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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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IN REPLY REFER TO

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AGDA (M) (17 Oct 69) FOR OT UT 693038

28 October 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Battalion,  
44th Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION (AW) (SP) 44TH ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96269

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31 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery for  
period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

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Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities. (C)

1. (C) General.

a. The mission of 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery and Battery G, 65th Artillery continues to be General Support of XXIV Corps. Battery G, 29th Artillery supports 1st Marine Division with one platoon of searchlights and XXIV Corps with a second platoon. On 1 June 1969 the third searchlight platoon was attached to the Americal Division.

b. The organizational structure of the Battalion is listed in Inclosure #1.

c. A map of the DMZ area, representing the northern portion of the area in which the Battalion is deployed, is included as Inclosure #2.

d. A map of Thua Thien Province, representing the central portion of the area in which the Battalion is deployed, is included as Inclosure #3.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. Primary sources of intelligence information for HHB, A, B, C and G/65 Batteries during the reporting period were the G-2 sections of 3rd Marine Division and 2nd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech). Order of Battle updates and Intelligence Summaries were procured from these units. In addition, the Battalion S-2 attended the 3rd Marine Division daily briefings. Battery D received its primary intelligence information from the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL). Battery G, 29th Artillery received its primary intelligence from 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. Supplementary information was received from XXIV Corps and III MAF in the form of Intelligence Summaries and Periodic Intelligence Reports and from intelligence information and estimates from field commanders of supported units.

b. Temperatures during the reporting period ranged from 85° to 100°. Winds were generally strong throughout the reporting period, averaging 15 miles per hour and gusting up to 30 miles per hour. Typhoon Tess, which passed approximately 75 miles off the coast, caused heavy rains and high winds during the period 11 through 13 July 1969. Warm clothing and wet weather gear were essential in mountainous areas.

c. Enemy Activity.

(1) Mining incidents increased sharply during the reporting period with the highest incidence rates being from 11 to 28 May and from 17 to 30

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June. The heaviest mining occurred along Route 9 between Cam Lo and Vandegrift Combat Base. Increased activity was also noted from Dong Ha north on Route 1 to Gio Linh and from Cam Lo north on Route 561 to Con Thien.

(2) Stand off attacks with mortars and rockets increased slightly over the last reporting period. Highest incidence rates were at Con Thien, where a total of 87 rounds were received during 13 attacks, Gio Linh where 55 rounds were received in nine attacks and Phu Bai where 60 rounds were received in eight attacks.

(3) Elements of this Battalion engaged in five significant ground actions. Two occurred at LZ Saigon (see paragraph 3b(15)), two at the Crow's Nest (see paragraph 3b(16)) and one south of Con Thien (see paragraph 3b(22)).

(4) There is continued evidence of infiltration through the eastern DMZ into South Viet Nam. Elements of A/1/44 and G/29 have fired at and illuminated numerous targets acquired by AN/TPS-25 radar.

(5) During the initial part of this reporting period there was increased emphasis placed on the Volunteer Information Program (VIP). Funds were carried by DUSTER crews providing mine sweep security and additional funds were made available to the Batteries upon request. This program was effective in that a large amount of both enemy and friendly munitions were turned in. Due to the success of this program, 3rd Marine Division formed a special team to follow the mine sweeps to receive ordnance and to exploit potential intelligence information sources.

### 3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

#### a. Areas of operations during the reporting period:

- |                                 |            |                  |                    |
|---------------------------------|------------|------------------|--------------------|
| (1) Maine Crag                  | 3rd MarDiv | 15 Mar to 2 May  | (Btry C)           |
| (2) Virginia Ridge              | 3rd MarDiv | 30 Apr to 16 Jul | (Btry A, G/29)     |
| (3) Massachusetts Bay           | 3rd MarDiv | 7 May to 18 Jun  | (Btry B)           |
| (4) Utah Mesa                   | 3rd MarDiv | 12 Jun to 9 Jul  | (Btry C)           |
| (5) Iroquois Grove              | 3rd MarDiv | 19 Jun to Pres   | (Btry B)           |
| (6) Idaho Canyon                | 3rd MarDiv | 16 Jul to Pres   | (Btry A, G/29)     |
| (7) Lam Son 271                 | ARVN       | Oct 68 to Pres   | (A, G/29, G/65)    |
| (8) Kentucky Jumper             | 101 Abn    | Feb 69 to Pres   | (B, D, G/29, G/65) |
| (9) Massachusetts<br>Striker    | 101 Abn    | Mar 69 to May 69 | (D, G/29, G/65)    |
| (10) Montgomery Ren-<br>dezvous | 101 Abn    | Jul 69 to Pres   | (Btry D, G/65)     |

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(11) Campbell Steamer	101 Abn	Jul 69 to Pres	(D,G/29,G/65)
(12) Bristol Boots	101 Abn	15 Apr to 12 May	(Btry D, G/65)
(13) Houston	1 MarDiv	6 Jan to Pres	(Btry D, G/29)
(14) Pipestone Canyon	1 MarDiv	27 May to Pres	(Btry G/29)
(15) Charlie Ridge	1 MarDiv	31 Mar to 29 May	(Btry G/29)

b. Significant events.

(1) On 2 May 1969 a QUAD .50 was airlifted from Phu Bai to the Eagle's Nest (YD 405037) in support of 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) operations in the A Shau Valley. The lift was accomplished in two CH-47 sorties. The first sortie carried the QUAD .50, its crew and its basic load of ammunition; the second sortie carried an additional four pallets of ammunition (21,000 rounds) plus miscellaneous gear.

(2) On 4 May 1969 a QUAD .50 was airlifted from FSB Pistol (YC 901-901) to FSB Fist (YC 857837) in support of Operation Bristol Boots conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL).

(3) On 5 May 1969 at 2100 hours LZ Baldy (BT 132453) received small arms and RPG fire. The SEARCHLIGHT crew returned fire with M-16s and M-60, resulting in one NVA KIA.

(4) On 6 May 1969 at 2300 hours the SEARCHLIGHT at LZ Cindy (BS 353-883) received small arms fire. The crew returned fire with M-16s and M-60s which resulted in one NVA KIA.

(5) On 8 May 1969 at 0010 hours the SEARCHLIGHT at LZ Baldy (BT 132-453) illuminated four VC, who were engaged with M-60 and M-79 fire, resulting in one VC KIA.

(6) On 10 May 1969, a DUSTER from Battery A, while conducting a Recon in Force operation northeast of Con Thien in support of Operation Virginia Ridge, struck a mine at grid YD 127732. One man sustained a sprained ankle; the vehicle sustained heavy damage to its tracks, road wheels and road wheel support arms and was towed back to Con Thien.

(7) On 12 May 1969 at 0430 hours the SEARCHLIGHT at LZ Baldy (BT 132453) illuminated a VC patrol. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons resulting in two VC WIA and captured.

(8) On 12 May 1969 two DUSTERS from Battery D returned to Phu Bai and a QUAD .50 was airlifted to FSB Roy (ZD 055032) from FSB Fist (YC 857837) as Operation Bristol Boots, conducted by the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL), terminated.

(9) On 13 May 1969 two DUSTERS from Battery C took part in a three-day recon in force operation in conjunction with Special Forces and CIDG

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personnel in the Mai Loc AO. There were negative results.

(10) On 13 May 1969 at 0100 hours the SEARCHLIGHT at LZ Center (BT 055205) illuminated a VC unit. The unit was engaged by a QUAD .50 from Battery G, 55th Artillery, resulting in four VC KIA.

(11) On 15 May 1969 two DUSTERS from Battery A departed Oceanview (YD 312732) and were redeployed to A-1 (YD 268731) where they are able to supplement the fires of DUSTERS at Gio Linh. The two positions provide excellent coverage of Jones Creek, a primary infiltration route from the DMZ into the Dong Ha area.

(12) On 18 May 1969 a DUSTER from Battery A, while supporting operations northwest of Con Thien in the Virginia Ridge AO, struck a mine at YD 145717. One Marine adjacent to the vehicle was wounded by the explosion, but there were no Battery A casualties. The vehicle sustained extensive damage to its hull and was retrograded.

(13) On 27 May 1969 a QUAD .50 was airlifted from Dong Ha to A-1 to provide additional security for the ARVN outpost and to supplement the fires of two DUSTERS located there.

(14) On 3 June 1969 one DUSTER from Battery C, while providing security for an Engineer mine sweep from Elliot Combat Base (YD 983545) to the Khe Gio Bridge (YD 026561), struck a mine at YD 018565. There were negative casualties, but the vehicle sustained heavy damage to its tracks, road wheels and road wheel support arms.

(15) On 15 June 1969 two DUSTERS from Battery C were attached to Battery B, 1st Bn (105 mm) 40th Artillery, and Task Force Mustang, to conduct operations in the Khe Sanh area. The Task Force, composed entirely of tracked vehicles, occupied seven night defensive positions during the 24-day operation. The DUSTERS were used primarily for perimeter and work party security. Harassing and interdiction fires by the DUSTERS were utilized within the perimeter defense plans. On 28 and 29 June, 297 rounds of 40 mm were fired at observed NVA troops with unknown results. On 30 June at 0015 hours, the Task Force's night defensive perimeter at LZ Saigon (YD 814272) was attacked by an unknown size enemy force. The main attack was opposite the areas defended by the DUSTERS, but close-in defensive fires were fired throughout the night. There were no friendly casualties and only light material damage. On 1 July at 0400 hours LZ Saigon was again attacked by Sappers and elements of 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment, 304th Division NVA. The DUSTERS were instrumental in preventing penetration of the perimeter and in repulsing the attack. They were credited with 9 NVA KIA (C) of the total body count of 40 NVA KIA. There were no casualties or damage to Battery C elements. The two DUSTERS returned to the Battery on 9 July without further incident.

(16) On 17 June 1969 a 3/4-ton truck from Battery C, while transporting supplies from Vinh Dai to Elliot Combat Base, struck a mine at YD 059574. The two occupants were medevaced. The vehicle sustained heavy damage.

(17) During the period 21 through 27 June 1969 the SEARCHLIGHT at

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the Crow's Nest (AT 075705), working with supported units, engaged 60 VC/NVA during attacks on an adjacent compound. Results were three VC/NVA KIA.

(18) On 22 June 1969 a DUSTER from Battery C, while providing security for a SEABEE work party at a gravel quarry (YD 071576) struck a mine while maneuvering into position. One crewman was KIA and four other WIA and evacuated. The vehicle sustained heavy damage.

(19) On 27 June 1969 a DUSTER from Battery C, while providing security in the same location, was heavily damaged by a command-detonated mine. The squad leader and one crewman were KIA and three crewmen were WIA and evacuated. The vehicle had been in position for approximately 1½ hours prior to detonation of the mine. The detonating wire led to a tree approximately 50 meters away, where claymore mines were positioned around the tree.

(2) On 30 June 1969 two men from Battery C, while providing security for an Engineer mine sweep on Route 9, were wounded at YD 008565 by shrapnel when a SEABEE stepped on and detonated an anti-personnel mine.

(21) On 8 July 1969, a second QUAD .50 was airlifted to FSB Currahee in support of operations conducted in the A Shau Valley by the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL).

(22) On 21 July 1969 at 0800, while conducting a mine sweep from Con Thien to C-2 (YD 135645), the mine sweep team and two DUSTERS from Battery A were ambushed at grid YD 123690 by an estimated 30 NVA using RPGs and automatic weapons. Immediate counterambush fires from the DUSTERS broke up the ambush. Battery A received credit for 2 NVA KIA (C) while sustaining four WIA. One DUSTER sustained heavy damage.

(23) On 16 June 1969 a pioneer road was completed from FSB Bastogne (YD 621091) into the A Shau Valley. The 27th Engineer Battalion with the 59th Land Clearing Company attached is conducting the operation which, when completed, will provide an all-weather road from Phu Bai to the A Shau Valley. DUSTERS from Battery D and QUAD .50s from Battery G, 65th Artillery, assisted by SEARCHLIGHTS from Battery G, 29th Artillery, have provided work party and perimeter security throughout the operation. The road from FSB Bastogne to FSB Blaze is in fair condition, but from FSB Blaze to the A Shau Valley the road is poor. Throughout the operation construction has been hampered by frequent rainfall resulting in numerous landslides and extremely hazardous road surfaces. Enemy attempts to interdict the road or to harass the work parties have been sporadic and light. The principal problems encountered by Battery D were resupply of fuel and ammunition and occasional communications difficulties. These problems were normally resolved within 24 to 48 hours.

(24) During the reporting period Route 1 from Camp Evans to DaNang and Route 9 from Dong Ha to Khe Gio Bridge have been surfaced with asphalt. Present plans are for Route 1 to be surfaced from Dong Ha to DaNang and Route 9 to be surfaced from Dong Ha to Vandegrift Combat Base, at YD 993483. The improved roads have resulted in less wear on vehicles and reduced travel time between locations. The road improvement program has been especially appreci-

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ated by the elements of Battery G, 65th Artillery which provide QUAD .50s daily for convoy security on Route 9.

(25) On 29 July 1969 a DUSTER from Battery A, while providing security for a recon team returning to Con Thien, struck a mine at grid YD 132722. Two personnel accompanying the vehicles received injuries from the explosion and were medevaced. There were no injuries to personnel from Battery A. The vehicle sustained moderate damage and was towed to Con Thien.

c. Fire unit locations: At the end of the reporting period, 31 July 1969, the Battalion was tactically deployed as follows:

UNIT	LOCATION	UNIT SUPPORTED
(1) HHB/1/44	Dong Ha YD 233583	1/44
(2) A/1/44	Dong Ha YD 233583	3 Marine Division
(a) 5 DUSTERS	Con Thien YD 113700	3 Marine Division
(b) 2 DUSTERS	Gio Linh YD 213742	2 Reg 1 ARVN Div
(c) 2 DUSTERS	A-1 YD 269732	2 Reg 1 ARVN Div
(3) B/1/44 (-)	Dong Ha YD 233583	3 Marine Division
(a) 4 DUSTERS	Quang Tri YD 211557	3 Marine Division
(b) 4 DUSTERS	Camp Eagle YD 809161	101st Abn Division
(4) C/1/44 (-)	Vinh Dai Rock Crusher YD178579	3 Marine Division
(a) 2 DUSTERS	Mai Loc YD 091509	CIDG
(b) 4 DUSTERS	Elliot CB XD 983545	3 Marine Division
(c) 2 DUSTERS	Khe Gio Bridge YD 026561	3 Marine Division
(5) D/1/44 (-)	Phu Bai YD 875148	XXIV Corps
(a) 2 DUSTERS	LZ Birmingham YD 708101	101st Abn Division
(b) 2 DUSTERS	LZ Currahee YC 403948	101st Abn Division
(c) 2 DUSTERS	Hai Van Pass AT 939918	1 Marine Division
(d) 1 DUSTER	Los Banos ZC 831998	101st Abn Division
(e) 1 DUSTER	Panther II YD 798108	101st Abn Division
(6) G/65 (-)	Dong Ha YD 233583	3 Marine Division

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(a) 2 M55s	Phu Bai YD 875148	XXIV Corps
(b) 1 M55	Lang Co Bridge AT 884956	101st Abn Division
(c) 1 M55	FSB Roy ZD 055032	101st Abn Division
(d) 2 M55s	Pohl Bridge YD 755142	101st Abn Division
(e) 2 M55s	FSB Blaze YD 538010	101st Abn Division
(f) 2 M55s	FSB Currahee YC 403948	101st Abn Division
(g) 1 M55	Eagle's Nest YD 405037	101st Abn Division
(h) 1 M55	A-1 YD 268731	2 Reg 1 ARVN Div
(7) G/29 (-)	DaNang AT 957757	III MAF
(a) 3 SLT	Camp Eagle YD 906163	101st Abn Division
(b) 2 SLT	Phu Bai YD 879144	XXIV Corps
(c) 1 SLT	Lang Co Bridge AT 884956	101st Abn Division
(d) 1 SLT	Panther II YD 798108	101st Abn Division
(e) 1 SLT	Camp Evans YD 539318	101st Abn Division
(f) 1 SLT	Con Thien YD 113700	3 Marine Division
(g) 1 SLT	Gio Linh YD 213742	1 ARVN Division
(h) 1 SLT	Crow's Nest AT 975705	1 Marine Division
(i) 1 SLT	Liberty Bridge AT 928513	1 Marine Division
(j) 1 SLT	Hill 37 AT 916302	1 Marine Division
(k) 1 SLT	Hill 327 AT 971737	1 Marine Division
(l) 1 SLT	Hill 41 AT 934663	1 Marine Division
(m) 1 SLT	Nam Bridge AT 296843	1 Marine Division
(n) 1 SLT	Hill 190 AT 892823	1 Marine Division
(o) 1 SLT	Song Cau Do Bridge AT 998706	1 Marine Division
(p) 1 SLT	Hill 65 AT 873577	1 Marine Division
(q) 1 SLT	Hill 55 AT 970615	1 Marine Division

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(r) 1 SLT Hill 10 AT 924691 1 Marine Division

d. Ammunition expenditures.

	Reporting Period	Total since Arrival
(1) 40 mm	219,881	1,460,273
(2) .50 cal.	243,398	2,534,996

e. Days spent for training, movement, operations were as follows:

- (1) Training (OJT): 92 Days
- (2) Training (Replacement): 27 Days
- (3) Movement: N/A
- (4) Operations: 92 days

4. (C) Logistics.

a. Property Books:

(1) A request for the establishment of a separate property book for Battery D was approved by USARPAC. Liaison and training sessions conducted by Battalion S-4 are in effect to insure that the property book is established and maintained properly.

(2) A request for the establishment of a property book for 3rd Platoon, Battery G, 29th Artillery has been submitted to USARPAC.

b. Significant equipment fills: The following major end items have been received over the past quarter.

(1) 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery	
(a) Truck, utility, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	8
(b) Truck, cargo, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	5
(c) Trailer, water, $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton	9
(d) Launcher, grenade, M-79	75
(e) Transmitter/Receiver RT-524	6
(f) Compass M-2	50
(g) Gun, twin 40 mm, M42A1	2
(2) Battery G, 65th Artillery	

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- (a) Mount, QUAD .50, M55 9
- (b) Truck, utility,  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton 1

c. Significant Equipment Shortages: The following items are on requisition and have been reported on the Commander's Critical Items List.

(1) 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery

- (a) Truck, wrecker, 5 ton 1
- (b) Recovery Vehicle, M578 3
- (c) Plotting board, Radar Data, PT-176 KPS 5
- (d) Receiver/Transmitter, RT/524 2
- (e) Truck, cargo,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton 1
- (f) Mount, for AN/VRC-47 61
- (g) Loudspeaker, LS-454 61
- (h) Gun, twin 40 mm, M42A1 3

(2) Battery G (MG), 65th Artillery

- (a) Truck, cargo,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton 4
- (b) Mask, protective, M17A1 56
- (c) Tool Kit, artillery mech 2
- (d) Machinegun, .50 caliber 2

(3) Battery G (SLT), 29th Artillery

- (a) Searchlight, visible light, infrared AN/ MSS-3 3
- (b) Telephone set, TA-312/PT 5
- (c) Switchboard, SB-224/PT 1

d. Decentralization of PLL: In accordance with AR 735-35, the consolidated Battalion PLL was reestablished at Battery level. Two major problems were experienced:

- (1) During initial decentralization, the supply system was heavily taxed with initial stockage requests from the Batteries.
- (2) Unit PLLs are operating with between 50 and 80 percent of their

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total line items at zero balance. However, repair parts for M42A1 DUSTERS are at approximately 90 percent zero balance. Although the Battalion has been able to accomplish all of its assigned missions, the deadline rate on tactical vehicles has increased.

5. (U) Personnel.

a. R and R participation:

	May	June	July
Hawaii	17	14	16
Tokyo	2	4	4
Bangkok	12	13	13
Hong Kong	7	8	7
Taipei	9	8	7
Kuala Lumpur	1	0	0
Penang	0	0	1
Singapore	2	5	4
Manila	1	1	2
Sydney	13	11	13

b. Decorations:

Silver Star	1
Legion of Merit	0
Soldier's Medal	0
Air Medal	2
Bronze Star "V"	1
ACM "V"	3
Bronze Star	20
ACM	33
Purple Heart	25

c. Casualties:

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(1) KIA - 4

(2) WIA - 27

6. (U) Religious Activities.

a. Memorial services for four men who were killed as a result of hostile action during the past quarter were held at their respective Batteries. A total of 25 General Protestant Sunday services were held: 12 at Dong Ha, eight at Vinh Dai, and five at Phu Bai. In addition, thirty field services for personnel at the following Fire Support Bases and LZs were held: Con Thien, Gio Linh, A-1, Mai Loc, Hai Van Pass, Panther II, Camp Eagle, Chu Lai, Lang Co Bridge, Los Banos, Birmingham, Elliot Combat Base and Quang Tri.

b. In addition to religious services the Chaplain also visited Battalion personnel in Army Hospitals and aboard the Hospital Ships USS Repose and USS Sanctuary.

7. (U) Medical.

a. During the reporting period 768 outpatient consultations were held and 453 immunizations were administered. Most illnesses treated were skin rashes, viruses and back pains. There were 14 cases of malaria and no cases of cholera or plague.

b. Emphasis has been placed upon a thorough sanitation and preventive medicine program throughout the Battalion. Use of mosquito nets, repellents and lotions was emphasized as was rodent control. Continuous command emphasis was placed on programs concerning the dangers of use of marijuana and narcotics.

8. (U) Civil Affairs.

a. Medical. The Battalion Surgeon re-initiated MEDCAPs to Phu Lai Xa Village during the latter part of the reporting period. An estimated 750 persons were treated, primarily for minor sores and infections. Immunizations, proper bathing procedures and lessons on dental hygiene were included as an integral part of the program. Biweekly visits by the Battalion Surgeon to the Dong Ha Hospital continue with an estimated 60 outpatients and 15 inpatients seen weekly.

b. Civic action.

(1) Construction of a Bo De school in Dong Ha continues at a satisfactory rate. Cement and tin are provided through funds made available by the 3rd Marine Division. Wood for desks is obtained from 105 mm shell packing cases. The four room school is scheduled for completion before the end of August.

(2) Five gym sets were received in June from the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Saigon, for use at the Dong Ha Catholic Orphanage. The sets were donated to the Orphanage by GYM-DANDY, Inc. of Bossier City, La. Coord-

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion (AW) (SR) 44th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

dination was made by S-5, 1st Battalion (AW) (SR) 44th Artillery with CRS for the shipment of these sets to Saigon. The sets were then shipped from Saigon to Dong Ha and presented to the Orphanage.

9. (U) Education. Third Marine Division Education Center, Quang Tri Combat Base, administers all courses and tests for personnel stationed at Dong Ha. The 26th General Support Group, Phu Bai Combat Base, administers all courses and tests for Battery D; 80th Support Group administers all courses and tests for Battery G, 29th Artillery.

10. (U) ARVN Training. During 14 through 21 July the Battalion provided OJT training for mechanics from the 11th Cavalry, 2nd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division on the M42 Duster engine and chassis, which are the same as those components on the M-41 tanks the ARVN tanks the ARVN unit recently acquired.

### Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (C) Operations.

a. SEARCHLIGHT deployment.

(1) Observation: There have been instances when SEARCHLIGHTS have illuminated targets, but support units have been unable to bring rapid and accurate fires to bear upon the targets.

(2) Evaluation: In many instances, SEARCHLIGHTS illuminate targets at ranges that render small arms fires ineffective and indirect artillery fires have not been immediately available. On several occasions in the past, 106 mm recoilless rifles and direct fires from 105 mm howitzers have proven to be effective. The end of the light beam can be placed on the target and used as a reference point by the 106 mm recoilless rifle or 105 mm howitzer. At locations where DUSTERS or QUAD .50 machineguns are co-located with SEARCHLIGHTS, this concept has worked extremely well.

(3) Recommendation: That commanders be advised of the effectiveness of using direct fire from 106 mm recoilless rifles, 105 mm howitzers and automatic weapons in conjunction with SEARCHLIGHTS and the need for instantaneous reaction when targets are illuminated.

b. Automatic weapons employment.

(1) Observation: DUSTERS emplaced to defend perimeters at large combat bases normally have been employed in widely dispersed permanent positions resulting in difficult command and control situations, inadequate coverage of all prime avenues of approach, and easy identification by the enemy.

(2) Evaluation: Battery B has four DUSTERS stationed at Quang Tri



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Combat Base, which, due to the size of the base, are unable to adequately provide fire support to all main avenues of approach to the perimeter. To compensate for this shortage of DUSTERS, numerous positions, all covering primary avenues of approach, were constructed. Each evening two DUSTERS assume randomly selected positions and provide H & I defensive fires for the perimeter. The other two DUSTERS are held in reserve, prepared to move into position upon request. This concept provides for H & I fires as required for designated areas as well as a centrally located reserve force which can react to contingencies as they arise anywhere on the perimeter.

(3) Recommendation: On large perimeters where insufficient numbers of DUSTERS are located to provide defensive fires for all areas of the perimeter, one solution is to retain at least two DUSTERS in a centrally located area and randomly deploy the rest to various preselected positions around the perimeter.

c. Airlift of M55 QUAD .50 mount.

(1) Observation: Slings presently used for airlift of QUAD .50 mounts are troublesome in assembling and attaching to the mount.

(2) Evaluation: A new sling, FSN 1670-902-3080, noun nomenclature: Sling, multiple leg, 15,000 lb rated capacity, is now available. The sling is composed of four adjustable legs attached to a 10-inch ring with a catch on the loose end of each leg. The mount is slung by attaching one leg to each of the two jacks and the third and fourth legs to the lunette and adjusting the legs to insure the mount will ride level.

(3) Recommendation: That this sling be made available and utilized for airlift of the M55 QUAD .50 mount.

d. Concertina wire.

(1) Observation: Concertina wire placed on top of overhead cover for bunkers and fighting holes will cause premature detonation of artillery rounds and lessen their penetrating effect.

(2) Evaluation: During an attack by fire at FSB Currahee, the Battalion Tactical Operations bunker of 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (AMBL), despite sustaining two direct hits from 82 mm mortar rounds, received only negligible damage. This was attributed to the presence of concertina wire strung across the top of the bunker which caused the incoming rounds to detonate prior to actually striking the bunker. Any type of material placed across the top of a bunker which will cause a point-detonating fuze to activate will have the same effect. This is especially advantageous at locations where activities preclude construction of heavy overhead cover.

(3) Recommendation: That commanders be made aware of this concept and employ it as the tactical situation dictates.

e. Sapper tactics.

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(1) Observation: Sappers are highly trained, strictly disciplined and take maximum advantage of cover and concealment during their approach to an objective.

(2) Evaluation: During recent Sapper attacks the NVA/VC have employed two new methods of approaching their objective. They are as follows:


(a) Sappers used sandbags to hold in front of themselves as cover while they made their final approach into and through the perimeter defensive barriers. Defenders inside the perimeter were unable to distinguish between these sandbags and those in front of their positions acting as claymore mine blast walls.

(b) Sappers and accompanying infantry delayed their attack until after the defenders had fired a "mad minute." Immediately after the "mad minute" the NVA/VC attacked. The defenders had used up much of their on-hand ammunition and had to expose themselves to enemy fire to get resupplied. Many of the defenders were not immediately aware that an attack was actually in progress, thinking the firing was merely a continuation of the "mad minute."

(3) Recommendations: That commanders be aware of the tactics discussed above and implement the information into their training program.

3. (U) Training: None.
4. (U) Intelligence: None.
5. (U) Logistics: None.
6. (U) Organization: None.
7. (U) Civic Action: None.
8. (U) Other: None.

3 Incl  
as

  
VICTOR J. HUGO JR  
LTC ADA  
Commanding

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
AVGL-CO (31 Jul 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery for  
Period Ending 31 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 108th Artillery Group, ATTN: AVGL-C, APO 96269, 12 August 1969

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps Artillery, ATTN: AVII-AT, APO 96308

Concur with the recommendations made in Section 2.

  
ROBERT V. LEE JR.  
Colonel, Field Artillery  
Commanding

AVII-ATC (14 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th Artillery  
for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)(U)

Headquarters, XXIV Corps Artillery, ATTN: AVII-ATC, APO San Francisco  
96308, 22 August 1969.


TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO San Francisco  
96308.

1. (U) The ORLL of the 1st Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th Artillery is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.
2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs, subject to comment indicated below.

a. Reference items on pages 12, 13, and 14, paragraphs 2a, b, d and e. Concur. These items will be disseminated to artillery with XXIV Corps via information letter. Recommend similiar dissemination throughout Vietnam by HQs USARV.

b. Reference item concerning Airlift of M55 Quad .50 mount, page 13, paragraph 2c. Reporting unit has been instructed to requisition this item through normal supply channels. No further action is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*for*  CPT  
HERBERT SIEGEL  
Major, ADA  
Adjutant

AVIL-GCT (31 Jul 69) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th Artillery for  
Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U). MAJ Mark1/jpg/2506


DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO SF 96308 30 August 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO SF 96375

1. The ORILL of the 1st Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th Artillery has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded in accordance with USARV Reg 525-15.

2. Concur with the report as indorsed by HQ, XXIV Corps Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. D. PECCO  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG

3 Incl  
1 - Bn Organization Structure  
2 - Map of DMZ area  
3 - Map Thua Thien Province

AVHGC-DST (31 Jul 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery for  
period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U) 24 SEP 1969

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 for Headquarters, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP), 44th Artillery.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "SEARCHLIGHT deployment", section II, page 12, paragraph 2,a; concur. This item will be evaluated for possible inclusion in a USARV Training Newsletter.

b. Reference item concerning "Automatic weapons employment", section II, page 12, paragraph 2,b; concur. This item will be evaluated for possible inclusion in a USARV Training Newsletter.

c. Reference item concerning "Airlift of M55 QUAD .50 mount", section II, page 13, paragraph 2,c; concur. The Sling, Cargo, Multi-Leg, 15,000 pound capacity, FSN 1690-902-3080 is available in the command and authorized by USARV Reg No 725-7. Approved rigging procedures using the multi-leg sling will be published in TM 55-450-12, Air Transport of Supplies and Equipment: Helicopter External Loads for Sling, Nylon and Chain, Multiple Leg (15,000 lb capacity). Recommendation to include rigging of the M55 QUAD .50 mount is being forwarded to the US Army Transportation School, Ft Eustis, Va, the proponent for the TM. The unit will be contacted to provide a recommended list of items for approval and subsequent inclusion in the USARV regulation. A review of current rigging procedures by qualified personnel is recommended to insure that safe practices are being followed pending the publication of approved procedures in TM 55-450-12. Requests for technical assistance should be directed to this headquarters, ATTN: AVHGD-SPM.

d. Reference item concerning "Concertina wire", section II, page 13, paragraph 2,d; nonconcur. Detonation of a point detonating fuze is caused by the fuze coming in contact with a solid object after arming. In order for a round to be detonated by concertina wire it would be necessary for the round to strike a strand of wire directly. This would be rather unlikely to occur. To provide for premature detonation the addition of some solid covering material spaced several feet above the bunker top would be much more effective.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON

1LT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
1/44 Arty  
XXIV Corps


GPOP-DT (31 Jul 69) 5th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Battalion (AW)(SP), 44th  
Artillery for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 4 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
C. L. SHORT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

AVGLD-C

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery for period ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

Inclosure 1: Organizational Structure.

1. (C) Assigned.
  - a. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery
  - b. Battery A, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery
  - c. Battery B, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery
  - d. Battery C, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery
  - e. Battery D, 1st Battalion (AW) (SP) 44th Artillery
2. (C) Attached.
  - a. Battery G (Machinegun), 65th Artillery
  - b. Battery G (Searchlight), 29th Artillery, minus one platoon


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Inclosure 1




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Inclosure 2

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NOT TO SCALE

22

Inclosure 3

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

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