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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-BCC

02 November 1970

SUBJECT: OR-LL Quarterly Report

Commanding General
Americal Division
ATTN: AVDF-GCDO
APO San Francisco 96374

1. (U) Reference:

- a. Americal Division Regulation 525-15, dated 08 April 1969.
- b. Unclassified message, Americal Division; Subject: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, dated 040302Z April 1969.

2. (C) Operations: During the period August, September, and October 1970 activities of the 198th Infantry Brigade were characterized by small unit patrols and ambushes, with emphasis on night operations, pacification support operations, and quick reaction to intelligence of enemy locations.

3. (C) Lessons Learned:

- a. Personnel: None.
- b. Intelligence:

(1) Subject: Marking and Location of Rice Cache Sites.

(a). Observation: During the evening of 05 October 1970, an element of an infantry reconnaissance platoon heard digging in vicinity of their location. On the morning of 06 October 1970, the platoon located 8 barrels of rice which had been partially uncovered by unknown persons. A more detailed search located another 18 buried aluminum cylinders 4 feet wide by 3 feet deep covered with approximately 12 inches of dirt. The cache site was in an area of sandy soil and scattered vegetation. In the area were numerous small knolls 14 inches to 30 inches in height. It was discovered through digging up all knolls that the caches were located in a random fashion. Some knolls contained rice while others did not. It was noticed that those knolls which contained rice also had a shrub growing near the center of the knoll. This shrub was marked near the base of the trunk with three cut notches.

2-12(ORC)

GROUP-4

Declassified at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years.

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The marked shrubs did not blend with the area and were obviously unnatural to the surrounding area. These shrubs were approximately 4 feet high and 3 feet in diameter and approximately 6 to 8 months old. The area also contained numerous trails which led into the vegetation and suddenly terminated.

(b) Evaluation: Although it is understood that in other areas the VC may use very divergent techniques to mark and place caches, it is hoped that this information may assist other units in locating rice caches.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that all units observe how these caches were located and instruct their personnel in the techniques and observations used by the reconnaissance platoon.

c. Operations:

(1) Subject: Casualties During Medevac Operations.

(a) Observation: During operations in an area where numerous booby traps are employed by the enemy, an incident occurred which resulted in a large number of casualties. On 14 August, an infantry platoon was set up near an old NDP to accept resupply. An individual of the platoon stepped on a pressure release booby trap, wounding himself and four other soldiers. A command helicopter flying in the vicinity of the incident arrived in the area to conduct the medevac. Personnel from the command ship got off to assist the wounded onto the helicopter. At this time one person from the command group detonated another pressure release booby trap. This resulted in fifteen more individuals being wounded, to include personnel from the command ship.

(b) Evaluation: Fewer casualties would have resulted if evacuation of the wounded had been more closely controlled, and if personnel from the medevac ship had been guided by someone on the ground.

(c) Recommendations: A few basic rules should be followed to preclude incidents of this nature:

1 Initially, maintain good unit dispersion - 15 to 20 meters per man.

2 When medevac helicopters or any type craft that come into the area of a booby trap or mine incident, the personnel from the craft should not get off to assist the wounded unless directed by someone in control of the LZ. The personnel on the ground should take care of the wounded and this will lessen the possibility of another detonation.

3 Have specific individuals appointed to carry or assist the wounded and also to maintain or control the flow of personnel to and from the medevac craft. "Safe lanes" should be established to the pad, and only one casualty at a time should be placed on the medevac in order to avoid large groups around the helicopter.

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(2) Subject: Booby Traps in the Coastal Plains.

(a) Observation: Analysis of booby trap casualties in an area on the coastal plain criss-crossed with hedgerows and trails disclosed that a large number occurred while either traveling on trails or moving through existing openings in hedgerows.

(b) Evaluation: If a unit avoids traveling on trails or moving through existing openings in hedgerows, casualties from mines and booby traps will be reduced. In heavily booby trapped areas (particularly where the major enemy force is local guerrillas), the following rules should be followed:

1 Do not travel on trails unless a large amount of civilian traffic is observed using the trail.

2 Cut new openings in hedgerows, rather than using existing ones. The reduced number of casualties is worth the extra noise.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that this information be disseminated to troops operating in similar terrain against a similar enemy force.

(3) Subject: Smoke Grenade Strikers Used in Enemy Booby Traps.

(a) Observation: A large number of enemy booby traps have been found that use a smoke grenade striker as the firing device.

(b) Evaluation: The source of these strikers is most likely field LZ's where expended smoke grenades have been left behind.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that all field commanders require smoke grenade strikers be destroyed after the grenade has been used.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FLETCHER B. JOSLIN
1LT, IN
Assistant Adjutant

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Group 4
Downgraded At 3 Year
Intervals: Declassified

INITIATED CONTACTS

	DAY			NIGHT			TOTAL ENEMY ELIMINATED			
	TOTAL # OF CONTACTS	SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS	% OF SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS	TOTAL # OF CONTACTS	SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS	% OF SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS	KIA	POW	VCI	WPNS
A Co	6	3	50				7 (5 KPA)	0	0	0
B Co	2	0	0				0	0	0	0
C Co	6	2	33				2	1	0	1
D Co	5	0	0				0	0	0	0
E Rcn	0	0	0				0	0	0	0
Snipers	0	0	0				0	0	0	0
TOTAL	19	5	21				9	1	0	1

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