Group under fire. The men of the Group Headquarters manned their perimeter with enthusiasm and professionalism, anxious to fulfill their role in engaging the enemy. Prior planning, timely intelligence, good defensive positions, and the outstanding esprit and discipline of the men successfully thwarted the enemy's attacks.

The Tet Offensive resulted in considerable damage to the Group Headquarters facilities and precipitated some much-needed construction. Extensive damage to the headquarters building, due largely to the concussion from an explosion in the Long Binh Ammunition Storage Facility, was repaired and major modifications were incorporated. A foyer was constructed to serve as a lounge for in-processing personnel - this proved to be a great help in alleviating the crowded conditions in the personnel section and affording a place for transients to wait in comfort while processing during inclement weather.

The foyer is also temporarily being used for Sunday chapel services. There was an obvious need for a Group conference room, the construction of which has already proven its worth many times over. The reorganization of office space within the headquarters building has paid dividends in efficiency and comfort. Perhaps the most significant construction undertaken this quarter at Group Headquarters was the new tactical operations center. The Tet Offensive clearly demonstrated the need for a secure area from which operations could be directed on a 24-hour basis during hostile actions. The new TOC is a sandbag-hardened, reinforced concrete block structure which houses the communication facilities (radio and land line) and affords space for the commander and key staff members to carry out their functions in directing operations during an enemy attack. During non-hostile conditions the TOC is used by the duty officer and permanently houses the radio room and switchboard. Improvement of the defensive perimeter and ready reaction plans is a continuing process.

The Group effort for the reporting period was characterized by extensive maintenance, repair and construction of lines of communication coupled with continuous operational support missions for the tactical units within the 79th Engineer Group area of responsibility. As the quarter drew to a close, extensive effort was placed on preparation for the coming monsoon season. Along with the rain comes an increased expenditure of effort on base camp development, planning for which is currently fully underway.

2. Command: Major changes included the departure of Major Paul

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Kavanaugh, Group S-1, to CONUS; the arrival of Major Kenneth E. Halloran as the new S-1; the departure of Major James J. Callahan, the Group S-4, to CONUS; and the arrival of Major Clayton S. Gates as the new S-4. Captain Roosevelt Scott, Group Maintenance Officer, departed for CONUS and was replaced by Captain James M. Wilkins. In addition to changes in members of the principal staff, Captain (now Major) John Whisler was reassigned to the 34th Engineer Battalion as S-3 and was replaced by Captain John M. Wattendorf as the new Group Assistant S-3. Captain Wilbur Gregory assumed duties as Engineer Supply Officer in the S-4 Section. First Lieutenant Gerald Froelich was assigned as Headquarters Company Commander and First Lieutenant Richard L. Darden became the Group Personnel Officer.

3. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline: During the reporting period the Group not only received a large number of replacements, but also experienced a large loss of personnel in view of the rotational humps in March and April. A total of 2,488 replacements were received: 893 in February, 303 in March, and 1,292 in April. A total of 2,366 personnel returned to CONUS. However, in view of the large number of replacements received in February and April, major rotational humps have again developed for next year. A carefully planned infusion program is currently being developed for next year. A carefully planned infusion program is currently being developed within the Group to insure that no unit will lose more than 15% of its personnel in any single 30 day period. This will require infusion with units outside of the Group, and coordination with 20th Engineer Brigade is currently underway.

The overall officer strength continued to be high, but the manning level for officers in the grade of Captain fell sharply from 72.8% at the beginning of the period to 47.5% at the end of the reporting period. There are currently rotational humps for officers in August 1968 and March 1969. This will result in infusion with units outside of the Group and a program is currently being developed by Group and coordinated with 20th Engineer Brigade.

Despite a relatively high casualty rate, morale within the 79th Engineer Group continued at a high level during the reporting period as exemplified by the high rate of production and evident good spirit.

During the reporting period the Group suffered 14 killed in action, 205 wounded in action, and one (1) missing in action. A total of 379 decorations were awarded to members of the Group including 1 Silver Star, 31 Bronze Stars for Valor, one Air Medal for Valor, and 31 Army Commendation Medals for Valor.

During the reporting period, the 79th Engineer Group experienced a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968.

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

total of 235 Article 15's, a drop from the 264 cases during the last reporting period; there were 7 Summary Courts Martial, an increase from the 4 during the last period; Special Courts Martial were down, a total of 10 cases as compared with 15 during the last quarter; no General Courts Martial were experienced. Cases of venereal disease reported during this reporting period dropped significantly with a total of 155 reported cases as compared with 235 cases reported during the last reporting period. There was a major increase in Congressional inquiries, a total of 34 as compared with 16 during the last quarter. An analysis was made of the causes of these inquiries and, although many were not initiated by soldiers themselves, a significant number were. Command emphasis was directed to a strong program of information to personnel to re-emphasize the availability of the chain of command and unit inspectors general to whom problems and complaints could be presented. Many of the complaints were minor and could have been solved at the lowest echelons of the chain of command. In several cases, personnel were not aware of the availability of members of the chain of command for problems and complaints. It is anticipated that with strong command interest in this area, a significant drop should materialize during the next quarter.

4. Intelligence and Counterintelligence: The 79th Engineer Group Headquarters continues to distribute intelligence documents from the 20th Engineer Brigade, II FFORCEV, and higher headquarters. Spot reports of enemy actions are forwarded to the 20th Engineer Brigade and II FFORCEV. This headquarters continues to handle personnel security actions, e.g., validation of clearances up to and including TOP SECRET, granting of CONFIDENTIAL clearances and approval of interim clearances up to and including TOP SECRET. The subordinate battalions are granted the same clearance validation and granting authority as Group.

The reconnaissance effort within the Group continued in support of tactical operations, and proposed and actual LOC maintenance. Prior to all operations, reconnaissances are conducted and engineer work estimates drawn up for all LOC's in the area of operations.

Periodic inspections of airfields in the Group area of responsibility continued during the quarter despite occasional difficulty in arranging transportation for the inspection teams.

5. Plans, Operations, and Training: The 79th Engineer Group continued to fulfill operational requirements and work on cantonment construction and other MCA funded projects during the quarter.

Typical of the dry season, effort continued with emphasis on lines of communication and operational support missions. Sweep operations,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

clearing and repairing enemy interdictions, and the general repair and maintenance of lines of communication required continued effort. The variety of operational support missions covered the spectrum from combat support missions to fire support base construction.

Of special interest was the priority mission to emplace a 930' tactical bridge (M4T6) on the Song Dong Nai River in the southern portion of War Zone D. The mission was conducted by A Company of the 168th Engineer Battalion (Combat) supported by the 100th Engineer Company (FB), 573d Engineer Company (FB), E Company, 15th Engineer Battalion, and E Company, 1st Engineer Battalion. The operation proved to be a very challenging one and was successfully accomplished on time. The bridge was extracted immediately after the tactical crossing of over 150 tracked vehicles for which it had been constructed. A considerable number of valuable lessons were learned as a result of this operation, and an aggressive program of bridge training was initiated to insure professionalism on quick-reaction bridging operations.

The maintenance of airfields remains a continuing effort and is largely responsible for the constant demand on airmobile equipment.

During the latter half of the reporting period, when the Tet Offensive had been broken and traffic began to return to normal, the Group began extensive preparations for the coming rainy season. The tempo was most noticeably increased in the effort to haul and stockpile materials for projects planned during the rainy season and for the priority project of constructing the Saigon Bypass from Cu Chi to Phu Coung. In addition, emphasis was placed on finishing horizontal construction so that vertical construction could proceed without delay during the rainy season.

During the reporting period new cantonment directives were published for Phu Loi, Di An, Lai Khe, and Cu Chi. The scopes of these directives were a result of the USARV Ad Hoc Base Development Study. The result was a decrease in scope of most facilities.

The USARV Ad Hoc Base Development Study Group published the results of their reviews of the base development programs at Phu Loi, Phouc Vinh, and Bien Hoa. As in the case of previous reviews, the decrease in scopes of the cantonments would be a decrease of approximately two (2) battalion months of construction at each cantonment.

Training with the M16A1 rifle became an area of particular emphasis during this reporting period, which resulted in the implementation of aggressive training programs in all units having personnel armed with

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

the weapon. As part of the contingency planning for defense of the Group Headquarters, selected personnel were trained in the use and employment of the M72 LAW (Light Anti-Tank Weapon). Emphasis was placed on the proper development and use of range cards to further enhance the professionalism of the perimeter defense system. A training program has been implemented whereby each month a different combat engineer company will receive a three-day training period on the M4T6 bridge. The training will put the emphasis on supervisory personnel with particular attention to proper planning, organization and supervision. Two of the three days will be a practical exercise consisting of the erection and removal of a bridge.

Training remains an area of command interest in order to maintain professional competence in all endeavors.

6. Logistics: Twenty-one (21) major items of equipment were declared combat losses as a result of enemy action, of which only 11 were replaced. Items not replaced to date are 4 ea D7E tractors, 1 ea VRC-46 radio, 2 ea 2½ ton trucks, 1 ea PRC-25 radio, and 2 ea 5 ton trucks.

Replacement of several major items of TOE equipment remains unsatisfactory. Relief has been obtained in some of the areas deemed critical during the last report period; e.g., scoop loaders and graders. The following are some of the current critical shortages:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>6 FILL</u>
Tractor, D7E	98	89	91
Cranes	42	37	88
Dump Truck, 5T	326	304	93
Compressor, 250 CFM	32	21	66
Semi-Trailer, 25T	117	104*	89
Tractor, 10T	82	11**	13
Bridgeboats, 27'	10	5***	50

\* It has been reported that 10 trailers will be received soon.

\*\* 40 ea 5 ton tractors issued ILO 10 ton tractors.

\*\*\* One combat loss was incurred on 26 April, for a net requirement of 6 boats. A new replacement model is reported due in May.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Availability of construction materials has generally been satisfactory during this period with, again, exceptions of some plumbing and electrical items, lumber 3" or greater in dimension, and structural steel bridge materials (e.g., 36 WF 230 stringers).

On 20 February 1968, the Group was granted a request for contract rock haul of approximately 42,000 cubic meters of crushed rock from the University Quarry, Long Binh to Cu Chi, RVN. Because of the Tet Offensive, contractor employees did not move significant rock quantities until late March. To date 12,000 cubic meters of rock have been hauled by contract to Cu Chi. Even with this additional capability for hauling, however, total hauling capacity remained critically short during the period. At present, the Group has a total of 280,000 tons of aggregate and 41,000 cubic yards of sand on commercial contract.

The food service section is in full operation. Monthly food service inspections are being conducted by the food service supervisor in each of the 24 mess halls of the 79th Engineer Group. Quarterly reviews of mess accounts are being conducted on one-third of all mess halls each month, whether the mess is operated in cantonment or field environment.

Command emphasis has continued in areas of supply accountability and reports of survey. During the period 40 reports of survey were initiated, compared to 51 for the last reporting period. It is anticipated that this number will decrease substantially during the next quarter. Two 79th Engineer Group Regulations dealing with property and supply accountability were published during the reporting period. 79th Engineer Group Regulation 735-2, dated 10 February 1968, concerns combat loss accountability, reporting and replacement procedures; 79th Engineer Group Regulation 405-4, dated 3 March 1968, "Control of Construction Resources", gives guidance on issue and control of construction materials.

During the reporting period, the maintenance section placed primary emphasis on assistance to subordinate units in areas of maintenance management, material readiness, PLL, and shop operation and safety. Expediting repair parts has also remained an important function of the section. Throughout the reporting period the average deadline rates of engineer and ordnance equipment were 7.0% and 3.4% respectively, with an average overall deadline rate of 5.0%. The average critical item deadline rate (as defined in 20th Engineer Brigade Regulation 750-4) was 10.3%. Generally, half of the deadlined items require direct support maintenance; one of every four items requiring DS maintenance is deadlined for over 30 days before being returned to service or turned in for lack of repair parts. The two most critical maintenance

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

10

EGM-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

problem areas encountered during the reporting period were repair or replacement of the D7E tractor engine and the 5 ton dump truck multi-fuel engine. Altogether, during the reporting period 43 D7E tractors and 100 5-ton dump trucks were deadlined for engines. Of these, the close of the reporting period finds the Group with 3 D7E tractors and 32 5-ton dump trucks deadlined for engines. An analysis of reasons for these deadlines is being conducted, and the Maintenance Section continues to work closely with both the Continental Motors representative and the 29th General Support Group to resolve difficulties encountered in repair or replacement of engines and to preclude a continuing high deadline rate.

On 24 April, First Lieutenant Edwin J. Sullivan was reassigned from the 554th Engineer Battalion to Group Headquarters to serve as the Group Material Readiness Expeditor. This position is not authorized by TOE; but it has been recognized by USARV as required to combat the serious operational problems caused by shortages of repair parts, major items, and construction material. It has been found that MRE's can often solve these problems by discovering un-inventoried stock in out-of-the-way places and by cutting through channels to get an item where it is required earlier than would otherwise be the case.

7. Force Development: A Company, 27th Engineer Battalion, was returned to its parent unit early in the reporting period as the majority of the 101st Airborne Division commenced operations in another corps tactical zone. The 34th Engineer Battalion (Construction) was relocated from Bien Hoa to Phu Loi in order to support tactical unit requirements more effectively.

It was determined that Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 79th Engineer Group, the 104th Engineer Company (DT), the 27th Engineer Land Clearing Team, and the 362d Engineer Company (LE) did not have adequate personnel authorized to meet the mission requirements of the Group. In order to maintain these units at required strength, formal target strengths were developed which increase the manning level of the three aforementioned units at the expense of all other Group units.

During the reporting period an excessive overage within Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 79th Engineer Group was reduced to proposed MTOE strength. The primary cause of the over-strength situation was the replacement of key enlisted personnel as much as 30 days prior to DEROS of the incumbent. An overlap of from 3 to 8 days is considered adequate.

8. Command Management: No change from last report.

9. Inspector General: As anticipated by the Group Pre-IG Team, consisting of the Group Executive Officer and representatives of the Group

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ECE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Staff, the results of the Annual General Inspection of the 66th Engineer Company (TOPO), and the 34th Engineer Battalion (Construction), were most favorable; both units received satisfactory reports. In addition, the Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company received its Annual General Inspection during the period 1-4 April, the results of which were highly satisfactory. Two of the battalions, the 168th and the 554th, are scheduled for Annual General Inspections during the month of June. The Group Pre-IG team will conduct a two day Pre-IG inspection of each battalion approximately one month prior to the scheduled AGI. Based upon previous experience, it is anticipated that the Pre-IG inspection will provide valuable assistance which will prove beneficial to the two battalions to be inspected.

10. Information: The 79th Engineer Group continued to publish the Pioneer, the Group newspaper, and monthly maintenance notes, as well as monthly Chaplain's Newsletters. Starting in February 1968, the Group compiles and publishes Engineer Field Notes on a monthly basis. Although there was no significant change to the number of Hometown News Releases during the period, the number of contributions of news stories from elements of the command fell off sharply. Action has been taken to establish a target goal of one news release per company size element per week. This program commenced late in the period and a significant increase is anticipated during the next period; renewed command interest has been generated in this field.

11. Civic Affairs: During the reporting period the Group Civic Action Program continued support of MEDCAP and provided technical assistance for battalion civic action officers. The operations during the month of February were hampered by the Tet Offensive. Units were limited in the areas which they could enter. The Civic Action Program is expanding now and within the next two months should be a much more active program than before the Tet Offensive.

### B. 66th Engineer Company (Topographic)

1. General: On 31 January 1968 the unit was subjected to a rocket and ground attack as part of the VC Tet Offensive. Operations were halted for three days and were hampered for the entire month of February. The surveyors especially were affected, being unable to take to the field for three weeks. There were no casualties during the quarter. On April 15, Brigadier General Chapman, Commanding General, 20th Engineer Brigade, presented the unit with the Meritorious Unit Citation for the period September 1966 to May 1967.

2. Command: Technical liaison was maintained with II Field Force Vietnam Engineer Section and United States Army Vietnam Engineer. The 66th Engineer Company remains under the administrative control of the

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12

EE-60

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

79th Engineer Group.

3. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline: During the quarter strength remained high. Administrative reports and records were prepared as needed, including the new Quarterly Operations Report which supersedes our old monthly report. Morale continues to be high as the unit continues its mission of topographic support of the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. In the quarter, 15 individuals were punished under Article 15 of the UCMJ. There were no trials by Court Martial and no cases of venereal disease were reported.

4. Intelligence and Counterintelligence: None

5. Plans, Operations, and Training: The unit, with the exception of the surveyors, was fully operational throughout the period except for the period of the Tet Offensive, 31 January 1968 to 3 February 1968. The Survey Platoon completed all previously assigned projects related to the Saigon, Bien Hoa mapping projects and all data has been turned in. The Cartographic and Reproduction Platoons were both on a two shift around the clock basis this quarter. Over one million impressions with an average run of 600 per plate were completed by the Reproduction Platoon this quarter. Tactical Scale Studies, uncontrolled and semi-uncontrolled mosaics, Inland Waterways overlays, Road Net Series, and many after action reports, photo print overlays and miscellaneous jobs were completed. Over 30 mosaics in the Saigon, Bien Hoa mapping project were printed and distributed. Work continues on the air-conditioner for the Electrostatic Printer. Continuous on the job training was conducted in all areas. All the perimeter defenses were strengthened this quarter with thousands upon thousands of sand bags being filled. Stand-by power for the Operations Pad was also installed. Five men attended the FADAC Training Course at Phu Loi.

6. Logistics: Several major items of equipment were received this quarter, including the FADAC, all related test equipment and two 3KW generators. The three MC-8's were returned from retrofitting at Granite City Army Depot and we are now awaiting 6 MRA-301's to take the place of all MC-8's. One new photo composing machine was also received. We are now short only two. Topo supply problems have been alleviated through unit action. Special permission was received to visit all the warehouses in the 506th Field Depot. The unit located and picked up 600 reams of paper, over 1,000 cans of developer and innumerable other hard to get topographic supplies. No problems are foreseen except for map paper since the Depot is now out of it completely. 600 reams should last two months.

7. Force Development: N/A

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

8. Command Management: N/A

9. Inspector General: The annual AGI inspections were conducted on 13-14 February with an overall rating of satisfactory and many areas rated superior.

10. Information: The Operations Report continues to get worldwide circulation.

11. Civic Affairs: None

C. 100th Engineer Company (Float Bridge)

1. General: During the period 1 February 1968 through 30 April 1968, the 100th Engineer Company (FB) continued to provide float bridge support to tactical units within the 79th Engineer Group's area of responsibility. The unit also continued to support units within the 79th Engineer Group in its secondary mission, that of cargo hauling. For a considerable part of February, this unit actively engaged in the perimeter defense of Camp Frenzell - Jones to suppress the enemy's Tet Offensive.

2. Command: The 100th Engineer Company (FB) remained stationed at Long Binh and attached, for all purposes, to the 79th Engineer Group. First Lieutenant T. E. Bender assumed command from Captain W. T. Gregory, Jr. on 25 February 1968. The following self-help projects were initiated and completed by the 100th Engineer Company (FB) during the quarter:

- a. Additional dayroom facilities
- b. Seven perimeter defense 5-man bunkers
- c. Improvements to EM club

3. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline: During this reporting period, unit strength decreased slightly, until at the end of the period, the unit is 9% understrength. Morale remained high throughout the reporting period and there were no major disciplinary problems. A rotational hump was experienced in March. The GED program initiated last reporting period has continued to produce gratifying results.

4. Intelligence and Counterintelligence: The 100th Engineer Company (FB) continued to process security clearances, to receive intelligence from 79th Engineer Group and other major supported units, and to report items of intelligence during the reporting period.

5. Plans, Operations, and Training: Operational support was provided

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(4)

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

in the form of bridge materials, technical assistance, and personnel to construct 210' of M4T6 bridge in support of the 65th Engineer Battalion; 2 bridge erection boats and personnel in support of the 15th Engineer Battalion; and a dry span (38'4") in support of the 92nd Engineer Battalion.

The largest operation of the quarter was the support of the 168th Engineer Battalion's mission to bridge the Song Dong Nai with 930' of M4T6 bridge to cross over 150 tracked vehicles. This unit provided 543' of bridge, 36 5-ton bridge trucks, 2 5-ton tool and rigging trucks, 2 20-ton cranes, 2 250 CFM air compressors, 1 wrecker, 1 fuel tanker, 4 27' bridge erection boats, 3 officers and 113 EM. The operation was successfully completed; however, many areas needing attention were uncovered.

Additional support was rendered units of the 79th Engineer Group in the form of general cargo hauling; altogether, 2885 5-ton bridge truck days were provided to 79th Engineer Group in the unit's secondary mission.

Detailed accounts of operational missions performed by the 100th Engineer Company (FB) are contained in attached after action reports.

Continued emphasis on training of unit personnel was given during this reporting period. Range firing has been conducted as a continuing process as well as transitional training on the M-16 rifle.

In addition, from 31 January 1968 to 27 February 1968 a substantial portion of the company was utilized for security force on the perimeter defense of Camp Frenzell - Jones during the enemy's Tet Offensive.

6. Logistics: Logistical support was normal during this period with the following items of special interest:

a. Of the two authorized 210 CFM air compressors, the remaining one was turned in for repair on 5 February 1968 and was scored out on 15 March 1968. Replacements for both were received on 26 April 1968.

b. Of the 10 authorized 27' bridge erection boats, 5 are on hand only 2 of which are operational with no replacements available as of this date.

c. Of the 60 authorized 5 ton bridge trucks, this unit is short two, leaving 58 on hand. As of this date, no replacements are available, while non-bridge units are still being issued this type of truck (i.e., Artillery Units).

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)7. Force Development: N/A

8. Command Management: The 100th Engineer Company (FB) continued to offer technical assistance to command and staff of various tactical units supported.

9. Inspector General: N/A

10. Information: The 100th Engineer Company (FB) continued to turn in home town news releases and contributed articles to the 79th Engineer Group's PIO section.

11. Civic Affairs: Food scraps and other edible wastes are continually being donated to the convent of the Holy Cross at Buc Hui, Ho Nai, for use as pig swill. In addition, this unit has adopted the Vien Ciac Pagoda Orphanage as a civic action project and is currently involved in an aggressive building project of a school house and a dispensary.

## D. 104th Engineer Company (Dump Truck)

1. General: The 104th Engineer Company (DT) remained stationed at Long Binh in a military area extending along the east side of Route 316 throughout the reporting period. Increased emphasis on hauling during this reporting period precipitated this unit's reorganization for 24 hour a day operation.

2. Command: The 104th Engineer Company (DT) remained attached to the 79th Engineer Group for all purposes.

3. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline: The company is presently at 170% of its authorized strength. This overstrength is justified by a requirement from higher headquarters to operate on a twenty-four hour basis. The morale of the company remains high even though the men are working long and difficult hours.

4. Intelligence and Counterintelligence: None

5. Plans, Operations, and Training: During this period both 1st and 2nd platoons remained in support of the 588th Engineer Battalion (Combat) during Operation Yellowstone. The 1st Platoon was attached to D Company in Katum for the purpose of upgrading route 4 to Prek Klok and route 246 to Bo Tuc. The 2nd Platoon was attached to B Company at French Fort for the LOC upgrading of TL-4 north to Prek Klok. The 2nd Platoon returned to Long Binh on 18 February 1968. The 1st Platoon returned to Long Binh on 21 February 1968.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

16

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

Four vehicles were lost during Operation Yellowstone. One truck was destroyed in an ambush, one by detonating a mine, and two were lost because of cracked frames. Total mileage during Operation Yellowstone was 80,291 miles and total yards hauled was 61,193 cubic yards.

The next operational support mission was to haul crushed rock for the 554th Engineer Battalion Saigon Bypass project. The 2nd Platoon began hauling crushed rock to Cu Chi on 23 February 1968. The 1st Platoon began hauling crushed rock to Cu Chi on 26 February 1968. During this period side boards were installed on all vehicles to increase their load to maximum capacity and eliminate spillage.

During the reporting quarter, the total mileage was 224,856 miles and total yardage was 32,941 cubic yards of bulk material.

During the reporting period the unit continued to reconstruct and resandbag the perimeter alert bunkers. It was learned during Tet that the bunkers were insufficient for this unit's needs.

Monthly command information classes and orientation briefings for newly assigned personnel were held by the Commanding Officer. In addition, four classes were conducted on safety and operational instructions for the multi-fuel M51A2 dump truck at base camp and TDY locations. Monthly character guidance classes were conducted by the 79th Engineer Group Chaplain.

6. Logistics: There is still a problem receiving PLL repair parts through normal requisitioning procedures. The unit has experienced a high deadline rate recently. This is attributed to the adverse working conditions under which the vehicles are presently operating. Also contributing to the deadline rate is the fact that the trucks have been in country over a year.

The supply room was found to have inadequate storage space, especially since some of the conex containers had to be turned in. This unit initiated a project expanding the supply room to provide storage space. The project will be completed in the near future.

7. Force Development: N/A
8. Command Management: N/A
9. Inspector General: N/A
10. Information: None
11. Civic Affairs: None

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ECE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

## E. 500th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge)

1. General: As part of the 79th Engineer Group (Construction), the 500th Engineer Company (PB) remained stationed at Long Binh in Camp Frensell - Jones extending along the east side of Route 316 north of the intersection of routes 15 and 316. In the immediate vicinity of the unit are two other separate companies of the 79th Engineer Group: the 100th Engineer Company (FB) and the 104th Engineer Company (DT).

2. Command: The command of the company passed from Captain James M. Wilkins to Captain Ronald R. Wagner on 25 March 1968.

3. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline: During the quarterly reporting period, the 500th Engineer Company (PB) maintained high individual morale with few disciplinary problems. There was one court martial and there were two punishments under Article 15, UCMJ. The overall assigned strength remained at an average of 124. This average is three under TOE authorization. This shortage of personnel prevented assigning an assistant driver, or "shotgun", in each dump truck when the unit operates on roads of marginal security, and operates vehicles and drivers 16 to 18 hours per day. Due to a shortage of replacement personnel in MOS 12C20 it has been necessary to assign Combat Engineers, MOS 12A10, to operate organic dump trucks. This arrangement has proved to be most satisfactory. Consideration has been given to requesting authority to hire indigenous civilian personnel to drive dump trucks for this unit. It is envisioned that these civilian drivers would be utilized to drive trucks on primarily administrative, cargo hauling missions in areas that are relatively secure. Minor problems of control would be generated by implementation of this plan, but it is felt that the resulting advantages would override these problems. Military personnel would continue to be utilized as drivers and "shotguns" in insecure areas or on bridge missions and to perform required maintenance.

4. Intelligence and Counterintelligence: The 500th Engineer Company (PB) receives continuous distribution of intelligence documents from Headquarters, 79th Engineer Group and higher headquarters. Requests for granting, validating, and upgrading of security clearances are submitted as needed.

5. Plans, Operations, and Training: During the reporting period the 500th Engineer Company (PB) served both in its primary mission of providing panel bridge support, and its secondary mission of providing dump truck support to the 79th Engineer Group and other units in the III Corp Tactical Zone. Panel bridge missions were as follows:

a. Support of the 4th Transportation Command in the rehabilitation of 80 feet of DS panel bridge. This bridge was unique in that it was

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

18

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS AFOR-65 (J1)

used to allow passage of vehicular traffic onto a floating barge. The shore end of the bridge was set on normal bearing plates which were imbedded in concrete. The barge end of the bridge was set on bearing plates which were welded to normal base plates. These base plates were then placed on channels welded to the barge. This arrangement was necessary to allow for movement of the barge under the bridge due to tidal actions. After Action Report dated 1 February 1968 is attached as inclosure #6, pertaining to this mission.

b. Support of the 588th Engineer Battalion with technical assistance in the repair of 60 feet of DS panel bridge and the repair and replacement of both ramps. After Action Report dated 6 March 1968 is attached as inclosure #7, pertaining to this mission.

c. Support of E Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, with technical assistance in the erection of 80 feet of DS panel bridge with 20 foot ramps. Inclosure #8, After Action Report dated 23 March 1968, is attached describing the bridge mission.

d. Support of E Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, in the repair and reinforcement of 40 feet of an existing 90 foot DS panel bridge. Inclosure #9, After Action Report dated 28 March 1968, is attached describing the mission.

e. The 500th Engineer Company (PB), with no outside assistance, erected 120 feet of DD Class 45/55 panel bridge at bridge site XT781133. Inclosure #10, After Action Report dated 1 April 1968, is attached giving description of the mission.

In addition to carrying on its primary mission the 500th Engineer Company (PB) completed the hauling of 15,800 cubic yards of construction material, primarily laterite, sand, and crushed rock, in support of base camp construction, LOC upgrading, and other construction projects.

A one week course of instruction on vehicle operation and maintenance is now being conducted for all replacement personnel. This training is in addition to the normal in-processing and orientations that all new arrivals receive. Results have proven satisfactory as maintenance problems have decreased and operating efficiency has increased.

6. Logistics: Logistical support, including resupply of PLI has been adequate, however, a minor problem continues to exist in the area of the Self-Service Supply Center. Normally the Self-Service Supply Center has limited supplies to provide to each unit of this command. With only one day a week allowed per company to shop at Self-Service Supply Center, items or the quantity of items diminish toward the end of the week, thus preventing many units from receiving needed supplies. It is felt that

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

provisions should be made to keep a well stocked inventory, thereby enabling units to secure needed supplies more readily.

7. Force Development: N/A8. Command Management: Technical bridge construction advice and assistance was provided by the key members of the unit to the commanders and staffs of the various supported tactical units.9. Inspector General: N/A10. Information: The 500th Engineer Company (PB) continued to provide home town news releases and contributed various news articles to the 79th Engineer Group PIO Section.11. Civic Affairs: The unit is presently in the process of seeking approval for a Donor Deposit Fund to be established to provide support and assistance to a Catholic orphanage in the local town of Ho Nai. Additionally, the unit has recently donated scrap lumber and other construction materials for assistance in the reconstruction of several local residences that were damaged or destroyed during the Tet Offensive.Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

## a. Personnel.

(1) The Chaplain's role in a higher headquarters under attack.(a) OBSERVATION. The Chaplain of a unit in defensive posture can enhance morale and improve confidence by spending his time moving from bunker to bunker.(b) EVALUATION. Personnel assigned to higher headquarters are primarily clerks, drivers, and service personnel. When under attack they function efficiently and effectively because of their basic training. The Tet hostilities opened at this headquarters with a rocket attack followed by a ground assault. The men functioned extremely well and with professional skill. Since the attack proved part of the larger Tet hostilities the alert defensive posture continued for several weeks. Thus the clerks, drivers, and service personnel had nightly guard duties and minimal sleep with utility repairs to accomplish in addition to continuing operational requirements. This dual role requires consideration in order to maintain high morale. The Chaplain of this headquarters made nightly visits to the firing points, towers, and bunkers to encourage fire discipline, to stifle rumors, to raise confidence and to give the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EEG-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

men an opportunity to talk. The Chaplain often took coffee, water, cookies or other refreshments to help the men keep awake and alert. Such efforts were repaid with an increased understanding by the men of their duties and responsibilities. Problem areas were pointed out to the Chaplain and then directed to the Company. The Chaplain's presence should enhance discipline, increase feeling of courage and show command interest in the welfare of the men.

(a) RECOMMENDATION. That the Chaplain visit the perimeter defense regularly after checking with the company commander. That Chaplains use these opportunities to stifle rumors, encourage the sentinels and show genuine interest in the men.

(2) Infusion Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. Major personnel losses were experienced in March and April 1968 and replacements for the losses have created serious rotational humps for February and April 1969.

(b) EVALUATION. The major losses during March and April resulted from the one year in country of two battalions, the 554th and the 34th Engineer Battalions. As it was their first year in country, a loss of up to 25% of their strength was authorized within a 30 day period. A partial infusion program spread many of these losses throughout the Group. Replacements, therefore, were received and new rotational humps created. Requisitions for the replacements were for the same months as the departures of the incumbents.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A carefully planned program is necessary not only to reduce the rotational humps to less than 15% of authorized strength departing within a 30 day period, but also to spread the rotation of personnel evenly throughout the year. Requisitioning of personnel to meet this objective should be closely supervised and meticulously planned at all levels. This program is currently underway in the 79th Engineer Group.

(3) Servicemen's Group Life Insurance.

(a) OBSERVATION. Too many servicemen in the Republic of Vietnam are not taking advantage of the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance.

(b) EVALUATION. In a recent mortar attack a young soldier was killed in action - this young married man had no life insurance policy. Servicemen's Group Life Insurance was available to him at the nominal fee of only two dollars per month to be taken out of his base pay. During his initial in-processing, every man is given the option of taking SGLI by the personnel clerk. Why do so many soldiers refuse this.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14 May 1968

EGE-CO

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

option? The question is not easily answered nor is it the same in every case; however, a lack of knowledge and understanding are certainly key factors in most instances.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all unit commanders at all levels of command make it standard policy to fully brief their personnel on the fundamentals of life insurance. Particular emphasis should be placed on the low cost and high rate of return on SCLI.

(4) Need for MTOE.

(a) OBSERVATION. The current TOE of a dump truck company provides an insufficient number of personnel to perform required missions.

(b) EVALUATION. During the reporting period the dump truck company again found that the present TOE called for insufficient personnel to operate in a combat zone. The TOE authorizes 48 dump trucks which require 96 people for safe operation in a combat zone. Under the present TOE, the unit is authorized 72 people to man the 48 vehicles. This creates an impossible situation when attempting to operate and maintain vehicles on a 24 per day basis. The 79th Engineer Group is aware of the problem and has authorized additional personnel for this purpose at the expense of other Group units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an MTOE be published for dump truck companies operating in a combat zone. Such an MTOE is currently under study.

## b. Operations.

(1) Mine Clearing Devices.

(a) OBSERVATION. Mine warfare in Vietnam, as practiced by the Viet Cong, consists primarily of the placement of scattered mines along a road or trail. To insure that these roads are kept open, a fast, reliable means of discovering and removing the mines must be developed.

(b) EVALUATION. Throughout the III Corp Tactical Zone the enemy has made extensive use of field expedient and manufactured anti-tank and anti-personnel mines to interdict lines of communication and to harass convoys. Usually these mines are not intended to cause extensive damage to the roadway but to slow down and stop convoys and deny the use of the road to the local populace. Sweep teams moving in front of the convoy with standard mine clearing devices are slow and, therefore, cause considerable delay. A temporary measure of using the standard wheeled tractor (290M) to clear brush and earthen road blocks that often

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

22

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

ECE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

are mined and booby trapped has proven effective; however, this is misuse of a key piece of equipment and could prove to be very costly. Since the beginning of World War II the Corps of Engineers has done considerable research on devices to be attached to the front of standard military equipment which would detonate or detect a mine or explosive device with minimum risk of damage to equipment or injury to personnel. A device of this type is critically needed in Vietnam.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That any available mine clearing device, either a test device or an item of standard issue, be sent to Vietnam for use by troops in the field, and that further research be conducted in this area of vital concern.

(2) Field Location of Battalion Headquarters.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is little apparent need for the relocation of a battalion headquarters to a field location, even if the entire battalion is in a close combat support posture.

(b) EVALUATION. During Operation Yellowstone the 588th Engineer Battalion relocated its headquarters to a field location to provide engineer support to the 25th Infantry Division. This proved to be an undesirable situation. The support area was located only fifty (50) kilometers from the normal base camp of the battalion, and all support came to the battalion through normal channels. The great bulk of administrative and logistical burden was handled in the same manner as if the battalion were in a normal operational status. The movement of the battalion headquarters to the field caused an already overburdened communications system to be taxed beyond its capability, caused the complete disruption of the normal flow of information particularly in the logistical field, and created a situation in the material readiness of the battalion that was totally unsatisfactory.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That during operations within close proximity of its home base camp (i.e., up to 150 km) a battalion headquarters should remain at that base. If a battalion "forward" is required, it should consist of no more than a small operational nucleus.

(3) Convoy Control in Congested Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION. Civilian vehicles in congested areas continually attempt to pass through the vehicle line thereby jeopardizing their safety and causing large gaps in the convoy. Additionally, these civilian vehicles attempt to pass convoys simultaneously on both the left and right sides of the road.

(b) EVALUATION. A whistle, used by the convoy commander, has

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

23.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EEG-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

been found to be most effective to control civilian traffic during convoy operations. Civilian drivers respond readily to the sound of a whistle and little, if at all, to the sound of a truck horn.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the use of a whistle to control civilian traffic that is interfering with a convoy become standard practice.

### (4) Authorization of a Fuel Tanker in Panel Bridge Companies.

(a) OBSERVATION. The lack of a fuel tanker as part of the TOE of a panel bridge company seriously hampers efficient operations.

(b) EVALUATION. When this unit is engaged in extensive hauling operations a considerable amount of valuable maintenance time is lost at the end of each day by having all of the unit vehicles assemble at a central, post operated, POL refueling point. This is necessitated because this unit is not authorized a tanker even though its secondary mission is the hauling of construction material and general cargo.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consideration be given to authorizing panel bridge companies one 1200 gallon fuel tanker.

### (5) Combat Engineer Vehicle.

(a) OBSERVATION. Current combat engineer support roles in Vietnam require a piece of engineer equipment which would provide the engineers with security for sweep teams; or, where security is provided, to move at a rate consistent with the rate of march of the security force.

(b) EVALUATION. Current engineer operations in support of tactical forces in Vietnam require engineer work crews (up to platoon size strength) to operate with minimum security in areas of frequent enemy ambush. The current TOE of the non-divisional combat battalion does not allow for the combat engineer vehicle. This vehicle would be a great asset in providing security, rapid cross country mobility, rapid means of road block removal while affording protection from small arms and anti-personnel mines, and a means for assaulting and neutralizing enemy field fortifications.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a Combat Engineer Vehicle be assigned the non-divisional combat engineer battalion on the basis of one per combat company.

### (6) Secure Means of Communications.

(a) OBSERVATION. The requirement exists for a secure means of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EE-20

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

communication between Group Headquarters and subordinate units

(b) EVALUATION. During the Viet Cong Tet Offensive all means of communication except voice radio was cut off. This greatly hampered the operation of the Group, particularly in the area of classified projects. Classified traffic had normally been handled by couriers, but the insecure condition of the local road net and higher priority demands for available helicopter time prevented normal courier service from taking place. The use of teletype with on line cryptographic facilities would greatly enhance the ability of the Group to carry out its assigned missions with minimum disruption due to enemy activity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the Group Headquarters and all subordinate battalions obtain necessary equipment to set up and operate a secure radio teletype net.

(7) S-3 Duty Officer.

(a) OBSERVATION. The need exists for an S-3 Duty Officer during periods of increased readiness.

(b) EVALUATION. During periods of increased readiness (i.e., increased guard stature or anticipation of enemy action) the normal staff duty officer is not qualified to handle the increased activity that occurs in the operations center. For this reason, an officer from the S-3 section was detailed to remain in the Group Operations Center during the hours of darkness to provide an immediate answer for any operational question that arises.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That any time the Group Headquarters is placed on increased readiness an officer from the S-3 be detailed to act as the duty operations officer.

(8) Use of Terrain Detachment and TOPO Company.

(a) OBSERVATION. The Group Headquarters S-3 Section does not make full use of the services of the Terrain Detachment and Engineer Company (TOPO) when performing reconnaissance of work sites, rivers, and roads.

(b) EVALUATION. This Group currently has immediately available the resources of the 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) and the 66th Engineer Company (TOPO). Within the resources of these two units exists considerable map and photographic coverage of most of the area in which the Group would have to operate. Since aircraft are critical, a complete ground reconnaissance is usually impossible; therefore, maximum use should be made of the resources available at these two units.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

25

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EEG-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. That the Group Operations Section maintain constant liaison with the terrain detachment and the TOPO Company and that maximum use be made of information available to supplement ground reconnaissance of future mission sites.

### (9) Sandbagging of Vehicles.

(a) OBSERVATION. Vehicles which have been hardened with sandbags often save lives.

(b) EVALUATION. During Operation Yellowstone, the personnel of this unit learned the importance of properly sandbagging a vehicle. The unit lost a total of four trucks due to land mines. Three trucks were a total loss; however, sandbagging prevented injury to any of the personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That it be SOP for operational units to insure all vehicles are properly sandbagged.

### (10) Engineer Support.

(a) OBSERVATION. Engineer support to tactical units in Vietnam can best be obtained by a mix of engineer units.

(b) EVALUATION. When providing engineer support to an infantry division, the combination of one (1) construction battalion and one (1) combat battalion has proven to be most effective. Specifically the construction battalion can provide base construction support, lines of communication upgrading, and back up equipment support. The combat battalion can provide support to combat operations, lines of communication repair and maintenance, and provide back up support on less sophisticated base construction projects. This system allows a greater degree of flexibility, provides better engineer support to the customer, and permits more efficient utilization of engineer resources.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That each division zone have one (1) combat and one (1) construction battalion.

### c. Training.

#### (1) Training of Bridge Specialists.

(a) OBSERVATION. Bridge personnel must be kept trained in the primary field of bridging, even though they may be conducting alternate missions such as convoys.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-60

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(b) EVALUATION. This headquarters had the mission of crossing an armored task force of over 150 vehicles over a float bridge 930' long under extremely hazardous conditions. It became apparent from the start that the personnel in the bridge company (particularly the boat operators) were not skilled in their MOS. The lack of skill occurred primarily because since their arrival in country they had spent the majority of their time conducting convoys utilizing their bridge trucks. It was also found that personnel in the combat companies were very weak in the conduct of bridging operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That periodic bridge training be conducted to insure that personnel in the combat battalions and the bridge companies are well versed in the science of constructing float bridge. An aggressive bridge training program is currently being implemented.

(2) Boat Operator Training.

(a) OBSERVATION. The only method of obtaining power boat operators is through on-the-job training.

(b) EVALUATION. It has been observed that the only area in the US Army where formal instruction on the operation of the 27-foot Bridge Erection Boat is conducted is at the Seventh Army Engineer School, where a three week course of instruction is given. This unit has ten (10) such boats authorized by TOE and the only method available to train operators is by giving a Bridge Specialist (MOS 12C30) on-the-job training. What usually happens is that a light truck driver is given the additional duty of power boat operator. Even though each platoon is able to place two boats in the water at least monthly, sufficient operator training cannot be achieved. Normally only enough time is permitted for operational checks and maintenance, thus resulting in the operator receiving training only on boat operation without being able to push a raft. Even if a full day is utilized for this training and bridge is available for use in the training, it usually is still insufficient due to the fact that lack of security means only enough time is permitted to assemble and disassemble the raft, not permitting the boat operator sufficient time to learn necessary hand signal commands or to experience pushing the raft for considerable lengths of time. In addition, much of our time in Vietnam is taken up by convoy operations thus forcing boat operators to be primarily truck drivers.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

(1) That a formal course of instruction be established, as an addition to Advanced Individual Training for MOS 12C20, which combines both boat operation and boat maintenance (now positions of 62B20) for a five week course of instruction.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(2) That the most outstanding trainees in MOS 12C20 be retained at the training units and given this additional five week course of instruction, and on completion, be awarded an MOS of 12C30.

(3) That MOS 12C30 be authorized the rank of Specialist Fifth Class in the TOE.

(3) Safety During Rocket or Mortar Attacks.

(a) OBSERVATION. There are more injuries due to carelessness during night mortar and rocket attacks than due to enemy action.

(b) EVALUATION. Recent mortar and rocket attacks during conditions of darkness have resulted in an alarming number of injuries to personnel that might have been easily avoided if simple rules had been adhered to during the attack. The initiation of an attack, whether signalled by incoming rounds or by the alarm siren, triggers off a stampede to the mortar bunkers. Running in the dark, often without boots, is hazardous at best, and when coupled with diving into a mortar bunker which is about four feet deep and three feet wide the action becomes downright foolhardy. Lying on the floor under a bed inside a building that has sandbagged walls offers considerably more protection than does the exposed run from the billets to the bunker. After the incoming rounds have ceased, personnel can move to the mortar bunkers in an orderly manner with boots on and await further attacks or an all-clear.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all personnel be instructed to move to mortar bunkers only after the incoming rounds have stopped falling, and that they do not run to the bunkers during hours of darkness.

d. Intelligence. None

e. Logistics.

(1) Dispersion of Class IV Stocks.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is insufficient dispersion of Class IV construction and fortification material.

(b) EVALUATION. During and after the Tet Offensive, when convoy movement was curtailed through Saigon and other areas into 1st and 25th Division areas, a critical lack of construction materials resulted temporarily for projects underway in these areas. The shortage of this type of item was more prolonged than that for other classes of supply, because of the lower priority placed on transportation of Class IV materials. For the 79th Engineer Group, almost all Class IV must be transported from Long Binh. Stocks at Tay Ninh, Dau Tieng, Cu Chi, Phu Loi and Di An are primarily for divisional units.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

28

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Critical Class IV supply items (e.g., sand bags, concertina, culvert, heavy timber, peneprimo) should be dispersed in Class IV supply points located closer to tactical units in the field. Establishment of a Class II and IV supply point at Phu Loi is being recommended under separate cover.

## (2) Forecast of Class IV.

(a) OBSERVATION. Several Class IV items are in chronically critical short supply or subject to wide surges in availability (critical shortage followed by excessive stocks): heavy timber, large culvert, asphalt products, cement and sandbags are example items.

(b) EVALUATION. Forecasts of selected Class IV items are required of using units, up to a year or more in advance. Some of these forecasts have not been matched by deliveries. Long range forecasts of this type are highly subject to change, as projects are modified and priorities shifted. In addition, operational support mission requirements are extremely difficult to forecast accurately, due to the spontaneity of the requirement for such missions. In some cases, even when accurate forecasts were made, units failed to submit timely requests for their required materials. In other cases, materials were not available in the depot at the time required.

## (c) RECOMMENDATION.

(1) Forecasts must be continuously updated for materials deemed key to upcoming projects. Units must submit requests and follow up their requests on a timely basis; a forecast is not a request for issue. Implementing instructions have been issued to 79th Engineer Group units.

(2) A system of continuous monitoring by USAIRV and 1st Logistical Command should be instituted, to identify items for which forecasted requirements exceed proposed supply, and to revise supply schedules accordingly.

## (3) Failure of 5-Ton Multifuel Engines.

(a) OBSERVATION. Excessive failures of the 5-ton multifuel engine were experienced during the reporting period.

(b) EVALUATION. This problem was analyzed, with particular attention paid to engine mileage, manufacturer, and number of days in the DSU. Of 42 engine failures considered, 21 were original engines. They failed after an average of 20,310 miles. The 21 replacements, of which at least 3/4 were rebuilt engines, failed after an average of only 5,082 miles. Among rebuilt engines, it appears that Hercules engines are

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS GSFOR-65 (R1)

more failure-prone than Continental engines. Additional command emphasis has been placed on proper operation and maintenance of these engines.

(a) RECOMMENDATION. That the above data be taken under advisement by USAMECOM.

(4) Replacement of Major Items.

(a) OBSERVATION. Excessive delays have been incurred in the replacement of several major items.

(b) EVALUATION. Major items have been lost through accidents, thefts, combat damage, and the combined effects of age and lack of repair parts. In the latter case, items are turned in for evacuation. This has been a very significant category of losses. Insufficient depot stock has caused using units to be without mission-essential items for many months. Specific examples are D7E tractors, 5-ton dump trucks, and 250 CFM air compressors.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Replacement factors currently in use should be studied and revised based on experience in this war. Since many items are lost through lack of repair parts, a review of the causes for these parts shortages should be conducted.

(5) Shortages of Direct Exchange Items.

(a) OBSERVATION. Using units are not authorized to increase their stock of DX items beyond the level established by the applicable TM, regardless of the number of demands. This level is normally set at one each, on the assumption that the DSU will replace the item immediately from stock items rebuilt by the DSU. At this time, units within this Group have over 300 outstanding direct exchange tags from their supporting DSU. The direct support units do not have the items, nor do they have the rebuild kits for the items.

(b) EVALUATION. Since units are not authorized to stock DX items based on demands, they have to rely on sources outside normal supply channels to keep vehicles operational. When doing this, units begin to hoard the parts, which compounds the problems of re-supply to other units. Consequently, some units have deadlined vehicles awaiting DX parts while other units have these parts available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None. This headquarters has informed 29th General Support Group of the problem. They are investigating the situation at this time.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

30

EGE-CO

14 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)


## f. Organization.

### (1) Shortage of Aircraft.

(a) OBSERVATION. The need for rotary winged aircraft for command and control, resupply, and reconnaissance cannot be met under the current support system.

(b) EVALUATION. This headquarters is currently charged with the responsibility of exercising command and control (to include OPCON) over two combat battalions and two construction battalions spread over a 7000 square mile area. To exercise effective control, to perform required resupply missions and to perform necessary ground and air reconnaissance would require twenty-four (24) UH-1D days per week. This requirement is more important when the availability of captains (48%) and average time of service of company grade officers is considered (1½ years). Currently approximately 60% of this requirement is being provided. It is recognized that this is done by providing maximum support from resources available. This does not, however, change the basic requirement which would allow for the maximum effective use of the engineer resources within the Group.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the Group Headquarters be authorized an Aviation Section which would remain under Group control for all purposes. This would ideally be an air section similar to the TOE air section for a Combat Group.



JOHN H. ELDER JR.

Colonel, CE

Commanding

Withdrawn, HQ, DA

13	Incals
1	Organization Chart
2	Overlay of 79th Engr Gp
3	Area of Operations
4	Overlay of 79th Engr Gp
5	Physical Location
6	Construction Projects
7	79th Engr Gp
8	After Action Report (Bridge Mission at XS887893)
9	After Action Report (Bridge Mission at XT230542)
10	After Action Report (Bridge Mission at XS898942)
11	After Action Report (Bridge Mission at XT737332)
12	After Action Report (Bridge Mission at XT784133)
13	After Action Report Resupply of Company "B", 168th Engr Bn (CBT)
14	After Action Report Support of the 94th Engr Bn
15	After Action Report Support of 588th Engr Bn
16	After Action Report Support of Company E, 65th Engr Bn, 25th Inf Div

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

51  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVB1-03 (14 May 68) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction) for  
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65(E1).

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 20TH ENGINEER BRIGADE, APO SF 96492

TO: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHEN-MO, APO 96375

1. Submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation 525-15, dated  
13 April 1968.

2. This headquarters concurs with the OML submitted by the 79th  
Engineer Group except Section I, paragraph A6, "Logistics":  
Add one each bridge erection boat and 4 each  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks to items  
lost as a result of enemy action and not replaced to date.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
RICHARD E. TAYLOR  
1LT, AOC  
Assistant Adjutant

Copy Furnished:  
CO, 79th Engr Grp

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

32

AVHGC-DST (14 May 68) 2d Ind CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 JUL 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 79th Engineer Group.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning mine clearing devices, page 19, paragraph b(1): Concur. Vehicle mounted mine detectors will be issued to some of the Engineer Troop units in the near future, based on recommendations of the field forces.

b. Reference item concerning authorization of a fuel tanker in panel bridge companies, page 21, paragraph b(4). Request for the 1200 gallon tanker with justification should be submitted as MTOE action IAW DA Circular 310-44, dated 5 November 1967.

c. Reference item concerning combat engineer vehicle, page 21, paragraph b(5). If the requirement is valid MTOE should be submitted by the unit IAW DA Circular 310-44, dated 5 November 1967.

d. Reference item concerning boat operator training, page 24, paragraph c(2); and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2: Concur. This command continues to experience requisition shortfall of personnel trained in MOS 12C30. In order to meet in-country requirements for MOS 12C30, personnel holding MOS 12C30 must be trained in RVN to serve as power boat operators. This training has proved to be a cumbersome and impractical task, therefore, every effort should be taken by DA to insure that AIT output include personnel who are trained in the operation and maintenance of the 27 foot Bridge Erection Boat.

e. Reference item concerning forecast of Class IV, page 26, paragraph e(2): Nonconcur. A system of monitoring requirements of selected Class IV items is in effect at this headquarters. Adjustments are made based on updated information and action is taken to effect changes in supply schedules through 1st Logistical Command. Current systems are considered adequate.

43

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVNGC-DST (14 May 68) 2d Ind

6 JUL 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 79th Engineer Group (Construction)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

f. Reference item concerning replacement of major item, page 27, paragraph e(4): Nonconcur. Replacement factors in use for equipment in this command are based on experience gained in RVN and are periodically reviewed and adjusted. Replacement factors for D7E tractors and 250 CFM compressors were reviewed as recently as March 1968. There is a critical shortage of 5 ton dump trucks in USARV and procurement schedules have slipped. Availability forecasts for this item cannot be made at this time. A recent change in the repair parts stockage policy at DSU/GSU level should result in increased availability of repair parts.

g. Reference item concerning shortage of aircraft, page 28, paragraph e(5). The standardized MTOE now at DA for approval proposes that the 79th Engineer Group be authorized an aviation section. If the MTOE is approved, the unit will be issued aircraft and aviators sometime during the 2d or 3d quarter of calendar year 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JOHN V. GETCHELL  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:  
HQ, 79th Engr Gp  
HQ, 20th Engr Bde

GPOP-DT (14 May 68) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 79th Engr Gp (Const) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 19 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concur in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN  
MAJ. AGC  
Asst AG

37 The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

\* SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
\*\* FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
\*\*\*PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

\* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

\*\* FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

\*\*\*Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

35

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) GACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION For Official Use Only
		2b. GROUP Cancelled 4 July 1969
3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Hq, 79th Engineer Gp (Const) (U)		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68.		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CO, 79th Engineer Group		
6. REPORT DATE 14 May 1968	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 33	7b. NO. OF REFS
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 682316	
10. PROJECT NO. a. N/A	11b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
12. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		14. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY GACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
15. ABSTRACT		

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD839350

NEW LIMITATION CHANGE

TO

Approved for public release, distribution  
unlimited

FROM

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.  
agencies and their contractors;  
Administrative/Operational Use; 13 MAY  
1968. Other requests shall be referred to  
Office of the Adjutant General [Army],  
Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED  
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND  
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON  
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE,

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED,

AD 839350



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (19 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682233

26 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 20th  
Engineer Brigade, Period Ending 30 April 1968

...T #2 UNCLASSIFIED

SEE DISTRIBUTION: This document is subject to special export controls and transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of ACSFOR.

FOR OT RD, WASH. D. C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command

US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants

US Army Command and General Staff College

US Army Engineer School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

SEP 13 1968

*Wickham*

Protective marking cancelled when  
separated from inclosure.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 20TH ENGINEER BRIGADE  
APO San Francisco 96491

AVBI-EC

13 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

TO: Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGN-MO  
APO 96491

Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DH  
APO 96491

Commander-in-Chief  
United States Army, Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96588

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
(ACSFOR-DA)  
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. COMMAND:

a. MISSION: The basic mission and capabilities of the Brigade Headquarters are stated in TOE 5-301R dated March 1966 as modified. Specific Brigade missions during the reported period were combat support and construction operations in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones of Vietnam.

b. Principle commanders and staff within the 20th Brigade at the close of the reported period were:

FOR OFFICE  
682233

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROTECTIVE MARKINGS MAY  
BE REMOVED 1 JULY 1969

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

WRI-BC

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OCS-CSFOR-65) for  
Operational Period Ending 30 April 1968

13 May 1968

Commanding General  
Deputy Brigade Commander  
CHOCPC  
Adj:ntant  
Supply Officer

COL Curtis Chapman  
COL J.A. Vivian  
LTC W.E. Evers  
MAJ J.R. Punty Jr.  
MAJ W.F. Frantz

Commanding Officer, 34th Engineer Group  
31st Engineer Battalion  
36th Engineer Battalion  
69th Engineer Battalion  
86th Engineer Battalion  
93rd Engineer Battalion

COL W.G. Stewart  
LTC E.D. Patterson  
LTC R.E. Leonard  
LTC J.I. Goetz  
LTC C.A. Selleck Jr.  
LTC J.X. Dorman

Commanding Officer, 79th Engineer Group  
34th Engineer Battalion  
168th Engineer Battalion  
554th Engineer Battalion  
588th Engineer Battalion

COL J.H. Elder Jr.  
LTC E.P. Stefanik  
LTC J.R. Manning  
LTC J.H. Sheard  
LTC C.C. Clement Jr.

Commanding Officer, 159th Engineer Group  
46th Engineer Battalion  
62nd Engineer Battalion  
92nd Engineer Battalion  
169th Engineer Battalion

COL H.C. Jones  
LTC G.B. Gray Jr.  
LTC HD Burtchett  
LTC R.L. Crosby  
LTC L.W. Prentiss Jr.

c. ASSIGNMENTS: During the past reporting period the 20th Engineer Brigade has undergone one major unit change, which was in the 34th Engr Group. The 27th Engineer Battalion (CBT) with its attached unit, 591st Engineer Company (LE), was moved to the I Corps area. The 31st Engineer Battalion (CBT) deployed from Fort Bliss Texas and was assigned to the 34th Engineer Group in late April, it is currently based at Blackhorse.

d. STATIONING: The Brigade Hq is presently stationed at Bien Hoa Army Base, about 30 km NE of Saigon (YT 02201505).

**2. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORAL AND DISCIPLINE:**

a. The following awards were made by this Headquarters during the reported period:

	<u>DSM "V"</u>	<u>BSM</u>	<u>ARCOM "V"</u>	<u>ARCOM</u>	<u>DU</u>	<u>AM</u>
IHC, 20th Bde	0	24	0	21	0	8
34th Group	14	66	6	203	27	5
79th Group	48	106	113	272	175	14
159th Group	<u>21</u> <u>83</u>	<u>86</u> <u>282</u>	<u>14</u> <u>133</u>	<u>322</u> <u>818</u>	<u>13</u> <u>216</u>	<u>46</u> <u>73</u>
GRAND TOTAL:	1650					

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBI-RC

13 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (OAS-CSPOR-65) for  
Period Ending 30 April 1968

### 3. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE--SECURITY

a. A detailed document handling SQF has been published in an effort to standardize document handling procedures throughout the Brigade. Courtesy inspections of the Group Headquarters were made to help insure that document handling and the proper security procedures were being followed.

b. A rewards program has also been implemented in the form of 20th EB Reg 37-2. This program establishes policies and procedures governing the payment of rewards to Vietnamese civilians for turn-in of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other material and supplies used by the enemy.

c. In addition to document control, the Brigade S-2 section is presently keeping an up to date listing of bridges, airfields, and status reports for those bridges and airfields located in the Brigade AOR. A thorough stock of maps of the III and IV CTZ's is also available in various map scales. Many other units have already utilized our local map supply center.

d. Listed below are other intelligence functions which the S-2 section is currently implementing:

- (1) Reception, preparation and dissemination of spot reports
- (2) Maintaining up to date information on enemy activities
- (3) Keeping rainfall statistics for III CTZ

### 4. PLANS, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING:

a. Since the reorganization of the Brigade Operations Section in late January, the Operational Support Section has become more of an S-3 section. The section has become active in training, force development, TOE and MTOE actions, doctrine, and engineer oriented R & D matters, contingency and defense planning, and all troop matters, such as change of command ceremonies and unit moves.

b. Following the VC/NVA Tet Offensive, in early February, the brigade's operational support effort was concentrated on constructing and improving installation defenses and protecting vital facilities within military bases. A large portion of this effort went to improving Long Binh Post defenses. Over 48 percent of the entire brigade effort went to operational support missions in mid-February.

c. During this period this headquarters directed the establishment of a Well Drilling School.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBL-EC

SUBJ CT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (AFS-CSFOR-65) for  
Period Ending 30 April 1968

13 May 1968

The school conducted its first class in Long Binh in order to train personnel from the brigade's well drilling detachments. CONUS training of these personnel was inadequate and the school was needed, not only to train detachment personnel, but to begin training filler personnel, so that a continuous well drilling capability would be maintained. The school is also open to members of the 18th Engineer Brigade. It is the only school of its kind in Vietnam.

d. Land clearing elements concentrated their efforts in the Long Binh - Bien Hoa area initially, then resumed the pre-tet clearing of LOC's and VC base areas.

e. The evaluation of the LeTourneau Transphibian Tree Crusher was completed. It was determined that the machines were useful in the conduct of military land clearing operations. However, the machines required considerable modifications and some redesign before they would be completely suitable for military jungle clearing. Therefore, the decision was made to terminate the contract and return the equipment to the manufacturer. It appears that the Army will stay with the Rome KG Flow blade and the D7E dozer to meet future land clearing requirements.

### 5. CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS:

a. A listing of current Brigade projects is attached as inclosure 5 and includes all directed MCA, Q&MA, and PEMA funded projects. Inclosure 5 does not include Operational Support projects. Significant accomplishments of Brigade units during the reported period were:

Man hours construction - 2,716,108

Man hours Operational Support - 869,333

Equipment hours - 1,079,268

Concrete placed (Cu Yds) - 26,245

Billets (SF) - 117,761

Buildings (Less Billets)(SF) - 602,942

Covered Storage (SF) - 80,632

POL Bolted Tanks (bbl) - 52,750

POL Pipelines (lin feet) - 12,646

Stabilized Area (Sq Yds) - 3,082,425

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBI-BC

13 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (FCS-CSFOM-65) for  
Period Ending 30 April 1968

Fill Hauled (Cu Yds) - 3,432,193

Rock Crushed (Cu Yds) - 339,892

Surfaced Area (Sq Yds) - 961,732

Roads Paved to NAVC Standards (KM) - 36.76

(1) The Construction Operation Section took over the writing of construction directives from Engineering and Plans the latter part of the last reporting period. The section has since been reorganized along functional lines to gain more expertise and familiarity with active projects. A clerk-typist was transferred into the section from the CHOFS Administrative section. The addition of a typist, who will become familiar with the administrative details for construction directives will greatly reduce the routine details that have been written by the action officers. The current organization of the section is as shown on inclosure 1. The new organization envisions each action officer maintaining suspense files, current status, and all correspondence pertaining to the projects within their area of responsibility.

(2) The responsibility for devising a presentation of the current and future workload for the Brigade was transferred to COS from C&P during the period. The statistician has primary responsibility for gathering and presenting this information. His current objective is to review all projects, to insure that old 18th Brigade directives and directives that have been inactive for a considerable period of time are still valid and to be able to present the current Brigade level of effort.

b. The requirement for crushed rock has greatly increased during this period, the largest single demand being the Delta Transportation Plan which provides crushed rock to all customers in the Delta area. It was determined that a redistribution of the Brigade's rock crushing assets concentrating them at Long Binh and Vung Tau will increase production from the present 15,000 - 30,000 cubic yards per week to 40,000 cubic yards per week during the next four months. This will allow the Brigade to meet its crushed rock requirements.

c. The Brigade now has four asphaltic concrete plants which together require 3200 tons of mineral product per day. These plants are located at Vung Tau, Long Binh and Cu Chi.

d. ENGINEERING AND PLANS:

(1) Design and Construction files were consolidated for ease of reference.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBI-BC

13 May 1968

SOFJ XT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

6. INSPECTOR GENERAL: The date of the Annual General Inspections for this headquarters has been changed from that reported previously to 8 - 12 July 1968.

### 7. INFORMATION:

a. This period saw a complete turnover of information personnel, to include the loss of an Information NCO (E-6). The present staff consists of an Information Officer (I.t), an Information Specialist (SP4 E4), a Still Photographer (SF4 E4), and a Clerk Typist (PFC E3).

b. During the third quarter, FY 68, there were 3080 Home Town Releases and 389 Feature Stories submitted by the subordinate units of the 20th Brigade. The FTR Program is running smoothly. Feature Stories are being submitted in sufficient quantity, but continued emphasis is needed to assure complete, factual and timely reporting.

c. The USARV Daily Highlight Program is being strongly emphasized as it is the fastest system of getting newsworthy events released to national and international media. This program will require extensive cooperation and support by all units. Once interest is generated, communications should be the only limiting factor.

d. Mr. Jordan, a senior editorial writer from the National Geographic Magazine, visited Operation "Pinnaroo", a joint land clearing effort by 20th Engineer Brigade and Australian engineers.

### 8. CIVIC ACTION:

a. Civic action, in its varied categories continues to be very effective. The most inhibitive factor to the Civic Action Program is the tremendous engineer requirement in such priority areas as Operational Support and Lines of Communication, which leave little time or equipment available.

b. All three subordinate groups continue to maintain well coordinated Civic Action Programs, working closely with province and district advisors.

c. Some of the more significant assistance provided during this reporting period was material and labor provided to schools, hospitals and orphanages throughout Bien Hoa and Long An Provinces. Assistance in rebuilding the market place at Tan Uyen and the ARVN housing at Foc Mon both destroyed by the TET aggression, was a valuable stepping stone to stronger US-VN relations.

### 9. SIGNAL: During the reported period:

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVBI-BC

13 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (TCS-CSFOR-65) for  
Current Period ending 30 April 1968

- a. Radio's were borrowed to establish a Brigade Command net FM. This net is operational 24 hours per day to provide instant backup for long distance telephone failure.
- b. Secure radio-teletype communications were established with IIFFV using equipment loaned to the 20th Engineer Brigade specifically for this purpose.
- c. A local battery switchboard was placed in operation in the 20th Engineer Brigade Hq. This system provides communications within the headquarters, to higher headquarters, and to the subordinate groups, bypassing all Army Area Communications System switchboards.
- d. Installation of a secure landline teletype system from Bde Hq to all subordinate groups using the dedicated circuits already installed within the 20th Engr Bde was begun.

## 10. CHAPLAIN:

- a. On 25, 26, and 27 February, a chaplains conference was held for all chaplains of the 20th Engineer Brigade. The attendance was staggered so that eight came at a time. In this manner, there was chaplain coverage in each Group.
- b. A 20th Engineer Brigade Regulation 165-1 was published on 23 April 1968. This set command goals for Character Guidance at 85% of present for duty; chapel attendance at 25% of present for duty; chaplain pastoral activities at 75% of chaplain time with troops; and six religious services per chaplain per week.

## 11. HEADQUARTERS COMPANY:

- a. Headquarters Company was assigned the responsibility of operating a Sector Operations Center in defense of Bien Hoa Army Base. This additional responsibility places considerable strain on the unit which is already heavily burdened with administrative duties.
- b. Headquarters Company borrowed various communications equipment and weapons in order to fulfill defensive requirements.
- c. PLL clerk classes were attended at Long Binh, enabling this unit to improve its PLL Control policies. PLL Control has been further enhanced through 3 PLL clerks responsible for mess, supply, and maintenance, respectively, with the control PLL being in the maintenance section. A PLL clerk has been requested through the personnel section.
- d. A TARES clerk (MOS 76P10) has been requested through the personnel section to improve the companies TARES management program.

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVB-1-CS

FMJ CT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (REF-REF-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

13 Apr 1968

## SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

### 1. PERSONNEL:

a. OBSERVATION: Logistical positions critical to the support mission are not being filled with logisticians trained in the current Logistics Program.

b. EVALUATION: With the volume of engineer construction material, equipment, and repair parts required to support combat operations in Vietnam, it is imperative that key positions down to brigade level be filled with specialists trained in the field of logistics. The Logistics Program presently offered by the Department of the Army is a logical source of qualified personnel. Assignment of logisticians from this program would materially increase the overall effectiveness of the vast supply operations in this theater. Personnel not trained in the Logistics Program are of necessity forced to learn the requirements of their position on a training basis which would normally require forty-five to ninety days. The effectiveness of supply operations during such a training period is reduced and incapable of maintaining the momentum or providing required support to current operations. A specific example, in the area of construction materials, would be an Engineer Officer, Chief of Construction Materials Section in a Support Command, Inventory Control Center, Logistical Command and/or theater headquarters.

### c. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1). That every effort be made to obtain and assign qualified logistically trained personnel to key TOT positions, with priorities to units in the Republic of Vietnam.

(2). That the Corps of Engineers evaluate engineer oriented logistics positions with a view towards designating selected TOT positions to be filled by Engineer Officers in the Logistics Program.

(3). That in addition to the present voluntary application for assignment to the Logistics Program, records of Engineer Officers with supply schooling and/or background be reviewed to select potential logisticians. Selected personnel could then be offered the opportunity to enter the Logistics Program together with a proposed schedule of future assignments.

2. OPERATIONS: During the T-T offensive, the following observations were made:

a. OBSERVATION: During periods of a high rate of interdictions tactical commanders, engineer commanders, and higher headquarters have an urgent need for up to date IIC reports.

# FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVB1-05

13 May 1968

SIRJ OT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (POC-CSFOR-55) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

b. EVALUATION: During TET it was discovered that many commanders were directing independent reconnaissance of various roads of concern to them, without coordinating such reconnaissance with other concerned units. This resulted in duplication of effort and confusion. II Field Forces Vietnam ended this confusion by delineating in writing the exact responsibilities by route number of each unit as concerned road reconnaissance and LOC reporting.

c. RECOMMENDATION: None.

d. OBSERVATION: During 100% alert, operations of Brigade headquarters were split between the command bunker and the headquarters building.

e. EVALUATION: A Brigade TOC in which the Operations and Command Sections are located together is needed. Action was taken to harden the Brigade conference room, which now serves as a Brigade TOC.

f. RECOMMENDATION: None.

g. OBSERVATION: During periods of heightened enemy activity engineer units must respond quickly to repair LOC interdictions.

h. EVALUATION: Responsibility for removal and repair of LOC interdiction was an engineer responsibility, requiring the tactical unit commander to call for engineer assistance through the chain of command. This was a slow and unresponsive procedure.

i. RECOMMENDATION: That the tactical unit commander be responsible for removal or repair of LOC interdictions in his AO using organic engineers. That Brigade engineer units in the field be instructed to respond immediately to requests from tactical unit commanders for removal or repair of LOC interdictions. These actions have been taken by II Field Force and this headquarters.

## 3. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

a. OBSERVATION: During the recent TET offensive, the damage inflicted upon the Army Area Communications System facilities coupled with the increase volume of high precedence traffic, resulted in a huge backlog of messages. High priority messages required up to eight days in transmission channels before delivery could be accomplished.

b. RECOMMENDATION: The Army Area Communications System cannot be depended upon as the sole means of communications during and after an enemy offensive. The 20th Engineer Brigade must be authorized personnel and signal equipment to establish and maintain, for extended periods of time, secure voice and teletype communications with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12

SVBI-OS

13 May 1968

SUBJ CT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFO-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

c. RECOMMENDATION: That the communications portion of the TOT for an Engineer Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company be re-evaluated by the Department of the Army. That this type of a headquarters be provided with the organic communications equipment and personnel to operate under combat conditions independent of the Army Area Communications System in any area of the world.

4. INTELLIGENCE: None.

5. LOGISTICS: See Personnel above.

6. MEDICAL:


a. OBSERVATION: During the early portion of the US Army stay in Vietnam it was noted that many cases of venereal disease were resistant to the then accepted treatment regimes. This resulted in the development of a significant number of chronic infections. We have now switched to the treatment program described in the USARM Medical Consultant.

(1) Simultaneous administration of probenecid 1.0 gm and procaine penicillin 2.4 mil.

(2) Probenecid 0.5 gm 6 hours after penicillin injection and again 12 hours after penicillin injection.

b. EVALUATION: On this treatment regime we have had a marked decrease in persistent unresponsive infections. This is very important to both the physical and psychological well being of the patient.

c. RECOMMENDATION: That this treatment program be continued.



JOHN H. ELDER JR.  
Colonel, CE  
Acting Brigade Commander

5 Inclosures

1-COS Organization

2-20th Engineer Brigade Organization

3-Brigade Internal Organization

4-Unit Locations

5-Current Projects Withdrawn, Hq, DA

10

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVHCC-DST (13 May 68) 1st Ind CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1568

TO: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 20th Engineer Brigade.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel, page 8, paragraph 1: Concur. USARV Regulation 614-185 outlines the procedures for the annotation of officer requisitions for special career program members for specific duty positions. Due to an administrative oversight, the 20th Engineer Brigade has not annotated officer requisitions in accordance with USARV Regulation 614-185.

b. Reference item concerning training and organization, page 9, paragraph 3: Nonconcur. An NTOE for Engineer Brigades in RVN was submitted to Department of the Army in February 1968. The proposed NTOE provides Engineer Brigades with tactical voice/RATT and secure land line teletype circuits to higher headquarters and assigned groups. This is considered sufficient back-up communications for use during temporary outages in the AACOMS.

c. Reference item concerning medical, page 10, paragraph 6: Concur. The penicillin-probenecid technique as promulgated in January 1968 is proving satisfactory. A message will be disseminated to all USARV medical units with recommendations to follow specified treatment programs for acute gonorrhea. The penicillin-probenecid technique will be included in the choice of treatments to be employed and will be the preferred method.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOHN V. GETCHELL

Captain, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General  
PROTECTIVE MARKINGS MAY  
BE REMOVED 1 JULY 1969

Copy furnished:

HQ, 20th Engineer Brigade

11

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14.  
GPOP-DT (13 May 68) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 20th Engr Bde for Period Ending  
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 AUG 1968


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ment and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


*K. F. Osbourn*  
K. F. OSBOURN  
MAJ. AGC  
Asst AG

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

20TH ENGINEER BRIGADE  
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



14  
 DT 67 FB 573 LE 595

PB 617 QRY 94 WD 156

CS 544 PC 536 PL 702

LC 86

TOPO 66 FB 100 DT 104

LE 362 PB 500 LE 557

MD 547 WD 97 WD 38

HO 113 LC 27 HD 515

DET (PROV)  
TC PL 714\*


PC 41 DT 43 CS 103

HO 143 BE 551 WD 22

INCL 2

\* UNITS TO JOIN 20TH BDE PRIOR TO 1 JUNE 1968

# HEADQUARTERS 20TH ENGINEER BRIGADE ORGANIZATION



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Ba Ria

57th Engineer Company (DT)

150th Engineer Company

Bearcat

56th Engineer Battalion (Cbt)

46th Engineer Battalion (Const)

595th Engineer Company (LE)

62nd Engineer Battalion (Const)

84th Land Clearing Team

92nd Engineer Battalion (Const)

Bien Hoa

20th Engineer Brigade

435th Engineer Company (FC)

Black Horse

31st Engineer Battalion (Cbt)

66th Engineer Company (TOPO)

Can Tho

49th Engineer Battalion (Const)

103rd Engineer Company (CS)

Cu Chi

554th Engineer Battalion (Const)

573rd Engineer Company (FB)

515th Asphalt Detachment

617th Engineer Company (PB)

113th Engineer Detachment (HO)

22nd Engineer Detachment (WD)

Di An

143rd COP Detachment

148th Engineer Battalion (Const)

547th Engineer Platoon (MD)

557th Engineer Company (LE)

551st Engineer Detachment (WD)

27th Land Clearing Team

Long Thanh North

Gia Ray

93rd Engineer Battalion (Const)

94th Engineer Detachment

Phu Loi

Lai Khe

34th Engineer Battalion (Const)

38th Engineer Detachment (WD)

Phu Quoc Island

Long Rinh

156th Engineer Detachment (WD)

79th Engineer Group

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

917th Engineer Detachment (WD)

Day 11

588th Engineer Battalion (Const)

352nd Engineer Company (CS)

Yung Tau

34th Engineer Group (Const.)

36th Engineer Battalion (Const)

544th Engineer Company (CS)

536th Engineer Detachment (PC)

SECURITY & USE INFORMATION

53

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotations must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION For Official Use Only
	2b. GROUP Cancelled 1 July 1969

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 20th Engineer Brigade (U)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations. 1 Feb - 30 Apr 68

5. AUTHORISER (First name, middle initial, last name)

CG, 20th Engineer Brigade

6. REPORT DATE 13 May 1968	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 18	7b. NO. OF REPS
-------------------------------	------------------------------	-----------------

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
---------------------------	-----------------------------------

8b. PROJECT NO.

N/A

682233

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310
--------------------------------	---

13. ABSTRACT

2 The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

\* SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
\*\* FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
\*\*\*PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

\* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

\*\* FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

\*\*\*Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.