

HEADQUARTERS  
AMERICAL DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-GC

7 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968  
(RCS-CSFOR-65)(RI)(U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Section I

Significant Organization and Unit Activities

A. Command.

1. (U)

Command

Major General Samuel W. Koster, Division Commander was reassigned to become superintendent of the United States Military Academy. General Koster departed on 3 June 1968. Brigadier General George H. Young assumed the duties of Division Commander on 3 June 1968 and was replaced by Major General Charles M. Gettys on 23 June 1968. General Young was reassigned to III MAF where he became the Commanding General of Support Command. Brigadier General Howard H. Cooksey assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander on 12 June 1968.

2. The following distinguished persons visited the Americal Division during the reporting period.

a. Lieutenant General James B. Lampert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 27 June 1968.

b. Lieutenant General Frank T. Mildren, DEPCOMUSMACV, 1 July 1968.

c. Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific, General Dwight E. Beach, 5 July 1968.

d. Secretary of the Army, Honorable Stanley R. Resor, 31 July 1968.

e. General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, visited the Division several times for operational guidance and orders.

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B. Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline

1. Personnel

a. (U) Enlisted Records.

(1) The records branch continued to audit records to insure their accuracy. Project PACE rosters have been verified and will continue to be verified as received from HQ, USARV. A separate audit was required to complete Project 100,000.

(2) The Enlisted Records Branch processed an increasing number of personnel during this period. 7523 personnel were serviced; 3972 personnel were in processed; 2665 personnel out processed; records of 1194 Medical Evacuees were processed out; and 351 records for RHA personnel were processed out.

(3) An out processing section has been established. This eliminates a considerable amount of traffic from the teams which enables them to devote more time to records maintenance.

b. (U) Awards and Decorations. The Awards and Decorations Section experienced a significant increase in the number of awards processed. During the reporting period 5,695 awards were processed and 2,707 General Orders published. The use of flexowriters has greatly increased the capacity of the General Orders clerks. This coupled with a new procedure for processing awards boards enabled a greater number of awards to be processed without an increase in the number of personnel.

c. (U) Letters of Sympathy and Condolence. A new system for preparing letters was instituted. The letters are prepared at this headquarters utilizing information obtained by telephone from the unit. The letters are then handcarried to the commanders for signature. This has resulted in the letters reaching USARV by the required suspense date and has greatly enhanced the quality of the letters.

d. (U) Missing Persons Boards. Missing persons boards are started within 72 hours of date of death if remains have not been positively identified. This results in more timely notification of next of kin, if applicable, or prompt forwarding to USARV.



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e. (U) Army Emergency Relief Fund Raising Campaign. AER campaign was announced effective 29 June. During the period of the report \$2593.95 was collected. The campaign terminates on 31 Aug 68.

f. (U) Relocation of Orders Section.

(1) The function of publishing Special Orders and Letter Orders was transferred from Administrative Services Division to Personnel Services Division. The primary purpose for this was to reorganize in a manner closer to that which will be required under the PERMACAP program. In addition the majority of orders published originate in personnel management branch and relocation places the requesting of orders as well as publication under a single manager.

(2) Three flexowriters were added to the orders section. This greatly improves the efficiency of that section.

g. (U) Administrative Machine Branch. ADP equipment less the UNIVAC 1005 card processor was received in May and has not become fully operational due to lack of air conditioning equipment. All officer records and enlisted records from the 11th Brigade have been punched on cards. Procedures will be tested utilizing this card file. No further cards will be punched until air conditioners are received and the equipment becomes fully operational.

2. (U) Postal Operations. Extreme problems concerning the dispatch and receipt of mail from Hawaii to the 11th Infantry Brigade were encountered during the months of April, May and June 1968. The discrepancies in the postal service to members of the 11th Infantry Brigade were investigated by military postal personnel of the Americal Division, United States Army, Vietnam, United States Army Pacific, and the DaNang Air Mail Terminal. In addition civil postal inspectors in Hawaii investigated the dispatch of mail from Hawaii to Vietnam.

3. (U) Reenlistment. Reenlistment involves the activities required to retain the maximum number of qualified competent enlisted personnel in the Regular Army. In order to achieve this objective, the enlisted personnel have to be counseled and advised by motivated and knowledgeable personnel who can assist in planning the enlisted man's career. The Reenlistment Division must provide qualified personnel to aid the commander in initiating and implementing his Reenlistment Program. All documents concerning separation, Reenlistment and extension of enlistments are prepared and processed by the Reenlistment Division. A great deal of difficulty was experienced trying to counsel all individuals in their units. This was overcome by providing reenlistment counseling sessions as an integral part of the instruction at the Division Combat Center.

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4. (U) Special Services.

a. A study was made to determine what facilities were available for recreational use by personnel of the Americal Division.

b. Additional facilities were approved which would provide for:

(1) Post Library facility which would support bookmobile service and books-by-mail to the individual soldier.

(2) Twenty-five field collection libraries. Ten are presently in use and 15 more have already been requested.

(3) Two complete multiple crafts shops and ten smaller crafts shops located throughout the division area.

(4) Two Service Clubs. One Service Club will become operational by 10 August 1968. Modification of the building to house the second Service Club is expected to begin in late FY 69.

c. Other Activities:

(1) A Chu Lai Inter-Service Softball League was formed. More than twenty units entered the competition.

(2) The Americal Beaches were opened on the first of May. Buoys were placed in the water this year to mark off the authorized swimming areas.

5. (U) Finance.

a. The period from 1 May 1968 to 31 July 1968 was primarily a period of internal review and organization and procedures improvement. After the complete reorganization and the greatly increased workload reported in the two previous quarters, many procedural refinements were necessary to make a smoother operation. Such areas as handling cash soldier's deposits, out-processing of individual's records, processing of Notice of Exceptions and charges as a result of Reports of Survey were some of the areas that were reviewed and refinements made.

b. The finance operation showed only modest expansion with the addition of finance service for the 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery and the 327th Aviation Detachment.

c. The Finance Office remains organized under MTOE 12-37E (4 Officers, 3 Warrant Officers and 20 Enlisted Men) which is inadequate for an operation of this size. Cited MTOE was designed for servicing 16,000 troops. Currently the Division Finance Office is servicing 22,515 troops.

d. Selected workload statistics for the period:



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	<u>May 1968</u>	<u>June 1968</u>	<u>July 1968</u>
Payrolls Prepared	308	307	312
Regular Monthly Vouchers	23,641	23,343	22,515
PCS Travel Vouchers	2,016	1,778	1,503
TDY Travel Vouchers	278	139	257
Counter Payments	5,036	4,631	4,570
Allotments Processed	3,174	2,448	3,036

6. (U) Provost Marshal Activities.

a. Raids and Checkpoints.

(1) 46 raids and 17 checkpoints were conducted during this reporting period in villages and hamlets within the Chu Lai area of Americal Division AO.

(2) Significant items confiscated on raids and checkpoints:

(a) MPC	\$1454.60
(b) American cigarettes	368 cartons
(c) American beer	352 cases
(d) Marijuana	3251 sticks; 8 lbs 2 oz loose
(e) American soda	33 cases
(f) American whiskey	7 quarts
(g) Poncho liners	105

b. PW Activities. Five PW collecting points were operated during the reporting period. Results of the five collecting points detainee processing is as follows:

(1) Total detainees processed	2052
(2) PW	(28)
(3) CD	(412)
(4) IC	(1598)
(5) CH	(14)

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c. Military Police Convoy Escorts. The Division Military Police convoy activities for the reporting period were as follows (does not include the 11th Inf MP escorts between Quang Ngai and Sa Huynh):

(1) Number of vehicles escorted - 2,877.

(2) Number of miles traveled - 24,588.

d. Weapon Registration Program. The Division Provost Marshal privately owned weapon registration program has been expanded to include war trophy weapons. During the reporting period 270 weapons were registered.

e. Lost, Stolen, and Recovered Weapons Reports. It was brought to the attention of the Division Provost Marshal that Lost, Stolen and Recovered Weapons Report (DA Form 3056) were not being forwarded to USARV, PM as required by USARV Reg 190-6. The Division Provost Marshal Section has investigated this problem closely and requested brigade Provost Marshals to strictly enforce the regulation. Of 45 lost, stolen or recovered weapons reported to this office, 35 reports have been forwarded to USARV, PM.



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## C. (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

## 1. G2 Section.

a. (1) The Americal Division continued to operate against elements of the 2d NVA Division in the Wheeler Wallowa AO. In addition elements of the 2d NVA Division were contacted in Operation Burlington Trail. Of special note was the arrival of the 3d NVA Division in the Song Re Valley area; thus, creating a threat to the SF/CIDG camps and population centers of Quang Ngai (P). Operations against MF, LF, Irregular and Infrastructure continued.

(2) On 1 June 1968, LTC A. E. ADKINS assumed duties as ACofS, G2 from LTC TOMMY P. TREXLER who departed on 15 May 1968. MAJ JOHN H. DORF was the interim ACofS, G2.

(3) On 3 July an inspection was conducted by the USARV IG Office and results were outstanding.

## b. G2 Air.

(1) The G2 Air Section intensified its collection efforts through aerial reconnaissance and surveillance during the Quarter. Increasingly favorable weather conditions allowed for more comprehensive planning and actual coverage flown. The monthly reconnaissance plan was adjusted to include those areas previously out of range due to poor weather. The volume of daily requests increased; and the Quarter saw a marked rise in the percentage of requests fulfilled to the specifications.

(2) Emphasis was placed on furnishing more information of immediate tactical value to Americal units. Working for faster imagery interpretation furnished timely targets to the artillery and tactical air elements, thus insuring rapid exploitation of intelligence.

(3) During the next Quarter, G2 Air will allocate its resources to maximize the advantages of the current weather and tactical situation. An improved AO plan has been developed which will provide Americal units with the latest reconnaissance information.

## 2. Enemy situation:

## a. (C) Quang Tin and Quang Nam.

(1) Activity in Quang Tin-Quang Nam Provinces resulted from Operations Wheeler/Wallowa and Burlington Trail. The enemy started another offensive in May with ground attacks and attacks by fire, interdiction of LOCs and sabotage. There were a total of 22 such incidents along Highway #1 during the period 1 May 68 to 30 July 68 (15 in May, 14 mines and 1 sabotage, 3 mines in June, and 4 mines in July).

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(2) On 1 May elements of 1-46 Inf conducted a CA in the vic of BT 132 072 and engaged an unknown size enemy force. Gunships assisted and a total of 27 VC were killed and 7 IWC.

(3) On the morning of 5 May the enemy initiated attacks by fire throughout the AO. LZ Baldy received 8 rounds of 60mm mortar fire. LZ Colt received 6 rounds of 60mm mortar fire and 3 rounds of RPG fire. LZ Center received a mortar and ground attack resulting in 18 NVA KIA, 9 IWC, and 5 CSWC. Documents taken from the body of an NVA officer identified elements of the 3d NVA Regt, 2d NVA Division. LZ Ross received 100 rounds of 60/32mm mortar fire, 32X122mm rockets, and several CS mortar rounds. 1-1 Cav received some mortar fire and 22 rounds of 122 mm rocket fire in the vic BT 228 314. In the Chu Lai TAOR, Hill 54 received 6-8 rounds of 60/82mm mortar fire. CLDC received 35 rounds of 122mm rocket fire probably fired by elements of 3d Bn, 62B Arty Regt attached to the 409 MF Sapper Bn. Three rocket launcher positions were found in the vic BT 438 052. Captured documents identified 20 Co, 409 Bn as attacking and partially destroying the bridge vic BT 381 145.

(4) On 5 May, LZ Center received sporadic mortar fire throughout the day. On the morning of 6 May, the FSB received 10 rds of 122mm rocket fire and continued sporadic mortar fire throughout the day. During the day, four helicopters and one O-1 received SA/AA fire which resulted in two helicopters being shot down. On 7 May an A-1 and an A-4 received heavy AA fire while making strikes in the area. One aircraft was shot down, while the other had to make a forced landing at Chu Lai. The intensive AA fire in the area and later the capture of a 12.7mm AA gun indicate that the GK-31 AA Bn had been attached to, or in support of the 3d Regt for the offensive in that area.

(5) On 8 May, elements of 1-6 Inf made contact with an unk size enemy unit in the vic of NUI HOAC Ridge (BT 056 226). Contacts with 3d NVA Regt continued in this area until 26 May, with elements of 1/1 Cav also in contact with the 3d Regt in the vic of BT 187 300. The results of these contacts were 365 NVA KIA, 67 IWC, and 21 CSWC.

(6) On 10 May, elements of the 40 Bn, 1 VC Regt, 2d NVA Div, mounted a ground attack on the SF/CIDG FOB at Ngok Tavak (YC 965 015). Kham Duc SF/CIDG Camp came under mortar attack and Ngok Tavak was evacuated. On the morning of 11 May, Kham Duc was reinforced with a Co of 1-46 Inf and the 2-1 Inf. On the night of 11 May, the OPs at Kham Duc came under ground attack. The decision was made to evacuate the camp and on 12 May the evacuation was completed. A prisoner captured on 11 May, stated that he was a member of the 60 Bn, 1 MF Regt, and that his unit had participated in the attack on Kham Duc. Results of the Operation at Kham Duc were 547 VC/NVA KIA.

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(7) During May Chu Lai received six 122mm rocket attacks. The first attack was on 5 May and on 6 May Chu Lai Airfield received two 122mm rockets at 1734H. This is the first time that Chu Lai had been rocketed during the day. On 11 May the airfield received three 122mm rockets with neg casualties or damage. On 14 May, which was a period of high illumination, Chu Lai received two 122mm rockets. This was the first time since TET that the enemy had rocketed the airfield during a period of high illumination. On 23 May, Chu Lai received ten 122mm rockets, and seven more rockets on 26 May. The last attack occurred on 9 Jun when Chu Lai received seven 122mm rockets, which were launched from vic BT 440 045, using one conventional launch system and one improvised launch system.

(8) On 14 May, a CAP MTT engaged 30 VC in an ambush vic BT 316 186. Captured documents identified the V-18 LF co. Results of the contact were ten VC KIA, nine IWC and misc equipment captured.

(9) On 15 May, FSB West received 26 122mm rockets with no casualties.

(10) On 27 May, Hau Duc SF/CIDG FOB received a heavy mortar attack. 200 rds of mortar fire and SA/AN fire were received throughout the day. It is believed that this attack was conducted by the 70 MF Bn to cover the movement of the 1 MF Regt, 2 NVA Div Base Area 117. Documents captured on 30 May by 1-6 Inf vic BT 244 122, indicated that the 1 MF Regt, 2 NVA Div had moved into Base Area 117. Scattered contact continued in this area until approx 9 Jun when eight B-52 strikes were put into the area. As a result of operations in Base Area 117, the 1 MF Regt moved to the south and west.

(11) On 31 May, Quang Tin (P) HQ in Tam Ky received six 122mm rockets with no casualties. Elements of 1-6 Inf Vic BT 225 085 captured a PW from the 74 Bn, who confirmed reports that the 74 MF Bn had received 250 NVA soldiers after the TET Offensive.

(12) On 1 June, Tam Ky received three rounds of 122mm rockets. On 2 June, Thang Binh (D) HQ received an attack by fire employing 60mm and 82mm mortars, and B-40 rockets.

(13) From 1 to 12 Jun there were many contact and attacks by fire in the Burlington Trail AO. On 5 Jun, F/8 Cav engaged an enemy MG position and destroyed a 12.7mm HMG. Captured documents confirmed the presence of the GK-31 AA Bn, 2 NVA Div in the vic of BT 202 431. On 6 Jun, Hau Duc SF/CIDG FOB received mortar fire and a light ground attack resulting in 7 VC KIA, 5 VC CIA and 5 IWC. On 7 Jun, 1-46 Inf, while in a night defensive position, received forty rds of 60mm mortar with negative casualties.

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(14) On 12 Jun elements of 1-46 Inf in On Burlington Trail, came under a thirty rd mortar attack during which two flame throwers were used by the enemy. Neither flame thrower was effective due to the range of their employment. One of the flame throwers was CIA.

(15) On the morning of 23 Jun, NSAD and the Coastal Group area in Chu Lai came under a 24 round mortar attack. During the mortar attack, enemy swimmers attached satchel charges to two barges. The barges were damaged but not sunk.

(16) On 24 Jun, a PW captured by the 196 Bde in Vic BT 012 409 stated that he was with a sniper team from the 105 Co. He stated that the 105 Co was located vic AT 970 390, has 100 men, and is currently avoiding contact with American units.

(17) On 26 Jun, a platoon of CIDG from Minh Long SF/CIDG camp engaged an unidentified NVA unit, the Aero Scouts assisted in the contact, resulting in 8 KIA and 8 IWC.

(18) On 4 Jul, elements of 3-21 Inf at BT 084 320, killed two NVA. Captured documents indicated they were from the 3 NVA Regt, 2 NVA Div.

(19) On 5 Jul, the 198 Bde found a pack containing a Russian stopwatch, firing tables for the 122mm rocket, and a US map with computations on it dated 12 May. The pack was found vic BT 427 081.

(20) On 14 Jul, an aircraft putting in an airstrike at AT 785 184 received an estimated 1000 tracer rounds of 23mm or 37mm AA fire. The aircraft were flying at 6500' when they received the fire.

(21) On 14 Jul, elements of 4-21 Inf found two base camps. One camp was in the vic of AT 804 515 and contained 250 lbs of peanuts, 60 AK-47 packed in cosmoline, and some NVA gas masks. The other camp, vic AT 813 181, contained one NVA gas mask, one K-44, one MG, and 21 bicycles.

(22) On 16 Jul, an aircraft attempting to insert LRRP Camel, received heavy AW/SA fire in vic AT 904 144. Approximately 200-300 enemy were observed in the area.

(23) On 21 Jul, a division aerial observer, vic AT 915 065, observed 50-60 NVA in uniforms with packs moving along a trail. He engaged with arty and killed four. In the vic of AT 939 062, the observer saw a companysized element and a possible resupply point.

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(24) On 23 Jul, elements of 1/1 Cav, in Opn Burlington Trail, contacted the enemy vic BT1527. Contact resulted in 63 NVA KIA, 8 IWC and 2 CSWC. Captured equipment and documents identified the 105 LF Co and elements of GE-40 Engr Bn, 2d NVA Div.

(25) On the morning of 24 Jul, LZ Bayonet received approx 40 rds of 60mm mortar fire and 2-4 rds of RPG fire, resulting in 1 US KHA, and 9 WHA. One or two VC entered the base and placed satchel charges inside the perimeter.

(26) On the night of 24 Jul, a 16 year old VC turned himself in under the Chieu Hoi program. He stated that he was working with the V-14 LF Co, and that the company was located at BT 287 089.

(27) On 24 Jul, a PW captured vic BT 042 432, stated that he was a member of the 4 Trans Co, 31 Regt, Div unk. He indicated that he had seen four American PWs in Phaoc Lanh (H) #2. He also stated that he had seen five more American PWs on 23 Apr in the vic of PHUOC HIEP (V), TIEN PHUOC (D).

(28) On 26 Jul, a PW captured vic AT 809 191, stated that he was a member of the 2 Bn (AKA 70 Bn), 21 Regt, and that the regiment was currently engaged in resupply activities in the Kham Duc area. The regiments base camp is currently located in the vic of 7C 1010, and the 21 Regt intends to move to the NUI DA Mtns (vic AT8916) for an offensive in August. At present thirty trucks, escorted by tanks, move along the SON HAI Trail (poss Hwy #14) to carry ammunition and rice.

(29) A PW captured on 29 Jul, stated that he was a member of the 44 Bn (aka 90 Bn), 1 MF Regt, 2 NVA Div. The PW stated that he believes the 1 MF Regt is located in the SON PHUC area vic AT 9237. A Hoi Chanh at Tam Ky subsector HQ indicated that 400 NVA believed to be part of the 31 Regt (aka 3 Regt) are located at BT 050 198.

(30) Operations in the Quang Tin, Quang Nam (P) area resulted in 797 NVA KIA, 1164 VC KIA, 529 IWC and 75 CSWC.

b. (C) Quang Ngai

(1) Enemy activity in Quang Ngai Province resulted primarily from friendly operations during the conducts of Operation Chatterbox Swamp and Vance Canyon; with enemy initiated contact heavier in May than in June and July. Incidents were characterized by sniper fire and mortar attacks. There was also an increase in acts of terrorism and sabotage, interdiction of LOCs by mine and booby traps continuing. There were a total of 26 such incidents along Hwy #1 during the period 1 May 68 to 31 July 68, (11 in May, 9 mines and 2 sabotage; 9 in June, 7 mines and 2 sabotage; 6 in July, 3 mines and 3 sabotage.)

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(2) On 1 May, vic BS 6977, elements of an RF Co were overrun by an estimated two VC Cos.

(3) On 5 May at 0130H, the MACV Compound in Quang Ngai City was mortared until 0202H. At 0145H, LZ Dottie received 18-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At 0240H a MACV advisor reported that Duc Pho District Hq received 8-11 mortar rounds plus satchel charges near the police station and MACV Compound. At 0235, LZ Bronco received two satchel charges inside the perimeter with two more exploding outside the perimeter. At 0340H, LZ Liz received two satchel charges.

(4) On 6 May at 0300H, LZ Bronco received 64 rounds of 60mm mortar, 2 RPG-2 rounds, and at least 1 RPG-7 round. As a result of the contact there were 3 NVA KIA. At 0355H LZ Thunder received 11 rounds of mortar fire. At 0400H, the 174 and 11 Avn received 40-50 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, resulting in several aircraft damaged.

(5) On 18 May, Quang Ngai Sector Engr Co and family quarters were hit by four 60mm mortars and small arms fire. As a result of the contact, there were 13 VC KIA, 7 PWs and 9 IWC. B/4-21 Inf vic BS 930 224, received nine rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. At the same time an APC on a ridge near BS 920 233 was hit by RR fire. LZ thunder received a satchel charge near the perimeter.

(6) On 22 May at 2300H Ba To SF/CIDG Camp received a ground attack and mortar fire from an unknown size enemy force, thought to have been elements of the 406 Sapper Bn. Contact resulted in 25 VC KIA.

(7) On 23 May at 1000H, at Mo Duc (D), BS 749 506, an unknown size enemy force kidnapped 15 civilians who had been working for US forces.

(8) On 24 May, the 2 ARVN Div, BS 05 735, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 53 VC KIA, 13 VCS, 12 IEC, and 2 CSWC. Documents captured during the contact identified one or two companies of the 48 LF Bn.

(9) On 27 May at Duc Pho (C), a reported VC sapper attack of four satchel charge destroyed 75% of a Catholic church with 5 IHA and 3 WHA all civilians. At Tho Lac, a refugee camp, vic BS002 398, several satchel charges were received, damaging 3 houses. A hamlet at BS 806 390 received one or two satchel charges with 2 civilians IHA and 8 houses destroyed. B/4-21 Inf at LZ Bronco, received 8-10 satchel charges in its perimeter as a result of an enemy attack against a refugee camp north of the LZ.

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(10) On 29 May, L2 Bronco received an estimated 125 rds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire resulting in 2 LHA and 41 WHA. A female detainee stated that she was part of a group of 15 uniformed VC who mortared L2 Bronco with 3 mortars.

(11) On 31 May at 0200H, BS 6081, gunships sank 35-40 sampans on the Song Ham Giang.

(12) On 2 Jun at 0910H, C/4-21 Inf vic BS 700 343 found and destroyed approx 30,000 lbs of salt.

(13) On 6 Jun at 0100H, vic BS603 917, friendly forces received 1 RPG round and AW fire in the Binh Son Bridge. VC entered a refugee camp near by and burned several houses. At 0415H, on L2 Thunder C/6-11 Arty received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar and small arms fire, inflicting 2 WHA and light damage to one 105mm howitzer.

(14) On 8 Jun at 0415H, BS 724 570, an RF/PF Co on a road clearing mission was ambushed, resulting in 24 VC KIA and 1 CSWC.

(15) On 15 Jun at 0800H, B/3-1 Inf vic BS 723 451, captured 2 PWs, LE VAN PHUNG, Sr Sgt, NVA and a female from 112 Co, 22 Regt, 3 NVA Div. These PWs were the first definite indication of the presence of the 3 NVA Div in Quang Ngai (P).

(16) On 16 Jun at 1045H, B/3-1 Inf vic BS 680 391, found a VC base camp with several huts.

(17) On 19 Jun, B/3-1 Inf at BS 394 602 had contact with 7 VC resulting in 7 VC KIA, 2 K-44 CIA. VC were all wearing blue uniforms with pistol belts and had documents indicating they were from the 401 NVA Regt.

(18) On 24 Jun, a PW was captured from the 21 Sapper Co who stated his unit was to coordinate with the 31 LF Bn plus elements of the 506 B Sapper Cos to ambush and block US/ARVN forces at the conclusion of Operation Chatterchoochee Swamp.

(19) On 29 Jun, four detainees, captured by the 4 ARVN Regt, vic BS 515 715, stated they were from the 3 and 4 Cos, 83 LF Bn and had a mission of ambushing ARVN elements. At BS 623 018 at 2320H in Son Tra (H) #1, VC opened fire on friendly forces keeping them busy while other VC launched satchel charges and grenades and set fire to houses in the village destroying about 90% of the houses with 15 RD WHA, 30 civilians WHA, 21 WHA evacuated.

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and the Secretary of the Army. Such studies included enemy locations, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and summaries of enemy activities.

(c) Produced special studies, estimates and overlays for the S2s of subordinate units, C Co 5 Special Forces Group (Abn), and other intelligence agencies in the area.

(d) The targeting Section produced special studies on the Song Re Valley area and the Tien Phuoc Rice Bowl area in an effort to locate elements of the 2 and 3 IVA Divisions.

(e) Working in conjunction with the II Section and G3 Plans, a study was prepared of all SF/CIDG Camps within the division area of interest.

(f) Updates were made on the OB studies of the 70 MF Bn and the 72 LF Bn.

(g) Updated studies on Hwy 1, 535 and the southern Chu Lai TAOR (Muscantine area) concerning mines, boobytraps and acts of sabotage. Prepared weekly studies on mines, boobytraps and acts of sabotage throughout Americal AO to aid in reducing casualties sustained by friendly forces due to such incidents.

(h) Concurred in Psyops drops and broadcasting for the G2.

(i) Continued to maintain and update Order of Battle files on all confirmed enemy units and higher headquarters.

(j) Continued to furnish Agent Report evaluations for the G2.

(k) Conducted liaison visits with SF/CIDG camps, advisory groups, subordinate units and higher headquarters.

(l) Provided Order of Battle information to the Radio Research Company.

#### c. Imagery Interpretation Section.

(1) During the reporting period the II Section continued to furnish the division imagery interpretation support through photo readouts and special studies.

(2) Specific accomplishments were:



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(a) Photography resulting from 175 photo missions was received. 131 of these were distributed to the brigades.

(b) 72 supplementary Imagery Interpretation Reports were published and distributed from the readouts of 89 photo missions.

(c) 24 special studies were completed. These include studies of Hiep Duc, Hau Duc and Rte 534 river areas.

(d) Completed the Special Forces Camp studies including overlays, mosaics and drawings. These were produced and compiled into book form for distribution.

(e) A total of 20 VR flights were made by the aerial observers of the Imagery Interpretation Section. They reported approximately 60 significant sightings. The hand held 35mm camera was used effectively, producing detailed aerial photographs of bridges, fording sites and trails.

(f) Liaison missions were continued to all the brigades, several SF/CIDG Camps, and III MAF. These were used to exchange intelligence information.

#### d. Interrogation Section.

(1) During the reporting period, the Interrogation Section interrogated and classified 234 detainees. Teams were assigned from division interrogation resources to operate the 1/1 Cav Sqdn's POW cage.

(a) NVA	16
(b) VC/PW	24
(c) Civil Defendants	51
(d) Returnee	17
(e) Regroupee	1
(f) Doubtful Case	0
(g) Innocent Civilian	125

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The totals above represent a decrease of 442 from the previous reporting period. This is due to the fact that there was a decrease in POWs captured.

(2) The decrease in number of Innocent Civilians is due to the fact that Division Interrogation Section is no longer receiving detainees directly from the field, as was the case during the last reporting period (Operation Muscatine). The brigade Interrogation Sections classify detainees and only the NVA/PT, VC/PT and Ho Chi Chanhs are forwarded to the Chu Lai Collection Point. The Innocent Civilians at division level come mainly from medical evacuation patients at the 2 and 27 Surgical Hospitals, detainees from Swift Boat operations, and headquarters elements. All hospital cases are now handled by the Division Interrogation Section.

(3) The Interrogation Section supported seven US Navy Swift Boat operations along the Southern I Corps coastal region. Over 125 persons were screened (not reflected in above totals) for intelligence information. Five were brought into the Division Collection Point for detailed interrogation.

(4) The Interrogation Section continues to provide field interrogation support and processes all detainees apprehended by the 1/1 Cav Sqdn. An interrogator and interpreter team is permanently detailed to accomplish this mission; however, there were four teams (2 US and 2 ARVN) operating with the squadron during most of the reporting period. Through field interrogations, these teams have helped the troops locate many rice caches, weapons caches, and tunnel complexes.

(5) In support of Operation Pocohantas Forest, the Division Interrogation Section dispatched a team consisting of two interrogators, two interpreters, and one ARVN officer (from 5th ARVN MID) to TF Cooksey.

(6) On 12 May five teams were sent to the Chu Lai Airfield to debrief the pilots and crews of aircraft that evacuated personnel from SF/CIDG camp. Personnel from B/2-1 Inf, and other elements of the 196 Bde which assisted in the evacuation were also debriefed. On 17 May two teams were dispatched to the NSA Hospital in DaNang to debrief three members of the 196 Bde who had escaped and evaded from the Kham Duc area when their outpost was overrun by NVA troops. Numerous electronically transmitted reports were prepared and disseminated to COMUSMACV, and other reports were submitted to the ACoFS, G3, Americal Division for preparation of an After-Action Report on the evacuation of the SF/CIDG camp.



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(7) During the reporting period, the Division Interrogation Section supported division elements by screening, summarizing, and forwarding to the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) over 500,000 pages of captured documents. During the month of May, the Americal Division was second of all units in Vietnam, in the total number of document pages forwarded to CDEC. The average time from time of capture to forwarding to CDEC was 5 days, which represents an improvement over the last reporting period.

(8) One hundred and twelve weapons were registered as war trophies during the reporting period. Approximately 30 NVA uniforms, medical equipment, NVA web gear, 54 AK-47s, and a Russian Flamethrower were delivered to the III MAF Collection Branch in response to SICRs levied by higher headquarters.

(9) The interrogation Section continues to coordinate with the IPW Sections of the 11, 196, 198 Bdes and the 1/1 Cav Sqdn. The section is also in constant contact with the Quang Ngai Interrogation Center, the Tam Ky S2 Sector Advisor, and III MAF to insure the fastest possible dissemination of intelligence obtained through the exploitation of prisoners of war.

e. Counterintelligence Section.

(1) During the reporting period the CI Section has continued to support the Americal Division by conducting investigations and inspections, collecting information and managing the Kit Carson Scout and Volunteer Informant Program.

(2) Counterintelligence inspections continue in an effort to strengthen the security posture of Division Headquarters and other divisional elements. Nineteen semi-annual CI inspections, nine pre-IG inspections, eleven courtesy inspections and ten unannounced inspections were conducted during the reporting period. In addition, security and investigative assistance was provided to the Marine Air Groups on Chu Lai installation.

(3) Cooperation with the Americal Provost Marshal and the Industrial Relations Office continues in an effort to increase control over the indigenous workers by establishing stricter procedures for processing, guarding and reporting changes in the work force. Approximately 25% of the reports containing the names, and pass number of employees of each activity have been received. An aggressive inspection and spot check program is in progress and is resulting in

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better internal control of workers. Indigenous employees apprehended out of their immediate area of employment were remanded to the CI Section for investigation. Hiring activities are required to make positive identification of the employee and explain why the person was not under required supervision and control. Workers repeatedly violating S.G. Reg 190-5 were barred from employment on the installation. When applicable, formal reports of the incident were forwarded through the G2 to the activity concerned.

(4) The recruitment of Hoa Chanh to serve in the division as Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) continues. At the end of the reporting period, 99 scouts were on the rolls. The performance of the scouts continues to improve as the scouts and the Americal Division units learn to work as a team. Two scouts were killed in action and one was reported missing in action during the reporting period.

(5) The Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) reached a peak in monthly expenditures during May and June. The VIP expenditure during these months averaged \$3,000 per month (354,000 \$VN). The termination of Operation Muscatine sharply reduced VIP expenditures in July. Expenditures were still predominantly for weapons and munitions rather than information through this program. The present downward trend of VIP expenditures is expected to continue until a new operation develops new areas of exploitation.

(6) Source recruitment continues to receive increasing emphasis. The major concern of the source program is to provide an early warning system for hostile activity and the identification of VC infrastructure in the Chu Lai TAOR.

(7) Personnel of the 8th ARVN MID, working with the CI Section, continue to assist in the identification of VC infrastructure and to provide increased coverage for the installation informant program.



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(7) USARV General Order 3602, 26 July 68, assigned the 1st Battalion 85th Artillery.

(8) USARPAC General Order 278, 29 May 68, reorganized the 3d Military History Detachment under MTOE 20-017E PAC 1/68 effective 16 June 1968.

(9) USARPAC General Order 292, 14 June 68, ammended USARPAC GO 300, 2 Dec 67, as reads HQ an MAIN SFT CO, 723d MAINT BN to read HQ and Co A, 723d MAINT BN.

(10) USARPAC General Order 303, 17 June 68, reorganized the 156th Signal Platoon under MTOE 11-33E PAC 1/68 effective 25 June 68.

(11) USARPAC General Order 311, 20 June 68, reorganized the 3d Bn, 18th Arty under MTOE's 6-436G; 6-437G; 6-439G; PAC 1/68 effective 1 July 68.

c. Disposition and movement of units during the period.

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period units were conducting combat operations as follows:

(a) 196th Inf BDE(1st) with 2-1st Inf, 4-31st Inf and 3-21st Inf: OPCON to Provisional Corps Vietnam conducted operations in the vicinity of Hue-Phu Bai.

(b) 198th Inf Bde (Lt) with 1-52d Inf (-), 1-20th Inf, and 1-6th Inf: Conducting operation WHEELER/WALLOWA and Opn BURLINGTON TRAIL.

(c) TF Roach with 5/46th Inf and 1-46th Inf: Conducting operations in the CHU LAI TAOR.

(d) 11th Inf Bde (Lt) with the 3-1st Inf, 4-3d Inf, and 4-21st Inf: Conducting Operation MUSCATINE and conducting operations in the DUC PHO AO.

(2) Major movement of units during the period was as follows:

(a) On 8 May 68, because of enemy buildup in the WHEELER/WALLOWA Area, two infantry companies and an artillery battery were moved from DUC PHO AO to WHEELER/WALLOWA area (A/4-21st Inf, D/3-1 Inf and B/6-11th Artillery).

(b) On 10 May 68, because of a mission to reinforce KHAM DUC SF Camp, A/1-46 Inf from Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL and the 2-1st Inf from the Camp Evans area moved to KHAM DUC. This initiated Operation GOLDEN VALLEY.

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(c) On 12 May 68, 2-1 Inf with A/1-46th Inf were extracted from Kham Duc. The 2-1 Inf returned to Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA with A/1-46th Inf returning to Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL. Operation GOLDEN VALLEY terminated this date.

(d) On 13 May 68, 196th Inf Bde (Lt) began movement back to LZ BALDY from PCV. The 4-31 Inf returned to WHEELER/WALLOWA area (FSB WEST). The 198th Inf Bde moved back to CHU LAI TAOR. TF Roach was disbanded.

(e) On 14 May 68, 196th Inf Bde (Lt) assumed control of Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA.

(f) On 29 May 68, because of enemy build-up in Tam Ky-Tien Phuoc area, 1-6 Inf moved from Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA to Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL.

(g) On 1 June 68, 1-52 Inf began movement from Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA to Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL. Movement completed on 2 Jun 68.

(h) On 8 Jun 68, 1-46 Inf began to move from CHU LAI TAOR to Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL to replace 1-6 Inf. On 9 Jun 68, move was complete with 1-46 Inf conducting operations in BURLINGTON TRAIL and 1-6th Inf conducting operations in the CHU LAI TAOR.

(i) On 13 Jun 68, 1-20th Inf began movement from WHEELER/WALLOWA AO to DUC PHO AO. The 4-21 Inf moved from DUC PHO AO to WHEELER/WALLOWA AO replacing 2-1 Inf at LZ BALDY. 2-1 Inf moved to LZ ROSS (BT027342). All moves complete on 15 Jun 68.

(j) On 16 Jun 68, 1/52 Inf began movement from BURLINGTON TRAIL AO to the CHU LAI TAOR to replace the S-46th Inf for VANCE CANYON Operation. The movement was completed on 20 Jun 68.

(k) On 19 Jun 68, Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP was initiated with 3-1 Inf conducting a battalion (-) combat assault into the area southwest of Quang Ngai City, vicinity HA THANH Special Forces Camp. The 1-20th Inf assumed responsibility for the DUC PHO AO.

(l) On 20 Jun 68, Operation VANCE CANYON was initiated with the S-46th Inf conducting a battalion size combat assault into the area vicinity TraaBong Special Forces Camp. The 1-52 Inf assumed responsibility for the southern portion of the CHU LAI TAOR with base at LZ GATOR, relieving the S-46th Inf for the operation.

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(m) On 29 Jun 68, Operation CHATTANOOCHEE SWAMP was terminated with the 3-1 Inf moving back to the DUC PHO AO and assuming responsibility for the northern portion of the AO.

(n) On 1 Jul 68, 5-46th Inf began extraction from Operation VANCE CANYON area, moving back to the southern portion of the CHU LAI TAOR. Operation VANCE CANYON was terminated on 2 Jul 68.

(o) On 1 Jul 68, 11th Inf Bde (Lt), initiated reconnaissance and surveillance operations in Song Re River Valley. C/3-1st Inf moved to Ha Thanh S.F. Camp and Recon 1-20th Inf moved to Minh Long S.F. Camp.

(p) On 2 Jul 68, 198th Inf Bde (Lt) assumed responsibility for southern portion of CHU LAI TAOR with the 4-3 Inf moving to CHU LAI Base in preparation for moving to WHEELER/WALLOWA area. The 4-3 Inf completed move to WHEELER/WALLOWA on 3 Jul 68.

(q) On 4 Jul 68, 196th Inf Bde (Lt) began redeployment of forces in preparation for Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST. Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST was initiated on 6 Jul 68, with TF COOKSEY conducting operations with 4 battalions from the 196th Inf Bde and TF ARVN with 3 battalions.

(r) On 5 Jul 68, TF ARVN joined Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST. TF ARVN consisted of the 5th ARVN Regt HQ with 2-5ARVN Bn, 3-5 ARVN Bn, 4-5 ARVN Bn, and C/1-22 ARVN Arty.

(s) On 11 Jul 68, 5-46th Inf was air-moved from CHU LAI TAOR to Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST with HQ at LZ WEST. The 1-52 Inf assumed responsibility for 5-46th Inf portion of the CHU LAI TAOR.

(t) On 20 Jul 68, 4-21 Inf was extracted from Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST and moved to Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA with HQ at LZ BALDY.

(u) On 22 Jul 68, two Mike Force companies from Da Nang arrived to conduct combat operations with the Americal Division in Operation POCHONTAS FOREST.

(v) On 29 Jul 68, two Mike Force companies were extracted from Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST and moved back to Da Nang.

d. Plans. The following plans, operations orders or fragmentary orders were in effect or initiated during the reporting period.

(1) OPLAN 2-68 (Defense of Critical Cities), 3-68 (US and Third Country National Emergency Relief/Evacuation Plan) and 4-68 (Natural Disaster Relief Plan) were all published during this reporting period. OPLAN 17-67 (GOLDEN VALLEY), which provides for the relief/evacuation/counterattack for selected SF/CIDG camps, continues in effect and is being rewritten at this time.

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(2) OPORD 8-68, which initiated operation POCAHONTAS FOREST was the only OPORD published during the reporting period.

(3) Fragmentary order #57-68 w/change 1, continues in effect. This order provides for intensified surveillance of a suspected NVA Division in Southern ICTZ.

(4) Numerous fragmentary orders have been issued that have bearing on the following operations: Operations WHEELER/WALLOWA, MUSCATINE, CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP, VANCE CANYON, BURLINGTON TRAIL and POCAHONTAS FOREST.

e. Operations:

(1) Light contact was generally the characteristic of combat operations during the reporting period. The enemy avoided any major engagement, placing emphasis on the harassment of friendly troops. Mine and booby trap incidents continued high during the reporting period. Americal Division initiated 4 major named operations during the reporting period, Operation GOLDEN VALLEY, Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST, Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP and Operation VANCE CANYON. Four major named operations were terminated during the reporting period, Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP, Operation VANCE CANYON, Operation GOLDEN VALLEY and Operation MUSCATINE. At the end of the reporting period three major named operations were being conducted, Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA, Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST and Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL.

(2) Operation MUSCATINE was conducted during the reporting period from 1 May 68 to 10 Jun 68 at which time it was terminated. The 11th Inf Bde conducted the operation with one battalion (4-3 Inf). Operation MUSCATINE was characterized by numerous mine and booby trap incidents. The enemy avoided major contact concentrating instead on small scale harassing attacks and extensive use of mines and booby traps. Results of Operation MUSCATINE for the period 1 May 68 to 10 Jun 68 were as follows:

FRND	ENEMY LOSSES
16 US KIA	72 VC KIA (C)
63 US WIA (EVAC)	2 NVA KIA (C)
25 US WIA (MINOR)	0 CSWC

(3) Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA continued throughout the reporting period. During the first part of May heavy contact was experienced vicinity of FSB CENTER (BT052253) from 5-14 May 68. Action centered around the high ground of Nue Hoac Ridge (BT0722). During this same period (12-14 May 68) the 196th Inf Bde (L) returned to the WHEELER/WALLOWA AO relieving the 193th Inf Bde in place. Again during the period 5-7 Jun 68, Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA experienced heavy contact, this time vicinity of FSB EAST (BT131202). The 3-21 Inf conducted extensive combat operations against the enemy entrenched in the high ground vicinity BT160205.

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After taking this high ground the 196th Inf Bde experienced light contact during the remainder of the reporting period. Upon initiation of Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST on 6 Jul 68, the 196th Inf Bde conducted Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA with 2 infantry battalions. Results for Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA for the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968 were as follows:

<u>FRIEND</u>	<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>
122 US KIA	865 VC KIA (C)
473 US WHA (EVAC)	560 NVA KIA (C)
242 US WHA (Minor)	173 IWC
	33 CSWC

(4) Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL continued throughout the reporting period. The period was characterized by light to moderate contact. During the latter part of May and the early part of June the enemy began to build up his forces in the area and the 198th Inf Bde was reinforced in the area with two battalions (1-6 Inf and the 1-52 Inf). Moderate contact was made during the early part of June with a resulting B-52 airstrike being employed on 3 June 1968 vicinity Base area 117. Contact continued light with the exception of one contact on 23 Jul 68. From 3 Jun 68, to the end of the reporting period with the 1-52 Inf moving from the BURLINGTON TRAIL AO to the CHU LAI AO during the period 16-20 Jun 68. On 23 Jul 68, A/1-1 beginning at 0322H became engaged with an unknown size NVA element. The engagement continued throughout the day until 1355H. The results of that contact were 68 NVA KIA (C), 3 IWC, 2 CSWC, 2 US WHA (E) and 3 WHA (M). Results of Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL during the period 1 May 68, to 31 Jul 68 were as follows:

<u>FRIEND</u>	<u>ENEMY LOSSES</u>
44 US KIA	163 VC KIA (C)
253 US WHA (EVAC)	203 NVA KIA (C)
91 US WHA (MINOR)	238 IWC
	35 CSWC

(5) Operation GOLDEN VALLEY was initiated on 10 May 68, by Americal Division. The purpose of Operation GOLDEN VALLEY was to reinforce the KHAM DUC SF Camp via ZC0003. A/1-46 Inf was airmoved to KHAM DUC closing at 1050H. The 2-1 Inf with A/3-82 Arty was airmoved from Camp Eagle to KHAM DUC with the first elements arriving at 1430H. On 11 May 68, decision was made to evacuate the KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp in a two day operation beginning on 12 May 1968. On the morning of 12 May at 0327H, KHAM DUC outposts surrounding the camp began receiving heavy attacks which continued through the day with the OP's being overrun or withdrawn. The decision was made to extract all US/SF/CIDG and civilians from the camp and with organic and TAC air suppressing the enemy attack, Air Force, Marine and Americal Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters began

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extraction. All personnel were extracted with the last lift leaving at 1620H. Results for the period 10-12 May 68 were as follows:

FRND

12 US KIA  
39 US WHA (E)  
67 US WHA (M)  
10 US MIA

ENEMY LOSSES

345 NVA KIA (C)  
200 NVA (CIDG FORCES OFCN TO AMERICAL  
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(6) Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP an operation SW of QUANG NGAI, was initiated by the 3-1 Inf of the 11th Inf Bde on 19 Jun 1968. The purpose of the operation was to neutralize VC/NVA elements vicinity Base Area 121 and extend GVN control in the area. The 3-1 Inf initiated operations with a battalion (-) size CA. The 2d ARVN Division participated with the 4th ARVN Regt (1-4 ARVN and 2-4 ARVN and 4-4 ARVN) and the 5th ARVN Regt (1-5 ARVN, 2-5 ARVN, and 3-5 ARVN) joining the operation on 20 June 1968. EA THANH SF Camp participated with elements of one CIDG company. The operation was terminated on 29 Jun 68 with light scattered contact reported during the operation. Results of Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP for the period 19 Jun through 29 Jun 68 were as follows:

FRND

2 US KIA  
13 US WHA (E)  
5 US WHA (M)

ENEMY LOSSES

23 VC KIA(C)  
17 IWC

(7) Operation VANCE CANYON, an operation vicinity TRA BONG SF/CIDG Camp, was initiated on 21 June 1968 by 5-46 Inf of the 198th Inf Bde in conjunction with forces from the TRA BONG SF/CIDG Camp. The purpose of the operation was to find, fix and destroy the enemy in vicinity of Base areas 113 and 120 and to extend GVN control in the area. The operation experienced light contact and was terminated on 2 Jul 68. Results of Operation VANCE CANYON for the period 21 Jun 68 through 2 Jul 68 were as follows:

FRND

5 US KIA  
14 US WHA(E)

ENEMY LOSSES

2 VC KIA (C)  
4 NVA KIA (C)  
46 IWC  
9 CSWC

(8) Operations in the CHU LAI TAOR continued during the reporting period with scattered light contact reported. The enemy avoided any major engagement in the area. There was a total of 9 mortar and/or rocket attacks on the CHU LAI Base during the period with occasional mortar or rocket attacks on friendly fire support bases, battalion bases, GVN installations RF/PF outposts, and friendly villages. During

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the period the technique of saturation patrolling of the CHU LAI Base rocket belt was employed. Results of operations in the CHU LAI TAOR during the reporting period were as follows:

## FIND

29 US KIA

256 US WIA (E)

## ENEMY LOSSES

105 ENEMY KIA (C)

24 IWC

4 CSWC

(9) Operations in the DUC PHO AO continued with light contact reported. On 1 July 68, 11th Inf Bde initiated reconnaissance and surveillance operations west of DUC PHO in the Song Re River Valley with units of the 11th Inf Bde conducting operations in conjunction with the Special Forces Camps of Gia Vuc, Ba To, Minh Long, and Ha Thanh. Results of Operations in the DUC PHO AO during the period were as follows:

## FIND

35 US KIA

297 US WIA

## ENEMY LOSSES

301 ENEMY KIA

30 IWC

5 CSWC

(10) Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST was initiated on 6 Jul 68 with the mission to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces in the HIEP DUC (AT9426) and Antenna (AT9137) Valley areas and to interdict enemy use of highway #534. TF Cooksey was formed to conduct operation, having 4 US Battalions an ARVN TF with 3 ARVN Battalions and CIDG Special Forces operating in the POCAHONTAS FOREST AO. In addition 2 Marine battalions conducted operations in Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST in conjunction with Americal Division. Light contact has been characteristic of the operation during the reporting period. The initial period of the operation (6- 20 July) was an attack to the west to seize predesignated objectives. Beginning on 20 July a reorientation of forces began in order to cordon and search the high ground southwest of Base Area 116. This phase was completed on 31 Jul 68. Results of Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST for the period 1 May through 31 Jul were as follows:

## FIND

4 US KIA

22 US WIA (E)

36 US WIA (M)

2 ARVN KIA

6 ARVN (E)

2 MF WIA (E)

## ENEMY LOSSES

46 VC KIA (C)

24 NVA KIA (C)

92 IWC

1 CSWC

## ARVN

23 VC KIA (C), 4 NVA KIA (C)

22 IWC, 3 CSWC

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(11) 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry: Conducting operations in the lowland and coastal areas of Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL and WHEELER/WALLOWA.

(12) Weather was generally good during the reporting period and did not hinder combat operations.

(13) Americal Division units continued to conduct many combat operations in conjunction with 2D ARVN Division forces as well as with Provincial and CIDG forces. Americal Division continued to support and conduct small joint operations with the combined action platoons. During the reporting period a major effort was made to conduct as many joint operations as possible. Joint convoys were run between Tam Ky and Tien Phouc with ARVN and US Forces both having an area of responsibility for raid and mine sweep security. Overall enemy losses in the Americal AO during the reporting period were:

ENEMY LOSSES

2406 Enemy KIA (C)

321 Weapons captured

f. Close Air Support.

(1) Missions/Sorties: During the period 1 May 1968 through 31 July 1968 the Americal Division employed 1,279 missions utilizing 2,681 air sorties.

(2) Skyspot missions: The division received 606 requests from subordinate units for CSS/TPQ-10 or MSQ-77 radar controlled missions. The division passed 377 mission requests to III MAF and 377 were approved for strikes. The USAF flew 225 missions utilizing 400 sorties, the USMC flew 26 missions utilizing 27 sorties and the RAAF flew 2 missions utilizing 2 sorties in support of the division. Total CSS completed during the reporting period was 252 missions utilizing 429 sorties.

(3) Forward Air Controlled (FAC) Missions: The division received 912 requests for preplanned forward air controlled missions, of which 732 were passed by III MAF and 630 approved. The USAF flew 467 missions utilizing 1066 sorties and the USMC flew 36 missions utilizing 172 sorties in support of the division. The division received 458 immediate/direct missions utilizing 924 sorties of which 437 sorties were flown by USAF, 404 sorties by USMC and 33 sorties by VNAF. Total FAC missions for the period was 1011 missions utilizing 2162 sorties.

(4) Arclight Strikes: Fifteen Arclight Strikes were flown in support of the division during the reporting period.

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(5) Ordnance expended: Total ordnance expended by close air support during the reporting period was 5,103.33 tons of bombs, 427.90 tons of napalm and 7,904 rockets.

(6) Damage assessment: Forward air controllers made the following bomb damage assessment (BDA) during the reporting period: 844 structures destroyed, 110 bunkers destroyed, 3010 meters of trench line opened or destroyed, 227 weapons positions and spider holes uncovered, 22 sampans destroyed, 246 secondary explosions and secondary fires observed, 63 killed by air (KBA), 56 culverts destroyed, 17 bridges destroyed, and 152 trail and road cuts.

### g. Training.

(1) The Americal Combat Center continued the mission of conducting in-country orientation and replacement training for all assigned and attached units of the division. During the reporting period 51 courses were completed and 3391 individual and unit personnel completed training.

(2) Fifteen personnel completed the Division Reconno Course.

(3) 293 junior leaders completed the Americal Combat Leadership Course.

(4) 36 personnel completed the Unit Reconnaissance Course.

(5) The mobile training team program continued. The following training was conducted by the Division for the 2d ARVN Div.

(a) Maintenance and employment of the M-29, 81mm mortar.

(b) Organizational maintenance of the M-16 rifle.

(c) Organizational maintenance of the M-60 MG.

(6) The 2d ARVN Division conducted the following training for the Americal Division:

(a) Structure of RVN government, province level and below.

(b) Structure of RVN military.

(c) VC/NVA mines and booby traps.

(d) Village search techniques.

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(7) One additional training site and a mock-up village for teaching village search techniques were constructed at the Combat Center during the reporting period.

2. Artillery. See separate ORIL for the Division Artillery.

3. Aviation.

a. (C) Command.

(1) During this reporting period the battalion was commanded as follows:

(a) 1 May through 13 July 1968 - LTC John L. Holladay, 0203755, Armor.

(b) 19 July through 27 July 1968 - LTC Gary E. Langston, 092697, Artillery.

(c) 28 July through 31 July 1968 - LTC John N. Brandenburg, 064653, Infantry.

(2) Major Edwin H. Harris Jr., 0504450, Infantry, assumed command of "A" Company, 9 July 1968.

(3) Major Junius I. Tanner, 038967, Infantry, assumed command of Aero Scout Company, 16 June 1968.

(4) Captain Robert J. Jordan, 05406215m Artillery, assumed command of Headquarters Company, 13 July 1968.

b. (C) Personnel.

(1) The 570th Transportation Detachment arrived 28 June 1968, with 53-EM, 1-WO and equipment. This unit will replace the 40th Transportation Detachment which is scheduled to depart 3 August 1968. The 570th will be attached to F Troop, 8th Cavalry pending receipt of assignment orders.

(2) The 415th Signal Detachment arrived 20 June 1968 with four (4) EM, one (1) WO and equipment and will be attached to F Troop, 8th Cavalry pending assignment orders.

(3) The following lists the consolidated battalion strength (F Troop, 8th Cav and attached units not included):

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<u>AUTHORIZED/MTOE</u>			<u>AUTHORIZED/AMCAL GO</u>			<u>ASSIGNED 31JUL68</u>		
OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
39	59	350	41	59	390	35	49	413

(4) The following lists the strength of F Troop, 8th Cavalry and attached units:

<u>AUTHORIZED/MTOE</u>			<u>ASSIGNED 31 July 1968</u>		
OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
13	35	189	14	29	208

c. (C) Intelligence.

(1) Sixty (60) aircraft were hit by hostile fire during the reporting period. Analysis of hit reports are as follows:

<u>ALT</u>	<u>ON GROUND</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>LNDR</u>	<u>ENRT</u>	<u>TARGET ATTACK</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
0	1					1
100				25	4	29
200				4	1	5
400			2	7		9
600				4	1	5
800				1		1
1000			1	4		5
1500				3		3
2000				1		1
3500				1		1

d. (C) Plans, Operations, Training and Organization.

(1) Plans: The Aero Scout Company has received diversified missions to include airmobile support and gunship support. The Aero Scout concept of reconnaissance remains the primary method of employment. Indoctrination of ground user units to employ the company in its primary role will continue to be emphasized to brigade and division headquarters.

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(2) Operations.

(a) The breakdown of aviation activity for the 123d Aviation Battalion and F Troop, 8th Cavalry Follows:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HOURS	4.202	3.712	3.964	11,878
TROOPS	17,417	14,223	16,224	47,869
CARGO TONS	163	206	95	471
SORTIES	10,560	9,004	9,653	29,217
MED EVACS	5	15	6	27
VC KBA	141	150	163	459
VC CAPTURED	35	29	13	77
STRUCTURES DESTROYED	18	21	46	85

(b) Ammunition expended:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
7.62	378,495	39,165	724,289	1,996,949
40MM	3,272	2,515	1,024	11,311
2.75" rockets	3,335	1,435	1,364	6,634

(c) "A" Company continues in general support of the division with two (2) UH-1D helicopters being provided for support of Special Forces operations.

(d) The Aero Scout Company provided support to both the 11th and 198th Light Infantry Brigades during the period 1 May through LIB, 1 July 1968. The most significant activity during this reporting period occurred 2 July 1968 at BS 592412, where a reconnaissance team located an unknown number of enemy in Khaki and green uniforms. The aero-infantry were inserted resulting in 23 KIA.

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(e) F Troop, 8th Cavalry continues under operational control of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry.

(3) Training:

(a) Standardization check rides and emphasis on all aspects of flight safety were areas receiving major command attention.

(b) Special emphasis was also placed on the training of newly assigned aircraft maintenance personnel. These personnel are being trained with more experienced mechanics for closer supervision during training activities.

(4) Organization. No report.

e. Logistics.

(1) The Aero Scout Company converted from XM-16 to XM-21 helicopter gunship armament subsystems.

(2) Two (2) UH-1C gunships were received as replacements for damaged UH-1B's.

(3) Three (3) JP4 refueling points and one (1) 115/145 aviation gasoline refueling point were established at Minh Long Special Forces Camp.

4. Chemical.

a. Organization: During the reporting period there were several personnel changes in the Division Chemical Section. SFC Clevenger was assigned as Radiological Plotter on 15 May 1968. On 1 June Major Denmark, Division Chemical Officer, rotated to CONUS. MSG Alfare was assigned as Operations Sergeant on 3 June 1968. Major Arter was assigned as Assistant Division Chemical Officer on 12 July 1968. At the present time the Division Chemical Section is at 100% strength.

b. Training:

(1) On 2 June a presentation of the M106 Riot Control Agent Dispenser (Mighty Mite) was given by SFC Spencer to three members of the 4th ARVN Regt. The purpose of the instruction presented was to familiarize the participants with the nomenclature and functioning of the apparatus. The 4th ARVN planned to use the Mighty Mite extensively for perimeter defoliation.

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(2) On 13 July, LT Danilovs and SFC Clevenger of the Division Chemical Section visited the 9th Infantry Division. During the visit instruction was received on the assembly and employment of the XM920E2 fuze and burster bomb system. Plans are now being established to use the XM920E2 in conjunction with future CS drum drops.

(3) On 23 July an inspection team, headed by SFC Bauer, was sent to the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. Sergeant Bauer's team performed a technical inspection of all M132 mechanized flamethrowers and associated service units located in the squadron. All deficiencies found were corrected on the spot. Waterproof cards were constructed and given to the unit. These cards provided preventative maintenance check lists for daily, weekly and monthly services.

(4) A weekly training program was initiated during May to cross-train individuals within the section in computing and plotting radiological fallout information. The training program has proven to be beneficial and the individuals involved are maintaining a high degree of proficiency.

#### c. Operations:

(1) During the period 29 May through 4 June, a 5 man team from the Division Chemical Section assisted the 26th Engineer Battalion in defoliation of their portion of the Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) perimeter.

(2) During the period 7-13 July a 4 man team from Division Chemical Section assisted the 335th Aircraft Direct Support Company in defoliation of their sector of the CLDC perimeter.

(3) Defoliation operations are continuing with the Division Chemical Section working in support of the 9th Support portion of the CLDC perimeter. This operation was started 30 July and is in progress at the present time.

#### 5. Engineer.

a. Primary engineer effort in the Americal Division AO continues to be directed toward operational support of the Division maneuver elements. Supporting engineer units have a high percentage of effort committed to LOC improvement.

(1) Route 1 has primary emphasis with four Engineer Battalions committed to the road.

(a) 19th Engr Bn: South I Corps boundary to BS756946.



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(b) 39th Engr Bn (DS Americal Division): BS756496 to BS695635 and from BS643733 to Chu Lai Main Gate.

(c) 104th ARVN Engr Bn: BS965635 to BS643733.

(d) 9th Engr Bn, USMC: Chu Lai Main Gate to north edge of Americal Division AO.

(2) Route 1 from Chu Lai to Northern Boundary of Division AO upgraded to 2 lane class 60 traffic by construction of the following bridges:

(a) BT379174-270' steel stringer, timber pile bent, reinforced concrete abutments, class 60.

(b) BT430109-228' steel stringer, timber pile bent, reinforced concrete abutments, class 60.

(c) BT493066-330' steel stringer, timber pile bent, timber pile abutment, class 60.

(3) Road from LZ Baldy, BT132453, to LZ Ross, BT027342, is being upgraded by the Divisional battalion (26th Engineer Battalion).

(4) Road from LZ Ross, BT027342, to AT920250 has been opened as a pioneer road in support of operation Pocahontas Forest by the 26th Engr Bn.

(5) Road from Tam Ky, BT313222 to Tien Phuoc, BT113142, is being upgraded by the 39th Engr Bn.

b. All LOC's in Americal Division AO remained enemy targets for interdiction.

(1) Road mines - 133.

(2) Bridges destroyed - 3.

(3) Culverts destroyed - 24.

(4) Road craters or trenches - 7.

#### 6. Signal.

a. (C) The KY-33 Secure Voice device has been issued to all subaccounts of the Division. As soon as the AN/PRC-77 Radios arrive, the KY-33 program will go into effect. This equipment will give Secure Voice down to Platoon level within the Division.

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b. (C) The KY-28 Secure Voice device program is advancing quite rapidly. The mounts for this equipment have been installed in half the helicopters of the 14th and 123d Aviation Battalions. The ASC-10 consoles have not been fitted at this time. Dunaelectronic personnel are awaiting schematics to complete installation. The 198th LIB has two helicopters that are using KY-28's at this time.

c. (C) Frequency congestion in the I Corps area continues to be a major problem. This section is constantly monitoring frequency requirements, attempting to alleviate this problem.

d. (U) During this quarter the Radio Rebroadcast Site for AFRTS was built and put into operation.

e. (C) The AN/GRC-142 Radio Set, which will replace the AN/GRC 46 Radio Teletypewriter sets, were received and are now being issued. Training of personnel to operate this new equipment was conducted by the 101st Air Cav Div.

f. (U) The Division Signal Office conducted Crypto Inspections of all accounts during this quarter.

g. (U) The division Signal Officer, acting as the Southern ICTZ Communications Coordinator, held monthly meetings to continue coordination between units responsible for installation of the Chu Lai Base Cable Plant. D/40th Sig agreed to install an additional 14,000 feet of multipair cable to the planned cable system in order to provide adequate distribution of cable to MCB 71, 23d S&T Bn, 27th Surg Hosp, 14th Avn Bn and 9th Spt Bn. 1st Sig Bde advised that cable plant would be completed by 31 Aug 68. Approximately 1200 additional telephones are scheduled for installation.

#### E. Logistics.

1. To increase production of ice cream, and to afford better coverage of units within the Americal Division Area of Operations, an ice cream plant was installed at LZ Baldy during the period 1 May - 31 July 1968. This plant produces 78 gallons per day.

2. Availability of ice was increased during the period 1 May - 31 July 1968, by contracting additional commercial ice from the plant at Quang Ngai. This plant now produces 50,000 lbs per day; this increased our daily production to 64,000 lbs per day. This averages out to less than 5 lbs per man per day (authorized issue for this area is 6lbs per day per man).

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3. NSAD released to the Americal Division, 18 each 1200 cubic foot walk in refrigerators. These reefers were allocated to units on a priority basis. These reefers were installed at the following locations: One at Hawkhill, 4 at LZ Baldy, 3 at LZ Bronco, 1 at LZ Ross, 1 at Hill 69, 1 at LZ Gator, 2 at LZ Bayonet, 1 at Fat City, 4 within the Chu Lai Base area. This greatly increased refrigerated storage capacity within the division area of operations.

4. To increase laundry capability for the Americal Division, 80th Support Group established a contract laundry in the Chu Lai area. Initially established to handle individual bundles, up to a capacity of 300 per day, a new contract was established in July, increasing the capability to include bulk unit laundry.

5. A captured material turn-in point was established in Chu Lai to assist the division in the retrograde of captured material. 1st Logistical Command directed that the 588th Maintenance Company would assume this responsibility.

6. The Americal Division was brought up to full strength on M48A3 tanks and M113A1 tracked vehicles for the first time since arriving in Chu Lai in April 1967. These vehicles were still at 100 percent authorized allowance on hand at the close of the reporting period.

7. On 25 July 1968 the DA M16A1 Survey Team inspected selected units of the division. The major areas of interest during the inspections were care and maintenance of the M16A1 Rifle, availability of M16 cleaning equipment and in-country training on all aspects of the M16A1 Rifle. The Survey Team, during their exit briefing, indicated that considerable progress had been made in rifle care and maintenance; however, a problem existed in the availability of M16 cleaning equipment. This problem has been solved and at present there are no significant shortages of M16A1 rifle cleaning equipment.

8. On 27 June 1968, Division Support Command began conducting roadside spot check inspections on vehicles and weapons. The program has proved to be an asset to unit commanders in providing a limited picture of the status of maintenance in their units.

9. On 10 July 1968, Division Support Command was tasked with the responsibility for organizing a division CMMI Team. The team has been formed and has conducted several courtesy inspections.

10. Maintenance problems continue to be encountered in procurement of major repair parts or assemblies (radiators, engines, etc.) rapidly enough to meet demands and maintain fill in ASL. The division average of ASL fill for the reporting period is 59 percent.

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F. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

1. (U) GENERAL. This report covers the significant organization, activity and lessons learned during the period 1 May to 31 July 1968.

2. (U) ORGANIZATION.

a. The G5 Section of the Americal Division is an augmentation to TOE 7-4E and is organized according to paragraph 25, TOE 7-4E as follows:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE</u> <u>AUTH/ACT</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
ACofS, G5	LTC/LTC	1	1
Asst G5	MAJ/MAJ	1	1
Admin Supv	E-7/E-7	1	1
Clerk Typist	E-4/E-5	1	1
Lt Truck Driver	E-3/E-4	1	1
Lt Truck Driver	E-3/E-3	1	1

b. Changes in personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

Departed:	MAJ McNulty	1 Jun 68
	LTC Anistranski	3 Jul 68
	1LT Jarrett	31 Jul 68
	SP4 Gozzard	31 Jul 68
Joined:	MAJ Evans	19 Jun 68
	SP4 Jones	10 Jun 68
	PFC Esch	31 Jul 68

c. The G5 Section is augmented by three Civil Affairs Platoons which are under the operational control of the G5, Americal Division. The 4th and 6th platoons are organic to the 29th Civil Affairs Company and the 51st platoon is attached to the company. The 29th Civil Affairs Company is under the command and control of the US Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). The 4th CA Platoon is in an area support role in the Duc Pho AO, the 6th CA Platoon is in an area support role in the Chu Lai AO, and the 51st CA Platoon is in an area support role in northern Quang Tin Province and southern Quang Nam Province. These platoons coordinate civic action programs in their areas of responsibility and act as liaison agents between US military and civilian agencies.



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d. The organic brigades and battalions of the division have principal duty civil affairs officers.

e. The 29th Civil Affairs Company provides a displaced persons team to each Province Senior Advisor in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. These teams assist the Province Advisors in the control of refugees, and maintain records of relief supplies.

### 3. (U) OPERATIONS.

a. The refugee hamlet of Son Tra in Binh Son District (BT264015), was attacked at 2330 hours 28 June 1968 by an unknown enemy force, resulting in extensive damage, loss of life, and injuries. Americal Division units, especially the 198th Inf Bde, responded with considerable quantities of emergency supplies. On 1 July 1968, VA Civil Affairs Platoon assumed responsibility for reconstruction and distribution of supplies. To date, reconstruction and MEDCAP's continue.

b. A meeting was held on 9 July 1968 at III MAF for all civil affairs officers in ICTZ. The meeting provided an opportunity for III MAF G5 to explain and discuss items of interest and problem areas that have arisen. Several forthcoming events, Mid-Autumn Festival, General Walt Scholarship Fund, and Christmas - TET were discussed in detail with all attendees. A representative from the III MAF COMUS office spoke on the functions of that office and what assistance G5's could expect.

c. On 18 July 68, the G5 held a meeting of all S5 officers at the division G5 office. The information from the III MAF meeting was disseminated and discussed. Commands not represented were furnished the information at a later date.

d. The weekly liaison visits to both province advisors meetings continue to be valuable to this office. Province advisors are able to request assistance, present problems, and discuss matters of mutual interest.

e. This office continued to coordinate movement of cords supplies from NSAD to each province headquarters. However, the quantities shipped are not sufficient to prevent supplies from accumulating. Each province was able to send one convoy each to NSAD and ship some supplies. The G-4 was advised of this problem and he will provide 10 flatbed trucks a day for the movement of CORDS supplies.

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The following is a listing of supplies transported:

Cement	2,090 tons
Tin	33 tons
Rice	338 tons

f. The division received one quota to the CORDS Orientation Course held in Saigon. The Assistant G5 attended from 21 - 29 July 68.

4. (U) CIVIC ACTION/REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

a. In support of the GVN program of revolutionary development, the G5 Americal Division, has continually maintained close coordination with CORDS in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Quang Nam Provinces.

b. Since 1 May 1968, Americal Division elements have performed the following MEDCAP activities:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF VISITS</u>	<u>PATIENTS</u>
Division Artillery	38	2,789
196th Inf Bde	46	3,669
198th Inf Bde	351	22,416
11th Inf Bde	120	16,174
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav	16	2,018
26th Eng	29	775
Total	600	47,841

c. Units continue to participate in self-help projects throughout the Division area. The Division assisted in the following projects during the period 1 May to 31 July 1968:

- 2 - Dispensaries
- 9 - Schools
- 9 - Wells
- 3 - Bridges
- 3 - Marketplaces
- 12 - Garden plots
- 2 - Playgrounds
- 2 - Churches
- 2 - Dams
- 1 - Public Bldg
- 3 - Culverts
- 4 - Showers
- 1 - Dormitory



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d. The following items were contributed by units and individuals:

Clothing	-	1,061 lbs
Food	-	54,820 lbs
Lumber	-	15,560 bd ft
Soap	-	10,912 bars
Money	-	371,833 \$VN

5. (U) a. This report covers organizational and unit activities of G5 (PSYOP) Americal Division during the period 1 May 1968 to 31 July 1968. At the end of the reporting period the PSYOP section was staffed as follows:

PSYOP Officer	1	O-4
Clerk-Typist	1	E-4
Driver	1	E-4
Translators/Interpreters	2	E-6 (ARVN)

b. In direct support of the division is Detachment 3, 7th PSYOP Bn, consisting of 2 officers and 7 enlisted men. These personnel presently comprise 1 command (HA), 1 audio-visual (HE) and 3 combat loudspeaker (HB) teams. The HE team consists of 1 officer and one enlisted man while the HB teams consist of 2 enlisted men each augmented by 2 Kit Carson Scouts and an interpreter. The loudspeaker teams provide ground, waterborne and serial broadcasts in support of tactical operations and civic action projects in each brigade area. The audio visual team is in support of the division and is used to show films on health and education and provide general entertainment throughout the division area of operations. The 7th PSYOP Bn also supports the division with the production of leaflets, posters and tape recordings. A quick reaction leaflet can be obtained within 36 hours, however, a normal time frame for production of an original leaflet has been 6 to 10 days.

c. The US Air Force, 9th Air Commando Squadron, provides C47 aircraft for large leaflet drops. The O23 aircraft broadcasts during daylight hours and drops limited amounts of leaflets on designated target areas.

d. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provides support in the form of leaflets, tapes and films in the Vietnamese language. These films are shown by the audio-visual team throughout the division area of operations to local populace audiences.

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PSYOP ACTIVITIES MAY - JULY 1968

a. Leaflets

	<u>Disseminated</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Avg per tgt</u>
May	49,038,000	500	98,000
June	41,871,000	463	90,000
July	30,532,500	358	85,000
TOTAL	121,441,500	1,321	92,000

b. Loudspeaker broadcasts

	<u>Aerial</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
May	123 hrs 10 min	297 hrs 30 min	-----
June	117 hrs 05 min	229 hrs 45 min	14 hrs 45 min
July	113 hrs -- min	256 hrs -- min	17 hrs 15 min
TOTAL	353 hrs 15 min	783 hrs 15 min	32 hrs -- min

c. Movies

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Audience</u>
May	152	76	15,125
June	91	53 $\frac{1}{2}$	13,925
July	65	45 $\frac{3}{4}$	8,085
TOTAL	308	174 3/4	37,135

d. Printed propaganda developed by PSYOP section, Americal Division

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-292-68(Poster)	30 Ralliers - Quang Tin	Chieu Hoi
7-294-68	Rallier - Ky My	Chieu Hoi
7-315-68(Poster)	Road to Happiness	Pro GVN
7-330-68	Hardships 1st Regt, 2nd Division	Anti NVA



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<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
7-349-68	Rallier - Son Tinh	Chieu Hoi
7-351-68	VC Atrocity - Moduc	Anti VC
7-352-68	Report VC activity on Tien Phuoc Road	Anti VC
7-361-68	Surrender or Die - Quang Ngai VC	Anti VC
7-366-68(Poster)	VC Bus Atrocity - Moduc	Anti VC
7-369-68	VC Bus Atrocity - Moduc	Anti VC
7-390-68	Hardships - 1st Regt, 2nd Division	Anti NVA
7-391-68	Hardship - 3rd Regt, 2nd Division	Anti NVA
7-392-68	Hardships - 21st Regt, 2nd Division	Anti NVA
7-401-68	Rallier - 1/1 Cav	Chieu Hoi

e. Tapes developed by PSYOP section, Americal Division.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Campaign</u>
448	Rallier Message (Quang Tin)	Chieu Hoi
449	Rallier Message (Ky My)	Chieu Hoi
455	NVA Hardships	Anti NVA
571	Rocket Rewards to Civilians	Rewards
572	Rewards to Children	Rewards
590	Allied Jets Bring Death	Anti NVA
602	Your Security is Assured	Pro GVN
609	Mo Duc Bus Incident	Anti VC
618	Tien Phuoc Road Benefits	Pro GVN
623	Rallier Message	Chieu Hoi
624	Rallier Message	Chieu Hoi
651	VC Mining Incident (Chau Lam)	Anti VC
663	VC Mining Incident	Anti VC
673	Tien Phuoc Road Reassurance	Pro GVN
674	Rewards for Mines	Rewards
676	Cadre of 48th Bn	Anti VC
693	Rally VC of Ky Sahn Village	Anti VC

f. PSYOP in support of major operations

(1) WHEELER/WALLONA

- (a) Leaflets - 34, 572,100
- (b) Aerial broadcasts - 85 hrs 55 min
- (c) Ground broadcasts - 212 hrs 05 min

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(2) MUSCATINE (terminated 10 June 68)

(a) Leaflets - 12,000,000

(b) Aerial broadcasts - 33 hrs 10 min

(c) Ground broadcasts - 84 hrs 30 min

(3) BURLINGTON TRAIL

(a) Leaflets - 7,718,000

(b) Aerial broadcasts - 24 hrs 30 min

(c) Ground broadcasts - 90 hrs 15 min

(4) VANCE CANYON (22 June 68 - 2 Jul 68)

(a) Leaflets - None

(b) Aerial broadcasts - 2 hrs 55 min

(c) Ground broadcasts - None

(5) CHATAHOOCHEE SWAMP (19-29 Jun 68)

(a) Leaflets - 1,771,000

(b) Aerial broadcasts - 4 hrs

(c) Ground broadcasts - None

(6) POCAHONTAS FOREST (commenced 6 Jul 68)

(a) Leaflets - 11,169,600

(b) Aerial broadcasts - 35 hrs 20 min

(c) Ground broadcasts - 14 hrs

g. "Chieu Hoi" program

(1) Hoi Chanhs by sector May - July 68



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	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	4	9	6	19
Quang Tin	70	37	56	163
Quang Ngai	29	25	33	87
<hr/>				
TOTAL	103	71	95	269

(2) Hoi Chanhs by Operation May - Jul 68

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
Wheeler/Wallowa	13	31	17	61
Muscantine (terminated 10 Jun 68)	7	--	--	7
Burlington Trail	61	15	36	112
Pocahontas Forest	--	--	9	9
<hr/>				
Total	81	46	62	189

(3) Hoi Chanhs turned in to Americal Division May - July 68

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
Quang Nam	--	--	1	1
Quang Tin	2	--	10	12
Quang Ngai	2	4	--	6
<hr/>				
Total	4	4	11	19

#### h. Volunteer Informant Program

(1) Number of informants May - July 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Engr Bn	6	9	1	16
11th Bde	368	893	6	1767
196th Bde	122	332	397	851
198th Bde	--	1	107	108
39th Engr Bn	21	80	48	149
1/1 Cav	2	--	1	3
Division Troops	10	--	--	10

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total	1029	1315	560	2904

(2) Total payments (\$VN) May - July 68

<u>Unit</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
26th Engr Bn	5,180	3,500	300	8,980
11th Bde	315,420	172,185	1,750	489,355
196th Bde	66,320	134,270	320,125	520,715
198th Bde	---	600	24,890	25,490
39th Engr Bn	46,450	165,600	110,850	322,900
1/1 Cav	2,100	---	2,700	4,800
Division Troops	5,500	---	---	5,500
Total	440,970	476,155	460,615	1,377,740

i. Chieu Hoi Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Chieu Hoi Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldsplr</u>	<u>Ground Ldsplr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
May	13,813,000	62 hrs 30 min	85 hrs	-----
June	18,411,000	54 hrs 30 min	43 hrs 45 min	-----
July	8,683,100	38 hrs 15 min	34 hrs 20 min	2 hrs 30 min
Total	40,907,100	155 hrs 15 min	163 hrs 05 min	2 hrs 30 min

(2) This campaign has been marked by a significant decrease in the number of Hoi Chanhs during the reporting period. Analysis indicates that the decrease in Hoi Chanhs can be attributed to the following:

(a) "Wait and see" attitude of NVA/VC following commencement of peace talks.

(b) Reduction in intensity of ground contact.



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(c) Slow recovery from temporary suspension of campaign during TET.

(3) The majority of Hoi Chanh continue to come from the areas where the military action is the most intense. The high percentage of Hoi Chanh from Operation Burlington Trail bears a direct relationship to the level of military operations conducted by the Americal Division in May in Quang Tin province.

(4) Exploitation of Hoi Chanh continues. During the reporting period over 40 Hoi Chanh were used in the preparation of quick reaction propaganda. The following specific instances illustrates the effectiveness of exploiting Hoi Chanh for both tactical and PSYOP purposes.

(a) On 3 May 68, 30 Hoi Chanh who had defected to Ky My (V) Tam Ky (D) Quang Tin (P) were exploited. Two taped messages, a leaflet and a poster were developed and disseminated throughout the area surrounding the unit location of the returnees.

(b) 21 May 68. Hoi Chanh led US forces to location of 15 weapons, 76 hand grenades, 15 rockets and 3000 rounds of small arms ammunition

(c) 21 May 68. Hoi Chanh led US forces to location of 76 grenade casts, 20 lbs. of explosives and 75 artillery rounds.

(d) 25 June 68. Hoi Chanh led US forces to location of an K-44. 475 rounds of small arms ammunition, 10 lbs. salt and 9000 lbs. of rice.

(e) 14 July 68. Hoi Chanh led US forces to location of 2 K-44s and 4800 lbs. of rice.

#### j. Rewards Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Rewards Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldspr</u>	<u>Ground Ldspr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
May	8,550,000	27 hrs	136 hrs 45 min	---
June	6,800,000	20 hrs 30 min	107 hrs	1 hr
July	2,711,600	10 hrs 35 min	134 hrs 05 min	---
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18,061,600</b>	<b>58 hrs 05 min</b>	<b>377 hrs 50 min</b>	<b>1 hr</b>

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(2) This campaign has been marked by a significant increase in the number of voluntary informers who have given information concerning enemy activity. The reduction in the number of informants in July 68 compared to the previous two months is not considered significant as the monetary amount paid for the items recovered remained approximately the same. The decrease in July in the number of informants from the 11th Bde area is due to a realignment of boundaries which resulted in a lucrative source of informants being transferred to 198th Bde's area of responsibility. Effectiveness of this program can be gauged by the claim by VC propagandists that any citizen who turned in armament under this program will not be paid by the Americans but will instead be decapitated.

(3) On 15 May 68 Americal PSYOP OPORD 3-68 was published implementing the revised Rewards (TIM SUNG GIAC) Campaign. Response was immediate in that on 19 May 68 a civilian informant led US forces to a weapons cache in Quang Tin province which resulted in the recovery of 50 individual weapons, 12 crew served weapons, 15,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 12 mortar rounds and 19 RPG-2 rounds.

(4) The most significant results however were obtained in Quang Ngai province where elements of the division conducted Operation Muscatine. During the conduct of this operation, from 19 Dec 67 to 10 Jun 68, 1547 voluntary informants were paid a total of \$VN 598,070 for turn in of the following items:

55	artillery rounds	405	mortar rounds
1,495	grenades	600	mines
156	40mm rounds	38	lbs. TNT
65,000	rounds small arms	36	M-72 LAW

Children under 16 years of age comprised approximately 60% of the informants. Propaganda initially disseminated in the form of leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts was followed by ground loudspeaker broadcasts, designated collection points, and the system to be used for turn in and payment.

#### k. Pro GVN Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Pro GVN Campaign:



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	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldsplr</u>	<u>Ground Ldsplr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
May	4,500,000	4 hrs 50 min	30 hrs 30 min	-----
June	6,550,000	11 hrs 20 min	23 hrs 45 min	12 hrs 45 min
July	722,000	5 hrs 15 min	46 hrs 15 min	7 hrs 15 min
TOTAL	11,772,000	21 hrs 25 min	100 hrs 30 min	20 hrs

(2) A concerted effort has been made to inform US forces arriving in country of the pertinency and practical usage of PSYOP in Vietnam. 51 classes have been presented to 3836 new arrivals to the division during the reporting period. The instruction covered a basic orientation of in country PSYOP with emphasis being given to the participation of the individual soldier in the "Chieu Hoi" and Rewards campaigns.

(3) PSYOP support for the opening of the road from Tam Ky to Tien Phuoc has continued. Propaganda in the form of two leaflets, a poster and two tapes have been specifically targeted at the local populace in the area pointing out the benefits that will accrue to them by keeping the road open in the form of better markets for their products and better medical and educational facilities which will be available. A personal appeal from the province Chief was disseminated by air and ground means requesting the local populace to report all VC activity in the area in order to keep the road open for their own benefit.

(4) The initial harvest of the year was completed in May. PSYOP support for the rice denial campaign consisted of the following:

Leaflets - 1,400,000

Aerial Broadcasts - 1 hr 50 min

Ground Broadcasts -22 hrs

855 tons of rice were evacuated to GVN safe haven areas during the harvest period. Necessary propaganda is now available for a more complete campaign implementation during the second harvest season later this year.

#### 1. Anti NVA Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti NVA Campaign:

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	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldsplr</u>	<u>Ground Ldsplr</u>
May	11,175,000	8 hrs 40 min	-----
June	8,330,000	13 hrs 10 min	-----
July	9,797,100	24 hrs 15 min	2 hrs
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TOTAL	29,302,100	46 hrs 05 min	2 hrs

(2) Propaganda continues to be developed specifically oriented to identified units. In June 68, elements of the 1st Regt, 2nd NVA Division were located within the Burlington Trail operation. A leaflet and tape were developed capitalizing on known hardships suffered by this unit and specifically directed at the 1st Regiment offering them a choice of freedom or death. This propaganda was disseminated following extensive air strikes on the unit and in conjunction with follow up ground operations.

(3) In July 68, Operation Pocahontas Forest commenced in western Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. Propaganda oriented specifically to designated units and individuals within the three regiments of the 2nd NVA Division has been developed and is ready for dissemination as soon as target audiences are confirmed.

m. Anti VC Campaign

(1) During the reporting period the following effort was expended in support of the Anti VC Campaign:

	<u>Leaflets</u>	<u>Aerial Ldsplr</u>	<u>Ground Ldsplr</u>	<u>Waterborne</u>
May	11,000,000	20 hrs 10 min	45 hrs 15 min	-----
June	1,780,000	14 hrs 05 min	55 hrs 15 min	1 hr
July	8,618,700	34 hrs 40 min	39 hrs 20 min	7 hrs 30 min
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TOTAL	21,398,700	68 hrs 55 min	139 hrs 50 min	8 hrs 30 min

(2) On 16 Jun 68 and again on 20 Jun 68, civilian vehicles traveling along Highway 1 in the vicinity of Moduc (D), Quang Ngai (P) hit mines which had been emplaced by the VC. As a result of these incidents, 26 civilians were killed and an additional 16 injured. Quick reaction propaganda was developed and included the dissemination by air and ground means of two leaflets, a poster and an aerial broadcast made by the district chief appealing to the local populace to report all VC activity. Ground loudspeaker broadcasts enforced this initial



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this initial dissemination by distributing the posters to all villages in the surrounding area and appealed to the people to help keep their roads safe to travel and their area free of VC atrocities by reporting all VC activity.

(3) Increased use has been made of loudspeaker teams working in conjunction with US Navy Swift Boats along the coastline. Messages have been targeted specifically against the 48th VC Bn on the Batangan peninsula (BS 7580) and also against VC controlled areas north of Chu Lai. As a result of surrender appeals made from the boat 3 VC swam out to the boat to surrender on 9 July 68 rather than be exposed to allied firepower. These missions have been conducted both day and night to make maximum use of optimum broadcasting conditions.

(4) On 6 Jul 68 a tank from 1/1 Cav hit a mine which had been emplaced along a road by the VC. A quick reaction tape was broadcast within 24 hours exhorting the local populace to report all VC mine emplacements for their own protection and safety. This was followed by an on the ground, face to face communication by Kit Carson Scouts working in conjunction with a combat loudspeaker team pointing out to the civilians in the area the benefits that they could accrue by reporting such activity. This process was repeated when an other vehicle hit a mine in the same general area on 30 July 68.

## SECTION II

### Lessons Learned, Commanders' Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations

#### A. Personnel, Administration, Morale, and Discipline.

##### 1. SUBJECT: (U) Letters of Sympathy and Condolence.

a. Observation: (U) Suspense dates were not being met and desired information was not being incorporated into letters prepared by unit commanders in the field.

b. Evaluation: (U) Letters, when prepared by this headquarters based on information received telephonically from the unit in the field, can be transmitted to HQ, USARV before the suspense date. Letters prepared at this headquarters and hand carried to the field for the unit commanders signature are more accurate and meaningful. This practice relieves the unit commander of a portion of his administrative workload.

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c. Recommendation: That the above cited procedure be incorporated into appropriate USARV regulations so that other units may benefit from this procedure.

2. SUBJECT: (U) Missing Persons Boards.

a. Observation: (U) The practice of not starting missing persons boards immediately when remains were "believed to be" but were not positively identified caused several problems. On a number of occasions positive identification proved the remains to be of someone other than those originally believed.

b. Evaluation: (U) Reporting remains not positively identified as EITHER (wait) and starting a missing persons board within 72 hours has alleviated most problems and enables the next of kin to be notified as expeditiously as possible.

c. Recommendation: (U) That the above cited procedure be incorporated into appropriate USARV regulations so that other units may benefit from this procedure.

3. SUBJECT: (U) Counseling of Personnel

a. Observation: Difficulty is experienced in counseling personnel concerning reenlistment in a hostile fire zone. The major problem is that personnel who are due reenlistment interviews and reenlistment counseling are not always available due to combat operations.

b. Evaluation: Enlisted personnel assigned to USARV have a variety of options available to them upon reenlistment. These options are available only while serving in country and should be explained to the individuals during counseling sessions as prescribed in USARV Reg 601-201. In addition, there are benefits incident to reenlistment which must be explained i.e., income tax saving, special leave, etc.. to insure that all enlisted personnel serving in the division are counseled concerning reenlistment options and benefits. The Division Reenlistment Office now conducts a thirty minute orientation at the Americal Combat Center. This insures that all personnel processing into the division are informed of reenlistment options available to them while serving in RVN. The class is presented by a primary duty career counselor who explains in detail all requirements and procedures for obtaining certain reenlistment options. Additionally, all benefits and procedures for reenlistment are explained. This additional assistance has resulted in an increase of the first term and AUS retention rate, and has enhanced the overall reenlistment effort within the division.



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c. Recommendation: All units should provide reenlistment counseling at their equivalent of our Combat Center/Replacement Detachment.

4. SUBJECT: Detainee Attempted Suicide and Suicide.

a. Observation. During the reporting period there were a number of attempted suicides and actual suicides by detainees while being held in US POW Compounds. One of the suicides was apparently caused by a poison of some kind and in one case the cause of death was undetermined.

b. Evaluation: The above actions indicate that the enemy propaganda and indoctrination procedures are effective and that extensive, close supervision of detainees is absolutely necessary.

c. Recommendation: Detainees be thoroughly searched not only for items of military value but also for any materials that may be used to commit suicide and that closer supervision and observation be given detainees while in the custody of US Forces.

5. SUBJECT: (U) PW Escape and Attempted Escape.

a. Observation.

(1) On 9 Jun 68, at the Americal PW Collecting Point, a detainee attempted to escape from the facility during an alert when the facility electric lights were extinguished. During the time the detainees were being moved to protective bunkers the detainees attempted to divert the guards attention by refusing to move into the bunkers. One detainee crept from the group and climbed atop a latrine building in close proximity to the inner facility fence, leaped over the fence, scaled a second fence and fled. The detainee was challenged by an MID interpreter and was wounded by rifle fire when he refused to halt.

(2) At the 196th LTB PW Collecting Point on Jul 68, a detainee, during a black out condition, leaped over the inner facility fence into a concertina wire barrier, scaled a second fence and escaped.

v. Evaluation.

(1) The agility of the oriental, as demonstrated in the above incidents, must be taken into consideration in the construction of PW Collecting Points. The presence of a structure in close proximity to a retaining fence was instrumental in the escape and attempted escape.

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(2) Several actions have been taken to lessen this problem.

(a) Emergency lighting has been installed at the Americal Division PW Collecting Point and is used while moving detainees to protective bunkers when normal power is interrupted.

(b) All structures in close proximity to fences have been moved away from the fences throughout the Division PW facilities.

c. Recommendation: That the above information be given to units in Vietnam that may encounter similar problems.

6. SUBJECT: Local Welfare Support.

a. Observation. Local welfare support activities are part of the "other war", necessary to help win the hearts and minds of the people. They are also important parts of religious action and morale, as affected by religion. The Americal soldier is often both generous and sympathetic. When his combat duties prevent his personal involvement, he needs others to help him to reach out into the local community and make his presence felt. A Local Welfare Support program can do this. At the same time, this help should not be the kind that bankrupts the Vietnamese after the unit moves out of the area. Chaplains receive many requests to help with local civilian projects. These are valid activities and part of the overall religious program of the command. However, since danger exists of biased distribution or illegal handling of monies, goods, or services, a procedure is needed which will be protective and effective.

b. Evaluation. Once a fair working idea has been developed of a group's particular needs, determination can be made of what the religious program of a particular faith group might be able to support. Any support decided upon should be short term, project orientated, and understood to be no obligation on the command for continuing support. At present there are four types of special offerings received from time to time. Some are local, others are Americal Division or USARV Chaplain requested. They help Orphans, Unit Projects, ARVN widows and children, and Refugees. In all cases the Division Fund Council recognizes local needs by proportioning the amount of money available.

c. Recommendation.

(1) Upon receipt of a project request the Brigade Chaplain should:

(a) Coordinate with the Brigade Adjutant to inform the Commander about local needs.



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(b) Coordinate with both Brigade S-5, Civic Action Officer, and MACV Advisor to research local needs affecting the request.

(c) If coordination indicates local needs can be helped by another designated offering through Chaplain Channels, a request can be made to the Division Chaplains Fund Council.

(2) No money, received through Chaplain Channels, is given directly into local hands. All offerings are deposited in the Fund and dispursed according to regulations.

(3) The goal of the religious program is to help, where possible, the operational control of welfare to local welfare agencies. Where Civic Action and Advisor military people indicate a need, we will try to meet some of it.

(4) The amount of welfare given to any agency can be determined by considering and balancing the following:

(a) Determining, generally and usually by inquiry to S-5, MACV Advisor, or US Missionary Supervisors, the amount of aid presently being given by government agencies, both US and RVG.

(b) Determining, if possible, some idea of the amount of aid being received from private donations.

(c) Estimating the amount of aid being received in form of welfare distribution of goods, clothing, materials, and services.

## B. Operations.

1. SUBJECT: (U) Tow cables for recovery operations in Vietnam.

a. Observation: Operations have been complicated by the inadequacy of tow cables recommended for use in the recovery of the M48A3 tank and the M113A1 ACAV. More specifically, the cables authorized for use in the recovery of the M48A3 and M113A1 have been snapping at an alarming rate.

b. Evaluating: The tow cables carries on the M48A3 and M113A1 are not strong or long enough for the terrain commonly encountered by armored and armored cavalry units in Vietnam. The mud suction of rice paddies and sand and steep dikes place unusual, intolerable stress and strain on cables presently authorized.

c. Recommendation: That the M113A1 cable be replaced by the M48A3 tow cable, and the M38 VTR tow cable be substituted for that authorized for the M48A3.

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2. SUBJECT: (U) Decreasing the risk of mine damage to recovery vehicles.

a. Observation: Recovery vehicles have detonated mines while attempting to secure or tow a vehicle inoperable due to mine damage.

b. Evaluation: Normally, the enemy will not lay a single mine, but bury two to four mines in tight, indiscriminate patterns. This method has been successfully employed to mine both roads and likely avenues of approach in the field. By capitalizing on the confusion and anxiety generated by a mine incident, any vehicle attempting to secure, aid or tow the damaged element stands in jeopardy of detonating a second mine.

c. Recommendation: Although circumstances might dictate a different course of action, the following general rules will be of aid in minimizing the danger to recovery vehicles. Keep the vehicle movement around the disabled vehicle to an absolute minimum. Dismount personnel from the vehicles to attend to the wounded, and to start recovery operations. Conduct mine sweeping operations in and around the recovery site to insure that there are no other mines. Conduct recovery operations with as few men as possible. If a recovery vehicle does hit a mine, despite the above precaution, casualties will be kept to a bare minimum.

3. SUBJECT: Hasty Marking of a Suspected Mine or Known Booby Trap.

a. Observation: Units have often been required to move at night through a known or suspected mine and booby trapped area. When speed and silence are essential it is difficult to clear the area properly and notify personnel coming up from the rear of known or suspected booby traps.

b. Evaluation: One technique that has been employed assists in speed of movement and also serves as a marking device for known or suspected booby traps. The unit may employ a dog team in its lead element followed by several mine detector teams. As the detectors sweep the area they pick up the presence of metallic objects which may or may not be booby traps. Rather than stop and probe, pressurized shaving cream is used to mark the suspected area. An arrow can also be made with shaving cream to indicate the direction to move around the possible danger area. Troops following can easily detect the circle of shaving cream and pass by safely.

c. Recommendation: One technique to mark suspected or known booby traps and mines while conducting a night move is to circle the area with shaving cream from a pressurized container.



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## 4. SUBJECT: (U) Field Recovery Operations.

a. Observation. The terrain in RVN is such that frequent and severe bogging of tracked vehicles will be encountered. Vehicles may become mired to such an extent that normal recovery procedures will be ineffective.

b. Evaluation: The normal towing hooks are located so low on the M113A1's hull that in many cases they are submerged in water/mud and a shovel must be used to dig out before the tow cable can be secured to them. This is entirely unsatisfactory when under hostile fire. Many times even after the cable has been fastened to the vehicle sufficient power cannot be applied to break the suction created by the mud around the vehicle.

c. Recommendation. It has been found quite effective to attach the tow cable to one of the front tow hooks on each vehicle. The free end of the tow cable can then be pulled up over the top of the APC deck and left in that position while on field operations. When the vehicle becomes stuck the free end of the cable can be attached to another vehicle quickly and the extraction may be accomplished with minimum delay. It has also proved effective to attach the free end of the cable to the assisting APC at the Lifting Eye, (FSN 5305-576-2121). This creates an upward as well as a forward thrust and will overcome the suction of the mud more easily. Even this will not be sufficient at times so that 2, 3, or more vehicles may have to be linked in a "Daisy-chain" to provide sufficient power for the recovery.

## D. Intelligence

### 1. (C) SUBJECT: LRP Insertions

a. Observations: The enemy normally ceases movement between 1130 and 1330 hours.

b. Evaluation: During the lull in enemy movement he normally establishes a defensive perimeter with trail-watchers and outposts covering likely avenues of approach. It is therefore risky to attempt an insertion during this period, since a patrol must move a least 500-1000 meters after insertion in order to determine if the enemy has observed the patrol.

c. Recommendations: That LRP insertion be conducted prior to 1000 hours and after 1500 hours.

### 2. (U) SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Agents in Combat

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a. Observation: In an MID attached to a separate brigade, the counterintelligence personnel are frequently called on to accompany infantrymen on Combat Operations. This situation is brought about by the necessity of having a knowledgeable individual present on the operation to apprise the Combat Commander of the MI source and Vietnamese counterparts and his capabilities and limitations. Quite often, the CI agent personally accompanies his source into the field to insure thorough on-the-spot consultation with source so that information supplied is being effectively exploited. Basically, this is a liaison function which has proven a valuable element in the success or failure of a mission launched on a source's intelligence.

b. Evaluation: Since the counterintelligence agent, who acts as an agent handler, understands the character of the source leading US elements to a target, the CI agent is able to keep the combat commander apprised of the operation as the source views it. This often enables the combat commander to alter his source of action based on the source's knowledge of the situation, since the source is normally familiar with the area in which the operation is conducted.

c. Recommendation: All counterintelligence personnel should be apprised of the value of field liaison while on an operation and be prepared to assume the infantrymen's role when the situation requires. The infantrymen are concerned with combat maneuvers while the CI agents continually collect and evaluate on the spot intelligence from the source, prisoners, and civilians encountered during the operation.

#### E. Logistics.

##### 1. Subject: Kit Food Disposable.

a. Observation: Unclassified Message AMKSR-GSSMS 31-300M dated 31 January 1968, subject FSN 7360-999-3860, discontinued the availability of the Kit, Food Disposable.

b. Evaluation: The utilization of the Kit, Food Disposable for feeding forward tactical elements of units in the Americal Division has brought numerous favorable comments on its practicality from commanders, troops and mess personnel. The Kit, Food Disposable has contributed to ability of the unit to accomplish its mission. Fewer aircraft sorties are required when utilizing this item because the Metal Food Container must be recovered. The Metal Food Container has been frequently damaged or lost due to hostile action. The Kit, Food Disposable, maintains food items in a more palatable condition over a longer period of time through the use of the sealed plastic inserts and enhances sanitation because of its disposable condition.



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c. Recommendation: That the Kit, Food Disposable, FSN:7360-999-3060 or a like item be furnished to units for utilization in this area of operation.

2. SUBJECT: Antipersonnel Mine M18A1 (Claymore)

a. Observation: The Antipersonnel Mine M18A1 (Claymore) is incorporated into most battalions perimeter defense plans. The Claymore is employed during the hours of darkness and recovered in the morning in accordance with local policy.

b. Evaluation: There is a high mortality rate on the electrical blasting cap wire that connects the blasting cap to the detonating cord. The Claymore has to be picked up every day and put in place every day. This causes the wire to be broken in a period of four to seven days. Although intensive training on the employment of the weapon has been given it has been found that the wires cannot stand up to the procedure of being employed and disarmed every day.

c. Recommendation: That a more durable wire be used for connecting the blasting cap to the detonating cord of the M18A1 Antipersonnel Mine.

3. SUBJECT: Establishment of Miniports (Helicopter Refueling Points) in Forward Areas.

a. Observation: A Supply and Transport Battalion does not have and is not authorized the TOE equipment needed to meet all forward area refueling requirements. On the other hand aviation units are authorized the required equipment by their applicable TOE.

b. Evaluation: On many occasions requirements for the establishment of forward area refueling points are of a short duration with a rapid reaction time. Mobile lightweight type equipment i.e., 3,000 gal tanks, 100 GPM pumps, and filter separator are most suitable for this type of operation. At times, the aviation units have used their equipment to establish these refueling points.

c. Recommendation: If the test and evaluation of the FARE system proves satisfactory recommend a minimum of four be authorized to each S&T Battalion. In addition, recommend that aviation units be required to establish refueling points within their asset capability, especially in those cases where the requirement is known to be of short duration.

4. SUBJECT: Packing and Crating of Double Pedestal Desks.

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a. Observation: The 23d S&T Battalion (AT84AA) has been receiving double pedestal desks in both level "A" pack (depot pack) and protective cardboard pack. The desks received in the cardboard pack have the desk legs exposed.

b. Evaluation: The protective cardboard pack is inadequate for handling and shipping of desks. Many are received in a damaged condition, i.e., legs broken off and dents in various areas of the desk. In addition, the cardboard pack does not provide adequate protection for outside storage.

c. Recommendation: Recommend level "A" pack be mandatory for all shipments of double pedestal desks.

5. SUBJECT: Order Ship Time.

a. Observation: A review of recent receipts in technical supply reveals that the average order/ship time for priority 12 requisitions is 128 days.

b. Evaluation: This lengthy order/ship time is far in excess of 15 days authorized by the appropriate USARV Regulation and is even in excess of the 120 day requisitioning objective authorized for selected items which are consistently at zero balance. This incompatibility of actual and theoretical order/ship time is probably a major factor contributing to the excessively high 67% zero balance in technical supply.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that all tech supply activities closely monitor order/ship times and adjust their requisition objectives to utilize realistic figures.

6. SUBJECT: Durability of Gasoline Engine Generators.

a. Observation: The present military standard gasoline generators, .5 KW, are not durable enough to withstand the constant operation required by everyday tactical operations.

b. Evaluation: The US Army in Vietnam functions 7 days a week without a break; as a result, small gasoline engines are required to function day in and day out. These small gasoline engines are not made for continuous operation and consequently a significant number of engines have to be replaced. Not only is this costly, but it also increases the amount of time that using units are deprived of electrical power with which to perform their mission.

c. Recommendation: That conversion to a standard diesel engine generator family be considered. The diesel engine is better designed for constant operation and would perform better than the present TOE generator with a decreasing amount of deadline time.



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7. SUBJECT: Screws Used to Secure the VRC-12 Series Radio Antenna Mounts.

a. Observation. Hexagonal head screws can be used to secure VRC-12 series radio antenna mounts to vehicles better than the counter-sunk machine screws.

b. Evaluation: Currently four counter sunk-screws (FSN 5305-042-0688) are utilized to secure antenna mount (SC-D-446058) for VRC-12 series radios, to military vehicles. Recommend these counter sunk screws be replaced with normal hexagon head screws (FSN 5306-225-9091). The hexagon head screws provide more surface area and can be removed without damage to the vehicle surface. The counter-sunk screws currently in use rust, freeze, etc. and are impossible to remove without tearing the surface to which they are attached. This presents a special problem when antenna mounts are changed frequently from one vehicle to another.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that the counter-sunk screws be replaced by hexagon head screws mentioned above to secure antenna mounts for the VRC-12 series radios.

8. SUBJECT: Float Items.

a. Observation: In past operations the need for float items at the organizational level has become apparent. The time required to repair handsets and radios leaves the company in the field without a portion of their communications equipment for considerable periods of time.

b. Evaluation: Speed in keeping the company's equipment in good repair is essential. If organizational maintenance had the ability to exchange a broken or deadlined piece of equipment immediately, the company would not be seriously hampered by equipment failure.

c. Recommendation: That a float be established at each maneuver battalion's Signal Repair Shop. The maintenance float could be hand receipted from the Brigade's Support Element. The float should consist of:

- |                          |        |
|--------------------------|--------|
| (1) Handset M-138/U      | 3 each |
| (2) Radio Set PRC-25     | 2 each |
| (3) Telephone Set TA-312 | 2 each |

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968  
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

## F. Organization

### 1. SUBJECT: Consolidation of 1200 Gallon POL Trucks.

a. Observation. TOE55-88E provides 2 ea 1200 gal POL trucks for each of the 3 light truck platoons of the Transportation Motor Transport Company of the Supply and Transport Battalion; however, these POL trucks have in actual practice been consolidated and placed in the POL squad of the medium truck platoon.

b. Evaluation. TOE 55-88E places the 1200 gal POL tankers in the light truck platoons to be used for the platoon's refueling support when the platoon is operating as an independent unit. However, in this unit's present situation the platoons do not operate independently and the 1200 gal POL tankers are not required for the platoons use. As a result, the 1200 gal POL tankers are used to provide POL distribution support to various units around the area. By consolidating the 6 tankers in one squad, much confusion and lack of control has been eliminated.

c. Recommendation: Consolidate POL tankers under one squad in one platoon whenever the situation permits.

## G. Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

### 1. SUBJECT: Nonapproved Civic Action Projects.

a. OBSERVATION: There are several civic action projects within the AO in various stages of completion that have not been approved by any one or all of the approving headquarters.

b. EVALUATION: An investigation of such projects invariably showed the civil affairs officers concerned were not knowledgeable of the regulations and reasons requiring this action. As a further result, this headquarters was not aware of several projects under construction and in at least one instance, considerable man-hours were spent investigating the circumstances.

c. RECOMMENDATION: All personnel concerned with civic action must understand and comply with applicable regulations to insure that proper approval is obtained prior to beginning a project.

### 2. SUBJECT: Helicopter Broadcasts.

a. Observation. In order to provide the greatest flexibility in conduct of aerial broadcasts, use should be made of helicopters as an aerial platform for quick reaction requirements.



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b. Evaluation: To gain maximum effect the following guidelines should be followed:

- (1) Aircraft maintain altitude of 700-900 feet.
- (2) Small target area should be selected such as one hamlet or concentrated troop area.
- (3) Aircraft should bank into the target area so that speakers are inclined at 45° angle.
- (4) Wind direction must be considered. It may be necessary at times to fly upwind in order for broadcasts to be heard in designated areas.
- (5) Aircraft forward speed should not exceed 80 knots.
- (6) Torque should be reduced on helicopter's blade in order to reduce blade slap noise to a minimum.

c. Recommendation. That the guidelines outlined above be amplified as necessary and incorporated into doctrinal guidance for aerial use of the AN UH-5 loudspeaker system.

3. SUBJECT: Limited PSYOP Resources.

a. Observation: Distribution of printing and developmental resources does not permit a continuous availability of localized, unit oriented leaflets to exploit specific situations.

b. Evaluation: Effective PSYOP campaigns require the rapid exploitation of specific vulnerabilities. Under the present centralized system of retaining all printing and developmental assets at one location, a numerically greater, but proportionately less effective, product is disseminated.

c. Recommendation: That PSYOP assets be decentralized on an area support basis. Developmental and printing assets should be placed in support of this division working under the guidance of the division PSYOP officer. One HC (Printing) and one HD (Propaganda Operations) team augmented by authorized division PSYOP assets would enable the most effective, localized campaigns to be conducted.

3. SUBJECT: Increased Loudspeaker Resources.

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a. Observation. There is an insufficient number of combat loudspeaker (HB) teams available to permit continuing support of each maneuver battalion in the division.

b. Evaluation. Division has authorized 6 sets of loudspeaker equipment AEM-BS-4 which contains a total of 24 separate loudspeaker units AN U1H-5. Distribution of these assets can be made permitting support of one set to each battalion. QJT of selected personnel will provide the commander with ready access to a broadcasting capability and will permit maximum use to be made of all available equipment.

c. Recommendation. That the guidelines outlined above be amplified as necessary and incorporated into doctrinal guidance for use of the AEM-BS-4 loudspeaker system.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*for* *James B. Dyer, Col. Arnold*  
NELS A. PARSON, JR.  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

Inclosure:

1. Americal Division Troop List



# DISTRIBUTION

1-ACSFQR-DA (thru USARPAC)	1-CO, 1st Bn 14th Arty
2-ACSFQR-DA (thru USARV to DA)	1-CO, 3d Bn, 16th Arty
2-CINCUSARPAC	1-CO, 3d Bn, 18th Arty
3-CG, USARV	1-CO, E Trp, 1st Cav
2-CO, 11th Inf Bde	1-CO, F Trp, 17th Cav
2-CO, 196th Inf Bde	1-CO, H Trp, 17th Cav
2-CO, 198th Inf Bde	1-CO, 6th Spt Bn
2-CO, 1st Sqdn, 1st Cav	1-CO 8th Spt Bn
2-CO, Div Arty	1-CO, 9th Spt Bn
1-CO, 3d Bn, 1st Inf	1-CO, 23d S&TBn
1-CO, 4th Bn, 3d Inf	1-CO, 23d Med Bn
1-CO, 4th Bn, 21st Inf	1-CO, 723d Maint Bn
1-CO, 1st Bn, 20th Inf	1-CO, 123d Avn Bn
1-CO, 2d Bn, 1st Inf	1-CO, 14th Avn Bn
1-CO, 3d Bn, 21st Inf	2-TACP(ALO), Americal Div.
1-CO, 4th Bn, 31st Inf	1-CO, 26th Engr Bn
1-CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf	1-CO, 39th Engr Bn
1-CO, 1st Bn 46th Inf	1-CO, 523d Sig Bn
1-CO, 5th Bn 46th Inf	1-ACofS, G1
1-CO, 1st Bn, 52d Inf	1-ACofS, G2
1-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty	2-ACofS, G3
1-CO, 3d Bn, 82d Arty	1-ACofS, G4
1-Co, 1st Bn, 82d Arty	2-ACofS, G5
1-Chemical Officer	1-Comdt, Americal Division Combat Center
1-Provost Marshal	1-IG
1-AG	1-OCMH-DA
10-CO, 3d Mil Hist Det.	

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968  
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

## Americal Division Troop List (As of 31 July 1968)

### 1. HQ AMERICAL DIVISION

IMC, Americal Division  
1st Sqdn, 1st Cav  
26th Engr Bn  
123d Avn Bn  
406th TC Det  
449th Sig Det  
F Troop, 8th Cav  
415th Sig Det  
570th TC Det  
523d Sig Bn  
23d MP Co  
3d Mil Hist Det

### 2. AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY

IMB, Div Arty  
3d Bn, 16th Arty  
3d Bn, 18th Arty  
1st Bn, 82d Arty  
3d Plt, G Btry, 29th Arty, Searchlight (OPCON)  
G Btry, 55th Arty (.50 cal)  
251st Radar Det  
252d Radar Det

### 3. AMERICAL DIVISION SUPPORT COMMAND

IMC and Band, Support Command  
23d S&T Bn  
Hqs & A Co, 23d Med Bn  
Hqs & A Co, 723d Maint Bn  
23 Admin Co  
258th Pers Serv Co  
Co E, 51st Inf (IRP)  
63d Inf Plt (CTT)  
Americal Combat Center (PROV)

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968  
(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) (U)

4. 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 11th Inf Bde  
3d Bn, 1st Inf  
4th Bn, 3d Inf  
1st Bn, 20th Inf  
4th Bn, 21st Inf  
6th Bn, 11th Arty  
6th Spt Bn  
E Trp, 1st Cav  
11th Sig Plt  
59th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)  
52d MI Det  
90th Chem Det  
31st Public Information Det

5. 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 196th Inf Bde  
2d Bn, 1st Inf  
3d Bn, 21st Inf  
4th Bn, 31st Inf  
3d Bn, 82d Arty  
8th Spt Bn  
F Trp, 17th Cav  
48th Inf Plt (-), Scout Dog  
156th Sig Plt  
10th Public Information Det  
27th CML Det  
569th MI Det  
636th MI Det, OB

6. 198TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

HHC, 198th Inf Bde  
1st Bn, 6th Inf  
1st Bn, 46th Inf  
5th Bn, 46th Inf  
1st Bn, 52d Inf  
1st Bn, 14th Arty  
9th Spt Bn  
H Trp, 17th Cav  
57th Inf Plt, Scout Dog  
48th Public Information Det  
87th Chem Det  
49th Sig Det  
635th MI Det

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968  
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7. NON DIVISIONAL UNITS

14th Cmbt Avn Bn  
71st Aslt Hel Co  
132d Aslt Spt Hel Co  
174th Aslt Hel Co  
176th Aslt Hel Co  
178th Aslt Spt Hel Co  
16th TC Det  
94th Sig Det  
151st TC Det  
348th A.S. Det  
400th TC Det

39th Engr  
Americal CA Co (PROV)  
4th CA Plt  
6th CA Plt  
9th CA Plt  
Americal RR Co (PROV)  
408th RR Det  
415th RR Det  
601st RR Det

O/L6, Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn USAF

USASSG, ACSI, DA





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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (28 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683082

1 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, Americal  
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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**SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED  
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31**

1975  
(insert year)

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
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Americal Division Artillery

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96374

3

AVDF-AT

15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)

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This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1. Section 1 - Operations: Significant Activities

a. Command:

(1) The Division Artillery commands the following assigned or attached units:

- 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T): assigned.  
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175mm SP): assigned.  
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery (155T/8"SP): assigned.  
Battery G, 55th Artillery (MG): assigned.  
3d Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery (Searchlight): attached.  
251st Countermortar Radar Detachment: assigned.  
252d Countermortar Radar Detachment: assigned.

(2) The Division Artillery also directs the activities of the three direct support battalions of the infantry brigades:

- 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery: assigned 11th Infantry Brigade.  
1st Battalion, 14th Artillery: assigned 198th Infantry Brigade.  
3d Battalion, 82d Artillery: assigned 196th Infantry Brigade.

b. Operations:

(1) The return of Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175G) from the Phu Bai area on 14 June 68 enhanced the Division Artillery's capability to provide heavy artillery support throughout the division area of operations. In order to provide medium artillery support throughout the division AO, the medium artillery battalion was split into six fire units. By placing these units in general support/reinforcing and reinforcing roles a quick fire channel was made available to the direct support battalions. One fire unit continued in a direct support role to the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. Air displacement of the light artillery units to otherwise inaccessible forward fire support bases was the primary method used during the period. This method provided the direct support units the flexibility and response necessary to support an often rapidly changing tactical situation. The provisional fourth firing battery

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of the direct support battalions, formed from existing assets, continued to provide the flexibility necessary to support operations and provide coverage for large brigade AO's. During the period direct support artillery batteries from one brigade were placed under the operational control of other brigades to support operations in high enemy threat areas.

(2) On 10 May 68 Kham Duc Special Forces Camp (ZC 006085) came under enemy attack. The 196th Infantry Brigade was tasked to provide reinforcement to the camp and sent the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry along with Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery to Kham Duc on 10 May 68. Due to the heavy enemy pressure on the camp, the decision to evacuate personnel was made and on 12 May evacuation began. As insufficient time permitted evacuation of the five 105 howitzers of Battery A, battery personnel destroyed them. The battery was reconstituted at LZ Baldy with division float howitzers and in-country 105mm howitzer assets.

(3) Artillery ammunition expenditures and the per cent of observed fires by caliber for the period were as follows:

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>EXPENDITURES</u>	<u>PER CENT OBSERVED</u>
105mm	138437	65
155mm	74358	31
8 In	21324	17
175mm	9559	24

(4) The Division Artillery provided supporting fires for the following major operations of the Division:

Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA	11 Nov 67 to present
Operation HOCAHONTAS FOREST	6 Jul 68 to present
Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL	3 Apr 68 to present
Operation MUSCATINE	19 Dec 67 - 10 Jun 68
Operation VANCE CANYON	21 Jun 68 - 2 Jul 68
Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP	19 Jun 68 - 29 Jun 68

(a) WHEELER/WALLOWA.

1. Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA continued during the reporting period with the 198th Infantry Brigade conducting operations in the Hiep Duc-Que Son Valleys. On 14 May 68 the 196th Infantry Brigade (-) returned from the Phu Bai area and assumed control of the entire operation.

2. Division Artillery supported the operation as follows:

a. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery provided direct supporting fires from Fire Support Base Center (BT 050250) and Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery supported from LZ Baldy (BT 140446). On 8 May, Battery B, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery moved to LZ Ross (BT 027314). On 13 May Battery C, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery returned from the Phu Bai area and was positioned at Fire Support Base West (AT 990250). Battery D, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery returned from Phu Bai on 16 May and provided direct supporting fires from LZ Colt (BT 115371). Battery A, after returning from the Kham Duc Special Forces Camp (ZC 006085) on 12 May, supported from LZ Baldy. On 19 May Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th

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Artillery moved to LZ Cacti (BT 063470) and on 2 June the battery displaced to LZ Clifford (BT 259104) to support Operation EURLINGTON TRAIL. On 6 June Battery D, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery moved to LZ East (BT 130202) and 17 June they displaced to LZ Baldy. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery moved from LZ Ross to LZ Baldy on 13 June and on 17 June they moved to LZ Thunder (BS 869319) in the Duc Pho Area of operations. On 13 June Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery displaced to LZ Ross. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery moved to LZ O'Connor (AT 392242) on 11 July to support Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST.

b. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T) provided reinforcing fires for the operation from locations at LZ Ross and Hawk Hill (BT 224111). Battery B, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175G) continued to provide general supporting fires from LZ Ross. On 5 July the Battery moved to LZ Karen (AT 914239) to provide general supporting fires to Operations POCAHONTAS FOREST and WHEELER/WALLOWA.

c. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 198th Infantry Brigade  
3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (105T) - DS 196th Infantry Brigade  
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) (155T) - Reinf 1st Battalion, 14th Arty  
Reinf 3d Battalion, 82d Arty  
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (8"/175G) - GS

(b) POCAHONTAS FOREST.

1. Elements of the Americal Division organized as Task Force Cooksey in conjunction with elements of the 1st Marine Division and the 2d ARVN Division, conducted offensive operations to the west of Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA to destroy enemy units in zone and to interdict Highway 534. Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST started on 6 July and continued through the reporting period.

2. Division Artillery supported the operation as follows:

a. Batteries A and C, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery moved from the Duc Pho Area of Operations to positions at LZ O'Connor (AT 932242) on 4 July and 5 July, respectively, and provided direct supporting fires to the operation. On 5 July Battery C, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery displaced to LZ Polar Bear II (AT 939212), on 9 July unit moved to LZ Richards (AT 866214), on 15 July they moved to LZ Mellon (AT 805183), and on 21 July they displaced to LZ Buck (AT 805320). Battery A, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery moved to LZ Richards on 10 July. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery moved to LZ O'Connor on 11 July.

b. The 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T) provided reinforcing artillery fires to the operation with Battery B displacing to LZ Lurch (AT 925238) on 5 July and Battery C moving to LZ Sooner (AT 875335) on 11 July. A two howitzer platoon from Battery B moved to LZ Richards on 16 July and returned to LZ Lurch on 21 July. On 29 July Battery B moved to the Thien Phuoc Special Forces Camp (BT 104144).

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Battery B, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8"/175G) moved to LZ Karen (AT 914239) on 5 July to provide general supporting fires to the operation.

g. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

3d Battalion, 82d Artillery (105T) - DS Task Force Cooksey.  
Batteries A and C, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (105T) - OFCON 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery.  
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) (155T) - Reinf 3d Battalion, 82d Arty  
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (8"/175G) - GS

(c) BURLINGTON TRAIL

1. Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL continued during the reporting period with the 198th Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry conducting the operation.

2. Division Artillery supported the operation with Batteries B and D, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery providing direct supporting fires from Hill 68 (BT 316131) and LZ Bowman (BT 237140), respectively, and two 155 howitzers from the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery supporting from Tien Phuoc Special Forces camp. On 2 June Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery moved to LZ Clifford (BT 259104) and two 155 howitzers from the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery moved to LZ Bowman. On 8 June Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery moved to Fire Support Base Young (BT 188158). On 23 June Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery displaced to LZ Gator (BS 571963). Battery D, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery moved to FSB Young on 5 July after Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery had displaced to support Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general supporting fires from Hill 54 (BT 398143).

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 198th Infantry Brigade  
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) (155T) - Reinf 1st Battalion, 14th Arty  
DS 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry  
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (8"/175G) - GS

(d) MUSCATINE.

1. Operation MUSCATINE continued into the reporting period with the 11th Infantry Brigade conducting the operation. The operation terminated on 10 June.

2. Division Artillery supported the operation with Batteries B and D, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery providing direct support from LZ Sue (BS 566877) and LZ Uptight (BS 728850), respectively. On 8 May Battery D displaced to LZ Buff (BS 539825). Two 155mm howitzers from the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided reinforcing fires from LZ Dottie (BS 630856) and two 175mm guns from Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general support from LZ Dottie. On 31 May the two 175mm guns moved to Hill 54 to support Operation BURLINGTON TRAIL.

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3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade  
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (82/175G) - CSR 6th Battalion, 11th Arty  
Battery B (-), 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T) - OPCON 3d Battalion,  
18th Artillery

(c) VANCE CANYON

1. On 21 June elements of the 198th Infantry Brigade conducted offensive operations into the vicinity of enemy base areas 118 and 120 west of Quang Ngai City, to destroy enemy elements and extend GVN control in the areas. The operation terminated on 2 July.

2. Division Artillery supported the operation by moving a platoon of Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery to Tra Bong Special Forces Camp (BS 344882) on 20 June and Battery A, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery to LZ Manchester (BS 302810) on 22 June to provide direct supporting fires.

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 198th Infantry Brigade

(f) CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP.

1. Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP began on 19 June with elements of the 11th Infantry Brigade and the 2d ARVN Division conducting offensive operations in enemy base area 121 west of Quang Ngai City to destroy enemy elements and extend GVN control in the area. The operation ended on 29 June.

2. Division Artillery supported the operation by displacing Battery C, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery to LZ Patch (BS 436635) to provide direct support fires to the maneuver elements.

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade

(g) CHU LAI AREA OF OPERATIONS.

1. Task Force Roach, formed from elements of the 198th Infantry Brigade, continued operations in the Chu Lai Tactical Area of responsibility until 14 May 68 when the 198th Infantry Brigade assumed control of the TAOR.

2. Division Artillery provided support as follows:

a. The 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery provided direct supporting fires to the 198th Infantry Brigade from positions at Fat City (BT 439075) and LZ Gator (BS 572965) with batteries B and A, respectively. On 23 June Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery moved to LZ Gator and on 2 July Battery A displaced to LZ Dottie. Two howitzers from Battery A moved to

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LZ Buff (BS 538825) on 24 July.

b. The 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, with Batteries A and B, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery attached, provided direct supporting fires until 14 May and, thereafter, reinforced from positions at Hill 54 and LZ Gator. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery provided general support from Hill 54. On 19 June the 8 inch platoon from Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery moved to LZ Dottie to give heavy artillery support to the southern Chu Lai area. On 25 June the 155mm howitzer platoon displaced from LZ Gator to the WHEELER/WALLOWA AO.

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 198th Infantry Brigade  
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (-) (155T) - Reinf 1st Battalion, 14th Arty  
3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T) - DS Task Force Roach  
Attached

Batteries A and B, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery (105T)  
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (8"/175G) - GS

(h) DUC PHO AREA OF OPERATIONS.

1. The 11th Infantry Brigade continued operations in the Duc Pho Area of Operations.

2. Division Artillery provided support as follows:

a. The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery provided direct supporting fires from LZ Liz (BS 753434) and LZ Thunder (BS 869321) with Batteries A and C, respectively. On 17 June Battery C moved to LZ Dragon (BS 731528) and on 19 June they displaced to LZ Patch to support Operation CHATTAHOOCHEE SWAMP. On 17 June Battery B moved to LZ Thunder. On 18 June Battery A moved to the vicinity of BS 763277 to support operations to the west of the Duc Pho AO and on 24 June they displaced to the vicinity of BS 628340 to support the westward movement. On 29 June Battery A (-) moved to LZ Dragon with a 105mm howitzer platoon moving to LZ Liz. On 1 July Battery D moved to the Gia Vuc Special Forces Camp (BS 377265) to support operations in that area. On 18 July Battery D displaced to LZ Checker (BS 437337) to support the maneuver elements, returning to Gia Vuc on 19 July. On 25 July they moved to the Bato Special Forces Camp (BS 555325). On 4 July Battery A moved to LZ O'Connor to support Operation POCAHONTAS FOREST leaving two 105mm howitzers at LZ Dragon.

b. Two 155mm howitzers from the 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery provided reinforcing fires from LZ Dragon. On 21 May the 155 platoon moved to LZ Liz. On 17 June two 175mm guns from Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery moved to LZ Dragon to provide general supporting fires in the AO.

3. Artillery organization for combat was as follows:

6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (-) (105T) - DS 11th Infantry Brigade  
OPCON

Battery B (-), 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155T)  
3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (-) (8"/175G) - GS



**SECRET**

c. The 251st and 252d Countermortar Radar Detachments arrived and became operational on 19 July 1968. The two detachments are positioned: 251st on Artillery Hill (BT 00043) and 252d on Landing Zone West (BT 000249).

d. The 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery arrived and was assigned to the Americal Division on 28 July 1968. The battalion is expected to be completely operational by 9 August 1968. The battalion will be generally deployed in the southern portion of the Americal AO.

2. Section II, Lessons Learned

a. Personnel.

(1) Shortage of Signal Corps Lieutenants and Captains.

(a) Observation: The lack of Signal Corp Lieutenants and Captains to fill TOE positions in direct and general support battalions as communications and assistant communications officers is considered critical.

(b) Evaluation: The communications mission could be greatly improved by filling these vacancies with trained Signal Corps officers. Each Direct and General Support Battalion is authorized one Lieutenant and one Captain as communication and assistant communications officer. Presently there are 4 captain and 2 lieutenant vacancies. Artillery Lieutenants are currently filling assistant communications officer positions in 2 battalions. If Signal Corps Lieutenants were available to fill these TOE positions, Artillery Lieutenants could be more efficiently utilized in artillery related positions such as executive officers, assistant executive officers or forward observers.

(c) Recommendation: That Signal Corps Captains and Lieutenants be made available to fill artillery communication positions.

(2) Non-promotable Lieutenants.

(a) Observation: Newly assigned Lieutenants arrive without DA Form 68.

(b) Evaluation: On four different occasions in the past sixty days, promotable 2d Lieutenants have reported for duty and could not be promoted on their date of eligibility because the losing command had failed to initiate DA Form 78. On one occasion the officer should have been promoted in December 1967; the officer was promoted on 24 May 68 with DOR of 23 March 68.

(c) Recommendation:

1. That the widest possible dissemination of the provisions of AR 642-100 be initiated.

2. That the POR processing checklist DA Form 2970 contain a special statement on promotable second lieutenants that the officers promotion eligibility date had been reviewed and, if applicable, the provisions of para 27 AR 624-100 have been implemented.

(3) Shortage of School Trained Personnel.

(a) Observation: Additional school trained MOS's authorized by the modification of the current TOE's have not been received. During the last quarter losses were also incurred in school trained personnel by infusion and rotation. Replacements have not arrived to fill the vacancies created. Specific examples where MOS's are authorized but no personnel are assigned: four (4) 76S20's authorized, four (4) 76K30's authorized, four (4) 71T20's



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seventeen (17) 63B's and 63C's (vehicle mechanics) authorized.

(b) Evaluation: The present system of requisitioning replacements does not adequately provide essential school trained personnel in a timely manner.

(c) Recommendation: That the system of requisitioning replacements insure that school trained MOS's have a higher priority than nonschool trained MOS's.

(4) Rating Officers for Artillery Forward Observers.

(a) Observation: Due to tactical requirements, a direct support artillery battery seldom supports habitually the same infantry battalion. The forward observers remain with the infantry companies to which they were originally attached and do not necessarily operate with the artillery batteries to which they are assigned.

(b) Evaluation: The battery commander is not able to give an accurate evaluation of his assigned forward observers since the observers seldom operate with the same artillery battery.

(c) Recommendation: That the artillery liaison officer attached to the infantry battalion be the rating officer for forward observers attached to the infantry companies of that battalion. This system has been adopted within this division and has proven effective.

(5) Administrative Problems of a Fourth Firing Battery.

(a) Observation: With the organization of a provisional fourth firing battery, significant administrative problems have arisen.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel working in positions essential to the mission and deserving promotion, are not always carried in TOE promotable positions. As an example, a survey rodman-tapeman authorized and assigned to HHSB in an E-3 position is actually serving as a fire direction computer in an E-5 position in Battery D; yet the man cannot be promoted. Moreover, the authority to administer UCMJ is not authorized for the fourth Battery Commander and he must request such action from another unit commander, thereby causing delays that sometimes nullify the charges.

(c) Recommendations: None. MTOE's are presently being processed to authorize the fourth battery.

b. Operations:

(1) 6400 mil firing chart.

(a) Observation: When moving to a new position area, much time is wasted in the preparation of the 6400 mil firing chart and subsequently, additional time is lost in checking indices with Battalion FDC.

(b) Evaluation: When occupying a new position area the HCO and VCO must wait until the coordinates of Battery Center are determined before

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constructing the firing chart. The construction of the chart is a slow and meticulous process consuming valuable time. The graphical relationship of the deflection and azimuth indices remains the same regardless of the physical grid location of battery center. Using a preconstructed template underneath the transparent grid sheet, the chart may be reoriented for any new firing position in a matter of minutes. The indices are already constructed in relation to a tick mark on the template. The tick mark may be oriented under the grid sheet to coincide with the grid of the new battery center. Once the template is oriented properly and the grid sheet secured over it, the proper indices will be displayed in relation to battery center. Such a template may be constructed permanently on the chart table with a permanent battery center. Upon arriving in a new position and the new grid of battery center determined, a new grid sheet may be oriented over the permanent and arbitrary Battery Center on the chart table. When properly oriented the indices will be properly displayed.

(c) Recommendation: Firing batteries consider the adaptation of such chart tables to facilitate the rapidity of FDC operations during moves. If all battery charts are not set up in this manner, one "jump" chart table could be constructed for use until actual firing charts are ready for operation in the new position.

(2) Short life of Artillery Graphical Firing and Site Tables.

(a) Observation: Due to climatic effect on wood and paper, replacement of GFT's and GST's is a constant problem in Vietnam.

(b) Evaluation: The present wood and paper GFT's and GST's are unsatisfactory in tropical climate. Wood swells and slides stick. The paper scales deteriorate rapidly and become difficult to read. Replacement is a constant problem.

(c) Recommendation: That GFT's and GST's be constructed of aluminum and enamel such as the Pickett Military Slide Rule.

(3) Difficulty in following the present Met and VE computation form (DA Form 6-15).

(a) The present DA Form 6-15 is difficult to follow and does not lend itself to abbreviated solutions.

(b) Evaluation: Because the present DA Form 6-15 does not follow a chronological sequence it is difficult to train new personnel in the computation of metros, VE's and Met fuze corrections. In those instances where mets are computed daily at the same location the present form does not lend itself to abbreviated computation. The present High Burst/MPI form (DA Form 6-55) is easy to follow and easy for new personnel to learn.

(c) Recommendation:

1. That the present DA Form 6-15 be revised to permit personnel with minimum training to use it.



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2. That an abbreviated form be devised for day to day computations from the same location.

(4) Problems encountered in the control of six firing batteries.

(a) Observation: Due to the tactical situation battalions have had to control as many as 6 firing units with little augmentation.

(b) Explanation: One of the major problems encountered in the control of six firing batteries was the shortage of trained Battalion Fire Direction Center Computers for checking technical firing data. This obstacle was overcome by the augmentation of two computers. Although a Battalion is authorized the personnel for the control of three firing units for sustained operations, the Battalion can accomplish the task by designating two computers to check the technical data of three firing units. The effectiveness of this method is dependent upon the degree of training and experience of the fire direction personnel.

(c) Recommendation: None

(5) Kham Duc action

(a) Observation: When an artillery battery occupies a position, immediate construction of overhead cover must commence.

(b) When an artillery battery is required to occupy a position in an area with a high probability of encountering enemy resistance immediately, it is imperative that parapets and overhead cover for the troops be constructed with minimum time delay. Immediately upon their arrival in the Kham Duc area Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery began receiving enemy mortar and small arms fire. Time did not permit the construction of this protection due to the requirement to deliver retaliatory fires immediately upon occupation of position. As the action progressed the personnel manning the guns were provided with little or no protection from mortar fragments and small arms fire.

(c) Recommendation: None

(6) FADLC Program Tapes.

(a) Additional combinations of program tapes for Computer, Gun Direction M10 (FADLC) were issued. The new series of program tapes are not adequate since sufficient combinations of weapon systems do not exist. The following additional program tapes are needed:

175mm (M107)

155mm (M114A1, M44, M44A1)

8 inch M110)

155mm (M114A1, M44, M44A1)

155 (M114A1, M44, M44A1)

105mm (M52, M52A1, M101A1)

175mm (M107)

105mm (M52, M52M1, M101A1)

8 inch (M110)

105mm (M52, M52A1, M101A1)

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(c) Recommendation: That a new series of program tapes be developed with a greater variety of combinations.

c. Logistics.

(i) Care and Maintenance of sling equipment.

(a) Observation: On 1 July 1968 a 105mm howitzer was being airlifted from one fire base to another in support of a tactical operation. The helicopter experienced turbulence, causing the load to jerk. The sling sheared in two, resulting in a total loss of the 105mm howitzer, section equipment, and other miscellaneous equipment.

(b) Evaluation: Sling equipment is rated for a specific maximum load for a specified number of lifts. This rating is predicated on the assumption that the equipment receives proper care and maintenance from Depot to the using unit. Sling equipment is occasionally received from Depot which had deteriorated due to improper storage. Slings that are allowed to get wet or oily, and then improperly stored in the open will rot. Moreover, without a standard means of logging the number of lifts for which an item of sling equipment has been used, it is difficult to determine its remaining life.

(c) Recommendation: Each sling should be load tested upon issue; this test would constitute one lift. A standard method should be devised to plainly mark the sling each time it is used. This will determine when slings should be replaced. Slings must be stored in such a way that they can dry out quickly, but not in direct sun light.

(2) Long Distance Overland Moves.

(a) Observation: Long distance overland moves through remote territory have pointed up the need for detailed logistical planning.

(b) Evaluation: Prior to beginning an overland move with a large complement of vehicles careful consideration should be given to recovery of vehicles that become inoperable along the route of march. A minimum of one recovery vehicle is a necessity for each march column. Numerous other vehicles,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton or larger, should be equipped with a tow bar to assist in the recovery effort. By providing this additional towing capability the greatest amount of the inoperable equipment can be recovered and can proceed with the convoy to the overnight laager area. It was further noted the  $1\frac{1}{4}$  ton and  $3\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicles use an excessive amount of fuel.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that each unit planning for an overland move give close attention to the stockage of the high mortality rate items for support of the move.

(3) FADAC Maintenance.

(a) Observation: Through a program of intensified daily maintenance the operational readiness of FADAC's has been increased to more than 85 percent.

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


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(b) A continued review of the FIDAC preventive maintenance program has resulted in procedures which significantly increased the division wide operational readiness. The results of this review are attached as Inclosure 1. The preventive maintenance program applies to both the FIDAC and the generator. Use of the attached checklist plus constant training and retraining of supervisors, operators and maintenance personnel have been the primary reasons for these results. Careful installation in a ventilated, dust free area is equally important.

(c) Recommendations: None

1 Incl  
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LAWRENCE M. JONES, JR.  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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17  
AVDF-GC (2 Sep 68) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Division Artillery

DA, HQ, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374 11 SEP 68

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, AVHGC-FD, APO 96375

1. Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the Americal Division Artillery for the period ending 31 July 1968.
2. This headquarters concurs with the observations and recommendations contained in the basic communication except as noted below.
  - a. Reference para 2a(1), Section 2: The Division Adjutant General and Signal Officer are aware of the shortages of Signal Corps Officers. Publicity has been and will continue to be given to the recent change in policy which encourages officers qualified in the communications field to apply for branch transfer.

- b. Authorized and assigned strength of company grade Signal Corps officers is shown below. The increased authorization is due to the recent assignment of the 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery.

	<u>10 Aug</u>	<u>9 Jan</u>
	AUTH/ASGD	AUTH/ASGD
CPT	31/18	32/17
LT	25/34	26/33

- c. Reference para 2a(3), Section 2: This headquarters indorses the plea for qualified personnel. At the same time it is recognized that MOS 76S and 71T are relatively new and that the demand for school trained personnel (MOS 76S and 71T) exceeds the supply. The current status within the division is as follows:

(1) 71T	70%
(2) 76S	75%
(3) 76K	90%
(4) 63 series	99%

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AVDF-GC (2 Sep 68) 1st Ind

11 SEP 68

SUBJECT: Operation Report-Lessons Learned, Division Artillery

c. Para 2c(1), Section 2: This headquarters has recently published and disseminated guidance criteria for the use of sling equipment, based on the guidance set forth in USARV messages AUHGAV-LOG 40132, 12 Mar 68, and AVHGD-EM 56680, 29 June 1968, and TM 55-450-11.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*James M. Cox III*  
JAMES M. COX III  
1LT, AGC  
ASST ADJ GEN

15

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AVRSC-POST (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind (U)

MAJ Klingman/hga/LPW 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (AOS-OSFOL-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 1 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPCF-LT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning shortage of school trained personnel, page 3, paragraph 2a(3) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c. Nonconcur. The urgent and continuing need for combat MOS in this command does not support this recommendation. The reasons for the shortage of school trained personnel in MOS 71T and 76S are adequately covered in paragraph 2c, 1st Indorsement. A recent increase in authorization has caused Americal Division strength in MOS 76Y (MOS 76K is obsolete) and 63 series MOS to fall below authorized levels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W. C. ARNTZ  
CPTAGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

By furn:

HQ Americal Div

HQ Americal Div Arty



GPOP-DT (15 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, Americal Div Arty for Period  
Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 16 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C.I. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN DIVISION ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-AT

7 July 1968

SUBJECT: Artillery Items for Command Emphasis

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Some artillery battalions of the Division are experiencing high deadline rates for FADACs and FADAC generators. Recently, one battalion had as many as four out of five FADACs down at one time for various causes.

2. Addressees are encouraged to review their FADAC maintenance procedures with a view toward improving operational readiness of FADAC. The following are suggested measures to improve maintenance programs:

a. Each unit should use a preventive maintenance checklist for each FADAC assigned (Example at Inclosure 1). This should be checked periodically by the battalion commander and/or the members of his staff on visits to the battery FDC's.

b. Maintenance requirements should be doubled during the dry season because of the large amount of dust. One artillery battalion requires the oil to be changed in FADAC generators every two or three days. Their deadline rate for generators is very low. Other periodic maintenance such as cleaning of filters should be done more frequently than indicated in the associated maintenance manuals.

c. When a FADAC must be evacuated to 723d Maintenance Battalion, at least one of the artillery battalion FADAC maintenance personnel should accompany it. This individual can assist 723d Maintenance personnel in determining and eliminating the cause of deadline. The most important benefit of this program would be the experience gained by the artillery battalion FADAC maintenance personnel. Many of the problems found by 723d Maintenance Battalion could possibly be eliminated at the organizational maintenance level. Liaison with the 723d Maintenance Battalion has been effected in order to support this program.

3. The following are some of the results experienced by one artillery battalion with an aggressive FADAC preventive maintenance program:

a. The four FADACs assigned to the battalion logged 724 hours of operation in the month of June.




b. The battalion FDC FADAC has logged 2,207 hours of operation with only 30 minutes of down time since issue in August 1967.

4. This letter is required to be on file in each battery and battalion FDC together with previously published "Artillery Items for Command Emphasis".

1 Incl  
as

/s/Lawrence M. Jones, Jr.  
/t/LAWRENCE M. JONES, JR.  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

A TRUE COPY:



ROBERT L. DUBOIS  
MAJ, Artillery  
Adjutant

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Inc11  
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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Change oil filter (every 50 hours)	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Clean or replace spark plugs (every 100 hours)																															
Check and adjust or replace Magneto points (every 500 hours)																															
Quarterly service (every 3 months or 250 hours)																															
FDO's initials																															

1. All the above checks and services can be found in greater detail in TM 9-1220-221-10, INTERIM TM 5-6115-271-14.
2. Lube by the lube order! Even though the generator is equipped with a sealed bearing and does not require lubrication the engine requires continuous lubrication.
3. Only qualified individuals should perform maintenance on the FAD/C and generator.



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The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

\* SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\* FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

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ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

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PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_

FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

\* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

\*\* FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

\*\*\*Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

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