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AUTHORITY

**15 May 1970, GDS, DoD 5200.1-r; OAG D/A  
ltr, 29 Apr 1980**

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (14 Sep 70) FOR OT UT 702054 22 September 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)

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AD51

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Donald L. Geer*

1 Incl  
as

DONALD L. GEER  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

OCT 7 1970

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15 MAY 1970

**SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters,  
United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April  
1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)**

**THRU:** Commander in Chief  
United States Army, Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-DT  
APO 96558

**TO:** Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C. 20310

**I. (C) Operations: Significant Activities**

**a. (U) COMMAND**

**(1) Commanders**

CG, USARV

1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970

GEN Creighton W. Abrams

DCG, USARV

1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970

LTC Frank T. Mildren

CG, USAECV(P)

1 February 1970 - 30 April 1970

MG John A. B. Dillard, Jr.

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CG, USAMEDCOMV(P)

1 March 1970 - 30 April 1970

BG David E. Thomas

(2) Distinguished Visitor Summary. During the reporting period, distinguished visitors to this headquarters were:

NAME/DATE

POSITION

MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr.  
2-3 February 1970

Deputy Chief of Staff, Communications-Electronics, United States Army, Pacific/Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications Command

LTG Henry A. Miley  
4 February 1970

Deputy Commander, United States Army Materiel Command

Mr. V. P. Huggard  
4 February 1970

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations & Logistics)

BG Fred Kornet, Jr.  
4 February 1970

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs & Budget), Department of the Army

BG Ernest Gould  
4 February 1970

Director of Education, Australian Army

GEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr.  
7-15 February 1970

Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific

MG Karl W. Gustafson  
10-16 February 1970

The Provost Marshal General, Department of the Army

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<u>NAME/DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Rev Dr. J. R. McLaughlin 12 February 1970	Executive Secretary, Commission on Chaplain and Related Ministry, United Methodist Church
LTC George I. Forsythe 14-17 February 1970	Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command
Mr. David Hardison (GS18) 14-17 February 1970	Scientific Advisor to Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command
LTC Arthur S. Collins 17 February 1970	Commanding General, I Field Forces, Vietnam
The HON T. R. Beal 17-22 February 1970	Under Secretary of the Army
MG James L. Baldwin 17-22 February 1970	Director, Force Planning Analysis, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
LTC Frank J. Sackton 22-24 February 1970	Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, Department of the Army
BG Maurice J. Halper 22-24 February 1970	Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, United States Army, Pacific
BG Lawrence V. Greene 24 February 1970	Military Assistance Command J-1
MG Rexford H. Dettre, Jr. 27 February 1970	Military Assistance Command J-5
MG Edward M. Flanagan 2 March 1970	Commanding General, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance

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<u>NAME/DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Mr. Clyde D. Hardin, PL313 2-7 March 1970	Assistant for Southeast Asia to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research & Development)
BG George Sammet, Jr. 2-7 March 1970	Director, Plans & Programs, Office of the Chief, Research & Development
Mr. Forrest C. Murphy 2-7 March 1970	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Opera- tions, United States Army, Pacific
BG Carl R. Duncan 5 March 1970	Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Staff
LTG William P. Yarborough 15, 17 & 18 March 1970	Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
BG Maurice J. Halper 15, 17 & 18 March 1970	Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, United States Army, Pacific
The HON J. Irving Whalley 29 March 1970	Member, House of Representatives
Mr. Edwin Greiner (GS17) 29-31 March 1970	Assistant Deputy for Logistics Support, United States Army Materiel Command
Dr. Joseph E. Sperrazza, PL313 29 March-2 April 1970	Director, Army Materiel Systems Agency Aberdeen Research & Development Center
Dr. Robert B. Dillaway, PL313 29 March-2 April 1970	Deputy for Laboratories, United States Army Materiel Command
LTC Joseph M. Heiser, Jr. 30 March 1970	Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Department of the Army

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<u>NAME/DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
MG Alberto Pico 1-5 April 1970	The Adjutant General, Puerto Rico
MG Charles P. Brown 2 April 1970	Deputy Commanding General, I Field Forces, Vietnam
BG Stewart L. McKenney 2-10 April 1970	Deputy for STANO, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Dr. Stanley J. Drazek (GS17E) 4 April 1970	Associate Dean, University College University of Maryland
LTC Michael S. Davison 5 April 1970	Commanding General, II Field Forces, Vietnam
LTC Walter T. Kerwin, Jr. 5-10 April 1970	Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Department of the Army
MG Walter E. Lotz, Jr. 5-10 April 1970	Commanding General, United States Army Electronics Command
MG Donald H. Cowles 11 April 1970	Military Assistance Command J-3
GEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr. 11-16 April 1970	Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific
RADM R. E. Faucette 16 April 1970	Assistant Chief, Research & Military Specialties, Bureau of Medicine
Mr. Joseph P. Welsch (GS17) 17 April 1970	Deputy Comptroller for Internal Audit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Comptroller

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<u>NAME/DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
RADM Robert M. Weeks 21 April 1970	Vice Director, Defense Communications
Elder Clark Smith (GS16E) 28 April 1970	Director, National Service Organization, Seventh Day Adventist Church
Rev Reo Clyde 28 April 1970	
Rev Gilbert Bertrochini 28 April 1970	
Rev Dr. Carl McIntire (GS17E) 28 April 1970	
Dr. James T. Shaw (GS17E) 28 April 1970	
Dr. Israel Gueiros 28 April 1970	

b. (U) PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

(1) Morale and Personnel Services. Chaplain Activities. There was an increase of 79,248 personnel attending character guidance instructions over the same quarter last year. While at the same time, there was an increase of 1518 character guidance instructions sessions. The percent of the Command attending religious services weekly was 19.5%, while the same quarter last year was 18.7%. The number of services conducted per chaplain per week this quarter was 7.6, while the same quarter last year was 6.5%. Contributions by Chaplains funds to Vietnamese religious charitable causes during 3d Quarter FY 70 totaled \$34,943.66.

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(2) Medical Services and Medical Supplies.

(a) Equipment Upgrade Project. This project is a two phased effort to certain hospitals and dispensaries that will continue operation through mid-range time frame. The first phase consisted of upgrading all standard nonexpendable medical equipment. This phase was completed on 31 March 1970. Total requirements under Phase I consisted of 156 line items with a dollar value of \$1, 503, 582. 50. Total dollar value of Phase I was significantly reduced from the projected cost of \$2, 000, 000 due to in-country wide inventories and depot assets applied against Phase I requirements. All Phase I requisitions have been passed out of country via Okinawa for further processing.

(b) During the report period, work began on Phase II which constitutes a nonstandard nonexpendable equipment requirement. Work on this portion of the project was somewhat delayed due to an insufficient number of manufacturer's catalogs; however, on 31 March 1970, some 85 catalogs were on hand and development of the nonstandard requirement began. Projected cost for Phase II is estimated at \$2, 000, 000 with a target completion date of 31 May 1970.

(3) General Education Development. At the beginning of the quarter, there were 24 Army Education Centers in operation throughout Vietnam. Deployment of troops resulted in the closing of two Education Centers and the relocation of one. One new Education Center was opened during the quarter. At the end of the quarter, there were 23 Army Education Centers in operation. Two other significant events were the transfer of the 1st Logistical Command GED Program to HQ, USARV and the transfer of all DAC Education Officer positions to HQ, USARV.

c. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Significant Enemy Activities.

(a) General. During the quarter enemy activity rose from an overall moderate level to a moderately high level. His activity was

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characterized for the most part by isolated attacks by fire, ground probes with sapper attacks, terrorism and proselyting activity directed against the GVN pacification program. Several highpoints of enemy activity were noted, the most significant of which was the night of 31 March-1 April when the enemy apparently initiated his Spring Campaign. Particularly significant during the period were supply problems caused by Allied preemptive operations in all four of the Corps Tactical Zones. To counter the threat to his supply and infiltration routes the enemy conducted several isolated and heavy ground and standoff attacks on Allied fire support bases threatening enemy operations. In March and April the enemy initiated extensive offensive activity in the Dak Seang area of II CTZ. In III CTZ enemy divisional elements moved generally to the west and southwest in the CTZ during the quarter, possibly in response to Cambodian pressures and in an attempt to maintain his existing supply corridors. Continuing infiltration was noted in IV CTZ with an accompanying high level of activity in Chau Doc Province.

(b) I Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy initiated activity in I Corps Tactical Zone remained at a moderate to high level during the reporting period and rose to a high level as the enemy initiated his Spring-Summer Campaign on 31 March-1 April. Enemy activity has remained at a moderately high level for the remainder of the reporting period. Enemy actions were characterized for the most part by attacks by fire, ground probes and sapper attacks on small unit outposts and hamlets. The enemy continued his effort to counter the GVN pacification program and strove to strengthen his hold on the populace by proselyting, abductions and terrorist incidents. Activity in northern I Corps was characterized by isolated heavy contacts by NVA units particularly south of the central and eastern DMZ. Local Force and Viet Cong units represented the major enemy force in the remainder of the corps. Their activity during February was aimed at rice collection due to the shortage of logistical support. In a related area elements of the V25 and T89 Sapper Battalions, Front 4 and the 70 Local Force Battalion, VC Quang Nam Province, while on a rice collection mission, were engaged by friendly forces who killed 225 of the enemy. Also, to add to the enemy problem of rice shortage, Allied operations continued to discover numerous large enemy food caches. During the reporting period elements of the 66 NVA Regiment, 304 NVA Division relocated

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from North Vietnam to the Bac Long Valley area and the 812 NVA Regiment, 324B NVA Division relocated in southern Quang Tri Province in order to strengthen Front 7. The 29 NVA Regiment and 803 NVA Regiment, both subordinate to the 324B NVA Division, redeployed from the Laotian Salient into western Thua Thien Province in order to better balance enemy strength in Thua Thien.

(c) II Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy initiated activity in II CTZ rose from a low to a moderate level during the past three months. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire, ground probes, sapper attacks, and abductions, with terrorist activity noted through the Corps Tactical Zone. In early December, the 66 NVA Regiment, all of the B-3 Front, moved north along the Cambodian border. The 66 NVA Regiment is still unlocated in Cambodia, but the 28 NVA Regiment and the 40 NVA Artillery Regiment were identified in the Dak Seang Area of Kontum Province on 7 and 16 April, respectively. These two regiments conducted intense operations against Dak Pek, Dak Seang, and Dak To. The K80 NVA Battalions and K20 NVA Sapper Battalion, also of the B-3 Front, are suspected to have participated in these attacks which occurred throughout March and April. In March and April over 1,000 enemy have been killed in that area. On 29 January the 22 NVA Regiment HQ and most of its elements moved from Quang Ngai Province in I CTZ to Binh Dinh Province of II CTZ. Despite the move the elements of the regiment were not able to conduct extensive attacks because of US, ARVN and ROK Forces' preemptive operations in the area. However, in late March and again in late April the enemy conducted sporadic attacks throughout Binh Dinh Province. The enemy in Phu Yen Province, particularly the 96 Local Force Battalion, participated in numerous abductions throughout the month of February. Captured documents revealed that the enemy was re-educating and re indoctrinating the victims to counter the loss of popular support due to the GVN pacification program. Also during this period, assassination of GVN sympathizers was noted. In the coastal areas, Binh Thuan Province was active in late March and early April. The 240 NVA Battalion, 840 VC Battalion and 186 VC Battalion all of MR-6 were identified on an attack in the Song Mao area. This enemy attack was not long in duration, but the enemy suffered over

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200 killed. Other usually active NVA and VC forces remained relatively dormant through the quarter. The 24 NVA Regiment Headquarters and its 4 Battalion moved to Cambodia possibly to coordinate attacks with the 66 NVA Regiment. The 6 Battalion remained in Pleiku Province, but moved to the extreme northern portion of the Province, continuing the traditional attacks on QL 14. The 18 NVA Regiment Headquarters on 10 April and its 8 Battalion on 30 March shifted from the area of QL 19 to the piedmont of central Binh Dinh Province and has remained relatively inactive. The 95B NVA Regiment of the B-3 Front has also remained mostly out of contact throughout the quarter. The 4 Battalion relocated to south central Pleiku Province on 15 March, just west of QL 14, but has remained out of contact during the period. Recent documents have revealed that the enemy is to start a new phase at the end of April. During the early part of the period, the enemy deactivated Local Force units to provide replacements for major units. In a turn-about during late February and March the enemy has employed replacements from NVA forces for Local Force elements in order to counter the GVN pacification program at village and hamlet level.

(d) III Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy activity ranged from a low level during February to a moderate level in March and April, with highpoints occurring toward the end of February and March. Increased activity on 31 March-1 April marked the initiation of Phase 1 of Campaign "X". Enemy units primarily employed indirect fire attacks and ground probes against Allied fire support bases, Special Forces camps, and Regional and Popular Forces compounds, as well as intimidation of the populace. Elements of the 9th VC Division were the most active enemy units in III CTZ during the period and redeployed during March from eastern War Zone C to the Vietnamese-Cambodian border in the area from the Dog's Face to the Angel's Wing. Elements of the 7 NVA Division deployed into eastern War Zone C and northern Binh Long Province, but generally avoided contact as they continued to defend VC base areas and traditional infiltration routes from Allied interdiction. Subordinate units of the 5 VC Division also generally avoided contact and remained deployed in Phuoc Long Province near the Bu Dop - Bo Duc area and along Jolley Road complex while the 33 NVA Regiment, 5 VC Division

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continued to maintain a presence in Binh Tuy Province. Activity in the subregions remained consistently low, as a result of understrength units and poor logistical support, with the exception of SR-6 where a steadily increasing level of terrorist activity in Saigon indicated a significant presence of SR-6 Special Action units within the city. Saigon also sustained two rocket attacks in mid-April, the first such attacks in 1970. Significant developments during the period include the shift in the 9 VC Division's area of operations, prompted primarily by developments in Cambodia, and the resubordination of selected enemy units in SR-2 and SR-3 to district level party committees in an attempt to bolster VCI, guerrilla and Local Force units. Reports also indicate that the 33 NVA Regiment, 5 VC Division continues to operate with Local Force units and may have been resubordinated to Binh Tuy Province.

(e) IV Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy initiated activity in IV CTZ rose from an overall moderate level in February, March and early April to a moderately high level in the latter half of April. Enemy offensive activity during this period was characterized by probing actions in search of infiltration routes from Cambodia to the Seven Mountains area and into the U-Minh Forest. The 95 NVA Regiment was identified in mid April in the U-Minh Forest. The 88 NVA Regiment appears to be continuing attempts to move in the Plain of Reeds. One of the highlights of the reporting period was the disbanding of a well-established unit with a colorful history, the 273 VC Regiment, elements of which formed a new D2 VC Regiment. The apparent reason for this reorganization was heavy losses inflicted by ARVN units in the U-Minh Forest. The change of government in Cambodia created a fluid situation along the border adjacent to IV CTZ. Increased exfiltration from Base Area 400 in the Seven Mountains area, southward to the U-Minh Forest, was started in late March. Infiltration was accomplished both by land and by sea. This movement caused increased activity in Chau Doc Province where the enemy attempted to keep ARVN troops at bay while carrying out infiltration plans. Also, documents captured stated that the 101D NVA Regiment had the mission of attacking and gaining control of Chi

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Lang Training Center in the Seven Mountains area. Other reports indicated that the 16 Armor Office had a similar mission against Bao Xoai Special Forces Camp located in the same general area. The highpoint started at the end of March and demonstrated special enemy interest in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province, the U-Minh Forest and Dinh Tuong Province as well as areas along the Cambodian border in northwestern IV CTZ.

**(2) Significant Intelligence Operational Activities.** The following significant activities took place during the reporting period.

15 February 1970	Terrorism Study published.
1 March 1970	Enemy Initiated Incidents Vicinity Long Binh Post, 21-28 February 1970 Study published.
15 March 1970	Rocket Attacks Against Long Binh and Bien Hoa Study published.
29 March 1970	Current Enemy Political Goals and Activities Study published.
5 April 1970	Recent Sapper Activities and Current Indicators of Future Actions Study published.
26 April 1970	VC/NVA use of Riot Control Agents in South Vietnam Study published.

**(3) Operation Special Watch** continued throughout the period except for 18 through 23 February. Special Watch is an intensified intelligence collection effort initiated by USARV G2 when intelligence indicates an increased enemy threat to the Long Binh Military Complex. Enemy locations and activities reported within a radius of 30 km of Long Binh Military Complex receive special attention. Daily checks are also made with US Army, USAF, ARVN and GVN (including PIOCC's and DIOCC's), as well as FWMAF intelligence agencies in the area for late information.

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A total of 533 man hours was devoted during the period to the collection, analysis and briefing of appropriate personnel. The 702d MI Detachment, in support of Headquarters, USARV, makes the daily checks.

(4) A monthly intelligence briefing was conducted for all newly arrived and assigned officers and senior non-commissioned officers assigned duty with Headquarters, USARV. In addition, special intelligence briefings were given for visiting dignitaries as required.

(5) A weekly intelligence conference was held each Friday at 1330 hours. The agenda of the conference included summaries of the significant operations, enemy activity and enemy order of battle updating. Weekly Intelligence Conference Notes were provided to all attendees including representatives from the local intelligence community and from the general and special staffs of Headquarters, USARV.

(6) The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) (MIBARS) continued to conduct in-country orientation courses to acquaint newly assigned G2 Air personnel and Image Interpreter (II) personnel with problems peculiar to tactical operations in the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 21 personnel attended two II courses, prior to the termination of the course in March. A total of 43 personnel attended the G2 Air Course which is presented monthly at the 1st MIBARS School in Saigon.

(7) The Current Analysis Special Intelligence (CASI) Officer provided material to support a review of all-source intelligence which was presented to the Command Group and designated USARV staff members daily. In addition, the CASI Branch presented an all-source briefing each Saturday to the Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, and designated members of the USARV and subordinate staffs. Special briefings for the Deputy Commanding General, USARV, the Chief of Staff, and other members of the USARV staff were conducted as required.

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**d. (C) PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.**

**(1) The Reduction of US Army Forces in RVN.**

(a) The President announced Phase III of the reduction of forces in RVN on 15 December 1969. The US Army Force level in RVN was reduced by 29,443 spaces through space authorization reductions, unit inactivations, and unit redeployments.

(b) The 1st Infantry Division was initially reduced to a color guard detachment in RVN, following which the detachment, representing the 1st Inf Div (-3d Bde TF), redeployed to Ft Riley, Kansas on 7 April 1970. The 3d Bde distinguishing flag, unit organizational colors and guidons were forwarded to USAREUR. The 24th Inf Div was inactivated 15 April 1970 and concurrently the 1st Inf Div was reorganized as the 1st Inf Div (Mech), using assets previously assigned to the 24th Inf Div.

(c) The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div was reduced to a color guard detachment in RVN and the detachment redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington for inactivation.

(d) Five other separate battalions were reduced to color guard detachments in RVN, and the detachments redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington for inactivation.

**(e) In-country reductions and inactivations included:**

- 1. 51 units which were reduced by reorganization.**
- 2. 48 non-divisional units which were inactivated in RVN.**
- 3. USARV patient account was reduced.**

**(f) Redeployments were completed 15 April 1970.**

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(2) Turnover of Base Camps.

(a) As a result of the reduction of US Forces in RVN and the transfer to RVN of increased responsibility for all aspects of the war in Vietnam, several base camps and numerous smaller facilities were turned over to RVNAF during the quarter. Planning for the subsequent turnover of other facilities has also been made.

(b) The following facilities have been turned over to RVNAF on the dates shown:

Dustoff Compound	2 Feb 70
Vung Tau, North Cantonment	27 Feb 70
Vung Tau, South Cantonment	27 Feb 70
Dau Tieng (partial)	28 Feb 70
Vung Tau, ASP	13 Mar 70
Camp Viking	18 Mar 70
Binh Thuy Port	19 Mar 70
Lai Khe (partial)	19 Mar 70
Camp Sally	30 Mar 70
FSB Gator	11 Apr 70
LZ Bayonet (partial)	14 Apr 70
FSB Fat City	14 Apr 70
Camp Enari	15 Apr 70

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(c) The following facilities are scheduled for transfer to RVNAF  
on the dates shown:

LZ Max	ASAP
Crocker Compound	ASAP
Camp Swan	1 May 70
"Can Dock", Qui Nhon	1 May 70
Camp Davies	1 May 70
Saigon Port	1 May 70
Soc Trang AAF	1 Nov 70
Bien Hoa (145th Avn Compound)	1 Nov 70

**(3) Reduction of US Army Units Located in Vung Tau.**

(a) USARV units stationed in Vung Tau are being restationed, inactivated, or reduced in strength on a phased basis. These actions will continue through 31 July 1970 where a minimum size force consistent with accomplishment of USARV tasks will be achieved. As the troop strength is reduced, the remaining units will consolidate within the Vung Tau cantonment area, reducing the size of the installation. Vung Tau Army Airfield operating personnel and equipment will be withdrawn NLT 30 June 1970. Concurrently, facilities excess to US and FWMAF needs are being released to GVN.

(b) Implementation of USARV OPLAN Vung Tau II will continue with the objective to reduce the US Army presence in Vung Tau.

**(4) Reduction of American Personnel, Installations and Activities  
in the Saigon/Cholon Area.**

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(a) The MOOSE II program was initiated on 15 December 1969. A line was established, which follows the Gia Dinh-Saigon/Cholon political boundary to sub-divide the Saigon area. This line became known as the MOOSE II LINE, with those units/agencies/installations located south of the line receiving priority for relocation. Upon initiation of this program the US population in the Saigon/Cholon area was 9,757. To date a total of 14 units/agencies, with a combined strength of 2674, have received movement orders. These units are in the process of relocating from Saigon to other locations such as Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Pershing Field, Bien Hoa, Di An and Long Binh Post.

(b) A study of each unit/agency located in Saigon/Cholon area continues with emphasis on those elements located south of the MOOSE II LINE. Those elements that are not required to be located in Saigon to accomplish their mission will be relocated out of Saigon to a military installation. Elements whose mission requires them to be located in Saigon will relocate north of the MOOSE II LINE, as facilities become available.

(5) Reorganization of the Operations Division. Due to the increase in the redeployment of units to CONUS and the relocation of units within country, the Operations Division, ACofS, G3 was internally reorganized. The Force Stationing Branch was formed to facilitate staffing and central control of redeployments/relocations. The Support and Artillery Branches were simultaneously discontinued to provide the personnel for the new branch as the Support and Artillery functions were absorbed by the Current Operations Branch..

(6) Transfer of Sheridan and Nighthawk Projects.

(a) USARV has been notified by DA that sufficient assets will not be available to support the deployment of 270 TOE Sheridans as previously scheduled. This decision was due to the following factors: combat losses

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exceeding original estimates; reduced procurement of Sheridan in FY 70 and cancellation of FY 71-72 procurement program; and a reduction of FY 71 OMA funds for overhaul of high mileage and combat-damaged Sheridans. DA did, however, indicate that the current in-country density of 216 TOE vehicles can be supported through June 71 at the present combat loss rate of 8 percent and 5000 mile rebuild criteria. As a result of these above actions, the 1/10 Cav, 4th Inf Div and the 2/1 Cav, IFFV will not receive the Sheridan. The issue of Sheridans to other scheduled units has been completed. On 5 March 1970, the new equipment training team (NETT) completed organizational training for USARV units. A total of 874 individuals were trained. In addition, DS/CS training was concluded on 23 Mar 70 with 189 personnel receiving this training.

(b) The searchlights, as established by the USARV BOI, were issued to selected units who were instructed to fabricate their own Nighthawk systems. The weapon kits and night vision devices would be provided from the unit's own assets. Instruction booklets describing the fabrication of the Nighthawk mount were made available by the USARV Aviation Officer.

(7) Artillery Ammunition Expenditures. USARV artillery expenditures had steadily decreased during the quarter except for the month of February. During February the artillery expenditures exceeded the quarterly average by 10, 138 rounds. This above average expenditure is attributed to friendly initiated actions in anticipation of an enemy TET offensive. The artillery expenditure records for March 1970 reflect the lowest expenditures for the past 21 months. Total expenditures for the quarter were 2, 579, 468 rounds. During the quarter, the USARV artillery ammunition posture improved to the point that no artillery ammunition allocation was required during April 1970.

(8) Sniper Program. Additional Sniper Instructor Teams (2) arrived in RVN 12 March 1970 and were assigned to the 1st Cav Div (AM) and Americal Division. As of 30 April 1970 all divisions have an operational sniper school and 1200 XM21 (ENSURE 240) sniper rifles are in

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country. The requirement for 1435 ENSURE 240 rifles was reduced to 1200 with the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division. All 1st Infantry Division sniper assets (instructors, snipers, equipment) were redistributed among other USARV units.

(9) RVNAF OJT Program. The RVNAF OJT program continued to increase during the quarter. USARV Regulation 350-8, dated 22 January 1970, subject: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces On-the-Job Training Program was published and distributed to major subordinate units in early March. This regulation prescribes policy, provides guidance and establishes responsibilities for the supervision, monitoring and reporting of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) on-the-job training (OJT) programs conducted by USARV units. The impact of the new regulation is beginning to reflect in the reporting procedures. Reports submitted by major subordinate commands indicate that 25,419 military and 4,793 civilian personnel have completed training and 3,371 military and 1,364 civilian personnel are currently undergoing training.

(10) During the reporting period the USARV Dog Training Detachment trained a total of 189 handlers in nine classes. The detachment received 76 dogs from CONUS and retrained a total of 165.

**Current Distribution of War Dogs in RVN:**

	Total Scout Dogs	Total Tracker Dogs	Mine Dogs On Hand	Tunnel Dogs On Hand
1st CAV DIV	79	4		
4th INF DIV	92	5		
25th INF DIV	73	5	6	3
101st ABN DIV	91	4	6	
AMERICAL DIV	75	5	8	3

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	Total Scout Dogs	Total Tracker Dogs	Mine Dogs On Hand	Tunnel Dogs On Hand
173d ABN BDE	21	2	1	1
1st BDE, 5th DIV (M)	29	2	5	1
3d BDE, 9th INF DIV	26	2		
199th LT INF BDE	28	2		
USARV DOG TNG DET	128	1	20	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>12</b>

(11) Quick Reaction Lessons Learned (QRLL). Combat operations continued to be analyzed and material of value to tactical units was extracted and published in the form of Quick Reaction Lessons Learned. Eight QRLL's were published and distributed during the reporting period. These were:

(a) TRAINING NEWSLETTERS

Training Newsletter Number 1-70

9 March 1970

Strobe Light

(b) COMBAT LESSONS BULLETINS

1. Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 1 7 February 1970

Air Cavalry Troop Employment Techniques

2. Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 2 10 February 1970

Air Assault Ambush Operations

3. Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 3 20 February 1970

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**The Mechanical Ambush**

**4. Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 4 23 February 1970**

**Ranger Operations**

**5. Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 5 11 March 1970**

**The Shotgun Technique of Area Saturation**

**6. Combat Lessons Bulletin Number 6 16 March 1970**

**Artillery Raids**

**(c) SUBJECT LETTERS**

**Tips for Commanders 1 March 1970**

**(12) ENSURE Program. ENSURE activities and events during the period 1 Feb 70 to 30 Apr 70 were:**

**(a) ENSURE 100: Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker (INFANT).** The INFANT system consists of a series of Night Vision Image Intensifiers integrated with the weapons system for fire control, and mounted in the UH-1M helicopter. Evaluation of three INFANT configured aircraft was completed during the reporting period.

**(b) ENSURE 131: Small Shallow Draft Boats.** A tentative BOI was forwarded to DA along with a recommendation to make the Boston Whaler, with 40 hp Johnson electric start outboard motor, the standard items for use in SEA. Additionally, 47 Boston Whalers and 100 motors were requested under Limited Production - Urgent type classification to replace losses and maintenance washouts pending availability of the items thru normal supply procedures as standard A.

**(c) ENSURE 170: Laser Target Designation System (LTDS).** The LTDS is designed to provide a means of positive location of targets,

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landing zones, and drop zones under varying conditions of weather and visibility. Evaluation of the LTDS was initiated during the reporting period in the 1st Cav Div.

(d) ENSURE 202: Mine Clearing Roller. This roller is designed to be mounted on the front of an M48 tank, or can be easily modified and mounted on a CEV for use in clearing mines from roads. Nine sets of 21 programmed under ENSURE arrived in country during the reporting period.

(e) ENSURE 240: Sniper Rifle. All divisions were operating Sniper Schools by the end of the reporting period. USARV requested that DA take necessary action to insure that the XM21 sniper systems receive logistical support equivalent to that normally provided standard items, to include replacement of parts peculiar to the XM21 system.

(f) ENSURE 263: Multishot Portable Flame Weapon, XM191. USARV was notified that there would be a three month slippage in delivery of additional launchers and incendiary rockets. Delivery is expected to resume in May 70. The ACTIV interim evaluation was completed in Feb 70. The full evaluation will end in Apr 70.

(g) ENSURE 272: Integrated Observation System (IOS). The IOS consists of a laser range finder bore sighted with a Night Observation Device (NOD) for night operations, and ten power ships binoculars for day operations. Evaluation of four IOS's was completed during the reporting period. Six additional systems were validated by DA as an add-on to this ENSURE, and the first of these is now in country, making a current USARV total of five operational sets. III MAF assets of six systems on hand and four in procurement are programmed to be turned over to USARV incrementally as USMC units are deployed.

(h) ENSURE 332: AN/TPS-58 (RATAC) Replacement Radar for AN/TPS-25. DA validated ENSURE 332 for 24 RATACS for the mid 1971 force structure. Four are for CONUS schools, 17 are for operational use, and three are for maintenance floats.

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(i) ENSURE 333: Log Periodic (LP) Antenna, AS-2236. DA validation for six LP antennas was received during the reporting period. The antennas were received and evaluation initiated within the 101st Abn Div (AM). The antenna is expected to permit direct secure voice communications at greater ranges than the standard AS-2169 currently authorized for Army units.

(j) ENSURE 335: Precision Para-Wing Aerial Delivery System (PPADS). A new ENSURE request for the PPADS was submitted in December 1969. The requirement was for a 2000 pound payload, radio controlled. The request was not validated by DA because of development problems in fielding an accurate 500 pound system under a Quantitative Material Requirement (QMR).

(k) ENSURE 336: Transponders for O-1 Aircraft. USARV ENSURE request for transponders for O-1's was validated by DA. The total quantity is 356 AN/APX-93 transponders. Maintenance will be provided by manufacturer's warranty for the first two years.

e. (C) LOGISTICS.

(1) Services Activities.

(a) Cargo discharged and handled in RVN ports (ST):

<u>Month</u>	<u>Discharged</u>	<u>Handled</u>
January	443,898	648,703
February	419,553	570,917
March	429,784	598,448

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(b) Sea Land Container Service:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Dry Vans</u>	<u>Reefer Vans</u>	<u>Total</u>
January	1,361	239	1,600
February	1,485	357	1,842
March	1,858	382	2,240

(c) Motor Transport Tonnage (ST):

<u>Month</u>	<u>Port and Beach</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Total</u>
January	311,145	180,227	127,426	618,798
February	327,441	226,737	135,788	689,966
March	288,376	203,685	160,750	652,811

(d) Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Service from Okinawa (Semitrailers  
and Vans):

<u>Month</u>	<u>Vans</u>	<u>S&amp;P's</u>
January	26	384
February	58	205
March	43	288

(e) Increased Highway Requirements in IV CTZ during the 3d  
Quarter FY 70: The 120th Truck Company was reunited in Can Tho  
(one platoon had been in support of the 199th Inf Bde) and a POL truck

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detachment became fully operational (one 1200 gallon tanker and nine 5,000 gallon tankers) to support increased requirements in IV CTZ.

**(f) Rail Tonnage (ST):**

<u>Month</u>	<u>US Military Sponsored</u>	<u>Non US Military Sponsored</u>
January	62,126.1	13,678.2
February	37,772.5	5,653.3
March	52,274.2	1,426.1

**(g) Rail passengers:**

<u>Month</u>	<u>US Military Sponsored</u>	<u>Non US Military Sponsored</u>
January	240,674	13,518
February	178,365	15,856
March	234,897	9,833

**(h) Significant Rail Accomplishments of 3d Quarter FY 70:**

1. The Long Binh and Newport rail spurs were placed in USARV's top ten construction priority list and in January RMK resumed work on the Long Binh spur after an eight month lay off. By the end of March the main portion of the Long Binh spur was down to design sub-grade and the contractor was laying down base material and ready to lay ballast on the north end of the spur once the rock could be made available. A spring in the POL yard on the southern end of the spur required considerable excavation and rock fill - this should be finished in July or August 1970. Newport spur construction has been delayed by the failure of the district chief to begin indemnification process in early

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March as scheduled. By the end of this quarter the district has commenced making indemnification payments; however, 18 Local Nationals (LN's) out of 53 refused to accept payment, further delaying resumption of construction.

2. Restoration in ICTZ north of Hue has progressed slowly, as the VNRS lacks any substantial earth moving capability and several large segments of the subgrade have been destroyed and require total restoration. During the month of March the VNRS reopened the Thap Cham-Song Phai line (40 km) in order to assist the 18th Engr Bde in the movement of rock from Red Horse Quarry at Phan Rang AFB to Son Pha. By 2 May 1970 the line is expected to be reopened through to Dalat, at which time resources will be shifted south of Thap Cham to begin restoration of the Xom Moi-Muong Man-Phan Thiet line in southern II CTZ.

(i) Intra-RVN Cargo/Passenger Movements:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Cargo (ST)</u>	<u>Passengers</u>
January	22,087.7	168,753
February	21,768.1	140,422
March	25,804.9	170,051

(j) Emergency Airlift Shipments:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Seats Programmed</u>	<u>Seats Allocated</u>	<u>Personnel Moved</u>	<u>% Filled</u>
January	35,219	35,714	35,264	98.2
February	29,418	27,950	27,336	98.1
March	40,037	38,589	39,514	102.7

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**(2) Ammunition Supply.**

**(a) Eight ammunition items were Available Supply Rate (ASR)/Allocation Management at the end of March 1970 as compared to four items at the end of January 1970. Items under ASR/Allocation Management at close of the period were:**

* Ctg, 40mm, HE, B572	Proj, 175mm, HE, D572
Ctg, 40mm, WSP, B535	Riot Control Agent, CS-2, K772
Ctg, 81mm, Illum, C226	Sig Illum, WSP, L312
Proj, 155mm, HE, D544	Demo Kit, Bangalore Torpedo, MO26

\* Item under DA ASR management.

**(b) The goal for retrograde of ammunition was set at 1,000 ST for the 1st Quarter CY 70. During the quarter 3,657 ST were shipped.**

**(c) Average Class V receipts during this period were more than the average issues (81,384 ST vs 76,063 ST).**

**(d) Weather conditions did not seriously affect Class V unloading at any of the ports during this quarter as it did during the previous quarter.**

**(e) The suspension of the Ctg, 152mm HE D381 for the Sheridan vehicle was lifted in January thus releasing in excess of 13,000 rounds for issue. Lifting of the suspension alleviated the shortages of 152mm ammunition. The Ctg, 152mm, HE-T, D592 was used in lieu of the HEAT-T during the period of suspension and allowed troop units to gain experience with the new round. The HE-T Round was found to be acceptable in the RVN environment.**

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(f) A test of containerized shipment of ammunition was concluded in January. 226 SeaLand vans were offloaded from the ship Azalea City at Cam Ranh Bay in record time. Some of the vans were trans-shipped by barge and overland to forward ASP's. The test was successful in that all vans arrived at destination in record time and in good condition. Some difficulty was encountered in the forward ASP's in "unstuffing" vans of propellant charges. Indication is that additional refinement of loading, blocking and bracing, and drawings of vans is required in order to reduce the "unstuffing" problem at forward ASP's where limited MHE and other needed equipment is available.

(g) A cost study was conducted during January to determine whether M16 and M14 AP mines in the custody of USMC in I CTZ (Project 972 stocks) should be renovated or destroyed in place. The cost study was initiated by USARPAC to consider renovation of these mines for meeting a portion of the Army's 5 year planned requirements for these items. An ammunition maintenance expert from FASCOM Korea was provided by USARPAC. A team consisting of the ammunition maintenance expert and personnel from 1st Log Comd, USARV and MACV conducted an inspection of the items and made cost estimates. The study was transmitted to USARPAC through MACV with appropriate alternatives and recommended an early decision on disposition of the mines. The decision made was for the III MAF to locally dispose of the mines since it was uneconomical to renovate them. Disposal was accomplished by the end of March.

(h) USARV attended the USARPAC Munitions Conference during the period 14-18 Feb 70. Areas of interest in providing ammunition to meet USARV requirements were discussed with DA, AAPSA and USARPAC agencies. A complete review of ICR's and TSR's for ammunition items stocked by USARV was made and necessary changes to rates were made.

(i) LTG Miley, Mr. V. P. Huggard and BG Kornet visited USARV on 4 Feb 70 and were given a comprehensive ammunition briefing. Topics

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covered were: in-country Class V stockage, receipts and issues of Class V during the period Nov 68 to Jan 70; present requisitioning procedures, Class V receipt, storage and issue capabilities in USARV and aspects of the proposed trade off of 2.75" FFAR's for the 20mm XM35 weapon subsystem for helicopters.

(j) Near the end of the quarter, USARV experienced decreasing issues of ammunition. Issues during March were below that which was projected and requisitioned. Ammunition storage facilities began to reach and exceed their capacity to receive and store high tonnage, high dollar value items. It was necessary to divert two ships to the offshore reserve, reduce requisitions and loan ammunition to ARVN in order to reduce the quantity of ammunition on hand to an acceptable level.

(k) LTG Heiser, DCSLOG, DA visited USARV on 30 March 1970 and expressed interest in recent ammunition consumption trends as well as possible future trends. Other areas of interest included the changes in USARV ammunition consumption rates as a result of troop reductions, shifts of troop units in country, changes in operations or reoriented activities and roles for USARV as redeployment of USARV units occurs.

(l) Air shipment of Class V to the IV CTZ was significantly reduced during the quarter by increasing the stockage level of the two ASP's located in the IV CTZ and transportation assets being made available for surface transport of Class V to outlying helicopter rearm points and staging areas. Action has been initiated to place the responsibility for Class V resupply to US units in IV CTZ on ARVN. This will be accomplished by phases as ARVN transportation assets are made available.

(m) Accidental detonations of some 81mm rounds with the M524A5 fuze were experienced during the quarter. The safety pins were apparently being removed by crews in anticipation of a fire mission. In some instances where missions were not fired, the rounds were placed back in the shipping

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containers without replacing the safety pins. Subsequent movement of the containers resulted in detonation. The dangers of premature removal of safety pins have been disseminated to all field units. Additionally, the Munitions Command has been requested to mark all boxes of 81mm mortar involved with an appropriate warning label.

(3) Economic Order Quantity Test.

(a) The Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) policy has been installed in six USARV DSU's (3 manual and 3 automated) for a 90 day test beginning in March 1970.

(b) Under current requisitioning policy, DSU's submit requisitions for supplies in 30-45 day quantities and must therefore submit requisitions several times per year for each FSN on the ASL. In many cases the items ordered have less total value than the cost to place the requisition. Often a one year supply of an item will require little storage place. Further the continual ordering of supplies in 30-45 day quantities keeps the supply system loaded with numerous requisitions for small quantities and thus contributes to what has been referred to as the "hyper-activity" of the supply system.

(c) The economic order quantity (EOQ) premise is that the cost of ordering very small or very large quantities of supplies is high. On one hand, small quantities are used rapidly and the supply system incurs high costs of requisitioning and receiving. On the other hand, large quantities require extensive storage space, require larger investment in inventory, and result in deterioration. Between these two extremes is a quantity of supply for which the combined costs of ordering and holding are less than for any other quantity. This is the economic order quantity (EOQ) and should be the amount of an item ordered each time a reorder point is reached. For "low-dollar" items this EOQ will usually be greater than the amounts ordered under our present system. For "high-dollar" items EOQ may be less than is ordered now.

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(d) A table which quantifies the logic behind EOQ has been devised for manual DSU's. It is easy to use and is applied to all items in the inventory. The data in the table is also incorporated into the NCR 500 programs. The changes required to use the new EOQ table are simple to implement without turbulence to daily operations. Use of EOQ based on this table is expected to substantially reduce the number of zero balances at DSU's, the number of replenishment requisitions from overseas depots and DSU's, and also make smaller reductions in the value, weight, and cube of inventories. Pending evaluation of the current test, it is envisioned that EOQ will be phased into all DSU's.

(4) Keystone Bluejay. Operation Keystone Bluejay (15 Feb 70-15 Apr 70) is the code name for Phase III of the redeployment of US Forces from the Republic of Vietnam. Phase III involved a reduction of 29,443 Army manpower spaces, which affected 141 USARV units. USARV G4 was required to receive and direct redistribution of approximately 80,000 major items of equipment turned in to the USARV Supply System. Redistribution also involved thousands of secondary items encompassing post, camp, station and ASL/PLL assets. USARV G4 accomplished coordination between this HQ and 1st Log Comd to effect a smooth flow of the equipment back into the supply system. Coordination was also accomplished with higher HQ, i. e., MACV, USARPAC and DA. Finally, the Keystone Bluejay units were required to coordinate directly with the SUPCOMS for turn-in of equipment. Because of the vast number of items reported for turn-in during Phase III as compared to Phase II, Keystone Cardinal, it was necessary to organize a full-time branch under the G4, Supply Division, to perform Keystone Bluejay functions. The mission of this branch was to receive, manage and control equipment disposition, maintain required data and to record and prepare interim and final reports. This branch was staffed with an augmentation of one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted men. Other personnel resources were provided from the G4 staff personnel. This branch could continue for future Keystone phases and should be augmented as required.

(5) Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Program.

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(a) Past experience has shown that throughout the command quantities of excess equipment exist which are unauthorized and not being reported on equipment status reports. Commanders were reluctant to report this equipment as excess because they had a valid need for the items, and by reporting them would be required to turn them in. MTOE/MTDA changes were not submitted because of the long delay inherent with processing, and in most instances, changes were not appropriate, since the additional equipment requirements were based solely on local missions and areas of operation. With the consent of DA, a program was developed whereby units reporting excess equipment would be allowed to retain the items, and this equipment would be recognized by DA as valid special requirements for base camp defense, Kit Carson Scouts, training programs, and other special projects. This program became known as the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Program (VARP).

(b) Under VARP, units with excess equipment reported the items to USARV, and were in turn granted authority to retain the items on a loan basis. Accountability for the items was established at the depots under a special code identifying VARP assets. These assets were not reported quarterly on the Depot Stock Status Report (AR 711-80) to the Major Items Data Agency (MIDA).

(c) Units will be allowed to retain these assets on loan until the residual force strength level is reached, at which time MTOE/MTDA changes must be submitted or the equipment turned in.

(d) The response to the VARP has been outstanding. Approximately 700 units reported excesses, to include over 60 million dollars of RICC 1 and 2 PEMA items. This program has now been extended indefinitely to provide units with a means of reporting any additional excess resulting from subsequent inventories. This program was developed as an expedient to obtain accountability and visibility of excesses. A possible solution to this problem in future operations would be to authorize the theater commander a bulk authorization of tactical equipment for use as a temporary loan pool to meet unique theater requirements, similar to ITIU (Inventory Temporarily in Use) Pools presently established in CONUS.

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(6) (a) Bakeries. During the third quarter, the seven Army Field Bakeries produced the following amounts of bread:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number of Pounds</u>
January	2,087,635
February	1,982,066
March	1,835,110

The total production for the quarter was 5,904,811 pounds.

(b) Food Service. Food Service staff visits were conducted to all divisions during the quarter. The quarterly staff visits have proven to be valuable in improving the overall Food Service Program.

(7) The Repair and Return Program for Communications-Electronics and Avionics Equipment. During this quarter two significant improvement actions were initiated in the Repair and Return Program.

(a) The Repair and Return Supply Information Letter (SIL) 9-69 which identifies items authorized for Repair and Return from Southeast Asia (SEA) has been completely revised. The listing now contains:

1. Items listed both in FSN sequence and end item sequence to provide field units with a much easier method for scanning an item to determine if it is authorized for R&R and what CONUS depot to ship it to for repair.
2. Items coded by repair depot and fund code.
3. Depot turn-around time - the number of days from receipt at CONUS depot until return shipment to the activity is effected - indicated for each item listed in the SIL.

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4. A separate inclosure 2 within the SIL identifies the units authorized to evacuate items to CONUS for Repair and Return.

(b) Sacramento Army Depot is now providing a weekly activity listing for communications-electronics and avionics items evacuated on repair and return to Sacramento. This listing is available at 34th GS Gp, 1st Signal Brigade, 1st Log Command, and three support commands (Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang) for use by all authorized DS/GS units in the R&R Program. This listing will be used to reconcile R&R items shipped to SAAD and to determine up-to-date status of equipment at SAAD. It is anticipated this listing will eliminate approximately 80 percent of the follow-up messages presently being sent to SAAD by USARV units and provide more responsive information to queries for status.

(8) Command Maintenance Management Inspection Program. During 3d Qtr, FY 70, 290 Command Maintenance Management Inspections (CMMI) were conducted in USARV with 106 units (36.5%) receiving an unsatisfactory rating. The standards used for USARV CMMI's are those listed in DA Pamphlet 750-10, Command and Materiel Maintenance Inspection Handbook, 24 January 1969. Emphasis is continually placed on vehicle spot inspections and during the quarter 920 vehicles were inspected by USARV teams. In addition to these inspections, each major subordinate command is implementing spot inspection programs. Of the 920 vehicles inspected by USARV teams, 461 were unsatisfactory, or 50% of the total vehicles inspected received an unsatisfactory rating.

(9) Selected Criteria for Retrograde of Army Material (SCRAM) Procedures. HQ USARV implemented SCRAM procedures in early October 1969. The procedures were used to inspect and classify approximately 26,500 major items of equipment from Keystone Cardinal in a two-and-one-half month period. The procedures were quickly learned and easily applied. The same SCRAM procedures were used for Keystone Bluejay. They enabled USARV to inspect and classify approximately 80,000 major items during 3d Qtr, FY 70. This major

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achievement could not have been accomplished by using standard  
technical inspection procedures from appropriate technical manuals.

(10) Class III Supply and Distribution. Bulk petroleum supplied  
through US Army activities to all forces in South Vietnam during the  
quarter was as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Bulk Petroleum</u>
January	2,828,900 Bbl
February	2,861,900 Bbl
*March	3,401,100 Bbl

\*Increase for March occasioned by Army assumption of bulk petroleum  
mission in I CTZ from Nav Sup Act DNG.

f. (U) COMMAND MANAGEMENT.

(1) Elimination of MACV AG PERMACAP Activity. At the direction  
of CINCPAC, PERMACAP activities of MACV AG will be terminated  
30 May 1970. MACV Data Management Agency will assume the personnel  
accounting task for MACV, permitting HQ USARV to discontinue the  
ADPE assigned to MACV AG.

(2) Elimination of 537th Personnel Services Company's PERMACAP  
Equipment. An ADPE utilization study, conducted by HQ, 1st Logistical  
Command at the instigation of HQ USARV, disclosed that the ADPE  
assigned to the 520th PSC, Bien Hoa, could assume the processing  
workload of the 537th PSC, also located at Bien Hoa. Accordingly, the  
ADPE assigned to the 537th PSC has been discontinued and will be  
shipped out of country.

(3) FY 71 Command Operating Budget Submission. USARPAC guidance  
directs a \$5.4 million ADP program for FY 71. The personnel and logistics

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systems in USARV are wholly dependent upon automation, and an ADP program adequate to USARV needs in FY 71 will cost \$10.2 million. Consequently, OACofS, MIDS submitted a \$5.4 million budget with an additional \$4.8 million unfinanced requirement.

(4) Extension of PERMACAP to 1st Aviation Brigade. In March, CG, 1st Aviation Brigade requested extension of PERMACAP to 1st Aviation Brigade. Implementation of PERMACAP throughout the Army is an announced DA policy. Since it is likely that 1st Aviation Brigade will have a continuing mission in RVN, the brigade was requested to prepare for the introduction of the PERMACAP system. ADPE will be provided from assets released by future redeployments.

(5) Establishment of a Data Processing Installation in 199th Light Infantry Brigade. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade has established a personnel strength reporting system that utilizes several items of key-punch equipment. The system and equipment were formally reviewed and approved by DA through HQ USARV in the third quarter FY 70.

(6) Elimination of PERMACAP Equipment Assigned to 1st Infantry Division. With the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Admin Co's ADPE was determined to be excess of USARV's needs and was released to USARPAC for use in the Division Logistics System (DLOGS) in Eighth US Army.

(7) Establishment of NCR 500 System in 15th Transportation Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division. Redeployment of the 701st Maintenance Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, provided an NCR 500 system to fill an urgent requirement for automation within the 15th Transportation Battalion. The transfer was completed during the third quarter FY 70.

(8) Transfer of the 526th Light Equipment Maintenance Company from Camp Davies, Saigon to Di An. This unit was transferred to the

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site formerly occupied by the 701st Maintenance Battalion in an adjustment of supply activities, made necessary by troop redeployments. This transfer reduced to three the number of USARV ADP installations in Saigon.

(9) Elimination of Individual Items of Excess ADP Equipment. A comprehensive review of ADPE utilization in-country resulted in discontinuation of 54 items of leased ADPE during the period 1 January-31 March 1970.

g. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(1) During the period, 844 complaints and 2,265 requests for assistance were processed. This is a considerable increase over the 2d Quarter, FY 70, due primarily to a change in reporting procedures. Totals reported for the 3d Quarter include reports from USARV major subordinate commands with both detailed and acting inspectors general. Previous quarterly reports included only reports from units with detailed inspectors general. The apparent reluctance on the part of enlisted personnel to use the normal chain of command continues since many complaints are still being addressed to the President, Members of Congress, and The DA Inspector General without first making the grievance known to the unit commander. The largest number of complaints continue to be in the area of unit administration, alleging improper handling of disciplinary matters and undue harassment. Only 49 of 844 complaints received (6%) alleged racial discrimination. Of the 49 complaints in this area, only one was determined to be justified. Overall there were no indications of new problem areas or trends which could result in conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) HQ USARV conducted annual general inspections of 32 USARV Organizations during the period. Areas most often found to be unsatisfactory or deficient were: required reenlistment interviews had not been conducted and reenlistment data cards had not been annotated with

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complete personnel data; special bank statements had not been obtained upon change of unit fund custodians, and units had failed to submit quarterly international Balance of Payments Reports; control copies of equipment transfer reports had not been attached to many transaction documents and retained in the document file; accountability had not been established for the basic load of ammunition in a few units; individual/organizational clothing and equipment records had not been properly maintained; in several units NCO GED coordinators had not been officially designated; an adequate supply of C-Day conversion forms was not maintained; training records had not been maintained to indicate completion of mandatory and recurring training; periods other than the required 0001-2400 hours had been used in the daily journal; an incentive awards program had not been established to recognize accomplishments in fields related to logistic readiness; excess equipment had not been promptly returned to the supply system; hand tools had not been properly maintained; prescribed load lists had not been consolidated into single listings; adequate barricades had not been constructed around a few ammunition storage areas; incompatible items of ammunition had been stored together; and "Restricted Area" signs had not been posted near some ammunition storage sites.

h. (U) COMMAND INFORMATION. None.

i. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

(1) Detachment of CA Units.

(a) The 41st Civil Affairs Company was inactivated in RVN as of 28 February 1970.

(b) The 2d Civil Affairs Company was slated for inactivation under Phase III reduction. Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, requested that II FVF be allowed to retain the 2d CA Company and that Co D, 75th Rangers be inactivated in its place. He deemed the action was necessary, for the 2d CA Company was needed to assist the province senior advisors in their efforts in supporting pacification and development in RVN.

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(2) Transfer of Responsibility for Civil Affairs. Primary responsibility for Civil Affairs, 1st Logistical Command was transferred from the Civil Affairs Division, ACofS, Personnel, 1st Log Comd, to ACofS, G5, HQ USARV, effective 16 April 1970. This was directed by the Consolidation of Headquarters OPLAN, HQ USARV.

(3) Preparation of Civil Affairs Plans. CA Estimate, Handbook, and Area Study for specific areas of Southeast Asia were prepared and forwarded to USARPAC as required by operating instructions from that headquarters.

(4) Procurement and Issue of PSYOP Equipment. USARV efforts to provide selected items of PSYOP equipment of US Army combat units have partially been completed. On 26 February 1970 USARV requested immediate shipment of 40 PA Sets AN/ULH-6 and a 90 day push package as add-on to ENSURE 197. Delivery of PA Sets AN/ULH-6 was received in-country on 4 April 1970. At the same time, 145 Public Address Sets AN/PIQ-5A (Bullhorns) were received and issued to units.

j. (U) COMMAND HISTORY.

(1) Organization. The newly-activated 35th Military History Detachment (MHD) was assigned to the Saigon Support Command effective 1 February 1970. The 17th MHD was reassigned from the 1st Inf Div to Special Troops and came under the operational control of the USARV Command Historian effective 7 April 1970. It will provide historical coverage of the advisory effort in III CTZ. Action is pending on diverting the 27th MHD from coverage of medical activities to furnish historical support to Army advisory elements in II CTZ.

(2) Historical Activities. Emphasis during this period was placed on staff assistance to advise units on maintenance and retirement of historical records.

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k. (C) AVIATION.

(1) Air Operations.

(a) Joint Air Operations Group (JAOG). The fifth quarterly meeting of the MACV JAOG was held on 6 April 1970. Pertinent items of the meeting follow:

1. The meeting was chaired by BG George W. Putnam, Jr., USARV Aviation Officer, representing the Deputy Commanding General USARV. BG Putnam will retain chairmanship of the JAOG until 6 July 1970 at which time it will be transferred to the Assistant Wing Commander, 1st Marine Air Wing.

2. Chairmanship of two of the JAOG working groups was transferred and confirmed by the JAOG as follows:

Artillery and Air Strike Warning - LTC Arnet, Aviation Office, USARV

Education - LCDR Edwards, Historian, COMNAVFORV

3. Action of the JAOG working groups are of a continuing nature and no major changes in the exercise of air operations were presented for consideration by the JAOG.

4. A study was conducted by the Air Traffic Control Working Group to determine the appropriateness and desirability of merging the JAOG and the Joint Air Coordination Committee into a single organization. Results of the study indicated that a merger at the present time would be premature. The recommendation that no action be taken on the proposed merger at the present time, but held in abeyance for possible future implementation, was accepted by the JAOG.

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5. The RVNAF Joint General Staff accepted the JAOG invitation for VNAF and ARVN representation. Major Ngoc and Major Thiet represent the VNAF and ARVN respectively.

(b) Plans.

1. USARV and DA agreed in early 1968 that 25 percent of assigned aviators would be experienced, i. e., second tour aviators. Currently 18 percent of assigned aviators are second tour; the difference apparently is made up of pilots who extend for periods varying from one to six months. Since practically all field grade aviators are included in the second tour group, a much lower experience level exists among the company grade officer and warrant officer aviators assigned to aviation companies and detachments. USARV has recommended to DA that aviator manning be at 100 percent of authorized in order to eliminate excessive flying hours per aviator and provide more aviators at company level with experience in flight training, communications, maintenance, flight operations, administration and aviation safety. Regardless of the decision on total manning, it is essential that the experience level among company grade and warrant officer aviators be improved.

2. Minimum acceptable manning for an air cavalry troop, assault helicopter company and O-1 or U-1A company is seven experienced aviators. These positions are: company commander, safety officer, maintenance officer (or assistant), and four instructor pilots. Each of these positions with the exception of the Major commanding can, and preferably should, be school trained warrant officers. The USARV second tour, school trained aviator requirements are as follows:

Instructor pilot.....1 per flight platoon or separate flight detachment

Safety officer.....1 per aviation company

Maintenance officer or assistant.....1 per aviation company

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CH-47 pilot..... 1 per aircraft

CH-54 pilot ..... 1 per aircraft

U-21 pilot..... 1 per aircraft

OV-1 pilot..... 1 per aircraft

3. Facilities. The concept of a portable revetment wall to fully close off CH-54 and OV-1 "U" shaped revetments has been studied. It is considered feasible and desirable. This construction is planned for all CH-54 and OV-1 units within USARV.

**(2) Aviation Training.**

**(a) AH-1G.** During the reporting period, the AH-1G Training Team transitioned 64 aviators and graduated 15 from the two Instructor Pilot/Standardization Instructor Pilot (IP/SIP) courses. Eleven additional IP/SIP's were qualified during non-school training time. On 17 April 1970, three of the authorized 14 AH-1G aircraft were withdrawn from the team and reissued to 1st Aviation Brigade units. With an increase in monthly flight time per aircraft, student output will remain the same, offsetting the reduced number of aircraft.

**(b) OH-58A.** The New Equipment Training Team (NETT) contract expired on 30 March 1970. Personnel of the NETT, reorganized into a USARV Training Team, continued to conduct the aircraft transition course as before. The maintenance training was discontinued because of maintenance personnel being assigned to USARV from the CONUS training base. 110 aviators were transitioned in the formal one-week course; six senior officer personnel were qualified. An additional aircraft has been assigned to the Team. Training classes will be increased from 8 to 12 students when two more instructor pilots become available.

**(c) OH-6A.** Sixteen IP/SIP's and 58 transition qualifications were accomplished by the Training team during the quarter.

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(d) CH-45 SAS & Speed Trim NETT. Six personnel were trained prior to the NETT contract termination on 15 Mar 70.

(e) INFANT NETT. The Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker (INFANT) NETT recently completed an evaluation of the INFANT system. The NETT is located at Phu Loi and is preparing to instruct aviators and enlisted personnel on the operation and maintenance of the INFANT system. Aviator course will be three weeks in length and enlisted maintenance course will be four weeks. A special class is presently programmed to commence on 4 May with subsequent classes starting in July.

(f) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) continued to operate at maximum capacity. A total of 906 personnel were graduated during the reporting period.

(g) The USARV Quarterly Flight Standardization Conference was held on 30 March 1970 at HQ USARV. There were 98 attendees from aviation units throughout Vietnam. Primary discussion areas were instrument flight rules, the 140 hour/30 day aviator flying hour limit, and the recently published USARV Supplement to AR 95-1. Additionally, there were individual discussion group sessions pertaining to each type of aircraft.

(3) Logistics.

(a) Operations:

1. The scheduled transfer of 44 UH-1H aircraft from USARV to the VNAF was completed on 8 March 1970. The VNAF now has 138 UH-1H aircraft assigned, three of which are in CONUS for overhaul.

2. The February 1970 aircraft Closed Loop Support Conference was held at the Aviation Systems Command in St. Louis, Missouri. USARV schedules and authorizations were updated and projected through FY 71.

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**3. USARV received the first shipment of SRU-21/P Survival  
Vests on 23 Mar 70. Distribution of these vests has been accomplished.**

**(b) Aircraft Armament.**

**1. A total of 10 XM-35 armament subsystems (20mm automatic gun), out of 47 on hand, were issued for combat and in-country evaluation. In excess of 150,000 rounds have been expended with negligible problems. The AH-1G Cobra aircraft involved have had numerous minor problems which are gradually being overcome. A 100,000 round test is currently in progress at Fort Rucker, Alabama to determine what actions can be taken to correct the problems encountered. All units with XM-35 equipped, AH-1G aircraft have reported favorably on the subsystem's performance, reliability, and accuracy. All units have indicated that the ammunition mix should be changed to include the armor piercing round for better penetration in heavy jungle. The current mix is 4 high explosive incendiary (HEI) to 1 tracer and 1 armor piercing.**

**2. There are presently 149 XM-59 armament subsystems (.50 cal MG) in the USARV inventory. On hand in units are 116; 33 are in depot stock. During the reporting period, it was discovered that the attaching lugs on the recoil adaptors were breaking due to materiel failure of the weld securing the lugs to the adaptors. All firing was suspended until modified adaptors could be issued. Replacement adaptors are not in USARV and a one-for-one exchange is underway. Replaced adaptors are being returned to WECOM for repair.**

**(4) Aviation Safety.**

**(a) Effective 1 February 1970, the USARV Form 232 aircraft accident report was eliminated. For aircraft accidents occurring on or after 1 February 1970, the DA Form 2397 series will be used to report the results of the investigation. One-man boards are still authorized for those accidents occurring in Vietnam in which no fatalities are involved.**

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(b) The USARV Aviation Safety Conference was conducted on 6 and 7 March 1970 at Long Binh, RVN. There were 43 attendees, consisting of Aviation Safety Officers from aviation units throughout Vietnam. Opening remarks were made by the USARV Aviation Officer. Topics of discussion included the aviator profile study, armament safety, aviation safety councils, aviation standardization and training, aviation medicine, safety programs, USARV Teardown Analysis Program, and the JAOG mission. Concluding remarks were made by the USARV Deputy Aviation Officer.

(c) In April 1970, USARV Aviation sent a message to the Director of Army Aviation, OACSFOR, DA requesting that the number of aviators trained at the University of Southern California as aviation safety officers be increased and that the priority of assignment of the graduates be to USARV. This action is required if USARV is to maintain a 100 percent fill of authorized aviation safety officers. As an interim relief measure, a team was requested from USABAAR to conduct the USABAAR Aviation Accident Prevention Course here in Vietnam for a short period of time. This course would provide aviation safety training to aviators not safety officer qualified. Both requests were approved. The number of aviators trained at USC as aviation safety officers will be increased from 150 to 250 per year. During the period 6 May - 3 June 1970, a seven-man team from USABAAR will conduct the USABAAR Aviation Accident Prevention Course at HQ USARV. Approximately 300 aviators from throughout Vietnam will attend this course.

1. (U) ENGINEER.

(1) Operations. The following battalions were inactivated during the reporting period: 168th Engineer Battalion (C), 569th Engineer Company (Topographic) (Corps), and the 501st Engineer Company (EC).

(2) US - ARVN Engineer Affiliation. This program is organized to permit maximum flexibility and freedom of action at battalion level. The program has three closely related areas of endeavor.

(a) Mutual association is the establishing of firm ties and mutual respect between US and ARVN units. Each US Engineer unit is affiliated with one or more ARVN units, with each unit doing that portion of the

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work for which they are best qualified and equipped.

(b) Training assistance (OJT) is an extensive program to train individual ARVN Engineers in specific MOS type subjects. 321 ARVN Engineers have received on-the-job training under the program during this quarter.

(c) To enhance the program outlined above, a Memorandum of Understanding between MACV J4 and Commanding General, US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam; subject: RVNAF Engineer Training, was signed on 26 March 1970. The scope of the Memorandum is to insure that all concerned are knowledgeable of the basic procedures to follow. In addition, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, ARVN, is now represented at the USARV Engineer weekly staff meeting. This permits a mutual understanding of US - ARVN Engineer operations.

(3) Mapping and Intelligence.

(a) Mapping emphasis continues to be placed on map revision and base camps photomosaic. The Mapping and Intelligence Branch continues to concentrate on furthering coordination between the various agencies producing maps of Vietnam and on increasing support to the Vietnamese mapping agencies.

(b) The Terrain Intelligence support consisted of drainage studies and reconnaissance for construction materials in support of the LOC program.

(c) The Hydrographic Survey Team continues to provide waterway reconnaissance to support engineer and naval forces in the Mekong Delta.

(4) Evaluation of Commercial Construction Equipment - LOC Program, Vietnam.

(a) The US Army Vietnam Lines of Communication (LOC) Program is an undertaking designed to establish a network of modern highways to

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improve tactical mobility, accelerate the Republic of Vietnam's pacification program and improve the economy of the country. The task is equivalent in size to the construction of a two-lane, high-speed highway from Washington, D. C. to Las Vegas, Nevada, a distance of 2535 miles. The USARV LOC Program was originally scheduled for completion by 1974. In view of the tactical and economic importance of the program and later the need for redeployment of US units, USARV was tasked to complete the major portion of the roads by December 1971. To satisfy this requirement, a concept was developed to procure commercial construction equipment to augment TOE authorizations and greatly increase construction capability. The mission of the equipment was to fill voids or gaps in construction unit capability for maximum production and a large scale road building project. The construction battalions, of necessity, are multipurpose construction units with capabilities for both horizontal and vertical construction. In order to fully mobilize for the LOC Program, it was necessary to tailor them to the project. The LOC equipment provided the increased rock production, haul, compaction, and surfacing capability required for such an ambitious program.

(b) An evaluation of the commercial equipment application for military engineer use was performed at the suggestion of Office of the Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) and the results were found to be as follows:

1. The MCA LOC equipment has increased the rate of placement of paved highway by over 50%. The impact is even more significant when consideration is given to the cut in manning level of engineer battalions engaged in LOC restoration.

2. The MCA LOC equipment can be operated by engineer troops as well as Vietnamese civilians when afforded proper training and supervision. Commercial type construction equipment far exceeds TOE construction equipment capability when deliberate highway restoration is undertaken.

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3. Overall, the equipment effectively performed in the intended manner. Considering the variety of equipment selected, the rapid procurement and introduction schedules, and the maintenance and operator mistakes encountered, the end result was a dramatic increase in production capability. The effectiveness of the LOC equipment combined with intensified job management greatly increased the construction capability of this command.

4. When compared to the cost of maintaining construction units in Vietnam until 1974 or of activating additional units to meet an earlier completion date, the LOC equipment buy was well justified.

(c) Results of this evaluation were forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Research and Development (OCRD), Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Mobility and Equipment Command (MECOM), US Army Engineer School (USAES), and the US Army Training Center Engineer (USATCE).

m. (C) COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS.

Contractor Operated and Maintained Integrated Communication Systems (COMICS) Project. In response to DA tasking, a joint USARV/1st Signal Brigade working group developed a plan for the contractor operation of selected communications facilities in the Republic of Vietnam. The plan provides for the replacement of US military personnel by contractor personnel at Integrated Communications System-Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA) sites, Dial Telephone Exchanges, and at the Area Maintenance and Supply Facilities which support the ICS sites. The civilian contractor personnel would eventually be phased out as qualified RVNAF personnel assumed the operation and maintenance of the facilities. The plan was prepared in consonance with the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program and was based, in part, on the 1st Signal Brigade ARVN training plan. The plan was briefed to the DCG, USARV and key members of the USARV staff on 14 February 1970. At this decision briefing, approval of the plan was obtained from the DCG, with the guidance

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that assurance be obtained that USARV O&M funds would not be required for implementation of this plan. A USARV representative departed RVN on 15 February 1970 and handcarried the plan through USARPAC and USASTRATCOM to DA where it was briefed, and where intermediary headquarters comments were provided. Subsequent refinement of the plan specifies provision by contractor of OJT for ARVN personnel and modified the concept of 100 percent contractor manning in order to retain adequate military manning to assure full military control of the system. Upon promulgation of COMUSMACV OPLAN J195 (Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan), the plan was further revised in order to accurately reflect the concept and guiding principles of J195. The contractor work statement was initially prepared at USASTRATCOM-PAC and included input from the 1st Signal Brigade. Final work statement will be provided to DA by USASTRATCOM HQ. A pre-bid conference is tentatively scheduled for mid-May with bid solicitation commencing shortly thereafter. It is expected that bids will be forwarded to DA for decision by mid-June. With OSD approval expected, the contract should be awarded by 30 July 1970 with contractor operation and maintenance commencing by 1 October 1970.

**2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.**

**a. (U) PERSONNEL.**

**(1) Control of Officer Strength and Requisition During Redeployments.**

**(a) Observation.** USARV has experienced difficulty in controlling the officer requisition system and strength as a result of the short reaction time on recent redeployments, inactivations and reorganizations.

**(b) Evaluation.** USARV units requisition officers eight months in advance, DA fills validated requisitions and issues assignment instructions to officer replacements normally four to six months in advance of the requested arrival date. Short notice (90 days or less) redeployments,

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inactivations and reorganizations do not allow sufficient time to identify those requisitions which should be cancelled and to notify DA in time to effect actual cancellation of all the requisition items which are no longer required. DA will not normally cancel assignment instructions of officers on orders to report in-country within 60 days. As a result, the command would be overstrength on the target date for the desired strength reduction.

(c) Recommendation. All units affected by redeployment, inactivation and reorganization should immediately report to USARV all validated requisition items which should be cancelled. USARV can then determine which requisition items are needed by other units and notify DA to cancel those items that will not be required. Replacements enroute against these cancelled requisitions should be diverted by DA regardless of the time remaining for shipment even after arrival at the port. When cancellation and diversions cannot be effected and an overstrength is anticipated, USARV can curtail in-country personnel as needed to meet desired strength objectives.

## (2) Physical Profiles.

(a) Observation. Excessive numbers of senior enlisted replacements, in the combat series MOS's, have physical profiles that prohibit their full utilization.

(b) Evaluation. During the period of April 69 through April 70, approximately twenty percent of all senior enlisted replacements assigned to USARV in the combat MOS series have had permanent physical profiles. The majority of these have been profiles that were not recorded on the qualification record or included in the individual medical file. In some instances the individual had in his possession the documented profile. In other instances, the individual reported to a Surgeon immediately upon arrival in Vietnam to have his long standing physical condition documented.

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1. It appears that the career branch of OPO Senior Enlisted Control Division has no knowledge of this "Hip Pocket" profile. This individual having concealed his profile, no entry could have been made on his field Qualification Report (DA Form 20), nor could the required Report of Change be forwarded to OPO. There is no requirement that a copy of the medical profile documentation (DA FORM 3349) be forwarded to OPO.

2. Check of Enlisted Qualification Records (DA Form 20) of individuals with "Hip Pocket" profiles shows that the majority had been promoted after the date their permanent assignment restriction of P-3 profile was documented.

3. Personnel management procedures now being used in USARV to alleviate the profile problem include:

a. The reassignment of personnel to security units in combat support and combat service support units.

b. Utilization within the combat unit in other MOS and grade as authorized by para 3-5b (1) and (2), AR 600-200.

c. Reclassification of out of combat MOS.

4. When appropriate, action is taken to terminate Superior Performance Pay and to notify the OPO control branch that individual is not eligible for promotion to the next higher grade because of his inability or refusal to perform in his PMOS.

5. The combat commander should not be burdened with reclassification or OJT of individuals in this category. The Skill Development Base Program offers the Army an additional means to retrain the career soldier with permanent physical profile. Although this program

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was established to alleviate the critical middle grade NCO and specialist supervisor shortage, it could be readily modified for this type mission, especially in view of the announced reduction of Army strength.

(c) Recommendation. The following actions should be considered by HQ DA as partial solutions to the above problems.

1. Change the existing promotion regulations. Specifically that part of para 7-15a (8), AR 600-200, which states.. "Individual having P-3, U-3, L-3 and otherwise eligible may with a waiver, be considered for promotion to the next higher grade" to "Waivers will not be granted to individuals possessing a profile which prohibits their performing in their PMOS in any location or under any circumstances, combat or non-combat."

2. Change the existing physical examination regulations. Modify AR 40-501 to require one copy of the DA Form 3349 (Medical Condition-Physical Profile Record) to be mailed directly to OPO, ATTN: EPADS on date completed and signed by the medical officer making the limiting evaluation.

3. Change eligibility criteria for MOS producing courses to allow acceptance of the individuals reclassified because of profile. Current regulations and eligibility criteria restricts entry to MOS producing courses to the soldier with six years of service or less in grade of E5 or below, with very few exceptions. This would include expansion of the Skill Development Base Program to accommodate individuals in this category.

(3) Extension Policy Impact on AOR/ORR Reporting.

(a) Observation. Personnel submitting requests for extensions within 60 days of DEROs have an unfavorable impact on Advance Overseas Returnee (AOR)/ Officer Returnee Report (ORR).

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(b) Evaluation. Review of records indicated several thousand deletions had to be made prior to DEROS. Personnel waited until assignment instructions were received. If the assignment was not to their liking, they applied to extend their FST in order to cancel the assignment. The increase in workload in APO as well as HQ, USARV aggravated efforts to furnish assignment instructions to all departing personnel at least 30 days prior to DEROS, to reduce error and at the same time increase the number of personnel departing with assignment instructions.

(c) Recommendation: That DA apply the USARV extension policy on an Army-wide basis. This policy directs that application for extensions of FST must be made and approved at least 60 days prior to DEROS so as to reduce turbulence in the assignment and requisition cycles.

(4) Civilian Personnel Recruitment.

(a) Observation. USARV Special Services program has been hampered by the lack of responsive recruitment of civilian professional Special Services personnel.

(b) Evaluation. The nucleus of the Army Special Services programs is the professional civilian staff. With the austere staffing of civilian Special Services personnel within the command, it is imperative that all authorized spaces be filled. In the recent past this headquarters has operated without an Entertainment Staff Director for the past three months and currently is without an Arts and Crafts Staff Director. This position has been vacant since July 1969. Several recruitment actions have been pending since 1967.

(c) Recommendation. That recruitment for professional civilian Special Services vacancies receive priority attention.

(5) Maintaining a Master Casualty File.

(a) Observation. A master file of combat casualties was initiated during the 1st Qtr, CY 70 under the monitorship of the AG.

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(b) Evaluation. HQ, USARV in January 1970, initiated an ADP master combat casualty file containing data including, but not limited to, the identification of the individual, grade, MOS, unit place and date of incident, type of operation, circumstances, type of wound (s) received, KIA, and missing status. This data will be maintained for the duration of the conflict and can be utilized to furnish commanders and staff sections statistical data such as the number killed by sniper action, by mines and mistaken for the enemy; to answer queries from NOK and governmental agencies and for historical and research purposes. Several projects undertaken in 1969 and 1970, which were manually researched and required numerous manhours of labor could have been more expeditiously handled through the use of an ADP file.

(c) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. Action at the HQ, USARV is within the AG Casualty Branch utilizing the casualty report as the basic source of data for the file.

(6) Control of Officer Strength - Unprogrammed Losses.

(a) Observation. Unprogrammed losses impact adversely on the control of officer strength throughout the command.

(b) Evaluation. Officer replacements are requisitioned eight months in advance. Emergency requisitions that are of high urgency take at least 90 days to get replacements in-country. Unprogrammed losses (casualties, med-evacs, eliminations, resignations, early releases, emergency leave, PCS, compassionate reassessments, etc.) in a combat environmental condition require immediate replacements for operational effectiveness.

(c) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. USARV uses casualty figures for the past six months and a non-casualty unprogrammed loss estimate (1%) to estimate unprogrammed losses eight months in advance. The UPL requisition is submitted to DA together with, but in addition to, the regular officer requisition.

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(7) Privately Owned Weapons.

(a) Observation. Privately owned weapons although unauthorized in Vietnam, have been discovered in investigations of numerous shooting incidents in this command.

(b) Evaluation. Appendix B, AR 310-10 prohibits the introduction of privately owned weapons into Vietnam. USARV Reg 210-5, prohibits the possession of privately owned weapons in Vietnam. All personnel deploying to Vietnam have a statement to this effect on their orders. However, privately owned weapons in Vietnam cannot be confiscated and destroyed. Instead they can only be seized and held by commanders until the owner has made arrangements to ship the weapon back to CONUS. Mails and household baggage cannot be utilized; only air freight may be used. This has created a situation in which a commander is forced to safeguard unauthorized weapons with often inadequate facilities for non-standard weapons; many thefts have resulted.

(c) Recommendation. That privately owned weapons being brought into or discovered in Vietnam be declared contraband and be subject to destruction upon discovery.

b. (C) INTELLIGENCE. Dissident Activity.

(1) Observation. The American Servicemen's Union (ASU) sponsored "GI International Strike", 15 April 1970, received no support from military personnel assigned to USARV. The strike, which called for American soldiers, worldwide, to stage massive sick calls, complaints to Inspectors General, and boycott of mess halls, received no publicity within RVN, with the exception of one piece of unsolicited correspondence which was immediately turned in by the receiving individual. Guidance for dealing with subject strike was sent to all USARV commands. Previous guidance concerning the handling of dissidents was reiterated, and USARV Commands were requested to monitor the strike on a low key basis without publicity. Guidance was furnished by investigative lead sheets to all MI units in Vietnam through G2's, SPO's and S2's.

(2) Evaluation. Anti-military groups have had little success in gaining support among the American soldiers assigned to RVN, due essentially to low-key but prompt and positive action taken by commanders.

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(3) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. Action within the command requires that all commanders continue to be thoroughly familiar with the provisions of para 46, AR 600-20, (prohibiting demonstration by military personnel). Command action is to be prompt, yet represent low-keyed efforts aiming at the identification, removal from the scene and isolation of agitators while avoiding undue physical confrontation and minimizing adverse publicity.

c. (U) OPERATIONS. Sentry Dog Utilization and Training Inspections.

(1) Observation. Inspections now required to be conducted quarterly should be conducted semi-annually.

(2) Evaluation. AR 190-12 requires periodic sentry dog utilization and training inspections. USARPAC Reg 190-12 required these inspections of the thirteen (six more to be added shortly) sentry dog sites located throughout Vietnam be conducted on a quarterly basis. Often due to the short duration of time between inspection, reports arrive at a unit just as the unit is in the process of dispatching the results of action taken required by the preceding report. This repetitiveness tends to reduce the impact and effectiveness of the inspections.

(3) Recommendation. That sentry dog utilization and training inspections UP AR 190-12 and USARPAC Reg 190-12, be conducted on a semi-annual basis. This recommendation is being forwarded to HQ USARPAC by separate letter.

d. (U) ORGANIZATION.

(1) Headquarters Consolidation.

(a) Observation. The rapidly changing situation in Vietnam requires an improved command and control structure for US Army forces in Vietnam which will be viable when major force reductions are directed.

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(b) Evaluation. To improve the command and control structure, eliminate layering, reduce headquarters strength and broaden the span of control while retaining maximum combat power as overall US Army strength in Vietnam declines, the DCG, USARV, has directed the consolidation of HQ, USARV and HQ, 1st Log Comd NLT 30 June 1970. The space savings achieved in the consolidation of the two headquarters, together with previous savings realized in KEYSTONE CARDINAL and BLUEJAY, will accomplish an overall reduction of more than 25% in personnel authorizations. A single command and control headquarters will be established which will be more responsive to the requirements of COMUSMACV and more readily amenable to additional savings in headquarters manpower as theater strength is further reduced. The concept plan for the new headquarters was forwarded to USARPAC and DA for review and approval on 14 April 1970. This concept plan outlines staff organization of the consolidated headquarters, explains in detail the disposition of personnel and equipment now authorized the two existing headquarters, and lists the manpower savings achieved. The manpower space savings will be included in the next USARV redeployment program. The concept plan included as an annex the proposed TDA for the consolidated headquarters organization.

(c) Recommendation. That USARPAC and DA grant early approval of the new concept TDA with an effective date of 26 June 1970.

(2) TAADS Approval Authority.

(a) Observation. Significant problems are experienced in obtaining timely approval of personnel and equipment changes under The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), AR 310-49. The present system is not responsive to the rapidly changing tactical and combat support situation experienced in Vietnam, especially during the turbulent period of redeployment.

(b) Evaluation. Under the present system, with USARPAC serving as the proponent, USARV must prepare and submit all documentation

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through HQ, USARPAC to DA. The entire MTOE/TDA change document is reviewed by USARPAC and then forwarded to DA for final approval. The normal time lapse between USARV submission and receipt of DA approved documents that can be used for requisitioning authority is from six to nine months. The DA IG was provided recent typical examples and discussed the possibility of designating USARV as the proponent authority for MTOE/TDA change documentation. In addition, a letter was forwarded to DA ACSFOR outlining the problems experienced in approval of changes under TAADS and recommended that USARV be granted proponent authority to approve those changes which do not place added requirements on HQ DA. If this authority is granted, USARV could document changes and provide tabular authority to units at least six months sooner.

(c) Recommendation. That DA approve the request that HQ, USARV be granted proponent authority for MTOE/TDA in accordance with AR 310-49.

e. (U) TRAINING. Cross Training of Veterinary Personnel.

(1) Observations. It has been noted that enlisted personnel from veterinary units who serve in isolated areas in support of field units are often required to work in an animal care and food inspection service.

(2) Evaluation. Personnel in such advanced support positions cross trained in both subsistence inspections and animal care would enhance the accomplishment of their mission and eliminate a need of assignment by carrying out such training within RVN on an OJT basis before sending the man out of the field.

(3) Recommendation. That DA study the feasibility of such cross training of approximately 10% to 20% of veterinary enlisted personnel prior to their departure from CONUS to RVN.

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f. (C) LOGISTICS.

(1) M551 Sheridan Product Improvement

(a) Observation. Certain M551 Sheridan parts and components continue to be a problem and require product improvement.

(b) Evaluation. USARV has experienced problems with such items as voltage regulators, sprockets, compressors and idler hub assemblies for the M551 Sheridan for several months. The voltage regulator, located directly under a fuel filter, requires relocation and improvement in durability. A new sprocket is being tested; however, correspondence from USATACOM indicated that this new item would not be available until 1971. CBSS compressors have failed after short periods of usage in many instances. Although the supply of compressors improved, product improvement has not been accomplished. Idler hub assemblies have been splitting in half along the weld - an indication of badly needed product improvement. USAMC has been apprised of these component failures.

(c) Recommendation. Request that AMC review the requirements for M551 Sheridan product improvements and expedite action to provide the improved items to this command. This will not only reduce deadlines, but also reduce costly replacements of items which are not often reflected in deadline rates.

(2) Selected Criteria for Retrograde of Army Material Predicting Correlation Between (SCRAM) Code and Vehicle Mileage.

(a) Observation. There is a correlation between the SCRAM code of wheel vehicles and the mileage of the vehicle.

(b) Evaluation. Predictions of percentages of 1/4 ton, 3/4 ton, 2-1/2 ton and 5 ton vehicles by SCRAM code is an essential element of

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the logistical planning for any future drawdown or redeployment. This predictive capability has been developed and is based on the mileage stratification of the wheel vehicle fleet in the combat units and the actual experience obtained from Keystone Bluejay. With this knowledge of the relationship between the condition of the vehicle and its mileage, maintenance workloads can be predicted, transportation and provisioning requirements can be established, and the numbers of vehicles, by type, which may be offered to ARVN can be determined.

(c) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters is required. This headquarters will continue refinement of this predictive technique to include periodic mileage stratification surveys of both combat and support units. Therefore the capability to apply this technique to actual densities of wheel vehicles in units identified for redeployment should always be valid.

(3) AN/TPS-25 Radar Sets.

(a) Observation. AN/TPS-25 Radar Sets have become a critical maintenance problem throughout USARV.

(b) Evaluation. The deadline status of AN/TPS-25 radar sets is critical in USARV and is caused by chronic malfunction, critical short supply of repair parts and technical knowledge and skill required to repair this aged equipment. No operational floats exist due to the overall low density and the requirement of controlled substitution to keep organizational sets operative. Closed Loop Support provides only one rebuilt set per month for exchange with assets employed in USARV. This situation has repeatedly been brought to the attention of USAECOM in detail and on more than one occasion, both by this headquarters and 1st Log Comd, through the exchange of correspondence, phonecons, and messages. In addition, a deadline status report was implemented on the AN/TPS-25 radar in order to intensively manage this item. Replacement items for the AN/TPS-25 called the RATAc are in the ENSURE Program for delivery to USARV in calendar year 1971.

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(c) Recommendation. In view of the critical maintenance problems being encountered with the AN/TPS-25, and the critical missions being performed by this radar, DA should expedite procurement of the RATAC as a follow-on radar for the AN/TPS-25. Additionally, any other available Army assets of AN/TPS-25's should be provided USARV to alleviate the current situation and to insure continuous operations pending availability of RATAC.

(4) Maintenance Management SOP's.

(a) Observation. Unit Maintenance Management SOP's are being found inadequate to meet unit needs during annual CMMI inspections.

(b) Evaluation. The importance of unit SOP's cannot be over emphasized in Vietnam. The constant personnel changeover, personnel shortages, and heavy mission requirements of all units in USARV dictate that each man know specifically the How, Who, What, Where and When maintenance on equipment is to be accomplished. The following deficiencies in unit maintenance SOP's are commonly found during CMMI's:

1. Unit SOP's are very vague and too general in maintenance organization and management. They fail to establish specific maintenance responsibilities for organizational and operator/crew maintenance.

2. Cyclic managed maintenance is not covered in all commodities of material, for example, office machines and equipment, telephone, misc. engineer equipment, protective masks, weapons, etc.

3. Tool control, accountability, and responsibility.

4. Unit publication and blank form control and requisition procedure.

5. In cases where organizational maintenance is satellite to another unit, specific operator and immediate supervisor maintenance

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responsibility are not being outlined nor is the organizational repair system being explained in detail.

(c) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. Action within the command requires that adequate and complete maintenance management SOP's are available in using units.

(5) Calibration of Test and Measuring Equipment in RVN.

(a) Observation. USARV combat, combat support, and combat service support units possess many items of test and measuring equipment (TME) which are not being presented within specified time frames for required "A" or "C" level calibration.

(b) Evaluation. USARPAC "A" Level Secondary Transfer Calibration Teams are providing calibration support to the command by operating 12 calibration loops in RVN. These teams are airlifted from Okinawa to RVN, are highly mobile, and after arrival in-country operate from M292 Vans. In addition, "C" level calibration support of common items of TME is furnished customer units throughout RVN by contractor operated (Kenton Ltd, Hawaii) AN TSM-55A (V1) (V2) Vans under the operational control of 1st Logistical Command. Limited calibration support is presently provided avionics peculiar TME; however, this capability is anticipated to be expanded in the near future through the hiring of additional contractor personnel and the acquisition of more calibration van facilities. The "A" level Calibration Program has experienced a great deal of difficulty in-country in obtaining from customer units accurate and updated Recall Lists and Delinquency Reports which are used to manage items requiring calibration. Since there is no overall TME equipment density listings available in-country, the only detailed listings available are the USARPAC Calibration Agency print-outs (Recall Lists) which have been developed by the transfer teams in their contacts with customer units. "C" Level Calibration has no density listing whatsoever, and is completely dependent upon CMMI's, AGI's or similar inspections to assure TME is calibrated. This problem is not peculiar to USARV, as it exists throughout the Army worldwide.

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(c) Recommendation. That Department of the Army approve a composite calibration/repair facility that would perform all "A" and "C" Level Calibration and repair for all types of TME as required. The facility should be capable of accommodating the repair of avionics equipment, fixed station communications peculiar TME and common items of TME as well. The concept presently employed by the USARPAC "A" Level Transfer Teams and the Kentron operated "C" level Vans should be merged into a single entity capable of performing both levels of calibration.

(6) NCR 500 Maintenance.

(a) Observation. Sixty NCR 500 computers are currently in use at medical, transportation, maintenance, supply and services and Divisional Direct Support units. During the 3d Qtr FY 70 USARV HQ began a courtesy inspection and assistance program that will include a visit to all NCR 500 equipped units in RVN. Fourteen units have been visited and these inspections have disclosed that additional command interest and supervision is required to assure that this equipment is properly utilized and adequately maintained.

(b) Evaluation. Preventive maintenance is the key to minimizing computer downtime. Environmental conditions, dirt in the vans and carelessness of operator and maintenance personnel are the major causes of machine failure. Managerial personnel must insure that scheduled maintenance is performed on the equipment and regular inspection checks must be made to maintain supervisory control over the activity.

(c) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. Action taken within the command is that units are maintaining close contact with these activities to surface problem areas, determine the need for changes in operating procedures, reasons for backlogs and causes of operational errors. The NCR 500 is the keystone of mechanized direct support operations. Proper supervision and care

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of this equipment is tantamount to effective and efficient direct support.

(7) Lateral Transfer of Keystone Bluejay Equipment.

(a) Observation. This headquarters has experienced difficulty in obtaining the appropriate response from units involved in lateral transfers of Keystone Bluejay assets.

(b) Evaluation. Definitive instructions were provided to all units requiring approval by this HQ prior to lateral transfer of equipment from deactivating units. Also, instructions for lateral transfers were contained in a supplementary message dispatched to complement the Keystone Bluejay Operations Order 183-70. A series of messages have been dispatched to the field, which request compliance from units involved. Less than 10% of the units have complied.

(c) Recommendation. No action required by higher headquarters. Action within the command is that stronger emphasis at all echelons is being placed on the control of lateral transfers, and that requests for lateral transfers will be submitted only in bona fide cases of proven shortages or change of mission.

(8) AR 711-5 Reporting.

(a) Observation. AR 711-5 requires the reporting of Army equipment which is classed as RICC 1, 2 and 6 in SB 700-20. HQ USARV experiences difficulties with reports from the field in being correct, timely and accurate.

(b) Evaluation. During any given Quarter, USARV receives between 1850 and 2000 Equipment Status Reports for review and compiling of the input data as a USARV Report to USARPAC for forwarding to USAMIDA. In many instances these reports are either filled out improperly or units fail to submit them at all. USARV provides LOI's with each report each Quarter, for providing guidance and assistance to the units on the latest changes to the reporting system. Equipment Status Reports are handled through USARV major subordinate commands to the reporting unit.

(c) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. The importance of the AR 711-5 Army Equipment Status Report is being continually emphasized. Provisions for adequate resources and trained

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personnel to accomplish the reporting requirements are being made.

(9) Movement of Rock by Rail in Support of the LOC Construction Effort.

(a) Observation. Engineer task vehicles have been heavily involved in rock line haul operations, moving rock from quarry to construction site in support of the LOC program.

(b) Evaluation. Most of QL #1 and QL #11 parallel RVN's rail lines. By establishing rock dump sites every 20-30 km's along the railroad, at locations adjacent to the highway a reduction in hauling time and an increase in task vehicle availability can be obtained. At each dump site, steel pilings are driven into the subgrade alongside the ties, paralleling the tracks, and then the subgrade outside the row of pilings is cut away to provide a vertical drop on either side of the track as hopper cars have to discharge on both sides of the track simultaneously. In rocky regions instead of driving steel pilings, it is necessary to build concrete retaining walls to support the rail subgrade. The resultant savings in time, personnel and equipment also provide the railroad with additional incentive to restore non-operational rail, and contribute towards the internal development effort in RVN.

(c) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. This technique developed by RMK/USAID and refined by the 18th Engr Bde will be utilized to the maximum extent possible throughout RVN.

(10) Maximizing the Use of Channel Airlift during Redeployments.

(a) Observation. Channel Airlift is more cost favorable than Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM).

(b) Evaluation. Phase III Redeployments (Keystone Bluejay) were conducted during the period 1 Feb 70 - 15 Apr 70. The total troop reduction involved 50,000 personnel, of which 29,443 were Army.

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25,026 spaces were reduced by adjustments in the pipeline flow of replacements; 417 personnel, representing the color guards of 3 units, redeployed by SAAM. The balance of the redeployment strength, 4,000 departed RVN in a casual status via scheduled channel airlift. Channel airlift from RVN to CONUS costs \$165.00 per passenger whereas SAAM costs approximately \$280.00 per passenger.

(c) Recommendation. Whenever the situation permits, make maximum use of channel airlift when deploying personnel from RVN.

(11) Rabies Vaccine (Modified Live Virus) Supply.

(a) Observations. Since December 1969, there has been a drastic shortage of supply of modified live virus rabies vaccine. Such a shortage in an endemic area such as RVN is a definite health hazard to the health of US and Local National personnel since a rabies control program is rendered useless with no vaccine.

(b) Evaluation. Shortage of vaccine was traced not to the supply or depot systems but to the manufacturers who have been unable to fill the demand. The supply problem is understandable but the critical nature of the disease and the need for the vaccine (10-12,000 doses/yr) suggests that an alternative source of supply should be kept available.

(c) Recommendation. That a contingency plan for supply for modified Live Virus Rabies Vaccine be considered, which will provide speedy resupply in the event of further delays in normal manufacture or supply channels.

(12) Portable Kennel for Rabies Incubation.

(a) Observation. The portable animal cages which have been received and put into service in RVN were found to be quite useful in isolated areas with no incubation facilities, but certain design problems have been noted.

(b) Evaluation. The presently used cages are structurally weak in the

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connection wire holding the wire mesh to the support poles, and holding the cage sides to the front. The floors of the cages are not solid. They are wire mesh and cause problems in cleaning, drainage and allow the animals' feet to go in the holes between the wire. Additionally, the cages are larger than necessary for detention of the suspect animals.

(c) Recommendation. That the present cages be utilized for as long as feasible and that the smaller cages be structurally designed with a solid metal floor and stronger wire connections between sections.

(13) Maintenance of Government Owned ADP Equipment.

(a) Observation. Government owned IBM keypunch equipment and Friden Flexowriters are not integrated into the Army maintenance structure above the organizational level.

(b) Evaluation. No higher echelon maintenance is available for these items of ADPE. In addition, providing maintenance above the organizational level for this equipment through commercial contracts incurs exorbitant expense with the cost of labor and parts often exceeding the value of the machine itself.

(c) Recommendation. That Department of the Army consider developing a capability for maintenance of government owned ADPE above the organizational level and that the maintenance of this type equipment be integrated into the Standard Army Maintenance System. Further, that spare parts for such equipment be included in the Army supply system be reconsidered.

g. (U) COMMUNICATIONS. Communications in Support of Redeployment and Relocation.

(1) Observation. Communications requirements for units redeploying from RVN or relocating within RVN do not cease until the base from which these units are relocating or redeploying is either completely abandoned or turned over to RVNAF.

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(2) Evaluation. During the final phases of redeployment or relocation actions, the organic communications capability of the redeploying or relocating unit is not adequate to support the operation. As organic communications are deactivated and prepared for turn-in, retrograde, or relocation, more requirements must be satisfied by the Area Communications System. The Area Communications System continues to maintain communications until all US units have departed the area and the base is either abandoned or transferred to RVNAF.

(3) Recommendation. No action by higher headquarters required. Action within the command is that redeploying and relocating units are to maintain close coordination with the unit providing local Area Service especially in the early planning stages, to insure that adequate communications are provided during all phases of the redeployment or relocation.

h. MATERIAL. None.

i. OTHERS.

(1) Civic Action Fund.

(a) Observation. US Army units do not have a formal means of obtaining materials for conducting civic action programs in support of the GVN Pacification and Development Program. Units are prohibited from ordering materials through Army supply channels, and do not have sufficient funds available to purchase needed supplies.

(b) Evaluation. In the Army supply system, property disposal yards are the only source of materials for civic action supported by US Army units. IAW DOD Manual 4160.21-M, Defense Disposal Manual, excess property may be donated to civic action when redistribution, transfer, or sale is economically impractical. Civic action support cannot rely on the availability and quality of salvage and scrap materials. Limited funds are available to US Army units for civic action purposes. Approximately \$VN25,000 (\$US212.00) per quarter is available from the MACV Civic Action/PSYWAR Fund to brigade-size units. Due to the lack of supplies and funds, US Army units are unable to support the GVN Pacification and Development Program to the fullest extent. The civic action

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program would also assist in base security by encouraging local populace surrounding our base camps to inform on the enemy's activities in the area.

(c) Recommendation. That US Army units be authorized to requisition supplies and materials for civic action programs through Army channels, or that US Army establish a budget for civic action for Military Civic Action.


(2) GSA Schedules.

(a) Observation. The FY 70 GSA contracts with IBM were not signed until April, and contracts with NCR and Stromberg Datagraphix are still unsigned.

(b) Evaluation. The delays in signing the GSA contracts have resulted in non-receipt of monthly invoices covering costs for some 1500 items of ADPE for the nine elapsed months of FY 70. Eliminating the backlog of invoice certification must await the signing of these contracts and will require approximately 900 manhours to complete. In addition, lack of firm price data compounded the difficulties encountered in adjusting FY 70 obligations to USARPAC directives.

(c) Recommendation. That GSA contracts with computer manufacturers be finalized prior to or immediately following the beginning of the fiscal year for which the contract will be in effect. Only through early completion of contract negotiations can large users of data processing equipment accurately forecast budget requirements and control fund expenditures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GEORGE L. MABRY, JR.  
Major General, US Army  
Chief of Staff

1 Incl  
Distribution List  
Incl 1 w/d HQ DA

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GPOP-DT (15 May 70) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Vietnam for Period Ending  
30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 **24 JUL 70**

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters concurs in subject report, with the following  
comments:

a. Reference paragraph 2a(2)(c)1: Concur. Such a change would put  
the onus on an individual with a limiting profile to become qualified in  
an MOS in which he could properly perform. Authorizing waivers for pro-  
motion to a higher grade in an MOS in which the individual cannot perform  
is a waste to both the government and the individual and stimulates apathy  
to personal improvement.

b. Reference paragraph 2a(2)(c)2: Concur. Modification of AR 40-501  
as recommended would insure that OPO would know of any limiting profiles  
and could program assignments, career patterns, and other personnel  
actions accordingly.

c. Reference paragraph 2a(2)(c)3: Nonconcur. Opportunities for  
qualification in a new MOS for career NCOs with limiting profiles are  
presently available through correspondence courses, QJT, on or off duty  
study at Post Education Centers, and personal study of appropriate  
manuals and reference materials. These methods place the burden for  
becoming promotion qualified on the individual as is the case for all  
other servicemen.

d. Reference paragraph 2a(3)(c): Concur. AR 614-30 should be  
changed to read that exceptions to the AOR/ORR time frame will not be  
granted. Only those cases involving compassionate considerations would  
be eligible for waiver of the established time frame.

e. Reference paragraph 2a(4)(c): This headquarters has and will  
continue to give priority attention to recruitment actions for professional  
civilian special services vacancies. The demand in this area has been  
far greater than the available supply. This situation can be expected to  
continue since qualified personnel in this category are seldom available  
from within the command; nearly all vacancies must be filled from CONUS  
sources.

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f. Reference paragraph 2c(3): Concur. The latter referenced in this paragraph identifies the problem as one dealing with the frequency of the report required as opposed to the frequency of inspections. The problem will be resolved with the distribution of USARPAC supplement to AR 190-12 which is presently being published. The supplement provides that periodic inspections will be conducted no less than once each quarter by subordinate command provost marshals and/or veterinarians. DA Form 2815-R will be completed at least semiannually and maintained on file at unit level for one year.

g. Reference paragraph 2d(2)(c): Nonconcur. A review of the request for proponent authority determined that the interests of Headquarters USARV and Headquarters USARPAC would be best served by retention of proponency at this headquarters. Headquarters USARV has been notified of this decision.

h. Reference paragraph 2f(5): Nonconcur. A study covering all areas of logistic support of test equipment, including the feasibility of combining calibration and repair into one service activity, was proposed to DA by USARPAC on 29 January 1970. DA DCSLOG reply, 4 June 1970, poses no objection to USARPAC undertaking such a study and advises that USAMC and USASTRATCOM will be notified of USARPAC intention to conduct the study and need for assistance. It is anticipated that this study will be performed during FY 71. Until such a study is accomplished in-theater, this headquarters does not support the USARV recommendation:

i. Reference paragraph 2f(12)(c): Concur. Recommend that these features be considered in future procurement of portable kennels.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. R. McLAUGHLIN  
COL, AGC  
Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
CC USARV

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310		1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
2. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, United States Army, Vietnam		2a. GROUP 4
3. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 1970.		
4. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CG, United States Army, Vietnam		
5. REPORT DATE 15 May 1970	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 74	7b. NO. OF REPS
6. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
7. PROJECT NO. N/A	702054	
8.	8b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
9. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	11. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310	
12. ABSTRACT		

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DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

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Security Classification