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
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
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3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division (Amrical)
APO San Francisco 96374

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THRU: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, DC 20310

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Location: CHU LAI Combat Base (BT 555035), RVN

Reporting Officers: Major General James L. Baldwin

Collated by: Captain William H. Offutt Jr., 3d Military History Detachment
Map References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets: 6538 I, 6539 I, II, III, IV; 6638 I, IV; 6639 I, II, III, IV; 6640 I, II, III, IV; 6738 I, II, III, IV; 6739 I, II, III, IV; 6740 III; 6838 III, IV; 6841 I, II; 6540 I, II, III, IV; 6541 I, II, III, IV.

I. (C) Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. (C) Background. The 23d Infantry Division continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, with contact ranging from light to heavy in Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK and from light to moderate throughout the remainder of the 23d Infantry Division's AO. Operations IRON MOUNTAIN, FREDERICK HILL, GENEVA PARK, PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE and NANTUCKET BEACH were terminated effective 010600H March 1971. Effective 010601H March 1971 Operations FINNEY HILL (198th Infantry Brigade) and MIDDLESEX PEAK (196th Infantry Brigade) were initiated. Operation WASCO RAPIDS was initiated at 130600H March 1971 by the 198th Brigade and terminated effective 272400H March 1971. Task Force Burnett continued OPCON to the 1st Marine Division participating in Operation HOANG DIEU. Operation HOANG DIEU was terminated on 30 November 1970. In support of Operation DEWEY CANYON, Control Headquarters XXIV Corps, the following units were placed OPCON to the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, effective 29 January 1971: 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry; 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry and 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery. 11th Infantry Brigade (-), 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery and 14th Combat Aviation Battalion were placed OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division. OPCON of all Division elements with the exception of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry was terminated effective 071700H April 1971.

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Effective 111430H April 1971 the 11th Infantry Brigade assumed responsibility for Operation FINNEY HILL. Using four Infantry Battalions the Brigade initiated combat operations to locate and destroy the VC Quang Ngai Provincial Headquarters and the 21st NVA Regiment. The 11th Brigade will assist the Mo Duc District Pacification Program by conducting combat operations in conjunction with the 4th ARVN Regiment, RF/PP forces to destroy VC/NVA forces and assist in rice denial. At 241500H April 1971 Landing Zone Maryanne (AS 961998) was transferred to the control of ARVN. On 26 April 1971 at 1745H the ARVN assumed control of Landing Zone Siberia (AT 901232). At 1645 on 27 April 1971, Fire Support Base Debbie (BS 872 324) was closed. 4-21 Infantry was relocated to Fire Support Base San Juan Hill (BS 634380). The ARVN assumed control of Landing Zone West effective 289010H April. Effective 291200H April 1971 Operation CAROLINE HILL was initiated by the 196th Infantry Brigade in Quang Nam Province. At 1201H, 29 April 1971, Operation MIDDLESEX PRAK came under the tactical control of the 198th Infantry Brigade.

B. Intelligence

1. (C) Intelligence Summary

a. Quang Tin (P):

(1) During the past six months, enemy activity increased slightly as the VC/NVA initiated two campaigns identified as the Winter-Spring Campaign (V-22) and the Spring-Summer Campaign (B-81). One of the primary objectives of these campaigns was to relocate the populace from GVN controlled areas to VC/NVA controlled areas. The campaigns failed to achieve this objective.

(2) During November and December, enemy initiated activity was light except for an occasional attack by fire and brief contacts with Allied units. According to agent reports, PW, and captured documents, this period was devoted to resupply and reindoctrination because severe weather conditions destroyed numerous food caches. The loss of these caches had a demoralizing effect on enemy personnel, forcing the VC/NVA to spend significant time rebuilding troop morale. During this time, reports indicated that the enemy was also preparing for a Winter-Spring Campaign which was to begin the first of the year.

(a) During January 71, enemy units in Quang Tin Province began final preparations for the Winter-Spring Campaign (V-22). The VC/NVA directed the campaign at outposts, refugee camps and resettlement villages in the eastern portion of the province.

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(b) There were three offensive phases of this campaign; 30 January to 6 February, 20 February to 26 February and 28 March to 3 April. As is usual in Quang Tin Province, each subsequent phase was more violent and more extensive than the previous one. On 1 February, the enemy launched the first phase of the V-22 Campaign throughout the province. The primary targets during this phase were RF and PF outposts in Thang Binh and Ly Tin Districts. In Thang Binh (D) Go Thong OP, Hill 198, Any Ly OP, and Thang Binh (D) Headquarters received ground attacks and/or attacks by fire. In Ly Tin (D) Hill 76, Hill 270, Fat City and Chu Lai Combat Base received attacks by fire and/or ground attacks. The majority of these attacks occurred on the morning of 1 February with the remaining attacks occurring throughout the week.

(c) Phase II of the Campaign began on 25 February when An Tan Bridge (BT498067) was attacked along with several outposts in Thang Binh (D).

(d) The most significant phase of the Campaign was the final phase which began on 28 March. It appears that the 28 March attack on FSB Mary-anne (AS9699) was not part of the original plan; the enemy decided to eliminate Maryanne, which had been an obstacle to their supply corridors for sometime. The VC/NVA attacked several other targets such as RF/PP outposts and villages in an attempt to weaken the GVN's control of the populace.

(e) After the end of the Winter-Spring Campaign, the VC/NVA prepared for the Spring-Summer Campaign (B081) and began the campaign on 26 April. This campaign is a continuation of the VC/NVA policy of harassing GVN troops and installations in an attempt to convince the population that the government of South Vietnam is not capable of protecting them.

(f) The enemy in Quang Tin (P) conducted 90 attacks by fire, 221 ground attacks/contacts and 218 anti-aircraft attacks during the past six months. US troops accounted for 885 enemy killed during this period, and captured 108,987 pounds of rice, 12,505 pounds of corn and 34,700 pounds of salt.

(3) There are three units in Quang Tin (P) that are directly subordinate to MR-5; the 502d MF Sapper Bn, the 409th MF Sapper Bn and the 78th MF Rocket Company.

(a) The 402d Sapper Battalion, with a strength of approximately 240 men, is composed of six companies, one of which is a water sapper company. During the past six months, the Battalion has been operating along the Quang Tin-Quang Ngai (P) border. The battalion participated in the first

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and second phases of the Winter-Spring Campaign. On 1 February, the 402d attacked Hill 76 (BT452039) inflicting heavy casualties. On 25 February, probable elements of the water sapper company destroyed two spans of the An Tan Bridge (BT497066).

(b) The 409th Sapper Battalion is considered the most effective unit operating in Quang Tin (P). With a strength of approximately 260, this unit is capable of launching violent and sudden attacks. During the past six months, the headquarters has remained in and around Base Area 117, while subordinate elements have been reported throughout the province. On 14 and 15 January, the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BS1298 resulting in 22 NVA killed and many structures destroyed. According to documents found in the area, the unit contacted was probably the 409th's headquarters. The 409th has initiated one attack during this period. On 28 March, probable elements of the 409th attacked FSB Maryanne resulting in heavy casualties and extensive damage to the base. At present the battalion headquarters is believed to be located at BT2504.

(c) In October 1970, the 78th Rocket Company was reported to be a battalion size unit with a strength of 180 men. Captured documents have shown that the unit was downgraded to company size sometime after August 1970. The unit now has a strength of 90 and continues to target Chu Lai Combat Base. During the last six months, the 78th rocketed Chu Lai five times causing light casualties and doing little damage.

(d) The provincial units in Quang Tin (P) include three infantry battalions, the 70th, the 72d, and D-11; one combat support battalion, the 74th; and one sapper group, V-16.

1. The 70th Battalion, with a strength of 211 men, primarily trained and resupplied during the past six months. Allied units have engaged elements moving into Quang Nam (P) to pick up supplies several times. In December, the battalion reportedly asked the province headquarters for reinforcements because of losses suffered from these contacts. The battalion participated in several attacks during the Winter-Spring Campaign. The 70th's most recent attack occurred on 23 April when PF Outpost #216 (BT144454) received a mortar barrage which inflicted moderate casualties on the defenders.

2. The 72d battalion is considered to be the least effective battalion in the province. Since the first of November, it has lost two company commanders, two company level political officers and several platoon leaders. The loss of key personnel has prevented the unit from

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participating in the campaigns as effectively as it should have. The majority of the time the 72d has stayed near Phuoc Tan (V) (BT170175) where food caches and a surgical unit are located. At present an element of the unit is believed to be located near the Quang Nam-Quang Tin (P) border along with elements of the 70th and D-11 battalions. The headquarters is currently located near BT1619.

3. D-11 Infantry Battalion is the least active infantry battalion in the province. There has not been a single enemy initiated incident that can be positively attributed to this battalion. In December, A PW from the battalion stated that elements of the unit consolidated with the Tien Phuoc (D) Force and provided personnel to protect supply lines moving into Base Area 117 from the south. An allied initiated contact on 26 April near the Quang Tin-Quang Nam (P) border (BT1236) netted 42 VC killed, one of whom was identified as the XO of D-11. If these personnel were from D-11, the battalion is probably incapable of any major offensive activity. The battalion headquarters is currently held at BT 2010. However, elements of the battalion are in the northern border area.

4. The 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion is the provincial artillery unit and reportedly has elements supporting the three local force infantry battalions. There has been only a limited amount of information concerning this battalion during the reporting period. The 74th Bn provides 122mm rocket support to the infantry battalions. The battalion headquarters is currently held at BT1821.

5. Since January 1971, captured documents have indicated that the V-16 Sapper Company has combined with V-17 Sapper Co to form the V-16 Sapper Group. Both units are still operating in their normal AO, one in the northern portion of the province and the other in the central portion, but they now have a central headquarters. The only contact with either of these units occurred on 6 April when the 2d. Sapper Co (V-17) attacked an outpost in Que Son (D), Quang Nam (P) (BT0832). Other than this contact, the units have remained inactive. The 1st Company is currently held at BT2212 and the 2d Company is unlocated near the northern province border.

(4) Significant incidents during this reporting period include:

On 4 November at BT104318 an UNSEF fired 20 rounds 82mm mortar and 15x8-40 rockets resulting in three civ KIA and three civ WIA (E).

On 14 November at BT075325 PF #154 engaged an estimated 75 VC resulting in 2 PF KIA, 1 PF WIA (E) and 29 VC KIA.

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On 15 November at BT 311118 - BT306117 RF #132 engaged an UNSEF resulting in 24 VC KIA, IWC, and 6 CSWC.

On 30 November at (UL)BT5105 - (LR)BT5503 an UNSEF fired 18x122mm rockets at Chu Lai Combat Base resulting in 7 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E), 3 VN civ WIA(S) and a dispensary destroyed.

On 24 December at BT049127 the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting in 20 NVA KIA and 1x120mm mortar captured.

On 25 December at BT206250 the 4-5th ARVN received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in neg cas.

On 4 January 1971 at BT247255 an UNSEF fired 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 PP WIA(S).

On 14 January at BS129996 the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting in 12 NVA KIA, 17 IW and 1,000 lbs of military equipment captured and 4,000 lbs of rice destroyed.

On 15 January at BS129998, the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting in 10 NVA KIA, 1x60mm mortar and 4 IWC.

On 17 January at BS096984, the 77th ARVN Rangers engaged an UNSEF resulting in 15 NVA KIA, 58 IWC and 11,000 lbs of rice destroyed.

On 26 January at BT143426, RF and PP elements raided a VC meeting resulting in 14 VC KIA, 5 Detainees, 60xB-40 rockets and 1xB-40 rocket launcher captured.

On 1 February at BT 173417 Thang Binh (D) Hqs received five 122mm rockets resulting in 2 VN Civ WIA.

On 1 February at BT452039, an UNSEF fired an unknown amount of B-40 rockets and conducted a sapper attack against Hill 76, manned by R/5-46th Inf and Ly Tin PP resulting in 5 VC KIA, 5 US KIA, 8 US WIA, 6 PP WIA, and 1 VN Civ WIA.

On 1 February at AS90953 - AS90960, C/1-46th found 1x.51 cal mg, 15x7.62mm MGs, 198xSKSs, 49xAK-47s, 3xK-44 rifles, 3000 rds SA ammo and 6x57mm RRs.

On 2 February Chu Lai Combat Base received 15x122mm rockets resulting in 3 US WIA(M), and 1 VN Civ WIA(E).

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On 6 February at BT149124, an UNSEF fired an unknown amount of mortar fire at PP #100 and #203 resulting in 1 PF KIA, 14 PF WIA and 10 VC KIA.

On 6 February at BT433064 fifty VC/NVA engaged Ranger Teams Maine and Texas with small arms and automatic weapons resulting in 5 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M).

On 11 February at A3906934, C/1-46 found 33xAK-47s, 16xSKSs, 6x140mm rockets, 133x60mm rounds, 5000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 107xbatteries and 6000 ft commo wire.

On 12 February at AS900936, an UNSEF fired automatic weapons at C/1-46th Inf resulting in 2 US KIA, 8 US WIA.

On 20 February at BT250420 an UNSEF fired small arms and threw hand grenades at PP #160 resulting in 3 VN Civ KIA, 12 VN Civ WIA and 2 VC KIA.

On 25 February at BT497066 an unknown type of explosive destroyed one pier and two spans of the An Tan Bridge (BT4906).

On 26 February at BT174232, an UNSEF fired 30 rds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire and then conducted a ground probe resulting in 9 RF WIA.

On 2 March in An Tan (BT4906) an unknown type explosive detonated in the An Tan Theater resulting in 20 Civ WIA(E).

On 8 March at BT2923, Tuy Ky airport (BT3221) received 6x122mm rockets resulting in 6 Civ WIA and 2 houses destroyed.

On 19 March at BT229230 two unknown type mines detonated resulting in 1 RF KIA, 21 RF WIA and 2xM-34 trucks destroyed.

On 23 March at BT535036 Chu Lai Combat Base received 12x82mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US WIA(E).

On 24 March at BT173097, 4/5 ARVN found 8000 rounds small arms ammunition, 10x82mm rounds, 9x82-40 rockets.

On 28 March at AS961998, an UNSEF fired 60 rds of 82mm mortar, small arms and conducted a sapper attack against the CP/1-46 (7SB Maryanne) resulting in 30 US KIA, 82 US WIA(E), 12 VC KIA, and 1x155 How destroyed.

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On 23 April at BT144454 an UNSEP fired 20-30 rds of 82mm mortar at PF #216 resulting in 2 PF KIA, 2 PF WIA(E), 23 VM Civ WIA(E) and 4 VC KIA.

On 26 April at BT122020 RF #744 and #258 engaged an UNSEP resulting in 30 VC KIA.

On 26 April at BT1236 Biet Laps PF engaged an UNSEP resulting in 1 PF KIA, 3 WIA(E), 42 VC KIA, 14 INC and 1 CSMC.

b. Quang Ngai (P)

(1) The situation in Quang Ngai (P) at the end of April is not significantly different from the situation at the end of the last reporting period (31 Oct 70). The VC/NVA have failed to extend their power base beyond the mountains in the western half of the province. The GVN has increased its authority in the populated lowlands by relocation of people from VC controlled areas to GVN controlled areas. Hamlets were built to accommodate the movement of refugees.

(2) In early January, enemy forces in Quang Ngai (P) made plans for the Winter-Spring Offensive which began in late January and continued through the first part of April. The campaign consisted of three offensive phases: Phase I 30 January to 6 February 71; Phase II 21-28 February 71; and Phase III 28 March to 3 April 71. A second campaign, the Spring-Summer Offensive (B.81) began 24 April 71, and is expected to continue into early June. During both campaigns, the largest enemy attacks were against RF/PP and ARVN posts scattered throughout the province. The VC continued to use penetration tactics against GVN controlled areas with major emphasis on New Life Hamlets, Chieu Hoi Centers, and ARVN Training Centers. Their mission was to liberate all civilians from GVN control and have them returned to VC controlled hamlets and villages. Terrorist attacks became frequent during the campaigns as the VC attempted to destroy the peoples' faith in the GVN ability to defend them.

(a) Politically, the VC continued to strengthen the infrastructure in villages and hamlets. Emphasis was on training, proselytizing, propaganda and obtaining pledges of loyalty from the cadre.

(b) Disruption of pacification activities was a major goal of the Winter-Spring Offensive of 71. Sapper tactics were used simultaneously with internal disruption within the villages. The enemy used hit and run tactics against RF/PP and ARVN units, while the majority of contacts with US forces were indirect fire attacks and US initiated.

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attacks. Ground contacts resulted from reaction to Allied operations around base areas, cache sites, and transportation corridors.

1. The first notable attack of the V.22 Campaign occurred on the morning of 1 February (see para (4)). Subsequent attacks were on OP's in Son Thinh, Mo Duc and Duc Pho (C). The attacks appear to have been well planned by district and provincial forces, with limited assistance in execution from the 21st Regt. The Thach Tru OP (BS65547), Nui Ong OP and refugee camp (BS612734), Thiet Truong OP (BS734524), Nui Deo OP (BS707505), Chau Me OP (BS750507), OP Pax (BS693538) and OP Woodstock (BS621618) were all hit during the first phase with the heaviest concentration of incidents occurring in Mo Duc (D).

2. Phase II of the V.22 Campaign began on 28 February and was considerably less intense than Phase I. Targets in Mo Duc and Son Tinh (D) were again the hardest hit.

3. Phase III of the V.22 Campaign was the most intense. A comparison of the number and size of attacks by phase is shown below.

| | 1-2 February | 2-4 March | 28 March-3 April |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------|------------------|
| Total attacks by fire | 27 | 14 | 36 |
| Attacks of over 20 rounds of indirect fire | 3 | 0 | 7 |
| Total Ground attacks/contacts | 30 | 17 | 39 |

Although attacks by fire occurred in at least eight different areas of the province, the largest number of reported incidents occurred in Son Tinh and Mo Duc (D). During Phase III OP#1 (BS517778), LZ Stinson (BS538824), Nui Deo OP (BS776535), and OP Woodstock (BS621618) were attacked.

(c) During the past six months, there were 253 attacks by fire, 434 ground attacks/contacts, and 306 anti-aircraft incidents. US forces accounted for 1,203 enemy KIA in Quang Ngai (P).

(d) The enemy continued heavy use of the Nuoc Ong, Dak Drinh, Song Re and Dak Selo transportation corridors. Visual reconnaissance revealed heavy use of trails along these rivers and heavy sampan traffic. APD missions recorded patterns of hot readings along both sides of these rivers prior to the start of both campaigns. The enemy also developed agricultural areas in the mountain valleys in the western portion of the

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province. Most enemy units faced severe supply problems as a result of Allied operations in these areas and unit production teams were employed for the purpose of achieving self-sufficiency. Allied rice denial operations were effective. More than 204,000 pounds of rice was captured during this reporting period. Eleven of the rice caches contained amounts in excess of one ton.

(3) In Quang Ngai (P), four units are directly subordinate to MR 5 Headquarters.

(a) The 21st NVA Regiment is the largest and potentially the most combat effective unit in the province. With three subordinate infantry battalions and 11 support companies, including anti-aircraft, mortar, and sapper companies, the regiment could inflict heavy casualties and damage on any target in its AO. At the beginning of April, the 21st NVA Regimental CP was located in north central BA 928 while the 60th Battalion was in northern Minh Long (D) and the 70th and 80th Battalions were in the vicinity of the Son Ve Valley. Elements of the 21st Regiment were responsible for the attacks on OP Woodstock (BS624618), PP 109 (BS678612), and for the forced landing of two aircraft in the Song Ve Valley.

(b) The 406th MF Sapper Battalion has been held in southern part of former base area 118 (BS3754) during the entire reporting period and has initiated three significant attacks, two of which occurred during attack phases of the campaigns. On 25 February at OP Midway (BS520887), a unit of the 406th Bn mounted a ground attack under cover of mortar fire resulting in 35 VC KIA no friendly casualties reported. On 24 April, probable elements of the 406th attacked LZ Honey resulting in 72 ARVN casualties and 19 VC KIA. The 406th Bn is considered the most effective sapper unit in the province.

(c) The 403d NVA Sapper Battalion, currently held along the Duc Pho-Ba To (D) border, remained inactive throughout most of the reporting period. This unit failed to mount any significant attacks. The 403d concentrated entirely on small-scale contacts and attacks by fire on targets around Duc Pho (D) Headquarters.

(d) The Quang Ngai (P) Force controls two NVA Battalions, three Local Force Battalions, and 17 Local Force Companies, and is directly subordinate to MR 5.

1. Of the five battalion size elements, the 48th LF Bn is probably the most active, initiating attacks on OPs and FSOs in the Son Tinh and southern Binh Son (D) area. It is possible that an element of

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the 107th Heavy Weapons Battalion supports the 48th. Units of the 48th Bn were reported to be providing security along the Son Giang, and targeted against Allied installations in both eastern and western Son Tinh (D) during all attack phases of both the V.22 and B.81 campaigns.

2. The 107th NVA Heavy Weapons Battalion dispersed elements throughout the northern half of the province during this reporting period. The Unit Headquarters is held in the northern Nghia Hanh (D) (BS5467) and was probably responsible for the mortar and rocket attacks on Quang Ngai City. One element of the 107th operated in western Son Tinh (D) in support of units of the 406th and 48th battalions. Since the 107th is the only unit in the province with a confirmed 122mm rocket capability, this element probably conducted the 27 April rocket attack on Bottie.

(4) Significant incidents during this reporting period include:

On 6 November at BS657575, C/1-20 Inf found and evacuated 2'000 lbs of rice.

On 6 November at BS850350, R/4-29 Inf found and evacuated 4000 lbs of rice.

On 30 November at BS469844, an UNSEP fired 82mm mortars, B-40 rockets, and conducted a ground attack which penetrated the perimeter of PSB Honey. Results were 1 ARVN KIA, 6 ARVN WIA, 24 VC KIA.

On 1 December at BS498828, D/1-52 found and evacuated 6000 lbs of rice, 3000 lbs was evacuated and 3000 lbs destroyed.

On 9 December at BS690965, PP #01, 02, 22, 53, engaged an UNSEP resulting in 25 VC KIA, 13 IWC, 6 unknown type rockets captured.

On 16 December at BS533428, 70th ARVN Rangers found and destroyed 11,000 lbs of rice.

On 1 February at BS592762, an estimated VC/NVA platoon fired 105x82mm mortar rounds and an unknown amount of small arms and initiated a sapper attack against PP #155 resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 5 VC KIA.

On 15 February at BS362801, D/1-52 Inf found and evacuated 4800 lbs of rice and 3500 lbs salt.

On 16 February at BS362801, D/1-52 found and destroyed 2270 lbs of salt.

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On 16 February at BS578845, C/1-52 Inf found and destroyed 6800 lbs of spoiled rice.

On 17 February at BS362800, D/1-52 Inf found and evacuated 4700 lbs of salt.

On 19 February at BS522858, C/1-52 Inf found and evacuated 2450 lbs of rice.

On 24 February at BS678612, an UNSEF fired 110x rounds 82mm mortar and an unknown amount of B-40 rockets at PF #109 resulting in 4 PF WIA.

On 24 February at BS621618, an UNSEF engaged PF #711 resulting in 7 RF KIA and 47 NVA KIA.

On 25 February at BS520887, an estimated 60 VC fired an unknown amount of mortar rounds and conducted a ground attack against RF #713 resulting in 4 RF KIA, 35 VC KIA.

On 5 March at BS615610, an estimated NVA Bn fired on R/4th ARVN resulting in 2 ARVN KIA, 24 NVA KIA.

On 13 March at BS624545, an UNSEF fired intense .30 and .51 cal at a UH-1C aircraft forcing it to land. Aircraft was later recovered.

On 13 March at BS62254, an UNSEF fired heavy .51 cal at a OH-6A aircraft resulting in a forced landing. The aircraft was later recovered.

On 19 March at BS564762, a reported VC/NVA Bn fired an unknown amount of mortars, B-40 rockets and small arms at 1-6 ARVN resulting in 16 ARVN KIA, 2 ARVN WIA, 35 ARVN MIA of which 34 later returned.

On 20 March at BS418809, an UNSEF ambushed 3/6 ARVN resulting in 28 VC KIA.

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. On 1 April 1971, USARV approved a MTOE for the Division Surveillance Platoon (Target Mission Force) of HHC, 23d Inf Div authorizing six (6) officers and sixty-six (66) enlisted men. As of 30 April 71, the Surveillance Platoon had an assigned strength of four (4) officers and sixty-six (66) enlisted men. The Surveillance Platoon continues to operate as previously reported. Sensors employed include 336 radio linked and 67 line sensors which are monitored from eight sites in the AO. All Phase I

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monitoring equipment and sensors have been replaced with Phase III equipment. On 20 April 71 the first US/ARVN combined sensor monitoring site was established at LZ Oregon. During the reporting period, the Surveillance Platoon began sensor orientation training for personnel of the division rifle companies. As of 30 April, 19 rifle companies had received orientation training. Since 1 November 1970, 3109 intruders were detected and 914 reactions were initiated.

b. Aerial reconnaissance missions continue to obtain timely information on enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 147 Infrared missions, 171 APD missions, 215 Photo missions and 1440 VR missions were flown.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. Counterintelligence Section.

(1) During the reporting period, there were four reportable incidents of sabotage, subversion or espionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed an increase during this reporting period as compared to the last period. During the reporting period, the CI Section conducted 226 investigations, as compared to 217 last reporting period. Of this number, 83 involved separate investigations of prostitutes apprehended for unlawful entry onto Chu Lai Base.

(3) The following CI services were provided:

| | |
|------------------------------|-----|
| Announced CI Inspections | 14 |
| Unannounced CI Inspections | 11 |
| Courtesy CI Inspections | 26 |
| Miscellaneous Investigations | 153 |
| PSI | 26 |
| AGI | 25 |
| DAME assist | 126 |

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(4) During the reporting period, the CI Section Case Officers conducted 223 source meetings and turned in 926 Information Reports. During the previous reporting period, there were 113 source meetings and 461 Information Reports prepared.

Information Evaluation

| Month Rating | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Unrated | Total |
|--------------|---|------|------|----|----|-----|---------|-------|
| Nov | 0 | 32 | 96 | 19 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 162 |
| Dec | 0 | 35 | 135 | 15 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 198 |
| Jan | 0 | 20 | 76 | 12 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 122 |
| Feb | 0 | 42 | 82 | 9 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 139 |
| Mar | 0 | 36 | 70 | 11 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 135 |
| Apr | 0 | 37 | 98 | 18 | 0 | 6 | 14 | 173 |
| <u>TOTAL</u> | 0 | 202 | 557 | 84 | 5 | 53 | 28 | 929 |
| % | 0 | 21.7 | 60.3 | 9 | .4 | 5.6 | 3 | 100 |

b. Interrogation Section.

(1) During the reporting period the IPW Section interrogated and classified 1,382 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification in comparison to the previous reporting period reveals that there were significant decreases in all categories except the Unclassified and Returnee. The increase in the returnee category reflects the fact that the IPW Section has interrogators working at the Chieu Hoi Centers.

| | <u>May 70 - Oct 70</u> | <u>Nov 70 - Apr 71</u> |
|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| PW/NVA | 77 | 50 |
| PW/VC | 202 | 121 |
| Civil Defendant (CD) | 1,477 | 595 |
| Innocent Civilian (IC) | 482 | 147 |

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| | <u>May 70 - Oct 70</u> | <u>Nov 70-Apr 71</u> |
|--------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Unclassified | 26 | 43 |
| Returnee | 94 | 426 |

(2) Three hundred (300) man days were spent in support of tactical operations during which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field. Of these 300 man days, 287 were spent in support of the 11th Bde during operations in the Dong Ha area.

(3) Information gained from 62 interrogations resulted in responses by tactical units. The breakdown by classification of detainees providing useful information is as follows:

| | |
|----------|----|
| Returnee | 9 |
| PW | 25 |
| CD or JC | 28 |

Tactical units reacted to such information as location of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemy base areas.

c. Imagery Interpretation Section.

(1) With the end of the monsoon, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance increased throughout the 23d Infantry Division's AO.

(2) During the reporting period, the II Section conducted the following missions:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| Visual Reconnaissance Missions | 85 |
| Hand-held Photography Missions | 15 |
| Infrared Missions | 95 |
| Photo Missions | 153 |

(3) In addition, the II Section completed several special projects such as fire support base studies, trail studies and photo mosaics.

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d. Order of Battle Section.

(1) The Order of Battle Section made no major operational changes during the current reporting period. The only significant changes dealt with the Order of Battle input for the 23d Infantry Division Weekly Intelligence Summary and the G-2's Weekly Intelligence Briefing. The formats of both now more clearly reflect trends in enemy activity.

(2) During the reporting period, the Order of Battle prepared four special projects:

(a) A "TET" Study completed on 22 January compared enemy preparations and activities for TET in 1971 with preparations and activities prior to TET in 1968, 1969, and 1970.

(b) A Personalities Handbook published on 7 February listed all reported enemy personalities, by unit and position, in the 23d Infantry Division's AO.

(c) An AKA Handbook on 14 February listed all reported AKA's for enemy units in the 23d Infantry Division's AO.

(d) An Anti-Aircraft Study was completed on 25 February. This study gave an analysis of enemy anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as the patterns and intensity of anti-aircraft fire within the TACR for the period 1 July to 4 December 1970.

e. LUC LUONG 66 Scout Section (C)

(1) Luc Luong 66 Training Center graduated two (2) classes of 28 and 9 scouts, respectively, during this period. A class was not conducted during the month of April because the 23d Infantry Division hired scouts who had been released by marine units that were redeploying.

(2) During the past reporting period one Scout received an ARCOM with V device. Terminations (84) during the past six months were for the following causes:

- (a) 13 Unsatisfactory performance
- (b) 35 Excessive AWOL
- (c) 10 KIA

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(d) 3 WIA

(e) 10 Resigned

(f) 13 Other

4. (C) Co G (RANGER), 75th Infantry: Summary of Significant Activities.

During the period, there were 94 long range reconnaissance patrols conducted within the Division AO including 79 area reconnaissance missions, 11 observation post missions, two search and attack missions, and two special missions. In 63 sightings, the patrols observed 234 enemy personnel. Results were 22 enemy KIA, 2 US KIA, and 27 US WIA. Patrols adjusted artillery on suspected enemy locations on numerous occasions with unknown results.

5. (C) Enemy Units Locations and Movements: Based on PW interrogations, documents, and other reliable sources, the following are locations of major enemy units in the 23d Infantry Division TAOI:

| UNIT | CATAG | STRENGTH | LOCATION |
|-------------------------|-------|----------|-----------|
| ME-5 HQ | (C) | 650 | Unlocated |
| 2d NVA Div HQ | (C) | 200 | Unlocated |
| GK-30 NVA Signal Bn | (C) | 275 | Unlocated |
| GK-31 NVA AA Bn | (C) | 250 | Unlocated |
| GK-32 NVA RR Bn | (C) | 200 | Unlocated |
| GK-33 NVA Mortar Bn | (C) | 350 | Unlocated |
| GK-35 NVA Sap/Raeron Bn | (C) | 340 | Unlocated |
| GK-37 NVA Trans Bn | (C) | 200 | Unlocated |
| GK-38 NVA Medical Bn | (C) | 200 | Unlocated |
| GK-40 NVA Engineer Bn | (C) | 200 | Unlocated |
| 1st MF Regt HQ | (C) | 125 | Unlocated |
| 40th MF Bn | (C) | 238 | Unlocated |
| 60th MF Bn | (C) | 170 | Unlocated |
| 90th MF Bn | (C) | 300 | Unlocated |
| 3d NVA Regt HQ | (C) | 150 | Unlocated |
| 1st NVA Bn | (C) | 109 | Unlocated |
| 2nd NVA Bn | (C) | 350 | Unlocated |
| 3rd NVA Bn | (C) | 200 | Unlocated |
| 21st NVA Regt HQ | (C) | 510 | BS4249 |
| 60th NVA Bn | (C) | 150 | BS5263 |
| 70th NVA Bn | (C) | 120 | BS5347 |
| 80th NVA Bn | (C) | 120 | BS6353 |

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| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CATAG</u> | <u>STRENGTH</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Quang Tri (P) Forces | | | |
| 70th LF Bn | (C) | 211 | BT1226 |
| 74th LF Hvy Wpns Bn | (C) | 233 | BT1821 |
| 402d MF Sapper Bn | (C) | 246 | BS1296 |
| 409th MF Sapper Bn | (C) | 269 | BT2504 |
| D-11 LF Bn | (C) | 174 | BT2010 |
| V-16 LF Bn | (C) | 80 | Unlocated |
| 1st Co | (C) | 30 | BT2312 |
| 2nd Co | (C) | 50 | Unlocated |
| 72d LF Bn | (C) | 220 | BT1619 |
| C-7 LF Co | (C) | 19 | BT1615 |
| C-9 LF Co | (C) | 12 | BT1528 |
| V-12 LF Co | (C) | 45 | BT1823 |
| V-14 LF Co | (C) | 22 | BT3012 |
| V-15 LF Co | (C) | 15 | BT2048 |
| V-18 LF Co | (C) | 20 | BT2712 |
| 74th LF Co (V-20) | (C) | 64 | BT3808 |
| 78th MF Rocket Co | (C) | 90 | BS4099 |
| Quang Ngai (P) Forces | | | |
| 403d NVA Sapper Bn | (C) | 270 | BS8030 |
| 107th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn | (C) | 250 | BS5368 |
| 40th NVA Sapper Bn | (C) | 190 | BS7044 |
| 120th LF Montgrd Bn | (C) | 300 | BS2763 |
| 406th LF Sapper Bn | (C) | 400 | BS4382 |
| 38th LF Bn | (C) | 160 | BS7848 |
| 48th LF Bn | (C) | 200 | BS5886 |
| C-18 LF Co | (C) | 20 | BS6459 |
| T-18 LF Co (V-20) | (C) | 30 | BS7285 |
| C-19 LF Co | (C) | 18 | BS7459 |
| 21st LF Sapper Co | (C) | 70 | BS5780 |
| P-31 LF Co | (C) | 15 | BS6290 |
| C-45 LF Co | (C) | 40 | BS7753 |
| K-51 LF Wpns Co | (C) | 10 | BS7790 |
| 72Z LF Co | (C) | 40 | BS5681 |
| C-65 LF Co | (C) | 30 | BS7371 |
| 81st LF Co | (C) | 40 | BS5565 |
| 95th A LF Sapper Co | (C) | 20 | BS6399 |
| 95th B LF Sapper Co | (C) | 40 | BS5191 |
| 120th LF Sapper Co | (C) | 30 | BS8928 |
| G-212 LF Co | (C) | 70 | BS5130 |
| C-219 LF Co | (C) | 40 | BS7843 |

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| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CATAG</u> | <u>STRENGTH</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|----------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 306th A LF Sapper Co | (C) | 65 | BS5377 |
| 306th B LF Sapper Co | (C) | 50 | BS5675 |

C. Operations.

1. Major Engagements: During the six month reporting period Division forces were involved in only one major engagement with enemy forces. The majority of the operations were pre-emptive in nature to offset enemy initiated actions against pacified areas. The most significant ground contact was an enemy initiated attack by small arms, rocket and mortar fire followed by a ground sapper penetration of the perimeter barrier at Fire Support Base Maryanne at about 0155H, 28 March 1971. As a result of the brief but fierce engagement 12 NVA/VC were killed. United States losses were reported as 30 killed and 82 wounded. One 155mm howitzer was destroyed and one 155mm howitzer was damaged. The saturation employment of satchel charges by the enemy caused extensive damage to the command bunker, communications bunker, fighting positions and individual sleeping bunkers.

2. Operations by AO:

(a) Operation FREDERICK HILL, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in close cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued combat operations to increase the overall effectiveness of the pacification operations near the coastal areas and the destruction of Main Force and NVA units operating in the western portion of the combined TAOR until 010600H March 1971 at which time the Operation was terminated. Contact ranged from light to moderate throughout the period 1 November 1970 to 1 March 1971. At About 1332H on 2 Nov, B/1-46 Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of AT941010 resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 3 INC. 2 US were WIA (E). On the 3d of November at 1425H FAC called in an air strike at AT845216 resulting in 5 NVA KIA. Recon platoon, 2-1 Inf detonated an M26 booby trap on 6 November in the vicinity of BT055397 resulting in 3 US WIA(E). At 1000H on the 6th of Nov, C/1-46 found (7) graves at BS021989, bodies were KIA. In Operation HOANG DIEU, vic BT031397, on 8 Nov, Recon platoon 2-1 Inf received a ground attack resulting in 7 US WIA(E). Fire was returned with artillery and small arms with unknown results. D/1-46 engaged an unknown size enemy force on the 10th of Nov at BT228112 resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 2 INC. There were no major contacts reported in the Frederick Hill AO until 180830H, when a patrol from D/1-46 Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap resulting in 5 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M) (BT223124). At 1630H on the same day B/3-21 Inf engaged 5 NVA

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vic BT182133 resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 1 IWC and 5 US WIA(E). A/4-31 found 1 82mm mortar tube with base plate, 3 7.62mm light machineguns and 1 RPG launcher vic AT809280. The day of 25 November proved very successful for C/1-46. While on a patrolling mission they found a weapons cache consisting of 23 individual weapons and 6 crew served weapons vic BT189134. Late in the afternoon of the 26th of November D/1-1 Cav had a LOH receive small arms fire from 5-10 NVA. The unit then engaged the area vic BT182079 resulting in 5 NVA KIA. In light and scattered contacts on 27 November, 196th Brigade reported 1 NVA KIA with 1 IWC. Friendly casualties were 6 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M), all from the detonation of booby trapped ammunition. In a report submitted at 280945H November from field location vic BT194130 C/1-46 Inf found 3 VC KIA and 1 75mm recoilless rifle. In a series of small unit engagements on 30 November in the Frederick Hill AO, 7 NVA soldiers were KIA with 1 US WIA(E). During the first six days of December light activity prevailed throughout the AO. Totals for this period were 17 VC killed, 8 NVA killed, 7 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured, 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Elements of B/2-1 Infantry encountered an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BT174193 on 11 December. Results of this contact were 1 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA and 4 IWC. There were no US casualties. Scattered contacts on the 12th and 13th of December in the Frederick Hill area resulted in 11 VC KIA and 14 US WIA with 13 IWC. Light and scattered skirmishes prevailed on 19 December. There were no significant contacts during this period. At 231600H December, A/1-46 detonated a booby trap (BT165177) resulting in 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA(E). In the vicinity of AT804296 at 241105H December, elements of D/2-1 engaged an unknown size enemy force and sustained 4 US WIA(E) with enemy casualties unknown. All friendly elements in the AO ceased offensive operations at 241800H December 1970 in compliance with Christmas Truce Period directives. At 251801H December 1970 units resumed offensive operations. While supporting ground operations on 29 December 1970, 116th Avn engaged the enemy in two separate contacts at BT169190 resulting in 8 NVA KIA. At AT928171, F/8th Cavalry engaged 7 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Elements of A/4-31 detonated an unknown type booby trap on 31 December resulting in 1 US KIA and 10 US WIA(E). At 311800H December 1970 Division elements assumed a defensive posture for the New Years Truce Period. Defensive patrolling and defensive ambushes were employed. Division units resumed offensive operations at 011801H January 1971. On 1 January 1971 the 196th Brigade soldiers engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA and 2 IWC. There was light and scattered action throughout the AO until 7 January 1971 when B/2-1 was engaged with a command detonated mine in the vicinity of AT924373 with 4 US WIA(E). B/2-1, patrolling in the vicinity of BT121087 on 9 January 1971, was ambushed by 10 NVA. The results of the fire fight were 5 NVA KIA, 4 IWC and 4 US WIA(E). At 1215H C/1-46 engaged 5 NVA (BT134075). Results of this action were 5 NVA KIA, 6 IWC

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and no friendly casualties. Again at 1830H C/1-46 operating at BT130083 engaged 5 NVA. The results of action in the AO during 1-5 January 1971 were 37 NVA/VC KIA, 22 IWC with friendly casualties of 5 US WIA(E). On the 11th and 12th of January C/2-1 in 4 contacts in the vicinity of AT9137 reported 4 NVA/VC KIA and 2 IWC, while suffering casualties of 2 US KIA. C/1-46, on the 13th and 14th, in 4 contacts in the vicinity of BT1707, netted 4 NVA/VC KIA, detained four and captured two weapons. On 15 January, C/3-16 Artillery, firing from Hau Puc, netted 10 VC KBA in the vicinity of BS129988. Action was light until 18 January when a USAF air strike resulted in 5 NVA KIA at ZC1733203. A patrol from D/3-21 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade on 19 January in the vicinity of BT033213 resulting in 4 US WIA(E). There was light contact on the 20th. Total results for the period 11-20 January were 30 VC and 18 NVA KIA with 9 IWC, US casualties were 2 US KIA and 10 US WIA(E). During the last ten days of January reports from the units ranged from "no contact" to very light contacts. Total results for this period area as follows: 21 NVA/VC KIA; 9 IWC; 1 US KIA; 20 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). The first day of February proved fruitful for C/1-46 while operating in the vicinity of AS890958, finding a weapons cache consisting of 222 IWC and 18 CSWC. In a sizable contact on 9 February, A/3-21 Infantry engaged a 10 man VC patrol vicinity of BT069291 resulting in 3 VC KIA, 4 IWC, while suffering 2 US WIA(E). Operating in the area of AS913946 on the morning of 11 February, D/1-46 Infantry was ambushed by an UNSEF which resulted in 2 US KIA; 4 US WIA(E); 2 US WIA(M). Later on the same day, C/1-46 Inf uncovered another cache of weapons at AS906934, resulting in 50 IWC. At about 121645H February C/1-46 was engaged by an UNSEF vicinity AS900936, resulting in 2 US KIA; 7 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Enemy casualties were unknown. Results for the period 1 through 14 February were: 52 NVA/VC KIA; 292 IWC; 18 CSWC; 17 US KIA; 30 US WIA(E) and 10 US WIA(M). The detonation of two booby traps on 16 February by elements of A/3-21 while operating in the vicinity of AT945242 resulted in 9 US WIA(E). On 20 February in the early afternoon A/3-21 Infantry was engaged by hand grenades and small arms fire in the vicinity AT993289 while on a search and clear operation. US casualties were 1 KIA; 8 WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Enemy casualties were unknown. D/1-46 Infantry while operating at AS588951 on the same day detonated an unknown type booby trap causing 3 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Light and scattered contacts were reported throughout the AO from 21 through 28 February. Results of all actions during the period 15 through 28 February were: 81 NVA/VC KIA; 20 IWC; 4 US KIA; 35 US WIA(E); 10 US WIA(M). Operation FREDERICK HILL was initiated effective 1800H March 1969 and was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. The results of Operation FREDERICK HILL for the reporting period are:

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US

33 KIA
234 WIA(E)
20 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

519 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
2352 DET
40 PW/VC
14 PW/NVA
11 RTNEE/VC
4 RTNEE/NVA
170 CIV DEF
64 IN CIV
529 IWC
35 CSWC

Cumulative results of Operation FREDERICK HILL are:

US

572 KIA
3251 WIA(E)
659 WIA(M)
2 MIA

ENEMY

7514 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
2352 DET
93 PW/VC
40 PW/NVA
99 RTNEE/VC
12 RTNEE/NVA
1075 CIV DEF
1112 IN CIV
1848 IWC
192 CSWC

(b) Operation GENEVA PARK, conducted by the 198th Infantry Brigade and the 6th ARVN Regiment was initiated effective 180001 H March 1969 with the mission of securing the major lines of communications and the destruction of enemy forces posing a threat to Quang Ngai City or the Chu Lai Combat Basecomplex was terminated at 010600H March 1971. During the reporting period contacts and engagements varied from light to moderate. D/4-31 in a light engagement on 3 November at BS451971 at 1435H accounted for 3 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. On the 5th of November D/5-46 made contact during a combat assault (BT295137) with 3 VC KIA and no friendly casualties. On 4 November in the early morning hours B/1-52 Inf engaged 4 VC. Results of the contact were 3 VC KIA, 2 MAM detained. A tracker dog team was used and followed a trail to a spider hole where 1 VC was found. He had been wounded in the earlier contact. On 6 November a convoy carrying a chassis for a 175mm gun was moved by road from Binh Son to Truong Son without incident. On 8

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November R/5-46 made contact at BT414033 with 6 VC. Results of the action were 5 VC KIA. At 0820H on the same day B/1-52 detonated a booby trapped 105mm round resulting in 3 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). D/1-46 was placed OPCON to the 198th Infantry Brigade effective 101730H for operations west of Ky Tra. At 1830H on 12 November A/5-46 (BT244124) received 12 60mm rounds resulting in 6 US WIA(E). Numerous minor contacts throughout the AO resulted in 10 VC and 1 NVA KIA. On 13 November gunships from 116th AHC made two engagements, one at 0830H vic BS564788 resulting in 5 VC KBG/S and the other at 2030H vic BS558790 resulting in 3 more VC KBG/S. A/5-46 suffered 7 US WIA(E) on 20 November when a booby trap was detonated at BT393092. On 22 November D/1-52, while on an Eagle Flight, teamed up with 174th Avn and engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of BS495793. Results of the contact were 11 VC KIA and 7 IWC. No major engagements were reported from 23 November through 6 December. Results of small engagements during this period were: 18 VC KIA, 2 NVA KIA, 3 IWC, 7 US KIA, 23 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). At 0350H on 11 December, while conducting a night raid vicinity of BS492824, D/1-52 accounted for 3 VC KIA and 1 IWC. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 1 WIA(E). Later the same date D/1-52 engaged 12 VC at the same location and as a result of the contact 10 VC were KIA, 5 IWC and 7 VN detained. There were no friendly casualties. During the period 7-19 December 1970 the 198th Brigade reported a total of 32 VC/NVA KIA and 17 IWC while suffering a loss of 3 US KIA and 30 US WIA. On 20 December 1970 in two scattered engagements, B/1-52 operating in the vicinity of BS194838, engaged 2 VC in a bunker, killing both. An hour and a half later B/1-52 engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA. There was light and scattered action throughout the AO during the period 21 December through 2400H December, at which time Division units assumed a defensive posture for the Christmas Truce Period. Results of engagements for the period were: 15 VC/NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 2 US WIA(E). At 251801H December 1970, Division units resumed offensive operations. There were no contacts reported on Christmas Day. Relative quiet prevailed throughout the AO until 31 December when elements of C/1-52 in the vicinity of BS547844 detonated a Bouncing Betty mine which required aero-medical evacuation for 4 US soldiers. The period from Christmas Day through the end of the year was marked by very light activity throughout the AO. Totals for the period 25-31 December 1970 were: 4 VC/NVA KIA and 11 US WIA(E). There were no contacts reported on the first day of 1971 and very light activity was reported in the GENEVA PARK area for the first five days of the New Year. On 6 January 1971, activity picked up with A/5-46 finding a weapons cache at BT340098 consisting of 3 IWC and 2 CSWC. At 1030H, in the same location, a booby trap was detonated resulting in 1 US WIA(E). One hour earlier at BT366048 B/5-46 engaged 4 VC which resulted in 1 VC KIA and 1 IWC. At 1745H, C/1-52 on a search and clear mission, engaged and killed 1 VC. At 071045H January, C/1-52 operating at BS559823,

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engaged 1 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VN detained and 1 US WIA(E). Activity again picked up on 9 January. In a series of scattered engagements, 1-52 accounted for 9 VC/NVA KIA. At 1400H, at BS55868, C/1-52 found 6 fresh graves and at BS55822, C/1-52 engaged an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 3 VC KIA. During the action a booby trap was detonated causing 2 US WIA(E). The results of the actions from 1-9 January were: 18 VC/NVA KIA, 4 IWC, 2 CSWC, 1 US KIA, 12 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). At 1415H vic BT36077 on 11 January, B/5-46 detonated an unknown type booby trap that resulted in 1 US KIA and 8 WIA(E). On the same day at 2015H Ranger teams Maine and Michigan from G/75 Rangers received SAP and hand grenades, forcing the unit to be extracted by McGuire rigs from a hot LZ. US casualties for the contact were 1 US KIA, 1 WIA(E) and 3 WIA(M). Action was light on the 13th, but on 14 January, C/5-46 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade vic BT328094 at 1445H, resulting in 4 US WIA(E). On 15 January at 0930H an element of G/75 Rangers engaged 3 VC vic BS451951, resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 IWC and 1 US WIA(M). There was light contact on 16 January. On 17 January at 0910H at BS553791, A/1-52 engaged and killed 6 VC, with 2 IWC after the US element had received M79 fire from the enemy force. The same day at 0207H R/1-52 detonated an unknown type booby trap that resulted in 8 US WIA(E). In two contacts later in the day at 1305H and 1550H C/1-52 killed 6 VC with 1 IWC while detaining 1 VC suspect. The 198th Brigade reported light contact in Operation GENEVA PARK on 18 January. On 19 January D/5-46 had 6 US WIA(M) in a contact with an unknown size enemy force vic BT340075 at 1230H. During the period 11-20 January, the 198th Brigade reported enemy losses as 29 VC and 1 NVA KIA, 1 detainee, 6 IWC and 1 CSWC. US casualties during the same period were 1 KIA, 34 WIA(E), and 7 WIA(M). Quiet prevailed throughout the AO from 21-26 January with reports of no contact being rendered by the majority of the maneuver elements. On 27 January while searching in the vicinity of BS355807, D/1-52 engaged an unknown size force and accounted for 4 NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 2 VN detained. There were no friendly casualties. Again, quiet returned to the AO with reports of light and scattered contacts until D/1-52 broke the silence on 30 January. During a search and clear mission at BS358795, a 3-10 man enemy force was taken under SAP. Results of the fire fight disclosed 4 NVA KIA with no friendly casualties. Results of all contacts for period ending 31 January 1971 were: 22 VC/NVA KIA, 12 IWC, 1 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). On the 1st day of February R/5-46 came under intense mortar and SAP while working in the vicinity of BT452938 and suffered 5 US KIA and 8 US WIA(E). Enemy casualties were not determined. On 3 February in a series of minor engagements 198th Brigade reported a total of 9 VC/NVA KIA while suffering no friendly casualties. An unknown type booby trap detonated by elements of C/5-46 at BT431055 resulted in 4 US WIA(E). Operating in the GENEVA PARK AO on the same day, elements of G/75 Rangers engaged an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of

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BT433064. In the fight that followed the Rangers suffered 5 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M) while enemy casualties were unknown. In a brief skirmish on 12 February at BS563810, A/1-52 was engaged by an unknown size enemy force and took 5 US WIA(E). Enemy losses were unknown. From 13 February through 24 February there was very little activity in the AO. On 25 February B/1-52, while operating in the vicinity of BS287605, received SAP and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 5 US WIA(E). There were no enemy casualties reported. The results of all contacts and engagements for the month of February were 68 VC/NVA KIA, 33 IWC, 1 CSWC, 7 US KIA, 60 US WIA(E) and 19 US WIA(M). Initiated at 180001H March 1969, Operation GENEVA PARK was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. The results for Operation GENEVA PARK for the reporting period are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|------------|----------------|
| 26 KIA | 334 KIA (CONF) |
| 225 WIA(E) | 0 KIA (PROB) |
| 32 WIA(M) | 1350 DET |
| 0 MIA | 24 PW/VC |
| | 4 PW/NVA |
| | 6 RTNEE/VC |
| | 0 RTNEE/NVA |
| | 146 CIV DEF |
| | 124 INCIV |
| | 112 IWC |
| | 5 CSWC |

Cumulative results for Operation GENEVA PARK are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|
| 231 KIA | 2337 KIA (CONF) |
| 1564 WIA(E) | 0 KIA (PROB) |
| 232 WIA(M) | 1353 DET |
| 0 MIA | 45 PW/VC |
| | 22 PW/NVA |
| | 49 RTNEE/VC |
| | 3 RTNEE/NVA |
| | 879 CIV DET |
| | 640 IN CIV |
| | 532 IWC |
| | 49 CSWC |

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(c) Operation IRON MOUNTAIN, conducted in Quang Ngai Province by the 11th Infantry Brigade in close coordination with the 4th ARVN Regiment, concentrated on the security of major lines of communications and through constant combat operations and civic programs was instrumental in furthering the goals of pacification throughout the combined TAOR. Operation IRON MOUNTAIN was terminated effective 040600H March 1971. In the first week of the reporting period the 11th Infantry Brigade had no major contacts. A total of 6 NVA and 2 VC were reported killed. At 081400H November (BS622528), D/4-3 found 11 graves. Bodies bore evidence of having been killed by artillery. On 10 November in a series of minor engagements throughout the AO, 6 VC and 4 NVA were reported killed. US casualties were 6 US WIA(E). There were no further significant contacts in the IRON MOUNTAIN AO until 19 November, via BS769557, when an unknown type booby trap was detonated and resulted in 5 US WIA(E). Isolated and light contacts continued throughout the AO until the early morning hours of 22 November when C/4-3 had three mechanical ambushes detonate vic BS606474 which resulted in a total of 10 VC killed and the capture of assorted clothing, equipment and documents. Later the same day R/3-1, while searching bunkers and military structures in the vicinity of BS582757, detonated an 82mm mortar round resulting in 4 US KIA, 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). C/1-20 detonated an unknown type booby trap at 031250H December while operating in the vic of BS735600 which resulted in 5 US WIA(E). From 23 November through 6 December, in a series of small unit engagements, the 11th Infantry Brigade reported a total of 39 VC KIA, 4 NVA KIA, 10 IWC, 2 US KIA, 36 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). There were light and scattered contacts reported by the 11th Infantry Brigade from 7 through 10 December. On 11 December, C/4-3, while on patrol, uncovered a weapons cache vicinity BS 622458. The cache consisted of 3 82mm mortar tubes, 5 7.62mm French machine guns, 2 M1 rifles, 2 French automatic rifles, 1 French rifle, 1 M2 Carbine and 2 PRC-10 radios. At BS515705, on the same day, A/3-1, while searching a tunnel complex, found a cache consisting of 1 BAR, 2 K44 rifles, 1 M1 Carbine and 1 SKS rifle. On 16 December elements of F/8 Cav, operating in the vicinity of BS753446, engaged 5 VC which resulted in 5 VC KIA with no friendly casualties. Totals reported by the 11th Brigade for the period 7 through 19 December were 32 VC/NVA KIA, 29 IWC and 8 CSWC. Friendly casualties were 1 KIA, 17 WIA(E), and 4 WIA(M). Activity was light throughout the AO and was characterized by small scattered contacts until 24 December 1970, when R/4-21 came under sniper fire at BS813329 and suffered 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). Enemy casualties were unknown. At 1800H, 24 December, Division units assumed a defensive role for the twenty-four hour Christmas Truce Period. Units engaged in defensive patrolling and ambushes during the truce period. There were no contacts reported on 25 December 1970. Division units resumed offensive operations at 1801H, 25 December 1970. A mechanical ambush set out by C/4-21 at

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BS819339 was detonated at 1855H, 26 December 1970 and resulted in 3 VC KIA. A booby trapped hand grenade at BS519752 was detonated by an element of A/3-1 and resulted in 1 US WIA(E), the only US casualty of the day. Light and scattered contacts prevailed through 31 December 1970. From 1800H, 31 December 1970 until 1801H 1 January 1971, all Division units observed the New Years Truce Period. Necessary defensive patrols and defensive ambushes were conducted. The period from 20 December through 31 December resulted in the following: 46 VC/NVA KIA, 10 IWC, 10 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). Of the 46 enemy KIA, 31 KIA were credited to aviation elements, artillery fires and Ranger activities. There were no contacts reported in the first three days of 1971. In a minor skirmish on 4 January at BS704555 C/1-20 engaged 2 VC. As a result of the action, 1 VC was KIA and 2 IWC. On 5 January R/1-20 teamed up with 174th Aviation and C/6-11 Artillery and, in a fire fight at BS763580, engaged an unknown size enemy force. The results were 7 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. There were no US casualties. At 1220H, 8 January 1971, C/4-21, operating in the vicinity of BS752360, detonated two 105mm artillery rounds. The resulting explosion caused 2 US KIA and 12 WIA(E). On 10 January at BS724435 in the late afternoon R/1-20 engaged an enemy force resulting in 5 NVA KIA with no US casualties. Results of all engagements and contacts for the first ten days of January were reported by the 11th Infantry Brigade as: 29 VC/NVA KIA, 4 IWC, 2 US KIA, 18 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). The 4th Brigade reported light contact on 11 January. The following day 174th Avn gunships flying in support of a B/1-20 contact engaged and killed 4 NVA and captured 4 individual weapons in the vicinity of BS640523 at 1015H. The same day at 1015H in the vicinity of BS756429 R/1-20 detonated a booby trapped 105mm round resulting in 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). The 11th Brigade reported light contact until 14 January when A/4-3 found 5 individual weapons in the vicinity of BS522396. The following day at 1500H D/4-3 found 5 individual weapons in the vicinity of BS637499. Also on the 15th at 1745H, C/4-3 engaged 4 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA. On 16 January B/123 Avn in two contacts engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 13 VC KIA, the first contact was at 1200H vic BS293576, the other at 1405H vic BS278499. The same day a USAF air strike at BS298556 resulted in 5 VC KIA. On 17 January a vehicle from 723d Maintenance was ambushed by an unknown size enemy force vic BS917173 that resulted in 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA(E). The 11th Brigade reported light action on the 18th, 19th and 20th of January. Total results for the period 11-20 January were 49 VC and 7 NVA KIA with 17 IWC. US casualties reported during the period were 3 US KIA, 13 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(M). While operating in the vicinity of BS401499 on 23 January, B/123 Avn engaged 8 VC which resulted in 8 VC KIA. Again on 25 January B/123 Avn, in three unrelated contacts accounted for a total of 20 NVA/VC KIA. At 1125H vicinity BS500381, 3 NVA were KIA, at 1415H BS258581 7 NVA were engaged resulting in 7 NVA KIA. Two hours later at

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BS392376, B/123 Avn engaged 16 NVA resulting in 10 NVA KIA. Working the area vicinity BS830430, 26 January, B/123 Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 9 VC KIA. A/4-21 had a defensive mechanical ambush detonate at BS877246 which resulted in 5 NVA/VC KIA. As a result of an air strike against an unknown size enemy force vicinity BS299561, FAC reported a total of 5 NVA KIA/S. Contacts were light to moderate during the period 24-31 January with the 11th Infantry Brigade reporting a total of 65 VC/NVA KIA, 6 IWC, 27 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). Two contacts were reported for the first two days of February. B/123 Avn on 3 February in the vicinity of BS735596 engaged 15 VC. As a result of this contact B/123 reported 12 VC KIA, 2 detainees and 2 IWC. After four days of no contact being reported, C/6-11 Artillery on 8 February reported that an M34 truck vehicle detonated a thirty-five pound mine at BS780425 which resulted in 5 US WIA(E). B/123d Avn engaged 7 VC/NVA at BS283473 on 19 February 1971. Results of the engagement were 7 VC/NVA KIA. While on a search and clear mission, 21 February at BS675592, elements of B/1-20 detonated a booby trap that resulted in 2 US KIA and 7 US WIA(E). On 22 February, at BS713558, D/1-1 Cav reported a contact with an unknown size enemy force. Final results of this fire fight were 13 VC/NVA KIA. There were no friendly losses. A/1-20 suffered 4 US WIA(E) as a result of detonating a booby trapped 105mm artillery round on 24 February while operating in the area of BS689501. Working with B/1-20, D/1-1 Cav engaged 6 VC/NVA in the early evening of 28 February at BS732442. Credits for the engagement are 3 VC/NVA KIA by D/1-1 Cav, 2 VC/NVA KIA by B/1-20. US forces reported negative casualties. Cumulative results for all contacts and engagements for period 1-28 February 1971 are as follows: 126 VC/NVA KIA, 27 IWC, 5 CSWC, 3 US KIA, 53 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). Operation IRON MOUNTAIN was initiated effective 16000H March 1969 and was terminated at 010600H March 1971. Results of Operation IRON MOUNTAIN for the reporting period are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|------------|----------------|
| 36 KIA | 497 KIA (CONF) |
| 232 WIA(E) | 123 KIA (PROB) |
| 24 WIA(M) | 2573 DET |
| 0 MIA | 15 PW/VC |
| | 4 PW/NVA |
| | 1 RTNNE/VC |
| | 2 RTNNE/NVA |
| | 38 CIV DET |
| | 76 IN CIV |
| | 128 IWC |
| | 12 CSWC |

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Cumulative results for Operation IRON MOUNTAIN are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|
| 440 KIA | 4466 KIA (CONF) |
| 2326 WIA(E) | 123 KIA (PROB) |
| 532 WIA(M) | 2573 DPT |
| 0 MIA | 96 PW/VC |
| | 41 PW/EVA |
| | 20 RTMKE/VC |
| | 5 RTMKE/NVA |
| | 1550 CIV DPT |
| | 1146 IN CIV |
| | 1130 IWC |
| | 94 CSCMC |

(d) Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE, initiated at 291200H June 1970 in the open terrain in the northeastern portion of the 23d Infantry Division, was ideally suited for the employment of armor. The responsibility for the AO was entrusted to the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry with F Troop, 17th Cavalry attached. Through constant combat operations, the operation proved to be highly successful. The operation was terminated at 010600H March 1971. During the reporting period, 1 November 1970 - 1 March 1971, contact was light to moderate with numerous encounters with anti-tank mines and casualty producing booby traps. No contact was reported in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO on the first and second day of the reporting period (1-2 November). On 3 November, a mechanical ambush was detonated at BT115449, resulting in 1 VC KIA. On 8 November a convoy departed Tam Ky and arrived at Tien Phuoc without incident. An ACAV from E Troop 1st Cavalry detonated a 70 lb mine at BT143299 at 091712H November resulting in 4 US WIA(E). Again at 101010H November (BT239192), a second E Troop ACAV detonated a 100 lb mine resulting in 5 US WIA(E) and the combat loss of the ACAV. At 1840H on 12 Nov vic BT240215, an RPG round hit a M113A1 resulting in 6 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). The vehicle was moderately damaged. A Sheridan from A Troop, 1st Cavalry detonated an 80 lb mine at 131812H Nov (BT178140) resulting in 5 US WIA(E). The '551 was a combat loss. No contact was reported in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO until 20 Nov at which time C/1-1 Cav detonated a 75 lb petra mine resulting in 5 US WIA(E) and a M113A1 declared a probable combat loss. The detonation occurred vic BT209209. There were no further significant events in the AO during the period 20-29 November. During this period, small unit contacts resulted in 8 VC KIA, 6 IWC and 5 US WIA(E). On 30 November at BT205220 an ACAV from C/1-1 Cavalry detonated an anti-tank mine resulting in 8 US WIA(E), 2 US WIA(M) and the ACAV (M113A1) being declared a combat

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loss. Again on 2 December at 1415H vic BT118250, F/17 Cav detonated a mine resulting in 4 US WIA(E). There were no other significant engagements in the AO until an ACAV from C/1-1 Cavalry detonated an anti-tank mine at BT24G227 on 7 December resulting in 2 US KIA, 14 US WIA(E) and 8 US WIA(M). On 11 December, in two separate incidents, C/1-1 detonated two anti-tank mines. The first occurred at 1835H in the vicinity of BT229232 and resulted in 5 US WIA(E) and moderate damage to a Sheridan tank. At 2010H in the same location, another mine was detonated resulting in 2 US WIA(E). Results of scattered contacts for the period 12-19 December were 1 US WIA(E) and 3 IWC. There were no significant engagements in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO from 19 December through 241800H December. There were no contacts reported in the AO from 24 December through 30 December. On 31 December at 1025H, while conducting a reconnaissance in force (BT213243), F Troop, 17th Cavalry detonated a booby trapped 81mm mortar round resulting in 11 US WIA(E). There were no contacts or engagements reported for the first five days of January 1971. At 0930H, 6 January 1971, B Troop, 1-1 Cavalry, while participating in a reconnaissance in force, vicinity BT215278, detonated a nitro starch mine causing 3 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). On 8 January 1971, activities increased as C Troop, 1-1 Cavalry made three separate contacts in the vicinity of BT176228, BT173230 and BT178228. Results of these contacts were 4 VC KIA, 1 IWC, 2 detainees and no friendly casualties sustained. At about 2130H, E Troop made contact at BT210482 and accounted for 2 VC KIA and 1 IWC, again with negative friendly casualties. Total results for all engagements for the period 20 December 1970 through 10 January 1971 were 16 VC/NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 20 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). During the period 11-20 January action was light in Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE with the exception of 13 January. At 1205H on the 13th, in the vicinity of BT179249, an M113AF from B/1-1 Cav detonated an 80 lb nitro starch mine that resulted in 4 US WIA(E). An hour later the element received a hand grenade from an unknown size enemy force that resulted in 2 US WIA(E). Total results for the period 11-20 January were 2 VC KIA with 2 IWC and 2 VN detained. The above represent the only US casualties for 11-20 January. During the period 21 through 31 January 1971, the 1-1 Cavalry reported negative contact except for the following: On the 22d, B Troop had a mechanical ambush detonate which resulted in 1 VC KIA. On the 25th, F Troop, 17th Cavalry reported a mechanical ambush had been detonated with 2 NVA KIA. The 196th Inf Bde assumed responsibility for Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE effective 260900H January 1971. The totals of all contacts for the period were 4 VC and 2 NVA KIA. On 1 February, D/1-1 Cavalry engaged 1 VC in the vicinity of BT198330 resulting in 1 VC KIA and 4 IWC. The AO was unusually quiet during the period 21 January through 14 February. Total results for the period 1 through 14 February were as follows: 5 NVA/VC KIA and 7 IWC while friendly casualties were 2 US WIA(E). The period from 15 February through 28 February saw

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an increase in the activities in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE Area of Operation. The most significant action occurred on 15 February when F Troop, 17th Cavalry, searching in the vicinity of BT239479 engaged and killed 6 VC, with 3 IWC and no casualties sustained by the US element. At coordinates BT234464, on 22 February 1971, F Troop, 17th Cavalry engaged and destroyed one enemy bunker. A ground sweep confirmed 2 NVA KIA and 4 IWC. F/17th Cavalry reported no friendly casualties. F/17th Cavalry engaged 6 VC, (BT422064), 28 February 1971 resulting in 6 VC KIA and 3 IWC. There were no friendly casualties. Total results of reported contacts, 15 February through 28 February 1971 are as follows: 17 NVA/VC KIA; 10 IWC and 10 US WIA(E). Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. The results of Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE for the reporting period are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|-----------|---------------|
| 2 KIA | 70 KIA (CONF) |
| 13 WIA(E) | 0 KIA (PROB) |
| 11 WIA(M) | 207 DET |
| 0 MIA | 2 PW/VC |
| | 3 PW/NVA |
| | 1 RTNEE/VC |
| | 0 RTNEE/NVA |
| | 45 CIV DEF |
| | 25 IN CIV |
| | 31 IWC |
| | 0 CSWC |

Cumulative results for Operation PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|------------|----------------|
| 20 KIA | 261 KIA (CONF) |
| 278 WIA(E) | 3 KIA (PROB) |
| 24 WIA(M) | 207 DET |
| 0 MIA | 8 PW/VC |
| | 5 PW/NVA |
| | 8 RTNEE/VC |
| | 1 RTNEE/NVA |
| | 117 CIV DEF |
| | 107 IN CIV |
| | 95 IWC |
| | 3 CSWC |

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(a) Operation NANTUCKET BEACH conducted in the 198th Infantry Brigade TAOR on the Batangan Peninsula by elements of the 1-6 Infantry and the 6th ARVN Regiment to further enhance the pacification program of the GVN was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. Contact remained light and scattered as numerous casualty producing booby traps and mining incidents were reported. There were no significant activities in the NANTUCKET BEACH area for the first 16 days of the reporting period. In an engagement with 5 VC on 17 November 1970, B/1-6 Inf operating in the vic of BS718832 reported 4 VC KIA and 1 IWC. On 18 Nov, D/1-6 Inf at BS698865 engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA, 4 IWC and 3 US WIA(E) and 5 VC detainees. No contact was reported in the AO until 21 November when an element of C/1-6 Inf operating in the vic of BS660871 detonated an unknown type booby trap resulting in 2 US KIA. In light and scattered contacts during the period 21-27 November, 1-6 Inf reported a total of 2 US KIA and 4 NVA/VC KIA. Quiet reigned throughout the AO until 00340H December when C/1-6 Inf engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS669945 and accounted for 9 VC KIA with 1 IWC. Totals for all scattered contacts during the period 28 November through 6 December were 15 VC KIA, 3 IWC, 1 US KIA, 4 US WIA(E), and 1 US WIA(M). During the period 7 through 19 December, the 1st Bn 6th Infantry reported a total of 10 VC/NVA KIA, 7 IWC and 5 US WIA(E). There were no significant contacts reported during this period. While on patrol on the morning of 20 December, A/1-6 Inf detonated an 82mm mortar round booby trapped with a pressure release firing device in the vicinity of BS644896 resulting in 6 US soldiers WIA(E) and 2 US soldiers WIA(M). No significant contacts were reported in the AO from 21 December 1970 through 30 December 1970. There were no contacts reported on 24-25 December during the Christmas Truce Period. Division units resumed offensive operations at 1800H, 25 December 1970. On 31 December, elements of D/1-6 while operating in the vicinity of BS719881 received small arms and M79 grenade fire sustaining 3 US WIA(E). At 1800H 31 December, the Division again assumed a defensive posture for the twenty-four hour New Years Truce period. Defensive patrols and ambushes were utilized to negate any truce violations reported in the Nantucket Beach AO. At 1801H, 1 January 1971, the Division units resumed offensive activities. No contacts were reported until 1310H, 5 January when D/1-6 engaged 10 VC at BS673894. Results of the fire fight were 1 VC KIA, 1 IWC and 4 US WIA(E). No contacts were reported on the 6th of January. D/1-6 detonated an M26 hand grenade in the vicinity of BS674894 on the 7th of January. 6 US soldiers were wounded by the detonation. While operating in the area of BS720845, A/1-6 Infantry engaged 7 VC on the 9th of January and accounted for 6 VC KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Total results for all engagements for the period of 20 December 1970 through 10 January 1971 were 8 enemy KIA, 7 IWC and 19 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). On 11 January two contacts resulted in the death of 3 VC and 1 IWC. The first contact occurred at 0505H when R/1-6 in the vicinity

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BS682897 had a mechanical ambush detonate resulting in 1 VC KIA with 1 IWC and the other when A/1-6 found 2 VC KRA in the vicinity of BS726854. There was no contact on the 12th and 13th. On the 14th of January at 0918H in the vicinity of BS685882, A/1-1 Cav detonated a booby trapped hand grenade resulting in 3 US WIA(E). The following day D/1-6 at 1130H in the vicinity of BS654884 engaged and killed 2 VC. Light contact was reported during the 16th through the 19th of January. On 20 January A/1-1 Cav detonated two booby traps in the vicinity of BS682933 which resulted in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). Total results reported by the 198th Brigade for the period 11-20 January in Operation NANTUCKET BEACH were 13 VC KIA with 1 IWC, 13 VN detained, 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). At about 1820H on 21 January, D/1-1 Cavalry inserted the "Blues" (Aero Rifle Platoon) at coordinates BS622972 where they engaged an UNSCP. The outcome of the contact was 13 VC KIA, 2 VN detained and 2 IWC. There were no friendly casualties. The following day, 22 January, D/1-1 again made contact and a sweep of the same area and found 6 IWC. D/1-6, at 251715H January on search and clear mission (BS657891) detonated a booby trapped "Bouncing Betty" anti-personnel mine that caused one US KIA and two US WIA(E). As a result of all contacts, 1-6 Infantry reported the following totals for the period 21 through 28 January: 16 NVA/VC KIA, 11 IWC, 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E). There was very light contact reported for the first six days of February. Mechanical ambushes accounted for 2 VC KIA during this period. On the 7th, C/1-6 made contact at three separate locations, 071150H, (BS703881), 071510H (BS738842), 071650H (BS752840). At the first location C Company engaged 6 VC and as a result 1 VC was KIA, 1 VN detained WIA and 3 IWC with no US casualties. At the last two locations, C Company elements detonated two booby traps that resulted in 7 US WIA(E). At 0830 hours 8 February, while reconning an area (BS689894) H Troop, 17th Cavalry tripped a booby trapped mechanical ambush and suffered 3 US WIA(E). There were no significant contacts reported until 20 February when D/1-6 Inf detonated a booby trapped can of petra. The resulting explosion caused 5 US WIA(E). There were no further significant events through the end of February. Cumulative totals for all contacts during the month of February were as follows: 6 VC/NVA KIA, 6 IWC while friendly casualties totaled 27 US WIA(E). Initiated at 0601H on 23 July 1969, Operation NANTUCKET BEACH was terminated effective 010600H March 1971. Results of Operation NANTUCKET BEACH for the reporting period are:

US

5 KIA
86 WIA(E)
4 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

91 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
579 DET
16 PW/VC

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US

ENEMY

0 PW/NVA
13 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
72 CIV DEF
29 IN CIV
48 IWC
0 CSWC

Cumulative results for Operation NANTUCKET BEACH area:

US

51 KIA
588 WIA(E)
63 WIA(M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

630 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
579 DET
36 PW/VC
2 PW/NVA
21 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
345 CIV DEF
268 IN CIV
207 IWC
5 CSWC

(f) Operation FINNEY HILL was initiated effective 010600H March 1971. Tactical Commander was Commanding Officer, 198th Infantry Brigade with the mission of continuing aggressive combat operations to insure the security of major lines of communications and supply as well as operations to increase the level of security of the pacification operations being conducted along the coast in the SE portion of the TAOR. At BS286638, 1 March 71, D/1-52 Infantry received 10 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 4 US WIA(E). The enemy casualties are unknown. D/1-52 engaged an NVA squad at BS290585, 4 March and accounted for 4 NVA KIA and 2 IWC. There were no friendly casualties. Light and scattered contacts were reported until 6 March when C/3-1 Infantry operating in the vicinity of BS528720, detonated a booby trapped 8" round and suffered 2 US KIA and 4 US WIA(E). B/123d Aviation on 8 March engaged and killed 5 VC in the area of BS324801. On 11 March at BS572817, elements of B/26th Engineers detonated a mine that resulted in 2 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). Minor and scattered engagements were reported by the 198th Brigade until 201100H March 1971 at BS367792 when C/1-52 Infantry engaged an UNSEF. Results of this action were: 12 NVA KIA, 2 IWC and 1 US WIA(M). Cumulative results for Operation FINNEY

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HILL for the first twenty days of operations (1-20 March 1971) are as follows: 99 NVA/VC KIA, 15 IWC and reported US casualties were 7 US KIA, 55 WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). C/1-52 Infantry engaged in a fire fight with a squad sized unit at BS382802 on 24 March 1971. Results of the action were 5 VC KIA and 1 US WIA(E). In a contact with 30 NVA on 28 March at BS390802, C/1-52 Infantry reported 12 NVA KIA and 3 NVA KIA. At BS571419 on 30 March 1971, A/4-21 Infantry sustained 4 US WIA(E) when elements detonated a booby trapped hand grenade. Results for the period, 21 through 31 March 1971 were reported as: 73 NVA/VC KIA, 19 IWC while US losses were 27 WIA(E) and 4 WIA(M). At 020103H April, at BS480708, elements of A/3-1 Infantry received small arms fire and hand grenades that resulted in 7 US WIA(E). Enemy casualties were unknown. At about 1255 hours the same day, D/1-20 Infantry received small arms and mortar fire in the vicinity of BS682507. US casualties were reported as 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA(E). Again, enemy casualties were unknown. At 1430H on the 3d day of April while working in the vicinity of BS358783, D/1-52 Infantry was engaged by an UNSEF. Results of the action were 3 NVA KIA and 5 US WIA(E). Again, on 7 April while searching the area of BS360787, D/1-52 received small arms and B-40 rocket fire. The outcome of this action was reported to be 6 NVA KIA and 5 US WIA(E). Total results of all engagements for period 1-7 April were 72 NVA/VC KIA, 7 IWC, 3 US KIA, 32 US WIA(E) and 5 US WIA(M). At 2150H, 7 April LZ Bronco received two rounds of unidentified indirect fire resulting in 3 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(M). On 111500 April, a UH-1H on a resupply mission for A/1-20 at BS528523 received small arms and indirect fire causing the aircraft to burn and explode. There were 6 US KIA, 7 US WIA(E) and combat loss of 1 UH-1H helicopter. In the subsequent ground attack on A/1-20's position 2 NVA were killed and 1 IWC. US casualties were 5 US KIA and 2 US WIA(E). Effective 111430H April the 11th Infantry Brigade assumed responsibilities for Operation FINNEY HILL and resumed control of 3-1 Infantry, 1-20 Infantry and 4-21 Infantry Battalions. Light and scattered contacts prevailed through 15 April 1971. Cumulative results for period 8 through 15 April 1971 are: 35 NVA/VC KIA, 8 IWC while US casualties were reported as: 13 KIA, 20 US WIA(E) and 7 US WIA(M). At 171415H April 71, B/3-1 working in the vicinity of BS476726 detonated a booby trapped hand grenade resulting in 3 US WIA(E). There were no contacts reported on 19 April. On 20 April, B/3-1 while searching an area in the vicinity of BS447738 detonated a pair of booby trapped hand grenades. The resulting explosion inflicted serious wounds to 4 US soldiers. Again, on 21 April elements of D/4-21 tripped a booby trap of unknown type and suffered 4 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). The incident occurred at BS553429. At coordinates BS791319, 231455H April, elements of C/4-21 while on a search and clear mission sustained 7 US KIA and 12 US WIA(E) when an undetermined size booby trap was detonated. Operating in the vicinity of BS497699 at about 09020H 29 April 1971 D/3-1 Inf while

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searching a tin roofed structure uncovered a cache consisting of 100 individual weapons and 27 crew served weapons of various types and manufacture. D/1-20 Inf at 201940H April 1971 engaged an UNSEF. 4 VC/NVA were KIA as a result of the encounter. There were no US casualties sustained. The engagement occurred in the area of B3921485. The cumulative totals for all actions reported for the period 16 through 30 April 1971 for Operation FINNISH HILL are as follows: 40 VC/NVA KIA, 107 IWC, 27 CSAC while US losses were reported as 7 KIA, 44 WIA(E) and 7 US WIA(M).

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|------------|----------------|
| 31 KIA | 327 KIA (CONF) |
| 177 WIA(S) | 0 KIA (PROB) |
| 24 WIA(M) | 47 DET |
| 0 MIA | 2 PW/VC |
| | 3 PW/NVA |
| | 0 RTNEE/VC |
| | 1 RTNEE/NVA |
| | 22 CIV DEF |
| | 13 IN CIV |
| | 163 INC |
| | 28 CSAC |

(1) Effective 21 March 1971, Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK was initiated under authority of Commanding Officer, 196th Brigade. In conjunction with the RVN forces in the combined TACR, emphasis was placed on and successive combat operations to increase the level of mobility of the friendly forces along the coastal plains and to destroy main force and NVA units operating in the western portion of the AC, and to assist in base denial operations. At 100000H, a 5 ton vehicle from A/20 Engr, 17 Inf, detonated a 40 pound land mine resulting in 3 US WIA(E). At 101000H vicinity B717208, a second 5 ton vehicle from A/20 Engr detonated a 40 pound mine resulting in 2 US WIA(E). On 4 March 1971 P/17 Cav, while operating vicinity B717208, received 4 RCL rounds and 5 82mm mortar rounds. Friendly casualties were 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E). At 040700H vicinity B717208, B/4-31 engaged 8 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA and no friendly casualties. On 1 March D/4-21 detonated a booby trapped 5 pound mine while operating vicinity B717208. Detonation caused 4 US WIA(E). On 1 March A/4-21 suffered 4 US WIA(E) when a booby trapped hand grenade was detonated at A717308. On 1 March at B717411, B/4-40 detonated a booby trapped 5 pound mine resulting in 4 US WIA(E). Light and moderate rain was experienced until 10 March when C/4-40 engaged 6 VC. 11 VC, 12 US WIA and 3 Inf with no friendly losses. D/1-40 conducted operations at B717411 on 11 March consisting of 15 IWC. Results

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of all contacts for the period 1 March through 20 March are 68 VC/NVA KIA, 15 IWC, 2 CSWC, 1 US KIA, 52 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). On the 21st of March while patrolling in the vicinity of BT227134/230138, A/5-46 engaged an UNSEF that resulted in 5 VC/NVA KIA and 6 VN detained. US forces sustained no losses. There were no significant contacts reported until 280155H March when LZ Maryannus received a mortar and sapper ground attack. Elements of CP group, C Company, Recon and Mortars, 1-46 Inf were engaged by an UNSEF which succeeded in breaching the perimeter. Results of the attack are as follows: 12 VC/NVA KIA, 30 US KIA, 82 US WIA(E), 1 155mm Howitzer destroyed and 1 155mm Howitzer damaged. On the morning of 31 March at BT240473 elements of F/17 Cav engaged an enemy force of unknown size. During the fire fight, 11 VC/NVA were KIA. There were no friendly casualties. Results of operations for the last ten days of March were reported as: 76 VC/NVA, 14 IWC, 1 CSWC, 35 US KIA, 96 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). While conducting a search operation on 1 April in the vicinity of AT961998, D/1-46 found an arms cache consisting of 5 IWC and 1 CSWC. F/17 Cav operating in the vicinity of BT204517 found seven graves on 5 April and credited the kills to B/3-82 Artillery. On 7 April, at BT213492, elements of F/17 Cav detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA(E) and 2 US WIA(M). Cumulative results for the period 1-7 April were reported by the 196th Brigade as being: 23 VC/NVA KIA, 8 IWC, 1 CSWC, 24 US WIA(E) and 4 US WIA(M). Light and scattered contacts were reported through 10 April. Effective 111430H April, the 198th Brigade terminated its activities in Operation FINNEY HILL and in conjunction with the 196th Brigade commenced participation in Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK. In a series of unrelated and scattered engagements on 13 April US forces suffered 6 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). Enemy casualties were not determined. At BT205505, 15 April, elements of F/17 Cav detonated a booby trapped 60mm mortar round. There were 3 US WIA(E). In all reported engagements for the period 8 through 15 April there were 21 VC/NVA KIA, 8 IWC, 19 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). At 161730H April, C/5-46 had a mechanical ambush detonate in the vicinity of BT255081 resulting in 3 VC/NVA KIA and 2 IWC. In the 198th Brigade TACR R/1-6, while patrolling in the vicinity of BS457893, detonated a 105mm round booby trapped with a trip wire firing device which resulted in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). In the 196th Brigade area of operation F/3 Cav at AT966525 received SAF resulting in 3 US WIA(E). Light and minor engagements were reported throughout the AO until the early morning of 21 April when H/17 Cav in night laager in the vicinity of AT966530 received two unknown type explosions at 0015H. 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA(E) were sustained and one M113A1 was declared a combat loss. At 0900H, 22 April E/1-6 detonated an M66A1 mine in the vicinity of LZ Professional which resulted in 42 US WIA(E). E/4-1 Cav at AT967556 engaged an UNSEF on 23 April and received credit for 4 VC/NVA KIA and 1 IWC. Two hours earlier at 1235H, A/1-6 engaged 5 NVA/VC at BT387006 and

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was credited with 4 VC/NVA KIA. In the 196th Brigade AO at LZ Stinson at 240545H April, Hq Co, 1-52 Inf received 30-40 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 7 US WIA(E) and 1 US WIA(M). At 241200H April in the vicinity of BS 355777 A/1-52 received an attack by fire with SAF, RPG and B40 rockets. US casualties were 8 US WIA(E). Enemy losses were not determined. 25 April marked the high point of activity in the combined 196th and 198th Brigades AO when in a series of sharp contacts the Brigades reported 15 VC/NVA KIA, 3 IWC and 1 CSWC while US losses were 2 KIA, 14 WIA(E) and 10 WIA(M). At 251610H, BS350784, A/1-52 received SAF and B40 rocket fire causing 5 US WIA(E) and 9 WIA(M). Return fire accounted for 2 NVA/VC KIA. At 1825H, 25 April at AT965523, A/2-1 received and returned an intense volume of small arms fire from an UNSEF. The fire fight resulted in 6 VC/NVA KIA and 1 US KIA with 5 US WIA(E). At BS377895 on 26 April a convoy from 23d S&T Bn received SAF resulting in 4 US WIA(E). P/17 Cav on 270820H April, detonated a land mine at BT035395 which resulted in the combat loss of an M113A1 with 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA(E). In the vicinity of BS353798 at 281315H April, D/1-52 engaged 4 NVA. When the contact was broken, a sweep of the area revealed 4 NVA KIA and 1 IWC. On the last day of the reporting period, 30 April, at BS348773, A/1-52 received SAF and two rounds of B40 rockets, inflicting serious wounds to 5 US personnel with 2 US suffering minor wounds. At 0825H, 30 April, at the same location, A/1-52 had received a similar attack by fire resulting in 5 US WIA(E). Total results for period 16 through 30 April for Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK were reported as: 76 VC/NVA KIA, 20 IWC, 3 CSWC, 6 US KIA, 102 US WIA(E) and 19 US WIA(M). Cumulative totals for Operation MIDDLESEX PEAK for the reporting period were:

| US | ENEMY |
|------------|----------------|
| 45 KIA | 274 KIA (CONF) |
| 293 WIA(E) | 0 KIA (PROB) |
| 44 WIA(M) | 118 DET |
| 0 MIA | 10 PW/VC |
| | 3 PW/NVA |
| | 4 RTNNE/VC |
| | 0 RTNNE/NVA |
| | 61 CIV DEF |
| | 9 IN CIV |
| | 83 IWC |
| | 7 CSWC |

(h) Effective 130600H March 1971, the 198th Infantry Brigade initiated Operation WASCO RAPIDS with the mission of targeting against the 21st Regiment, 2d NVA Division operating in the vicinity of Nui Nhan (BS6554),

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Nui Co (BS6348) and the 38th Local Force Battalion in the vicinity of BS6947. On the afternoon of 13 March, vicinity BS670588, elements of A/3-1 sustained 4 US WIA(E) when an unknown type booby trap was detonated. For the first eight days of the operation (13-19 March 1971) light, minor and scattered contacts prevailed throughout the AO. In two separate contacts on 20 March 1971, B/1-20 engaged 1 VC in the vicinity of BS670497, resulting in 1 VC KIA. Later, at 1540H, vicinity of BS669501, B/1-20 engaged 7 VC with SAF and artillery resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC KBA. Cumulative results for this period were 8 VC/NVA KIA, 10 US WIA(E) and 3 US WIA(M). There were no contacts reported from 21 through 27 March 1971. One individual weapon was found during this period. Operation WASCO RAPIDS was terminated effective 272400H March 1971. Total results from the entire operation are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|-----------|--------------|
| 0 KIA | 11 KIA |
| 10 WIA(E) | 0 DET |
| 3 WIA(M) | 0 PW/VC |
| 0 MIA | 0 PW/NVA |
| | 0 RTNEE/VC |
| | 0 RTNEE/NVA |
| | 0 CIV DEF |
| | 0 IN CIV |
| | 1 IWC |
| | 0 CSWC |

(i) Operation CAROLINE HILL was initiated effective 291200H April 1971 under tactical control of the 196th Infantry Brigade, and in conjunction and coordination with GVN forces, to conduct unilateral and combined operations in support of current campaign plans with priority on the pacification and resettlement of the lowland area west of Da Nang and Hoi An, destroy Base Areas 112 and 127, secure Da Nang from ground, mortar and rocket attacks, support rice denial operations and provide support to RVNAF in providing reaction forces for relief of Border Defense Bases in the TAOR. On the first day of the operation there were no contacts reported. H/17 Cav, operating with Task Force 23d Cav, detonated an unknown type booby trap in the vicinity of AT930530 which resulted in 3 US WIA(E). In one of a series of light and scattered engagements on 30 April 1971, D/3-21 uncovered a weapons cache (AT962429) consisting of 34 individual weapons. Results of all contacts for 30 April 1971 were reported as 3 VC/NVA KIA, 34 IWC and 2 US WIA(E). Cumulative totals for Operation CAROLINE HILL are:

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| US | ENEMY |
|----------|--------------|
| 0 KIA | 3 KIA (CONF) |
| 5 WIA(E) | 0 KIA (PROB) |
| 0 WIA(N) | 1 DLT |
| 0 MIA | 1 PW/VC |
| | 0 PW/NVA |
| | 0 RTREE/VC |
| | 0 RTREE/NVA |
| | 0 CIV DEF |
| | 0 IN CIV |
| | 35 INC |
| | 0 CSNC |

3. (C) Plans

a. The following OPLANS and OPORDS were in effect or initiated during this reporting period:

(1) OPORD 9-70 (Fall/Winter Campaign). OPORD 11-70 (Rice Demolition) was published on 4 November 1970.

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley); OPLAN 8-69 (Emergency Relocation and Evacuations); OPLAN 14-69 (Reinforcement of MR 1) was superseded on 22 April 1971; OPLAN 1-70 (Security for Visits of HRO); OPLAN 3-70 (Defense of Major Cities); OPLAN 5-70 (PW Recovery Operations); OPLAN 8-70 (Egress/Recap) was published on 16 November 1970; OPLAN 9-70 (Civil Disturbance) was published on 23 December 1970; OPLAN 17-70 (Typhoon Tropical Storm); OPLAN 1-71 (Reinforcement of MR 2, 3 & 4) was published on 21 January 1971; OPLAN 2-71, 3-71 & 4-71 (Reinforcement of MR 1) were published on 22 April 1971.

b. Numerous Fragmentary Orders applicable to Operations FREDERICK HILL, GENEVA PARK, NANTUCKET BEACH, IRON MOUNTAIN, PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE, MIDDLESKY PEAK, FINNEY HILL and LAMSON 719 have been published.

c. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) continued through January 1971.

4. (U) Organisation

a. Chu Lai Defense Command was relieved from attachment to HQ and HQ Co and Band, Americal Division Support Command and attached to HQ and HQ Co, 198th Infantry Brigade effective 12 November 1970.

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b. The 635th MI Co was attached to the 23d Inf Div Spt Cmd effective 20 December 1970.

c. The 116th Avn Co (AMC) was attached to the 23d Inf Div effective 1 Jan 71 and further attached to the 14th Cbt Avn Bn effective 1 Jan 71.

d. Btry D, 1st Bn 82d Arty was attached to 3d Bn, 18th Arty effective 23 Jan 71.

e. Co C, 23d SMT Bn (PROV) was activated effective 26 Jan 71.

f. Trp F, 17th Cav was relieved from attachment to Hq and Hq Trp, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav and attached to Hq and Hq Co, 196th Inf Bde effective 26 Jan 71.

g. The 116th Avn Co (AMC), 176th Avn Co (AMC) and 178th Avn Co (ASIC) were relieved from attachment to 14th Cbt Avn Bn and attached to 123d Avn Bn effective 29 Jan 71. Effective the same date, Trp F, 8th Cav was relieved from attachment to 123d Avn Bn and attached to 14th Cbt Avn Bn.

h. Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV) and Spt Co, 23d SMT Bn (PROV) were activated effective 27 Feb 71 and assigned to the 23d Inf Div Spt Cmd, QPCON to the 11th Inf Bde, on the same day.

i. Effective 27 Feb 71, the following attachments were made: 2d Bn, 1st Inf relieved from attachment to 196th Inf Bde and attached to 11th Inf Bde; 3d Bn, 1st Inf, 1st Bn, 20th Inf and 4th Bn 21st Inf relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde and attached to 198th Inf Bde; Hq Hvy, 6th Bn, 11th Arty relieved from attachment to 6th Bn, 11th Arty and attached to 11th Inf Bde; Btry C, 6th Bn, 11th Arty and Btry A, 3d Bn, 82d Arty relieved from attachment to 23d Div Arty and attached to Hq Btry, 6th Bn, 11th Arty; Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV) and Spt Co, 23d SMT Bn (PROV) attached to Co B, 723d Maint Bn; Co B, 723d Maint Bn relieved from attachment to 723d Maint Bn and attached to Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV); Co B, 23d Med Bn relieved from attachment to 23d Med Bn and attached to Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV); Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Arty relieved from attachment to 1st Bn, 14th Arty and attached to 3d Bn 82d Arty; Co C, 26th Engr Bn, Forward Support Plt, Co B, 523d Sig Bn and MI Det, 635th MI Co relieved from attachment to 23d Inf Div Spt Cmd and attached to the 11th Inf Bde; Btry A, Btry B and Btry D, 6th Bn, 11th Arty relieved from attachment to 6th Bn, 11th Arty and attached to 1st Bn, 14th Arty; 5th Bn, 16th Inf relieved from attachment to 198th Inf Bde and attached to 194th Inf Bde; Trp H, 17th Cav relieved from attachment to 198th Inf Bde and attached to 11th Inf Bde.

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j. The 99th Inf Plt (Scout Dog) was relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde and attached to 196th Inf Bde effective 7 March 1971.

k. The 1st Plt, 23d MP Co was relieved from attachment to the 11th Spt Bn (PROV) effective 15 March 1971.

l. Effective 19 March 1971, Co B, 23d Med Bn was relieved from attachment to the 11th Spt Bn (PROV).

m. Btry B, 1st Bn, 14th Arty relieved from attachment to 3d Bn, 82d Arty effective 1 April 1971.

n. Co 2, Co G, 75th Inf (PROV) was activated and assigned to Co G, 75th Inf effective 1 April 1971.

o. Effective 10 April 1971, the following attachments were made: 2d Bn, 1st Inf relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde and attached to 196th Inf Bde; 3d Bn, 1st Inf, 1st Bn, 26th Inf and 4th Bn, 21st Inf relieved from attachment to 198th Inf Bde and attached to 11th Inf Bde; 5th Bn, 46th Inf relieved from attachment to 196th Inf Bde and attached to 198th Inf Bde; Hq Btry, 6th Bn, 11th Arty relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde; Btry C, 6th Bn, 11th Arty and Btry A, 3d Bn, 82d Arty relieved from attachment to Hq Btry, 6th Bn, 11th Arty; Co B, 723d Maint Bn relieved from attachment to Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV); Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Arty relieved from attachment to 3d Bn, 82d Arty; Btry A, Btry B and Btry D, 6th Bn, 11th Arty relieved from attachment to 1st Bn, 14th Arty, Co C, 26th Engr Bn, Forward Support Plt, Co B, 523 Sig Bn and MI Det, 635th MI Co relieved from attachment to 11th Inf Bde.

p. Effective 11 April 1971, Task Force 23d Cav (PROV) was activated and attached to the 196th Inf Bde.

q. Effective 11 April 1971, Trp H, 17th Cav was relieved from attachment to the 11th Inf Bde and attached to the 196th Inf Bde and Trp E, 1st Cav was relieved from attachment to 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav and attached to the 196th Inf Bde.

r. The 99th Inf Plt (Scout Dog) was relieved from attachment to the 196th Inf Bde and attached to the 11th Inf Bde effective 12 April 1971.

s. The following inactivations were effective 23 April 1971: Hq, 11th Spt Bn (PROV), Spt Co, 23d Spt Bn (PROV) and Co G, 23d Spt Bn (PROV)

t. Effective 30 April 1971, Trp F, 17th Cav was relieved from attachment to the 196th Inf Bde and attached to the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav.

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5. (U) Training

- a. The Division Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of O-3 who are assigned or attached to the Division. During the reporting period, 135 courses were completed for 9312 personnel.
- b. The Division Combat Center completed 4 Combat Leadership courses for 148 students and 4 Support Leadership courses for 111 students.
- c. Four Unit Reconnaissance courses were completed, graduating 102 personnel.
- d. The Division Sniper School graduated four classes totalling 97 students.
- e. Training of Territorial Forces Junior Officers continued. Eight classes were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 181 RF/PF Junior Officers completing the course.
- f. The Division Combat Center continued support of a Mine and Booby Trap Mobile Training Team that conducted classes on countering enemy mines and booby traps for units of the Division.
- g. A Sapper Infiltration Demonstration Mobile Training Team was established to provide training pertinent to the techniques employed by sappers when penetrating perimeter wire. As of the end of the reporting period, 943 personnel on various Division Fire Bases had received this training.
- h. The Division Support Command continued to conduct a monthly PLL Clerks course for all elements of the Division. A total of 173 personnel attended this course.
- i. The Division Support Command also conducted its monthly TAMMS course during the reporting period with a total of 148 students attending.
- j. The 16th Combat Aviation Group conducted 6 CH-47 Sling Loading classes for units of the Division during the reporting period.
- k. Three Mobile Training Teams were established to provide training for ARVN during the reporting period. These were the Demolitions MTT and the Mechanical Ambush MTT established by Division Support Command and the Anti-Tank Weapons MTT established by the 198th Inf Bde. As of the end of

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the reporting period, 720 students had received demolitions training, 53 mechanical ambush training and 1000 anti-tank training.

i. On 9 Nov 70, "Project Buddy" was established by the Division Support Command to provide on-the-job training to members of the I Corps Area Logistics Command (ARVN) in various skills related to the logistics field. To date, 91 ARVN personnel have completed training.

j. A Helicopter Gunship Control Mobile Training Team was formed to provide instruction to ARVN units in the techniques of helicopter gunship control. To date, 200 personnel have received this training.

k. On 23 April 1971, a Dust-Off Procedures Mobile Training Team was established to provide US units with instruction in dust-off procedures to include the use of the jungle penetrator.

l. The 23d Infantry Division Artillery conducted 9 six-day classes in Advanced Fire Direction Techniques for Division Artillery personnel.

m. The 23d Infantry Division Artillery also conducted 4 five-day Reconnaissance Sergeant courses during the reporting period.

6. (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period 1 November 1970 through 30 April 1971, 477 Close Air Support (CAS) and 155 Combat Skyspot (CSS) missions for a total of 632 air missions utilising 1,046 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the 23d Infantry Division. This is a decrease from 2,958 missions and 3,927 aircraft sorties flown during the previous six month period.

(1) CSS Missions

During the reporting period, 155 CSS missions, using 244 aircraft sorties, were flown. The USAF flew 76 missions using 139 sorties; the RAAF flew 44 missions using 46 sorties; the USMC flew 25 missions using 31 sorties; the USAF flew 5 missions using 10 sorties; and VNAF flew 5 missions using 18 sorties. This is a decrease from the previous six months period when 1,444 CSS missions using 1,034 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Division. The large decrease can be attributed to the removal in September, 1970 of the Marine ASRT Sky Spot Control Facility from Che Lai and a significant decrease in the number of Marine A6A Beacon missions allocated during the last three months.

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(2) CAS Missions

During the reporting period 477 CAS missions, using 802 aircraft sorties, were flown. The USAF flew 169 missions using 349 sorties; the RAAF flew 147 missions using 147 sorties; the USMC flew 85 missions using 150 sorties; the USN flew 21 missions using 45 sorties; and VMAF flew 55 missions using 111 sorties. This is a decrease from the previous six months period when 1,514 CAS missions, using 2,415 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Division. The large decrease can be attributed to bad weather during the first three months of the reporting period, the 23d Division's low Tac Air priority during Operations LAMSON 719 and 720, and the general decreasing availability of Tac Air due to unit withdrawals from RVN, notably the Marine air wing which was removed from Chu Lai.

(3) Ordnance Expended

A total of 1,720 tons of bombs were dropped during the period, of which 130 tons were Napalm. The decrease from 16,578 tons for the previous six months is in proportion to the decrease in the number of missions delivered.

b. There were no Arc Lights flown in support of the 23d Infantry Division in the last six months.

c. Bomb damage assessments made by forward air controllers (FAC's) during the period included the following: 900 structures destroyed, 399 structures damaged, 922 bunkers destroyed, 168 bunkers damaged, 52 secondary explosions, 55 secondary fires, 7 bridges destroyed, 15 bridges damaged, 7 .51 cal positions destroyed, 12 .51 cal positions damaged, 6 fighting positions and 49 tunnels destroyed, 4 caves collapsed, and 49 enemy killed by airstrikes (KBAS).

7. (C) Artillery: Division Artillery continued to provide fire support for the Division throughout the Division's area of operations. In order to provide appropriate fire support to the maneuver elements of the Division, frequent moves of artillery firing elements were necessary. Artillery operations during the period are as follows:

a. The direct support unit of the 196th Infantry Brigade remained the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. B Battery, 1-14 Artillery with four howitzers remained attached to the battalion for the entire period. A Battery, 3-82 Artillery was detached from the battalion and attached to 6-14 Artillery during the period 1 March to 3 April. C Battery, 1-14 Artillery located at Rat City (BT340077) and Ky Tra (BT316089) was attached

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to 3-82 Artillery from 1 March to 8 April. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery relocated from Hawk Hill (BT231315) to Da Nang on 25 April.

(1) Two howitzers of A Battery started the period at Baldy (BT133453) in support of Task Force Burnett which was engaged in a joint operation with elements of the 1st Marine Division in Quang Nam Province. The other four howitzers of the battery moved from Young (BT188158) to Hawk Hill (BT225312) on 1 November upon completion of their mission in support of 2-1 Infantry. On 2 November A Battery moved four howitzers to Baldy to increase the support of Task Force Burnett. On 10 November the battery moved four howitzers from Baldy to Casey Jones (AT998516) in support of Task Force 2-1 Infantry which was OPCON to the 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. On 1 December two howitzers were moved from Baldy to Hawk Hill, having completed their mission in support of Task Force Burnett. On 2 December the battery moved four howitzers to Crest (AT816386) from Casey Jones in support of 2-1 Infantry upon completion of the joint operation with the 1st Marine Division. On 13 December the two howitzers at Hawk Hill were moved to Maryanne (AS961998) to support elements of 1-46 Infantry operating in the vicinity of that fire base. On 19 January, the four howitzers at Crest were moved to Marge (BT186051) in support of 2-1 Infantry. On 24 January the two howitzers were displaced from Maryanne to Young in support of 1-46 Infantry in a combined operation with RF/PF from Quang Tin Province. On 1 March the two howitzers at Young and four howitzers at Marge were moved to Chu Lai Combat Base in preparation for movement to Quang Tri Province in support of Operation LAMSON 719. Upon closing at Chu Lai, the battery was attached to 6-11 Artillery and moved by road on 2 March to Dong Ha (YD205605). On 8 April the battery returned to Hawk Hill after termination of Operation LAMSON 719. After refitting, the battery moved to Hill 151 (AT935474) on 13 April, where they remained at the end of the period.

(2) B Battery started the period with all six howitzers at Center (BT050250). On 7 November two howitzers were moved to Young (BT188158) in support of operations of 1-46 Infantry and 3-21 Infantry south of the fire base. On 13 December two howitzers were moved back to Center as they were replaced by four howitzers of B Battery, 1-14 Artillery at Young. On 20 December the battery moved two howitzers to New Hau Duc (AS051049) in support of a combined operation of 1-46 Infantry with 4th Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment. On 24 December the howitzers were displaced back to Center upon termination of the combined operation. On 29 December two howitzers of B Battery moved from Center to Baldy (BT133453) in support of 4-31 Inf. On 12 January the two howitzers moved from Baldy to Hawk Hill (BT225312) by road and were airlifted to Center the following day; the 4-31 Infantry operation in Quang Nam Province having been completed. On 15 January B

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Battery moved three howitzers to Carole (BT158081) in support of a combat assault of 2-1 Infantry in the vicinity of Marge (BT186051). These howitzers returned to Center on 19 January when the support of 2-1 Infantry was provided by A Battery, 3-82 Artillery from Marge. On 24 January, three howitzers were moved from Center to Hawk Hill in support of F Troop, 17th Cavalry, which was attached to the 196th Brigade. On 14 February one howitzer was moved back to Center from Hawk Hill to provide additional fire support to 3-21 Infantry. On 24 February two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Grunt (AT957111) to support 1-46 Infantry operations in the Phuoc Chau Valley. On 1 March two howitzers were displaced from Center to Young to support elements of 3-21 Infantry, replacing A Battery of the 3-82 Artillery. On 17 March 1-46 Infantry closed its operations in the Phuoc Chau Valley and the battery moved the two howitzers from Grunt to Maryanne (AS961998) in continuation of its support of 1-46 Infantry. On 24 March two howitzers returned to Center from Maryanne. On 27 March two howitzers were moved from Center to Baldy to provide support for F Troop, 17th Cavalry. On 3 April the two howitzers at Young were moved to Hawk Hill and then to Baldy on 5 April. On 12 April two howitzers from Baldy and two from Center were moved to Hill 510 (AT946404) in conjunction with the Division's TAOI expansion into Quang Nam Province. The remaining two howitzers of the battery were moved from Baldy to Hawk Hill on 18 April and on 22 April they moved to Hill 65 (AT880580). At the end of the period, the battery remained split with four howitzers at Hill 510 and two at Hill 65.

(3) At the beginning of the period, C Battery provided support for 4-31 Infantry from Siberia (AT903232) with the battery consolidated at that location. On 7 November two howitzers were moved to Young (BT188157) OPCON to B Battery 3-82 Artillery in support of elements of 3-21 Infantry and 1-46 Infantry operating south of the fire base. On 20 November two howitzers were moved from Siberia to Pratt (AT 822262) in support of 4-31 Infantry. On 4 December the two howitzers of C Battery OPCON to B Battery 3-82 at Young were airlifted back to Siberia when they were replaced by B Battery, 1-14 Artillery. On 15 December 4-31 Infantry operations in the vicinity of Pratt were completed and the two howitzers at Pratt were moved back to Siberia. On 25 January C Battery moved two howitzers from Siberia to West (AT990250) to expand their support of 4-31 Infantry. On 26 April the battery headquarters and four howitzers were moved to Da Nang to prepare for future operations. The remaining two howitzers of the battery were moved from West to Da Nang on 27 April, consolidating the battery at that location. On 30 April, the battery headquarters and the six howitzers were moved to Hill 350 (AT837757) where they remained at the end of the period.

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(4) B Battery remained attached to 3-82 Artillery and provided support to 1-46 Infantry throughout the period. The battery started the period based at Maryanne (AS961998). On 4 December, the battery moved two howitzers to Young (BT188158) in support of 1-46 Infantry and the other two howitzers from Maryanne followed on 13 December to Young. On 24 January the battery moved back to Maryanne continuing to support 1-46 Infantry. On 17 March the battery moved its four howitzers at Maryanne to Mildred (BS024978). On 31 March the four howitzers at Mildred were moved back to Maryanne in support of 1-46 Infantry and elements of the 5th ARVN Regiment. On 23 April the battery headquarters and the four howitzers were moved from Maryanne to Hill 270 (AT865582) continuing to provide direct support to 1-46 Infantry.

b. The direct support unit of 198th Infantry Brigade remained the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery. Four howitzers of B Battery remained detached from the battalion and attached to 3-82 Artillery throughout the period. During the period 1 March to 11 April, C Battery of the battalion was detached and attached to 3-82 Artillery. During this same period, the battalion had A, B and D Batteries, 6-11 Artillery attached, thereby controlling the fires of five batteries.

(1) A Battery (with two howitzers from B Battery, 1-14 Artillery Attached) continued to provide support to 1-6 Infantry from split positions. At the beginning of the period, four howitzers were located at Bayonet (BT558003) and four howitzers at Dottie (BS630853). On 23 December two howitzers were moved from Bayonet to Tam Ky (BT292232) to provide artillery coverage for Division convoy to Da Nang taking troops to see the Bob Hope Show. These howitzers returned to Bayonet on 25 December following closure of the convoy back to Chu Lai in the late evening of 24 December. Two howitzers were moved from Dottie to a field position (BT568000) on 19 January to provide support for eagle flights of 1-6 Infantry, and returned to Dottie on the same day. On 17 February two howitzers were moved to Ha Thanh (BS385698) to provide support for 1-52 Infantry. On 1 March two howitzers were displaced by road from Dottie to Liz (BS753432) to provide support to 1-20 Infantry, when C Battery, 6-11 Artillery was displaced to support Operation LAMSON 719. On 6 March the two howitzers at Liz were deployed to Snoopy (BS705613) where they remained until 31 March when they returned to Dottie. At the end of the period, the battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Bayonet, two howitzers at Dottie and two howitzers at Ha Thanh.

(2) C Battery provided support for 5-46 Infantry throughout the period. Initially, the battery was evenly split with the headquarters and three howitzers at Fat City (BT440077) and three howitzers at Ky Tra (BT316089).

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On 21 April the fire base at Ky Tra was closed and the three howitzers were moved to Professional (BT173077) where they remained at the end of the period.

(3) At the beginning of the period, D Battery provided support to 1-52 Infantry from Stinson (BS538824) with four howitzers and two howitzers were located at Nui Pho Tinh (BS648936). On 8 November the two howitzers at Nui Pho Tinh returned to Stinson upon completion of operations in that area. On 25 December two howitzers were moved from Stinson to Cindy (BS342 882); these two howitzers closed back at Stinson on 7 January. On 17 January three howitzers were displaced from Stinson to Cindy to support elements of 1-52 Infantry operating south of the fire base. At the end of the period, the battery continued to operate from split locations with the battery headquarters and three howitzers at Stinson and the remaining three howitzers located at Cindy.

c. The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery continued to provide direct support to the 11th Infantry Brigade at Bronco (BS812396). During the period 1 March to 8 April, HQ and C Batteries, 6-11 Artillery were attached to 11th Infantry Brigade and deployed in northern MR 1 in support of Operation LAMSON 719. During this period of attachment to 11th Brigade, A, B and D Batteries of the battalion were attached to 1-14 Artillery, while A Battery, 3-82 Artillery was attached to 6-11 Artillery. The HQ and C Battery returned to Division Artillery control on 9 April and resumed direct support of 11th Infantry Brigade on 11 April.

(1) A Battery continued to provide support of 4-21 Infantry from split locations. At the beginning of the period, the battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Debbie (BS869319) and two howitzers at Charlie Brown (BS928220). On 13 February the battery moved two howitzers from Debbie to a field location (BS25340) in support of 4-21 Infantry. The following day these two howitzers returned to Debbie upon completion of the operation. On 31 March the two howitzers at Charlie Brown were moved to Snoopy (BS705613) upon turn-over of Charlie Brown to the Quang Ngai Regional Forces. On 14 April two howitzers were moved from Debbie and two from Snoopy to Tiger (BS478476) in support of 4-3 Infantry. On 22 April the two howitzers at Debbie were moved to Bronco (BS812396) to support 4-21 Infantry and in preparation for closing Debbie as a US fire support base. Upon termination of the 4-3 Infantry operation west of Tiger, the four howitzers and battery headquarters displaced to Crunch (BS534515). At the end of the period the battery continued to operate from split locations at Crunch and Bronco.

(2) B Battery provided support to 4-3 Infantry at the start of the

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period with four howitzers located at OP George (BS470866) under the OPCON of the 1-14 Artillery and two howitzers and the battery headquarters at San Juan Hill (BS634380). The four howitzers at OP George reverted to 6-11 Artillery control on 2 November and were returned to San Juan Hill. On 7 November two howitzers were moved to Crunch (BS535515) to support operations in that area. The two howitzers moved from Crunch back to San Juan Hill on 17 December. On 13 January two howitzers were moved from San Juan Hill to Ba To (BS556326) to support a combined US/ARVN operation in the area. The two howitzers at Ba To returned to San Juan Hill on 12 February upon completion of the combined operation. The battery was attached to 1-14 Artillery on 1 March and then on 6 March three howitzers were moved from San Juan Hill to Liz (BS757432) to provide support to 1-20 Infantry. Also on 6 March the battery FDC was moved to Bronco (BS812396) to facilitate control of the two firing elements. The three howitzers at Liz and the FDC at Bronco returned to San Juan Hill on 9 April to support 1-21 Infantry.

(1) C Battery provided support to 1-20 Infantry from split locations at the beginning of the period. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Liz (BS757432) and two howitzers were located at Snoopy (BS757432). On 7 November the two howitzers at Snoopy were moved to Dragon (BS757432) and returned to Snoopy on 14 November. On 1 March the six howitzers and battery headquarters moved to Chu Lai and on 2 March road marched to Dung Ha Combat Base (MD135643) to prepare for Operation LAMSON 719. On 1 April the battery moved to FSB C-2 (MD135643) to support 1-61 Infantry. On 4 April the battery moved back to Dung Ha Combat Base in preparation for movement back to the Division AB. The battery rotated sections and gun crews to the battalions for refitting and on 15 April moved two howitzers to Liz. At the end of the period, the battery was continuing to support 1-21 Infantry with four howitzers and the battery headquarters at Liz and two howitzers at Bronco.

(2) D Battery provided support to 1-1 Infantry from split locations at the beginning of the period. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at FSB C-2 (MD135643) and two howitzers were located at Nghia Anh (BS757432). On 7 November the two howitzers at Nghia Hanh were moved to Dragon (BS757432). Besides the two howitzers were moved from FSB C-2 to Minh Mang (BS757432) to support 1-1 Infantry operations in that area. Two howitzers were moved from the area of Xa Rang (BS556326) on 13 January and refitted at Liz on 15 January. On 15 April the two howitzers at Liz were moved to the west of the west of FSB C-2, facilitating the movement of the battery at the end of the period.

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fires to 1-82 Artillery in the FREDERICK HILL AO and direct support to 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry in the PENNSYLVANIA SQUARE AO at the beginning of the period. The battalion was relieved of the mission of direct support to 1-1 Cavalry on 29 January at which time they provided reinforcing fires to 3-82, 6-11 and 1-14 Artillery. On 13 April the battalion was relieved of the reinforcing mission to 1-14 and 6-11 Artillery. The battalion headquarters and fire direction center were located at Chu Lai at the beginning of the period and moved to Da Nang on 15 April 1971, in conjunction with the TAOL expansion of the Division into Quang Nam Province.

(1) A Battery provided both direct support fires and general support/reinforcing fires from split locations at the beginning of the period. The headquarters and three howitzers located at Hawk Hill (BT225312) provided direct support to 1-1 Cavalry. The remaining three howitzers at West (AT990250) provided general support/reinforcing fires to 3-82 Artillery. On 23 January 1971, one howitzer at West was moved to Hawk Hill in preparation for movement to the southern part of the Division AO to replace 1-82 Artillery elements which were preparing for participation in Operation LAMSON 719. On 25 January two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Dottie (BS630853) to provide reinforcing fires to 1-14 Artillery. On 26 January two howitzers of the battery were moved from Hawk Hill to Snoopy (BS708610). On 18 March the two howitzer crews at West were exchanged with crews from B Battery at Debbie (BS869319). This was done to facilitate future operations. On 11 April the battery headquarters and six howitzers road marched to Rawhide (AT880580). On April 13th two howitzers were moved from Rawhide to Hill 510 (AT946404) and on the following day four howitzers and the battery headquarters were moved from Rawhide to Hill 151 (AT935474). At the end of the period, the battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at Hill 151 and two howitzers remained at Hill 510.

(2) B Battery initially provided general support/reinforcing fires with the battery evenly split between Tien Phuoc (BT702140) and Maryanne (AS961998). On 23 January, one howitzer was moved from Maryanne and one from Tien Phuoc to Hawk Hill (BT225312) and the other two howitzers from Maryanne were moved to Hawk Hill on 24 January. On 25 January two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Debbie (BS869319) and on 26 January two howitzers were moved from Hawk Hill to Fat City (BT440077). These moves were made for the purpose of replacing 1-82 Artillery which was preparing for participation in Operation LAMSON 719. On 18 March, the two howitzer crews at Debbie were exchanged with crews from A Battery at West (AT990250). On 12 April the two howitzer crews at Fat City were exchanged with crews from C Battery at Siberia (AT903232). These exchanges resulted in the battery then being split between Tien Phuoc, West and Siberia. On 25 April the two howitzers at Siberia were displaced to West and Tien Phuoc. At

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the end of the period, the battery continued to operate from split locations with the headquarters and three howitzers at Tien Phuoc and three howitzers at West.

(3) C Battery initially provided general support/reinforcing fires with the battery consolidated at Pleasantville (BS027977). On 29 December two howitzers were moved to Siberia (AT903232) to provide additional support to the maneuver forces operating from that fire base. On 20 March the battery moved two howitzers from Pleasantville to Maryanne (AS961998) to increase the fire support available from that fire base. On April the battery exchanged personnel between Siberia and Fat City (BT440077) to C Battery to facilitate future operations. On 13 April the two howitzers at Fat City were moved to Rawhide (AT880580) in connection with the TAOI expansion. The two howitzers at Maryanne were displaced to Baldy (BT130 459) on 22 April in support of Task Force 23d Cavalry. On 24 April the battery headquarters and two howitzers moved from Pleasantville to Rawhide and then on 26 April the two howitzers at Baldy were moved to Rawhide, consolidating the battery at that location. At the end of the period, the battery remained consolidated at Rawhide.

e. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support/reinforcing fires to 1-14 Artillery and 6-11 Artillery in the central and southern portions of the Division at the beginning of the period. The battalion headquarters and operations center were initially located at Hurricane (BT537033). The battalion headquarters and headquarters battery, A, B and C Batteries were detached from the Division Artillery during the period 30 January to 8 April and attached to the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in support of Operation LAMSON 719. (This period will be covered in a separate report). Upon return to the Division Artillery, the battalion headquarters and operations center again located at Hurricane where they remained at the end of the period.

(1) A Battery reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artillery from Fat City (BT440077) with four howitzers and from Dottie (BS680853) with two howitzers. On 25 January the two guns at Dottie moved to Fat City, consolidating the battery at that location. On 26 January the battery moved to a staging area at Hurricane (BT537033) in preparation for participation in Operation LAMSON 719, and departed Chu Lai on 29 January. Upon return from the operation in northern MR 1 on 8 April, the battery refitted at Hurricane and deployed to Dottie on 11 April and to Fat City on 13 April where they remained at the end of the period.

(2) B Battery reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artillery with two howitzers at Stinson (BS539834) and provided reinforcing fires to 6-11 Artillery from

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Snoopy (BS708610) with four guns. On 24 January the two howitzers at Stinson were moved to Snoopy to consolidate the battery at that location. On 26 January the battery moved to a staging area at Hurricane (BT537033) in preparation for participation in Operation LAMSON 719 and departed Chu Lai on 29 January. Upon return from the operation in northern MR 1 on 8 April, the battery refitted at Hurricane. On 11 April two howitzers were moved to Snoopy. Two howitzers were deployed to Stinson on 14 April and two more howitzers were emplaced at Snoopy the same day. At the end of the period, the battery remained split with the headquarters and four howitzers at Snoopy and two at Stinson.

(3) C Battery reinforced the fires of 6-11 Artillery with its headquarters and four howitzers at Liz (BS757432) and two howitzers at Debbie (BS869319). On 25 January the two howitzers at Debbie moved to Liz to consolidate the battery there in preparation for future operations. On 26 January the battery moved to a staging area at Hurricane (BT537033) in preparation for movement to northern MR 1. The battery departed Chu Lai on 29 January for participation in Operation LAMSON 719. Upon return from this operation on 8 April, the battery refitted at Hurricane until 11 April when two howitzers were moved to Debbie. The four remaining howitzers and the battery headquarters moved to Liz on 18 April. On 22 April the two howitzers at Debbie were moved to Bronco (BS812396). At the end of the period, the battery remained split with the battery headquarters and four howitzers at Liz and two howitzers at Bronco.

(4) D Battery (8 inch) provided reinforcing support to both 1-14 and 6-11 Artillery from Dottie (BS630853) and Bronco (BS757432) at the beginning of the period. On 6 November the howitzers at Dottie were moved to Fat City (BT440077) to conduct an artillery raid on a bunker complex west of the fire base. Upon termination of the raid on 7 November, the two howitzers were moved back to Dottie. On 8 December the two howitzers at Dottie were moved to Bronco to increase the supporting fires for 4-21 Infantry operating to the southwest of the fire base. These two howitzers returned to Dottie on 10 December upon termination of the operation. On 20 and 21 January the two 8 inch howitzers at Bronco were converted to 175mm guns, making the battery a composite 8 inch howitzer/175mm gun unit. The battery consolidated at Dottie on 21 January and departed for Ross (AT037343) on 22 January and closed there on 23 January after an overnight stop at Hawk Hill (BT225312). Upon closing at Ross, the battery was attached to 3-18 Artillery for all purposes. On 15 February the battery departed Ross and closed at Rawhide (AT880580) on 16 February at which time they became OPCON to the 11th Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division. The control of the battery was returned to the Division on 16 April. At the end of the period, the battery remained at Rawhide providing general supporting fires in the 196th Infantry Brigade AO in Quang Nam Province.

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f. The 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general supporting fires for the 23d Infantry Division TAOI with its headquarters and fire direction center at Chu Lai.

(1) A Battery supported operations in the 198th Infantry Brigade AO from Cindy (BS342882). It also provided support to ARVN Border Ranger unit operations in the areas of Tra Bong and Ha Thanh.

(2) B Battery continued to support operations in the 196th Infantry Brigade AO from Tien Phuoc (BT102140). The battery also provided fire support to the ARVN Border Ranger unit operating from Tien Phuoc. On 25 March the battery moved one 8 inch howitzer and one 175mm gun to Pleasantville (BS051049) to conduct an artillery raid. The battery fired primarily in the area south of Maryanne (AS761999). On 28 March the battery moved an additional 175mm gun to Pleasantville to give added fire power to the raid. The two 175mm guns and one 8 inch howitzer returned to Tien Phuoc on 8 April upon successful completion of the raid. The battery expended a total of 697x8 inch and 841x175mm rounds during the raid.

(3) C Battery continued to provide general supporting fires in the 11th Infantry Brigade from Crunch (BS534515) and additionally provided support to the ARVN Border Ranger units at Minh Long, Ba To, and Gia Vuc.

g. Counter Mortar Radar Detachments:

(1) The 251st FA Detachment (CM Radar) was initially located at Pat City (BT440077) to provide detection coverage for the Northern Rocket Pocket of Chu Lai Combat Base. The detachment moved to OP Nui Wong (BS702601) on 22 April to provide countermortar coverage for that OP and surrounding area. The detachment also participated in registrations for artillery units which were in range of both positions occupied during the period.

(2) The 252d FA Detachment (CM Radar) remained at Sugar Mill Hill (BS613735) for the entire period. The operation of the radar continued to be combined effort with personnel from the 2d ARVN Division Artillery participating. The detachment provided countermortar detection coverage in the Quang Ngai City area and assisted 2d ARVN and 23d Infantry Division Artillery units within range to conduct registrations.

h. Ground Surveillance Radar Section:

(1) The AN/TPS-25 radar section organic to the HHS, 23d Infantry Division Artillery continued to provide surveillance from OP 1 (BS516778).

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During period when the section's primary radar was nonoperational, it was augmented by an AN/PPS-5 radar.

(2) The 271st FA Detachment (Radar) remained at OP 3 (B3751421) during the entire period. It enjoyed a successful record of detecting attempted infiltration into the districts of Mo Duc and Duc Pho.

1. Meteorological Stations:

(1) The meteorological section of 3-18 Artillery remained at Chu Lai during the period, providing metro data for the artillery units located in the north and central coastal areas of the Division AO.

(2) The meteorological section of 3-16 Artillery remained at Tien Phuoc (BT102140), providing metro data in the northwestern portion of the Division AO.

(3) The meteorological section organic to HEB, 23d Infantry Division Artillery remained at Bronco (B3312396) and continued to provide metro data for artillery units operating in the southern portion of the Division AO.

8. (U) Aviation. A separate ORLL for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group for this reporting period.

9. (C) Chemical. During the period 1 November 1970 - 30 April 1971, the Division Chemical Section, 27th Chemical Detachment, 57th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities.

- a. 110 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.
- b. 37 E-158 tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed for temporary denial of terrain to the enemy.
- c. 200 Airborne Personnel Detector missions were flown.
- d. 16,550 gallons of contaminated fuel were used to defoliate FSB's.
- e. 753 55 gallon drums of thickened fuel were dropped on spider holes, bunkers, and suspected mine fields.
- f. 2408 pounds of persistent CS were staked into the perimeter wire of Chu Lai Combat Base.

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10. (C) Engineer.

(1) Activities for the period consisted of the divisional engineer effort being devoted primarily to direct combat support of the division, while non-divisional units devoted primary efforts to the construction of secondary LOC's and operational support construction.

(2) LOC Program

(a) QL-1

1. A major repair effort was required to repair flood damage caused by monsoon rains in November and December. To insure continuous traffic, the 26th Engineer Battalion provided and installed 136 ft of M476 dry span, 70 ft of Bailey bridge, and 90 ft of M476 float bridge. The 39th Engineer Battalion repaired 11 bridges and installed 9 culverts. During the period Jan - Mar 71, permanent shoulder repair on QL-1 was performed by NCR 32 from the northern AO border to Tam Ky, and from Tam Ky south to the Song Ve River by the 82d ARVN Engineer Battalion.

2. Enemy Interdictions. The enemy interdicted QL-1 by blowing three culverts and damaging three bridges. The culverts were only blown half way across and in all cases, the road was immediately passable. Repairs were easily made by the 39th Engr Bn within three days. Circumstances and the ensuing repairs for each of the damaged bridges are described as follows:

(a) On 25 Dec 70, an enemy sapper unit was detected by PF security forces approaching bridge L-B-90 at BS596927. One VC was killed and a 18" x 18" x 12" explosive charge was captured. One explosion was set off which lightly damaged a pier column. Approximately 2 ft of concrete flaked off to the steel reinforcing bars. The column was immediately repaired by the 39th Engr Bn.

(b) On 30 Jan 71, an enemy sapper unit slipped in among PF security forces on bridge L-B-96 at BS642746 and destroyed or damaged four columns located on the same side of a pier. Bridge capacity was reduced to class 30 and traffic was restricted to one lane. Temporary repairs were made by the 39th Engr Bn by construction of two Bailey piers on either side of the damaged pier. The 26th Engr Bn supported the operation by providing two M476 rafts. Repairs were completed on 5 Mar 71. MFW was tasked to conduct permanent repair of the pier and is presently awaiting allocation of funds.

(c) On 25 Feb 71, a timber pile pier on bridge L-B-87 at BT487067 was blown and the adjacent spans dropped, thereby creating a 75 ft gap.

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On the following day, the 26th Engr Bn installed 90 ft of DS Bailey bridge to open the bridge to traffic. One day later, the 26th Engr Bn installed 315 feet of M476 float bridge at the same site, followed by the removal of the Bailey bridge. Beginning 3 Mar 71, the 39th Engr Bn built a new pier and reconstructed the two spans. Work was completed on 14 Mar 71, at which time the float bridge was removed by the 26th Engr Bn. This was a classic example of two engineer units combining respective capabilities to rapidly solve an enemy interdiction.

(d) Repair of potholes. With the opening of the RMK hot mix plant at Chu Lai in March, the MPW departments of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces conducted a vigorous program in repairing potholes on QL-1. The section of QL-1 from Quang Ngai city south to the MD2 border remains to be accomplished.

(e) Secondary LOC's. Beginning 1 Feb 71, the 39th Engr Bn initiated its 1971 road construction program, which calls for 85 km of all weather roads. To date about 15 km are complete with the exception of a sand-asphalt surface treatment. The 26th Engineer Bn concentrated on constructing dry weather roads in support of pacification programs in each province. Approximately 33 km of dry weather road have been completed. A more detailed narrative of each road constructed by the 26th Engr Bn may be found in para B(3). Work on Rte 529 to Tra Bong commenced with the 103d ARVN Engr Bn constructing a 63 foot class 30 timber trestle bridge at B3537884.

(3) Land Clearing.

(a) Clearing operations continued in the Batangan by the 59th Land Clearing Company, 118th ARVN Land Clearing Company and the 26th Land Clearing Team. Due to tactical requirements, in support of pacification, the 26th LCT was moved to the Ky My area of Quang Tin Province in early April 71. The 59th LCC then assumed the 26th LCT's mission of clearing in the vicinity of LZ Stinson where work is still continuing.

(b) On 25 Jan 71, the 118th ARVN LCC departed to northern MR1 in support of LAMSON 719. On 27 Jan 71, one platoon (10 dozers) of the 59th LCC redeployed to Khe Sanh to provide land clearing support in that area. Upon completion of that mission they were placed in support of the 101st Abn Div and are not expected to return until 15 May 71.

(c) Statistical results by area are indicated below:

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| AREA | UNIT | ACRES | BNKRS | TRENCHES & TUNNELS(m) | MINES & B/T's | OTHER |
|----------|---------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------|------------------------------|
| Batangan | 59 LCC | 7,624 | 77 | 13,424 | 78 | 720 lbs/rice 20 lbs/salt |
| | 26 LCT | 2,118 | 83 | 1,013 | 13 | 20 lbs/rice |
| | 118 LCC | <u>346</u> 10,088 | <u>3</u> 163 | <u>90</u> 15,027 | <u>2</u> 93 | <u>300</u> lbs/rice |
| AREA | UNIT | ACRES | BNKRS | TRENCHES & TUNNELS(m) | MINES & B/T's | OTHER |
| Stinson | 59 LCC | 810 | 6 | 2,100 | 3 | |
| | 26 LCT | <u>674</u> 1484 | <u>12</u> 18 | <u>25</u> 2,125 | <u>7</u> 10 | |
| Ky My | 26 LCT | 712 | 9 | 250 | 18 | |
| | TOTAL | 12,290 | 190 | 17,402 | 121 | 1040 lbs/rice 20 lbs/salt |

(4) Airfield Rehabilitation.

(a) Tien Phuoc. Following flood damage at the end of Oct 70, the 39th Engr Bn conducted extensive repairs of the runway. Damaged matting removed and new matting was installed on the runway and the parking apron. Additionally, the runway ditches were repaired to improve drainage. On three occasions from Feb to Mar 71, the 39th Engr Bn had to conduct welding repairs on matting that had become loose.

(b) Tra Bong. The airfield was closed by the 39th Engr Bn 1-14 Jan 71 for repairs. Potholes in the runway and parking apron were filled with a soil cement mixture accompanied by welding repairs on 9-11 April 71.

(c) Tam Ky. A soft spot was repaired by the 39th Engr Bn in Nov 70.

(d) Minh Long. Welding repairs were made by the 39th Engr Bn in Nov 70.

(e) Ha Than. During the period 1 Nov 70 - 21 Jan 71, NGR-32 resurfaced

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the airfield with M8A1 matting. From 11-18 April 71, the 2d ABW Engineers conducted welding repairs.

(f) Ba To New. NCR 32 constructed a new airfield at this location during the period 16 Oct 70 to 16 Mar 71. Difficulties due to weather and transportation problems impeded progress.

(g) Duc Pho. In Dec 70, the 26th Engr Bn repaired several soft spots under the runway and parking apron.

(5) 26th Engr Bn Operations.

a. Combat Engineer Support.

(i) Minesweeping.

(a) Daily minesweeping of Liz, Pat City, Hawk Hill, and the Sniper Range access roads continued. With training provided by B/26, the responsibility for the daily sweep of the Liz access road was turned over to the 1/20 Inf on 6 April.

(b) In support of division and province convoys, B/26 periodically swept route 529 from Binh Son to Tra Bong, and D/26 assisted the 39th Engr Bn in the sweep of route 533 from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc. Additional mine-sweeps were conducted by B/26 on the Stinson access road to resupply the 99th LCC, and on the Ky My road to resupply the 26th LTC.

(c) In conjunction with the 26th Engr Bn's road construction program, minesweeps were conducted each morning on the Hui Lac Son to Center road, the Ky My road, the Tien Phuoc to Pleasantville road, and the Stinson road.

(2) LZ Preparation. Engineer Alpha and Bravo LZ/PZ preparation teams cleared three LZ's at Nui Don Da (BT282120), Annette (AT965476), and Hill 510 (AT945405). Two more LZ's are now in progress at H'11 350 (AT812 757) and Hill 848 (BS417925). All of the above LZ's were swept for mines and booby traps and the surrounding area cleared for fields of fire.

(3) Tactical Wire Installation. From 5-18 Nov 70, E/26 installed 600 meters of the 23d Inf Div's improved tactical wire system to strengthen the perimeter in Subsector IV. From 24-25 Jan 71, E/26 with personnel support from B/26, D/26 and the 198th Inf Bde installed 1000 meters of tactical wire around the beach POL farm. In February, B/26 installed 2200 meters of tactical wire around the other POL farm at the south end of

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the post and installed 1100 meters of chain link fence around the Chu Lai power plant. An additional 2100 meters of tactical wire were installed around the battalion's perimeter by D/26.

b. Land Clearing.

(1) Phase I - Batangan. During this operation from 14 Nov to 22 Dec 70, the 26th LCT cleared 706 acres, and destroyed 167 meters of tunnels 490 meters of trenches, 20 fighting positions, and 16 bunkers. Dozers detonated 9 anti-personnel mines.

(2) Phase II - Batangan. Following a maintenance stand down, the 26th LCT returned to the Batangan during the period 7 Jan to 21 Feb 71, and cleared 1,412 acres. Sixty seven bunkers, 4 fighting positions, 306 meters of tunnels, and 50 meters of trenches were destroyed. Fourteen anti-personnel mines were detonated.

(3) Stinson. In conjunction with road building, 26th LCT cleared 674 acres during the period 11-30 Mar 71. Twelve bunkers and 25 meters of tunnels were destroyed. Seven anti-personnel mines were detonated.

(4) Phase I - Ky My. To support the construction of three PP outposts, the 26th LCT cleared 204 acres from 4 to 8 Mar 71. No enemy positions were found. Eight anti-personnel mines were detonated.

(5) Phase II - Ky My. Returning to Ky My on 6 April 71, the 26th LCT began clearing the priority one area of the 1971 land clearing program. Statistics on this operation will be reflected in the next ORLL report.

c. Road Construction.

(1) Center Access Road. From 15 Feb to 28 Mar 71, A/26 upgraded 15 km of dry weather road from Ross to Center. A thirty foot 60" CMP was installed between Ross and Nui Lac Son. Two small bridges were redecked with PSP and a 50 foot timber bridge was built between Nui Lac Son and Center. One and one half kms of new road were constructed up the side of the mountain to the fire base. On 4 April 71, equipment and supplies belonging to the 3-21 Inf were extracted using this road.

(2) HL 586 - Ky My Road. To support pacification and resettlement in Quang Tin Province, A/26 upgraded 10 km of dry weather road on HL 586 to the vicinity of BT182221 and constructed two access roads to PP OP's on Hills 35 and 173. A 90 ft DS Bailey bridge was built at BT263253 to bypass a damaged Eifel bridge. Work continues on repairing the Eifel bridge.

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(3) HL 527 - Stinson Road. During the period 16 Feb to 4 April 71, B/26 upgraded 10 km of dry weather road to Stinson. One 48" and eight 36" CMP culverts were installed. Progress was greatly hampered by enemy mining and sniper activity.

(4) HL 518. Between 5 Nov and 24 Dec 70, B/26 repaired HL 518 to PSB 411 for division convoys. One 48" CMP culvert was installed, pot holes were repaired, and the road was ditched and crowned.

(5) HL 525. During the period 8 to 28 Feb 71, B/26 repaired HL 525 in the Batangan to support resupply of the 26th LCT. One 48" CMP culvert was installed and 973 cubic yards of laterite were spread and compacted.

e. Tactical Bridging Support.

(1) QL-1. During the month of November, two tropical storms flooded the division area and washed out a number of bridges on QL-1. Throughout the month, E/26 was tasked to perform bridging missions. On 1 Nov 70, E/26 installed a 38'4" fixed span at bridge #104 and a 23'4" fixed span at bridge #105. E/26 supported C/26 on 4 Nov by building a 70' DS Bailey at bridge #99C. On 9 Nov, E/26 installed a 45' fixed span at bridge 99C. Also on the same day, E/26 removed the 38'4" fixed span at bridge #104. The following day E/26 removed the 70' DS Bailey and the 45' fixed span at bridge #99C. On 28 Nov, E/26 installed a six float normal M476 at bridge #106. On 4 Dec, this float bridge was removed. On 31 Dec, a 30' fixed span was placed at bridge #86. On 25 Feb, E/26 provided personnel and technical assistance to B Co for the construction of a 90' DS Bailey at bridge #87. On 27 Feb, E/26 with elements of D/26 and B/26 constructed a 315' M476 float bridge at the same site and then removed the 90' DS Bailey. The float bridge was removed on 14 Mar 71.

(2) HL 529. A 60' DS Bailey was installed at BS537883 on the 26th of Dec to facilitate construction of a timber bridge by the 103d ARVN Engr Bn. The mission was accomplished by a combined force of E/26 and one plt from the 103d ARVN Engrs. This bridge was removed by the 103d ARVN Engr Bn on 16 March. On 6-8 April, E/26 and the 103d ARVN Engr Bn installed four dry spans to open the road for a division convoy on 10 April 71.

(3) HL 586. A 90' DS Bailey was installed at BT263253 by E/26 and A/26 to bypass a damaged Rifele bridge.

e. Fire base/OP Construction.

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(1) LZ Marge. From 16-27 Jan 71, A/26 reopened LZ Marge. The project included clearing fields of fire, digging a communications trench, preparing four gun pads, and constructing a helipad and a lookout pad.

(2) LZ Professional. This project commenced 21 April with B/26 providing the effort. To date construction has included 8 living bunkers, an ammo bunker, 5 gun pads, an aid station, and an interior road. Work is still in progress.

(3) During the period Dec 70 to Feb 71, C/26 constructed seven OP's at Legionnaire, Warrior, Woodstock, Wink, Pax, Frag, and Patty for eventual turnover and occupation by PP forces. Engineer effort consisted of pushing up defensive berms, laying tactical wire, and building and installing bunkers.

(4) Fire base Upgrade. Upgrade of existing fire bases during this period included bunker construction at West, Siberia, Maryanne, San Juan Hill, and Dottie and interior road construction at Liz, Fat City, Bronco, and Hawk Hill.

(5) Mess Hall and Shower Point Construction. In Dec 70, a survey was conducted to examine mess hall facilities at all the fire bases in the division's TAOR. Results showed that a number of these facilities had deteriorated or were non-existent. As a result, five 20'x64' bunker halls were constructed at Stinson, Ky Tra, Center, Maryanne, and West; and four above ground 40'x60' mess halls were built at Dottie, Liz, 411 and San Juan Hill. In addition, seven showers were built at West, Maryanne, Dottie and Stinson (2), Liz and 411. One shower remains to be installed at San Juan Hill.

(6) Refuel/Rearm Points. To support Division and ARVN operations in the western portion of the AO, rearm/refuel points were constructed at Rawhide, Tra Bong, Tien Phuoc refuel point and Minh Long (Rearm point). Scope of these projects included building four 20'x22' helipads at each point, an ammo bunker for the rearm point, and three to four 30'x35' berms for the POL bladders.

f. The Battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows:

- (1) HHC, B Co, D Co, E Co, - Chu Lai.
- (2) A Co, - Camp Pardue, Da Nang.
- (3) C Co, - FSB Brance

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D. Logistica.

1. (U) General: The period 1 November - 30 April 1971 was highlighted by continued support of forward fire support bases under adverse monsoon conditions, phase down of monsoon stockage on fire support bases and preparation for the dry season. Continuous emphasis was required to take advantage of those periods of good weather to restock forward supplies depleted during bad weather. Extended periods of bad weather which would not permit resupply by sea placed the Division in a critical position on Class III and Class V on three occasions. Emergency resupply by surface was required. Continued emphasis was placed on reduction of excesses and turn-in of unneeded equipment to facilitate eventual phase down. Support of a major operation (LAMSON 719) by elements of the Division taxed the logistic system of the Division to the maximum. Careful management of reduced assets of men and materiel was required to insure adequate support to all forces. Plans were made and coordination effected to support the move of the 196th Infantry Brigade from Quang Tin to Quang Nam Province. In the very latter part of the period redeployment planning was revived with staff responsibility being vested with the ACofS, G4.

2. (C) Services Division. a. Class I.

(1) Batteries: Effective 1 November 1970 subordinate units in the Division were suballocated BS-30's and BS4386's. On 12 Jan 71, BA-1100's were suballocated. The initial allocations were based on end item density but weighted in favor of combat units. The suballocation has had three major readjustments since then, raising further the proportion of batteries going to combat units.

(2) The major problem in implementation was failure of the supporting supply system to deliver the required number of batteries during November and December. Division requirements have been met since December. The Division's allocation has been raised as shown below:

| | <u>BA-30</u> | <u>BA-4386</u> | <u>BA-1100</u> |
|------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|
| May 1970 | 43,008 | 8,000 | N/A |
| June 1970 | 44,000 | 15,000 | N/A |
| April 1971 | 48,400 | 15,800 | 800 |

It is adequate for the Division's current operations.

b. Class III. (1) The Division continued to operate under a allocation system for Mogas and Diesel fuel controlled by XXIV Corps. The allocation for Mogas has increased slightly over the last three quarters and that of

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Diesel fuel has dropped 20%.

(2) The Division has not had much difficulty staying within its allocation. With the movement of 196th Brigade to Da Nang, there should be a further drop in POL consumption as the convoy requirement is reduced.

(3) Probably the most sensitive problem in Class III was the shortage of trioxans bars during the rainy season. Throughout the Division, two bars were desired per meal, combat individual - one to heat the meal and one to heat a beverage. Shipment consistently fell short of this requirement in spite of repeated requests. The advent of the dry season has alleviated the problem.

c. Class IV. (1) Beginning with the past six months control of allocated Class IV items passed from USARV to the Support Commands. The immediate effect was a 72% cut in the Division allocation of plywood and small size lumber. After justification was given to Da Nang Support Command, the allocations were raised to 103% of the original allocation.

(2) The allocation is sufficient for all necessary construction within the Division, however in-country shortages and lack of shipping limit the amount actually received. The Division was allocated 4,000 coils of concertina per month. This in itself is insufficient at current usage rate but the Division has sufficient concertina on hand for operations. If usage rate continues at the current level, ACoS, G4, will seek a higher allocation.

(3) The fire base mess hall project and the joint CP construction project were the biggest users of lumber during the past six months and necessitated special requests to insure that the Division would have enough material on hand to continue other projects.

d. Class V. (1) The number of ammunition items under allowable supply rate (ASR) has decreased during this quarter to seven items. Supply from Da Nang to Chu Lai and from other ASP's to Da Nang has caused shortage in M16A1's without accessories and 155mm propellant charges. The latter was brought to light by a records error in ASP105. The Da Nang Support Command ACoS, Ammunition is taking action to eliminate these problems.

(2) The Management Operating Rate (MOR) was initiated with the 24 December - 24 January Class V allocation period. The MOR differs from ASR in that it is a management guideline, not an absolute limit on expenditure. 'Class' management should keep a unit below the MOR unless operational requirements force it above that figure.

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(3) The deciding factor as to whether an MOR or ASR is employed is the depot stockage. Above 40 days the MOR applies; for 40 days or below the ASR is used. This varied somewhat depending on the status of incoming shipments.

e. The 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry represented the Division in Corps competition for the Phillip A. Connally Award. The unit was selected to represent XXIV Corps on 22 Dec 70. On 12 Jan 71 a USARV Team inspected the mess, awarding a score of 81.25. On 20 Jan 71 it was announced by USARV the 4th Bn, 3d Inf was one of two finalists that will be inspected by USARPAC during 26-29 Jan 71. The USARPAC Team arrived on 27 Jan 71. 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry was chosen as the USARPAC representative in the Department of Army Competition. The DA Team is scheduled to arrive 17-20 May 71.

(4) (U) Supply Division, a. Preparation for the monsoon season continued as well as resupply to maintain monsoon stockage levels. At the end of the monsoon season, stockage levels were drawn down to normal operating levels. The success of continuous logistical support during the monsoon season was directly attributed to the prior preparations taken.

b. Preparations were also initiated for the approaching dry season. Submission of requisition and stockage of water storage containers, dust control products, fuels, insect control measures and preventative maintenance requirement were initiated.

c. A provisional Light Truck Company was organized and equipped from Division assets and assigned to the 23d S&T Bn. This Company operated in support of LAMSON 719 in conjunction with Da Nang Support Command units. A new Provisional Ranger Company was also organized and equipped from within Divisional assets. All equipment for both of these provisional units was obtained by cross levelling from all Divisional units. Cross levelling of $\frac{1}{2}$ ton and $\frac{3}{4}$ ton vehicles within the Division was accomplished and approved operating levels established. This insured an equal distribution of available $\frac{3}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicles to meet operation requirements.

d. Logistical support for units committed to LAMSON 719 was accomplished by expedited supply actions to fill critical shortages, cross levelling of existing Division assets and redistribution on hand and received equipment and supplies. DISCOM furnished a Forward Support Element (FSE) with the 11th Bde at Dong Ha as well as Division Liaison Team personnel at Quang Tri for Division units OPCON to the 1/5 Inf, and the 101st Div. The FSE provided support for all classes of supply from within the established logistical channels. Aviation logistical support was provided by DSU elements

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of 16th CAG. Prior coordination and planning with XXIV Corps, 101st Div and Da Nang Support Command was highly effective and insured continuous logistical support. Visits by personnel of the ACofS, G4 and DISCOM maintained contact with forward units.

e. M203 Grenade Launchers replaced the M79's on hand in the Division. Due to the change over from Qui Nhon Depot to Da Nang in November 1971, issue of supplies and equipment was extremely curtailed for three (3) months due to the loss of a large quantity of requisitions. These requisitions were re-established but TOE and stockage quantities were continuously short until March 1971. By means of expedited supply action, command correspondence and personal liaison, critical shortages were satisfied.

f. Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) items were continuously in short supply: insect repellents, insecticides, paper products, plastic wire, paper, stencils, printing ink, mess hall cleaning supplies, office supplies and locks. In March 71 all of these shortages were eliminated and normal shortage of supplies were maintained except for locks.

g. Continued emphasis was placed on the identification, accountability and disposition of excess. The Division Asset Reduction Team identified property valued at \$2,676,838.00. This equipment was placed on accountable records or laterally transferred to satisfy unit shortages. Accountability for previously unreported equipment valued at \$564,199.00 was established IAW the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Program (VARP). Equipment valued at \$1,760,318.00 was reduced from authorization levels under the provisions of USARV Reg 310-32 Turn-in of Unneeded TOE/HOE. 311 Reports of Survey were processed on equipment valued at \$729,208.00.

h. Thru the continued conduct of the monthly G4/S4 Conferences, an exchange of information and problem areas between the Division logistical elements and the unit S4 proved highly beneficial. The ACofS, G4 also conducted two (2) Logistics Orientation Classes for newly assigned unit supply and maintenance officers and NCO's. These orientation classes were presented to acquaint newly assigned supply and maintenance personnel with the logistics procedures within the Division as well as the logistical support provided by non-divisional units.

5. (U) Maintenance Division. a. The 23d Infantry Division CMMI Team conducted 13 courtesy and 21 record inspections during the months of Nov to Dec. Two (2) units received a satisfactory rating on the second inspection. Effective 31 December AR 750-S and USARV Reg 750-S were suspended. The CMMI has been changed to Command Maintenance Management Assistance.

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The annual visit is now a tool to be used by the commander in improving the overall readiness of his unit. Since the change, the team has made 17 courtesy visits and 13 follow-up assistance visits.

b. The 100% M16A1 Muzzle bore erosion check was completed on 29 Nov. 22,252 weapons were inspected with 2,531 barrels changed.

c. During the half year the division retrograded a total of 599.1 serviceable tons excess and 1997.6 unserviceable tons excess which amounted to a \$6.466 million dollar estimated value shipped.

d. Effective 1 December repair parts support was shifted from Qui Nhon Depot to Da Nang Depot. Demand data was lost in the shift and the Division lost 80% of its outstanding requisitions. This resulted in a repair parts shortage which lasted for two months. Strict coordination must be made by depots to insure this does not happen on future changes.

e. 773 M293's were received in this Division in November on a one for one switch with M79's. A maximum effort was placed to secure all the M79's and return them to Depot. In late March 617 additional M203's were received. In late April 523 more M203's were received. The exchange program is continuing.

f. Project Scrub was conducted with a DA Civilian Team visiting the Division to "scrub it clean" of all excess. The team classified 67 lines, 147 tons, amounting to a value of \$411,000.00.

g. Excessive amounts of electronic equipment were deadlined for lack of repair parts. A maximum effort was placed with the ADC(S) talking with the DCG/Material USARV to obtain the parts. The majority of the parts have been obtained, but some still remain to be received.

6. Division Support Command. a. 23d Support and Transportation Battalion.

(1) The Battalion mission throughout the reporting period continued at a scope larger than normally intended Division Supply and Transport Battalion level. This is directly a result of the size of the 23d Infantry Division.

(2) The Motor Transport Company underwent far reaching changes within the reporting period. A light cargo platoon was converted into a medium stake and platform platoon. This change enhanced the capability of the Battalion to perform "line haul" missions within the Division area of

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operations. The Motor Transport Company logged over 60,000,000 ton miles during the period. Cargos consisted of Classes I, II, III (Bulk) and IV to Fire Support Base Hawk Hill and Fire Support Base Bronco. Bulk Class III was carried to Quang Ngai, while Tien Phuoc received Classes II, IV and V. The line haul missions consisted of convoying Class II and IV from the US Army Depot Da Nang to the Division Base Camp at Chu Lai.

(3) In keeping with the general reduced combat sweeps in the Division AO, tactical convoys to forward areas were on the marked decrease. Khe Sanh and Tien Phuoc were however visited by the convoys of the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion. Of particular interest was the sending of a detachment from the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion to the 11th Infantry Brigade at Dong Ha for support of the Brigade's efforts during Operation JEFFERSON GLENN.

(4) The supply portion of the mission was also represented during "Jefferson Glenn". Dong Ha became an FSB and the 23d Supply and Transport Battalion provided Class I, II, IV and III supply as well as bath service.

(5) The highlight of the reporting period however was the formation of a completely unique company sized organization known as "C" Company 23d Supply and Transport Battalion. With the requirements as a result of LAMSON 719, the Battalion organization was increased to include this "fourth" unit. The assets required in both equipment and personnel were brought together from numerous organizations within the Division, organized and committed to the support of the ARVN incursion into Laos. This unit was formed from 23d Infantry Division assets on 25 January 1971, and within 48 hours, deployed to augment the movement of various 11th Infantry Brigade and 16th CAG units to Quang Tri and Khe Sanh. Company C was attached to the 39th Transportation Battalion (truck) for the duration of Operation LAMSON 719 and transported essential supplies along QL9 from FSB Vandegrift to Khe Sanh. Until its withdrawal on 3 April 1971, the unit's 48 five ton cargo vehicles had transported more than 500 million ton miles. On 8 and 9 April 1971, Company C again assisted 23d Infantry Division elements to return to Chu Lai and Duc Pho. Its mission completed, Company C was inactivated on 23 April 1971.

b. 23d Medical Battalion.

(1) During the reporting period six operations were supported: FIRNEY HILL, MIDDLESEX PEAK, FREDERICK HILL, IRON MOUNTAIN, GENEVA PARK and JEFFERSON GLEN. Only JEFFERSON GLEN involved the relocation of units assigned to this battalion. The move of B Company to the north in support of the 11th Infantry Brigade was accomplished by motor convey. D Company

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likewise moved into the facility vacated by B Company. Vehicles organic to the battalion were used and no outside assets had to be requested.

(2) The greatest difficulty encountered in the redeployment was assembling equipment needed by B Company to meet possible contingencies in the new area of operations. The adverse impact of the retrograde program was felt at this time. Units of the battalion had turned-in items not used regularly in a semifixed environment, which consequently, reduced their ability to function fully in a field location. A shortage of vehicles which allowed only two of the four companies to be one-hundred per cent mobile was one of the larger problems. By careful redistribution and by maintaining only minimum transportation assets at the two static companies, the task of moving two entire companies was accomplished. The lack of common repair parts such as carburetors, wheel bearings and master cylinders, needed to put deadlined vehicles into use, compounded the situation.

(3) The need for coordination between division level and army level medical services in operations such as JEFFERSON GLEN was definitely required but not established. The medical company that deployed with the 11th Brigade was not gainfully employed in its supporting role to receive casualties because of the proximity of a surgical hospital. Patients were overflowed to the hospital by helicopter ambulances. In view of this situation the medical company was made available to augment personnel resources of the hospital and to expand patient care facilities. The company was not, however so utilized by the hospital.

(4) Effective 1 April, Headquarters and A Company, 23d Medical Battalion assumed the mission of providing division level medical service to the 198th Infantry Brigade. This task had been performed by D Company. This added to A Company's basic mission of providing unit level medical service to divisional units operating in the division rear area.

E. Civil Military Operations.

1. (U) Organization

a. During the reporting period, the following officer personnel were assigned to the G5 section: LTC Bobby G. Evans, G5; MAJ Frank T. Peterlin, Deputy G5; MAJ Humberto F. Olivers, Deputy G5; CPT Charles M. Mochow, Asst CA Officer; CPT Luis R. Lizardi, Quang Nam (P) Liaison Officer; 1LT James N. Murphy, Asst PSYOP Officer and 1LT Daniel J. Boccolucci, Administration Officer.

b. On 19 April 1971, the 6th Platoon of the 29th Civil Affairs Company

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was released from direct support of the 23d Division and returned to its parent organization at Da Nang.

2. (U) Operations.

a. Community Relations: In an effort to maintain and constantly improve US/VN relations, the 23d Division continues its active sponsorship of and participation in Friendship Councils. The Friendship Council membership is composed of representatives from the military and civilian communities and meets each month for discussion of mutual problems which, if ignored, could seriously damage US/VN relations. Each brigade and the Division Headquarters currently sponsor a Friendship Council.

b. Accident Reaction Teams: In order to quell US/VN confrontations which often erupt as a result of highway traffic accidents, the 23d Division has established Accident Reaction Teams for the purpose of effecting rapid solarium payment and claim settlement. Each major subordinate command and the Division Headquarters has a team, the composition of which is as follows:

(1) Major Subordinate Command

Claim Investigator

Solarium Payment Officer

Interpreter

(2) Division Headquarters Team

AC ofS, G5

Provost Marshal

Foreign Claims Commissioner

Interpreter

c. MEDCAP II: As one of the most widely practiced and well received programs being conducted, the MEDCAP is fully supported by the units of the 23d Division. MEDCAP results during the reporting period are as follows:

| UNIT | MEDCAPS | TREATED |
|----------|---------|---------|
| 11th Bde | 488 | 24, 490 |

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| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>MEDCAPS</u> | <u>TREATED</u> |
|--------------|----------------|----------------|
| 196th Bde | 732 | 16,892 |
| 198th Bde | 195 | 32,286 |
| 1-1 Cav | 247 | 3,327 |
| DIVARTY | 377 | 28,596 |
| 26th Engr Bn | 56 | 2,465 |
| DISCOM | 44 | 2,135 |

d. Police Substations: Construction of National Police Substations throughout the Division's TAOI has been emphasized as a project of high priority as they will introduce a new measure to territorial security and Gvn influence to interior areas. Continuing coordination is being made to turn excess SEA Huts over to province authorities for construction of the Substations.

e. Civic Action Materials: In support of civic action projects throughout the TAOI, civic action materials are given to province officials when these materials are not available through ARVN or GVN channels. Major materials donated during the reporting period are as follows:

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>QUANTITY</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| Health and Medical Supplies | 7,031 |
| Lumber | 54,800 bd feet |
| Roofing Tin | 798 |
| Cement | 111 bags |

f. Refugees: The refugee population in the Division's TAOI continues to be a cause for concern, but through a concerted US/ARVN/GVN effort, the refugees are being resettled into new areas. The refugee count in the Division's TAOI as of 31 December 1970 is as follows:

| <u>PROVINCE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|
| Quang Nam | 5,019 |

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| <u>PROVINCE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|
| Quang Tine | 18,299 |
| Quang Ngai | 18,090 |

3. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification

a. Population Security: Following is the status of population in A & B rated hamlets within the Division's TAOI as of 31 March 1971:

| <u>PROVINCE</u> | <u>% POPULATION A & B</u> | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|--------|
| Quang Nam | 302,600 | 50.3% |
| Quang Tén | 263,100 | 64.8 % |
| Quang Ngai | 365,600 | 49.7% |

b. Peoples Self Defense Force: Following is the status of the PSDF within the Division's TAOI as of 31 March:

| <u>PROVINCE</u> | <u>ORGANIZED</u> | <u>TRAINED</u> | <u>ARMED</u> |
|-----------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Quang Nam | 152,318 | 136,057 | 12,236 |
| Quang Tin | 95,780 | 95,780 | 13,532 |
| Quang Ngai | 107,440 | 91,819 | 17,505 |

c. During the reporting period, the number of Hoi Chanks returning to GVN control within the 23d Inf Div TAOI are:

| <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 293 | 496 | 303 | 161 | 126 | 75* |

*Statistics include Quang Nam Province

d. VCY are considered to be neutralized when they are (1) killed, (2) rallied, (3) captured and sentenced for a period of at least one year. VCY neutralized within the 23d Div TAOI during the reporting period are:

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| <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 261 | 350 | 287 | 221 | 200 | 381* |

*Statistics include Quang Nam Province.

4. (U) PSYOP Activities (Nov 1970 - Apr 1971)

a. Leaflet dissemination missions

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

| <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 466 | 454 | 987 | 1,684 | 1,972 | 1,953 |

(2) By organic resources.

| <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 161 | 442 | 481 | 404 | 395 | 406 |

b. Leaflets disseminated by campaign (Thousands)

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

| <u>CAMPAIN</u> | <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Chieu Hoi | 5,667 | 4,365 | 9,722 | 26,580 | 21,126 | 27,875 |
| Pro-GVN | 837 | 136 | 2,032 | 1,125 | 225 | 140 |
| Anti-VC/NVA | 596 | 408 | 512 | 225 | 1,033 | 2,302 |
| Rewards | 240 | 331 | 340 | 2,492 | 4,209 | 2,273 |
| Resources Denial | 1,067 | 680 | 1,600 | 2,288 | 833 | 725 |
| Family Reunion | 200 | 170 | 300 | 185 | 300 | 307 |

(2) By organic resources.

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| <u>CAMPAIGN</u> | <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Chieu Hoi | 2,653 | 7,811 | 6,915 | 6,748 | 2,444 | 3,444 |
| Pro-GVN | 86 | 202 | 632 | 502 | 324 | 152 |
| Anti-VC/NVA | 759 | 1,011 | 555 | 1,055 | 480 | 1,160 |
| Rewards | 1,234 | 1,108 | 1,770 | 1,690 | 1,200 | 1,910 |
| Resources Denial | 800 | 486 | 320 | 335 | 165 | 1,160 |
| Family Reunion | 2,697 | 2,062 | 1,196 | 1,470 | 340 | 232 |

c. Tape broadcast missions:

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft.

| <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 358 | 269 | 673 | 972 | 1,325 | 1,271 |

(2) By organic resources.

| <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 250 | 525 | 503 | 533 | 575 | 591 |

d. Tape broadcast time by campaigns

(1) By 9th SOS aircraft:

| <u>CAMPAIGN</u> | <u>NOV</u> | <u>DEC</u> | <u>JAN</u> | <u>FEB</u> | <u>MAR</u> | <u>APR</u> |
|------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Chieu Hoi | 5:30 | 4:10 | 35:00 | 42:00 | 18:15 | 37:00 |
| Pro-GVN | 1:00 | 1:55 | 1:35 | 1:30 | 1:00 | 1:55 |
| Anti-VC/NVA | 1:35 | 1:40 | 1:20 | 1:05 | 15:30 | 10:15 |
| Rewards | 1:05 | 1:00 | 7:00 | 7:35 | 15:30 | 10:15 |
| Resources Denial | 1:25 | 1:25 | 2:00 | 1:30 | 1:50 | 1:05 |
| Family Reunion | 2:00 | 1:00 | 7:20 | 2:30 | 1:10 | 2:35 |

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(2) By organic resources.

| CAMPAIGN | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | MAR | APR |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Chieu Hoi | 14:20 | 49:40 | 47:10 | 35:45 | 25:10 | 53:20 |
| Pro-GVN | 1:15 | 2:30 | 1:50 | 1:50 | 4:45 | 1:45 |
| Anti-VC/NVA | 5:45 | 11:00 | 3:15 | 8:15 | 7:45 | 11:05 |
| Rewards | 2:00 | 7:05 | 16:00 | 10:30 | 9:55 | 15:55 |
| Resources Denial | 1:20 | 2:25 | 2:00 | 1:30 | 1:00 | 10:55 |
| Family Reunion | 12:05 | 12:10 | 9:35 | 8:20 | 3:35 | 2:15 |

e. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts:

| | NOV | DEC | JAN | FEB | MAR | APR |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Missions | 52 | 61 | 57 | 76 | 63 | 70 |
| Broadcast hours | 113:30 | 147:10 | 124:30 | 189:30 | 146:00 | 201:20 |
| Leaflet disseminated (Thousands) | 991 | 1,264 | 17 | 1,106 | 244 | 1,410 |

f. Artillery leaflet dissemination:

| | NOV | DEC | JAN* |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|------|
| Number of rounds fired | 404 | 321 | 135 |
| Leaflets disseminated (Thousands) | 201 | 193 | 85 |

*Artillery missions terminated on 20 January 1971.

5. (U) Recent significant PSYOP results.

a. During the reporting period considerable emphasis has been placed on combined PSYOP with the 2d ARVN Division and with Vietnamese district officials in Quang Ngai Province. In January, an ARVN officer

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from G5, 2d ARVN Division was attached to the PSYOP branch, G5, 23d Inf Div to train in the targeting and operational techniques of the PSYOP program. In addition he was trained in the use of the UH-6 loud-speaker system which is used in conjunction with the organic helicopter. Beginning in January, the Quang Ngai Province PSYOP Advisor coordinated, combined PSYOP missions with Vietnamese district officials and the PSYOP Branch, G5, 23d Inf Div. Since January, periodic combined missions have been conducted with Vietnamese officials from Son Tinh, Binh Son, Tu Nghia, Ba To, Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts.

b. On 17 Nov, a Montagnard VC nurse rallied to a PF outpost in northern Tu Nghia (D), Quang Ngai (P). A special tape was developed exploiting, her and used in the area for the next week. During that week an additional 9 Montagnards rallied in the vicinity where missions had been conducted.

c. Extensive land clearing, night operations and shortage of food and medical supplies set the stage for a lucrative target for PSYOP exploitation in the Batangan Peninsula. From 3 Dec to 28 Jan an intensive campaign was conducted in this area. In addition to normal PSYOP resources, a special O2B aircraft was assigned on a daily mission to the 198th Inf Bde. The 7th PSYOP Bn attached a loudspeaker (HB) team to the 1st Br, 6th Inf to support friendly ground operations. As returnees came in, they would be used to broadcast to their comrades which proved to very effective. Upon completion of the campaign, 92 Hoi Chanh had returned to GVN control.

d. A similar intensified program was conducted in Son Tinh (D), Quang Ngai (P) west of LZ Stinson during the period 1-15 Jan. The early-word broadcast was used extensively and a total of 12 Hoi Chanh returned to GVN control.

e. It was found that all audio-visual (HE) teams' missions had to be coordinated at the district level, normally through the District Senior Advisors. In order to facilitate this coordination, the 23d Inf Div released control of the HE teams on 7 Feb to the Province PSYOP Advisors in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The teams are still available for support of 23d Inf Div units on a special mission basis by coordination with Det 3, Co B, 7th PSYOP Bn.

f. On 1 Feb, a Montagnard guerrilla rallied to the Son Ha District Headquarters in Quang Ngai Province. Upon interrogation, he revealed that the NVA were recruiting local Montagnard guerrillas for replacements in main force units in the lowlands. Also morale of the Montagnard was low because of artillery harassment and small unit operations. Tapes were produced exploiting this intelligence using the Montagnard Bru dialect.

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These tapes were used in conjunction with both organic and 9th SOS serial missions in Son Ha District. During the period 1-15 Feb, 55 Montagnards local VC rallied to the RVN.

F. (U) Personnel.

1. Provost Marshal.

a. A Military Police Selective Enforcement Team (Strike Force) composed of six (6) Military Policemen was initiated on 1 Feb 71 for special operations to include traffic enforcement, AWDL apprehension and perimeter security. The use of traffic mirror boxes was initiated and highway QL#1 was marked with white stripes to facilitate the use of aerial observation and detection of speeders. Extensive publicity was utilized to inform the command of the program. The Strike Force is employed to conduct extensive shakedowns at exit gates and surveillances of the Chu Lai perimeter with special emphasis on the interdiction of local nationals attempting to enter the base through the perimeter.

b. During the last quarter of 1970 the 23d Military Police Company experienced critical personnel shortages in military policemen which reduced the capability of mission accomplishment. Division resolved the personnel shortage by authorizing qualified personnel in other MOS's to be reassigned to the 23d MP Co. Minimum qualifications required a GT of 100, record of good conduct, and volunteer for the duty. On 24 and 25 December, sixty-five individuals were officially transferred to the Company, bringing its authorized manning level to 110% strength. Because 95B MOS replacements were not available this policy continued until 31 Mar 71.

c. USARV General Order 1294, dated 19 Apr 71, attached the 300th Military Police Company to the Division to conduct Military police operations in support of the Division and to operate Combined Police Stations in the Division area of operations. Prior to its attachment the 300th Military Police Company participated in Operation DEWEY CANYON II, providing road security and convoy escort on Highway QL#9 between Dong Ha and The Sanh.

d. On 15 Jan 71 the Provost Marshal, in cooperation with Quang Tin PSA, formulated a Joint Narcotics Suppression Team composed of ARVN CID, National Police and 23d Infantry Division CID. This team, recently augmented with National Police from Quang Ngai Province, has conducted eight joint raids, resulting in the seizure of nearly 2300 vials of heroin, 1700 marijuana cigarettes, 1750 grams of loose marijuana, over 1000 Binoctal and Immenoctal tablets, over \$1,000,000 NV and various quantities of other drugs and narcotics.

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e. In March 71, the Provost Marshal assumed responsibility for road security and convoy escort on QL#1. The 23d MP CO. received all V-100 divisional assets, achieving 100% of equipment authorized (10 armored cars). Road clearance operations are conducted daily at dawn doubled since 1 March and now include secondary roads to Tien Phuoc and Tra Bong.

f. On 1 Mar 71, one squad, 1st Platoon, 23d MP Co, in direct support of the 11th Infantry Brigade, moved from LZ Bronco, RVN, to Dong Ha Combat Base, RVN, participating in Operation DEWEY CANYON II. Members of the squad operated the Brigade POW Collection Point, operated joint patrols with the 300th MP Co and developed a VIP program on QL#9.

f. On 1 Mar 71, one squad, 1st Platoon, 23d MP Co, in direct support of the 11th Infantry Brigade, moved from LZ Bronco, RVN, to Dong Ha Combat Base, RVN, participating in Operation DEWEY CANYON II. Members of the squad operated the Brigade POW Collection Point, operated joint patrols with the 300th MP Co and developed a VIP program on QL#9.

g. Statistics revealed significant increase in the traffic accident rate within the division area of operations. In 1970 there were a total of 534 traffic accidents investigated by the Military Police. These resulted in 312 injuries and seven deaths. Through the first 3 months of 1971 there were 128 accidents and 76 injuries and 12 deaths. In an effort to halt these high rate, the Provost Marshal developed and executed a two-phase campaign of publicity and enforcement during the month of April which the CG designated Traffic Safety Month. In addition to increased traffic enforcement (368 moving violations cited in April), Vehicle Safety Inspection Checkpoints were initiated, resulting in over 300 vehicles cited for defective equipment. The enforcement effort succeeded in reducing accidents 50% although the number of injuries were not significantly reduced due to one serious accident which alone accounted for eight injuries and one death.

h. On 26 April 71, 2d Platoon, 23d MP Co, redeployed from LZ Hawk Hill to Da Nang in direct support of the 196th Inf Bde, completing the move on 7 May 71. The Platoon operates joint patrols with Co B, 504th MP Bn, at the Hoa Vang District Combined Police Station, operates two vehicle/pedestrian gates at Camp Reasoner and operates Civilian Employee Processing Gates at Camp Reasoner.

j. On 25 Feb 71 work was initiated to construct a new Processing Complex at Gate #1 to facilitate control of vehicles and employees. Located astride MSR 7 adjacent to Civilian Personnel Office, the complex is expected to be completed by 30 May 1971.

l. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. During the period Military Justice/Military Affairs continued to comprise the largest activity area. During the period, this command tried 10 general courts-martial, 36 special courts-martial in which a bad conduct

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discharge was authorized, and 287 special courts-martial; also received were 299 special courts-martial and 7 summary courts-martial for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 2226 Article 15, UCMJ, proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding to USAPSSC, Ft Benjamin Harrison, Indiana and 130 Article 15, UCMJ, appeals received for review and advice. Military Affairs actions during this period included 127 Line of Duty determinations, 99 Reports of Survey, 209 Reports of Investigation, 138 Elimination proceedings, 40 Congressional Inquiries, 846 POW/Detainee Classification reports, and 10 Collateral Investigations for review and forwarding to Department of the Army

b. Rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during this period were: .41, 1.46, 11.62, and .33 respectively.

c. The Legal Assistance Branch processed 5467 cases during the period, including but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, income tax, citizenship, general counseling, and advice.

d. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Conventions, with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the 23d Inf Div Combat Center and to the Combat Center Leadership Course. Instruction is also given on the Military Justice Act of 1968. In addition, unit instruction to include search and seizure is provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior noncommissioned officers.

e. During the period 251 claims for damages to servicemen's property were paid totalling \$10,955.22. Foreign claims are now adjudicated at this headquarters since establishment of Foreign Claims Commission #419 in February 1971 at Chu Lai, RVN, and 48 foreign claims were paid totalling 3,212.00 \$VN.

f. During this period this section has presented 119 classes on Drug Abuse at the Combat Center and at the various units to promote the Drug Amnesty Program and awareness of the problems of drug abuse.

3. (U) Division Chaplain.

a. Character Guidance Regulation 600-30 was revised.

b. Civic Action Programs - continued to assist the Catholic and Protestant orphanages in An Tan and the Catholic school and orphanage in

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Binh Son. \$3,072.10 was donated from the Chaplains Fund to aid Vietnamese orphans, schools and churches.

c. Cardinal Cooke visited the Division AO 23 December 1970.

d. Dr. Hoffman of the Lutheran Hour visited the Division AO 22 December 1970.

e. Chief of Chaplains Major General Sampson visited the Division AO 10 and 11 January 1971.

f. Four distinguished church leaders visited the Division AO 27 January 1971. Dr. C. Edward Brubaker - Chairman, The General Commission on Chaplains and Armed Forces Personnel, Robert James Marshall - President, Lutheran Church in America, Robert Verolle Mess, Jr. - President, United Church of Christ, William Phelps Thompson - Stated Clerk, The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

g. A total of six chaplains were deployed in support of Operation LARMON 719. Adequate religious coverage was provided. Even though 1-1 Cavalry has no authorized chaplain space, a chaplain has been attached to them because of their mission.

h. Area religious coverage has been emphasized during the last quarter. This provides better coverage in a highly mobile situation.

i. The Division Combat Center was host to Jewish Passover Services for Military Region I on 9-11 April 1971. Facilities were adequate and the program was successful.

j. The USO sponsored an ecumenical Sunrise Service on 11 April 1971. Attendance was good.

4. (U) Surgeon.

a. During the reporting period three drug suppression teams were formed from the Division resources. Each team is lead by an officer with a background in psychiatry, psychology, or sociology. There are also two former drug users on each team. They visit all the fire bases and OP's in the Division AO to consult with assigned personnel.

2. The malaria statistics for the period are as follows:

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| MONT | # CASES | RATES* | RATE VIVAY* |
|------|---------|--------|-------------|
| NOV | 109 | 52.3 | 24.5 |
| DEC | 95 | 43.7 | 19.2 |
| JAN | 94 | 45.1 | 18.4 |
| FEB | 50 | 26.5 | 12.2 |
| MAR | 92 | 44.1 | 17.8 |
| APR | 152 | 76.2 | 33.5 |

* Rate is expressed as cases per 1000 per year.

The fall in the malaria rates during the November to February monsoon season in the usual pattern seen during this period. It reflects the decreased mosquito population as well as the parasite's ability to reproduce in the body of the mosquito at lower temperatures.

c. During the period, an amnesty program was instituted for drug users. From 1 January 1971 to 30 April 1971, 387 persons were granted amnesty. During this same time frame, 83 failures were documented.

5. (U) Information Office.

a. News Releases (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Division ID | 253 |
| 11th Inf Bde | 133 |
| 196th Inf Bde | 127 |
| 198th Inf Bde | 124 |
| DIVARTY | 10 |

Total 652

b. Photo Releases (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Division ID | 442 |
| 11th Inf Bde | 51 |
| 196th Inf Bde | 70 |
| 198th Inf Bde | 19 |
| DIVARTY | 7 |

Total 589

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c. Published Releases/Photos

| | | | | |
|-----------------|----------|----|--------|----|
| Army Times | Releases | 50 | Photos | 11 |
| Stars & Stripes | Releases | 45 | Photos | 10 |
| | | — | | — |
| | Total | 95 | | 21 |

d. Correspondent Support (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

TOTAL: 116

e. Significant Activities (1 Nov 70 - 30 Apr 71)

- (1) Calley Deposition 26 Oct - 3 Nov 70 (All Major News Media)
- (2) Flood Damage 2 - 8 November 1970 (DASPO)
- (3) Fragging Incidents: 11-17 January 1971 (CBS)
18-25 January 1971 (CBS)
12-18 April 1971 (Overseas Weekly)
- (4) Land Clearing: 18-25 January 1971 (SEAPIC)
8-14 February 1971 (SEAPIC)
- (5) Pacification: 15-21 March 1971 (Australian Broadcast Company)
12-18 February 1971 (British Broadcast Company)
- (6) PSB Maryanne 29 Mar - 4 Apr 71 (ABC, CBS, NBC, AP, UPI, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, L'Express)
- (7) Calley Verdict: 29 March - 4 April 71 (ABC, CBS, NBC, AP, UPI)

6. (U) Command Changes.

a. The following command changes have been made during the time frame 1 November 1970 through 30 April 1971:

(1) Generals.

(a) MG James L. Baldwin assumed command of the 23d Infantry

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Division, vice MG Albert E. Milloy on 23 November 1970.

(b) BG B. K. Gorwitz assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander/Support, vice BG R. L. Atteberry on 1 March 1971.

(c) BG J. C. McDonough assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander/Maneuver, vice BG T. C. Mataxis on 21 April 1971.

(2) Colonels.

(a) COL G. P. Tilson assumed command of DISCOM on 5 March 1971, vice COL P. B. McDaniel.

(b) COL W. S. Goodwin assumed command of the 11th Inf Bde on 7 March 1971, vice COL J. L. Insani.

(c) COL C. R. Smith assumed command of the 198th Inf Bde on 19 March 1971, vice COL W. R. Richardson.

(3) Lieutenant Colonels.

(a) 6th Bn, 11th Arty, LTC G. E. Hobbs assumed command from LTC R. H. Kleinfelder on 2 November 1970.

(b) 2d Bn, 1st Inf, LTC H. G. Watson assumed command from LTC A. H. Coleman on 4 November 1970.

(c) 3d Bn, 1st Inf, LTC J. B. Luke assumed command from LTC C. J. Landry on 10 November 1970.

(d) 14th Aviation Bn (CBT), LTC J. F. Butkowsky assumed command from LTC D. E. Boyle on 14 November 1970.

(e) 3d Bn, 82d Arty, LTC R. C. Martin assumed command from LTC F. M. Zabcik on 29 November 1970.

(f) 1st Bn, 82d Arty, LTC W. P. O'Brian assumed command from LTC R. F. James on 5 December 1970.

(g) 123d Aviation Bn (CBT), LTC M. Vissers assumed command from LTC J. C. Orr on 10 December 1970.

(h) 1st Bn, 20th Inf, LTC T. W. Brogan assumed command from LTC G. P. Lynch on 14 December 1970.

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(i) 5th Bn, 46th Inf, LTC E. E. Passmore assumed command from LTC J. R. Henry on 19 December 1970.

(j) 1st Bn, 6th Inf, LTC J. E. Sawey assumed command from LTC F. F. Woerner on 9 January 1971.

(k) 4th Bn, 21st Inf, LTC V. B. Sones assumed command from LTC R. A. Witter on 12 January 1971.

(l) 3d Bn, 18th Arty, LTC F. P. Mulvey assumed command from LTC R. C. Schmidt on 18 January 1971.

(m) 723d Maintenance Bn, LTC S. J. Crabtree assumed command from LTC J. E. Harris on 18 January 1971.

(n) 3d Bn, 16th Arty, LTC E. B. Johnson assumed command from LTC T. J. Lightner on 25 January 1971.

(o) 3d Bn, 21st Inf, LTC L. W. Roberts assumed command from LTC C. P. Saint on 19 February 1971.

(p) 26th Engineer Bn, LTC T. Sands assumed command from LTC H. V. Dutchyskyn on 1 March 1971.

(q) 23d Medical Bn, MAJ T. Bowen assumed command from COL Krekorian on 4 March 1971.

(r) 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav, LTC G. L. Breeding assumed command from LTC Burnett, (MIA) on 9 March 1971.

(s) 4th Bn, 31st Inf, LTC H. S. Mitchell assumed command from LTC W. G. Hammill on 27 March 1971.

(t) 1st Bn, 46th Inf, LTC C. J. Tate assumed command from LTC W. P. Doyle on 30 March 1971.

(u) 1st Bn, 20th Inf, MAJ J. S. Peppers assumed command from LTC T. W. Brogan on 14 April 1971.

(v) 4th Bn, 3d Inf, LTC J. S. Shannon assumed command from LTC A. F. Coast (NSD) on 27 April 1971.

(2) The following staff changes have been made;

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(a) Colonels. COL W. R. Richardson assumed duties as Chief of Staff on 3 April 1971, vice A. R. Clark.

(b) Lieutenant Colonels and selected Majors.

(1) MAJ C. E. Heas assumed duties as Division Chemical Officer, vice CPT Owens on 3 November 1970.

(2) LTC R. J. Barnhart assumed duties as Division Adjutant General, vice LTC J. M. Eubanks on 10 December 1970.

(3) LTC T. S. Robinson assumed duties as Division Inspector General, vice LTC R. Black on 12 December 1970.

(4) CPT Griscom assumed duties as Acting Division Information Officer, vice MAJ Gabelia on 31 December 1970.

(5) LTC I. Moss assumed duties as Division Chaplain vice LTC T. R. Pope on 10 January 1971.

(6) MAJ R. D. Baily (JR) assumed duties as Division Information Officer vice CPT Griscom on 12 January 1971.

(7) LTC A. B. Pursell assumed duties as ACofS, G2, vice LTC. R. S. Holmes on 21 February 1971.

(8) MAJ T. Bowen assumed duties as Division Surgeon vice COL E. A. Kreherian on 4 March 1971.

(9) LTC B. G. Evans assumed duties as ACofS, G5, vice MAJ R. A. Murchison on 27 March 1971.

(10) MAJ O. L. Breck assumed duties as Acting ACofS, G1, vice LTC C. J. Tate on 30 March 1971.

(11) LTC M. T. Rogerson assumed duties as ACofS, G1, vice MAJ O. L. Brock on 27 April 1971.

(12) CPT Griscom assumed duties as Division Information Officer vice MAJ R. D. Baily (JR), on 28 April 1971.

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II. Section II, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations (U).

A. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Formation of a Joint Narcotics Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: The burgeoning narcotics problem involving servicemen in Vietnam should rate number one priority in our enforcement effort. The enforcement effort should continue to be directed at the source of supply.

(b) EVALUATION: The Joint Narcotics Team has proven effective. With continued emphasis and support it can continue to be so. The increased cooperation on the part of the National Police and ARVN CID has given the program the impetus it needs to be effective particularly in limiting and eliminating the source of supply.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued emphasis be given to this activity concentrating particularly on the source of narcotics and distributors soliciting narcotics addicts.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

2. (U) SUBJECT: Personnel Problems During Special Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The sudden build-up for the Combat Operation LAM SON 719 brought about a serious accountability problem for this headquarters.

(b) EVALUATION: In most cases, less than 24 hours notification of the need for personnel of a particular MOS was given to a battalion. In this short period of time, the needed MOS's had to be screened, the companies had to be notified, and the individuals concerned had to report to their new assignment location. Also, on account of this, almost every individual was moved without orders which further added to the accountability problem. It was not easily discernible whether the lost personnel were on TDY or had been assigned to another unit.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that a thorough study be conducted prior to a special operation as to the personnel requirements and the classification of those participating in the operation.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

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(U) Intelligence

B. (U) SUBJECT: Sensor Emplacement.

(a) OBSERVATION: Before closing down a fire base, additional sensors were emplaced to monitor any activity that might occur after the base was abandoned. After all friendly elements departed the fire base, the sensors were activated and artillery was fired on the positions with unknown results.

(b) EVALUATION: Since most fire bases are usually located on prominent terrain features or near major enemy infiltration routes, it is important to deny their use to the enemy after it has been closed down by friendly forces. The use of sensor devices in this manner provides timely intelligence and when combined with artillery fire has proved very effective.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That additional sensors be employed and monitored after closing out fire bases. The enemy usually moves into abandoned fire bases shortly after friendly troops have departed. By combining sensors and responsive artillery fire when activations occur, the use of abandoned fire bases can be denied to the enemy.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

2. (U) SUBJECT: Airborne Personnel Detector Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Airborne Personnel Detector continues to be used throughout the division as an intelligence source concerning enemy locations and activities. The usual reaction to positive readings sensed by the APD is artillery fire. The results of this reaction are unknown. Also, missions have sometimes been interrupted when visual sightings are made so that both gunships could engage the target.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to exploit positive readings immediately, while still continuing the APD mission, a Visual Reconnaissance (VR) OH-6A helicopter was added to the standard APD team on several missions. The VR OH-6A would follow approximately 300 meters behind and to the left of the APD OH-6A helicopter and investigate positive readings detected by the APD helicopter. The OH-6A while searching the area, would be under the protection of one of the gunships while the rest of the team continues the mission. Immediate reaction to confirmed readings is attained without compromising the primary mission of the APD to gain intelligence data throughout the entire designated area.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an additional OH-6A helicopter be included on all APD missions to act as a VR helicopter in order to visually confirm positive readings sensed by the APD.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

3. (C) SUBJECT: Draft Deferments For Luc Luong 66 Scouts.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 23d Infantry Division is experiencing problems due to expired draft deferments for Luc Luong 66 Scouts. MACV policy requires that applications for new draft deferments be submitted four months prior to expiration of previously granted draft deferments. After submission many applications are misplaced or ignored resulting in many scouts having expired draft deferments. The scouts are then subject to apprehension by ARVN personnel and are frequently taken into custody.

(b) EVALUATION: The present draft deferment policy is producing problems. Apprehensions by ARVN cost the government money since the apprehended scouts are still entitled to pay while in this status. In addition, a great deal of time is wasted in trying to locate scouts who have been apprehended. Further, the morale and efficiency of the scouts is effected because they are subject to apprehension.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend other units consider sending a representative to Saigon monthly for the purpose of hand carrying deferment applications. The 23d Infantry Division MI Company did this in March 1971 and received 75 new draft deferments. This effort significantly increased the effectiveness of the Luc Luong 66 Program.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

4. (C) SUBJECT: Volunteer Informant Program (VIP)

(a) OBSERVATION: Expenditures under the VIP Program for the 3d Quarter of Fiscal Year 71 were down from the previous quarters. Users of the VIP funds were provided with a quarterly ceiling not to be exceeded without the division's prior approval. The ceiling was more than sufficient, as less than 30 percent of available funds were spent during this quarter. During the period there were always sufficient funds on hand for advance to using units. No funds were frozen as in the past when VIP Officers were suddenly assigned to field duties or evacuated without being able to clear their account beforehand. Placing VIP funds under control of Battalion and Brigade S-2's achieved more control of the funds and placed more emphasis on gaining intelligence. The S-2's have maintained excellent coordination

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with the Class "A" Agent Officer and have solved many potential problems. It is anticipated that there will be an increase in VIP expenditures during the last quarter of Fiscal year 71; however, total expenditures for the year are not expected to equal the amount budgeted by MACV.

(b) EVALUATION: There has not been an increase in the amount of intelligence information collected through the VIP Program, because emphasis has been on purchasing ammunition rather than on intelligence collection. With the unit S-2's controlling the funds, the division has been able to stabilize prices paid for ammunition and redirect the program toward intelligence collection.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) Commanders and their respective S-2's be advised of the status of VIP funds at least quarterly. This information should be based on feeder data submitted by the Class A Officer, ICP.

(2) The program continue to be administered through the Brigade's S-2 and intelligence channels.

(3) Continue to brief newly assigned S-2's and intelligence personnel on their responsibility to obtain maximum intelligence for the VIP dollar and not to accept receipts contrary to appropriate regulations and guidance from the Division Class "A" Agent Officer.

(4) The Class "A" Agent be informed in advance of any contemplated moves of units or VIP Officers so that he can take action to continue the availability of funds for the respective unit.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

(5) (C) SUBJECT: Update Trail Study Data Base

(a) OBSERVATION: The Imagery Interpretation Section was assigned the task of updating a trail study in the western portion of Quany Tin Province near the Laotian border. The mission presented a problem because the area was large (400 sq km), and predominately overcast with a 3,000 to 5,000 foot ceiling. It was also desirable that the number of photographs be kept to a minimum.

(b) EVALUATION: Previously used methods of employing high performance aircraft for photographing trails for study have proved ineffective due to the difficulty in following the trail from the air. In addition, the altitude required by high performance aircraft is such that they cannot operate in areas where low cloud cover predominates. The Imagery Interpre-

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tation Section solved the problem by employing an Army Mohawk OV1-A aircraft equipped with a KA-30 camera and three inch lens. The photography provided by the three inch lens produced a scale (1:24,000) too small to make a detailed analysis of the trails even though the trails were visible. To acquire larger scale photograph, trail segments were selected from the small scale photograph and flown with the KA-30 camera using a 12 inch lens. The 12 inch lens provided a scale of 1:1000 enabling the Imagery Interpretation Section to complete its mission with a minimum number of photographs and without the use of a tactical air reconnaissance high performance aircraft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the solution found by the 23d Infantry Division Imagery Interpretation Section be considered by other units.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

C. (U) Operations.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Security of Night Defensive Positions

(a) OBSERVATION: Often times, platoon elements would endanger themselves by allowing their established LP's and ambush point personnel to withdraw to the platoon laager when daylight had arrived.

(b) EVALUATION: Consistent morning ground fog would provide the enemy with excellent cover to achieve positions within RPG range of the laager, and the enemy seemed to know of the habit of the ambush or protective position personnel to retire to the platoon laager at first light.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Security personnel, regardless of weather conditions or visibility, should remain in position until the platoon is prepared for movement and the order is given for withdrawal from these positions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This recommendation is now standard tactical procedure within the unit.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Protective Devices.

(a) OBSERVATION: The placement of protective devices (i.e. trip flares, mechanical ambushes) prior to dusk, often proved to be wasted effort.

(b) EVALUATION: In many instances it was suspected that the enemy

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had observed the emplacement of these devices. Occasionally wires had been cut or safety pins had been replaced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Although more difficult and dangerous, the emplacement of these devices when visibility is reduced, should be considered.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

3. (U) SUBJECT: Ambush Tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to recent changes to small units ambush tactics, units have been able to deceive the enemy and gain a decisive advantage.

(b) EVALUATION: By breaking units down into half platoon size elements and practicing good camouflage and carefully choosing the ambush position, some units have increased friendly initiated contacts by 50% and the number of enemy killed by 65%. By employing these tactics, plus restricting movement during daylight hours to early morning or late afternoon and enforcing strict noise discipline, units have achieved a marked increase in tactical success.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units place increasing emphasis on small unit operations which are characterized by stealth when moving into the ambush site and strict noise discipline.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

4. (U) SUBJECT: Hot Weather Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the dry season heat can prove to be a hindering factor in the conduct of operations. On one recent operation a rifle company was able to move only 50' meters during one day because they had to carry three heat casualties along with them. The company was carrying the usual combat load of three day's rations, water, ammunition and field equipment normally carried during the monsoon season.

(b) EVALUATION: In order to be effective while conducting hot weather operations, the combat load has to be lightened and the temperature considered when planning troop movement in the field. Small size patrols with light gear have proved to be more effective during hot weather.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To lighten the combat load, only the bare essentials should be carried. If the tactical situation permits, resupply should be on a once-a-day basis, rather than every three days. Each man should carry

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two extra canteens of water and a sufficient supply of salt tablets. Movement in the field should be done during the cool hours of the morning and late afternoon - commensurate with the tactical situation.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: That this lesson learned be included in unit SOF's for hot weather operations.

5. (U) SUBJECT: Counter Mortar Fire Plan

(a) OBSERVATION: The intensity and frequency of enemy indirect fire can be reduced by a thoroughly rehearsed, well planned, counter mortar fire plan.

(b) EVALUATION: Counter mortar target grids are cleared several times daily. 81mm mortar and 4.2" mortar tubes are laid on the cleared grids when not firing missions. Rounds are prepared with charges cut. At the first indication of enemy indirect fire attack the counter mortar grids are fired. Return fire response time was cut to as little as four seconds on one occasion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This system will work in any situation where counter mortar grids can be pre-cleared and kept cleared for instant response.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

6. (U) SUBJECT: Indirect Fire with a Quad .50.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of the Quad .50 as an indirect fire weapon brought about a significant increase in the deadline rate for machine gun mounts.

(b) EVALUATION: The Quad .50 was designed for direct fire at aircraft targets. When used for indirect fire, the weapon must be locked in firing position causing excessive stress on the firing circuit. This causes parts in the mount to wear out prematurely and increases the replacement rate of these parts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That commanders employ the Quad .50 for indirect fire only when absolutely necessary.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Commanders of fire bases which have a Quad. 50 employed, have been informed of the problem and it has been recommended to them that the Quad .50 not be used for indirect fire when other systems are available.

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7. (U) SUBJECT: Vehicle Readiness

(a) OBSERVATION: Self-propelled howitzers in isolated bases seldom have reason to displace. When required to displace, mechanical failures are frequently experienced because limited movement of the howitzers does not give a true measure of the vehicle's capability for sustained road marches.

(b) EVALUATION: Road marches could be completed more successfully if a better evaluation and assurance of mechanical condition were known.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That selfpropelled artillery units be required to road march on a periodic basis to better evaluate the mechanical condition of the vehicles.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Periodic, unannounced road marches will be directed by this headquarters as well as units conducting short marches on a periodic basis within security limitation.

i. (U) SUBJECT: Flame Drops to Clear LZ's and Booby Traps.

(a) OBSERVATION: Booby traps and mines continue to be a hazard to U.S. Forces. Forward CP's and LZ's are sometimes overgrown with foliage. Flame drops have been conducted against these targets.

(b) EVALUATION: The flame effectively clears small areas of mines and booby traps and assists in clearing away brush and vegetation. This has been helpful for clearing LZ's and forward CP's. The 14 drum flame rack continued to be an effective means of dropping the drums when conducting a flame drop.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the division continues to utilize flame for these missions.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A,

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9. (U) SUBJECT: Mine Incident Maps.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is an accepted fact that the enemy repeatedly mines the same sections of roads.

(b) EVALUATION: Awareness of this tactic and the knowledge of those sections the enemy mines, can be extremely helpful in countering enemy road mining.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Mine incidents should be plotted on a map (preferably 1:50,000) to gain information on those sections of a road encountering heavy mining. Prior to initiating a minesweep mission, the minesweep team should be thoroughly briefed and cautioned to pay particular attention to these sections.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

10. (U) SUBJECT: Concrete Fords.

(a) OBSERVATION: At the conclusion of the past monsoon season, many culverts washed out on secondary roads. These roads remained impassable until engineer effort was made available for their repair.

(b) EVALUATION: Although culverts are easy to install and provide a reasonable answer to certain drainage situations, they are subject to being washed out during the monsoon season where the volume of water and the ensuing current far surpasses the capacity of the culvert.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Shallow but wide water crossings often dictate the construction of concrete fords. They are permanent in nature and are in general easier to construct than timber bridges. They, of course, become impassable during the flood highpoint, but require little if any maintenance when the water subsides.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

11. (U) SUBJECT: Method of Plotting APD Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: Field experience has shown that when the APD CH 6A flew into niches on top of a ridge line, some enemy base camps were

AVDF-HL

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Amrical), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

(a) SUBJECT: AN/PRS - 7, Non-Metallic Mine Detector Train-
ing

(a) OBSERVATION: Many personnel involved in mine sweep operations lack confidence in the new AN/PRS - 7 non-metallic mine detector.

(b) EVALUATION: The AN/PRS-7 non metallic mine detector has a completely different mode of operation than the P-153/158 metallic mine detectors. It will produce a signal only when the search head is in motion. The volume of the signal is dependent upon the rate at which the area is swept and the size of object to be detected.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Minesweep personnel should be constantly retrained on the AN/PRS-7 mine detector with emphasis given to the two characteristics mentioned above. Lanes containing various types of enemy mines and ordnance should be used. Once an individual has understood the detector's mode of operation and has become attuned to its signal, confidence will be rapidly gained.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

F. (U) Logistics.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Maintenance of the APD

(a) OBSERVATION: The downtime of the APD during the previous reporting period had been excessive due to rotary valve failure. This type of maintenance was only authorized at Direct Support level. A lapping stone was obtained so that this maintenance could be performed at division level.

(b) EVALUATION: This downtime has been reduced somewhat due to more responsive maintenance, and the performance of the APD enhanced by the use of a rotary valve lapping stone. By using this lapping stone, the rotary valve's surface is improved and therefore prevents flaking which causes false readings.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this type maintenance continue to be performed at user level.

(d) COMMAND ACTIONS: N/A

AWOP-ML

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Américan), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSR02 - 65 (E3) (U)

discovered on high plateaus.

(b) EVALUATION: Most of these high plateaus are difficult to fly into and some tight maneuvering on the pilots part may be necessary. The mission controller could make the maneuver easier if he directs the OH-6A gradually up the ridgeline which the OH-6A is flying parallel to. In this way the OH-6A helicopter will have the proper altitude to fly into the high plateau without sacrificing air speed, thus becoming more vulnerable to enemy fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When running an APD mission, the mission commander should carefully consider investigating high plateaus on top of ridgelines and plan the course of the mission accordingly.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

II. (U) SUBJECT: Defoliation of FSB's Using Contaminated Fuel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Many FSB perimeters are heavily overgrown with elephant grass and foliage. Contaminated fuels have been used to defoliate vegetation growing in the perimeter wire of FSB's. The fuel is sprayed from a surfaced based rig onto the vegetation and then ignited.

(b) EVALUATION: Fair to good results have been obtained using this scorching method of defoliation. However, it is time consuming due to the large quantity of fuel required.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That defoliation by contaminated fuel be continued where required.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A.

D. (U) Organization: None

E. (U) Training.

AVPF-HI

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Infantry Division (Américai), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

2. (U) SUBJECT: Contingency Bunker Material.

(a) OBSERVATION: Construction of advanced fire support bases is often hampered by the effort associated with the acquisition and preparation of materials for bunkers.

(b) EVALUATION: Once a decision is made to construct a fire support base, it is imperative that the engineers have bunker material readily available in order to react immediately to the requirement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: By standardizing bunker sizes, the Divisional Engineer Battalion has instituted a "Bunker Contingency Plan." The smaller airmobile bunkers are constructed in the rear areas and are held ready for immediate hook out. Components of larger bunkers are cut and stored in packets to facilitate on site assembly. As timbers are committed, additional material is drawn to replenish existing stocks. Additionally, the precut and preassembled bunker set concept lends itself to continual relocation, thereby reducing future material requirements.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

3. (U) SUBJECT: Maintenance of Small Arms and Generators

(a) OBSERVATION: Infantry battalions are not authorized trained armorers at company level and have no ready resources for inspection and repair of small arms. Also, there is a lack of trained generator repairmen at lower unit level. The necessary program of preventive maintenance needed to keep generators working in this climate cannot be accomplished without trained generator repairmen.

(b) EVALUATION: With a lack of skilled arms and generator repairmen readily available to the infantry battalions, much valuable time may be lost in evacuating weapons and generators from the field to support maintenance facilities. In order to prevent this problem this unit has developed a small arms technical assistance team. When units are refitting in a rear area the team inspects and repairs all weapons. This reduces the number of weapons failures in the field due to worn parts and reduces significantly the number of weapons turned in to support maintenance shops. To improve the number of technically qualified generator repairmen, units select personnel who are to be generator operators on the separate fire bases. These operators are then sent to the supporting unit's generator shop and trained in all aspects of generator operations and repair. This has reduced the rate of generator failure throughout the division.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Amrical), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all forward support facilities adopt similar programs to assist field units in the maintenance of vital equipment.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

H. (U) SUBJECT: Mobility.

(a) OBSERVATION: The present static situation of many support units has resulted in neglect of mobility requirements and capabilities.

(b) EVALUATION: Support units must maintain a high degree of mobility if they are to be capable of supporting ground operations in RVN. In many instances, units have constructed shelters for equipment in order to protect it from the weather. Often, however, rapid movement of the equipment could be accomplished only by destruction of the shelter; a situation that could result in damage to the equipment itself. In addition, a considerable amount of equipment has been secured in place, by imbedding base plates and standards in concrete. While this practice serves also to discourage pilferage, rapid movement of the equipment would be extremely difficult. Many units have neglected to write effective loading plans, or have not modified existing plans to reflect changes in equipment or available transport to attempt to load a large amount of support equipment without adequate loading plans would result in delay that could have serious consequences.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Shop van equipment should be maintained in the van to the greatest extent possible and work performed there. Ground mounted equipment must be installed in such a way that a rapid disconnect capability exists. Loading plans should be accurate and up to date. Personnel with the responsibility of readying equipment for movement must have a sound working knowledge of the unit's loading plans.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

G. (U) Communications: None.

H. (U) Materials: None.

I. (U) Other:

1. (U) SUBJECT: Physicals.

(a) OBSERVATION: Physicals for individuals being processed for administrative discharges were taking too long to complete.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Amrical), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSIOR - 65 (R3) (U)

(b) EVALUATION: Both commanders and personnel themselves were being penalized by having a decentralized physical examination procedure. As many as four separate locations had to be visited to fulfill the requirements of the governing regulation. The average time needed to complete one physical was in excess of seven days.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a centralized physical examination station be set up.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Effective 22 April 1971, a centralized physical examination station was initiated. Once each week all personnel pending discharge under the provisions of AR 635-200 or 635-212 will be processed in a single day.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Medical Evacuation

(a) OBSERVATION: Through habit, units have grown entirely dependent upon air for casualty evacuation.

(b) EVALUATION: In many instances, in the just completed operation, because of the mountainous terrain and high altitude, morning ground fog or inclement weather would make it virtually impossible to complete a "DUST OFF". Valuable time was often wasted waiting to see if the aircraft could perform.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When organic tracked medical vehicle is not with a unit, one of the units vehicles should be designated as an emergency evacuation carrier. This should be especially stressed when the Battalion/Squadron field aid station is within a reasonable distance.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Unit has included this into tactical SOP as a standard practice.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

AFDP-NL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(América), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

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2-CO, 23d Infantry Division Arty
8-CO, 23d Infantry DISCOM
2-CO, 16th CAG
1-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
1-CO, 26th Engr Bn
1-CO, 523d Sig Bn
1-CO, 23d MP
1-CO, 300th MP
1-CO, HHC, 23d Infantry Division
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf
1-CO, 2d Bn, 1st Inf
1-CO, 1st Bn, 52d Inf
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
1-CO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty
1-CO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf

1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 16th Arty
1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Arty
1-CO, 1st Bn, 22d Arty
1-CO, E Troop, 1st Cav
1-CO, F Troop, 17th Cav
1-CO, H Troop, 17th Cav
1-CO, 123d Avn Bn
1-CO, 14th Avn Bn
12-CO, 3d Mil Hist Det
1-ACoFS, G1
5-ACoFS, G2
5-ACoFS, G3
1-ACoFS, G4
1-ACoFS, G5
1-Chemical
1-Engineer
1-Signal
1-Aviation
1-Prevost Marshal
1-Staff Judge Advocate
1-Information Officer
1-Inspector General
1-Surgeon
1-Chaplain
1-Adjutant General
1-XXIV Corps LNO
2-TACP (AIO), 23d Inf Div

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVII-GCT (15 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division,
(Americas), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCG CSFORA-65 (R3) (U)

RE, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 12 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division and concurs with the report except as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Formation of a Joint Narcotics Team," page 86, paragraph II41: Concur. A command wide Joint Narcotics Detachment has been established within USARV under control of the 8th Military Police Group. One team from that organization works in Military Region 1. They are presently expanding their activities in coordination with Vietnamese authorities and US Forces military police. The endeavor has thus far proven quite successful. Continuing emphasis is being given to this activity.

b. Reference item concerning "Sensor Employment," page 87, paragraph II51: Nonconcur. Item is not valid. The 23d Infantry Division's Sensor Officer has been questioned regarding the item. He stated he had requested the item be deleted from the ORNL and it had been published through an administrative error.

c. Reference item concerning "Indirect Fire with a Quad .50," page 92, paragraph II66: Nonconcur. A quad .50 machinegun battery attached to DIV Corps Artillery has been asked about problems encountered while employing the weapon system in the indirect fire mode. That unit reports no significant problem with the gun mounts caused by indirect firing. This headquarters has recommended the reporting unit coordinate with the Corps Artillery machinegun battery to determine if the reasons for component failure can be attributed to causes other than indirect firing.

d. Reference item concerning "Vehicle Readiness," page 93, paragraph II77: Concur. The same problem has been identified by other self-propelled artillery units in Military Region 1.

e. Reference item concerning "Mine Incident Maps," page 94, paragraph II89: Concur. Every possible method or procedure for countering the enemy's mine/booby trap threat should be stressed.

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AVII-GCT (15 May 71) 1st Ind 12 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, (Amrical), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RG3 CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

f. Reference item concerning "Concrete Fords," page 94, paragraph IIC10: Concur. However, no recommendation is apparent. Concrete fords are good structures in certain cases. A given type drainage structure should not be preselected because good engineering design considers factors peculiar to each given situation.

g. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of the AFD," page 96, paragraph IIF1: Nonconcur. Observation states that this type of maintenance is only authorized at DS level. To perform this maintenance at the user level, the DS unit must insure that personnel and equipment are available at the user level and must provide the required training and supervision to insure that the required repairs are correctly performed.

h. Reference item concerning "Maintenance of Small Arms and Generators," page 97, paragraph IIF3: Concur. The use of contact teams and special maintenance programs is standard practice (FM 29-22). Using units having a particular problem should contact their support unit for assistance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. A. SMITH
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVRDO-DO (15 May 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(Americ), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 27 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry
Division (Americ) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


CLAUDE F. MACLEAN
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

GPOP-PD (15 May 71) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 23d Infantry
Division (Americal), Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 87 OCT 1971

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This Headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed with
the following comment: Reference paragraph '2b 1st Indorsement:
Rationale for nonconcurrance is based on that the recommenda-
tion did not include pertinent limiting factors, e.g., closed
fire bases are in effect returned to GVN control and emplace-
ment of sensors will have to be cleared through GVN channels;
sensor readout capabilities may be lost when line of site
characteristic is negated when friendly units depart fire
base areas.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M.L. Mah

M. L. MAH
1LT, ACC
Asst AG

AVDF-HL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americas), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

23D INFANTRY DIVISION TROOP LIST (AMERICAS)
(as of 30 April 1971)

1. HEADQUARTERS 23D INFANTRY DIVISION

HHC, 23d Infantry Division

1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (-)
F Troop, 17th Cavalry

26th Engineer Battalion

523d Signal Battalion
COMSMB CONTACT TEAM #2

23d Military Police Company

300th Military Police Company

328th Radio Research Company

3d Military History Detachment

OL R, 5th Weather Squadron, USAF (-)

2. 23D INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHC, Division Artillery

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-)

3d Battalion, 16th Artillery
Battery D, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery

3d Battalion, 18th Artillery

1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (-)

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery
Battery B (-), 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery

Inclosure 1

AVDR-HL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Amrical), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

Battery G, 55th Artillery (.50 Cal)

251st Field Artillery Detachment

252d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

271st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

3. 23D INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC, and Band

23d Medical Battalion

23d Supply and Transport Battalion

723d Maintenance Battalion (-)

23d Administration Company

635th Military Intelligence Company

Company G, 75th Infantry (Ranger)

63d Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker Team)

23d Infantry Combat Center (PROV)

4. 16th COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th Combat Aviation Group

14th Combat Aviation Battalion

71st Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

116th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

132d Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter)

174th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

176th Aviation Company (Assault Helicopter)

178th Aviation Company (Assault Support Helicopter)

534th Medical Detachment

756th Medical Detachment

123d Aviation Battalion (Combat) (Infantry Division)

Troop D, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry

AVDR-HL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(Americas), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CAFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

Troop F, 8th Cavalry
Company E, 723d Maintenance Battalion

335th Transportation Company
362d Aviation Detachment

5. 11th INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Infantry Brigade

3d Battalion, 1st Infantry

1st Battalion, 20th Infantry

Task Force, 23d Cavalry (PROV)
E Troop, 1st Cavalry
H Troop, 17th Cavalry

59th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

31st Public Information Detachment

90th Chemical Detachment

327th Aviation Detachment

Combat Weather Team 1

6. 196th INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Infantry Brigade

2d Battalion, 1st Infantry

3d Battalion, 21st Infantry

4th Battalion, 31st Infantry

1st Battalion, 46th Infantry

Company 2, Company G, 75th Infantry (Ranger) (PROV)

48th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

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15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(Americas), Period Ending 30 April 1971, DCS CSFOR - 65 (R) (U)

10th Public Information Detachment

27th Chemical Detachment

7. 198th INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Infantry Brigade

1st Battalion, 6th Infantry

4th Battalion, 3d Infantry

5th Battalion, 46th Infantry

1st Battalion, 52d Infantry

57th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

87th Chemical Detachment

Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

8. NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

Detachment 3, 7th PSYOP Battalion (Direct Support of Division)

USASSG, ACSI, DA

AVDF-HL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Amrical), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

(U) Distinguished Visitors.

The following is a list of distinguished personnel who visited this command during the reporting period.

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>NAME</u> | <u>TITLE</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2 Nov | COL Freitag and COL Wallace | MACV IG Team |
| 2 Nov | GEN Walt | ACMC |
| 2 Nov | LTC McCutcheon | CG, III MAF |
| 2 Nov | BG Haynes | Legislative Asst, HQMC |
| 3 Nov | BG Herring | CG, 834th Air Division |
| 3 Nov | BG Schaefer | CG, 18th Engr Bde |
| 6 Nov | COL Healy | CG, 5th Special Forces Group |
| 7 Nov | LTC Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps |
| 9 Nov | MG Baldwin | DCC, XXIV Corps |
| 11 Nov | BG Hemingway | USARV Avn Officer |
| 11 Nov | COL Ramoe | SA, Quang Ngai Province |
| 11-12 Nov | BG Hume | DCS (PRO), USARV |
| 12 Nov | MG Baldwin | DCC, XXIV Corps |
| 12-13 Nov | MG Hodson | TJAG |
| 12-13 Nov | COL Persons | USARPAC SJA |
| 12-13 Nov | COL Newman | USARV SJA |
| 12-13 Nov | LTC (P) Sneeden | Office TJAG, DA |
| 13-14 Nov | COL Jones | US Army Recruiting Command |
| 14 Nov | COL Dickenson | DCPG, DA |
| 15 Nov | LTC Clarke | Chief of Engineers, DA |
| 15 Nov | MG Noble | CG, USAECV |
| 17 Nov | MG Baldwin | DCC, XXIV Corps |
| 20 Nov | LTC Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps |
| 21 Nov | MG Baldwin | DCC, XXIV Corps |
| 22 Nov | COL Hayward | Military Asst to LTG Ewell, Senior US Military Advisor US Delegation Paris |
| 23 Nov | GEN Abrams | COMUSMACV |
| 23 Nov | LTC Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps |
| 24 Nov | LTC Graham | Chief, CMOD DCSOPS USARV |
| 25-27 Nov | Mr. Snoderly | Director, Service to Military Installations, SE Asia HQ |
| 27 Nov | LTC Daly | NBE, GS, DSO, Chief of the Aust. General Staff |

Inclosure 2

AVDP-NL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division
(Americorps), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

| DATE | NAME | TITLE |
|-----------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 27 Nov | MG Fraser | CBE, Commander, Aust. Force Vietnam |
| 27 Nov | COL Clark | OBE, Commander, Aust. Army Training Team, RVN |
| 2 Dec | MG Bolton | Dir CPS, ODCSOPS, DA |
| 2 Dec | COL Sniffen | Deputy STAMO Systems Manager |
| 3 Dec | Air Commodore Spurgen | DFC (RAAF) |
| 4 Dec | BG Sweeney | CG, Da Nang Support Command |
| 4 Dec | COL Mathias | CofS, Quin Nhon Support Command |
| 4 Dec | COL Thoang | CO, I ALC |
| 4 Dec | COL Pulaski | SA, I ALC |
| 5 Dec | BG Wolfe | Chief, ASA Pacific |
| 5 Dec | COL Lansford | CO, 509th RR Group |
| 5-6 Dec | COL Hammock | Military Judge |
| 7 Dec | BG Wittmer | USARV Provost Marshal |
| 7 Dec | COL Swanson | CO, 504th MP Bn |
| 7 Dec | BG Joslyn, USMC | CofS, III MAF |
| 7 Dec | BG Miller | Outgoing CofS, III MAF |
| 7-12 Dec | Mr. Smith (GS-15) | Chief Liaison Officer to the Vietnamese Red Cross for the American Red Cross Director of Selective Service |
| 8-9 Dec | Dr. Tarr | Office of SEATO HQ |
| 9-10 Dec | COL Jamieson | Sr US Army Combat Develop- ment Command Liaison Officer |
| 10-12 Dec | COL Vaught | Vietnam |
| 15 Dec | MG Toan | CG, 2d ARVN Div |
| 15 Dec | COL Ramos | SA, 2d ARVN Div |
| 15 Dec | COL Day | Incoming SA, 2d ARVN Div |
| 15 Dec | COL Meinsen | ACofS, G3, XXIV Corps |
| 16 Dec | Mr. McCarthy | Office of the Special Asst to the US Ambassador to Vietnam |
| 20 Dec | LTC Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps |
| 21 Dec | Dr. Hoffman (GS-18E) | Lutheran Hour Preacher, and of the Lutheran Laymen's League |
| 23 Dec | COL Day | SA, 2d ARVN Div |

AVDR-ML

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Américain), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

| DATE | NAME | TITLE |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| 23 Dec | Cardinal Cooke | Military Vicar to Catholic Armed Forces Pers |
| 23 Dec | LTC Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps |
| 24 Dec | MG Noble | CG, USAEVC |
| 24 Dec | BG Schaefer | CG, 18th Engr Bde |
| 24 Dec | COL Mason | XXIV Corps Engr |
| 24 Dec | COL Loi | Province Chief, Quang Ngai Province |
| 24 Dec | Mr. Cushing | PSA, Quang Ngai Province |
| 24 Dec | MG Foster | CG, 1st Signal Bde |
| 24 Dec | BG Foster | DCG, 1st Signal Bdes |
| 25 Dec | Admiral McCain | CINCPAC |
| 25 Dec | Ambassador Koren | Political Advisor to Admiral McCain |
| 25 Dec | Rear Admiral Voris | PACOM Surgeon |
| 30 Dec | LTC Robertson | CG, III MAF |
| 30 Dec | BG Bernstein | MACV Surgeon |
| 2-3 Jan | RKP Lowenstein | D-New York |
| 6 Jan | BG Sweeney | CG, DNG Sup Cmd |
| 6 Jan | LTC Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps |
| 5 Jan | GEN Weyand | DEPCONUSMACV |
| 6 Jan | BG Hill | CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) |
| 10-11 Jan | MG (Chaplain) Sampson | Chief of Chaplains, US Army |
| 11 Jan | Members of the House Armed Services Committee | |
| 12 Jan | COL Handley | CONARC Liaison Tng Team |
| 12 Jan | COL Godwin | USAINTS |
| 12 Jan | COL Achee | USAADVNS |
| 12 Jan | COL O'Leary | USARS |
| 12 Jan | COL Leu | USACGSC |
| 13 Jan | MG Woolwine | Asst Dep CG for Material, USARV |
| 15 Jan | BG McGuire | USARV DCSOPS Designated |
| 15-16 Jan | GEN Abrams | COMUSMACV |
| 19 Jan | COL Day | Sr Adv, 2d ARVN Div |
| 22 Jan | Mr. McKean | Dsp Chief Adv, British Defense Ministry (09 Equiv) |
| 22 Jan | COL Brandenberg | USA, DCPG, IAO |

AVDA-HL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (América), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

| DATE | NAME | TITLE |
|-----------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| 23 Jan | BG Hill | CO, 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech) |
| 25 Jan | MG Milloy | DCG, XXIV Corps |
| 26 Jan | BG Meyer | CO, 1st Avn Bde |
| 26 Jan | BG Hemingway | CO, XXIV ARTY |
| 26 Jan | BG Smith | ADC/S, 101st Abn Div |
| 27 Jan | REV DR. Brubaker | Chairman, Gen Commission on Chaps and Armed Forces Pers |
| 28 Jan | MG Milloy | DCG, XXIV Corps |
| 2 Feb | LTC McCaffrey | DCG, USARV |
| 3 Feb | BG Sweeney | CG, DNG Sup Comd |
| 6 Feb | MG Seneff | Dep Proj Dir |
| 10 Feb | MG Noble | CO, 16th Engr Bde |
| 12 Feb | MG Milloy | DCG, XXIV Corps |
| 12-13 Feb | MG Bowley | USAF, Dep C/S, MACV |
| 14 Feb | BG Sweeney | CO, DNG Spt Comd |
| 15 Feb | COL Rovigno | Dep CO, 509th RR |
| 15 Feb | MG Fraser | CO, Australian Forces |
| 16 Feb | COL Bachus | Dep CO, 45th Engr Op. |
| 16 Feb | COL McIntyre | CO, 45th Engr Gp. |
| 18 Feb | MG Milloy | DCG, XXIV Corps |
| 19 Feb | COL Day | Sr Adv, 2d ARVN Div |
| 20 Feb | COL Yonge | SDSLO HQ, Australian Forces, RVN |
| 22-23 Feb | BG Whelan | MC, Spec Asst to Surg Gen |
| 22-23 Feb | BG Hays | Chief Army Nurse Corps |
| 22-23 Feb | COL Smith | Nurse Consultant, USARV |
| 22-23 Feb | COL Fisher | Army Nurse Corps |
| 22-23 Feb | COL Barrett | Med Consultant, USARPAC |
| 22-23 Feb | COL Neal | CO, SAMECOMV |
| 23 Feb | BG Collins | Chief of Mil Hist, DA |
| 27 Feb | MG Toan | CO, 2d ARVN Div |
| 1 Mar | BG Gorwitz | Incoming ADC/M |
| 4 Mar | MG Toan | CO, 2d ARVN Div |
| 5 Mar | Mr. Hardin (GS 18) | Spec Asst for Sea Matters to the Secy of the Army |
| 5 Mar | COL Shattuck | Office Dir of Defense Research & Eng |
| 5 Mar | COL Petty | STAND Officer, OCASFOR |
| 6 Mar | COL Nutting | DCO Ops, 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech) |
| 11 May | BG Schraeder | CO, 14th Engr Op. |

AVDP-HL

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Amrical), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

| DATE | NAME | TITLE |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 12 Mar | COL Bowen | USARV Psychiatrist Consultant |
| 12-13 Mar | COL Freeland | XXIV Corps, C3 |
| 16 Mar | COL Dong | Chief of Staff, MR I |
| 18 Mar | BG Bernstein | MACV Surgeon |
| 21 Mar | BG Sweeney | CO, DNG Sup Comd |
| 22 Mar | COL Day | SA, 2d ARVN Div |
| 27 Mar | MG Hughes | MC, Chief Surgeon, USARPAC |
| 27 Mar | COL Noel | USARV Surg, RON |
| 28 Mar | MG Toan | CO, 2d ARVN Div |
| 29 Mar | BG Schraeder | CO, 18th Engr Bde |
| 30 Mar | COL Wolfe | Australian Military Attaché |
| 30 Mar | COL Leary | Commander AATTW |
| 1 Apr | GEN Beynon | DEPOCOMUSMACV |
| 2 Apr | BG Wittmer | USARV Provost Marshal |
| 2 Apr | CMP (COL) Stegman | USARV Staff Chaplain |
| | | arrived for RON |
| 2 Apr | COL Day | PSA, Quang Ngai |
| 2 Apr | COL Cox | DCO, 2d ARVN Div |
| 3 Apr | COL Day | PSA, Quang Ngai |
| 4 Apr | MG Widdicks | CG, 1st Marine Division |
| 6 Apr | LTC Sutherland | CO, XXIV Corps |
| 6 Apr | COL Bachus | Incoming CO, 45th Engr Gp. |
| 6 Apr | COL McIntyre | Outgoing CO, 45th Engr Gp. |
| 7 Apr | BG Bernstein | MACV Surgeon |
| 8 Apr | COL Day | PSA, Quang Ngai |
| 9 Apr | Bob Wilson (R-CA), Jack Brenkly (D-CA), Harold Reynolds (D-NH), C.W. Young, (R-MIA), and Lloyd D. Spence (R-SC) | Members House Armed Services Committee |
| 10 Apr | LTC Corcoran | Chief of Staff, CINCPAC |
| 10 Apr | COL Nickel | Resc Amt to C/S, CINCPAC |
| 13 Apr | Sen Stevens | R - Alabama |
| 13 Apr | COL Leary | Socy to Army Rep |
| 13 Apr | COL Barton | USAF, IDASC |
| 13 Apr | BG Smith | ADC/S, 101st Abn Div |
| 13 Apr | MG Tarpley | CO, 101st Abn Div |
| 15 Apr | MG Schraeder | CO, 18th Engr Bde |
| 16 Apr | LTC McCaffrey | DCO, USAHV |
| 20 Apr | MG Campbell | USAF Cmdr PACEX |
| 20 Apr | BG Brofit | USAF, Chief AFZS |

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15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division (Americas), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR - 65 (R3) (U)

| DATE | NAME | TITLE |
|-----------|--------------|-------------------------|
| 20 Apr | Mr. Pond | Asst to Chief AAFES |
| 20 Apr | Mr. Davis | Asst to Cmdr PACEM |
| 20 Apr | COL Perkins | USAF Commander VBS |
| 20 Apr | MG Toan | CG, 2d ARVN Div |
| 21 Apr | BG McDonough | Incoming ADC/M |
| 23 Apr | Mr. Daly | President World Airways |
| 27 Apr | MG Milloy | DCG, XXIV Corps |
| 27-30 Apr | LTC Schepper | O of SGS, DA |
| 28 Apr | COL Day | PSA, Quang Ngai |
| 29 Apr | BG Cooper | DCG, USARV Engr |

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(18) DACSFOR

AGDA-A (N) (22 Apr 71) - 01-UT-784121

20 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division (U) (19) (6) (8) Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

(9) Operational rep't. for quarterly period
ending 31 Oct 70.

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.

(11) 15 Nov 70

2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

(12) 93p.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDP-HL

15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

THRU: CG, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: Chu Lai Base (BT 555035), RVN

Reporting Officer: Major General Albert E. Milloy

Prepared by: Captain William H. Offutt, Jr., 3d Military History Detachment.

Map References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets: 6533 I; 6539 I, II, III, IV; 6638 I, IV; 6639 I, II, III, IV; 5640 I, II, III, IV; 6738 I, II, III, IV; 6739 I, II, III, IV; 6740 III; 6838 III, IV.

I. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Command.

1. (C) Background. The 23d Infantry Div. continued to conduct combat operations throughout the division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) during the reporting period. Contact with enemy units ranged from light to moderate throughout the TAOI. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, Pennsylvania Square and Iron Mountain continued throughout the period. Operation Elk Canyon terminated on 26 August at which time Operation Elk Canyon II commenced. Elk Canyon II terminated 19 September. On 5 September, the 196th Infantry Brigade initiated Operation Nebraska Rapids, a joint operation with the 1st Marine Division. The operation terminated on 8 September. On 2 October the 1-1 Cavalry and the 2-1 Infantry formed Task Force Saint. The task force was placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for Operation Tulare Falls, which lasted thru 15 October. On 21 October, Troop F, 17th Cavalry was placed in direct support of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade for an indefinite period. Task Force Burnett, composed of units from 1-1 Cav and 2-1 Inf was formed on 27 October and placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for participation in Operation Hoang Dieu. Joint operations with the 2d ARVN Division, rice denial and pacification continued successfully.

2. (U) Command Changes.

a. Colonels.

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15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

(1) COL Hugh F. T. Hoffman, Jr., assumed command of the 198th Brigade on 15 August 1970, vice COL W. B. Richardson, who was wounded (non-evac).

(2) COL Paul B. McDaniel assumed command of the DISCOM on 18 August 1970, vice COL Hoffman.

(3) COL William B. Richardson assumed command of the 198th Brigade on 9 September 1970 from COL F. T. Hoffman, Jr.

(4) COL John L. Insani assumed command of the 11th Brigade on 11 September, vice COL K. B. Barlow.

(5) COL J. K. Sadler assumed command of the Division Artillery on 24 September 1970, vice COL D. M. Dexter, Jr.

(6) COL W. S. Hathaway assumed command of the 196th Brigade on 25 October 1970, vice COL E. L. Kennedy.

b. Battalion Changes.

(1) CO, CLDC, LTC R. W. Fell assumed command from LTC W. C. Hogan on 7 September 1970.

(2) 5th Bn, 46th Inf, LTC J. R. Henry assumed command from LTC H. J. Wereszynski on 9 September 1970.

(3) 3d Bn, 1st Inf, LTC C. J. Landry assumed command from LTC R. A. Culbertson on 11 September 1970.

(4) 1st Bn 14th Arty, LTC R. L. Ray assumed command from LTC B. Pogoloff on 21 September 1970.

(5) 4th Bn, 31st Inf, LTC W. G. Hammell assumed command from LTC T. A. Brun on 26 September 1970.

(6) 4th Bn, 3d Inf, LTC A. F. Coast assumed command from LTC P. D. Grimm on 5 October 1970.

(7) 23 S&T Bn, LTC S. R. Levenson assumed command from LTC J. F. Senna on 7 October 1970.

(8) CO, Combat Center, LTC J. R. Wheaton, Jr., assumed command from Major C. I. Clark on 7 October 1970.

(9) 1st Bn, 52d Inf, Major C. E. Getz assumed command from LTC J. E. Clites, Jr. on 7 October 1970.

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15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR—65 (R2) (U)

(10) 6th Bn, 11th Arty, Major G. R. Keech assumed command from LTC R. H. Kleinfelder on 14 October 1970.

(11) 1st Sqd, 1st Cav, LTC S. J. Burnett assumed command from LTC C. E. Saint on 24 October 1970.

(12) 1st Bn, 46th Inf, LTC W. Doyle assumed command from LTC R. Carville on 25 October 1970.

3. (U) Staff Changes.

a. Colonels. COL Alpheus P. Clark assumed duties as Chief of Staff on 11 September 1970, vice COL John L. Insani.

b. Other

(1) CPT Johnson assumed duties as Division Information Officer, vice Major W. F. Gabella who was medevaced on 20 August 1970.

(2) Major J. S. Peppers assumed duties as Acting ACofS, G3, vice LTC L. J. Stottle who turned to CONUS on emergency leave and PCS on 23 August 1970.

(3) Major T. D. Cox assumed duties as Assistant Chief of Staff, vice CPT Q. W. Dutson on 20 August 1970.

(4) Major R. A. Murchinson assumed duties as ACofS, G5, vice LTC G. R. H. Johnson on 2 September 1970.

(5) LTC W. H. Wereszynski assumed duties as ACofS, G3 from Major J. S. Peppers on 9 September 1970.

(6) Major W. E. Gabella returned to duty and assumed duties as Division Information Officer, on 14 September 1970.

(7) LTC L. W. Roberts assumed duties as ACofS, G1, vice LTC W. E. Henschel on 7 October 1970.

(8) LTC C. E. Saint assumed duties as ACofS, G3 from LTC W. H. Wereszynski on 25 October 1970.

4. (U) Distinguished Visitors.

AVDF-HL

5 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPCR-65 (R2) (U)

| <u>NAME</u> | <u>POSITION</u> | <u>PERIOD</u> |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------|
| BG Heiser | Dep J-3, MACV | 1 Aug |
| TG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 1 Aug |
| MG Toan | CG, 2d ARVN Division | 1 Aug |
| MG Toan | CG, 2d ARVN Division | 2 Aug |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 3 Aug |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 4 Aug |
| LTG Lam | CG, I Corps | 4 Aug |
| MG Widdecke | CG, 1st Marine Division | 4 Aug |
| COL Gard | AG, XXIV Corps | 5 Aug |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 8 Aug |
| MG Toan | CG, 2d ARVN Division | 8 Aug |
| LTG Kerwin | DCSPR | 9 Aug |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 9 Aug |
| BG Cooper | DCG, XXIV Corps | 9 Aug |
| MG Baldwin | G2, USARV | 10 Aug |
| COL Weyrick | CG, XXIV Corps | 11 Aug |
| LTG Sutherland | Dep Dir Opns, DA | 11 Aug |
| BG Schroeder | IO, USARV | 12 Aug |
| COL Leonard | CG, XXIV Corps | 13 Aug |
| LTG Sutherland | Dep Senior Advisor, I Corps | 14 Aug |
| BG Jackson | Outgoing C/S, XXIV Corps | 16 Aug |
| MG Shedd | Advisor, 2d ARVN Division | 16 Aug |
| COL Ramos | C/S, 2d ARVN Division | 16 Aug |
| COL Cam | ADC, 2d ARVN Division | 17 Aug |
| COL Luat | SA, 2d ARVN Division | 17 Aug |
| COL Ramos | OO, 509th R&R GP, SGN | 17 Aug |
| COL Higgins | OO, North District Engineer | 19 Aug |
| COL Barber | DCG, XXIV Corps | 19 Aug |
| MG Baldwin | CG, 1st Avn Bde | 19 Aug |
| BG Hemingway | CG, XXIV Corps | 20 Aug |
| LTG Sutherland | (Ret USAR) 20th Century Fox Corporation | 20 Aug |
| BG McCarthy | CG, US Army Engineer Command RVN | 21 Aug |
| MG Noble | US Army Engineer Cnd, RVN | 21 Aug |
| COL Barker | CG, Qui Nhon Depot | 22 Aug |
| BG Sweeney | Asst for SEA to Asst Secret- | 22 Aug |
| Mr. Hardin (GS-18) | ary of the Army | |
| COL Newman | USARV Asst C/S, G3 | 24 Aug |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 24 Aug |

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15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

| <u>NAME</u> | <u>POSITION</u> | <u>PERIOD</u> |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| REP, Honorable Landgrebe | Representative, Indiana | 25 Aug |
| BG Simmons | ADC, 1st Marine Division | 26 Aug |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 27 Aug |
| CSM Copeland | SMA Designate | 28 Aug |
| COL Vance | OO, DNG Support Command | 28 Aug |
| Hon Krogh | Special Asst to the President for Domestic Affairs | 29 Aug |
| COL Kampe | J-3, MACV | 30 Aug |
| COL Carswell | MACDC | 30 Aug |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 31 Aug |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 31 Aug |
| COL McCintyre | Incoming OO, 45th Engineer Group | 4 Sep |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 6 Sep |
| MG Bowers | Dep C/S, DCGFA, USARV | 6 Sep |
| MG Norton | DCG, Project MASSTER, DA | 6 Sep |
| BG Meyer | CG, XXIV Corps Artillery | 7 Sep |
| MG Woolwine | ADCG-LOG | 7 Sep |
| GEN Rosson | DCG MACV | 7 Sep |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 7 Sep |
| MG Toan | CG, 2d ARVN Division | 7 Sep |
| COL Ramos | Advisor 2d ARVN Division | 7 Sep |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 8 Sep |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 10 Sep |
| BG Hume | DCS (P&O) USARV | 10 Sep |
| COL Kotite | | 10 Sep |
| LTG Weyand | Dep OO MACV (Designate) | 11 Sep |
| Miragadier Gurr | ORE New Zealand Army | 12 Sep |
| BG Condit | CG, Combat Service Support Group, USACDC | 13 Sep |
| MG Gettys | C/S (Designate) USARV | 13 Sep |
| MG Toan | CG, 2d ARVN Division | 13 Sep |
| MG Foster | CG, 1st Sig Bde | 14 Sep |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 16 Sep |
| LTC Staford | SA, Quang Tin Province | 16 Sep |
| BG Quinn | Asst Wing Command, 1st MAW | 16 Sep |
| Mr. Winship | Asst to Ambassador, US Embassy, SGN | 17 Sep |
| BG Hixon | C/S, XXIV Corps | 18 Sep |
| COL Lee | C3, XXIV Corps | 18 Sep |
| GEN Haines | CINCUSARPAC | 22 Sep |

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15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

| <u>NAME</u> | <u>POSITION</u> | <u>PERIOD</u> |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| COL Hoffman | XO, CINCUSARPAC | 22 Sep |
| BG Ursano | Dep CofS (F&A), USARV | 22 Sep |
| COL Green | CG, XXIV Corps | 24 Sep |
| LTC Phien | DCS, POLWAR, MR | 24 Sep |
| MG Widdecke | CG, 1st Marine Division | 24 Sep |
| BG Thomas | CG, USA MEDCOM, VN (PROV) | 25 Sep |
| BG Meyer | CG, XXIV Corps Artillery | 25 Sep |
| COL Conrad | CofS, DNG Support Command | 25 Sep |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 26 Sep |
| MG Deane | Director, DCPG | 28 Sep |
| COL Brandenberg | ECPO Liaison Officer | 28 Sep |
| COL Baker | MACV-J3-04 | 28 Sep |
| COL Burr | XXIV Corps G2 | 28 Sep |
| BG Schrader | CG, 18th Engineer Bde | 29 Sep |
| LTC Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 3 Oct |
| COL Mason | XXIV Corps Engineer | 3 Oct |
| COL Baught | Senior Liaison Officer, Army Combat Development Command | 3 Oct |
| LTC Sutherland | Project MASSTER | |
| COL Kersey | CG, XXIV Corps | 5 Oct |
| LTC McCutcheon | USMC, Incoming Dep CofS, XXIV Corps | 5 Oct |
| MG Woolwine | CO, 1st MAF | 6 Oct |
| COL Hammack | Asst CG, Logistics, USARV | 6 Oct |
| MG Baldwin | Military Judge, US Army | 6 Oct |
| COL Vance | Dep CG, XXIV Corps | 6 Oct |
| COL Kamps | CO, DNG Support Command | 7 Oct |
| Vice Admiral Gralla | USARV Redeployment Officer | 8 Oct |
| COL Peyton | USNCOMSC | 9 Oct |
| COL Noel | CO, US Army Medical Command, Japan | 10 Oct |
| COL Bowen | Dept Commander, Medical Command, RVN | 10 Oct |
| LTC Sutherland | USARV Neuropsychiatric Consultant | 12 Oct |
| MG Toan | CG, XXIV Corps | 13 Oct |
| Mr. Anderson | CG, 2d ARVN Division | 14 Oct |
| Miss Smith | Outgoing Dir. USO RVN | 15 Oct |
| COL Hathaway | Public Relations, USO RVN | 15 Oct |
| | Incoming CO, 196th Inf Bde, Americal Division | 16 Oct |

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15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CEPOR-65 (R2) (U)

| <u>NAME</u> | <u>POSITION</u> | <u>PERIOD</u> |
|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| COL Woods | Northern District Engineer | 17 Oct |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 17 Oct |
| Chap (COL) Stegman | USARV Chaplain | 18 Oct |
| Mr. Hadley | Correspondent | 18 Oct |
| COL Cook, COL Oberley, CDR Stohr, & MAJ Stalman | MACV IG Team | 18 Oct |
| LTG McCaffrey | DCG, USARV | 19 Oct |
| BG Hume | Dep CofS (PGO), USARV | 19 Oct |
| MG Baldwin | DCG, XXIV Corps | 19 Oct |
| Mr. Willet | Asst Dir, Service to Military Instal, S. E. Asia Office | 19 Oct |
| BG Davison | Dir Enlisted Personnel, DA | 20 Oct |
| Mr. Lazar | IMR Dep for CORDS | 21 Oct |
| Mr. Dean | IMR Asst Dep for CORDS | 21 Oct |
| Chap (LTC) Brooks | USARV Dep Chaplain | 21 Oct |
| LTG Sutherland | CG, XXIV Corps | 21 Oct |
| COL Vance | CO, DNG Support Command | 21 Oct |
| Mr. Steinberg | Staff Member, Senate Sub- committee on Juvenile Delinquency | 23 Oct |
| CMDR Lofarno | Chief of S.E. Asia Dept of Defense Information | 26 Oct |
| COL Meinen | ACofS, G3, XXIV Corps | 28 Oct |
| COL Doyle | ACofS, G1, XXIV Corps | 28 Oct |

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15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR—65 (R2) (U)

B. (U) Personnel.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate.

a. During the period, Military Justice/Military Affairs continues to comprise the largest activity area. During the quarter Aug-Oct 70, this command tried 7 general courts-martial, 6 special courts-martial in which a bad conduct discharge was authorized, 121 special courts-martial, and received 126 special courts-martial and 3 summary courts-martial for supervisory review from subordinate commands. In addition, 1,251 Article 15, UCMJ proceedings were received for supervisory review and forwarding to USARPSSC, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Military Affairs actions during this quarter included 39 Line of Duty determinations; 45 Article 15, UCMJ appeals for advice; 66 Reports of Survey; 141 Reports of Investigation; 33 elimination proceedings; 24 Congressional inquiries, and 11 Collateral Investigations forwarded to DA.

Quarterly rates per thousand for general, special (BCD), special, and summary courts-martial during this period were .30, .26, 5.26, and .13 respectively.

b. Legal Assistance Section processed 2,303 cases during the quarter, including but not limited to, domestic relations, indebtedness, wills, powers of attorney, income tax, citizenship, and general counseling and advice.

c. This office continues to provide instruction on the Geneva Convention with strong emphasis on war crimes and detainee treatment, to each group of replacements processed through the 23d Infantry Div. Combat Center; and to the Division Combat Center Leadership Course. Instruction is also given on the Military Justice Act of 1968. In addition, unit instruction is provided on an on-call basis to officers and senior NCOs.

d. During the quarter 90 claims were received for payment for loss or damage of servicemen's property. Foreign claims are monitored at this headquarters for substantive and procedural completeness and forwarded to the Foreign Claims Office for adjudication.

e. During this quarter this section has presented 57 classes on Drug Abuse at the Combat Center and at the various units to promote the drug amnesty program and awareness of the problems of drug abuse.

2. (U) Division Chaplain.

a. During the period, the normal schedule of religious services and

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counselling was held in the field and division rear. The Character Guidance Council was reactivated, and a Drug Amnesty Program activated. Support continued for the Catholic and Protestant orphanages in An Ton and the Catholic school and orphanage in Binh Son. The 23d Infantry Div. participated in World Prayer Day, held 21 October 1970 with special prayer services observed. Morning Devotions were begun at the Division Chapel along with regular Saturday evening Fellowship and sports movies program.

b. Chaplain (CPT) Phillip Nichols, 1-52 Infantry, was killed in action 13 October 1970. A memorial service was held for him Sunday 18 October 1970 at the Stella Maris Chapel. USARV and XXIV Corps Chaplains were present. On 21 October, a monument in front of the Division Chapel was dedicated to the memory of Chaplain Nichols at a special memorial service. Brigadier General Atteberry, ADC (S), gave the dedication address.

3. (U) Division Finance Office.

Conversion Day was held 7 October 1970 to change series 681 MPC to series 692 MPC. The operation concluded, 1030 hours, 9 October 1970.

4. (U) Provost Marshal.

a. The hazards of driving on Highway QL - 1, the only major road in the 23d Infantry Div. AOR, were brought to light by the increasing number of traffic incidents and accidents. In response to the problem an aerial military police patrol was inaugurated in July 1970.

(1) Preparations were first made on the ground by marking the highway with white blocks 176 feet apart and visible from the air. In this manner the aerial patrol could clock vehicles on the ground and in coordination with patrols located in advantageous positions, apprehend speeders.

(2) During this reporting period approximately 107 hours flight time was logged in the operation. Widest dissemination of the program was made to the command to warn speeders of the consequences. Flyers were distributed in the Division Daily Bulletin and articles were placed in the division newspaper.

(3) Another aspect of the patrol was its use along beach areas of Chu Lai Base in an effort to stop individuals from swimming in unmarked and unguarded beaches. Too frequently in the past, swimmers use of the unaccessible areas resulted in fatal consequences. The patrol was able to spot these personnel and quickly notify the Military Police Desk.

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(4) A third aspect of the patrol was the utilization of the aircraft to check the countryside for black marketeering or illicit activities. Normal sanctuaries for criminal activity were thus denied.

b. In September 1970 a solution to combat the growing drug abuse problem within the 23d Infantry Div. TAOR was put into effect. A drug amnesty program was formulated under the auspices of the Office of the Provost Marshal with goals of education, rehabilitation and medical care for drug abusers. A team, composed of the Division Provost Marshal, Division Surgeon, Division Chaplain and Division Staff Judge Advocate compiled a lesson plan and toured the Division area explaining the drug problem and amnesty program. No location was considered too remote and consequently the team found itself at brigade base camps and forward firebases talking with soldiers fresh from the field. Training aids consisted of a sample of illicit drugs, handbooks and educational films.

(1) The cross-section of experiences which the team members possess was invaluable. A daily seminar was held for newly arrived troops at the Division Combat Center, with each member contributing his view of the problem.

(2) Operation Amnesty was given wide coverage in the classes, and since the program was initiated approximately 5,000 soldiers have been exposed to its advantages, with eighty-seven (87) signing up for assistance.

5. (U) Division Surgeon.

a. The following figures represent the malaria statistics for the 23d Infantry Div. during the period, 1 August through 31 October 1970.

| <u>Month</u> | <u>No Cases</u> | <u>Rate Malaria*</u> | <u>Rate Vivax*</u> |
|--------------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| August | 163 | 83.8 | 26.5 |
| September | 165 | 87.5 | 23.8 |
| October | 168 | 84.0 | 28.0 |

* Per 1000 troops per year

b. Both total malaria and vivax malaria rates have remained at a relatively high level during the last quarter. This reflects the increase in mosquito population due to the intermittent rainfall during the period resulting in increased mosquito breeding grounds. The vivax rate is about one-third of the malaria rate reflecting relatively good anti-malaria tablet discipline.

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C. Intelligence.

1. (C) Intelligence Summary

a. Quang Tin (P)

(1) During the past quarter, enemy activity has been moderate in relation to the previous quarter and has only been harassing in nature. Although reports were received indicating that the enemy was planning an offensive (H-25) for this period, it failed to materialize for several reasons: Operation Elk Canyon, the follow-up sweeping operations, and in conjunction with these, the enemy's inability to obtain enough food to sustain an offensive.

(2) Operation Elk Canyon, which was designed to disrupt the enemy's supply lines in his rear area, began on 12 July and caused the enemy extreme difficulty. An indication of how much difficulty was the relocation of K-80 NVA Battalion from Kontum province to the Kham Duc area, with the objective of forcing Allied troops out of the area. Nguyen Nhanh, a PW lieutenant from the rear services of Quang Nam (Quang Tin) (P) Headquarters stated that the Allied operation at Kham Duc had cut his supply line, preventing him from supplying the various provincial units with food. On 25 August, Operation Elk Canyon I ended and Operation Elk Canyon II began. The latter was a sweep operation conducted along the Dak Rose supply route which further disrupted enemy supply channels.

(a) During these two operations, enemy activity was directed toward the removal of Allied troops from Kham Duc. In what may have been an attempt to draw Allied forces from Kham Duc, the enemy launched several harassment type attacks, usually attacks by fire, on isolated outposts in Eastern Quang Tin (P). In line with these harassment attacks, reports were received that the enemy was planning an offensive for the fall and winter months. This offensive was to be in two phases: The first phase was to last from 16 August until 31 October. The targets of this offensive were to be resettlement hamlets, the GVN pacification program, and GVN officials. The first phase of the offensive was to be directed against isolated outposts, RF and PF units, with the probable intentions of drawing ARVN and US troops away from the lowlands. Once the Allied troops were away from the populace, the second phase was to begin. It appears now that the harassing attacks that were underway at this time were part of the first phase. The second phase was to bring the people back under VC control by using terrorism, kidnapping, and the destruction of district and province headquarters in an effort to show the people that the South Vietnamese Government could not protect them.

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Reports indicate that the offensive was postponed due to supply problems. Various reports stated that the enemy had a severe food shortage, and that all major attacks were being delayed. Each week new reports stated that major attacks were to begin the following week. However, when that time came, the attacks failed to materialize. New reports came in stating that the next week would be the big one, and this continued throughout the quarter.

(b) Recent reports have indicated that immediately after the Kham Duc operation, the enemy began to rebuild his supply lines. Visual reconnaissance of the area west of the Song Tranh River indicated extensive enemy activity. Trails showed signs of heavy use, new defensive positions were built, numerous areas were under cultivation, and new supply points were being formed. Along with this activity, numerous units were reported to be sending transportation elements to K-7 supply area. This area, along the Song Tranh River, has long been a VC logistical area. It contains numerous munition factories, storage areas, hospitals, and detention camps. Reports were also received stating that Quang Nam (Quang Tin) (P) units were sending elements into Quang Ngai (P) to obtain food. The enemy also received instructions from higher headquarters advising them to devote at least 16 per cent of their total strength to food production because sufficient food could no longer be supplied to them through normal channels. Since the withdrawal of Allied troops from Kham Duc, the enemy has been searching for food. Recently, numerous cultivated fields have been sighted in Base Area 117 and Hiep Duc.

(3) In August, the province received a directive from MR-5 that reorganized the province force. This force now includes three infantry battalions. The units mentioned were the 70th LF Battalion, 72d LF Battalion, and D-11 Infantry Battalion. The 70th and 72d LF Battalions have always been province units, but D-11 was new. It is now felt that D-11 Battalion is one of the two battalions that made up the 36th NVA Regiment of Front 4. The 36th Regiment has normally operated in the mountains along the Que Son/Duc Duc (D) border in Quang Nam (P) and was probably disbanded so that its units could be distributed among the province force to build up these units.

(a) D-11 Infantry Battalion is currently held at BT 2410 with a strength of 200 men. Since this unit is new, little is known about it. Three PW's, who are from units identified as possible AKA's for D-11 Battalion, stated that their unit has four companies numbered 1, 2, 3 and 6. The 6th Company is the heavy weapons company, and the other three are infantry companies. The battalion has a probable strength of 200 men. The only confirmed contact with D-11 occurred on 17 September when RF #195 at BT 255145 engaged an estimated VC company resulting in 13 killed and one document captured. The captured document was roster for D-11 Battalion. Since that time, agent reports have

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stated that the unit was staying in this general area and had no mission at the present time. Visual reconnaissance of this area during the past quarter has indicated a significant amount of enemy activity such as heavy trail use, numerous bunkers, spider holes, and .51 caliber positions. This type of activity usually indicates a base area.

(b) V-16 Sapper Battalion has been downgraded to two separate companies, V-16 Sapper Company and V-17 Sapper Company. V-17 is operating in Northern Quang Tin (P) with the 70th LF Battalion. During this quarter there has been only one confirmed contact with V-16 Sapper Company. On 3 October, Nui My outpost at BT 218171 was overrun. A Hoi Chanh from V-16 Sapper Company was taken to the outpost where he identified the enemy dead as being from V-16 Sapper Company.

(c) There were also indications of possible movement of the 3d NVA Regiment, 2d NVA Division, into Northern Quang Ngai (P). The 3d NVA Regiment disappeared approximately the same time D-11 Battalion appeared. Agent reports have stated that D-11 Battalion has taken the place of the 3d NVA Regiment in Quang Tin (P). Not enough information has been received to substantiate the fact that the 3d Regiment has relocated in Quang Ngai (P). A PW from the 3d Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment, who was captured at BT 1125, stated that the regiment moved into Laos after the Hiep Duc campaign and left a small element in Quang Tin (P) to obtain supplies for the return of the unit in January 1971. The last location confirmed for the 3d Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment was BT 0620 on 29 June. It is possible that the unit did move into Laos.

(d) At the beginning of August, the 70th LF Battalion was located at BT 1226 with a strength of 145 men. By the middle of August, the 70th Battalion was moving westward, probably into a base camp area. Visual reconnaissance of the area on 12 August indicated numerous huts. It appears that the unit spent a few weeks in one area, then moved a few kilometers one direction or another, and then remained there for a period of time. On 11 October, the 70th Battalion was located at BT 0727 with a strength of 251 men. The unit has spent this time avoiding contact with Allied units. Information received indicated that there has been only one confirmed contact between the 70th Battalion and Allied units. This contact was an Allied ambush which killed 5 VC, including the Commanding Officer of the 3d Co., while capturing 2. Reports indicate that this unit has been resting and refitting for the past three months. These reports have also indicated that morale is low due to the lack of food supplies.

(e) The 72d LF Battalion was located at BT 1720 with a strength of

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160 men at the beginning of August. The unit has remained in this area for the past quarter and is currently held at BT 1819 with a strength of 130 men. Allied units have had several contacts with the 72d Battalion, the most significant occurring on 6 September and 15 September. The contact on 6 September was enemy initiated and resulted in 7 NVA killed and one detainee. The detainee was from the heavy weapons company of the 72d LF Battalion. The contact on 15 September was US initiated and resulted in 20 NVA killed and one PRC-25 radio captured. Documents and one PW indicated that the unit was the 72d Battalion. Since these contacts, the battalion has been refitting and awaiting replacements. This unit is also experiencing morale problems due to recent losses.

(f) The 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion is the province artillery unit. Whenever a province unit needs fire support, an element is sent from the 74th Battalion to that unit for support. Elements of the 74th Battalion have been reported throughout the province. Therefore, definite proof of contact with this unit is extremely difficult to confirm. The only confirmed contact with this unit was on 31 August when a mechanical ambush killed 2 VC and wounded a third. The wounded VC was the Executive Officer of the 2d Company, 74th Heavy Weapons Battalion. The headquarters of the 74th Battalion is currently located at BT 1717 and has been in this area for the past quarter. One element is believed to be in Northern Quang Tin (P) providing support for the 70th LF Battalion. Another element, possibly the 2d Company, is believed to be operating with the 72d LF Battalion. A third element is believed to be in Southern Tam Ky (D) with D-11 Battalion.

(4) The 78th Rocket Battalion, the 402d Sapper Battalion, and possibly the 409th Sapper Battalion are thought to belong to the Chu Lai Front. Chu Lai Front headquarters is directly subordinate to MR-5 and its mission is to harass Chu Lai Combat Base. The headquarters of the Chu Lai Front is apparently colocated with the 78th Rocket Battalion at BT 3901. One report stated that the Front had been disbanded and the 78th Rocket Battalion had been downgraded to a company-size unit. However, until more information is received to verify this, it will be assumed that these two units are still operational.

(a) The 78th Rocket Battalion has been unlocated for most of the quarter in Southeastern Quang Tin (P) with a strength of 150 men. Allied forces have not had direct contact with the 78th Battalion since May 1970. However, Chu Lai Base has been rocketed twice during the quarter, and Fat City received an attack by fire. These incidents were probably caused by the 78th Battalion, since it is the only unit in the Chu Lai area with

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the capability to fire rockets. The 78th Rocket Battalion is currently held at BT 3901 with a strength of 150 men as of 18 October. During the quarter, agent reports have stated that the 78th Battalion has been located on both sides of the Quang Tin (P), Quang Ngai (P) border. Like most other units, the 78th Battalion has several base camps and spends a few weeks at one location before moving to another. Visual reconnaissance during the quarter indicated very little activity in the 78th Battalion area of operation. The activity sighted was usually small groups of personnel carrying supplies.

(b) The 402d Sapper Battalion was located at BT 3508 on 1 August with a strength of 210 men. Since that time, the unit began moving south in an attempt to obtain supplies. By the end of August, the 402d Sapper Battalion was located at BT 3802, where the unit remained for a month. It then continued south, stopping in the vicinity of BS 3196, where it is believed they received supplies from Quang Ngai (P). On 22 October, the 402d Battalion was reported to be back in Quang Tin (P) at BT 3605. It is assumed that this unit is resupplied and ready to begin offensive operations. During this reporting period, the 402d Battalion avoided contact with Allied forces, and is considered to still have approximately 200 men. Agent reports have stated that the 402d Sapper Battalion has up to 400 men, but no PW's or documents have been captured to confirm this report.

(c) At the beginning of August, the 409th Sapper Battalion was located at BT 2410 with a strength of 269 men. Agent reports during the quarter have indicated that the 409th Battalion is split into two elements. One element is believed to be operating in Northern Quang Tin (P), and the other in Southern Quang Tin (P). No PW's or documents have been captured to confirm the presence of the northern element, but several PW's and documents have confirmed the presence of the southern element. Two different PW's have stated that the 409th Sapper Battalion has had extreme difficulty in resupplying. On 25 September, an Allied ambush captured a number of a transportation unit of the 409th Sapper Battalion, at BS 539963. This PW stated that the 409th Battalion could not obtain supplies in Quang Tin (P), so he was sent into Quang Ngai (P) to obtain them. He also stated that the 409th was planning to move into Quang Nam (P) during October; however, this move has not yet occurred. Another PW, captured 25 September at AS 994979, from the 3d Company, 409th Battalion, stated that his company had moved to this area to prevent the civilians from rallying to CVN. This is in the vicinity of the K-7 supply area and this unit was probably sent there to obtain supplies from K-7, it must send one of its elements to obtain them. The two contacts mentioned were the only confirmed contacts with the 409th Sapper Battalion. The current location of the 409th Battalion is BS 2696 with a probable strength of 260 men.

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(5) The district level forces have also continued to remain in the back-country of Quang Tin (P). Tam Ky (D) units, V-12 LF Company and V-18 LF Company, have seen limited activity.

(a) V-12 LF Company is currently located at BT 1822 with a strength of 45 men as of 9 July. There have been no reports received on this unit since 23 August, when three Hoi Chanh were received who stated that V-12 LF Company has no leadership because their CO, XO and PO have either deserted or been killed. Until the unit has been refitted, it will probably remain out of contact.

(b) V-18 LF Company has been reported at BT 2812 with a strength of 100 men. This strength is probably high for this unit, because the majority of the LF companies in Quang Tin (P) have less than 50 men. There has been no confirmed contact with V-18 LF Company during the quarter. Visual reconnaissance of V-18's suspected base area indicated considerable activity. Several .51 caliber positions, spider holes, bunkers, trench-lines, and trails have been reported during the past three months.

(c) V-15 LF Company and C-9 LF Company were located at BT 1331 and BT 0834 respectively with strengths of 35 men and 40 men at the beginning of August. Since that time both units have been involved in numerous small contacts that have reduced their strengths considerably. V-15 LF Company was located at BT 1330, and C-9 was located at BT 1528.

(d) C-7 LF Company, which is a Tien Phuoc (D) unit, was located at BT 0909 with a strength of 40 men. The mission of this unit is to secure the road from Phuoc Tien (V), BT 155115, to Phuoc Thanh (V), BT 015105. A Hoi Chanh, Nguyen Chi Thanh, who returned on 27 September, stated that C-7 LF Company had lost 25 men from contacts with ARVN units. He also stated that the only contact that the unit initiated was in September when C-7 attacked Hamlet #1, Phuoc Tien (V) at BT 174127. The unit is currently providing security for the Tien Phuoc (D) committee. C-7 LF Company is located at BT 1310 as of 10 September.

(e) The 74th LF Company has remained in the vicinity of BT 3807 with a strength of 64 men. Agent reports have indicated that this unit has been buying rice from nearby villages for province units; therefore, they have not been involved in any offensive activity. The 74th LF Company is held at BT 3707 as of 23 October.

(6) The enemy has initiated 152 contacts with Allied forces during this quarter. Of the 152 contacts, 74 have been attacks by fire, with the remainder

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being ground attacks/contacts. Significant incidents include:

(a) On 5 August, 2-1 Infantry at Kham Duc airfield vicinity ZC 001092 received an estimated 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, 10 rounds of RPG fire, small arms fire, satchel charges, and sapper attacks from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 16 NVA killed, 5 individual weapons, 3 crew-served weapons, 16 packs, 32 satchel charges, and miscellaneous military equipment captured.

2-1 Infantry at Kham Duc airfield, vicinity ZC 001092, received 9x122mm rockets from an unknown size enemy force, resulting in no casualties or damage on 6 August.

On 7 August, 2-6th ARVN Regiment vicinity YC 846006, engaged an estimated VC company resulting in 20 VC killed. C/3-16 Arty at Fat City, vicinity BT 435079, received 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 60mm mortar fire, an unknown number of RPG rounds, small arms fire, and a ground probe from an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 VC killed and 4 satchel charges destroyed.

On 15 August, 4-4th ARVN Regiment vicinity ZC 118016 received 100 rounds of RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force.

RF #722 at BT 126282, engaged 2 platoons of VC, resulting in 14 VC killed on 25 August.

On 26 August, RF #102, vicinity BT 110300, engaged an estimated 15 VC resulting in 14 VC killed and 1 detainee.

(b) On 5 September, RF #928, vicinity BT 232188, received 30 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force.

D/1-1 Cavalry, at BT 307158, received heavy small arms fire from an estimated VC platoon. They returned fire, resulting in 7 NVA killed, 1 crew-served weapon captured, and 1 detainee. The detainee stated that he was from the heavy weapons company, 72 LF Battalion on 6 September.

On 9 September, the Chu Lai Combat Base, at BT 56 received 9x122mm rockets, resulting in no casualties or damage.

RF #195, at BT 255145, engaged an estimated VC Company, resulting in 13 VC killed and 1 document captured on 13 September.

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On 15 September, A/3-21 Inf, at BT 196178, engaged an unknown size enemy force, resulting in 20 NVA killed, 1 detainee, 1 PRC-25 radio, and 2 field phones captured. (possibly 72d LF Battalion)

On 27 September, C/4-31 Inf with A/26 Engineers at AT 9616, found 250 bunkers. They destroyed 170.

On 30 September, RF #722, at BT 202475, engaged an unknown size enemy force, which returned fire. Results were 21 VC killed and 5 VN detained.

(c) On 3-4 October, the Nui My OP, vicinity BT 218171, received heavy small arms, M-79, and mortar fire followed by a ground attack which overran the OP. Results were 11 VC killed, 4 US wounded, 3 US killed and 20 - 30 PF's wounded. Reports received later indicated that V-16 Sapper Company and possibly the 72d LF Battalion were involved in the attack.

On 11 October, 4th and 5th ARVN Regiments received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire at BT 156247, resulting in 1 ARVN killed and 8 ARVN wounded.

2-5th ARVN Regiment at BT 094316 received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on 12 October.

On 13 October, 3-5th ARVN Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 238495, resulting in 1 ARVN killed, 1 ARVN wounded, 31 VC killed, and 5 VN detained. (PW captured on 12 October at BT 237496 stated that he was from Q-80 Battalion).

(7) Division forces accounted for 684 killed during the quarter. Allied forces captured or destroyed 83,652 pounds of rice during the quarter.

(8) There have been 160 anti-aircraft incidents during the quarter. Of these, 146 involved .30 caliber fire with four .51 caliber incidents. All other incidents involved mortar, RPG, or miscellaneous type fire. The majority of anti-aircraft incidents have occurred in four areas: The Kham Duc airfield, Bao Area 117 vicinity BT 2210, the rocket pocket vicinity of BT 4006, and the K-7 logistical area vicinity of AT 9301. The other incidents were scattered throughout Quang Tin (P). During the period, three aircraft were lost. One of these losses was especially significant. On 26 August, a CH-47 from 178th Aviation at AT 861064, while returning troops from Kham Duc airfield, received ground fire with an unknown number of hits. The aircraft crashed resulting in 31 killed and 9 wounded.

(9) During the past quarter there have been 13 LOC interdictions, the

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majority on Highway #1 and Tien Phuoc Highway; none were significant.

b. Quang Ngai (P)

(1) The overall situation in Quang Ngai (P) at the end of October was not significantly different from that at the end of August. In general, the section of the province controlled by the Saigon government, largely in the heavily-populated lowlands of western Quang Ngai (P), was not greatly expanded. On the other hand, the Peoples' Revolutionary Government also failed to extend their power base out of the mountains and transportation corridors of the western half of the province.

(2) Early in August, the Quang Ngai Provincial Forward Front outlined their plans for a Fall-Winter offensive to begin in mid-month and run through an unspecified date. This campaign, which was to be conducted on the military, economic and political fronts, was the major event of the quarter and the guidelines in this plan, to a great extent, determined enemy activity. The first two objectives of the Forward Front's plan for the Thu-Dong (Fall-Winter) campaign indicated the enemy's overall aims. Their first goal was to penetrate organizations of the Saigon government by dispatching cadre, and the second was to penetrate the Regional and Popular Forces units. The plan's third goal was to penetrate American and ARVN units through utilization of legal security cadre and military intelligence spies. The order of importance of these objectives indicates that both on the political and military fronts, "penetrating" (as opposed to "defeating") tactics were to be conducted, suggesting that the Provincial Headquarters would attempt to set the stage for a victory to be achieved in the future. The major political thrust would be directed against GVN organizations and installations (which would include district headquarters and administrative officials) and the major military thrust would be against the Regional and Popular Forces elements.

(a) Politically, the enemy attempted to lay groundwork for a province takeover by strengthening the infrastructure in villages and hamlets. Training courses for party secretaries and economic cadre were organized, primarily in Mo Duc (D), Son Tinh (D) and Binh Son (D). Reorganization meetings for village and hamlet cadre were held under the auspices of provincial administrators. Building secret bunkers for meetings and model villages as counterparts of GVN resettlement areas were also among the political tasks accomplished.

(b) The military phase of the Thu-Dong campaign became known as the T-30 campaign, the overall aim of which was to disrupt the Pacification Program.

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By weakening the Regional and Popular Forces strength and will to fight, the campaign would pave the way for political takeover by the provincial headquarters. The offensive was subdivided into two phases, each with a preparation and execution period. Agents' collection of information at enemy meetings disclosed the major strategy of the campaign would be to (a) Absolutely apply guerrilla warfare; priority use of sapper units and (b) Establish an uprising in each district. The widespread attacks during late September and early October, and the use of sapper tactics in the major enemy thrusts (especially in the 8 Sep Tra Bong attack) were evidence that these principles were followed. Seize-and-hold tactics were not used extensively during the campaign, nor was a prolonged set-piece battle with ARVN or American units attempted. Most of the attacks by fire against American units were directed against NDP's rather than firebases.

(1) The preparation period for the first phase of the T-30 campaign probably began during the first week of August. During the preparation period, two guidelines were set down by the Provincial Headquarters. These were to "Develop sapper activities by establishing more sapper units" and to "Strengthen one artillery unit in each district". The first guideline was followed by the enemy's attempt to transfer promising youth from village guerrilla forces to local forces units, and by strengthening the 406th MF Sapper Bn. The second guideline was followed by units rebuilding their supplies of ammunition.

(2) The attack period of the first phase was to begin on National Liberation Day, 19 August, run through the GVN Senate elections on August 30, and climax on the first anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's death on 3 September. While this period was one of increased activity, the major incidents of the period took place after 4 September. The first notable attack occurred on 24 August, when in Mo Duc (D), B/1-20 was mortared and PF #144 received a sharp contact. The province was then quiet until the 30th, when LZ Stinson, Mo Duc (D) HQ and Binh Son (D) PF #1 were mortared, the RF/PF Training Center in Quang Ngai City rocketed, and Kai Loc (H) assaulted. B/1-20 and RF #468 killed ten enemy in an incident in Mo Duc (D). On 31 August, Tu My (V), FSB 411, Nui Ong Do OP and An Son OP were all mortared, and Nghia Hanh RF's and PF's received a ground attack. On 2 September, 3-1 Bn received the first of six contacts and 15 mortar attacks which occurred over a three day period in northeast Minh Long (D). On 3 and 4 September, RF's in Binh Son (L) received three ground attacks from enemy units using RPG supporting fire. On 5 September, LZ Stinson was mortared again, and on 6 September, Son Ha (D) HQ received 50 82mm rounds. The major attacks of the period took place on the morning of 8 September, when Tra Bong (D) HQ was mortared and assaulted, and on the night of 8-9 September, when Tra Binh (H), Dai Loc (H) and LZ Stinson received attacks.

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by fire and combined ground and sapper attacks. Both hamlets received mortar fire and ground probes again on the night of 10-11 September. Following these attacks, activity tapered off.

(3) Agents' reports indicated that the enemy began preparation for Phase II of the campaign around 10 September. Twelve days were to be spent rebuilding forces, eight days in preparation, and ten days in operations. Starting date for the second attack period was to be 29 September. On this day, Tra Cau (V) in Mo Duc (D) was assaulted, and on 30 September, Tri Binh (H) in Binh Son (D), received a ground attack from an estimated enemy company. On 2 October, Nui Tho OP in Mo Duc (D) was mortared. On 4 October, Vinh An (H) in Duc Pho (D) was assaulted, and An Loe (H) and Phu Hau (H) in Son Tinh (D) received large combined fire and ground attacks. On 6 October, Nui Trui OP in Nghia Hanh (D) was mortared. Activity then tapered off, reaching a normal level on 10 October. The second phase of campaign proved to be less intense than the first, as fewer attacks by fire were conducted. Figures for the two attack periods indicate the difference between the two Phases.

Fall-Winter Campaign

| | Phase I 30 August-12 September | Phase II 27 September-10 October |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Total attacks by fire | 81 | 32 |
| Against US | 36 | 6 |
| Against RFs, PFs and GVN installations | 44 | 24 |
| Total ground attacks/contacts | 69 | 80 |
| Against US | 41 | 42 |
| Against RFs, PFs and GVN installations | 26 | 34 |
| Total antiair incidents | 33 | 19 |
| Aircraft forced to land | 5 | 0 |
| Rocket Attacks | 1 | 1 |
| Mortar attacks over 25 rounds | 6 | 6 |
| Mortar attacks 10-25 rounds | 8 | 6 |

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(4) Probably the major result of this campaign was that it demonstrated the enemy's capability to conduct an offensive throughout the province, as targets were hit in all ten districts. That the enemy hit some targets (such as Tu My (V), LZ Stinson, Tra Binh (H)) two or three times indicates the enemy still has staging areas near important installations in which they are safe from Allied attack for at least a short period of time. The incidents involving 3-1 Inf Bn (2-5 Sep) near Nghia Hanh (D)--Minh Long (D)--Son Ha (D) border showed the 21st NVA Regt had the capability of conducting an effective series of ambushes and harassing mortar attacks. However, the withdrawal of the 60th Battalion after three days indicated the enemy may not have the equipment or will to engage in a prolonged struggle.

(3) The enemy not only used the attacks of the T-30 campaign to attempt to increase their base of influence, but also relocated their main units in critical areas to place pressure on the pacification program. Shifting the locations of major forces not only permitted the enemy to threaten friendly forces in different areas, but allowed them to retrain guerrillas in use of boobytraps, mines and terrorism to keep pressure on pacification efforts.

(a) The most important move of a major unit involved the shift of half of the 48th LF Bn from eastern Binh Son (D) to western Son Tinh (D) in early August. The element, approximately 100 men, remained in the area around LZ Stinson throughout the quarter. An initial reason for this move was given by two returnees who stated the 48th was retraining and resupplying. Another report stated that the road improvement and landclearing operations of the American engineers in eastern Binh Son (D) made it hazardous to keep the entire 200-man unit in the eastern area. But the possibility that the 48th assisted in attacks on Tra Binh (H) and Dai Loc (H) in the first phase of the Thu-Dong campaign and the identification of the 48th as the unit which assaulted Phu Hau (H) in the second phase indicated the 48th moved west for offensive reasons. The resettlement areas in western Son Tinh (D) are, in part, where the struggle between pacification and infrastructure elements was most intense during the quarter, and the shift of the 48th west to this area indicated the enemy's intention of building a power base in this area. The shift coincided with numerous reports of meetings by provincial level cadre with local communists in the area.

(b) The 406th Sapper Battalion, reclassified as a Main Force unit during the quarter on evidence that the unit is subordinate to HQ-5, shifted east into Son Tinh (D) for a period of time. During the relatively quiet month of August, the 406th was unlocated in Son Ha (D) west of the Horseshoe. During the first phase of the Fall-Winter campaign, part of

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the unit was believed to be operating with the 48th LF Bn and an element of the 107th NVA Hwy Wpns Bn in western Son Tinh (D). However, the identification by prisoners of the 406th as the attacker of Tra Bong (D) headquarters indicated that the whole battalion, possibly reinforced by MR5, probably moved from northern Son Ha (D) up to Tra Bong (D) for the attack. After the attack, the unit returned to Base Area 118. During mid-September, the 406th moved to the Vinh Tuy area, where most reports stated they retrained with the 48th. However, this retraining was apparently not intended to prepare the 406th for the second attack phase, since the unit was not reported in connection with any of the attacks at that time. After the second phase of the campaign, the 406th moved to Base Area 118.

(c) The 38th LF Bn and the 107th NVA Hwy Wpns Bn did not undertake major relocations during the quarter, but remained in their traditional AOs. The 38th may have been the attacker of the Chau Me OP, the Nui Ong Do OP and Mo Duc (D) HQ during the first phase of the T-30 campaign, and the Thach Tru (H) and Nui Tho OP during the second, but confirming evidence was lacking in all cases. The 38th spent much time providing security for rice-gathering activities during the period.

(d) The 107th NVA Hwy Wpns Bn, as usual, operated in elements throughout the northern half of the province during August, September, and October. The headquarters of the unit was held near Quang Ngai City at the beginning of August, and may have been the unit which rocketed the provincial training center. In late August, this element moved to Base Area 121, remaining there until after the second phase of the Fall-Winter campaign, when it relocated near the Horseshoe. One element of the 107th operated in western Son Tinh (D) in support of the 48th and 406th during the first phase of the campaign, and then moved to Base Area 118 with the 406th. After the headquarters moved to Base Area 121, an element remained near Quang Ngai City, and after the headquarters moved to the Horseshoe, an element located near the Minh Long--Nghia Hanh--Son Ha border, possibly moved east to attack the Nghia Hanh (D) headquarters in Mid-October. The 107th, like the 38th, was not identified with any of the attacks during the campaign, but rather, provided support to the province headquarters' sapper units.

(e) The 403d NVA Sapper Bn remained inactive through most of the quarter. The unit was located in Base Area 124 during August and September, and then split into companies to conduct ground probes in Duc Pho (D). Toward the end of October, the 403d returned to Base Area 124. The threat of an attack in Duc Pho (D) was present throughout the quarter, because of the 403d's presence in the second phase of the Thu-Dong campaign. Documents captured on 19 October contained a roster, battle plans, notes on the unit history, and strength figures for the 403d. During the quarter, the 403d's

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strength decreased from 279 to 256 men.

(f) At the beginning of August, the 21st NVA regimental CP and 80th Bn were in Base Area 128, the 60th Bn was in the Yen Ngua area, where it was to remain through most of the period, and the 70th Bn was in the Song Ve Valley. The units remained in these areas until the end of the month, when the entire regiment moved to the Nghia Hanh - Minh Long border to attack An Son OP in Nghia Hanh (D). The attack itself was made by the 1st Co, 60th Bn and the 23d Sapper Co of the regimental headquarters, with the 70th and 80th Bns taking up positions to block friendly reinforcements. Following this attack and the three days of engagements with 3-1 Inf, the 60th Bn moved back to the Yen Ngua area, the 70th to the eastern edge of Base Area 128, and the regimental CP and the 80th Bn along the Nghia Hanh border to the Song Ve Valley. The 80th moved into Base Area 123 and began a long period of rice collection that lasted through October.

(g) The 21st NVA regimental CP stayed on the west bank of the Song Ve River for a week, and then moved west along the Minh Long - Ba To border in early October. The regimental headquarters returned to the western Song Ve Valley at the end of the quarter.

(4) As most of the major units were operating in the highlands west of the coastal plains, the enemy transportation battalions in the western sections of the province were concerned almost exclusively with the economic phase of the campaign. While the major units and local forces in Nghia Hanh (D), Mo Duc (D) and Son Tinh (D) were attempting to obtain rice from these production areas, the main economic policy of the enemy seemed to be toward developing selfsufficiency in the west. This policy was developed as part of the Quang Ngai (P) Forward Front's campaign whose guidelines were:

"Construction of an effective transportation line system; construction of strategic supply reserve caches; construction of modern farm production areas; and establishment of a market price control and black market organization in GVN areas."

(a) In fulfilling the first objective, the enemy continued their heavy use of the Nuoc Ong, Dak Drinh, Song Re and Dak Selo transportation corridors. Visual reconnaissance noted heavy use of the trails along these rivers practically every week during the quarter. Numerous sampans were also observed at various points along the river. The enemy also attempted to develop agricultural areas in the valleys in the western part of the province. VRs often detected areas of extensive cultivation, but defoliation

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missions were reported to have taken a heavy toll of crops in the area. In the eastern and central areas of the province, local and provincial forces delegated production details to the troops. In some districts, entire units were converted into production elements as the Provincial Headquarters ordered lower-ranking members of military units to become self-sufficient.

(b) The construction of strategic supply caches was undertaken not only in the enemy's base areas and in the western sections of the province, but also in the eastern areas where food had to be procured for cadre and soldiers. In the east Division units operated effectively against attempts to gather rice, capturing over 280,000 lbs of rice during the quarter. Flood damage following the heavy rains of 29 September--2 October also reportedly damaged much of the enemy's rice supply.

(5) Significant incidents include:

(a) On 2 August, the Quang Ngai Training Center, BS 604721, received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar, 2 rounds of 122mm rockets and a ground attack from an unidentified UNSEF. Results were three Vietnamese trainees killed, eight Vietnamese trainees wounded, and 15 VC killed.

F/8 Cav engaged an UNSEF from BS 531449 to BS 305618 north of the river, killing 26 NVA, and engaged an UNSEF from BS 230643 to BS 305615 south of the river, killing 7 NVA on 10 August.

From 30 August to 4 September, Tu My (V), BS 547738, received a ground attack, an attack by fire, and a combined mortar and RPG attack. Total results were 1 PF, 1 RF and 1 civilian KIA, 1 PF WIA (M), 2 RF WIA, 2 civilians WIA (M) and 11 VC KIA.

On 8 September, Tra Bong (D) HQ and the ARVN Ranger compound at BS 342879 and BS 347881 respectively received over 100 rounds of mortar fire, heavy SA and AW fire, and a coordinated ground and sapper attack from the 406th MP Sapper Bn. Official results from the Quang Ngai (P) SIA list 21 friendly killed (including the subsector CO), 31 friendly wounded (including two officers), 1 American advisor killed and three wounded. 24 VC were killed and 6 were detained. Reports state the district HQ was 75% destroyed, the CIDG compound 25-30% destroyed, the RF camp 50-75% destroyed, and the RD cadre area 50% destroyed.

From 8 September to 9 September, LZ Stinson, BS 538824, received 82 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar (including 7 CS rounds), heavy SA and AW fire, and a sapper attack from an unidentified UNSEF, resulting in 2 PFs killed, 18 wounded

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and 2 structures destroyed. Dai Loc (H), BS 598809, received 20 rounds of 60 and 82mm mortar, an unknown amount of RPG, SAF and a ground attack from an unidentified UNSEF. Results were 4 PFs, 1 PSDF and 1 civilian killed, and 3 PFs, 1 PSDF and 12 civilians wounded, and 115 structures destroyed.

(b) On 4 October, Phu Nau (H), BS 604863, received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and a ground attack from an unidentified UNSEF. Results were 6 PFs and 8 VC killed.

From 11 - 12 October, B, C and D/1-20 Inf received heavy SAF, Chicom H/Grenades, RPG and mortar fire at BS 670590. Results were 3 US KIA, 1 US MIA, 11 US WIA (E), and 4 US WIA (M).

On 13 October, Nghia Hanh (D) HQ and the MACV compound at BS 616644 received two 122mm rockets, 25 rounds of 82mm mortar and 4 B-40 rockets. Results were: 11 US KIA, 4 US WIA (2 evacuated), 1 PF WIA, 1 RF WIA, 1 interpreter WIA, 1 generator operator WIA.

D and R/1-52 Inf, BS 494836, BS 520860 and BS 517873 respectively engaged a company size VC force, resulting in 26 enemy killed and 10 detained on 19 October.

On the Tra Bong Road, BS 451873 and BS 555893, there were 28 incidents of LOC interdiction. Total results were 15 Vietnamese civilians KIA, 7 US KIA, 12 US WIA (E), 1 PF WIA (E), 3 RF WIA (E), 1 Vietnamese civilian WIA (E), and 1 US WIA (M) from 12 August to 16 October.

2. (C) G2 Section: Summary of Significant Activities.

a. As of 31 October 1970, the 23d Infantry Div. Sensor Unit (Target Mission Force) had a personal strength of six (6) officers and sixty-two (62) enlisted men. TMF continues to operate as reported on 31 July 1970. A total of 221 radio-linked and seventy-two line sensors are being monitored in the AO. Orientation and familiarization training on Phase II equipment was completed on 27 August 1970. Forty-four US and one ARVN attended this training. During the reporting period, 1,907 intruders were detected and 692 actions were initiated, resulting in 11 VC/NVA KIA, 1 VC/NVA WIA, and five IWC.

b. The G-2 Air section's reconnaissance missions continue to obtain timely information of enemy locations and infiltration routes. During the reporting period 338 Infrared missions, 112 APD missions, 191 Photo missions and 856 VR missions were flown. The infrared missions produced a total

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of 561 targets; of these, 210 were engaged by artillery fire.

3. (C) Military Intelligence Company: Summary of Significant Activities

a. Counterintelligence Section.

(1) During the reporting period there were no reportable incidents of known sabotage, subversion, or espionage.

(2) Investigations concerning Vietnamese Nationals showed a marked increase during this quarter as compared to last quarter. During the reporting period this office conducted 217 investigations, as compared to 50 reported last quarter. Of this number 45 involved separate investigations of prostitutes, apprehended for unlawful entry into the Chu Lai Base.

(3) This office provided the following CI services:

| | |
|------------------------------|----|
| Announced CI Inspections | 37 |
| Unannounced CI Inspections | 40 |
| Courtesy CI Inspections | 10 |
| DAME Assists | 63 |
| Miscellaneous Investigations | 36 |
| PSI | 17 |
| AGI | 14 |

(4) During the reporting period the CI Section Case Officers conducted 113 Source Meetings and turned in 461 Information Reports. During the previous quarter there were 192 Source Meetings and 542 Information Reports prepared.

| Month | Information Evaluation | | | | | | Total |
|--------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|-------------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| AUG | 0 | 32 | 70 | 20 | 10 | 9 | 150 |
| SEP | 1 | 19 | 106 | 18 | 3 | 9 | 179 |
| OCT | 1 | 28 | 76 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 132 |
| <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>79</u> | <u>252</u> | <u>43</u> | <u>14</u> | <u>18</u> | <u>461</u> |
| <u>%</u> | <u>.4</u> | <u>17.1</u> | <u>54.7</u> | <u>9.3</u> | <u>3.1</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>11.5</u> |
| | | | | | | | <u>100</u> |

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c. (c) Interrogation Section

(1) During the reporting period, the IPW Section interrogated and classified 1,177 detainees. The breakdown of detainees by classification in comparison to the previous period reveals that there were significant proportional changes in detainee levels in the categories VC/PW and Civil Defendant.

| | May 70 - Jul 70 | Aug 70 - Oct 70 |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| NVA/PW | 50 | 27 |
| VC/PW | 346 | 56 |
| Civil Defendant | 698 | 779 |
| Innocent Civilian | 234 | 248 |
| Unclassified | 14 | 12 |
| Returnee | 39 | 55 |

(2) Forty-six (46) man days were spent in support of tactical, cordon and search, and screening operations and other actions in which interrogation teams worked directly with units in the field. Of the 46 man days, thirty-five (35) were spent in support of operation Elk Canyon.

(3) Information from 129 interrogations resulted in responses by tactical units. The breakdown by classification of detainees providing such information is as follows:

| | |
|----------|----|
| Returnee | 25 |
| PW | 37 |
| CD or IC | 67 |

Tactical units reacted to such information as locations of food and weapons caches, identification of VCI, rocket and mortar firing positions and enemy base areas.

c. Imagery Interpretation Section.

(1) The Imagery Interpretation Section was relocated to the Chu Lai West

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Airfield, next to the passenger terminal. Although all the aerial surveillance assets from the 131st RAC were consolidated at Phu Bai no degradation of support is anticipated.

(2) During the reporting period, this section conducted the following missions:

| | |
|--------------------------------|----|
| Visual Reconnaissance Missions | 90 |
| Hand held missions | 10 |
| Infrared missions | 54 |
| Photomissions | 39 |

(3) In addition the II Section completed several special projects such as area and fire support base studies, overlays, trail studies and mosaics.

d. Order of Battle Section.

(1) The Order of Battle Section has made no major changes during this reporting period. The only change that has been made dealt with expanding weekly summaries. This expansion provides a complete weekly recap of enemy activity by unit throughout the Division TAOR.

(2) During the reporting period, the Order of Battle Section was tasked through the G-2, by order of the Commanding General, with two major projects:

(a) The first dealt with a detailed study of Sapper attacks against Allied forces and installations in the Division TAOR. This study presented information collected from documents, PW reports and other intelligence gathering sources. Its purpose was to show the increasing emphasis the VC/NVA units are placing on sapper tactics and the subsequent need for background knowledge to aid in the prevention and early detection of future sapper attacks. As a result of the study, a briefing was prepared and presented to ADC-M and all CLDC Sub-sectors. A training film of sapper techniques is also being produced in order to provide commanders with a teaching aid for their units.

(b) The second project concerned VC Infrastructure in the TAOR. The sources used to obtain the data required are as follows:

(1) OB files for the past 6 months of Agent Reports, PW reports and ARVN summaries.

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(2) Questionnaires from the Kit Carson Scout Section and Chieu Hoi Center.

(3) Liaison visits with Province Hqs, XXIV Corps, and MACV-J2.

The information obtained from these sources was compiled and presented to CG 23d Infantry Div. and General Staff; G-3 and CORD's Adv. from XXIV Corps, the COs and CAs of the 198th and 11th BDEs, and the CO 1/1st Cav. These briefings are continuing. The purpose of this study is to bring to light the important role that VCI play in the enemy's overall operational plans. As a result of the information obtained, specific areas in the Division TICR were targeted in order of priority.

a. (C) Kit Carson Scout Section

(1) KCS Training Center graduated three classes of 20, 11 and 8 Scouts, respectively, during this period. The number of Scouts per class was substantially reduced to provide for more intensive individual training. Recent reports indicate the Scouts are extremely effective as interpreters and interrogators.

(2) During the month of October, possible infiltrators with false Chieu Hoi papers were discovered. The two suspects were turned over to Vietnamese authorities for further questioning.

(3) During the month of August, 2 Scouts received Bronze Stxs. Terminations during the past three months were for the following causes:

- (a) 8 unsatisfactory performance
- (b) 7 excessive AWOL
- (c) 7 KIA
- (d) 3 VC suspects
- (e) 2 WIA (amputees)
- (f) 1 resigned
- (g) 1 joined PP
- (h) 1 failure in class

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(i) 1 marijuana violation

4. (C) Co G (RANGER), 75th Infantry: Summary of Significant Activities

During the period 1 Aug - 31 Oct 1970 there were 50 long range reconnaissance patrols deployed within the Division AO including 28 area reconnaissance missions and 11 observation post missions. These patrols accounted for 152 sightings of 497 personnel. Results were 18 enemy KIA, 1 US KIA and 11 US WIA. On numerous occasions, the LRRP teams adjusted artillery on enemy locations with unknown results.

5. (C) Enemy Unit Locations and Movements: Based on PW interrogations, documents, and other reliable sources, the following locations are given for major enemy units in the 23d Infantry Div. TADII:

| UNIT | CTG | STR | LOC |
|------------------------|-----|-----|-----------------|
| MR-5 HQ | (C) | 650 | TRI-BORDER AREA |
| 2d NVA Div HQ | (C) | 200 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-30 NVA Signal Bn | (C) | 275 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-31 NVA AA Bn | (C) | 250 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-32 NVA RR Bn | (C) | 200 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-33 NVA Mortar Bn | (C) | 350 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-35 NVA Sap/Recon Bn | (C) | 340 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-37 NVA Trans Bn | (C) | 200 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-38 NVA Medical Bn | (C) | 200 | UNLOCATED |
| GK-40 NVA Engineer Bn | (C) | 800 | UNLOCATED |
| 1st MP Regt HQ | (C) | 125 | UNLOCATED |
| 40th MP Bn | (C) | 238 | UNLOCATED |
| 60th MP Bn | (C) | 170 | UNLOCATED |
| 90th MP Bn | (C) | 300 | UNLOCATED |
| 3d NVA Regt HQ | (C) | 150 | UNLOCATED |
| 1st NVA Bn | (C) | 109 | UNLOCATED |
| 2nd NVA Bn | (C) | 350 | UNLOCATED |
| 3rd NVA Bn | (C) | 200 | UNLOCATED |
| 21st NVA Regt HQ | (C) | 707 | BS 6053 |
| 60th NVA Bn | (C) | 150 | BS 5363 |
| 70th NVA Bn | (C) | 120 | BS 5046 |
| 80th NVA Bn | (C) | 125 | BS 6550 |
| QUANG TIN (P) FORCE | | | |
| 70th LF Bn | (C) | 251 | BT 0926 |
| 74th LF Hwy Wpns Bn | (C) | 250 | BT 1717 |
| 78th MP Rocket Bn | (C) | 150 | BT 3901 |

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| | | | |
|--------------------|-----|-----|-----------|
| 409th LF Sapper Bn | (C) | 269 | BS 2696 |
| V-16 LF Sapper Co | (C) | 30 | BT 2110 |
| V-17 LF Sapper Co | (C) | 30 | UNLOCATED |
| 72d LF Bn | (C) | 130 | BT 1819 |
| C-7 LF Co | (C) | 50 | BT 1310 |
| C-9 LF Co | (C) | 20 | BT 1528 |
| V-12 LF Co | (C) | 45 | BT 1822 |
| V-14 LF Co | (C) | 62 | UNLOCATED |
| V-15 LF Co | (C) | 15 | BT 1128 |
| V-18 LF Co | (C) | 100 | BT 2812 |
| 74th LF Co (V-20) | (C) | 64 | BT 3707 |
| 402d Sapper Bn | (C) | 210 | BT 3606 |
| 7-11 Inf Bn | (C) | 200 | BT 2410 |

QUANG NGAI (P) FORCES

| | | | |
|-----------------------|-----|-----|---------|
| 403d NVA Sapper Bn | (C) | 270 | BS 7333 |
| 107th NVA Hwy Wpns Bn | (C) | 250 | BS 5065 |
| 120th LF Montgd Bn | (C) | 300 | BS 3575 |
| 406th LF Sapper Bn | (C) | 240 | BS 4185 |
| 38th LF Bn | (C) | 160 | BS 6756 |
| 48th LF Bn | (C) | 200 | BS 5684 |
| C-18 LF Co | (C) | 60 | BS 6461 |
| T-18 LF Co (712) | (C) | 45 | BS 6983 |
| C-19 LF Co | (C) | 18 | BS 7557 |
| 21st LF Sapper Co | (C) | 70 | BS 5780 |
| P-31 LF Co | (C) | 30 | BS 6595 |
| K-51 LF Wpns Co | (C) | 15 | BS 7191 |
| C-65 LF Co | (C) | 45 | BS 7470 |
| C-75 LF Co | (C) | 22 | BS 7472 |
| 81st LF Co | (C) | 70 | BS 5566 |
| 95th A LF Sapper Co | (C) | 47 | BS 6891 |
| 95th B LF Sapper Co | (C) | 40 | BS 5090 |
| 120th LF Sapper Co | (C) | 30 | BS 8831 |
| C-212 LF Co | (C) | 50 | BS 5238 |
| C-219 LF Co | (C) | 30 | BS 7741 |
| 506th A LF Sapper Co | (C) | 65 | BS 5780 |
| 506th B LF Sapper Co | (C) | 65 | BS 5465 |

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D. Operations.

1. Operations Summary:

a. General: 23d Infantry Div. forces continued to conduct combat operations throughout the Division Tactical Area of Interest during the period 1 August 1970 to 31 October 1970 with contact ranging from light to moderate throughout the AO. Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, Iron Mountain and Pennsylvania Square continued throughout the period. Operation Elk Canyon terminated on 26 August at which time Operation Elk Canyon II commenced. Elk Canyon II was terminated on 19 September. On 5 September, the 196th Bde initiated Operation Nebraska Rapids, a joint operation with the 1st Marine Division. The operation terminated on 8 September. On 2 October the 1-1 Cavalry and the 2-1 Infantry formed Task Force Saint. The Task Force was placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for Operation Tulare Falls and terminated on 15 October. On 21 October, Troop F, 17th Cavalry was placed in direct support of the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade for an indefinite period. Task Force Burnett, composed of Headquarters, A and D Troops 1-1 Cavalry and B, C, D, R/2-1 Infantry was formed on 27 October and placed OPCON to the 1st Marine Division for participation in Operation Hoang Dieu.

Severe tropical storms and Typhoons Kate and Joan seriously curtailed military operations during the period 15 October to 26 October as 23d Infantry Division Troops and materiel assets were diverted to engage in disaster relief operations with the 2d ARVN Division.

b. Major Engagements: During the three month reporting period, Division forces were not included in any major engagement with enemy forces. The majority of the operations were pre-emptive in nature to offset enemy initiated actions against pacified areas during the national election campaign period. Enemy initiated RPG fires on 26 October against a troop carrying CH-47 helicopter resulted in the most significant casualty toll during the reporting period with terminal reports of 31 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E).

c. Operations by AO:

(1) Operation Frederick Hill, conducted by the 196th Infantry Brigade in close cooperation and coordination with the 5th ARVN Regiment, continued throughout the reporting period. Emphasis was on combat operations to increase the level of security of pacification operations near the coastal area and the destruction of main force and NVA units in the western portion of the

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combined TAOR. Contact was light to moderate throughout the reporting period. On 4 Aug, D/4-31 found graves of 6 NVA in the vicinity of AT 913271. Late that morning D/4-31 found a weapons cache, containing 4 individual and 2x crew served weapons. The next day C/1-46 received small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in 2 US KIA, 2 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M) at AS 981966. At BT 123237, on the 6th of Aug, D/3-21 found graves of 5 NVA. C/1-46 received small arms fire which resulted in 5 US KIA and 5 US WIA (E) on 8 Aug at AS 971958. A/3-21, on 19 Aug, found 10 graves with 10 VC killed by artillery fires in the vicinity of BT 167211. On the last day of the month, C/3-21 detonated a homemade boobytrap at BT 141270 causing 5 US WIA (E). On the 10th day of Sep, A/3-21 engaged 5 VC killing 4 and detaining 1 in the vicinity of BT 091272. Three days later D/3-21 observed and engaged 6 VC resulting in 5 enemy killed and 2 individual weapons captured in the vicinity of BT 086235. On 15 Sep A/3-21 engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 10 NVA, capturing 4 individual weapons and detaining 1 VN at BT 196178. Later that afternoon, A/3-21 engaged 10 NVA killing all 10 in the vicinity of BT 194177. At 1314H that afternoon 116th Avn gunships engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 9 NVA in the vicinity of BT 196178. At BT 145217 on the 19th of Sep, C/3-21 detonated an unknown type boobytrap resulting in 5 US WIA (E). On the morning of the next day, at BS 115978, C/2-1 detonated a 10 lb charge resulting in 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA (E). That evening A/3-21 received 1 RPG round which wounded 5 at BT 185203. On the 21st of Sep, D/1-46 engaged 20-30 VC killing 3 and sustaining 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA (E) in the vicinity of BT 294177. A/1-46 found 15 graves containing 15 NVA at AT 950052. Three days later, A/4-31 received friendly artillery fire resulting in 1 US WIA (E) at AT 817264. In the late afternoon of 28 Sep A/3-21 found a camouflaged cache along a trail at BT 108289. The cache contained 4 crew served weapons and 1 individual weapon. On the first day of October at 1100H, R/3-21 engaged 6 NVA killing 4 and capturing 2 individual weapons at BT 083295. Forty minutes later R/3-21 detonated a boobytrap and sustained 5 US WIA (E) at BT 069290. At 1340H on 5 Oct R/5 ARVN found 6 VC killed by artillery at BT 105268. On 13 Oct A/1-1 Cav found a total of 3600 lbs of unpolished rice and 300 lbs of potatoes at BT 104462 and BT 091454. At 1055H on 14 Oct 196th Bde Avn observed 7 NVA with packs in the vicinity of AT 817256. C/3-82 Artillery engaged the enemy and killed 2. Late in the afternoon the same day at AT 833242, 116th Avn engaged 6 NVA, killing 4. On 18 Oct, the 196th Inf Bde reported light contact in their combined AO with the 5th ARVN Regt. US/GVN forces combined in one operation as D/4-31 Inf and National Police conducted search and clear operations South of Hiep Duc. Light contact was reported on 20 Oct. US/GVN forces further combined in one operation as 2-1 Inf and PF's conducted search operations vicinity BT 281159. Enemy losses were reported as 10 VC killed and three individual weapons captured. On 26 Oct D/3-21 received 3 60mm mortar rounds inside

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their perimeter. As a result the unit sustained 7 US WIA (E) and 2 US WIA (M). The next day, B/2-1 on patrol, detonated a boobytrapped 82mm mortar round resulting in 4 US WIA (E). No significant contact was reported for the remainder of the reporting period. The results of Operation Frederick Hill are:

| <u>US</u> | <u>ENEMY</u> |
|-------------|----------------|
| 52 KIA | 580 KIA (CONF) |
| 229 WIA (E) | 0 KIA (PROB) |
| 44 WIA (M) | 1 DET |
| 0 MIA | 13 PW/VC |
| | 7 PW/NVA |
| | 16 RTNNE/VC |
| | 1 RTNNE/NVA |
| | 196 CIV DEF |
| | 90 II. CIV |
| | 198 IWC |
| | 22 CSWC |

(2) Operation Geneva Park continued throughout the reporting period as the 198th Infantry Brigade and the 6th ARVN Regiment concentrated on the security of major lines of communication and the destruction of enemy forces attempting to attack Quang Ngai City or the Chu Lai Base complex. Activity was light as Division units searched the Rocket Pocket around Chu Lai, targeted against elements of the 78th Main Force Rocket Bn and the 48th Local Force Bn. Saturation patrolling, extensive night ambushes, preplanned air strikes, scheduled artillery fires and sensor devices were used to inhibit attempts to attack the populated areas. During the reporting period Geneva Park saw light contact in their AO until 5 Aug. On that day, C/1-52 was hit by two claymores resulting in 2 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E) at BT 376072. In the morning of the next day, at BT 083328, H/17 Cav killed 3 VC and captured 3 individual weapons, in the same action detaining 18 individuals. Later that morning in the vicinity of BT 363066, C/1-52 received small arms fire sustaining 8 US WIA (E). On the 7th of Aug B/1-52 detonated a Bouncing Betty mine resulting in 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA (E) at BS 503863. Action remained light until the night of the 11th. F/8 Cav (Night Hawk) engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 26 of the enemy. In the early morning hours of 13 Aug, H/17 Cav killed 5 VC and captured 2 individual weapons at BS 579851. On 18 Aug LRRP Team Teapasse at BS 375008 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 NVA KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 24 Aug A/1-52 received and returned small arms fire resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 detainee WIA (E), 2 individual weapons captured and 3 US WIA (E). Action in the AO was

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light until the last day of the month when H/17 Cav detonated a 50 lb mine resulting in 5 US WIA (E). Later that afternoon D/1-52 detonated a 155 round sustaining 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 6 Sep, at BT 307158, a D/1-1 LOH received small arms fire and returned fire killing 7 of the enemy. The LOH crashed as a result of hits received during the action causing the death of 1 US. Two days later FSB Stinson received an unknown amount of mortar fire and a ground attack resulting in 7 US WIA (E) and 5 US WIA (M). On 9 Sep a UH-1C from 176th Avn received small arms fire and crashed at BS 408804 killing the 4 US aboard. On 15 Sep F/8 Cav gunships killed 5 VC in the vicinity of BS 515822. Five days later, C/1-52 engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 6 at BS 533895. On the 26th of Sep C/1-52 received small arms fire resulting in 6 VC KIA, 2 individual weapons captured and 1 US WIA (E). On 29 Sep F/8 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 273117. Two of the enemy were killed and one detainee was wounded. F/8 Cav sustained 1 US WIA (E). On the 4th of Oct, C/5-46 engaged 7 VC killing 3 and capturing 3 individual weapons. Two days later, 123d Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 297133 killing 14 of the enemy. On 7 Oct, C/5-46 detonated an unknown type boobytrap resulting in 8 US WIA (E). That afternoon, A/1-52 received small arms fire, mortar, RPG's and a ground attack, in which 2 VC were killed and 5 US wounded. On the 9th of Oct, C/75th (Rangers) engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 3 US WIA (M) and 2 NVA KIA at BS 456891. C/1-52 with 174th Avn engaged a VC platoon on 12 Oct, resulting in 11 VC KIA, 2 crew served weapons captured and 1 US WIA. C/1-52 on the next day, found a cave containing 5 VC KIA. They also found 3 hand grenades, 1 SKS and 14 RPG rounds at BS 569865. In the early afternoon of the same day C/1-52 found and evacuated 1 60mm mortar tube with baseplate, 1 baseplate for an 82mm mortar and 7 82mm mortar rounds. At 1940H that evening, B/1-52 sustained 8 US KIA, 5 US WIA (E) and 1 ARVN KIA when an unknown type mine detonated in their NDP. On an Eagle Flight in the early afternoon of 19 Oct, R/1-52 was inserted into an LZ at BS 494836, where they engaged two VC, killing one and detaining the other. On a later insertion, at 1430H, R/1-52 engaged 6 VC killing four and capturing another with an individual weapon. Later the pilot of the AMC aircraft observed 30 VC with weapons and packs at BS 517873. Company D and R/1-52 were inserted while 174th Avn gunships engaged the enemy force. The ground elements made contact with the enemy force killing 21 of the enemy, capturing 8 individual weapons and detaining 8 VN. There were no significant activities for the remainder of the reporting period. Results for Operation Geneva Park were:

US

36 KIA
216 WIA (E)
24 WIA (M)

ENEMY

341 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PRON)
3 DET

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0 MIA

8 PW/VC
3 PW/NVA
4 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
105 CIV DEF
87 IN CIV
83 IWC
7 CSWC

(3) Operation Nantucket Beach was conducted on the Batangan Peninsula in the 198th Infantry Brigade TAOR by elements of the 6th ARVN Regiment and the 1-6 Infantry targeted against elements of the 48th Local Force Bn. Operations were conducted on a continuing basis throughout the reporting period in support of the GVN pacification program. Contact remained light and scattered as numerous casualty-producing boobytraps and mines were reported. Operation Nantucket Beach saw light action until 11 Aug when A/1-6 detonated an unknown type mine resulting in 13 US WIA (E) at BS 703904. On 30 Aug at BS 639966, 176th Avn engaged 15 VC killing 6. Light action prevailed until the 20th of Sep when C/1-6 ambushed 7 VC at BS 687806 killing 4, detaining 1 WIA and capturing 1 individual weapon. Operation Nantucket Beach again saw light action until the 19th of Oct. One US was killed and three wounded when B/1-6 detonated an unknown type boobytrap. At 1815H on 27 Oct, HHC/1-6 received fourteen rounds of 82mm mortar. All rounds impacted to the East and West of the perimeter. There were no further significant activities for the remainder of the reporting period. Results for Operation Nantucket Beach for the reporting period were:

US

2 KIA
81 WIA (E)
1 WIA (M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

105 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
1 DET
16 PW/VC
0 PW/NVA
18 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
40 CIV DEF
41 IN CIV
37 IWC
0 CSWC

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(4) Operation Iron Mountain continued throughout the reporting period as the 11th Infantry Brigade and the 4th ARVN Regiment concentrated on security of major lines of communication and supply as well as combat operations to increase the level of security of the pacification operations being conducted along the coast. Enemy activity ranged from light to heavy during the reporting period. Two major engagements with enemy forces occurred. One on 1 Sep near Nghia Hanh (BS 617643) and the other on 12 Oct in the Song Ve Valley (BS 668587). In the early afternoon of 3 Aug, 174th Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force, at BS 440770, resulting in 16 VC KIA. Later that night D/3-1 engaged a sampan killing 6 VC in the vicinity of BS 445759. On the morning of the next day, B/3-1 detonated an unknown type boobytrap, killing 1 US and wounding 7 US at BS 470785. Action was light in the 11th Bde AO until the night of 9 Aug. F/8 (Night Hawk) engaged an unknown size enemy force, killing 6 NVA at BS 252622. Later that evening, F/8 (Night Hawk) killed 8 more NVA at BS 272620. On 14 Aug, 174th Avn killed 5 VC at BS 560824. However, at BS 771438, C/1-20 detonated an unknown type mine which resulted in 1 US KIA and 30 US WIA (E). 3 days later, C/4-3 received mortar rounds from D/4-3 resulting in 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA. Action remained light until the early morning hours of the 30th. A total of 15 VC/NVA were killed before 0400H. F/8 Cav (Night Hawk) accounted for 5 VC at BS 713581. 174th Avn engaged and killed 5 NVA at BS 751502 while B/1-20 killed 5 VC and captured 2 individual weapons after receiving hand grenades and RPG fire. On 1 Sep, A/4-3 had one of their mechanical ambushes detonate resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 3 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon captured at BS 725337. A short time later at BS 556633, B/123d Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 15 NVA KIA, 1 US MIA, and 2 US WIA (E). On the morning of 2 Sep, D/2-1 and E/1-1 Cav received 50 RPG rounds which resulted in 2 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E) at BS 559639. That evening, C/3-1 received 1 82mm mortar round resulting in 1 US WIA (M) at BS 616643. In the afternoon of 3 Sep, C/3-1 suffered 9 US WIA (E) due to small arms fire and RPG fire at BS 561634. On 7 Sep, R/4-21 engaged an unknown size enemy force at BS 908299 resulting in 2 VC KIA, 2 detainees, 1 individual weapon captured and 3 US WIA (E). On 11 Sep, B/3-1 found 10 NVA killed by gunships at BS 561636. On 15 Sep, B/3-1 received heavy small arms, mortar and RPG fire resulting in 1 NVA KIA, 2 individual weapons captured, 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA (E) and 2 US WIA (M). The AO saw light action until 28 Sep when a rocket from a supporting gunship fell short onto A/3-1's location at BS 519658. Casualties were 5 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M). Action was light until 2 Oct when D/4-21 found a large base camp at BS 742308. In the ensuing battle, 1 NVA was killed and 5 US were wounded. The next day, C/1-20 with 123d Avn killed 7 VC at BS 785506. On 4 Oct, there was an increase in enemy activity directed towards GVN outposts and villages. Seven villages and outposts were attacked. An RF outpost at Nui My was attacked

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resulting in 3 US KIA, 4 US WIA (E), 2 RF KIA and 10 RF WIA (E). On 5 Oct, B/1-20 killed 5 VC, capturing 3 individual weapons and sustained 2 US WIA at BS 75X629. Two days later B/1-20 detonated a 60mm mortar round resulting in 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M). On 11 Oct, D/3-1 with 174th Avn killed 5 VC at BS 447730. On the following day, B/1-20 engaged an unknown size enemy force at 1230H resulting in 3 US KIA, 7 US WIA (E), 1 US MIA and 1 NVA KIA. During a surge operation on 12 Oct, elements of B/1-20 were inserted into a hot LZ vicinity BS 665867. During the insertion, one helicopter was shot down. The 3rd platoon of B/1-20 was inserted into a hot LZ vicinity BS 667587. As the 3rd platoon with company command elements swept toward the down helicopter, they received intense small arms and RPG fire resulting in 4 US KIA (including the corporal commander), 1 US MIA, 11 US WIA (E) and 1 US WIA (M). At 1045H 19 Oct, B/1-20 while on patrol, uncovered a cache containing 1000 lbs of unpolished rice in four sacks marked Connell's Extra Long Grain and Sugar Co, INC, Dallas, Texas. Three bags were marked "Fertilizer Donated by the U.S." In the early evening of 20 Oct, C/1-20 found a tunnel complex in the vicinity of BS 728623, containing six 155mm artillery rounds and two RPG rounds. In the afternoon of 23 Oct, A/3-1 on a search mission, found a base camp with indications of recent use. Further searching revealed a cache consisting of 2000 lbs of rice, two unknown type foreign rifles, two AK-47's, two Thompson Sub-machine guns, 2 105mm rounds, 1 B-40 rocket and miscellaneous small arms ammunition, blasting caps, medical supplies and clothing and an NVA flag, red with gold lettering and a gold star in the center. There were no further significant contacts during the remainder of the reporting period. The results of Operation Iron Mountain were:

US

30 KIA
305 WIA (E)
53 WIA (M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

397 KIA (CONF)
27 KIA (PROB)
2 DET
15 PW/VC
1 PW/NVA
5 RTNEE/VC
336 CIV DEF
210 IN CIV
123 IWC
5 CSWC

(5) Operation Pennsylvania Square continued throughout the reporting period, concentrating on security of major lines of communication and supply as well as combat operations to increase the level of security of the paci-

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sification operations being conducted along the coast. Enemy activity continued to be light throughout the reporting period as the 1-1 Cavalry continued its operations. On 6 Aug, A/1-1 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 4 VC KIA and 2 individual weapons captured at BT 083328. In the early evening of the next day, F/17 Cav detonated a 40 lb nitro starch mine resulting in 7 US WIA (E) in the vicinity of BT 232229. B/1-1 Cav on the morning of the 8th, engaged 8 NVA killing 6 and capturing 6 individual weapons. The next morning at BT 109305, A/1-1 Cav detonated a nitro starch mine resulting in 4 US KIA and 8 US WIA (E). Operation Pennsylvania Square saw light action until 17 Aug when C/1-1 Cav engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 147287 which resulted in 1 NVA and 2 VC KIA, 2 individual weapons captured and 4 detainees. They also received 1 Hoi Chanh in the action. On the morning of the 21st, F/17 Cav detonated a 30 lb mine at BT 206236 resulting in 5 US WIA (E). On the 27th, B/1-1 Cav detained 3 VN received 4 Hoi Chanh and captured 1 individual weapon. On 30 Aug, A, D/1-1 Cav in the vicinity of BT 272126 engaged 17 NVA. The action resulted in 14 NVA KIA, 3 detainees and 3 individual weapons captured. The first day of September witnessed D/1-1 Cav kill 2 NVA and detain 7 individuals in the vicinity of BT 246145. The following afternoon, D/1-1 Blues engaged an unknown size enemy force at BT 080335, killing 9 of the enemy, detaining 4 wounded VN and capturing 3 individual weapons. On the 14th of Sep, B/1-1 Cav detonated a boobytrap hand grenade wounding 5 US at BT 175274. At midday on the 17th, 71st Avn engaged an unknown size enemy force killing 7 VC and capturing 3 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon in the action. On 25 Sep, F/17 Cav detonated a mine at BT 130320. Casualties sustained were 4 US WIA (E) and 6 US WIA (M). On the first day of Oct, in the vicinity of BT 138328, F/17 Cav detonated a mine resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). On 4 Oct., a combined 1-1 Cav/RF outpost received a ground attack from an estimated VC Company in which 3 US were killed and 4 wounded. The next morning an ACAV from E/1 Cav hit a 65 lb petna mine resulting in 5 US WIA (E) at BT 255187. On 9 Oct D/1-1 observed and engaged 5 VC. Four of the enemy were killed by gunships and 3 individual weapons were captured. Two US were wounded. There were no significant activities until the morning of 24 Oct around 0120H near BT 206200 when a Sheridan from E/1 Cav detonated an 80 lb mine resulting in four soldiers WIA (E) and 1 Kit Carson Scout WIA (E). The Sheridan was a combat loss. Later at 0155H, at the same location, another Sheridan detonated an 80 lb nitro starch mine. Two US were wounded and again the Sheridan was a combat loss. On 27 Oct, Task Force Burnett was organized as follows: HQ/1-1 Cav; A Troop, 1-1 Cav and D/2-1 Infantry. The Task Force is under operational control of the 5th Marine Regiment, First Marine Division. B/1-1 Cavalry and E/1 Cavalry continue operations in Pennsylvania Square. Both Troops are under operational control of the 196th Infantry Brigade. There were no further significant activities for the remainder of the reporting period.

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Results for Operation Pennsylvania Square were:

US

10 KIA
126 WIA (E)
13 WIA (M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

143 KIA (CONF)
3 KIA (PROB)
0 DET
5 PW/VC
2 PW/NVA
7 RTNEE/VC
1 RTNEE/NVA
66 CIV DEF
71 IN CIV
47 IWC
1 CSWC

(6) Operation Elk Canyon continued with operations to interdict the enemy's lines of communication and the destruction of main force units. On 26 Aug, the initial phase of the operation was terminated, redesignated Elk Canyon I and Elk Canyon II was initiated to continue operations in a new AO until it was terminated on 19 Sep. In the Elk Canyon AO, vicinity YC 845009, in the early afternoon of 2 Aug, A/1-82 Artillery, firing in support of 2/1 ARVN Regiment engaged an unknown size enemy force and accounted for 15 enemy KIA. In a mortar and rocket attack on 4 Aug at 0610H, A/1-82 received seventy to eighty rounds of 82mm mortar rounds, 10 B-40 rockets and 3 120mm mortar rounds coupled with a sapper attack. The results of the action were 16 NVA KIA, 5 individual and 3 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 2 US KIA, 9 US WIA (E) and 5 US WIA (M). Later contacts were light until 1220H on 11 Aug when 1/2-1 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The results of this contact were 4 NVA KIA and 1 individual weapon captured. There was 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA (E). The contact was made in the vicinity of YC 998111. On 13 Aug, D/2-1 again made contact at ZC 012102 when they received 10 60mm mortar rounds and an unknown amount of small arms fire. The results of this action were 2 NVA KIA, 2 individual and 1 crew served weapon captured while our losses were 1 US KIA, 9 US WIA (E) and 3 US WIA (M). On 16 Aug at YC 993100, at approximately 1650H, A/2-1 was engaged by an unknown size force. Enemy losses are unknown. Friendly casualties were 8 US WIA (E). Operation Elk Canyon terminated at 2400H 26 Aug 1970 as units redeployed from Kham Duc to vicinity landing zone Judy (AT 861064). While making an air move from Kham Duc to LZ Judy on 26 Aug, a CH-47 helicopter received RPG ground fire causing the helicopter to crash with a terminal report of 31 US KIA and 9 US WIA (E). There were no further significant events until 4 Sep at AS 798996 in the early morning hours, A/3-82

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Artillery engaged an enemy force, resulting in 6 NVA killed by artillery fire. D/1-46 detonated two M-16 mines on 12 Sep, vicinity BS 048978 at 1500H with 4 US WIA (E). Elk Canyon II was terminated at 2400H on 19 Sep 70. Cumulative totals for Elk Canyon and Elk Canyon II will be included in the cumulative totals of Operation Frederick Hill, 196th Infantry Brigade.

Results of Operations Elk Canyon and Elk Canyon II for reporting period were:

US

36 KIA
70 WIA (E)
20 WIA (M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

78 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
1 DET
0 PW/VC
1 PW/NVA
0 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
0 CIV DEF
0 IN CIV
39 IWC
8 CSWC

Total results of Operations Elk Canyo I and Elk Canyon II for period 121200H July - 192400H Sep 70 were:

US

37 KIA
99 WIA (E)
23 WIA (M)
0 MIA

ENEMY

107 KIA (CONF)
0 KIA (PROB)
1 DET
0 PW/VC
1 PW/NVA
0 RTNEE/VC
0 RTNEE/NVA
0 CIV DEF
0 IN CIV
56 IWC
14 CSWC

42

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2. (C) Plans

a. The following operation plans and orders were in effect or initiated during this reporting period.

(1) OPORD 6-70 (Combined Summer Military Campaign Plan) was published on 5 Aug 70, OPORD 7-70 (Elk Canyon II) was published on 21 Aug 70, OPORD 8-70 (Nebraska Rapids) was published on 2 Sep 70, OPORD 9-70 (Combined Fall-Winter Campaign Plan) was published on 9 Oct 70.

(2) OPLAN 4-69 (Golden Valley - Relief/Reinforcement of CIDG Camps), OPLAN 5-69 (Noncombatant Emergency Relocation and Evacuation), OPLAN 11-69, OPLAN 12-69 (Golden Valley Rehearsal), OPLAN 13-69 (Rapid Reaction), OPLAN 14-69 (High Threat Countermeasures), OPLAN 1-70 (Security for High Ranking Officials), OPLAN 3-70 (Defense of Major Cities), OPLAN 7-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Contingency Plan) and OPLAN 20-70 (Reinforcement of MR 1) remained in effect as published contingency plans. OPLAN 5-70 (PW Recovery Operations) was published on 16 Aug 70.

(3) Numerous Frag Orders applicable to Operations Frederick Hill, Geneva Park, Nantucket Beach, Iron Mountain and Pennsylvania Square have been published.

b. Monitoring of the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP) continued.

3. (U) Organization

Effective 20 September 1970, Troop E, 1st Cav was relieved from attachment to 11th Brigade and attached to 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry

4. (C) Training

a. The Division Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all individuals through the grade of O3 who are assigned or attached to the Division. During the reporting period, 85 courses were completed for 8,965 personnel.

b. The Division Combat Center completed 3 Combat Leadership Courses for 143 students and 2 Support Leadership Courses for 44 students.

c. 2 Unit Reconnaissance Courses were completed, graduating 70 personnel.

d. The Division Sniper School graduated 3 classes totalling 70 students.

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e. Training of Territorial Forces Junior Officers continued. 5 classes were conducted during the reporting period with a total of 141 RF/PF Junior Officers completing the course.

f. The Division Combat Center continued support of a Mine and Boobytrap Mobile Training Team that conducted classes on countering enemy mines and boobytraps for units of the division.

g. The 16th Combat Aviation Group conducted CH-47 Operations classes during the month of August for interested personnel.

h. Instructors from the Division Sniper School conducted marksmanship refresher training for elements of the 1st Bn, 6th Infantry and the 1st Sqdn, 1st Cavalry.

i. The Division Support Command continued to conduct a monthly PLL Clerks Course for all elements of the division. A total of 76 personnel attended this course.

j. The Division Support Command also conducted its monthly TAMMS Course during the period with a total of 84 students attending.

k. 23d Infantry Div. Artillery conducted 4 classes in Advanced Fire Direction Techniques for Division Artillery personnel.

l. A Marksmanship Training Clinic was conducted by the Division Sniper School in order to improve marksmanship in division units with 54 students attending.

5. (C) Close Air Support

a. During the period 1 Aug through 31 Oct 1970, 720 close air support (CAS) and 387 Combat Sky Spot (CSS) missions for a total of 1107 air missions utilizing 1701 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the 23d Infantry Div. This is a decrease from 1,815 missions utilizing 2226 aircraft sorties flown during the previous quarter.

(1) CSS Missions

During the reporting period, 387 CSS mission utilizing 309 aircraft sorties were flown. The USAF flew 40 missions utilizing 64 sorties; the USA flew 3 missions using 6 sorties; and the USMC flew 344 missions using 239 sorties. This is a decrease from the previous quarter when 1057 CSS missions utilizing 1175 aircraft sorties were flown in support of the Division.

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The decrease can be attributed to the Marine ASRT sky spot control facility being removed from Chu Lai.

(2) CAS Missions

A total of 720 close air support missions were flown using 1392 sorties. This is a slight decrease in missions and a slight increase in sorties from the previous quarter in which 794 CAS missions using 1051 sorties were flown. The decrease in missions can be attributed to the Marine air wing being removed from Chu Lai and bad weather. The USAF flew 368 missions using 689 sorties, an increase of 183 missions and 328 sorties. USMC flew 243 missions using 482 sorties, a decrease of 309 missions and 539 sorties. VNAF flew 13 missions using 30 sorties, a decrease of 21 missions and 46 sorties. USN flew 96 missions using 201 sorties.

(3) Ordnance Expended

There was a total of 47,974 tons of bombs used during the reporting period. This was a decrease of 1,996 tons of bombs from the last reporting period. Two hundred and one (201) tons of napalm and 58 rockets were used, a decrease of 99 tons of napalm and 168 rockets. The sharp decrease in rocket expenditures can again be attributed to the increased control of their use by I DASC.

b. There were no Arclight strikes flown in support of the 23d Infantry Division in the last three months.

c. Bomb damage assessments made by forward air controllers (FAC's) during the period indicated the following: 327 structures destroyed, 155 structures damaged, 99 secondary explosions, 132 secondary and sustained fires, 15 fighting positions and spider holes destroyed, 32 tunnels destroyed, 8 caves collapsed and 26 enemy killed by air strikes (KBAS).

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6. (C) Artillery: Division Artillery continued to support the entire Division AO, providing fire support to all operations. Artillery was required to perform moves to support these operations. Artillery moves during the period are as follows:

a. The direct support unit of the 196th Infantry Brigade remained the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. On 29 September the Battalion fire direction center moved from WEST (AT 990250) back to HAWK HILL (BT 225312) to rejoin the Battalion Headquarters.

(1) A/3-82 was split, with the Battery HQs and four howitzers on MARY ANN (AT 961998) and 2 howitzers at TAI KY (BT 292232). On 26 August the howitzers on MARY ANN moved to JUDY (AT 861015) in support of operation ELK CANYON II, which was being conducted by elements of 1-46 and 2-1 Infantry and 5th ARVN Regiment. On 8 September the two howitzers at TAI KY moved back to HAWK HILL, continuing support to 1-1 Cav. On 13 September the howitzers on JUDY were split, with two moving to HAWK HILL and two joining B/1-14 on MARY ANN to continue support of forces in ELK CANYON II. On 19 September howitzers were moved from HAWK HILL to NEW HAU DUC (BT 048043), from which they could support elements of 2-1 Inf in an operation to reopen LZ BOXER (BS 116978). The next day these two howitzers and two from MARY ANN moved to LZ BOXER in support of 2-1 Infantry which was operating in the area until 4 October. On this date the four howitzers moved from BOXER to Grid BT 048507 in support of Task Force Saint, which was engaged in operation Tulare Falls in the 5th Marine Regt area. On 15 October Tulare Falls ended and the howitzers returned to HAWK HILL, consolidating the battery at that location. On 17 October four howitzers moved to LZ YOUNG (BT 188158) to support operations of 2-1 Inf. On 27 October the two remaining howitzers at HAWK HILL moved to LZ BALDY (BT 133453) to support Task Force Burnett. At present the battery FDC and four howitzers are at LZ YOUNG and two howitzers are at BALDY.

(2) B/3-82 continued to support 3-21 Infantry from split locations, with the HQ and three howitzers at LZ CENTER (BT 050250) and three howitzers on PREP (AT 007148). On 10 August, one howitzer was moved from PREP to TIEN PHUOC (BT 102140) to support 3-21 Inf operations N-NE of TIEN PHUOC. On 12 August, the two remaining howitzers moved to CENTER closing PREP. When the operation ended at TIEN PHUOC on 15 August, the howitzers returned to CENTER consolidating the battery. Between 17 August and 21 August, two howitzers were again moved to TIEN PHUOC to support operations. On 24 August, two howitzers were moved to HAWK HILL (BT 225312) to support operations to the West; on 9 September, they returned to CENTER from HAWK HILL. From 9 September to 23 September, two howitzers were again moved to TIEN PHUOC; on 23 September the battery was consolidated at CENTER.

(3) At the beginning of the period, C/3 82 provided support to 4-31 Infantry. Its HQ and three howitzers were at SIBERIA (AT 903232); with two howitzers at KILOW (AT 802181) and one howitzer at LZ PREP (AT 007148) adding support to B Btry. Between 7 August and 15 August, the howitzer from PREP moved to

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TIEN PHUOC (BT 102140) and then to SIBERIA (AT 903232). On 24 August, the battery was consolidated at SIBERIA, with the arrival of the two howitzers from MELON, and remained consolidated for the rest of the period.

(4) B Btry, 1st Bn, 14th Arty remained attached to 3-82 Artillery, and provided support to 2d Bn, 1st Inf, initially from FSB KHAM DUC (20 009085). On 26 August, as operation ELK CANYON I ended, the battery moved to MARY ANN (AS 961998) and has remained at that location supporting 1-46 Inf during ELK CANYON II and subsequent operations west and east of MARY ANN.

b. The 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery remained in direct support of the 198th Inf Bde in the Geneva Park and Nantucket Beach Areas of Operation. The battalion headquarters and fire direction center remained at BAYONET (BT 558003) until 17 October, when they moved within the Chu-Lai perimeter.

(1) A/1-14 continued to provide support to 1st Bn, 6th Inf from split positions. The battery headquarters and four howitzers were located at LZ BAYONET, and four howitzers were at DOTTIE (BS 630853).

(2) C/1-14 remained evenly split between FAT CITY (BT 440077) and KY TRA (BT 316709), supporting 5th Bn, 46th Inf.

(3) D/1-14 continued to provide support to 1st Bn, 52d Inf. At the start of the period the battery headquarters and three howitzers were located at STINSON (BS 539234), and three howitzers were at CHIPPEWA (BS 485967). On 6 August, as 1-52 completed operations south-southwest of CHIPPEWA, the howitzers returned to STINSON. On 18 August, the two howitzers were moved to TRA BONG (BS 343083), and a third was moved on 19 August to support 1-52 Inf in operations south of TRA BONG. These weapons returned to STINSON on 2 September as operations ended. Two howitzers again were moved to TRA BONG on 9 September to support 1-52 Inf, and returned as operations terminated on 20 September. The same move was conducted on 27 September and 4 October. Between 12 October and 19 October, two howitzers were again moved to TRA BONG, this time to support operations by 4-3 Inf north-northeast of TRA BONG. On 20 October, two howitzers were moved to NUI PHO TINH (BS 648936) from STINSON. At present the battery remains split between STINSON and NUI PHO TINH.

c. The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery continued to provide direct support to the 11th Inf Bde at BRONCO (BS 812396).

(1) A/6-11 provided support to 1st Bn, 21st Infantry from DEBBIE (BS 869319) with its headquarters and four howitzers, and from CHARIE BROWN (BS 928220) with two howitzers. On 2 September, two howitzers were moved

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from DEBBIE to NGHIA HANH (BS 616642) to support District Forces during a period of increased enemy activity, returning on 12 September. On 4 September, the two howitzers at CHARLIE BROWN moved to DEBBIE as operations ended. On 14 September, two howitzers returned to CHARLIE BROWN. On 28 September, the two howitzers from CHARLIE BROWN and on 30 September two from DEBBIE moved to REED (BS 764277) to support 4-21 operations around FSB REED. These four howitzers departed REED on 14 October as operations ended, and returned to DEBBIE and CHARLIE BROWN.

(2) B/6-11 provided artillery support to 4th Bn, 3d Inf from SAN JUAN HILL (BS 634380). On 7 August, three howitzers moved to DWARF (BS 731328) in support of 4-3 operations to the west and southwest, and returned to SAN JUAN HILL as operations ended on 23 August. On 3 September, two howitzers moved to BS 453443 to participate in a mini-Artillery Raid in support of CIDG forces; they returned on the same day. On 5 September, two howitzers moved to MINH LONG (BS 37512) in support of 1-20 Inf, which was operating to the east. This operation ended on 11 September and the howitzers returned to SAN JUAN HILL. From 29 September to 6 October, two howitzers again were located at MINH LONG. On 10 October, four howitzers were placed under operation control of 1st Bn, 14th Arty when they moved to OP GEORGE (BS 470866) to support 4-3 Inf in operations to the northeast.

(3) C/6-11 provided support to 1-20 Inf, initially with its headquarters and four howitzers at BRONCO (BS 812396), and two howitzers at SNOOPY (BS 708610). On 20 August, the battery headquarters and four howitzers moved from BRONCO to LIZ (BS 757432) to establish a new fire base. The battery provided support from LIZ and SNOOPY for the remainder of the period.

(4) D/6-11 supported 3d Bn, 1st Inf initially from HILL 411 (BS 539731). Between 11 August and 16 August, two howitzers were moved to MINH LONG (BS 37512) in support of operations west-southwest of NGHIA HANH. From 16 August to 25 August, three howitzers were located at BS 458763 in support of 3-1 operations west of OP 1. On 28 August, two howitzers were moved to NGHIA HANH to support paramilitary forces during a high threat period. The howitzers returned to HILL 411 on 26 September. On 28 September, two howitzers were moved to DRAGON (BS 730529) to support 1-20 Inf operations west of DRAGON, and returned to HILL 411 on 3 October as operations ended. On 28 October, two howitzers were moved to NGHIA HANH (BS 616642) in support of 3-1 Inf operations west of NGHIA HANH.

d. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery provided general support reinforcing fires for the southern half of the AO (Iron Mountain, Nantucket Beach and Geneva Park Operations), with its battalion headquarters and operations center located at HURRICANE (BT 537033).

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(1) A/1-82 Artillery reinforced the fires of 1-14 Artillery from FAT CITY (BT 440077) with four howitzers, and from DOTTIE (BS 680853) with two howitzers.

(2) B/1-82 Artillery provided reinforcing fires to both 1-14 Artillery and 6-11 Artillery, with its headquarters and four howitzers at SNOOKY (BS 708610) and two howitzers at STINSON (BS 539821). On 3 September, two howitzers were moved to NGHIA HANH (BS 616642) to increase supporting fires for units west of NGHIA HANH. The howitzers returned on 15 September as operations ended.

(3) C/1-82 Artillery reinforced the fires of 6-11 Artillery, with its headquarters and four howitzers at LIZ (BS 757432) and two howitzers at DEBBIE (BS 869319). On 7 August, two howitzers moved from DEBBIE to DWARF (BS 731328), providing fire support to 4-21 Inf. The howitzers returned on 22 August as operations ended.

(4) D/1-82 Artillery (8-inch) provided support to both 1-14 and 6-11 Artillery from DOTTIE (BS 630853) and BUNDOK (BS 812396). On 13 September, the two weapons from BUNDOK were moved to DIAGON (BS 730529) for a one-day operation to destroy a VC-infested swamp.

e. The 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided reinforcing fires to 3-82 Artillery on Frederick Hill NO, and provided direct support to forces operating in Pennsylvania Square. Initially the headquarters and fire direction center were located at ARTILLERY HILL (BT 515040), and on 30 August moved within the Chu Lai perimeter.

(1) A/3-16 Artillery provided both direct support and reinforcing fires from its split locations. The headquarters and two howitzers, which are located at HAWK HILL, provided direct support to 1-1 Cav. Three howitzers located at NEST (AT 990250) provided reinforcing fires. The remaining howitzer was co-located at SIBERIA (AT 993232) with one howitzer from C Btry. On 29 August, the two howitzers moved from SIBERIA to HAWK HILL to increase support for combined operations of 1-1 Cav and 3-21 Infantry. At present the battery is split between HAWK HILL and WEST.

(2) B/3-16 Artillery provided fire support from split locations at TIEN PHUOC (BT 102140) and NEW HAU DUC (BT 070062). On 18 September, a shift of personnel was conducted between NEW HAU DUC and MARY ANN (AS 961998). The battery currently is evenly split between TIEN PHUOC and MARY ANN.

(3) C/3-16 Artillery initially provided reinforcing fires to operation ELK CANYON I with three howitzers at KHAM DUC (ZC 009085), while two howitzers were located at MARY ANN (AS 961998) and one at SIBERIA (AT 903232). On 24

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August, the howitzers at HAU DUC moved to JUDY (BT 201015) as EK CANYON I ended and EK CANYON II was initiated. These howitzers were initially in direct support of 1st Bn, 5th ARVN Regt, which was operating to the West. As the fire moved over their own supporting 105mm coverage, the 155mm howitzers of C Btry reverted to a reinforcing role. On 29 August, the howitzer on SIBERIA moved to HAK HILL (BT 225312), adding support to A Btry. On 12 September, this howitzer was moved to MARY ANN (AS 941948), increasing the number of howitzers there to three. On 13 September when EK CANYON II ended, the three howitzers on JUDY moved to NEW HAU DUC (BS 024977), and on 18 September, there was a shift of personnel between MARY ANN and NEW HAU DUC, consolidating the battery at that location.

f. The 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general supporting fire for the American TAOL, with its headquarters and operations center located initially at ANTELOPE HILL (BT 915040), and then at Chu Lai beginning 8 October.

(1) A/3-18 Artillery supported operations in the 198th Brigade AO from LZ CRUNCH (BS 342882) during the period. It also provided direct support to ARVN Ranger Operations conducted in and around TIAH BONG and HA THANH.

(2) B/3-18 Artillery remained at TAOL PHUOC (BT 102140) supporting operations in the 196th Brigade AO. It also provided support to Special Forces operations in the TIAH PHUOC and HAU DUC areas and responded to numerous sensor missions in the area.

(3) C/3-18 Artillery continued to support the 11th Brigade AO from LZ CRUNCH (BS 521515) and provided support to ARVN Ranger Operations in the GIA VUC, HA TO, and MINH LONG areas.

g. Ammunition expenditures by caliber for the period 1 August to 31 October were:

| | |
|-------|---------------|
| 105mm | 177,720 |
| 155mm | 70,027 |
| 8" | 15,024 |
| 175mm | 7,725 |
| TOTAL | <hr/> 270,476 |

h. Countermortar Radar Detachment

(1) The 251st PA Detachment (CM Radar) was initially located at OP 1 (BS 518778) where it covered LZ STINSON and PSS 411. On 2 September, the

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radar was moved to FAT CITY (BT 440071) to provide coverage for the Northern Rocket Pocket, thereby providing protection for the northern portion of Chu Lai Base. The detachment also participated in registration for artillery units that were within range.

(2) The 252d FA Detachment (CM Radar) initially provided support for ARTILLERY HILL (BT 511040) with a primary sector of scan to the west into the Northern Rocket Pocket. On 29 August, the detachment moved to the vicinity of QUANG NGAI (BS 613735) where it is manned jointly by 23d Infantry Division Artillery personnel and 2d ARVN Division Artillery personnel. The radar continues to assist ARVN and Americal artillery units within range to conduct registrations.

i. Ground Surveillance Radar Detachment

(1) The organic AN/TPS-25 continued surveillance from OP 1 (BS 516778) with a primary sector of scan to the west over the Song Tra Khuc River.

(2) The 271st FA Detachment (Radar) remained at OP 3 (BS 754421). Its primary sector of search was west covering the primary infiltration routes into the districts of NO DUC and DUC PHO.

j. Quad .50 Machineguns

Battery C, 55th Artillery (MG) continued to be deployed throughout the 23d Infantry Div. AO in support of ground defensive plans of fire bases. In addition, the unit provides security on all road convoys.

k. Meteorological Stations

(1) Initially, the meteorological section of 3-18 Artillery provided metro data for the north and central coastal area from ARTILLERY HILL (BS 515042). On 10 October, the station moved to Chu Lai and continues to provide support from that location.

(2) The meteorological station of 3-16 Artillery remained at TIN PHUOC (BT 102140), providing metro data to the northwestern portion of the AO.

(3) The 2-11 Artillery meteorological station remained attached to the 6-11 Artillery until 8 October, and was located at DUC PHO (BS 814382) where it provided metro data to the southern portion of the AO. On 8 October, the section was returned to the 101st Airborne Division, and the 23d Infantry Div. Artillery organized a section which continued to operate from DUC PHO.

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7. (U) Aviation - A separate OML for Aviation will be submitted by the 16th Combat Aviation Group on 10 November 1970.

8. (C) Chemical. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1970, the Division Chemical Section, the 27th Chemical Detachment, the 87th Chemical Detachment and the 90th Chemical Detachment conducted the following chemical activities.

a. 130 drums of persistent CS were dropped for terrain contamination.

b. 12 E158 Tactical CS Cluster Bombs were employed for temporary denial of terrain to the enemy.

c. 114 APD missions were flown.

d. 3 FSB's were defoliated by ground spray of 935 gallons of agent Blue.

e. 5 FSB's were defoliated by helicopter spray of 220 gallons of agent Blue and 1420 gallons of diesel.

f. Approximately 16,825 acres of enemy crops were destroyed by helicopter spraying using 13,830 gallons of herbicide.

g. 354 drums of thickened fuel were dropped on suspected enemy positions and minefields.

h. 440 drums of thickened fuel were dropped for land clearing operations.

9. (C) Engineer

a. Activities for the quarter consisted of the divisional engineer effort being devoted primarily to direct combat support of the division, while non-divisional units devoted primary efforts to the construction of secondary LOC's and operational support construction. One change in engineer troop disposition occurred during this reporting period. CBMU 301 redeployed to the United States in September.

b. LOC Program. During the reporting period paving of QL-1 was completed in the Division TAOI. Maximum horizontal effort remained committed to the construction of tactical and "Farm to Market" roads; and to road opening operations to support tactical convoys.

(1) QL-1

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- (a) The 26th Engr Bn continued to provide tactical bridge support for restoration of CL-1 within the TMOI.
- (b) The 39th Engr Bn provided expedient maintenance from the II Corps boundary (BS 907150) to Tam Ky (BT 910225). The battalion continued construction of concrete headwalls on CL-1 between Binh Son and Duc Pho.
- (c) Elements of the 32d NCR completed paving operations north of Tam Ky to the northern AO boundary and paving of the Tam Ky City Streets during this reporting period.
- (d) Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 301 continued to provide mineral products for engineer construction until their redeployment 27 Sep.

(2) Secondary LOC's

- (a) Increased commitment of engineer effort on the tactical LOC's continued through this reporting period; however, construction was hampered due to heavy rains during Oct. 10 km were completed during this reporting period bringing the total kilometers completed in the Tactical Road Program to 54 km. 83 km are still under construction.
- (b) The 39th Engr Bn continued to be the primary unit committed to upgrade of secondary LOC's, with significant contributions being made by the 26th Engr Bn, 103d ARVN Engr Bn and Ministry of Public Works, Quang Ngai Province.

c. Land Clearing

- (1) The 26th Engr Bn Land Clearing Team conducted Mo Duc Phase III clearing operations 5-30 Aug in an area west of Mo Duc Village. 957 acres were cleared.
- (2) The 26th Engr Bn Land Clearing Team initiated clearing operations in conjunction with road construction operations along the Tra Bong Road on 5 Sep 70. 650 acres were cleared prior to 30 Sep when the operation was suspended due to inclement weather.
- (3) Clearing operations on the BatangĒi continued during this reporting period. On 21 Aug, a 3d platoon joined the 59th Land Clearing Company, a 45th Engr Gp Unit. 11,555 acres were cleared during this reporting period.

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d. Airfield Rehabilitation

(1) Duc Pho. Approximately 60 ft of runway was rehabilitated during this reporting period.

(2) Ha Thanh. On 23 Oct, 32d NCR completed this airfield to Type II, C-123 standards.

(3) Ba To. The 32d NCR completed work on the subgrade of the airfield at Ba To on 20 Oct. An ARVN transportation unit is presently hauling MBA1 matting to FSB Bronze. The matting will be airlifted to Ba To by CH-54 aircraft.

e. Combat Support

(1) FSB/LZ Construction. During this reporting period twelve (12) FSB/LZ's were opened. Numerous FSB/LZ's were upgraded during this reporting period.

(2) Minesweep Activities. Transfer of QL-1 minesweep responsibilities to Territorial Forces was completed during this reporting period. Thang Binh District assumed responsibility on 8 Aug and Duc Pho District on 14 Aug, to complete the turnover. Prior to turnover, the 26th Engr Bn conducted a training program for the respective districts.

(3) Road Opening Operations. During this period HL 529, from Binh Son to Tra Bong was opened to support seven (7) Division/Province Convoys. HL 516/517, from Ngai Hanh to Minh Long was opened once. The 26th Engr Bn provided technical assistance, equipment and material support to the 2d ARVN Engr Bn for a road opening operation to convoy foodstuffs to Hiep Duc. Five (5) DIVARTY/MACV Convoys were conducted from Tien Phuoc to FSB Pleasantville and New Hau Duc. HL 533 from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc was opened six (6) times during the reporting period.

f. Engineer operations in the TMO

(1) 26th Engineer Battalion (Combat)

(a) Combat Engineer Support:

1. LZ Preparation. Twelve (12) LZ/PZ's have been constructed during this period employing engineer A, B, and C teams. C teams utilizing the

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Case 450 airmobile dozer were employed at five (5) locations and expanded LZ's into fire support bases to support multi-battalion sized operations such as those at FSB Boxer.

2. Minesweeps.

a. Daily minesweeps of Liz, Fat City and Sniper Range access roads continued.

b. CL-1 minesweep responsibilities were transferred to Territorial Forces in Thang Bing and Duc Pho on 8 and 14 Aug 70 respectively. Prior to this turnover, A/26 and C/26 conducted extensive training on sweep techniques and demolitions for the District Forces. This training included joint sweep operations for a period of ten (10) days.

3. Operation Elk Canyon. The requirement for engineer support was terminated on 24 Aug 70. During the operation, A/26 supported by MCB-62 maintained Kham ~~ac~~ airfield to allow continuous C123 and C130 traffic. Engineer commitments also included protective construction at the Kham Duc Artillery FSB, clearing LZ's and FSB's for the 6th ARVN Regiment, and direct combat support to the 2-1 Infantry Battalion.

(b) Land Clearing:

1. Mo Duc Phase III. This operation was conducted by C/26 during the period 5-30 Aug 70 and was directed at denying use of a known base area for the 38th Local Force Battalion. Totals for the operation included: 957 acres cleared, 190 bunkers and 815 lm of tunnel destroyed, 29 mines/boobytraps found and destroyed and 21 detonated. Casualties were: six (6) US, two (2) PF and one (1) civilian wounded.

2. Tra Bong Route Clearing. Route clearing was initiated by B/26 on 5 Sep 70 and was conducted in conjunction with road construction operations. Clearing was to enhance security along HN 529 and to reduce mining incidents directed at US and GVN forces by the 48th Local Force Battalion and local guerrillas. Totals for the operation were: 650 acres cleared, 65 Tm of tunnel destroyed and seven (7) mines and boobytraps found and destroyed. There were no accidental detonations during the operation and no US casualties sustained. On 20 Sep 70, five (5) dozers were employed in a combined cordon and search operation vic An Diem (2) along with elements of 1-52 Inf, Binh Son District Forces and H/17 Cav. During the operation, enemy strongholds were destroyed including 440 lm trenches and tunnels, fifteen (15) spider holes and five (5) mines. On 30 Sep, land clearing operations along the Tra Bong road were suspended due to inclement weather.

(c) Road Construction:

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1. Tra Bong (HL 529). D/26 in conjunction with B/103 ARVN Engr Bn continued upgrade operations of this vital Secondary LOC. During the reporting period 12,620 cu yds of laterite and 8,610 cu yds of 2" (-) baserock were hauled upgrading 11km of road from QL-1 west. In addition, 393 lin ft of CMP were installed. During this period there were 45 mine/boobytrap incidents resulting in two (2) US and seven (7) VN civilian KIA and nine (9) US WIA. Work has been suspended on this road due to weather.

2. Hawk Hill Access Road. On 24 Sep 70 upgrade of the access road from QL-1 to Hawk Hill was initiated by A/20 supported by HHC, B, C and D/26 and the 103d ARVN Engineers. A total of 0.85 miles of road have been graded and ditched 2,680 cu yds laterite fill hauled, 420 lin ft of CMP installed and 2,300 cu yds of 6" (-) baserock hauled from Da Nang, placed and compacted. Rock haul was completed on 24 Oct.

3. Tien Phouc - New Hau Duc Road. This 14 km road was completed by D/26 to a Dry Weather standard on 17 Sep and the first convoy to LZ Pleasantville conducted on 21 Sep. Upgrade operations will continue during the monsoon season. On 23 Oct, one (1) platoon D/26 moved from LZ Pleasantville to Tien Phouc to consolidate construction forces. Also on that date, a 23'4" M4T6 Dry Span was airlifted and placed across a break in the Tien Phouc River Bridge to allow resumption of both civilian and limited military traffic. Subsequent to the 1 Oct flood, effort was diverted to assist the 39th Engrs in the repair of HL 533.

4. Duc Hai Road. Construction continued on this Dry Weather pacification road during the reporting period. The 10 km road was completed on 24 Sep 70 by C/26 after hauling 5,330 cu yds of fill, 200 cu yds of rock and installing 264 lin ft of CMP. The completed road has facilitated the rapid development of the Duc Hai new settlement area.

(d) Road Openings:

1. Tra Bong. Seven (7) Division/Province resupply convoys were conducted during this period. B/26 supported each of these convoys with minesweeps and upgrade, as required. Casualties from B/26 include five (5) US KIA and seven (7) US WIA. One (1) CIV and one (1) M48 with mine roller were combat losses due to mining.

2. Minh Long. On 12 Aug 70, C/26 commenced road opening operations from Ngia Hanh to Minh Long. Supported by airmobile equipment from HHC/26 and MCB-62, the road was upgraded to allow passage of a Division convoy on 15 Aug. There were one (1) US KIA and three (3) US WIA during this operation.

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3. Hiep Duc. On 2-6 Sep 70, A/26 provided technical assistance and equipment and material support to the 2d ARVN Engr Bn during the road opening and 6 Sep convoy movement to Hiep Duc. This marked the first opening of that road since Nov 69 and provided vital food supplies to the civilians in the area. Assistance by the 1st Engr Bn (Marine) from Ross to the Division AO boundary facilitated the 3 Sep move to Nui Lac Son from which ARVN Engr effort was initiated. There were no incidents.

4. Pleasantville. Beginning with the initial convoy on 21 Sep, D/26 supported with minesweeps and general upgrade five (5) combined DIVARTY/MALV convoys to LZ Pleasantville and to New Hau Duc. These convoys resupplied both US Artillery and VN civilians with necessary ammunition and foodstuffs allowing critical airlift assets be diverted to priority division combat support missions.

5. LZ Young. On 17 Oct, E/26 assisted by D/39 Engr minesweep teams employed two (2) AVLB's to open the road from Tam Ky to LZ Young. This operation was conducted in support of a rapid move to that location by elements of the 1-14 Arty Bn to support combat operations. There were no incidents.

(e) Tactical Bridging Support:

1. On 6 Oct, C/26 supported by E/26 installed a 70 ft DS Bailey Bridge on QL-1 at coordinates BS 685658 to replace a timber bridge that had burned. Removal was conducted on 22 Oct after reconstruction of the timber bridge by the 39th Engr Bn.

2. On 13 Oct, B/26 initiated bridging operations vic My Lai to support extraction of 39th Engr personnel and equipment from LZ Minuteman. This operation included the installation of a 45 ft M4T6 Dry Span with trestle bent and a 4-float normal M4T6 raft. The latter was airlifted from Chu Lai on 18 Oct. Rafting operations were completed on 21 Oct and all elements returned to Chu Lai on 24 Oct. Highlight of the operation was the raft movement of two (2) 290M tractor-scraper rated Glass 52.

(f) Contingency Operations:

1. Flood Damage/Civilian Relief. On 1 Oct a 19.5 inch rain resulted in the first flood of the year. Due to this, priority battalion operations were directed toward civilian relief, flood damage recon and repair, and extraction of the land clearing team from the Tra Bong Road. Assault boats, outboard motors, and operators were dispatched to Binh Son, Tu Nghia and Nghia Hanh and conducted civilian rescue operations for a period of four (4) days.

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"First-light" ground recons augmented aerial V/R!2 for early warning of critical areas. Engineer repair teams performed culvert repairs on HL 518, HL 533 and the Liz access road; one (1) 23'4" Dry Span was installed on QL-1 at BS 63580% in support of 39th Engr expedient repair/maintenance operations and general upgrade was conducted on the Duc Hai and Hai Mon Roads, as well as interior roads at all accessible firebases.

2. Typhoon Preparation.

a. On 15 Oct, assigned projects and missions were discontinued due to warnings of Typhoon Joan. Companies prepared for emergency evacuation of the area and emergency rescue/relief missions in accordance with Division OPLAN 17-70 (Typhoon/Tropical Storm Contingency Plan). On this date, B/26 operating in conjunction with H/17 Cav and supported by E/26 conducted an emergency road opening operation to extract the Land Clearing Team from the Tra Bong Road. Operating under adverse weather conditions, and at night in a VC/NVA infested area, this difficult operation was successfully completed without incident and serves as a tribute to the professionalism and competence of all personnel involved.

b. On 24 Oct, preparations were again made, this time for Typhoon Kate and as of this date emergency/evacuation teams and equipment are ready for rapid employment.

(g) Firebase/OP Construction

1. Nui Yon. On 5 Sep, D/26 supported by HHC/26 commenced clearing operations for a Duster position at Nui Yon. The project included clearing for placement of two (2) tracks, and construction of an access road from HL 533 for land resupply. As of this date final gradework is being conducted to maintain the road during the monsoon season.

2. LZ Pleasantville. This project commenced on 5 Aug 70 in support of 3-16 Artillery Bn and suspended on 23 Oct when the D/26 work force was relocated to Tien Phuoc. To date construction has included: seven (7) living bunkers, one (1) FDC, six (6) ammo bunkers, six (6) 155 Howitzer emplacements, one (1) messhall, two (2) helipads and emplacement of tactical wire.

3. Ky Tra. On 19 Oct, B/26 supported by HHC and E/26 commenced clearing operations for the 5-46 Inf Bn forward FSB at Ky Tra. Since initiation the area has been cleared, helipads and gun pads constructed, and tactical wire installed. This FSB provides security for the populated area and fire support for combat operations in the vicinity.

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4. Dai Loc. During the period 6-12 Oct, B/26 supported by HHC/26 and elements of 1-6 Inf Bn cleared and constructed a term vic Dai Loc, BS 570014, for a PF outpost. The outpost will provide security for the valley settlements in the area as well as the planned road construction into Stinson.

(h) Firebase Upgrade. Upgrade of existing firebases during this period included bunker construction at West, Siberia, Mary Ann, Liz, Debbie, Hawk Hill and Chu Lai; road construction at Liz, Debbie, Mary Ann, Hawk Hill and helipad repair at Bronco using sand-cement and sand-asphalt stabilization.

(i) Support of Unit Relocation. With the turnover of Bayonet and Artillery Hill to ARVN and the resettlement of the Chu Lai Units, B, D and E/26 have been engaged in relocation of units within the Chu Lai area. Supporting projects have included rehabilitation of the 198th Inf Bde Hqs, construction of an FDC/TOC for the 1-14 and the 3-18 Artillery Bns, construction of aircraft rearm revetments and refuel pads for the 16th CAG, and assistance in relocating seventeen (17) SEA Huts.

(j) The Battalion's disposition at the end of the reporting period was as follows.

1. HHC, B Co, D Co, E Co - Chu Lai
2. A Co - PSB Hawk Hill
3. C Co - PSB Bronco
2. 39th Engineer Battalion

a. LOC Upgrade.

1. The priority of the battalion continued to be concentrated on LOC's. The majority of the effort was committed to HL 533, HL 521, HL 522, HL 524/523 and HL 525.

2. A total of 123 km were tasked to the battalion. 14 Km (HL 525) were completed during the reporting period and another 54 km are under construction.

b. Maintenance and Upgrade of CL-1.

1. A major repair effort was required during the month of Oct due to the heavy rains received in Southern I MR. During this reporting period, 1,650 meters of washed out shoulders were repaired and upgraded, six (6) bridges repaired, two (2) culverts and headwalls replaced and a multi-culvert complex initiated.

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2. The construction of a 60 foot Timber Bent Bridge at bridge 1-B-100 was accomplished in Oct. The bridge was accidentally burned by Vietnamese civilians on the night of 5 Oct.

c. Land Clearing Operations.

1. The battalion withdrew its dozers and personnel from the Provisional Land Clearing Company during operation Mo Duc III to prepare for an equipment turnover to the 118th ARVN Land Clearing Company.

2. The 59th Land Clearing Company continued clearing operations on the Batangan Peninsula with 5,176 acres being cleared, 186 bunkers destroyed, 6,505 lin meters of tunnels destroyed, 33 mines and boobytraps were found and destroyed and 15 mines and boobytraps detonated.

d. Airfield and Helipad Rehabilitation.

1. The airfield at FSB Bronco was repaired during Aug. This included the removal of 75 pieces of MX19 matting, the subgrade reworked and the matting replaced.

2. Welding of the airfield matting at Minh Long is still in progress.

3. Five (5) refuel pads for the 178th Assault Helicopter Company at Chu Lai were rehabilitated during this reporting period.

e. Vertical Construction.

1. The battalion completed construction of the messhall for the 23d Med Bn and began construction of a Class I Warehouse at FSB Bronco.

2. Living and ammunition bunkers at Tien Phuoc were completed during this reporting period.

3. The battalion provided material support and technical assistance for the construction of a TOC bunker at Son Ha District Headquarters.

4. Construction was begun on three (3) bunkers and a latrine for the Tra Bong District Headquarters during this reporting period.

f. Well Drilling Operations. The 49th Well Drilling Detachment completed the drilling of a second well at FSB 411.

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g. The battalion's disposition at the end of this reporting period was
as follows:

1. HHC, A Co, C Co, 137th (LB), 522 (PB) - Chu Lai
2. B Co - PSB Bottie
3. D Co - Tam Ky
4. 59th Land Clearing Company - Batangan Peninsula

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E. Logistics.

1. (U) General: The period 1 August 1970 – 31 October 1970 was highlighted by intensive preparation for the monsoons, stocking of forward fire support bases, increasing the capacity of road transport, increased emphasis on economy with numerous items coming under allocation, continued reduction of excesses and further improved maintenance posture.

2. (U) Services Division: a. On 18 July 1970 the division was assigned an allocation of small-sized lumber and plywood. A request for an increased allocation was submitted on 4 August 1970. The division received an allocation greater than the original but still about 35% below that requested on 4 September 1970. The final allocation was particularly small for 4x lumber widely used in bunker construction. The division has had sufficient material for tactical construction. A request for additional material was granted for construction of new tower bunkers on Chu Lai West. This was to fill the gap left by LZ Bayonet.

b. The division allocation of lumber was based on tactical use only. Philco-Ford is tasked with Repairs and Utilities for Chu Lai, LZ Hawk Hill and LZ Bronco. This headquarters received numerous requests for material from units whose R&U Job Order Requests could not be met by Philco-Ford. Division assets were used if the request was deemed urgent.

c. USARV released 600,000 sandbags above the monthly allocation of 500,000 on 10 August 1970. One-half of these have already been issued and the remainder are being issued during the monsoon season in addition to the monthly allocation.

d. During the quarter the division accumulated a large number of unsupported rations. This can be reduced by combat-lossing rations when appropriate. Units must also submit headcounts that correspond with the rations required.

e. Beginning with the second quarter FY 71, USARV allocated bulk POL down to corps level. As of 21 October, the division had not received its allocation. The division's request was based on past usage of JP-4, DF-2, and Mogas. The division will be reimbursed by a like amount for POL issued to non-divisional units if proper accounting is maintained.

3. Supply Division: a. Preparation for the monsoon season highlighted the supply activity during the quarter. Wet weather suits, ponchos, field jackets, blankets, poncho liners, nylon rope, and snap links were ordered and available for all units prior to the rainy season. Distribution of the

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new footgear for inundated areas was made to all Infantry Battalions and to the Artillery Battalions for Forward Observers.

b. An additional step taken to prepare for the monsoon season was to increase the stockage levels at Fire Support Bases resupplies exclusively by air. Increased stockage levels were as follows:

Class I: Minimum 6 days; maximum 72 days.

Class III: 6 days.

Class IV: For all known projects.

Class V: (1) Artillery: Double basic load.

(2) Infantry: Basic load plus operational load.

c. Emphasis on the tactical resupply of forward units by fixed wing aircraft and road convoy continued in order to release helicopters for direct support of maneuver battalions. During Operation Elk Canyon I, the Tien Phuoc JP-4 refuel point was successfully resupplied by road. Resupply of JP-4 at Minh Long is now being accomplished by fixed wing aircraft.

d. DISCOM furnished a Forward Support Element (FSE) at Kham Duc to support Operation Elk Canyon I. This FSE furnished a shower point, GR Point and received and distributed over 5,773,000 lbs of cargo delivered by fixed wing aircraft. A re-arm point and JP-4 refuel point which dispensed 392,000 gallons was established by 16th Aviation Group (Combat).

e. A new item of equipment received was the M203 Grenade Launcher. 23d Infantry Div. received 807 of the authorized 1207 during the third week of September. After assembly by the 723d Maintenance Battalion, these were distributed to units prior to 1 October. The remaining 400 M203's will be received during the next quarter. An M-79 Grenade Launcher is being turned in for each M203 Grenade Launcher received.

f. Status of JP-4 refueling equipment continues to remain critical. At the end of the quarter the division was short four 5,000 gallon tankers, four 350 GPM pumps, thirteen 350 GPM filter separators and fourteen 10,000 gallon bladders. All shortages are on CCIL and request for assistance has been submitted to USAFW.

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g. Support provided by the Chu Lai Self Service Supply Center continues to be unsatisfactory. Constant coordination with 57th Transportation Battalion yields negligible results. Requests forwarded directly to Da Nang Support Command alleviated a few critical shortages but did not materially improve the overall support. The ADC/S presented this as a support problem area to the USARV G4.

h. Supply actions processed by G4 remained at a high level. Accountability for previous unreported equipment valued at \$39,257.00 was established in accordance with the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Program. Equipment valued at \$7,718.00 was reduced from authorization levels under the provision of USARV Regulation 310-32. Forty-nine Reports of Survey were processed on equipment valued at \$86,735.00. Ten initial requests and ten renewal requests for temporary loans were forwarded to USARV. Fifteen items were submitted to USARV on the Division CG's CCL.

i. Headquarters, USARV, directed reduction of ASL stockage has reduced the number of lines on hand at the 23d S&T and 723d Maintenance Battalions. The new requirement of 6 demands in 180 days has reduced the on hand quantities as follows:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>PREVIOUS # LINES</u> | <u>CURRENT # LINES</u> |
|---------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 23d S&T Bn | 1,248 | 1,055 |
| "23d Maint Bn | 8,841 | 4,964 |

4. Maintenance Division: a. The 23d Infantry Div. CMMI Team conducted 17 courtesy and 11 record inspections during the quarter. Two units received a satisfactory rating on the second inspection. The 723d Maintenance Battalion conducted 627 Roadside Spot Check Inspections during the quarter.

b. The installation of M113A1 Belly Armor Kits was completed.

c. A complete 100% M16A1 muzzle bore erosion check was initiated. As of 31 October 1970, the check was 74.7% complete with 16081 of 21,528 weapons checked. 2,932 barrels were changed.

d. Excessively high failures of 20H: 10KW generator engines indicate a need for increased operator training. Commanders should insure:

1. That only properly trained and licensed operators operate equipment.
2. That equipment is not operated continuously for long periods without backup and rotation to permit cooling, maintenance, and oil change.

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3. That generators are not overloaded.
4. That sufficient TM's are on hand and used.
5. That requests for replacements are submitted in accordance with TB 5-6100-201-15.
6. That echelons of repair are not exceeded in the using unit.
 - e. During the quarter, the division retrograded a total of 429.3 serviceable tons excess and 1,448.7 unserviceable tons excess which amounted to a 37.65 million dollar value shipped.

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F. Civil Military Operations

1. (U) Organization

a. During the month of August the following persons were assigned to the G5 Section: MAJ Richard A. Murchison, G5; CPT John L. Lansdale, Deputy G5; CPT Royd M. Nuckles Jr., CA/CA Officer; 1LT Allen R. Polachowski, Assistant PSYOP Officer; 1LT Paul S. Minarik, Assistant PSYOP Officer. In September 2LT Billy C. Boyd was assigned as the Assistant CA/CA Officer and in October CPT Joe L. Hill was assigned as the PSYOP Officer and 2LT Walter S. Thayer as Administration Officer.

b. The 23d Infantry Div. continued their active participation in Community Relations. Friendship Councils are currently operating in the Chu Lai Installation area and in each Brigade A.O. The purpose of the council is to foster better relations and understanding between the 23d Infantry Div. and the local communities and provide a common ground for discussion of problems affecting both parties. At Council meetings, problems are discussed and solved which if otherwise ignored could possibly generate friction and seriously damage U.S. relations.

2. (U) Operations:

a. In order to improve US/VN relations and promote civil affairs/civic actions, units have been assigned responsibilities for villages surrounding the Chu Lai Installation. To adjust for unit redeployment, responsibilities have been realigned and are now as follows:

(1) Ly Tin District

Ky Khuong (V) - 26th Engr Bn

Ky Sanh (V) - 5/46 Inf Bn

Ky Lien (V) - 5/46 Inf Bn

Ky Ha (V) - DIVARTY

Ky Hoa (V) - DIVARTY

Ky Xuan (V) DISCOM

An Tan Protestant Orphanage - 16th CAG

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Chu Lai Catholic Orphanage - Headquarters Commandant

(2) Bin Son District:

Binh Thang (V) - 1/52 Inf Bn

Binh Nghia (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn

Binh Sa (V) - 1/6 Inf Bn

b. Rice Denial: The 23d Infantry Div. continues to support the program to deny vital resources to the enemy. During the reporting period, 132.76 tons of rice were captured.

c. Refugees: The refugee population in the 23d Infantry Div. TAOI numbers approximately 84,000 as of 31 October 1970.

d. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) material This office continued to coordinate the shipment of CORDS material to Quang Ngai (P) and Quang Tin (P) during the reporting period.

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>QUANTITY</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| Health and Medical Supplies | 550 lbs |
| Cement | 278 bags |
| Tin Sheets | 402 sheets |
| Paint | 64 gals |

e. Civil-Military Actions: During the reporting period, the 23d Infantry Div. solicited civic action projects from Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces. The provinces submitted a total of 228 projects and assigned each a priority for completion. An OICORD was published tasking each major subordinate command with the mission of assisting GVN Authorities in the completion of these projects in their respective A.O.

3. (C) Civil Affairs Pacification:

a. The 23d Infantry Div. continues to support the GVN Pacification and Development Program throughout Quang Tin and Quang Ngai province.

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b. Progress in the pacification program in the Division TAOI during the reporting period:

(1) Security of Population (as of 30 September 1970, A, B, and C status):

| | | |
|----------------|---------|--------|
| (a) Quang Tin | 358,100 | 94.9% |
| (b) Quang Ngai | 576,200 | 83.4%* |

* Sept HES Shows 83.4%. Quang Ngai Deputy Province Chief reports 88.1%

(2) VCI Neutralized (as of 24 October 1970):

| | |
|----------------|------|
| (a) Quang Tin | 1620 |
| (b) Quang Ngai | 1274 |

(3) Peoples Self Defense Force (as of 23 October 1970):

| <u>Province</u> | <u>Organized</u> | <u>Trained</u> | <u>Armed</u> |
|-----------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|
| (a) Quang Tin | 92,436 | 92,336 | 14,166 |
| (b) Quang Ngai | 104,760 | 89,459 | 16,050 |

c. The 23d Infantry Div. is continuing its support of pacification and development through MEDEVAC II.

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>MEDCAPS</u> | <u>PERSONS TREATED</u> |
|-----------------|----------------|------------------------|
| 1. 196th Bde | 426 | 15,335 |
| 2. 198th Bde | 160 | 10,186 |
| 3. 11th Bde | 327 | 9,612 |
| 4. DIVARTY | 223 | 11,978 |
| 5. 26th Engr Bn | 30 | 3,634 |
| 6. 1-1 Cav | 309 | 6,084 |

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4. PSYOP Activities (Aug - Oct 70):

a. Leaflets dropped by aircraft by campaign:

| <u>Campaign</u> | <u>AUG</u> | <u>SEP</u> | <u>OCT</u> |
|-----------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Chieu Hoi | 6,842,000 | 12,892,000 | 7,078,000 |
| Pro-GVN | 477,000 | 162,000 | 1,050,000 |
| Anti-VC/NVA | 2,758,000 | 3,322,000 | 1,324,000 |
| VIP | 1,427,000 | 6,592,000 | 6,262,000 |
| Family Reunion | 2,591,000 | 3,897,000 | 4,387,000 |
| Rice Denial | 572,000 | 2,067,000 | 1,530,000 |

b. Total leaflet drop missions flown by 9th SOS in support of the 23d Infantry Division.

| | <u>AUG</u> | <u>SEP</u> | <u>OCT</u> |
|--|------------|------------|------------|
| | 1,967 | 1,301 | 738 |

c. Aerial Loudspeaker Targets during this period:

| | <u>AUG</u> | <u>SEP</u> | <u>OCT</u> |
|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Aerial type targets | 1,484 | 1,321 | 390 |
| Aerial type time | 179:47 | 127:50 | 36:49 |
| Early Word Targets | 19 | 14 | 10 |
| Early Word Time | 6:20 | 4:40 | 3:00 |
| Heliborne Targets | 505 | 675 | 320 |
| Heliborne Tape Time | 93:00 | 92:15 | 55:18 |

d. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts:

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| | <u>AUG</u> | <u>SEP</u> | <u>OCT</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Missions | 41 | 67 | 44 |
| Broadcast hours | 162 hr 30 min | 199 hr 30 min | 105 hr 45 min |

e. Water borne Loudspeaker broadcast:

| | <u>AUG</u> | <u>SEP</u> | <u>OCT</u> |
|--|------------|------------|------------|
| | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| | 3 hr | 3 hr | 0 |

f. Movie missions conducted during period:

| | <u>AUG</u> | <u>SEP</u> | <u>OCT</u> |
|----------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Movie Missions | 41 | 20 | 17 |
| Movies shown | 25 | 40 | 18 |
| Movie hours | 21:30 | 24:40 | 9:00 |
| Attendance | 10,150 | 11,000 | 3,500 |

g. Number of Hoi Chanks in the 23d Infantry Div. TAOI:

| | <u>AUG**</u> | <u>SEP**</u> | <u>OCT**</u> |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 229 | 167 | 128 |

** Includes only Hoi Chanks processed through Chieu Hoi Centers at Tam Ky and Quang Ngai.

5. (U) Recent Developments:

a. During the reporting period, the 23d Infantry Div. has revised targeting procedures to improve efficiency. PSYOP planning is closely coordinated with G2 to insure that specific enemy units are targeted. In addition, a system using the NES report has been initiated to improve the targeting of the local population throughout the Division TAOI.

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b. There has been increased emphasis on night PSYOP aerial missions flown by organic helicopters. A total of 1500 missions were flown disseminating 15,269,000 leaflets and broadcasting 240 hours. This organic support expands the PSYOP program over the entire Division TWR.

c. To offset the loss of aerial PSYOP missions during periods of inclement weather, two methods of leaflet dissemination were employed. Command and control aircraft dropped 1,082,000 leaflets while conducting daily inspection tours. In addition, artillery propaganda rounds were used for preplanned targets against VC and NVA units. A total of 153 propaganda rounds were fired disseminating 76,500 leaflets.

d. The 7th PSYOP Battalion Detachment #3 Team has made a major contribution to the success of the VIP program. HB teams have increased VIP broadcasts by 50%. In addition, special leaflets have been produced instructing inhabitants to turn in munitions to the broadcast teams.

e. A questionnaire has been distributed to the Chieu Hoi centers in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin to determine why Hoi Chanh's have rallied and to evaluate the effectiveness of the divisions PSYOP program.

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II. Section II, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations (U).

A. Personnel.

1. (U) SUBJECT: Small Unit Leadership

a. Observation: Although there has been an improvement in small unit leadership as a result of a considerable increase in the assignment of junior officers, there is still a shortage of qualified non-commissioned officers to fill leadership positions. Graduates of the non-commissioned officers candidates course are technically proficient, but generally lack the leadership experience necessary to perform the duties of platoon sergeants and squad leaders.

b. Evaluation: The main problems are the lack of experience in graduates of the non-commissioned officers candidate course and too few promotion allocations for E-4's or E-5's who have demonstrated both leadership ability and technical proficiency.

c. Recommendation: Every effort should be made to identify and insure experienced NCO's with MOS 11B in the grades E-6 or E-7 are assigned to maneuver battalions and that an increase of E-4 and E-5 allocations are made available for 11 series MOS's.

2. (U) SUBJECT: Finance Operation: Conversion Day

a. Observation: Units serviced by the Division Finance Office were generally unprepared for the 7 October 1970 conversion day operation.

b. Evaluation: (1) American Regulation 37-10 requires a semiannual Military Payment Certificate Conversion Readiness Report to be submitted to ACo/S, G1 on 1 March and 1 September each year. This report reflects the state of readiness to accomplish conversion of MPC's to include the following:

(a) Conversion officers and alternate conversion officers are currently appointed on orders.

(b) Conversion day SOP's of subordinate units are written, current, available and have been reviewed.

(c) An adequate supply of blank conversion forms are on hand.

(d) Conversion officers have been oriented on conversion day procedures.

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(2) Despite the foregoing, the early hours following the announcement of conversion day were spent in acquiring forms, briefing conversion officers and taking action to overcome inadequate unit SOP's.

c. Recommendation: (1) Recommend emphasis be given to conversion day readiness during unit inspections, staff visits and command visits to subordinate units.

(2) Sub-Zone Coordinator Regulations should govern conversion day operations to insure coverage is extended to all units.

3. (U) SUBJECT: Excess MPC

a. Observation: Individuals serviced by the Division Finance Office generally had substantial sums of MPC in their possession.

b. Evaluation: Recognizing that conversion day followed close upon payday, many personnel converted sums in excess of \$150.00, requiring special certificates.

c. Recommendation: (1) That commanders emphasize to their men the pitfalls connected with holding large sums of money on their person or in unit safes.

(2) Finance Offices should prepare and distribute a handout explaining the options available to members for safe handling and transmission of funds.

4. SUBJECT: Handling of Funds

a. Observation: Some conversion officers failed to exercise due care in the collecting and handling of funds.

b. Evaluation: Conversion officers reported to the Division Finance Office with old series MPC and conversion records that were not in agreement. Consequently, these officers made up shortages from personal funds or spent needless hours attempting to reconcile overages.

c. Recommendation: Finance Offices should reproduce and distribute the conversion readiness checklist printed in MACV Directive 37-10 to assist unit conversion officers.

5. SUBJECT: Conversion Status Report

a. Observation: Current procedures do not provide timely status reports.

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b. Evaluation: Status reporting during the conversion period was unresponsive to the needs of the command because procedures were not established to provide the information required. Status reports were collected on an exceptions basis by several agencies resulting in confusion and duplication of effort.

c. Recommendation: That reporting procedures be incorporated into appropriate regulations.

6. (U) SUBJECT: Utilization of Finance Building during Conversion Day

a. Observation: All transactions, conversions, and processing replacements/losses were handled in the Main Finance Building.

b. Evaluation: There were too many transactions taking place in the Main Finance Building at the same time. This caused a great deal of traffic and confusion in a location already at a high level of activity. Processing and paying all replacements/losses in another area would tend to equalize the traffic flow and work load within the Finance Office.

c. Recommendation: Recommend that an additional building be used for processing and paying all financial transactions, other than conversion, during the conversion period.

7. (U) SUBJECT: Procedures for Transient Personnel

a. Observation: Procedures with regards to transient personnel were not clearly understood and were slow in being disseminated to conversion officers.

b. Evaluation: Detailed procedures regarding transient personnel were received in the message announcing conversion day. These procedures were passed, but did not always reach all unit conversion officers. Consequently, a great deal of confusion surrounded the MPC conversions associated with transient personnel.

c. Recommendation: Procedures pertaining to transient personnel be incorporated into the conversion day regulation.

B. Intelligence

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infra. ., Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, MCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) SUBJECT: Volunteer Informant Program (VIP)

a. Observation: Spending under the VIP continued at the level of the 4th quarter FY 70 until late August or early September. The FY 71 budget was not received until mid - August, and it was reduced by 50% of the FY 70 budget. This caused problems in administration and disbursement of the FY 71 allotment. To afford maximum use of the FY 70 funds, accounts were established down to battalion level. Prior to receipt of the FY 71 budget, a change had begun to reduce the number of accounts to brigade and equivalent size units. By 1 September 1970, the changeover was generally completed, with the new system in effect to control the funds by having accounts with the Brigade S-2's and reducing the amounts to 12,000 \$VN to be maintained on a reimbursable basis.

b. Evaluation: The VIP has had limited success as an intelligence collection program. Personnel untrained in intelligence were buying ammunition. Considerable time delay existed between issuance and implementation of instructions, which caused either under or over spending. Brigades and separate units were provided with a funds ceiling which should assist in adjusting spending.

c. Recommendation: (1) The program continued to be administered through intelligence channels.

(2) That VIP officers clear the account immediately upon transfer to another job, prior to going on leave outside of Vietnam, or for any other reason that would not permit him to fully control the fund.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Investigation of Prostitutes

a. Observation: Approximately two - man hours every other day are being used in interviewing prostitutes who are of no counter-intelligence interest.

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b. Evaluation: One or two prostitutes every other day are apprehended inside the Chu Lai Base perimeter. During the month of October, 13 prostitutes were interrogated, half of whom were repeaters, and none were of CI interest. Since September 1969, none of the prostitutes interviewed has been found to be of CI interest.

c. Recommendation: A brief interrogation should be conducted by the Military Police and if nothing of intelligence interest is uncovered, the prostitute should then be turned over to the National Police.

3. (C) SUBJECT: Marking and Location of Rice Cache

a. Observation: During the evening an element heard digging in the vicinity of their location. In the morning the element located 8 barrels of rice which had been partially uncovered by unknown persons. A more detailed search located another 18 buried aluminum cylinders, 4 feet wide by 3 feet deep, covered with approximately 12 inches of dirt. The cache site was in an area of sandy soil and scattered vegetation. In the area were numerous small knolls 14 inches to 30 inches in height. It was discovered through digging up all knolls that the caches were located in a random fashion. Since some knolls contained rice while others did not, it was noticed that those knolls which contained rice also had a shrub growing near the center of the knoll. This shrub was marked near the base of the trunk with three cut notches. The marked shrubs did not blend with the area and were obviously unnatural to the surroundings. These shrubs were approximately 4 feet high and 3 feet in diameter and from 6 to 8 months old. The area also contained numerous trails which led into the vegetation and suddenly terminated.

b. Evaluation: Although it is understood that in other areas the VC may use very divergent techniques to mark and place caches, it is hoped that this information may assist other units in locating rice caches.

c. Recommendation: That all units be informed of how these caches were located and instruct their personnel in the techniques used.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Trail Systems Data Base Record

a. Observation: Numerous requests from tactical units for specific information concerning enemy trail and waterway transportation use has prompted the need for a system which provides for the recording and rapid and accurate dissemination of this information to requesting units.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR--65 (R2) (U)

b. Evaluation: Previously used methods for the dissemination of trail and waterways activities were found inadequate. Information was entered without segregating the reports from various agencies. Chronological data concerning date of entry were not included and degree of transportation system use was not noted.

c. Recommendation: That the solution found by this unit, described below, be considered by other units. The Imagery Interpretation Section has initiated a data base system specifically for recording information concerning enemy transportation systems to include trail systems and waterways. Intelligence derived from this data base will include: (1) Exact coordinates of trails and waterways; (2) The degree of use of trails on a varying scale from light to heavy; (3) The exact date of the entry and dates of subsequent activities noted. Information will be disseminated by means of a clear acetate overlay to include all activity recorded within the requested coordinates. Overlays will be keyed to 1:50,000 scale maps compatible with those used by tactical units.

5 (C) SUBJECT: Mosaic Construction of Photographs

a. Observation: The construction technique used in making photographic mosaics in some cases did not allow for the degree of accuracy required by units conducting fire support base studies and such specialized projects as power line traces for engineer units.

b. Evaluation: The method used in mounting the photographs of the mosaic hindered the overall clarity of the finished product. The previously used construction technique in certain cases (large area coverage) caused a noteable loss of overall accuracy and lack of coverage.

c. Recommendation: That the technique now used by this unit, described below, be considered by other units. The uncontrolled construction technique was adapted with the addition of rubber cement adhesive to mount the photographic. The resolution benefits greatly increased readability for the untrained interpreter. Increased accuracy of ground detail on the finished product caused a general lessening of the APPARENT photo distortion which occurs in large area coverage (those requiring more than 3 flight lines).

6 (C) SUBJECT: VCI Neutralization Element

a. Observation: There is no agency within the Division specifically charged with targeting the Viet Cong Infrastructure.

b. Evaluation: In October 1970, a study was conducted on the organization

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and operation of the VCI within the Division AO. Information relative to VCI strengths, locations, activities, and personalities was obtained from numerous sources both from within and outside of the Division. In order to properly focus attention on VCI activity, the establishment of a Division VCI neutralization element was initiated. The functions of this element are:

- (1) To establish a system for maintaining and updating information relative to VCI strength, locations, activities and personalities.
- (2) To establish coordination and liaison with DIOCC's, PIOCC's and ARVN units to facilitate flow of VCI information and coordination of operations.
- (3) To provide recommendations concerning likely VCI target areas.
- (4) To assist in planning and conduct of VCI programs. The VCI Neutralization Element, consisting of two officers and one EM, operates under the staff supervision of the ACofS, G2 and serve as the focal point for counter-VCI activities within the Division.
c. Recommendation: The VCI Neutralization Element has been organized as the Division coordinating agency for counter-VCI operations. Subordinate units retain responsibility for active VCI neutralization operations in their respective AO's and should closely coordinate with DIOCC's, PIOCC's and the Division VCI Neutralization Element. A similar element may prove useful to other units.

C. Operations.

1. (C) SUBJECT: Actions taken in negotiating stream crossings
 - a. Observation: Due to the Armored Cavalry Squadron's maneuverability, all natural streams and river crossing sites in the Squadron's TAOR have been used. Once a stream crossing site has been used, use at a later date can not be considered safe.
 - b. Evaluation: When a crossing site is approached that has been previously used, it should be assumed that the crossing and its approaches have been mined.
 - c. Recommendation: When the tactical situation requires that a stream must be crossed, previously used crossings and their approaches should be avoided, if at all possible. If this is not possible and an old crossing site must be used, the following steps should be taken:

- (1) Approaches should be cleared with either 152 cannister rounds or

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Bangalore Torpedoes and swept with organic mine detectors.

(2) The crossing proper should be cleared with demolitions or Bangalore Torpedoes.

(3) Only the driver should be in the first and second vehicles to cross the stream. Other crew members should be dismounted.

2. (C) SUBJECT: Casualties During Medevac Operations

a. Observation: During operations in an area where numerous boobytraps are employed by the enemy, an incident occurred which resulted in a large number of casualties. An infantry platoon moved to an area near an old NDP for resupply. An individual of the platoon stepped on a pressure-release boobytrap that wounded him and four other soldiers. A command and control helicopter flying in the vicinity of the incident landed in the area to conduct the medevac. Personnel from the command and control aircraft got off to assist in loading the wounded. One of the individuals detonated another pressure-release boobytrap resulting in fifteen additional wounded.

b. Evaluation: Fewer casualties would have resulted if evacuation of the wounded had been more closely controlled, and if personnel from the medevac ship had been informed of the situation and guided by someone on the ground.

c. Recommendation: (1) Maintain dispersion of 15 to 20 meters between men at all times.

(2) When medevac helicopters land in the area of a boobytrap or mine incident, personnel from the aircraft should not get off to assist the wounded unless the area has been cleared by someone in control of the LZ.

(3) Specific individuals should be designated to load the wounded and also to control the flow of personnel to and from the medevac aircraft. "Safe lanes" should be established and one casualty brought forward at a time to avoid large groups forming around the helicopter.

3. (C) SUBJECT: VC use of smoke grenade fuses

a. Observation: The VC are removing fuses and percussion caps from used smoke grenades and reusing the assembly as a fuse for their boobytraps.

b. Evaluation: At least 15 boobytraps recently found and destroyed have been fused with M201A1 fuse assemblies from U.S. smoke grenades. A box of

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tools have been captured which appeared to be used for making boobytraps. It contained 10 M201A1 fuse assemblies and 10 blasting caps which could be fitted on the smoke grenade fuse.

c. Recommendation: The M2-1A1 fuse assembly for the smoke grenade be replaced by a device which is consumed or destroyed when the grenade has been used. Units should habitually remove the M201A1 fuses from used smoke grenades and destroy them.

4. (C) SUBJECT: Action to be taken when a vehicle detonates a mine

a. Observation: A cavalry platoon returned to an area where it had employed mechanical ambushes the previous night. As the Commander moved into the area, his ACAV detonated a mine. While attempting to secure the damaged vehicle, two more anti-tank mines were detonated by individual soldiers, resulting in numerous casualties. A mine dog team was brought in and a careful search of the area was conducted with organic mine detectors. Two additional mines were discovered.

b. Evaluation: VC/NVA units are aware of the American Soldiers tendency to rush to the aid of wounded personnel. This characteristic is exploited by employing anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in groups.

c. Recommendation: Only the minimum number of personnel necessary to evacuate injured should enter a mined area. Footsteps and tracks made by personnel and vehicles that have already entered the area should be used. Mine Dog Teams, scout dogs and mine detectors should also be employed to the maximum extent possible.

5. (C) SUBJECT: Equipment and Personnel losses from enemy mines and boobytraps emplaced in vicinity of friendly Mechanical Ambushes.

a. Observation: Incidents have occurred where the area around friendly Mechanical Ambushes has been boobytrapped and/or mined.

b. Evaluation: Mechanical Ambushes are emplaced early in the evening and retrieved the following morning. This procedure is known by enemy units and if a mechanical ambush is detected, it is a logical place for boobytraps or mines to be employed.

c. Recommendation: Personnel responsible for emplacing and retrieving mechanical ambushes should be briefed on the possibility of encountering mines and boobytraps. Movement to the mechanical ambush site should be accomplished in a slow, deliberate manner with each member of the unit being alert for

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boobytraps and signs of mine emplacement. If the area immediately surrounding the mechanical ambush yields signs that the device may have been tampered with, the mine should be destroyed in place.

D. Organization: None

E. Training: None

F. Logistics

1. (U) SUBJECT: Mobile TOC/CP Organization

a. Observation: During the disengagement/Vietnamization period infantry battalions will rely less upon permanent home fire bases and will, by necessity, assume a more mobile role, moving to areas of greatest need.

b. Evaluation: Multiple battalion level missions, involving successive operations in widely separated areas and requiring the construction of successive fire bases requires a compact TOC/CP Kit, able to be airlifted to a site and made operational in minimum time. Lack of such pre-planned and pre-loaded kits delays the command/control of combat operations.

c. Recommendation: A kit consisting basically of four modified CONEX containers, augmented by a standard load of PSP/RPG screen/engineer stakes, offers a highly flexible air-mobile CP/TOC set up. Two CONEX's, fitted with medical stretchers arranged in a bunk-bed configuration, provide living quarters for the TOC personnel; one CONEX, containing two cots, houses the commander and operations officer. The fourth CONEX, containing a built-in counter unit with radio racks, battery-powered emergency lighting, wall map boards, seats, storage boxes, and control power terminal box, houses a TOC capable of operation immediately upon landing at a forward site. The unit may be arranged in a number of configurations depending upon terrain and availability. Most suitable is an arrangement in which the CONEX's face each other in pairs, two to a side, with 8 foot separation. The gap may then be spanned with PSP, creating a central briefing area.

2. (U) SUBJECT: PEMA Reconciliation

a. Observation: A problem exists in getting complete PEMA reconciliation from ICC-V.

b. Evaluation: In an attempt to get a complete PEMA reconciliation, our DSU submitted punched cards for all open requisitions to ICC-V. ICC-V was

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to bounce these cards against their deck and furnish the 23d Supply and Transportation Battalion with complete status. The reconciliation has not been returned. Sixty days have elapsed during this period, this time is extremely critical, as DSU's can not submit AFI cards and the monthly status provided by ICC-V is incomplete and inaccurate for the majority of the lines.

c. Recommendation: Quarterly reconciliation be compiled by ICC-V and the time between the cut-off date and the printout not exceeding fifteen days. If this is not feasible, it is further recommended that units be authorized to submit AFI cards.

G. Communications

1. (U) SUBJECT: Power for communications sites

a. Observation: This unit has been experiencing excessive system down time at outlying sites.

b. Evaluation: This situation occurs at the outlying sites served principally by air. The monsoon season has caused increasing difficulty in getting serviceable generators to the sites and evacuating the unserviceable items. One of the primary causes is the cancellation of fixed wing and helicopter flights due to inclement weather.

c. Recommendation: Three recent actions by the Division Signal Battalion have, to a great degree, alleviated the problem.

(1) A minimum of five generators are maintained at each site which is served primarily by air.

(2) Replacement and evacuation procedures have been consolidated so that serviceable generators are flown to the site each time unserviceable generators must be evacuated.

(3) Consideration is being given to installing rotary converters at the sites to provide an additional method of emergency back-up power. With the rotary converters installed, any 24 volt vehicle may be used to supply power to sites using the AN/MRC 112 or AN/GRC-163 configuration.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFORC-5 (R2) (U)

15 November 1970

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
23d Infantry Division Troop List
Abbreviations and Terms
Incl 2 wd HQ DA

Arthur H. Clark
ARTHUR H. CLARK
Colonel, US
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

2 CINCUSAFAC, ATTN: G101-DT
3-CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO
1-CMHC-DA
7-CG, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCF
2-CG, 11th Inf Bde
2-OO, 196th Inf Bde
2-OO, 198th Inf Bde
2-OO, 23d Infantry Division Arty
3-OO, 23d Infantry DISCOM
2-OO, 16th CAG
1-OO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav
1-OO, 26th Argr Bn
1-OO, 523d Sig Bn
1-CG, 23d MP Co
1-OO, HHC, 23d Infantry Division
1-OO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf
1-OO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf
1-OO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf
1-OO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf
1-OO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf
1-OO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
1-OO, 1st Bn, 46th Inf
1-OO, 5th Bn, 46th Inf
1-OO, 2d Bn, 1st Inf
1-OO, 1st Bn, 52d Inf

1-OO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
1-OO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty
1-OO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty
1-OO, 3d Bn, 16th Arty
1-OO, 3d Bn 18th Arty
1-OO, 1st Bn, 82d Arty
1-OO, E Troop, 1st Cav
1-OO, F Troop, 17th Cav
1-OO, H Troop, 17th Cav
1-OO, 12d Avn Bn
1-OO, 14th Avn Bn
12-OO, 3d Mil Hist Det
1-ACofS, G1
10-ACofS, G2
10-ACofS, G3
1-ACofS, G4
1-ACofS, G5
1-Chemical
1-Engineer
1-Signal
1-Aviation
1-Provost Marshall
1-Staff Judge Advocate
1-Information Officer
1-Inspector General
1-Surgeon
1-Chaplain
1-Adjutant General
1-XXIV Corps LNC
2-TACP (ALO), 23d Inf Div

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AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 8 DEC 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned, for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division, and concurs except as indicated in paragraph 2g below.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Excess MPC," page 73, paragraph II A3: concur. Information should be provided personnel prior to departure on R&R or out-of-country leave reminding them that all monies must be taken with them when leaving country. Many instances arose where personnel were out-of-country on C Day, and upon arrival in RVN were requested to appear before a board in order to convert the MPC left in-country. This overburdened the boards, and could have been prevented had R&R and leave instructions indicated not only the minimum amount of money to be taken on R&R/leave, but that no MPC could be left in-country.

b. Reference item concerning "Volunteer Informant Program (VIP)," page 75, paragraph II B1: administration of VIP funds is the responsibility of military intelligence personnel, since the funds are provided by the Intelligence Contingency Funds. Intelligence personnel should continue to provide guidance to Brigade S2's concerning use of the VIP funds and should emphasize collection of information above collection of ordnance.

c. Reference item concerning "Trail Systems Data Base Record," page 76, paragraph II B4: concur. The best source of this type information is photography. To cope with the anticipated increase in frequency of missions, a system of individual route folders is suggested. The folder could consist of a 1:50,000 map (cut down) to show route alignment and a log to show route history. If frequent VR is available it can be used to pinpoint areas of most current interest along selected routes to provide a better indication of route status. A more accurate portrayal is provided by plotting directly on terrain features of a map instead of an acetate overlay, thus avoiding the possible mal-alignment inherent in the use of overlays.

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AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

d. Reference item concerning "VCI Neutralization Element," page 77, paragraph II B6: concur. The involvement of all tactical units in the neutralization of the Vietcong Infrastructure is both desirable and necessary. The present Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program requires careful coordination of all intelligence input to assure successful targeting. All similar elements which are established in military units should stress the necessity of establishing coordination and liaison with the appropriate DIOCC and/or PIOCC, to permit the proper flow of VCI information and coordination of operations. Every effort should be made to keep the appropriate PIOCC informed as to the status of all neutralization operations. Information on enemy prisoners of war and enemy killed in action, should be immediately reported to Phoenix/Phung Hoang offices, to assist in the identification and neutralization of known VCI.

e. Reference item concerning "Equipment and Personnel losses from enemy mines and boobytraps emplaced in vicinity of friendly Mechanical Ambushes," page 80, paragraph II C5: concur. Personnel should also avoid using the same routes to and from mechanical ambush sites. A boobytrap/mine symposium will be held at XXIV Corps to assist in dissemination of information on enemy techniques and ways to counter them.

f. Reference item concerning "Mobile TOC/CP Organization," page 81, paragraph II F1: concur. However, serviceable CONEX containers should not be withdrawn from the transportation system for any purpose other than specifically authorized by competent authority. USARV Regulation 55-7 states that CONEX containers will be emptied and expeditiously returned to the transportation system. The regulation also authorizes the CO, TMA, MACV, to make appropriate disposition of uneconomically repairable CONEX containers. Many of these could be returned to useful service as mobile TOC/CP's. Other material that meets the requirements for a mobile TOC/CP should also be examined.

g. Reference item concerning "PEMA Reconciliation," page 81, paragraph II F2: nonconcur. USARV unclassified message 210907Z Nov 70

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AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS GSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

establishes policies for US Army depots and ICC-V to provide timely
printout of requisition status to DSV/GSU's every 30 days from which
the DSV/GSU's will furnish status to the units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. H. Smith
W. H. SMITH
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CC:
CQ, 23d Inf Div

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AVHDO-DO (15 Nov 70) 2d. Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 23d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)


Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 28 JAN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOZ-DT, APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report--Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 23d Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "PEMA Reconciliation," page 81, paragraph II F 2 and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2g. The authority to release and back-order PEMA items has now been changed to the depot level. USARV Reg 700-35 dated 5 October 1970 prescribes the procedures for performing backorder reconciliations with the Direct Support Units. This regulation incorporates the suggestions of the 23rd Infantry Division. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain ACC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps
23rd Inf Div

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 70) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 23d Infantry Division for Period
Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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23d INFANTRY DIVISION TROOP LIST (as of 31 October 1970)

1. HEADQUARTERS 23d INFANTRY DIVISION

HHC, 23d Infantry Division

1st Sqdn, 1st Cav (-)

Trp E, 1st Cav

Trp F, 17th Cav

26th Engr Bn

523d Sig Bn

COMSEC CONTACT TEAM #2

23d MP Co

146th MP Flat, 504th MP Bn

328th RR Co

635th MI Co

3d Mil Hist Det

OL 7, 5th Weather Sqdn, USAF (-)

2. 23d INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

HHA, Div Arty

6th Bn, 11th Arty

1st Bn, 14th Arty (-)

3d Bn, 16th Arty

3d Bn, 18th Arty

1st Bn, 82d Arty

3d Bn, 82d Arty

Btry B (-), 1st Bn, 14th Arty

Btry G, 55th Arty (.50 Cal)

251st FA Det (Radar)

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252d FA Det (Radar)

271st FA Det (Radar)

3. 23d INFANTRY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

HHC and Band

23d Med Bn

23d S&T Bn

723d Maint Bn (-)

23d Admin Co

Co G, 75th Inf (Ranger)

63d Inf Flat (CTT)

23d Infantry Division Combat Center (PROV)

Chu Lai Defense Command (PROV)

4. 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

HHC, 16th CAG

14th Combat Avn Bn

71st Avn Co (Aalt Hel)

116th Avn Co (Aalt Hel (OPOON)

132d Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)

174th Avn Co (Aalt Hel)

176th Avn Co (Aalt Hel)

178th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel)

196th Avn Co (Aalt Spt Hel) (OPOON)

534th Med Det

756th Med Det

123d Avn Bn (Cbt) (Inf Div)

Trp D, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav

Trp F, 8th Cav

Co E, 723d Maint Bn

335th Trans Co

362d Avn Det

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5. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Inf Bde

3d Bn, 1st Inf

4th Bn, 3d Inf

1st Bn, 20th Inf

4th Bn, 21st Inf

59th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

31st Public Information Det

90th Chem Det

327th Avn Det

Combat Weather Team 1

6. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Inf Bde

2d Bn, 1st Inf

3d Bn, 21st Inf

4th Bn, 31st Inf

1st Bn, 46th Inf

48th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

10th Public Information Det

27th Chem Det

7. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Inf Bde

1st Bn, 6th Inf

5th Bn, 46th Inf

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1st Bn, 52d Inf

Trp H, 17th Cav

87th Chem Det

8. **NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS**

6th CA Plat, 29th CA Co (DS of Div)

Det 3, 7th PSYOP Bn (DS of Div)

USASSG, ACSI, DA

~~INCLUSION~~

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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