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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGDA (M) - (3 Sep 69) FOR OT UT 692183 ✓ 17 September 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang (U) (8) Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, DA NANG
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVCA DNG-GO-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command,
Da Nang, for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)).

THRU: Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-O
APO 96384

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GROP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Section I, Operation: Significant Activities. a. (C) The US Army Support Command, Da Nang (USASUPCOM, DNG), continued to provide logistical support to all US Army units operating in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). Mortuary and property disposal services were provided to all US Forces in ICTZ and in support of Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF) as directed. During the reporting period, the USASUPCOM, DNG, was engaged in logistical support operations for 89 days. The logistical operations conducted involved employment of the Support Command's units in direct support of the Americal Division operations in Southern I Corps, *1*

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→ 101st Airborne Division operating in the vicinity of Phu Bai, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Division (Mech) operating in the vicinity of Quang Tri and 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cav Regt operating in the vicinity of Camp Evans. In addition, all non-divisional Army units operating within ICTZ were supported. Class I was provided to Marines in the Phu Bai area, and the Naval Detachment at Sa Huynh. Inclosure 1 contains organizational chart.

b. (U) Command Group Activities. The following key personnel changes occurred within the USASUPCOM, Da Nang:

(1) Colonel E. S. Goepper assumed the duties of Acting Commander on 19 April 1969, upon Brigadier General Gunn's departure for a 30 day Special Leave.

(2) LTC M. DeMello Jr. assumed the duties of Special Assistant for Combat Security on 2 April 1969.

c. The USASUPCOM, Da Nang, continued to be a key point of interest for distinguished visitors. During this period, the headquarters was visited by:

(1) LTG MILDREN, Frank L., Deputy Commanding General, USARV.

(2) LTG CUSHMAN, Robert E. Jr., Commanding General, III MAF.

(3) LTG NICKERSON, Herman, Commanding General (DESIGNEE), III MAF.

(4) LTG WALT, Lewis W., Assistant Commandant, United States Marine Corps.

(5) Other distinguished visitors are listed in Inclosure 2.

d. A luncheon in honor of Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., departing Commanding General, III MAF, was held on the 20th of March 1969. BG Gunn hosted the event with the following guests attending:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
LTG H. W. Buse	CG, FMFPAC
LTG Herman Nickerson, Jr.	CG, Designee, III MAF
MG Carl A. Youngdale	DCG, III MAF
MG Charles J. Quilter	CG, 1st MAW
MG Charles M. Gettys	CG, Americal Division
MG Clifford B. Drake	DCG, XXIV Corps
BG Warren K. Bennett	Dep C/S, Plans, III MAF
BG James A. Feeley	CG, FLC

Incl

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
RADM Emmett P. Bonner	COMNAVSUPACT, Da Nang
BG Allen G. Pixton	CG, XXIV Corps Artillery
BG Darrie H. Richards	CG, USASUPCOM, Qui Nhon
RADM John G. Dillon	Commander, 3rd NCB
COL Richard J. Glikes	G-4, XXIV Corps
COL Edwin S. Goepper, Jr.	CO, 80th General Support Group
COL Lawrence C. Norton	G-4, III MAF
COL Thomas A. Mort	CO, 26th General Support Group
COL Warren H. Jepson	DC, USASUPCOM, Da Nang

e. (U) ACofS, Comptroller (Inclosure 3). The 192nd Finance Section was reorganized under MTOE 14-500EP02 P00169 effective 12 February 1969, with an authorized strength of five (5) officers, four (4) warrant officers, and 153 enlisted men for a total strength of 162. Effective 29 March 1969, per letter, AVHGF-F, Subject: Finance Support of Non-divisional Personnel, HQ, USARV, 27 March 1969, two officers and sixty enlisted spaces were informally withdrawn from MTOE 14-500E, 192nd Finance Section, and allocated to the Americal Division. The personnel filling the aforementioned spaces have been transferred to the Americal Division and will be utilized to provide finance service to nondivisional personnel located in the Chu Lai area.

f. (U) ACofS, Personnel (Inclosure 4). The summary of ACofS, Personnel and Administration Activities is given in inclosure.

g. (C) The ACofS, SP&O, Security Division (Inclosure 5). Command emphasis was placed on installation security during this period. A security officers conference was held at HQ, USASUPCOM, DNG, on 12 March 1969. The purpose of this meeting was to provide major elements of the command with a review and discussion of all security policies and procedures in effect. The 524th MI Detachment (CI) continued to provide counter intelligence support for the command and its subordinate units. On 2 April, LTC Manuel DeMello Jr. was assigned to this command as Special Assistant to the Commander for Combat Security. Enemy activity during the early part of February was light, however, on 23 February, VC/NVA units launched a country-wide offensive that continued at a moderate level throughout ICPZ, as the enemy persisted in his efforts to gain support of the populace. Enemy interdiction of LOC's continued without seriously hampering 1st Log operations in I Corps. The majority of this type activity took place in the Cua Viet area in the North and in the Binh Son, Quang Ngai, and Mo Duc areas of the South.

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h. (U) ACofS, SP&O, Plans Division (Inclosure 6). An MTDA for Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, was prepared and submitted to 1st Logistical Command during the month of April. This MTDA was a modification of the TASTA-70 concept of organization. The MTDA changed the Director of Petroleum and the Director of Retrograde and Disposal under TASTA 70 to Assistant Chief of Staff and incorporated structural changes based upon more than one years operational experience.

i. A logistical support conference was held in March and was attended by representatives of the support command and all major supported units. Mutual problem areas and items of interest to supported units were discussed. In February 1969, this command assumed the custodial responsibility of the Property Disposal Yard at Chu Lai from the US Marine Corps.

j. In February 1969, a biweekly Commanders' Report was initiated. This report is an attempt to improve communication between commanders. It contains items of command interest by functional area. Additionally, it provides the Commanding General with a personal forum by which to emphasize subjects of major command interest.

j. (U) ACofS, SP&O, Operations Division (Inclosure 7). Resupply to Logistical Support Activities (LSA's) operated by this command was accomplished with few difficulties. Weather conditions were very favorable in the I Corps area and had little effect on supply movement. Major supply routes in Northern I Corps were generally safe for easy movement of supplies and equipment in the area. Supply routes in Southern I Corps are still hindered by enemy activity. Convoys require escort vehicles and mine clearing procedures to precede all convoy movements. An LSA was established at LZ Baldy to provide support to the 196th Inf Bde, Americal Division. The port of Sa Huynh is being fully utilized for resupply movement into LSA Duc Pho in support of the 11th Bde, Americal Division. A study was conducted to see if this command could provide support to MACV advisory personnel in I Corps. The study produced positive results.

k. (U) ACofS, SP&O, Civil Affairs (Inclosure 8). During this period, 120,000 VN dollars were expended on Civic Action/Community Relations projects in the USAGUPCOM, DNG, area of operations. Eleven (11) homes were rebuilt and seventeen (17) repaired in the Hoa Long Village area (068 704). Terrorist activity was extensive during February, but diminished in the latter part of the quarter. The self-help farming project started on Nui Kim Son (068 713) and Son Thuy (068 713) by Da Nang Support Command in November, has been a great success. The harvest was completed this quarter. Tours of interesting and historical areas of Da Nang were conducted for Da Nang Support Command personnel. Naval

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Support Activity Civic Action has assumed responsibility for the Scouting Association at the Da Nang Chapter. The Tien Sha Chapter of scouting continues to be supported by Da Nang Support Command. The Tien Sha Chapter conducted their second organization day anniversary on 23 Mar 69. BG James W. Gunn, Commanding General, USASUPCOM, DNG, participated in the ceremony. A street cleaning project was conducted by the Tien Sha scouts under direction of the scout leader, CPT Chanh. This is the first implementation of MG Heiser's "Better Relations" program. The scouts cleaned Route 538 of trash and debris and attended a party in their honor at Da Nang Support Command compound the same evening. The CA section continued to educate the Support Command personnel in Vietnamese culture and customs through informational magazines, tours, and classes.

1. (U) Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply (Inclosure 9). Sufficient stocks of Class II and IX supplies were on hand to support current operations. Project Fill, which was initiated in early November to reduce zero balances on critical items in the depot and DSU/GSU's continues to be closely monitored and reported to the ICCV. Over 1200 zero balance lines have been reported. A fill rate of approximately 15 percent has been experienced. Project Count II was initiated in early February and is approximately 45 percent completed. Implementing instructions were received for Repair and Return Program for the M108 and M109 weapons, repair services will begin in May. Project Clean (NCR 500) was initiated during December 1968 and requires each DSU/GSU, which has the NCR 500, to conduct a manual review on one third (1/3) of the stock record ledgers each month. The tank exchange program to replace sixty-nine (69) M48A2C (Gas) Tanks with M48A3 (Diesel) Tanks in the 1/5th Infantry Division (Mech), has been completed. An Instruct/Advise Team was organized during the reporting period and is conducting visits to the DSU/GSU's. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply, acted on fifty-five (55) Reports of Survey, three (3) Combat Loss, and thirty-one (31) Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss during this period.

2. (U) Director of Food (Inclosure 10). On 10 Mar 69, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Food, was redesignated Directorate of Food and became a major element of the ACofS, Supply. Sufficient Class I supplies were available in ICTZ LSA's throughout the reporting period to sustain all operations. Daily ration monitoring and efficient, timely resupply by surface and air continues to be the key to Class I operations in ICTZ. An efficient management program plus coordination with Marine units in Northern I Corps, continues to draw down excess B-rations at Phu Bai. Excess B-rations resulted from closing the Quang Tri Class I point in late 1968 and consolidating supplies with the Class I yard at Phu Bai. LSA Baldy, in support of the Americal Division, went into operation, as planned, in February. Plans are to build up a 3-5 day supply of A-rations at LZ Baldy upon completion of storage facilities. The continuous flow ice cream plant, located at

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Quang Tri, has been deadlined (16 Apr) awaiting spare parts. Parts are being obtained as expeditiously as possible.

n. (U) ACofS, Petroleum (Inclosure 11). The summary of ACofS, Petroleum activities is given in inclosure.

o. (U) ACofS, Ammunition (Inclosure 12). Waivers were returned from 1st Log Comd approved for Camp Evans, Hill 63, Chu Lai, and Duc Pho. The 101st Abn Division constructed two sling out pads, one in the Phu Bai ASP and the other at Camp Evans ASP. PSP was installed at Hill 63 and Chu Lai and five (5) quonset huts for ammunition storage at Quang Tri will be completed in May. The approval obtained from III MAF to ship ammunition by vehicle over the Hai Van Pass will greatly enhance our flexibility to resupply NICTZ during adverse weather conditions and non-availability of sea or air transportation. Headquarters of the 571st Ord Co was moved from Quang Tri to Phu Bai.

p. (C) ACofS, Transportation (Inclosure 13). During the month of February, the 235th Trans Plt (5-ton Cargo) located at Red Beach, Da Nang, exchanged colors with the 515th Trans Plt (5-ton Cargo) located at Cam Ranh Bay. This redesignation was effective 10 February 1969. The 403rd Trans Co (Terminal Transfer) moved from Quang Tri to Da Nang on 5 April 1969. The 446th Trans Co (Med Trk) moved from Quang Tri to Saigon on 20 April 1969. The Movement Control Center in Da Nang and its two field offices located at Quang Tri and Phu Bai processed a total of 14,716 TCMD's aggregating 189,249 S/T of Army cargo. The railroad continued operation during the reporting period, however, there were no shipments of US Army sponsored cargo. It is anticipated that shipment of US Army sponsored cargo will commence on or about 1 June 1969.

q. (U) ACofS, Retrograde and Disposal (Inclosure 14). Property Disposal Activity reached an all time low of a 21% backlog of usable material not processed at the PDO during the reporting period. This percentage is based on total acquisition cost of usable property on hand versus usable property sold, reported for sale and held for screening. The Support Command objective is to achieve a 10% backlog by 30 June 1969. The 633rd CC&S Company has been maintained at full strength "Type B" to keep the momentum of the retrograde program moving.

r. (U) ACofS, Maintenance (Inclosure 15). LTC P. Wilson, ACofS, Maintenance, from November 1968 to March 1969, departed for CONUS assignment. The need for additional AN/MPQ-4A Radar Sets in ICTZ became evident and assistance was requested from HQ, 1st Log Command. A Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) for rewind of electric motors was initiated and approved. A program for increased maintenance support of $7\frac{1}{2}$ ton refrigeration units was initiated. A Philco-

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Field maintenance contract proposal for general equipment repair was rejected. The M107/M110 Repair and Return (R&R) Program has made progress, however, implementation of M109 R&R program was deferred until receipt of sufficient repair parts. A program was established to provide intensive assistance to all artillery units in ICTZ utilizing Field Maintenance Technicians (FMT's) assigned to the ACofS, Maintenance. An Instruct and Advise (I&A) Team was organized in coordination with ACofS, Supply, and assistance visits made to all logistical command maintenance DSU's in ICTZ. The first comprehensive analysis of I Corps DS equipment maintenance requirements versus the support commands capability to meet these requirements was completed. The 510th Engineer Platoon, attached to the 67th Maintenance Company, returned to Qui Nhon, 28 February 1969. The non-operational readiness (NOR) rate of selected items of equipment in most cases continues to be below the established M&CV tolerance.

s. (U) Assistant Chief of Staff, Services (Inclosure 16). (1) Maximum emphasis was given to expediting design and release for construction of MCA projects essential for operational mission. Three projects of particular interest are 120,000 SF of depot covered storage, maintenance facilities, and hardstand for the 156th Heavy Equipment Maintenance (HEM) Company, and the 876-Man Cantonment. In the case of the depot covered storage, immediate action was taken to substitute an on-hand 175' x 570' building, excessed by the Navy, for 4-120' x 200' buildings which had been programmed for the project but shipment from CONUS has been deferred. Consequently, contract construction of the depot covered storage is expected to start in mid-June. With regard to the maintenance facilities of the 156th HEM and the 876-Man Cantonment, Pacific Architects and Engineers, Da Nang Office, is currently doing the design with an expected completion date of 31 July 1969.

(2) In view of the long lead-time normally associated with the MCA program and the limited quarterly allocation of O&MA funds to Installation Engineers, substantial planning and programming in conjunction with USAECAV was conducted toward identifying priority projects suitable for minor new construction. Favorable O&MA funding consideration of this urgently needed new construction, heretofore unavailable, will materially enhance the operational effectiveness of this command.

(3) In mid-February, six (6) new Field Laundry Units were received which made it possible to augment field laundry support at the brigade combat bases at Duc Pho and LZ Baldy. Planning has been initiated to fill the 71st Laundry Platoon, currently at zero strength, to further increase field laundry capability with resultant reductions in contract laundry costs.

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t. (U) Command Chaplain (Inclosure 17). The summary of Chaplains activities is given in inclosure.

u. (U) Headquarters Commandant (Inclosure 18). Average strength of the command during this reporting period was 252 personnel. As of 30 April 1969, a total of 267 personnel were assigned to this command, broken down as follows: 78 Officers, five (5) Warrant Officers, and 184 Enlisted Men. Three (3) bunkers were completed and one (1) started during this reporting period. A washroom was added to the mess hall in March. A patio was poured at the EM club in April. Improvements were made on existing troop billets and in April construction was started on two (2) SEA HUTS. In March, a dayroom/classroom was built. In April, work commenced on walkways and revetments in the troop area.

v. (U) Command Judge Advocate (Inclosure 19). The summary of military justice activities is given in inclosure.

w. (U) Provost Marshal (Inclosure 20). No major operational changes occurred during the period 1 February 1969 - 30 April 1969. Personnel losses and gains had no major impact on the operational capabilities of the section. Numerous coordination visits were made to this staff section by commanders and provost marshals of other units. Coordination/liaison visits by members of this staff section to units in outlying areas were made frequently during the quarter. A special security survey of all ammunition and petroleum facilities controlled by HQ's, USASUPCOM, Da Nang, was conducted. During the period 24 March through 15 April 1969, a total of 18 facilities were surveyed. A number of security deficiencies were noted and a recommendation to correct each deficiency was made as part of the survey. Excellent progress was made towards the correction of all deficiencies by 30 April 1969, and follow up action continues. 31 March through 6 April 1969, the MACV IG team visited the Da Nang area for the purpose of checking the combat and physical security procedures in effect to include protection of property, gate security, control of foreign nationals, documentary control of property, and protection of property in storage and in transit. An informal exit briefing was conducted but a formal inspection report has not yet been received. From 26 April through 29 April 1969, a four (4) man team from HQ's, 1st Log Comd, made a 525 inspection of this command. The team consisted of representatives from the Provost Marshal Office, ACoS, Trans, and ACoS, Supply. An exit briefing was conducted by the team but their final report has not yet been received.

x. (U) Signal Office (Inclosure 21). The summary of activities is given in inclosure.

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Da Nang for period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

2. (C) Section II, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluation, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel:

(1) Item: Entry of Bunkers During Attack.

(a) Observation: On 201930 April 1969, the Da Nang East area received 24 x 122mm rockets, three of which impacted in the vicinity of the 80th GSG Officers Billeting area. Several individuals were injured while running to a bunker.

(b) Evaluation: In this case, it was concluded that needless personnel injuries were sustained as a result of confusion and obstacles in pathways leading to bunkers.

(c) Solution: (1) All obstacles leading to bunkers have been removed enabling individuals to proceed to bunkers in a more orderly manner.

(2) More frequent practice alerts are being conducted so that individuals will be completely familiar with the procedures to be followed during an attack to include seeking cover in the immediate area.

(3) Additional bunkers are being constructed to reduce movement to shelters.

(2) Item: Personnel Replacement.

(a) Observation: This office has experienced the usual problems of staffing caused by rotation and reassessments.

(b) Evaluation: Continual personnel turbulence has caused essential staff maintenance mission to be delayed, and has hindered both effective cross-training and operational continuity.

(c) Solution: In February, a program was initiated to write complete functional job descriptions for each staff member. Formal cross-training between commodity sections was incorporated in the standing operating procedures (SOP). The effect of this system is to minimize interference with mission assignments and maintain continuity of operations. The procedures and the job descriptions are consistent with formal projects later developed by 1st Logistical Command as Project "SOP Alpha" and "SOP Bravo".

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Item: Radar Maintenance Training.

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(a) Observation: Replacements for radar repair personnel were not being received at an adequate rate.

(b) Evaluation: Shortfall of trained radar electronic repairmen was affecting the radar maintenance support, especially on counter-mortar set AN/MPQ-4A. Equipment requiring repair had to wait on available repair personnel.

(c) Action Taken: A training course on set AN/MPQ-4A was organized and conducted by Field Maintenance Technicians (FMT) of the Electronics Command (ECOM). The instruction was well received and reduced the shortage of trained personnel.

(2) Item: CC&S.

(a) Observation: During the month of February 1969, a gun rail removal kit arrived at the 633rd CC&S Company accompanied by Mr. Clayton (DAC). This kit was designed to recover rails that are worth approximately \$1,000.00 per set for reuse.

(b) Evaluation: Very little was known about the size, power requirements and general requirements necessary to operate the kit. After arrival on the ground it was discovered that an external power source was required. An additional delay was caused in obtaining the generator. After the operation got under way, extreme difficulty was encountered in removing the rails. It required from 2,500 to 3,000 pounds pressure to remove the rails while other SUPCOM's were experiencing the need for only 1,500 pounds pressure. This was attributed to the extreme hot weather conditions in ICTZ.

(c) Recommendation: That in future planning of this sort, advance information be provided to the 1st Logistical Command and SUPCOM's in order to allow maximum effectiveness of personnel on TDY, at the earliest date after arrival in country.

(3) Item: PDO.

(a) Observation: In the very near future, this command (USASC DNG) and other SUPCOM's in the 1st Logistical Command will receive extremely expensive and to some extent sophisticated specialized equipment in PDO activities.

(b) Evaluation: Specialized equipment, i.e., metal balers, aluminum sweepers, etc, require special power and/or installation in the way of foundations, road access etc. If thought of soon enough in the procurement cycle, plans can be made to have a technical representative of the company from which the equipment was procured to work with the recipient to the maximum extent.

(c) Recommendation: That a letter submitted to 1st Logistical Command, Subject: Specialized Equipment for DNG PDO, dated 19 April 69,

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command,
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be implemented to the maximum extent to allow all personnel to plan for the arrival of the equipment by knowing in advance, any and all requirements and the specifications of the equipment to include instruction in operation of the equipment by the manufacturer.

(4) Item: Loss of Funds.

(a) Observation: Due to other duties within the unit, a class A agent officer completed paying the personnel of his unit and placed the paid vouchers in the unit safe. Two weeks later the finance officer requested return of the vouchers. The officer opened the safe and discovered the vouchers missing but later learned that the company clerk forwarded the vouchers to the finance office. The Vouchers were never recovered.

(b) Evaluation: The inattention of the class A agent officer caused additional work of reconstructing approximately 8 vouchers and obtaining certification of payments from the individuals who had been reassigned from Vietnam in addition to the loss of \$298.00 in Government Funds due to inability to identify the remaining payees.

(c) Recommendation: That finance officers maintain a copy of vouchers advanced to class A agent officers for payment. That class A agent officers make returns to the finance officer not later than 24 hours upon completion of payments and that paid vouchers be treated the same as cash.

(5) Item: Handling of Explosives.

(a) Observation: On 19 March 1969, an individual picked up a hand grenade fuse while cleaning an ammunition conex. The fuse detonated, resulting in the individual's loss of a finger.

(b) Evaluation: The control and safe handling of explosives has been and will continue to be an area which requires close supervision. Conex containers used to store ammunition must be the object of extensive controls.

(c) Actions Taken: (1) Conexes used to store ammunition are being inspected on a regular basis by qualified officers.

(2) EOD personnel are notified of any explosive items which appear to be unsafe. When such items are discovered, the immediate area is cleared until items are rendered safe by a qualified individual.

(3) Instructions on the handling of explosives are being presented more frequently to personnel of this command.

(6) Item: AUTOSEVOCOM Installation.

(a) Observation: The AUTOSEVOCOM installation was hampered due to

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a long waiting period for Army personnel to inspect this facility.

(b) Evaluation: Current regulations require that AUTOSEVOCOM facilities be inspected by subscribers service, although installation in this area is done by Air Force personnel. The Air Force facility also has a qualified inspector which could have saved on installation time of the equipment.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend regulation be changed so that installing service will also be inspecting service.

c. (U) Training.

(1) Item:

(a) Observation: Prior to the end of August 1968, a retrograde assistance team of packaging and preservation specialists (two (2) Dept of Army Civilians) was in the DNG CC&S activity to provide technical knowledge and know how to the retrograde operation. The operation never really got off the ground due to the overall lack of military personnel available to assist the technical personnel. Immediately upon their departure the program deteriorated to nothing more than a passive operation. In November 1968, two more P&P Specialists arrived and were assigned to the 633rd CC&S Company to again provide the technical knowledge not available in the military personnel assigned.

(b) Evaluation: Having learned from the experience gained as a result of the previous period of time without the assistance of the civilian technician's knowledge this command on 15 March 1969, requested that the two civilians currently assigned be replaced by two other civilians in an attempt to keep the current retrograde program, which is in high gear, going. The assistance provided by these personnel has been extremely beneficial to the retrograde program and invaluable in improving the quality as well as the quantity of retrograde.

(c) Recommendations: That the request for replacement of the two civilians currently assigned to the 633rd CC&S Company, DSC, be approved and that action be taken through CAO, V to obtain the replacements in order to have them report to DSC NLT 20 May 1969.

(2) Item: 50 caliber MG Malfunction.

(a) Observation: During the past quarter, there were two incidents of rounds exploding in the chamber of 50 caliber machine guns, injuring the firer. The apparent reason for the malfunctions was improper timing and headspace settings.

(b) Evaluation: The personnel operating the 50 calibers did not know of the need to set the headspace timing or they did not know how to

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properly set the headspace timing.

(c) Recommendation, Action Taken: A program has been initiated to train personnel in the proper method of setting headspace and timing on the 50 caliber machine gun.

(3) Item: Defense Against Sapper Attacks.

(a) Observation: After action reports and intelligence summaries have indicated that many sapper attacks are meeting with success. Since the enemy is hurting man-power-wise, it is very likely that he will continue to employ sapper attacks which require less personnel than ordinary offensive attacks.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel in the target areas were not knowledgeable in the tactics used by the sappers in their attacks; therefore, during sapper attacks many personnel took cover in bunkers suspecting only a mortar and rocket attack and were KIA or WIA by satchel charges thrown into the bunkers.

(c) Action Taken: An information and training program has been initiated to indoctrinate all personnel on the methods used by sappers and the defense against sappers.

d. (C) Intelligence: NONE.

e. (U) Logistics:

(1) Item: Combat Essential Resupply Shipments.

(a) Observation: Considerable difference seems to exist in the definition of "Combat Essential Requirement," as used by various organizations and headquarters and delays frequently occur in processing.

(b) Evaluation: Tactical units are requesting items which to them are "Combat Essential". When the shipments are requested by 1st Log elements, they are frequently delayed or cancelled by higher tactical headquarters either because they have no knowledge of the requirement or consider that a combat emergency is not warranted.

(c) Recommendation: That regulations be revised to include a more specific definition of "Combat Essential" resupply and to include who the tactical units must notify to insure prompt processing.

(2) Item: Timing of Class V Allocations.

(a) Observations: USARV allocations do not cut off at the same time as ammunition reports. In addition, allocations are frequently increased too close to the end of the allocation period to allow for redistribution of assets before the allocation period ends.

(b) Evaluation: Daily ammunition report cuts off at 1500 hours while the allocations cut off at 1800 hours. On the last day of the

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allocation period, allocated items are frequently recorded as being drawn in the wrong period which results in differences in records at various headquarters and difficulty in controlling allocations. When the allocation message is received each month, available supplies are redistributed into ASPs based on the allocations of the units they support. If changes are made in the last few days of the period, redistribution frequently can not be effected before the period ends and the unit does not get to draw its increase.

(c) Recommendations: (1) That allocations cut off at the same time as ammunition reports.

(2) That unit allocations be adjusted half way through the allocation period.

(3) That, if units do not get to draw allocation increase before the end of the period, the increase be carried over since basic loads will have been depleted in meeting operation requirements.

(3) Item: Planning Factor of 14 Square Feet/Ton for ASPs in RVN.

(a) Observation: The planning factor of 14 square feet per ton area required to store Class V appears to be too low to enable compliance with explosive weight limits and compatibility requirements.

(b) Observation: Under category storage the following absolute minimum pads are needed at each ASP to meet compatibility requirements:

Category A -1 pad

B -1

C -1

D -1

E -1

F -1

Unser. -1

Capt. En. -1

ICM -1

11 pads

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If an equal number of days of supply of ammo is stored in each category, as SOs are distributed currently, two to four more pads are required for Categories A and B to meet explosive weight limits of 55,000 lbs/pad. Low pad area utilization results in all 50 x 50 or larger pads by meeting above storage requirements, since explosive limits are reached before cube limits. LC Reg 525-1 already recognizes the requirement for a minimum of fourteen pads in a modular ASP (35,000 sq. ft.). Since these are restricted to 2000 tons total capacity, the planning factor is 17.5 square feet per ton. Appendix D, paragraph 2f (1) and (2) provides the percentage each category of explosive represents of the normal stockage objective in RVN. The number of square feet per ton required for each category is also shown. Computations using these figures indicate the overall planning factor should be 18.38. Experience within I Corps indicates 18 sq ft/ton is about right. Considerably more tonnage could be stored of certain categories; such as chemical, small arms, and ICM; since separation requirements result in low pad utilization.

(c) Recommendations: (1) That the planning factor for rating capacity of ASPs be changed from 14 sq ft/ton to 18 sq ft/ton.

(2) Sizes of pads could be reduced to get better area utilization, but flexibility would be sacrificed.

(4) Item: Planning Class V Support of Operations.

(a) Observation: Class V support elements are not being brought into the planning of operations soon enough.

(b) Evaluation: Frequently organizations are completing support planning for operations without notifying supporting 1st Log Comd elements on anticipated increase in supply requirements. When notified, support elements frequently find the tactical units have already decided on how support arrangements will be and it is too late to change or the tactical unit will not allow a change. Usually the same support could have been provided more simply and at less cost to the government if the 1st Logistical Command elements, knowledgeable in the subject and the resources available, had been told what support was needed and not how to support the operation. Even on short notice operation, supporting elements and higher tactical headquarters must be aware of requirements to insure rapid processing of resupply request and assure that the higher headquarters will approve these requests for an increased portion of the theater's Class V assets.

(c) Recommendations: That the need for 1st Logistical Command elements to plan 1st Logistical Command Support be emphasized to all tactical elements and the need for early planning emphasized.

(5) Item: Air Shipments on OI-999 Priority.

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(a) Observation: An increasing number of OI-999 shipments are arriving long after their RDD.

(b) Evaluation: Priority OI-999 air shipments are frequently arriving over a week after offered for shipment. Such delays result in critical supply levels and subsequent CE shipments. These CE's only further delay already overdue OI-999s waiting at the same airhead for aircraft space. Losses at the airhead increase when items remain staged for extended periods.

(c) Recommendations: Evaluation of air shipment priorities with a view of revising them as to time intervals, from offering to delivery, that can be reasonably counted on by receiving activities.

(6) Item: Differences in Ammunition Rates.

(a) Observation: Considerable differences exist in the various ammunition rates associated with ammunition usage and stockage.

(b) Evaluation: Theater and Corps stockage are based on Intensive Combat Rates (ICR) and Theater Sustaining Rates (TSR). Basic Loads are based on considerably higher rates. Using units plan operational requirements frequently using the highest expected rate based on past peak usage for short periods. ASP resupply is based on the most recent usage rates adjusted for known future operations or unusual requirements. These differences, when coupled with the relatively infrequent use of Ammunition Supply Rates (ASR) announcements to subordinate commands when items are known to be in short supply but are not allocated, create considerable disparity between the rate of receipts and the rate of issue. Continued usage rates at higher than TSR will result in continuing increase in the TSR and ICR at each subsequent recomputation and such increases may not necessarily reflect the relative intensity of combat to other lower ICR/TSR periods.

(c) Recommendations: (1) That regulation establishing Basic Loads be revised and stated in terms of either ICR or TSR.

(2) That guidance be provided to tactical units and requirements for operations be developed and stated in terms of either ICR or TSR.

(3) That tactical units be advised on the use and importance of establishing and controlling Ammunition Supply Rates (ASR) to insure uninterrupted resupply at acceptable rates.

(7) Item: Palletization of Artillery Projectiles.

(a) Observation: A large percentage of projectiles are being damaged or broken loose from their pallets in shipment.

(b) Evaluation: Projectiles palletized three per pallet result in an

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unstable configuration for handling and storage. They fall over, and frequently fall out of S & P trucks. Stacking difficulties develop in storage and in ships. Dropping may crack cases which could result in premature in-bore detonations. Loose rounds resulting from damaged pallets increase handling time, damage rates, and losses in transit. Loose rounds are difficult for using units to sling-out and create hazards by falling from the slings. The incidence of these problems is drastically reduced where projectiles are palletized six per pallet.

(c) Recommendations: Maximum use of pallets of six or more projectiles in shipments from offshore or CONUS.

(8) Item: Unit Turn-in of Unexpended Class V Components and Captured Ammunition.

(a) Observation: Unit turn-ins of unexpended Class V components, packing materials and captured enemy ammunition throughout I Corps are negligible in spite of high issue rates and reports of large caches of enemy ammunition discovered.

(b) Evaluation: Repeated efforts to increase turn-ins of these items has resulted in relatively no increase in receipts. Certain packing materials are urgently needed in ASPs to repackage goods damaged in shipment and to repackage serviceable ammunition turned in by units. When not immediately repacked, the latter deteriorates and must be destroyed. In addition, small arms boxes, metal links, pallets, etc are vitally needed here and offshore.

(c) Recommendations: (1) That command emphasis be taken through tactical headquarters to insure sufficient quantities of these materials are turned in to meet requirements, or that ASPs be authorized to enforce turn-in requirements prior to issuing replacement ammunition.

(2) That units be directed when possible to turn-in captured enemy ammunition instead of destroying it.

(9) Item: Support under Inter Service Support Agreements (ISSA).

(a) Observation: Numerous requirements from ISSA supported elements are being received to supply items and locations not covered within the ISSA.

(b) Evaluation: MACV-SOG, 5th Special Forces, USAID, and Air Force receive Class V support from the US Army in I Corps. SOs list specific items authorized to be drawn from Da Nang ASP. An increasing number of unforeseen demands for Class V items are being received at outlying ASPs not covered by ISSA and for unauthorized items. Units are indicating these are combat emergency requirements. Distribution should be the supported element's responsibility under the ISSA. In addition, allocation

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data applicable to specific units supported, is not being received by the Ammunition Support units. In some cases, long operations are being supported by unit requests certifying combat requirements without supported unit's ISSA being revised.

(c) Recommendations: (1) ISSA's of units cited above be reviewed to insure adequacy of items and locations in relation to supported elements probable conditions.

(2) Procedures be established for supported units to immediately submit changes to ISSA when operations are required which can not be covered under existing ISSA.

(3) That Major Headquarters of supported organizations provide each Support Command with specific unit breakout of allocation of Class V applicable to the Support Command.

(10) Item: Central Power.

(a) Observation: Lack of central power for 1970 Military Construction Army (MCA) Program.

(b) Evaluation: (1) The lack of sufficient central power for the Da Nang/Da Nang East Military Complex became apparent during this period. Power is provided to Army and Navy Compounds from a central power plant operated by the Navy. Leased facilities serving FWMF in Da Nang City, receive power from municipal plants operated by the city. Air Force power needs are met by Air Force central power.

(2) COMNAVFORV, Rep, DNG, programmed a joint Army-Navy MILCON central power project for I Corps. It has been indicated that this program will not receive FY 1970 funds. If this is the case, power will not be available for future MCA facilities programmed for Da Nang East which were submitted, approved and funded on the basis that adequate central power would be available from the Navy.

(c) Recommendations: That the joint MILCON project for expansion of the Naval Central Power System be approved and funded to support FY 70 program, or that a limited generator power plant be approved to support Army units centered around USAFUPCOM, DNG, and Da Nang Signal Bn Compounds in Da Nang East area.

(11) Item: Construction Design.

(a) Observation: The time required to design the typical MCA project is normally 120 days which is excessive. This delay is further compounded by the fact that design effort can not commence until approval and funding of the project.

(b) Evaluation: Once funding has been accomplished, design, whether by contract or troop, should be limited to the selection of the most appropriate standard wooden type structures contained in TM 5-302. These

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structures are completely designed and contain sufficient detail to permit construction, with only the siting requiring design effort. Complete Bills of Material for the designs in TM 5-302 are contained in TM 5-303. By the use of these designs, not only would design time be drastically reduced, but the order-ship time of pre-fabricated metal buildings from CONUS would be eliminated. In general, wooden structures would meet the longevity criteria established for most cantonments in RVN and are less expensive than steel buildings. A further dividend in favor of wooden construction over steel was evidenced by the recent USMC ASP fire/explosion, where wooden structures withstood the effects of shock waves to a much higher degree than steel structures. A case in point was the 138th Aviation Company hanger which sustained no structural damage despite being in line of sight and nearer to the blasts than some equivalent steel structures which were damaged beyond repair. Adoption of aforementioned system would reduce the required design to site adaption only and in most instances, construction could be started within a matter of weeks rather than months after project approval/funding.

(c) Recommendations: That maximum use be made of standard designs contained in TM 5-302 and that design missions be accomplished at the lowest practicable level.

(12) Item: Reporting of Combat Losses and obtaining releases for replacement.

(a) Observation: In accordance with USARV Reg 735-3, Units requisition replacements for Combat Losses by submitting a confidential message to ICCV with an information copy to this headquarters. Upon receipt of the information copy the appropriate commodity manager at ICCV is contacted by telephone and requested to effect a release verbally and later confirmation by message, if assets are on hand in the Da Nang Field Depot. Presently the ICCV will not release a Combat Loss replacement until a copy of the combat loss message is received.

(b) Evaluation: That approximately 3 days could be saved if the Support Command could obtain telephonic release for Combat Losses.

(c) Recommendations, Action Taken: A policy has been established authorizing commodity managers to release assets for M48A3 tank and M113 personnel carrier only by telephone when notified by the Support Command that a Combat Loss has occurred.

f. (U) Organization:

(1) Item: CC&S

(a) Observation: The DSC, has a TO&E "Type B" CC&S Company. Due to

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the tremendous workload in ICTZ a "Type B" unit has proved to be inadequate to provide all aspects of the mission that should normally be expected of a CC&S Company. This has caused a backlog in the disassembly area and a de-emphasis of the operation in the "can" point. In an effort to correct this situation an attempt was made to provide the company with LN personnel, but a "freeze" on hiring negated this approach. A second attempt was made to correct the situation by initiating a PR&C for contractor assistance.

(b) Evaluation: It is felt that until the 633rd CC&S Company is provided with the assistance requested that the disassembly area operation and "can" point will, out of necessity, take a "back seat" to the retrograde of reparables.

(c) Recommendations: That the request DA Form 14-115 (PR&C) forwarded to Hq 1st Logistical Command by letter dated 10 March 1969, be approved and that contractor assistance be provided to accomplish these two important and necessary aspects of the CC&S Companies' mission.

g. (U) Other:

(1) Item: Command Emphasis.

(a) Observation: On 23 Mar 69, the Boy Scouts, Tien Sha Chapter, celebrated their 2nd Organizational Day Anniversary. The highlight of the party was the participation of BG James W. Gunn, Commanding General, USA Support Command, Da Nang.

(b) Evaluation: The appearance of the Commanding General added importance to the ceremony. The General's concern for the party gave the Vietnamese the feeling that their activities were noticed by the General, and deemed important to his command.

(c) Action Taken: Members of the Command and Staff are being encouraged to participate in Vietnamese functions and ceremonies.

(2) Item: Project Support.

(a) Observation: During the civic action activities in Hoa Lang Village (068 704), it was found that materials used in construction can be procured through the Vietnamese supply system from District (Hoa Vang), although this supply system is complicated and slower in response than the US Army system.

(b) Evaluation: The Vietnamese should be allowed the opportunity to support and supply themselves through channels opened to them by their government and the people be taught how to use this system.

(c) Recommendations: That the Vietnamese supply channels from Province and District be utilized whenever possible, to implement procedures of its use, and develop the system.

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(3) Item: Importance of Security to Civic Action.

(a) Observation: In the Hoa Lang Village (068 704) and surrounding hamlets, lack of effective security at night is a deterrent to effective civic action. This area is situated on the edge of VC Territory, and is a main avenue of advance for VC infiltrators into Da Nang.

(b) Evaluation: Tactical forces, both Marine and Popular Force, police the area. However, the nature of the infiltration and village location makes it impossible to enjoy complete friendly control of the area. Consequently, the attitude of the people is reluctance to cooperate with the US Army and Marine CA personnel for fear of VC reprisals. These forces are doing all they can to prevent harassment of the village, effective security remains the major factor in obtaining willing cooperation from village people in regard to Civic Action Projects conducted in their behalf.

(c) Recommendations: None.

(4) Item: Long Range Project.

(a) Observation: Long range projects are not desirable for civic action purposes. These projects often get lost in administration and complicated operational difficulties. They only serve to confuse the system and may have for reaching adverse effects on the village and/or hamlet society.

(b) Evaluations: Long range projects should be limited to only those necessary to insure village and/or hamlet survival.

(c) Recommendations: Short range, high impact projects which have a life-span of 1 to 3 months should be the concentration projects for civic action.

3. (U) Section III, Escape, Evasion, and Survival: None.

James W. Gunn

JAMES W. GUNN
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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1. (U) Organizational Chart
2. (U) List of Distinguished Visitors
3. (U) AGofS, Compt
4. (U) AGofS, P&A
5. (U) AGofS, SP&O, Sec-Div
6. (U) ACofS, SP&O, Plans Div
7. (U) ACofS, SP&O, Opn Div

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- 8. (C) AGofS, SP&O, GA
- 9. (U) ACofS, Sup
- 10. (U) Dir of Food
- 11. (C) ACofS, Patrol
- 12. (U) ACofS, Ammo
- 13. (C) ACofS, Trans
- 14. (U) ACofS, R&D
- 15. (C) ACofS, Maint
- 16. (U) ACofS, Services
- 17. (U) Chap
- 18. (U) HQ, Comd
- 19. (U) Comd JA
- 20. (U) PM
- 21. (U) Sig

Incls 2 - 5, 8, 10, 11, 17 - 21 wd Hq, DA

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DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

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Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is forwarded.

2. (G) Pertinent comments follows

a. Reference item concerning CC&S, page 10, paragraph 2b(2). Concur. In the future complete coordination of requirements for instructional material and equipment will be accomplished prior to granting theater clearance.

b. Reference item concerning PDO, page 10, paragraph 2b(3). Non-concur. It is not considered that the equipment referred to requires the assistance of a technical representative for accomplishing installation. As pointed out in the 1st Indorsement, this headquarters 1 May 1969 to basic letter from the US Army Support Command, Da Nang, 19 April 1969, the added cost of bringing a manufacturer's representative is not considered justifiable.

c. Reference item concerning Loss of Funds, page 11, paragraph 2b(4). Concur. Action taken by Headquarters, Da Nang Support Command is adequate and information has been passed to other Finance Sections of this command. No action is required by higher headquarters.

d. Reference item concerning AUTOSENVOCOM Installation, page 11, paragraph 2b(5). Concur. If the Installing Service inspected the facility it would relieve the work load of US Army Inspection units and expedite operation.

e. Reference item concerning Training of Personnel in Retrogade Operations, page 12, paragraph 2c(1). Concur. The requested civilian personnel will arrive in country on 9 June 1969 as part of a nine man retrograde team provided by AMG in CIO-V case 55-69.

f. Reference item concerning Combat Essential Resupply Shipments, page 13, paragraph 2e(1). A review of MACV Directive 55-4 and 1st Logistical Command Regulation 55-40 confirmed that sufficient guidance is provided to determine whether a particular requirement is "Combat Essential". These regulations also clearly define the request channels. The problems

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alluded to in this paragraph of the ORLL appear to be those resulting from judgements made by individuals, not from a lack of guidance in the applicable regulations. No action is required by this or higher headquarters.

g. Reference item concerning timing of Class V allocations, page 13, paragraph 2e(2). Concur in recommendation (1). Because of the criticality of the daily ammunition reports, cut off of all ammunition reports should be based on the 1500 hour time frame. Recommend that higher headquarters adjust cut off time of the allocation period. Nonconcur in recommendation (2). Suggested adjustment would only force issuing units to draw their complete monthly allocation during the first half of the allocation period. No action required by higher headquarters. Nonconcur in recommendation (3). This recommendation is in direct conflict with USARV Reg 700-7, dated 30 June 1968, which states that assets not drawn by the close of the period revert to control of HQ, USARV. Carryover of allocation would amount to a unit stockpile, held within an ammunition supply point or depot. No action required by higher headquarters.

h. Reference item concerning Planning Factor of 14 Square Feet/Ton for ASP's in RVN, page 14, paragraph 2e(3). Concur in recommendation (1). The factor of 14 square feet/STON does not provide for the storage space lost because of the necessity of maintaining lot integrity and storage compatibility. In maintaining lot integrity, a physical separation within a pad is required to preclude mixed issues. In addition, ammunition must be stored separately by compatibility groups. These two requirements do not allow for maximum utilization of storage space. The typical ASP consists of 14 storage locations which are 50 feet by 50 feet. This gives 35,000 square feet of storage space. The practical limit on such an ASP is 2,000 STON. This gives 17.5 or 18 square feet per STON. Action to adjust planning factor will be taken by this headquarters. Nonconcur in recommendation (2). A decrease in the size of the pads would eliminate flexibility and create the need for more engineering support to build additional pads. No action required by higher headquarters.

i. Reference item concerning Planning of Class V Support of Operations, page 15, paragraph 2e(4). Concur. It is axiomatic that logistical planning must be done simultaneously with tactical planning. The Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, has emphasized the policy that 1st Log Comd elements cannot remain passive and wait for the supported units to inform them of the tactical plans and support requirements. 1st Log Comd elements must maintain active liaison with supported units on a daily basis to keep current with tactical operations in progress and on those planned for the future. No further action is required of this or higher headquarters.

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j. Reference item concerning air shipments on 01-999 Priority, page 15, paragraph 2 e (5). Nonconcur with observation. Investigation has revealed that the difficulty in responding to priority air shipments resulted from a misunderstanding concerning reaction time for priority 999 shipments. This misunderstanding has been clarified. No further problems in this area are expected.

k. Reference item concerning differences in ammunition rates, page 16, paragraph 2 e (6). Nonconcur. USARV Reg 735-28 covers basic lead and authorizes the unit commander the advantage of requesting a maximum quantity of basic ammunition. This ammunition represents the computed amount for varied situations and tactical conditions. Tactical units should not be involved in computing rates per individual unit since rates are theater rates. Theater Sustaining Rates and Intensive Combat Rates (TSR and ICR) are used to establish stockage objectives and accomplish requisition actions. They are reviewed and adjusted every six months. The use of TSR and/or ICR to establish basic leads would cause a continual fluctuation in a unit's authorized basic lead. No action required by higher headquarters.

l. Reference item concerning palletization of artillery projectiles, page 16, paragraph 2 e (7). Nonconcur. Ammunition is requisitioned by DODAC not by FSN. The FSN dictates size of pallet loads as used by shipping depots in CONUS and offshore reserve locations to fill the requisition to the closest pallet. Proper use of Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE) and proper blocking and bracing would alleviate unsafe conditions in handling and storage aboard vehicles and vessels. This problem has not been reported from other locations and the physical weight of individual items tend to refute problem as stated. No action required by higher headquarters.

m. Reference item concerning unit turn-in unexpended Class V components and captured ammunition, page 17, paragraph 2 e (8). Concur. However, it should be noted that HQ, USARV has directed using units to turn-in Class V components (Ref: AVHGD-AM, subject: Ammunition Packing Material, DTG 131112Z Oct 68). Turn-in of captured enemy ammunition is a matter of continuing command interest as evidenced by periodic messages to all commands. Continued command emphasis is required by tactical commands.

n. Reference item concerning support under Inter Service Support Agreements (ISSA), page 17, paragraph 2 e (9). Concur. Any change in customer requirements necessitates an amendment to the ISSA to be initiated by the customer. Customer units should further be made aware of the ISSA items for support and request only these items agreed to. Action by higher HQ is required.

o. Reference item concerning central power, page 18, paragraph 2 e (10).

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Concur. It is the understanding of this headquarters that the Navy has been tasked with the responsibility of furnishing power for the Da Nang complex. The Commanding General USAECiV has been requested to perform and provide to the COMNAVFORV Representative, Da Nang, a power survey to include the Army facilities at Da Nang East. It is recommended that action be taken to resolve the critical power problem which appears to be developing in the Da Nang area.

p. Reference item concerning Construction Design, page 2e(11). This headquarters agrees that often the time required for design is excessive, but recognizes that engineering design is, by its very nature, a lengthy process. It is recommended that Headquarters USARV evaluate the suggestion for the use of the designs contained in TM 5-302 although it is doubtful that the use of the Army Functional Component's System would decrease design time inasmuch as standard tropicalized designs are currently in use both in construction directed to troops and in contractor-directed construction. It is further recommended that Headquarters USARV evaluate the suggestion to make maximum use of wood frame structure in favor of steel prefabricated buildings.

q. Reference item concerning CC&S page 19, paragraph 2f(1). Concur. Action taken by forwarding headquarters with relation to the PR&C is considered inadequate. The requirement was not completely justified, no scope of work or specifications were attached, nor was an estimate of the actual contract cost presented. This headquarters has initiated a PR&C for the actual operation of selected functions within the Unserviceable Division of the US Army Depot, Long Binh. It is anticipated that if this type contract proves feasible at Long Binh it will be expanded as necessary to provide the same services in other CC&S activities. Recommend that HQ, USARV and HQ, USARPAC approve the PR&C noted above.

r. Reference item concerning Project Support, page 20, paragraph 2g(2). Concur. The action taken is part of the normal civic action operating procedures which are outlined in USARV's Civic Action Guide for the S-5. To enhance the GVN's image, maximum participation by the Vietnamese officials is encouraged especially in the areas of self-help, labor, and the furnishing of materials. By emphasizing the GVN's participation and minimizing US support, the people will become more aware of their Government's interest in their welfare. In addition, it will help develop the GVN's chain of command by requiring them to utilize their supply system down to the lowest levels.

s. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

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AVCA GO-MH 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the US Army Support Command,
Da Nang for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

28 JUN 1969

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

LANNY K. KELSEY
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM, DNG

AVHGC-DST (30 April 1969) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command,
Da Nang, for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1))

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 23 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Da Nang.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Support under Inter Service Support Agreements (ISSA)," section II, page 17, paragraph e(9) and 1st Indorsement; nonconcur. Paragraphs 7e(2), (3), (4), and 7f, USARV Regulation 700-13, dated 30 December 1968, prescribes specific clauses which are included in all Class V ISSAs prepared by Headquarters, USARV. Subordinate commands should refer all cases in which the receiving activity is not complying with a specific agreement to Headquarters, USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-SD. Support being requested on a continuing basis, which is changed in any way from that which an ISSA provides for, should be immediately referred to Headquarters, USARV. The unit will be notified of proper procedures to be followed. No further action required by higher headquarters.

b. Reference item concerning "Central Power," section II, page 18, paragraph e(10), and 1st Indorsement; concur. The Department of Defense has disapproved all requests for Army power plants in the Da Nang complex area because the Navy has been tasked to supply the power. This headquarters has dispatched a message to Headquarters, MACV asking for assistance in obtaining sufficient power to meet the Army's requirements.

c. Reference item concerning "Construction Design," section II, page 19, paragraph e(11), and 1st Indorsement; nonconcur.

(1) Few of the plans in TM 5-302 are of the tropical design required in RVN. The contractor constructed facilities designed by the Officer in Charge of Construction-RVN (OICC) have provided a sizeable collection of designs which are being used whenever possible. The United States Army Engineer Construction Agency Vietnam (USAECAV) specifies standard tropical designs for troop construction directives.

(2) Pre-engineered metal buildings provide for rapid design and construction. Since metal buildings are more resistant to the elements than wooden structures and afford greater flexibility of design, their continued use is considered prudent. The fact that the 138th Aviation Company's hanger sustained less damage than steel buildings in the same area does not

AVHGC-DST (30 April 1969) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, US Army Support Command,
Da Nang, for Period Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1))

prove that wooden buildings are more resistant to shock waves. The resultant damage is dependent upon many factors in addition to distance and line of sight.

d. Reference item concerning "CC&S," section II, page 19, paragraph f(1); nonconcur. The Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C), referred to was returned without action by this headquarters on 26 June 1969 because it contained several irregularities. It is presently being revised for resubmission by the 1st Logistical Command. No further action is required by this or higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
US Army Spt Comd, Da Nang
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (30 Apr 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command,
Da Nang, for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 AUG 69


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forward-
ing indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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INCLOSURE 1

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ACofS, SP&O, Plans Division

1. (U) Organization:

a. An MTDA for Headquarters Detachment, Da Nang Support Command modifying the DA approved TDA was submitted for approval to 1st Log Command on 23 April 1969. The MTDA calls for the upgrading of ACofS slots from O-4 to O-5 and the upgrading of certain key NCO slots from E-5 and E-6 to E-7, E-8 and E-9.

b. A total of seven (7) General Orders were prepared for publication reassigning or attaching subordinate units within the command.

c. On 15 Feb 69 CPT Tutton, Plans Officer returned to CONUS, CPT Tutton was replaced as Plans Officer by Major Gregory F Coseo who arrived in the command on 20 Feb 69.

2. (C) FORCE DEVELOPMENT:

a. The following units have been deployed from ICTZ:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>EFF DATE</u>
510th ENG Pjt	Phu Bai	Qui Nhon	28 Feb 69
264th TC Pl	Da Nang	Qui Nhon	1 Apr 69
235th TC Plt	Da Nang	CRB	10 Feb 69
446th TC Co	Quang Tri	Saigon	15 Apr 69

b. The following unit was deployed to ICTZ:

515th TC PLT	CRB	Da Nang	10 Feb 69
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3. (U) TRAINING:

a. Project Skills I was initiated by 1st Logistical Command on 15 February 1969. From that date to the end of the reporting period, Da Nang Support Command has trained 140 personnel under Project Skills I A and B.

b. The US Army Mobility Equipment Command (USAMECOM), which is under the operational control of Da Nang Support Command, has provided training to 31 ARVN personnel during the reporting period.


c. On 3 February 1969, a Training Seminar for subordinate units was held at HQ, Da Nang Support Command.

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INCLOSURE 1

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ORLL (CONT)

Items discussed included the QJT Program, Support Command Regulation 350-1, replacement training, maintenance training, weapons familiarization and requesting of training aids. The seminar was an excellent vehicle for airing and discussing problems related to training.

d. Project Ready II was completed on 22 February 69. This Project was the follow up program to the Project Ready I staff visits. The visits were made by an Ad Hoc committee from this headquarters. Items checked included personnel strengths, training, PLL's, morale and living conditions. The visits of Ready II showed that excellent progress had been made since the visits of the Ready I program.

4. (C) SUPPORT CONCEPT: Plans for current and future logistical support of Army units in ICTZ were developed by this headquarters. Logistical support activities are based on supply points at Quang Tri, Phu Bai, Da Nang and Chu Lai, with limited facilities at Dong Ha, Camp Evans, Hill 63 and Duc Pho. Army Forces north of Camp Evans will be supported out of Quang Tri using the Dong Ha/Cua Viet Port. Phu Bai will support Camp Evans and south to Hai Van Pass. Southern ICTZ will continue to be supported through the ports at Chu Lai and Sa Huynh. Da Nang will continue as the primary storage and trans shipment point for ICTZ.

5. (U) SUPPORTED FORCE: Supported strengths are under continual revision based on unit arrivals and departures and major command reorganizations. Following the end of the reporting period, it was determined that Da Nang Support Command supports approximately 73,050 troops. This is an 8.2:1 ratio based on supported strength against Support Command strength.

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ACofS, SP&O, Operations Division

1. (C) DNG, Support Command presently has six major logistical support activities(LSA's) as described under new definitions recently published by the Department of the Army.

a. LSA Quang Tri provide all but class I support to 1/5 Inf. Division (MECH) and elements of the 108th Artillery Gp. Class I is provided by USMC forces in that area. Average supported strength is 13,000 troops.

b. LSA's Camp Evans and Phu Bai provide all classes of supply to XXIV Corps and 101st ABN Division. Marines in this area are providing class I support. Average total supported strength is 32,000.

c. LSA LZ Baldy provides all classes of supply to the 196th Inf. Bde, Americal Division, average strength in this area is 4,000 troops.

d. LSA Chu Lai supports Americal Division in classes I & V. The Navy provides class III and stores class I. Americal DISCOM operates classes II & IV.

e. LSA Duc Pho supports the 11th Bde, Americal Division with all classes of supply. Average supported strength in this area 6000 troops.

2. (C) During the month of February the enemy increased their rocket attacks resulting in heavy damage to installations within DNG area.

a. 230312H Feb 69, an estimated 4,000 S/T of Ammunition was destroyed at an ARVN Ammo Dump in East DNG area.

b. 230530H Feb 69, incoming rounds hit DNG AFB and POL Storage, destroying 200,000 gallons of JP/4 fuel.

c. 280228H Feb 69, the Bridge Ramp in DNG was hit by a rocket attack resulting in the loss of 432 S/T of ammo and two Navy ships.

3. (U) Movement of units continued throughout this reporting period with the following moves being accomplished:

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ACofS, SP&O, Operations Division

- a. 10 Feb 515th TC Plt from CRB to DNG.
- b. 10 Feb 263rd TC Plt from DNG to CRB.
- c. 23 Feb 510th Engrs Plt from Phu Bai to QNH.
- d. 5 Mar 43rd Engrs Det from Quang Tri to Phu Bai.
- e. 5 Mar 571st ORD Co Hq's from Quang Tri to Phu Bai.
- f. 15 Mar 533rd Engrs Det from Pho Track to Phu Bai.
- g. 1 Apr 264th TC Plt from DNG to QNH.
- h. 1 Apr 403rd TC Co from Quang Tri to DNG.

4. (U) Several administrative improvement projects have been completed to obtain better management and efficiencies in office procedures. A series of charts have been redesigned to provide trend information reflecting status of supplies with safety and management levels being incorporated. The completion of logistical and tactical situation maps have greatly facilitated briefing and orienting visitors and newly assigned personnel to this command.

5. (C) With the possibility of implementing T-Day, a unit movement plan with personnel and equipment data from supported units is being compiled for future requirement.

6. (U) Movement Control Centers (MCC's) have been established throughout I Corps operated by the 403rd Terminal Service Co. for maximum control and utilization of surface transportation assets of this command.

7. The amount of supplies moved through the port of Sa Huynh was increased to allow the Navy to more effectively utilize the port and personnel. Vehicles traveling between Qui Nhon and Duc Pho were showing premature aging. QL-1 highway, between Chu Lai and Duc Pho is unreliable for a main supply route because of the capability of the VC to blow bridges at any time they desire.

8. (U) A recent study was conducted by this command for the USA Combat Developments Command (CDC) on the LSA at Duc Pho. The study provided CDC with information on SOP's, organization problem areas, or ways it could be made more efficient.

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ACofS, SP&O, Operations Division

9. (U) In mid-February this command took over the operation of the Property Disposal Yard at Chu Lai from the Americal Division.

10. (U) MACV advisors in I Corps are presently receiving support from a number of different sources. A request was made by MACV to see if they could receive all their support from this command. The results of this study stated this command could provide their required support.

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ACofS, Supply

1. (U) Command: None

2. (U) Personnel Administration, Morale and Discipline:

a. LTC Donald W. Cripps replaced LTC Robert E. Crowe on 6 February as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply. LTC Crowe, 1LT Rodney L. Smith, MSG Edward F. Fischler and SFC Francis R. Keane, departed the command during the reporting period.

b. Upon departure LTC Crowe was awarded the Legion of Merit. The Bronze Star Medal was awarded to 1LT Smith, MSG Fischler and SFC Keane.

3. (U) Operations: None

4. (U) Training:

a. On 25 February 1LT Earl T. Sutter attended a Closed Loop conference at 1st Log. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the progress of the Closed Loop Program and the problem areas encountered by each Support Command.

b. During early March, Major Robert J. Sweeney, Supply Officer, attended a conference at 1st Log, to discuss the Red Ball requisition procedures for the M107/110 Repair and Return program.

c. Major James E. Bertram, Supply Management Officer, attended a conference held at USARV Headquarters. The purpose of the conference was to introduce to the various divisional and separate brigade logistical personnel, supply improvement projects currently being used within 1st Log, which are being adopted for USARV units.

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d. Capt Bill G. Belcher attended the monthly Count II conference at Long Binh Depot. Purpose of the conference was to present progress status and problem areas of the Count II project.

e. As a part of Project Skills a composite instruct/Advice Team was established from qualified Supply and Maintenance personnel. A program of instruction has been established and visits are being made to the DSU/GSU's. Classes have been beneficial and should continue to eliminate many problem areas.

5. (U) Intelligence: None

6. (U) Logistics:

a. Project Fill - Project Fill was initiated in early November for the purpose of reducing habitual zero balances on critical items at the DSU/GSU's and Depot. DSU/GSU's screen their ASL's to identify those items which are zero balance or are in critical short-supply. This information is forwarded to the USA FLD DEPOT, DNG, where it is further screened, consolidated and forwarded to ICCV. As of 15 April, the depot had received reports on 3032 lines from the DSU/GSU's and filled 905 lines of those reported. The depot reported 1266 lines to ICCV of which 195 were filled.

b. Project Count II - The concept of Project Count II requires an accelerated 100 percent cyclic inventory to be conducted every six months at Depots and DSU/GSU's. To date, the Depot has completed 41 percent of the inventory and the DSU/GSU's have completed 49 percent. No problems are expected in completing the inventory in the given time frame.

c. Repair and Return Program - In February implementing instructions were received for the Repair and Return program of the M108 and M109 Self Propelled weapons. During March, PLL's and ASL's were established by the ICCV. Direct Exchange items for the DSU/GSU's were also established. Requisitions were submitted and repair parts are being received at the present time. Repair and Return of the weapons is planned to begin in May.

d. Project Clean (NCR 500) - Project Clean (NCR 500) was initiated in December 1968 as a management tool by which DSU/GSU's would conduct a 100 percent review of the stock record ledgers on a cyclic basis. During March the first review was completed. A total dollar value of \$238,402.62 was realized on 17,452 cancelled requisitions. Total value of excess identified was \$126,593.

e. Tank Exchange - The 1/5th Infantry Division (MECH) had a total of 69 ea tanks, M48A2C (gas) to exchange for M48A3 (diesel). Tanks (M48A3) were released by ICCV for the exchange program as they were reported by the Da Nang Depot as being on hand in RFI condition. The exchange program began 12 December 68, and completed on 1 April 69.

f. Reports of Survey, Combat Losses and Quarterly Report of Operational Loss.

(1) This staff acted on 55 Reports of Survey during the reporting period. Total amount loss to the Government was \$101,074.08. Seven (7) individuals were found pecuniarily liable for a total of \$799.00.

(2) Three (3) Combat Loss reports were acted upon during the reporting period. These reports involved eight (8) items for a dollar value of \$5,451.00.

(3) Thirty-one (31) Quarterly Reports of Operation Loss were received during the reporting period. Dollar value of droppage allowed was \$2583.26

7. (U) Organization: In keeping with the TASTA-70 concept, effective 10 March 1969 the Assistant Chief of Staff, Food was redesignated Directorate of Food and become a major element of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply.

8. (U) Other: None.

ACOFS, AMMUNITION

1. (U) Class V Supply and Storage. a. Waivers were returned from 1st Log Comd approved for ASP's on dates indicated:

- (1) Camp Evans - 1 Mar 69
- (2) Hill 63 - 7 Mar 69
- (3) Chu Lai - 18 Feb 69
- (4) Duc Pho - 28 Feb 69

b. Construction in the ICTZ ASP's follows:

(1) Construction continued at Phu Bai with the rehabilitation of the old USMC Berms and the construction by the 101st of a sling out pad in the ASP.

(2) Construction at Camp Evans consisted of turning over four (4) pads to the 101st Abn Div for a sling out area and relocation of the RTT, motor pool, and bunker.

(3) Rehabilitation was completed at Hill 63 ASP and the installation of PSP at Hill 63 and Chu Lai was of significant importance in the SICTZ facilities improvement objectives.

(4) At Quang Tri, five (5) quonset huts for ammunition storage will be completed in May.

c. Support of the ARVN at Quang Tri continued with another 60 days extension requested and granted. Renewal is also expected for the May-June period.

d. Authority to ship ammunition by vehicle over the Hai Van Pass during periods of reduced sea transportation capabilities was obtained from III MAF, which will greatly enhance our flexibility to resupply NICTZ during adverse weather conditions and non-availability of sea or air transportation.

e. Stockage objective changes were minor ones in TSR and ICR rates coupled with relative few density changes and presented no significant change in our ICTZ stockage objectives.

f. Based on recently completed construction, approved waivers and experience factors regarding the influence of explosive weight and compatibility in ASP rated capacity it was found that explosive weight limit and compatibility were the determining factors in two of our ASP's. Three of our ASP's capacity is limited by LC Reg 525-1 to 2000 tons for modular ASP's. Comparison of available capacity with the current SO indicates approximately 8600 tons of unobligated facilities.

INCLOSURE 12

(INCLOSURE 12 CONT'D)

2. (U) Ammunition Service Organization. Headquarters of the 571st Ordnance Company was moved from Quang Tri to Phu Bai to facilitate coordination with major Headquarters, improve communication and proximity to their largest ASP for control.

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ACOFS, TRANSPORTATION

1. (U) Key Personnel Changes: On 7 February 1969, 1LT Franklin R. Emrick, Port Operations Officer, departed to Fort Eustis. On 7 March 1969, CPT David B. Ehle assumed position of Highway Motor Plans Officer. On 6 April 1969, MAJ Robert B. Goldberg, Plans and Operations Officer, departed for Germany. On 12 March 1969, CPT William Moroz, Port Operations Officer, departed for Mobility Command, St Louis.

2. (U) During the reporting period, there were several incidents of enemy initiated action against Da Nang Support Command motor convoys. None of these incidents caused serious damage or injury. Morale and Esprit de Corps of transportation units have continued at a high level.

3. (C) Transportation Operations. a. In relation to the disposition of forces in the ICTZ, the following redeployment of transportation units were accomplished:

(1) 235th Trans Plt (5 Ton Cargo) in Da Nang exchanged colors with the 515th Trans Plt (5 Ton Cargo) in Cam Ranh Bay, effective 10 February 1969.

(2) 403rd Trans Co (Terminal Transfer) from Quang Tri to Da Nang, effective 5 April 1969.

(3) 264th Shore Plt from Da Nang to Qui Nhon, effective 10 April 1969 (less personnel and equipment). Personnel and equipment have been integrated into the 403rd Trans Co.

(4) 446th Trans Co (Med Trk) from Quang Tri to Saigon, effective 20 April 1969.

(5) 363rd Trans Plt (Med Trk) from Phu Bai to Quang Tri, effective 20 April 1969.

b. The 39th Trans Bn and 57th Trans Bn continued to support Northern and Southern ICTZ respectively.

c. The 515th Trans Plt (5 Ton Cargo) continued to operate primarily from Da Nang to LZ Baldy (Hill 63) providing ammunition resupply to the Americal Division.

d. During the reporting period, ocean transportation moved 182,446 S/T of Army Cargo through the Port of Da Nang and its subsidiary ports.

e. During the reporting period, the Movement Control Center and its field offices processed 14,716 TCMD's aggregating 189,249 S/T of Army cargo.

f. During the reporting period, transportation truck units moved 293,195 S/T of cargo in support of units within ICTZ.

INCLOSURE 13

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(INCLOSURE 13 CONT'D)

g. The 1st Shore Platoon, 264th Trans Co and 403d Trans Co (TT) processed 28,200 S/T of Army Cargo through the major air fields in ICTZ during the reporting period.

h. The railroad continued limited operation during the reporting period. There were ten major enemy initiated incidents which caused a total of 17 days loss of operation. There was no damage to US Army owned equipment or US Army Cargo. Utilization of the railroad by US Army is still dependent upon completion of the spur lines at Bridge Ramp, Da Nang, and 26th GSG, Phu Bai. Estimated completion date of spur line construction at both sites is 1 June 1969.

4. (C) Logistics. A critical shortage exists in 5 ton cargo trucks. The TOE authorization for the three 5 ton cargo companies in ICTZ is 180 task vehicles, however, there are presently only 107 task vehicles on hand.

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ACoFS, RETROGRADE AND DISPOSAL

1. (U) The retrograde quota established by 1st Logistical Command has continued to increased during the period from 4,000 short tons in February and March to 5,000 short tons in April, an increase of 25% over January. The assigned quota was exceeded for each month.
2. (U) During the reporting period there were 569 M ~ series vehicles transferred from the PDO account to the Republic of China (Taiwan) and 61 of the same type vehicles transferred to the Republic of Korea on a non-reimbursable Military Assistance Program (MAP) release approved by CINCPAC.
3. (U) During the period there were 11 usable property sales lists submitted by PDO to the Foreign Excess Sales Office with an acquisition cost of \$4,247,543.70 and 4,486 short tons.
4. (U) The first piece of specialized non-standard equipment for Da Nang PDO has arrived in country. A set of 60 ton truck scales is presently at Da Nang PDO awaiting installation.
5. (U) During the period Giant Tire Service completed a shipment of 262 short tons of tires sold on IFB #9006.
6. (U) The old scrap contract (Leong Sin) was terminated during the report period and a new one established on 10 March 1969 with Whiting, Chase, and Lehman for 57,704 short tons for a two (2) year period at a bid price of \$1,286,800.00. New scrap contractor had his first ship in the commercial harbor as of 28 April 1969.
7. (U) On 28 March 1969, the first LST load of scrap from the Phu Bai ASP was shipped out by Cecil Whiting. Approximately 1½ LST loads remain.
8. (U) On 14 April 1969, the Americal Division Base Development Board assigned a priority "03" to the construction project for the Chu Lai PDO. The 58th MCB has been tasked with construction.
9. (U) On 16 April 1969, one enlisted man was assigned to Chu Lai to monitor removals of 6,038 short tons of scrap sold during last report period. No removals have been effected to date.

INCLOSURE 14

ACoFS, MAINTENANCE

1. (U) Communication-Electronics: AN/MPQ-4A Radar Set. This set is the primary radar intercept equipment for detection of enemy rocket and mortar launching sites. Due to continuous usage, retrograde actions and lack of replacements; there presently exists a critical shortage of this radar system in ICTZ.

STATISTICS (AN/MPQ-4A)

AUTH	23	(17 for use, 6 floats)
ON HAND	16	(15 in use, 1 float)
Retrograded	3	
Replacements Received	1	
Awaiting Retrograde	2	
Combat Loss	1	
Total Short	8	
Total Needed	10	(8 + 2 awaiting retrograde)

A letter was prepared and dispatched to HQ, 1st Logistical Command requesting assistance in obtaining the 10 required radars.

2. (U) General Equipment:

a. Rewind of Electric Motors: Heretofore there existed no organic electric motor rewind facilities available to the US Army in ICTZ. The US Navy, under existing Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) furnishes limited motor rewinding for Repair and Utilities (R&U) activities. A request for extension of this ISSA to include tactical electrical motor rewinding was refused due to inadequate facilities to handle the required workload. To alleviate this problem, this office initiated a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) to provide for rewind of electric motor on the local economy through the US Navy Purchasing Officer, Da Nang. The MIPR was approved for FY 69 in the amount of \$5,000. Anticipated funding for FY 70 is approximately \$20,000.

b. Contract Proposal - Philco-Ford: A comprehensive review was accomplished of the Philco-Ford contract which covered the establishment, management and operation of maintenance facilities in ICTZ for forklifts, electric motor rewind and refrigeration/air conditioners. During the course of this review, the following facts were disclosed:

(1) At the time of initial liaison between this HQ and Philco-Ford, approximately January 1969, the overall non-available rate for forklifts was 25%. Of this 25%, 63% were deadlined for parts (EDP). At times the non-available rate for forklifts exceeded 50% in NICTZ seriously endangering the command's support mission. It was estimated that the utilization of a civilian contractor would increase the availability of repair parts, based on prior experience between this HQ's and Vinnell Corporation at Wunder Beach.

(2) This HQ's is presently experiencing a non-availability rate of

INCLOSURE 15

(INCLOSURE 15 CONT'D)

6% for rough terrain forklifts. If repair parts fill continues at its present course, the deadline rate will fluctuate around 10% or one-half the MACV tolerance. Lack of repair parts continue to bar further reduction of the MHE deadline, although within the last two months our supply posture has improved.

(3) Recently this headquarters successfully secured a Military Inter-departmental Purchase Request (MIPR) for electric motor rewind therefore, additional motor rewinding facilities as proposed by Philco-Ford will not be required.

(4) Heretofore lack of trained personnel hampered our refrigeration/air conditioning support capability. However recently, the personnel profile on refrigeration/air conditioning repairmen (S1E) no longer presents a problem as we presently have 19 on hand as opposed to 22 authorized. Based on the above cited facts the proposed contract was rejected.

c. Reefer Repair and Return (R&R) Program: With the onset of the summer season, the operational status of 7½ Ton refrigeration units will become of vital concern within the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). Past Technical Inspections (TI) on these refrigeration units have indicated almost a total lack of organizational maintenance. Liaison visits resulted in reports of inoperative reefers that were not job-ordered to the appropriate support maintenance activity. To remedy this situation, the following plan was put into effect:

(1) Increased emphasis on both support and organizational maintenance.

(2) Monitoring of support maintenance with respect to status of equipment repairmen, required special tools, equipment, repair parts, and status of maintenance floats.

(3) A technical inspection to be performed by the various support maintenance units on all refrigeration units in ICTZ. As a result of these technical inspections a maintenance repair and return program will begin to upgrade the condition of our refrigeration unit fleet.

3. (U) Firepower and Mobility: a. M107/M110 R&R Program: The M107/M110 (175mm Self propelled Gun, 8" Self propelled Howitzer) R&R Program continued throughout the quarter. In all, fifty-six R&R services have been conducted twenty-three of them during this quarter. A weapon remains on the R&R Program for seven days. If the weapon requires additional repairs beyond the seven day time frame, it is removed from the R&R Program and placed in direct support maintenance for the required repairs. The non-operational rates for the M107's and M110's are listed below:

(INCLOSURE 15 CONT'D)

END <u>ITEM</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	NON-OPERATIONAL		
		<u>% NORM</u>	<u>% NORs</u>	<u>% NOR</u>
M107	Feb	15.2	8.5	23.7
M110	Feb	9.8	1.9	11.7
M107	Mar	13.9	8.2	22.1
M110	Mar	12.6	0.6	13.2
M107	Apr*	7.1	7.9	15.0
M110	Apr*	4.5	1.7	6.2

*Note: These statistics were calculated as of 22 Apr 69.

A steady reduction of the non-operational rate for the M107 has been experienced, with a sharp drop in April. The non-operational rate of the M110 remained approximately the same in February and March and then dropped abruptly in April. This overall decrease in the non-operational rate of both weapons reflects, at least in part, the success of the R&R Program. Intensive management and extensive use of Field Maintenance Technicians (FMT's) and the retrograding of several of the older weapons under the closed loop program have also contributed to this improved maintenance posture. One of the difficulties encountered in the management of the R&R Program was the fact that additional repair parts, found to be required during R&R services, were requiring longer to obtain than the seven days allotted for R&R services. R&R centers were directed to perform a pre-R&R inspection of each weapon three weeks before the scheduled R&R service. This has alleviated this problem to some degree. Another problem was maintenance support on those weapons located in areas accessible only by air. For these weapons, the DSV involved has been conducting a modified R&R Program utilizing a contact team to perform on-site maintenance.

b. M108/M109 R&R Program: There are 36 M108/M109 Howitzers (105mm and 155mm Self propelled Howitzers) in this command that will be subject to this program. On 10 Apr 69, this command was directed to take action to initiate this program immediately. DNG SUPCOM UNCLAS msg 4356 DTG 221028Z Apr 69, subj: R&R Program M108/M109 SP Artillery was sent to 1st Log Comd, requesting that initiation on this program be delayed until a fill of at least 60% is obtained on the expanded ASL of repair parts to be used in the services. This same message also requested that, since the present non-operational rate for these weapons is very low, these services, when initiated, be reduced in frequency to semi-annually and remain as such so long as the non-operational rate continues to remain low. Another reason for requesting that the M108/M109 R&R Program be downgraded to a semi-annual service was to keep the maximum amount of personnel and facilities available for use on the M107/M110 R&R Program and regular repairs. Experience has shown that the M108/M109 Weapons require much more maintenance than do the M107/M110 Weapons and so we want to continue to direct our primary efforts to the M107/M110 Weapons.

(INCLOSURE 15 CONT'D)

c. Use of Field Maintenance Technicians: (FMT's) During the latter part of February and the first part of March two different teams of FMT's from 1st Log Comd HQ made technical assistance visits to the artillery units in NICTZ. During these visits, these teams conducted a survey of the M107/M110 Self Propelled Weapons to determine which weapons met retrograde criteria. A list of these weapons was published by 1st Log HQ on 28 Mar 69. There are nine M107/M110 SP Weapons in the Da Nang Support Command which meet these criteria and two of these have already been replaced. In addition to selecting retrograde candidates, the teams provided intensive assistance and instruction in maintenance, particularly at the battery level. These instructions were very well received and the number of weapons deadlined for organizational deficiencies dropped noticeably shortly thereafter. This office has established a team of two WEJOM FMT's to conduct a similar program. A schedule has been arranged to permit a visit to each artillery battalion in ICTZ once each month. This team will also make liaison visits to the DSU's in the Support Command in conjunction with their assistance visits to the artillery units.

4. (U) Instruct and Advise (I&A) Team: A "pre-visit" instructing team was formed in conjunction with ACoFS, Supply for the purpose of assisting DSU's in improving upon maintenance and supply procedures. This program was formalized by 1st Log Command as a section of Project Skills I. Personnel from the offices of the ACoFS, Maintenance and ACoFS, Supply visited each DSU in April 1969. Recent I&A reports from 1st Log were used as instruction guides maximum emphasis was placed on the assistance aspect of program, rather than the inspection phase. Instead of formal classroom type instruction, case studies were used as a "lessons learned" system. These "pre-visit" I&A teams will visit each DSU every two months.

5. (U) ICTZ ES Maintenance Requirements Versus Da Nang Support Command Maintenance Capability. The first comprehensive analysis of ICTZ ES Equipment Maintenance requirements versus the support command's capability to meet these requirements was accomplished. The approach used in this analysis was consistent with the CDC study entitled "Capabilities of Constar Maintenance Units Expressed in End Item Equivalents." The basis for our analysis were taken from those requirements data contained in the equipment density booklets provided each direct support company, and the units capability based upon its current TOE/MTOE. This study has provided the command with a vehicle to plot the course of combat service support operations based upon known requirements. Similar type analysis will be accomplished on a quarterly basis.

6. (U) On 28 February, the 510th Engineer Platoon, attached to the 67th Maintenance Company returned to Qui Nhon. To offset the shortfall condition resulting from this action the 43rd Engineer Detachment moved from Quang Tri to Gia Le where it was attached to the 596th Light Maintenance Company.

ACOFS, SERVICES

1. (U) MCA Program:

a. Two MCA projects were completed during the period. Scope of these projects consisted of 92 ~~52~~ HUTs sited in 700 area at Da Nang and 194 ~~52~~ HUTs sited at Quang Tri. These ~~52~~ HUTs were utilized as follows:

	<u>52</u>	<u>GT</u>
1. 400	16	
2. 111	152	
3. 17	25	

At both locations, facilities were utilized to provide space for Program 6 units. Both projects were funded out of USARV project 260 for Minimum Essential Requirements (MER). Actual construction was accomplished through the utilization of self help labor and Naval Construction Battalion effort.

b. The following MCA projects have been funded by MACV and released on Construction Directives or Notices to Proceed and are awaiting completion of design and construction priority before actual construction begins:

- (1) 505-Man Cantonment. 156th HEM Co (primarily maintenance facilities and hardstand)
- (2) Maintenance Facility (4000SF). 85th LEM
- (3) 876-Man Cantonment. 80th GSG and 34th S&S Bn
- (4) Maintenance Facilities (2200 SF). 85th LEM
- (5) Depot Covered Storage. US. Field Depot
- (6) Depot Security Lighting. US. Field Depot

c. The following MCA projects have received favorable consideration at USARV level and are being forwarded to MACV for funding:

- (1) Addition to Power Distribution System, Da Nang East
- (2) Roads, Parking Hardstand, Maintenance Hardstand and Open Storage for USAFSCOM, DNG.
- (3) Addition to ADP System/Building for US Army Field Depot, DNG
- (4) Addition to US Army Mortuary, Da Nang
- (5) Facilities for CC&S Activity, Da Nang

INCLUSION 16

(INCLOSURE 16 CONT'D)

(6) Addition to Water Distribution System, Da Nang East

d. The following projects have been submitted through command channels and are awaiting action at higher headquarters:

(1) Sanitary Sewer System, Da Nang East

(2) Additional BOQ's, 80th GSG area

(3) Supplemental PDO areas for Post Hostile Activities, USASUPCOM, DNG

e. The following funded project was cancelled during the period:

Finance Building w/Storage, Quang Tri

2. (U) Minor Construction. Significant projects completed during the quarter include: Well to support steam cleaning operation at CC&S Activity, central air conditioning for the Depot ADP Facility, Command PIO Laboratory and scullery for HHD, USASUPCOM mess.

In keeping with the policy to replace deteriorated tents covering tent frames with more durable material, 34th S&S Bn started converting some 114 tent frames in the 700 area and Beach Cantonments to SEA HUTS. As of this date, the project is 75 percent complete. Realization of this project will enhance morale and effectiveness materially.

In the interest of faster response time from the time a project is funded until Naval Public Works starts construction, this office identifies key projects of command interest and requests that the planning and estimating cycle be compressed. As a result of the USMC ASP fire on 27 April and commitment of the entire Naval Public Works Division to assessment of damages resulting therefrom, planning and estimating of SUPCOM projects will be deferred approximately two weeks.

3. (U) Real Estate. During the reporting period, two requests for acquisition of real estate were submitted to Commander, United States Naval Forces, Vietnam, Representative, Da Nang. These were:

(1) Request for approximately two acres of land located adjacent to Tien Sha Ramp for use as a staging area for retrograde material.

(2) Request for approximately 600 SF of land at Deep Water Pier to accommodate an operational laboratory of 172nd Preventive Medicine Detachment.

No reply has been received regarding the first request. The latter request was denied in view of the interface of responsibilities between the

(INCLOSURE 16 CONT'D)

Navy and Army relative to inspection of retrograde cargo. By agreement between NSA Hospital and the 172nd Medical Detachment, the Navy will perform all inspections of retrograde cargo once it arrives at the Deep Water Pier. The Army Medical Detachment will inspect the cargo prior to its shipment to the Deep Water Pier in conjunction with the CC&S Activity.

4. (U) Facilities/Base Development Boards. a. Joint Area Base Development Board: ACofs, Services, represented USARV units, Da Nang area, at the Joint Board Meeting for contract construction on 21 March. Army projects received equitable priority in relation to projects proposed by other services represented.

b. Army Base Development Board: Meetings were held the 15th day of each month for the reporting period. All requests for the siting of facilities were approved or resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all members. Additionally, significant policies and procedures relative to base development and construction programming were reiterated for the benefit of many new members

c. Minor Construction Board: Meetings were held the 15th day of each month for the purpose of reviewing, amending, and approving the proposed work request priority list developed by the Installation Engineer, Da Nang. The 15 March Board Meeting was extremely fruitful in that the priority list was purified to eliminate non essential, nice-to-have projects. Emphasis was given to improving and upgrading mess facilities, particularly in the sanitation area. Allocation of additional O&M funds to Installation Engineer, Da Nang, permitted the funding of the following significant projects: Loading ramp for CC&S Activity, water infiltration gallery for 80th GSG, electrical distribution for 34th S&S Bn, ADP facility for Personnel Service Center, and BOQ for USASUPCOM, DNG. Realization of these important projects will enhance the commands operational and cantonment capability materially.

5. (U) Repairs and Utilities. In view of the criticality of electrical power in the Da Nang area, techniques and procedures for the conservation of power have been disseminated to all concerned by means of Commander's Notes and a command letter stressing that this problem be given personal command attention.

6. (U) Engineer Operational Support. a. Landmine Warfare: Policy outlined in LC Reg 524-4, concerning employment of only command controlled mines by logistical units was reiterated to subordinate commands as a result of current emphasis on disposition of mine field records. In consonance with this policy, engineer assistance has been requested to remove one AP minefield emplaced by Da Nang Sub-Area Command in October 1967.

(INCLOSURE 16 CONT'D)

b. POL Tank Farm Protection. Engineer troop effort was requested from III MAF to construct protective structures for the Quang Tri Tank Farm.

7. (U) Laundry and Bath. a. General: Production figures for laundry and bath operations for the reporting period are shown below:

MONTH	CONTRACT LAUNDRY (\$)	FIELD LAUNDRY (LBS)	BATH (#)
February	127,805	907,490	10,100
March	133,191	941,108	12,648
April	137,366	1,122,880	13,807

b. Contract Laundry: Three contract laundry points remain in operation at Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai.

c. Field Laundry: Six field laundries are currently operated in support of Army units in ICTZ at Quang Tri, Camp Evans, Phu Bai, LZ Baldy, Chu Lai, and Duc Pho. As reflected in the above tabulation, field production laundry has steadily increased during the period. The increase in production is attributed mainly to receipt of six new Eidai laundry units.

d. Field Bath: The number of field baths has been reduced from 3 to 2, with the Americal Division taking over operation of the bath point at Duc Pho. Two field bath points continue in operation at Camp Evans.

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