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File

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division  
APO San Francisco 96219

AVDF-BCC

1 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 198th Infantry Brigade for  
the Period Ending 30 April 1970, RSC CSFCE-65(R2)

Commanding General  
Americal Division  
ATTN: AVDF-GCDO  
APO San Francisco 96374

1. (U) References:

- a. Americal Division Regulation, 525-15, dated 8 April 1969.
- b. Unclassified message, Americal Division, ATTN: AVDF-GCDO, subject:  
Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, dated 040302Z April 1969.

2. (C) Operations:

During the period February, March, and April 1970 activities of the 198th Infantry Brigade were characterized by small unit patrols and ambushes, pacification support operations, and quick reaction to intelligence on enemy locations.

3. (C) Lessons Learned:

- a. Personnel: None
- b. Intelligence: None
- c. Operations:

(1) Observation: On 21 January an infantry platoon conducted a Combat Assault to three successive LZ's. On each LZ the platoon divided into squads and searched the objective. On the third LZ they encountered a well fortified enemy. The rest of the infantry company reacted by conducting Combat Assaults into the area of contact, then with the aid of gunships and air strikes, the infantry destroyed the enemy and secured the objective. Results of the action were 15 enemy killed, two crew served, and three individual weapons captured.

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GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
Declassified after 25 years.

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On 12 February a company size infantry element Combat Assaulted to relieve an engineer road crew pinned down by a superior enemy force. The result of this action was six enemy soldiers killed, two captured and six individual weapons captured in action.

(2) Evaluation: The only problem encountered was availability of aircraft for the reaction force. The Combat Assault is an excellent means of moving troops to contact once the enemy is found.

(3) Recommendations: It is recommended that aircraft be made available more rapidly for reaction forces.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) Observations: An excessive amount of ice is being lost in transit between the issue point and release point due to the intense heat in the tropic zone.

(2) Evaluation: The quantity of ice lost from issue to release was due to the nonavailability of adequate containers. It was necessary to construct a container made from plywood, styrofoam, and sheet metal. The container holds 2400 pounds of ice.

(3) Recommendations: That a standard ice container that can be housed in a 1½ ton trailer be designed and the TOE of units located in tropical areas be augmented to include this item.

g. Communications:

(1) Observations: Tactical operations conducted in remote areas of Viet Nam can not always be supported with communications using the AN/PRC-77.

(2) Evaluation: It is necessary to provide a radio with greater transmitting and receiving capabilities in order to overcome the terrain and distance. This unit has built a jump TOC utilizing a GONEX container. The jump TOC has two each RT-524 radios, four each 12V truck batteries connected in series, mounted in two each wooden boxes, two each KYB-6 secure radios, two each RC-292 antennas, two each whip antennas mounted, and one each 1.5 KW generator. Additionally, there are map boards, rations, sandbags, lanterns, and other essential items packed in the GONEX. The jump TOC can be air lifted into any location and communication established within a very short period of time.

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(3) Recommendations: All units should be informed that the 198th Brigade has this capability and that it is readily available for inspection at any time.

h. Material: None

i. Civil Affairs:

(1) Observation: During the month of February there were many indicators that some NVA deserters desired to Chieu Hoi. It was later learned that they were not fully cognizant of how or where to Chieu Hoi, and feared approaching an enemy location. On 6 March 1970, the Brigade S-5 with Delta 1-1 Cavalry (two Gunships and two LOH's) went to the deserters alleged location and broadcast for ralliers to move to an open area and they would be picked up. This resulted in one NVA corporal from the 3rd NVA Division rallying on the spot.

(2) Evaluation: By providing a quick secure means for a Hoi Chanh to rally it can encourage an otherwise procrastinator.

(3) Recommendations: When exploiting potential ralliers, by utilizing speaker missions, a means of enabling a rallier to Chieu Hoi should be considered.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JONATHAN W.B. COSBY  
1LT, AR  
Assistant Adjutant

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