

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 52d Infantry  
198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division  
APO San Francisco 96219

AVDF BCCP

15 March 1970

SUBJECT: Input Data for OR-LL for period 1-28 February 1970 (U)

Commanding Officer  
198th Infantry Brigade  
ATTN: AVDF BCC  
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The following is a report of Lessons Learned for period 1-28 February 1970 from this headquarters. This report is submitted for inclusion in the 198th Infantry Brigade Operational Report-Lessons Learned.

1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities:

Operations for the reporting period were characteristic of Battalion operations for the past four months. Small units continue to make the majority of enemy contacts. There were two major enemy contacts during the past month. At approximately 0100 hours, 1 February 1970, elements of the 406th Sapper Battalion initiated a coordinated attack at LZ Stinson and the pacification hamlet at Dai Loc. The attack lasted until 0500 hours. A total of fifty-five 82mm and 60mm mortar rounds were fired at LZ Stinson. Numerous mortar rounds, RPGs, bangalore torpedos, M-72 LAWs, Chicom hand grenades, and small arms fire were expended by the enemy attack on Dai Loc. As always, the "Ready Rifles" did prevail. The results of the encounters were 14 VC KIA, and the following equipment captured in action: 3 AK-47s, 4 RPGs with launchers, 150 Chicom hand grenades, 16 bangalore torpedoes, and 3 M-72s. Immediate and violent reaction to hard intelligence remains the basic objective of the 1/52 Infantry operational concept. Intelligence gathering resources are employed intensively and reaction forces are kept available to rapidly attack all targets based on hard intelligence.

The other significant enemy contact for this reporting period was on 12 February 1970. Reacting to a distress call from an engineer platoon and RF security force, the "Ready Rifles" air assaulted a company size reaction force to relieve the pressure on the besieged force. In typical fashion of the "Ready Rifles" modus operandi, that of immediate and violent reaction to all enemy initiated contacts, two platoons of Alpha company and the reconnaissance platoon were on the ground in the objective area fifty-five minutes after receiving the alert order. Once on the ground,

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the "Ready Rifles" established contact with the enemy and rapidly seized the objective. The result of this action was six enemy soldiers killed in action, two wounded in action and six individual weapons captured. Negative friendly casualties of equipment loss was sustained in this action.

Enemy casualties for the reporting period were: 63 KIAs, 132 detainees, 8 POWs, 27 individual weapons captured, and 2 crew served weapons captured.

## 2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Airborn PSYOPS Mission

On 26 February 1970, an NVA POW was snatched in the western part of the 1/52 area of operations. Interrogation of the POW revealed that there were a number of deserters from the Army of North Viet Nam in the "Happy Valley" area. Further interrogation of the POW revealed that these deserters desired to Chieu Hoi, but did not know how. On the 6 March 1970 PSYOPS mission, consisting of one loudspeaker ship (Huey), one heavy gun team from Delta Troop 1st Squadron, 1st Cav. (two gunships and two LOHs), and one slick with a squad of infantry conducted airborne PSYOPS mission over "Happy Valley". The content of the broadcast message was that if a deserter wanted to Chieu Hoi, he should raise his hands over his head and move to an open area and he would be picked up at that point. Further, if he had a weapon, he was to hold it over his head, when he moved to the open area. As a result of this unique mission, one Chieu Hoi appeared and was picked up by the team.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

PAUL H. LAPOINTE  
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