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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH BATTALION, 56TH ARTILLERY  
APO 96491

#17.

AVGHFCO

7 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ~~Ending~~ 31 October 1966,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

TO:

1. (U) In compliance with AR 1-19 and USARV Regulation 870-2, the Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 is herewith submitted.

2. (U-FOUO) Organization for Combat.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COMMANDER(S)</u>
6th Battalion 56th Artillery	LTC James L. Hollis (13 Dec 65 - 4 Sep 66)
	LTC Peter B. Farrell (5 Sep 66 )
Headquarters Battery	CPT Charles C. King (30 Jun 66 )
Battery A	CPT James B. McCoy (12 Mar 65 - 7 Aug 66)
	Cpt Raymond R. Moose (8 Aug 66 - 1 Oct 66)
	CPT Jerry L. Kintigh (2 Oct 66 )
Battery B	CPT Joe B. Harvey (1 Feb 66 - 13 Sep 66)
	CPT John H. Little (14 Sep 66 )
Battery C	CPT William H. Forster (1 May 66 - 19 Aug 66)
	CPT Fred R. Clifton (20 Aug 66 - )

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Battery D

CPT Edward S. Graham Jr.  
(23 Dec 65 - 22 Aug 66)CPT Paul P. Hagerty  
(23 Aug 66 - )

## SECTION I (C) Significant Organizational or Unit Activities

1. (C) GENERAL

a. During the reporting period, the units of this battalion continued to accomplish their primary mission of providing air defense against low and medium altitude targets in the Bien Hoa, Long Binh, Saigon and Tan Son Nhut areas of the Republic of Vietnam. This was accomplished by maintaining operational sites in the Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut areas. Batteries "A" and "C" located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam, provide primary coverage for Saigon, Tan Son Nhut Air Base and surrounding areas. Batteries "B" and "D" located at Bien Hoa Air Base, provided primary coverage for Bien Hoa, Long Binh, and surrounding areas. The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, located in Long Binh, provides command, administrative, operational and logistical support for the firing batteries.

b. There has been one move in the battalion during this reporting period. It occurred on 29 and 30 September 1966 when Battery "A" made an administrative move of personnel and administrative facilities from Tan Son Nhut Air Base to the Hoc Mon Sub Sector. The battery's tactical site will remain at Tan Son Nhut until radar berms, interior roads, and missile storage areas are completed at the Hoc Mon site.

c. On 5 October 1966 "B" Battery began initial occupation on its new site. At present the site is approximately five (5) percent completed. No battery personnel are being used in the construction effort, however the battery is supplying one (1) officer and thirty (30) EM per day as a security force. The site was attacked with small arms and automatic weapons fire on 6 October 66 by an estimated VC squad. Fire was returned with unknown results and the unit suffered no casualties. (See Incl 1 After Action Report)

d. There have been six (6) major changes of Command in the battalion during this reporting period. The Battalion Commander, LTC James L. Hollis, 09700227, returned to the ZI upon completing his normal tour in Vietnam; LTC Peter B. Farrell, 062580, assumed command of the battalion on 5 September 1966. CPT James B. McCoy, 096889, commander of Battery "A", returned to the ZI after completing his normal tour in Vietnam; CPT Raymond R. Moose, 098852, assumed command of Battery "A" on 8 August 1966 and exercised this duty through 1 October 1966 when he became Liaison Officer; CPT Jerry L. Kintigh, OF105451, assumed command of Battery "A" on 2 October 1966. CPT Joe B. Harvey, OF103702, former commander of Battery "B" returned to the ZI upon completing his normal tour in Vietnam; CPT John H. Little, 098191, assumed command of Battery "B" on 14 September 1966. CPT William H. Forester,

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05309283, former commander of Battery "C" returned to the ZI after completing his normal tour in Vietnam; CPT Fred R. Clifton, OF103340, assumed command of Battery "C" on 20 August 1966. CPT Edward S. Graham Jr., 05006769, former commander of Battery "D" returned to the ZI after completing his normal tour in Vietnam; CPT Paul P. Hagerty, 095029, assumed command of Battery "D" on 23 August 1966.

e. The 1966 Savings Bond Program has progressed to the point where the Battalion is presently recording 98.7% participation.

f. Over 70% of all personnel in this unit are actively supporting the Battalion Civic Action Program. Primary support has been given to the villages of Thanh Hoi and Phuc Lam in the Long Binh area and Gia Dinh in the Hoc Mon area. The various projects undertaken during the past quarter included the following:

(1) Delivering four (4)  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck loads of flour, rice, cooking oil, and powdered milk to the three villages cited above.

(2) Delivery of firewood and items of clothing to the villages cited above.

(3) The Battalion Surgeon and Battery medical personnel conducted weekly sick calls for approximately 300 Vietnamese.

(4) The Battalion Surgeon is completing arrangements for two (2) Vietnamese women to receive major medical aid. One woman may receive extensive treatment in CONUS for facial burns and the other woman will have her eyes straightened at the hospital in Bien Hoa.

g. Distinguished visitors during the period of this report include:

<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE OF EVENT</u>
GEN Harold K. Johnson and Party	Army Chief of Staff	1 Aug 66
LTC J. E. Engler	DCG USARV	1 Aug 66
BG E. H. Almquist Jr.	ADCSOPS	1 Aug 66
COL J. J. Wilson	Exec to CofSA	1 Aug 66
LTC J. C. Kiefe	Asst Exec to CofSA	1 Aug 66
MAJ T. J. Irwin	Aid to CofSA	1 Aug 66

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<u>VISITOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE OF EVENT</u>
SGM W. Woolridge	SGM of the Army	1 Aug 66
Chinese Nationalist/US MAAG Advisor		
COL C. L. Tsui	4th ADA Regt CAF	4 Aug 66
LTC K. H. Lin	11th ADA Regt CAF (Deputy Commander)	4 Aug 66
LTC C. M. Mao	OPNS Div CAF (Chief of Opns Section)	4 Aug 66
LTC B. A. Stewart	AF Section, MAAG, ADA	4 Aug 66
MAJ T. H. Shin	Log Div, CAF Log Officer	4 Aug 66
COL Thomas H. Barfield BG Designate	CO, 38th Arty Bde (AD)	17 Aug 66
BG Richard J. Seitz	Asst DCG, CofS, USARV	22 Aug 66
LTC William H. Holcombe	CO, Designate 6th Bn 71st Arty	23 Aug 66
COL William S. Holmes	Cmd and Staff Dept. Ft Bliss	2 Sep 66
BG W. D. Crittenberger	IIFFV Arty Commander	4 Sep 66

2. (C) PERSONNEL

a. During the period 1 August to 31 October 1966, this organization had an average total assigned strength of 1045 personnel. The present total authorized strength is 858 personnel. There were 497 losses and 466 gains during this period. There are many LONG school trained mechanic and technician shortages of ranks E3 through E6. Replacements for these personnel have not been provided in the numbers requisitioned.

b. Shortage list of Long school trained MOS's.

<u>MOS</u>	<u>MOS TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ACT</u>	<u>SHORTAGES*</u>
05B20	Radio Operator	E4	14	9	5
05C40	Radio TT Operator	E5	1	0	1

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<u>MOS</u>	<u>MOS TITLE</u>	<u>GR</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ACT</u>	<u>SHORTAGES*</u>
17H40	FDS Crewman	E6	1	0	1
22J40	HAWK M/L Crewman	E6	4	3	1
23P20	HAWK FC Mechanic	E6	4	2	2
23P20	HAWK FC Mechanic	E5	8	2	6
23P40	HAWK FC Mechanic	E7	5	3	2
23P40	HAWK FC Mechanic	E6	5	2	3
23T20	HAWK CW Radar Repairman	E6	3	1	2
23T20	HAWK CW Radar Repairman	E5	3	1	2
25J40	OC-CDG Repairman	E7	1	0	1
25J20	OC-CDG Repairman	E5	3	1	2
26J40	DF Acq Radar Mechanic	E6	1	0	1
31M20	Radar R&C ATT	E4	8	4	4
31M20	Radar R&C ATT	E3	8	5	3
31M40	Radar R&C ATT	E5	8	4	4

\*Shortage of Personnel by 31 December 1966 assuming replacements are not received.

c. The majority of all senior noncommissioned officers (E7 through E9) are due to rotate from this organization from May to August 1967. Recent curtailments of approximately 30% of these noncommissioned officers will allow for an equitable turnover without causing a critical shortage.

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Requisitions have been submitted so that replacements will arrive 10 days prior to the DEROS of all outgoing personnel. The Sergeant Major and all five First Sergeant positions are presently filled. Three of the 39 E7 through E9 positions presently are vacant but emergency requisitions for these vacancies have been submitted. There are three 90 day losses for E7 through E9, all of which have been requisitioned.

d. At the present time all field grade and captain positions are filled. Of these only the S3 position will be vacant within 90 days. (o/a 25 December 1966). One of the senior captains presently assigned to this organization is earmarked to fill this vacancy. A known replacement (Captain MOS 1180) will fill the senior captain's position. There are two lieutenant vacancies (MOS 1180) on emergency requisition. There is one lieutenant (MOS 1180) 90 day loss in January 1967. All warrant officer positions are filled. However one warrant officer with MOS 223C is scheduled to rotate in January 1967. A replacement for his position has been requisitioned. As with the senior noncommissioned officers, most officers and warrant officers were due to rotate during June through August 1967. However, approximately 30 percent had their tours curtailed by 30 days. Requisitions recently were submitted so that replacements should arrive approximately 10 days prior to each Officer's rotation date. This curtailment will prevent a critical shortage of officers and warrant officers at any one time.

### 3. (C) INTELLIGENCE

a. During the reporting period Captain Norman L. Brame Jr. assumed duties as Intelligence and Security Officer.

b. Current intelligence information on the ground threat was obtained during the reporting period from II Field Forces Vietnam and III Vietnam Corps.

c. Liaison visits were made with the Hoc Mon Sub Sector, Capital Military District, Bien Hoa Sub Sector, and Dong Nai Sensitive area. These visits proved invaluable in determining current VC activities near units of this battalion. Cooperation was excellent during each liaison visit.

d. Coordination was effected with Quan Trung Training Center and the Hoc Mon Sub Sector to prepare for the tactical movement of Battery "A" to their new site in the Hoc Mon area. The Vietnamese offered their resources to assist in protecting the battery when it moves. Valuable information was obtained from Hoc Mon Sub Sector on enemy capabilities to conduct harassment and interdiction during the movement.

e. Liaison was made with II Field Forces Vietnam, Long Binh Post, and III Vietnam Corps to establish procedures necessary to intergrade Battery "B" into local defenses. Plans for fire support were laid on with Dong Nai Sensitive area. Coordination was also made with the 11th ACR to provide a reaction force should the need arise.

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f. Physical Security within the Battalion is considered adequate. However, with Battery "A" and "B" having to secure two areas each during the transition from one location to another, requirements have become more demanding in areas of personnel and equipment. Units are continuing to improve on their active and passive defensive measure by installing perimeter lighting, sandbagging of billets, and improving perimeter positions. Monthly ground defense exercises have been conducted by this and higher headquarters. The results of these exercises have been used to improve the ground defense capabilities of all units.

g. During the reporting period major effort has been put forth to improve the battalion Sentry Dog program. Dog kennels and training facilities have been constructed in three batteries. Facilities for other two batteries are presently under construction. Emphasis has been placed on adequate training and proper utilization of the sentry dog to enhance the units capability to detect intruders. A sentry dog and his handler were credited with preventing the breaching of the perimeter of a battery in the battalion by detecting hostile intruders and alerting the unit in time for it to react and repel the intruders. During the reporting period arrangements have been made to send five people to a two week supervision course for dog handlers in Okinawa. In order to insure proper training, handling, and utilization of Sentry Dogs there is a need for a Non-Commissioned Officer, trained in Sentry Dog Handling, to supervise the Battalion's twenty sentry dogs. The present TOE does not provide for this individual. A request for the addition of one E5, MOS 95B4D to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery TOE has been submitted.

h. The problem of personnel arriving in this command in MOS 16E and 17H without adequate security clearances, as mentioned in last report, has been resolved by the approval of USARV to issue subject personnel Interim SECRET clearances.

i. During the reporting period Battalion granted two hundred four (204) Confidential Clearances, processed sixty (60) requests for National Agency checks and validated two hundred six (206) Top Secret/Secret.

#### 4. (C) OPERATIONS

a. Training conducted during this period has been directed toward maximizing the operational efficiency of the battalion with special emphasis placed on training for Annual Service Practice (ASP). In preparation for ASI, which is being conducted at Bolo Point Firing Range, Okinawa, during the period 18 October 1966 through 14 November 1966, all units have undergone pre-ASP test. The tests duplicate the actual ASP and are conducted using USARPAC directives on ASP procedures and scoring. Each unit received a minimum of four pre-ASP tests prior to their ASP.

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b. During 18-24 October 1966, "C" Battery underwent ASP. Unofficial results for the battery are 203 points lost out of 1850 (89%) and two successful missile launches. "B" Battery conducted their ASP during 25-31 October 1966. Unofficial results are 63 points lost out of 1850 (96.6%) and 2 successful missile launches.

c. During this reporting period one (1) Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) was administered by the 97th Artillery Group and nine were administered by the Battalion. Four (4) resulted in a Battery status rating of Operational; two (2) were rated as Limited Capability; and four (4) were declared Non-operational. The Non-operational ORE's resulted from equipment failures.

d. Air Defense exercises have been increased to enable all newly assigned personnel to become familiar with Air Defense Control procedures used during the air battle. The new live aircraft exercise "HAWK RUN" was initiated during this period and is proving to be a very effective training exercise.

e. Extensive Battery Control Central (BCC) training has been conducted utilizing the AN/TSQ-21 Simulator. This training has provided the operators with realistic and logical situations in preparing them for Annual Service Practice, Tactical Effectiveness Evaluations, and to function as a team.

f. The overall training program for this quarter has been according to the Master Training Schedule except for the addition of a two (2) hour instruction block on the handling, care, and cleaning of individual and crew served weapons.

g. Missileman examinations were administered to sixteen (16) EM during this reporting period. Of the examinations administered, ten (10) persons made a passing grade and six (6) failed to make the necessary passing grade of seventy percent (70%). Examinations on the TSOP were administered to twelve (12) officer and twenty four (24) Enlisted personnel. One (1) officer and three (3) enlisted men failed to achieve the minimum score of 80%. On being retested the officer and two (2) of the enlisted men achieved the passing grade.

h. The scenario for the Army training movie, "HAWK In Vietnam" was written by members of this unit in preparation for the actual filming to begin in August 1966. Filming of the movie was accomplished on location in this battalion between 3 Aug 66 and 23 Aug 66. All props, personnel and sets were provided by this unit. A pictorial unit, from the Signal Office, United States Army Vietnam, was in charge of filming with members of the S3 staff, this headquarters, serving as technical advisors. The filming was completed several days ahead of schedule. The movie consisted of the following:

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(1) History of Army HAWK site selection, deployment and organization in Vietnam.

(2) Simulated Tactical Engagement and Operational Readiness Evaluations.

1. Draft copies of a revised tactical SOP were submitted to 97th Artillery Group (AD) after being staffed by members of this headquarters and the Tactical Control Officers of all firing batteries in this battalion.

5. (C) LOGISTICS

a. Supply:

(1) Class I: The use of menu substitutes is increasing. This is causing a problem of not being able to effectively forecast and plan meals in advance. On many occasions the mess stewards do not know what they are to serve until the rations are received from ration breakdown. Fresh vegetables are still in scarce supply. Canned vegetables are being substituted as much as possible, and in general personnel eating in the mess halls have accepted the substitutes.

(2) Class II and IV:

(a) All units of the battalion are still experiencing difficulty in obtaining office equipment and machines. By personal follow-up action to obtain status of requisitions from the supply control centers a few dueout requisitions have been filled. In particular typewriters, office desks, fans and filing cabinets have been received during this period, but total requirements have not been met, and timely follow-up actions of all units is being submitted to obtain status of requisitions.

(b) The following items which have been approved for issue to this unit as additions to the TOE have still not been received:

<u>FSN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>UNIT DOC NO</u>
5895-617-0029	Interrogator Set, AN/TPX-26	1 ea	6066-003
1095-726-5820	Pistol, Pyrotechnic AN-M8	6 ea	5333-003
1010-691-1382	Grenade, launcher M-79	30 ea	5333-004
5805-503-2616	Signal Assy, TA 207/P	1 ea	6006-009
6115-542-6011	Generator Set, 45KW	1 ea	6046-001

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<u>FSN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>UNIT DOC NO</u>
1005-064-5808	Pedestal	28 ea	6137-001
1005-854-4463	Mount	28 ea	6137-002
1005-565-2797	Cover	28 ea	6137-003
5820-194-9928	Radio Set, AN/PRC-6	25 ea	6138-001
6625-828-6440	Signal Generator TS-452	1 ea	6207-002
6115-518-3499	Dummy load, electrical	1 ea	6006-008
5820-705-9067	Radio Set, AN/PRC-10	1 ea	5337-001

Note: All of the above items are essential to the accomplishment of this unit's mission. To date, none of the equipment has been received. Follow-up requests have only received replies that the items are "due-out".

(c) Shortages of 2½ ton LWB trucks: During the quarter there were no LWB 2½ ton trucks received, and two were salvaged, leaving the Battalion 38 short. While the shortage of those vehicles has not seriously hampered operation, it is beginning to present a maintenance problem, since the vehicles on hand are being subjected to an abnormally high usage. The majority of LWB 2½ ton trucks (42 out of 50) on hand are rated as amber ESC because of age, and this contributes to the problem of keeping these vehicles operational. Additionally, the LWB 2½ ton vehicles in the Battalion have been used heavily, due to the shortage of LWB trucks. These vehicles are supposed to be primarily missile carriers and constant usage as cargo trucks is detrimental to their condition.

(3) Class III: No problems have been experienced with Class III material during this period.

(4) Class V: No problems have been experienced with Class V material during this period other than the pyrotechnics listed in last quarter's report are still in short supply.

b. Repair Parts:

(1) General:

(a) Red Ball Express: Forty-eight (48) Red Ball Requisitions were submitted during the quarter and forty (40) were received. The remaining eight (8) were from 9 to 47 days old at the end of the quarter.

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(b) Scoop Loader (Clark Model 175 AN-23): The scoop loader which was reported in the last report as deadlined for an engine has been repaired and was returned to the unit on 17 October 1966. This battalion is still experiencing difficulty in the non-availability of scoop loader repair parts.

(2) HAWK

(a) During the last reporting period the DSP technical supply recieved 9607 requisitions from its customers. Of these, 8280 matched the authorized stockage list giving a demand accomodations of 86%. Of the requisitions recieved matching the stockage list 6507 were issued giving a demand satisfactory figure of 78%. The remaining 3102 requisitions were passed to the GSU.

(b) Lack of repair parts has continued to be critical in the following areas:

1. Loader Transporters: the loader transporter reported non-operational at close of last quarter has been returned to operation by fabrication of many parts. It has not yet been load tested due to missing and incorrect components in the load-testing kit. These components are being made or requisitioned so that the load testing can be completed. A second loader has been non-operational since 27 September 1966 awaiting a final drive assembly. Subsequent to that time the second final drive assembly was taken from this loader to keep another loader in operation, so the one loader is now awaiting 2 final drive assemblies. Missile latch assemblies continue to be a problem. There are outstanding requisitions on all loaders for latch assembly FSN 2590-777-3134. These latches must be replaced annually as a safety precaution. It is anticipated that loader parts will become increasingly scarce due to the phasing out of our particular models and non procurement of spare parts.

2. Range only Radar: This radar continues to account for a large percentage of AMBER system time. One of the problems is a lack of an adequate supply of repair parts. This radar failure rate is the highest of any item in the system and troubleshooting and repair times are among the highest. The modulator cabinet is the primary source of failures and the most common component failures within it are; the semiconductors FSN 5961-881-8190, FSN 5961-837-6217, FSN 5961-837-6218 and rectifier FSN 1430-864-2985.

3. Launchers: Replacement cables for those on which the potting compound has melted have been slow in arriving in country. No launchers have been deadlined yet as a result of this, but the problem is serious. Twenty five (25) of these cables FSN 1440-774-9379 are still on requisition.

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c. Maintenance:

(1) General:

(a) Automotive Deadline Rate: A deadline rate of 2.07 percent was compiled during this quarter as compared to a rate of 2.6 percent during the previous quarter.

(b) M151 Turn Stops: During the performance of Bn CMMI's, it was noted that not all of the  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks, M151, had turn stops installed. The Turn Stop is a safety device to lessen the possibility of a vehicle turning too sharply and flipping over. It was further noted that those turn stops which were installed in jeeps were not welded in place, thus they would work loose and get out of adjustment, or fall completely off. All  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks were deadlined until they were inspected to insure turn stops were installed. At present all  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks are inspected prior to dispatch to insure that the turn stops are present and are tight. In the near future a battalion wide program will be initiated to have the turn stops adjusted properly and then spot welded in place. This procedure has been coordinated with the supporting maintenance activity.

(2) HAWK:

(a) The technical repair shops of the direct support platoon processed 1410 maintenance requests during the period. Of these requests, 898 were for repair of chassis and 462 were for repair of major items of equipment. The remaining 50 requests were for repair of test equipment and miscellaneous items.

(b) The following is the present status of problem areas reported in the preceding command report:

1. Generators 45KW, 400 and 60 cycle: Actuator failures on these generators continues to be a problem. The use of a filter in the hydraulic lines has not eliminated failures. Rebuild procedures at the GSU have been improved and no significant generator downtime has been encountered as a result of actuator failure in spite of the excessive failure rate. This problem is under study by engineer representatives both here and in CONUS. Two defective actuators were shipped to CONUS as part of this study. EIR control number E25074 has been submitted and assigned EIR case number 4569-0308-03. This EIR recommended use of the filters mentioned above.

2. Generators 45KW, 400 and 60 cycle: Failures due to excessive moisture still continues to be a problem. It is being reduced by building shelters for all generators and by insuring that generators are not operated with open doors.

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3. Launcher Control Units: The shorting of launcher control units due to moisture has been virtually eliminated through the use of precautionary measures as recommended in previous report.

4. Melting Cables: This continues to be a problem. No steps can be taken to prevent melting. Careful observation can eliminate damage to missiles in case the melting is severe enough to cause shorting. The replacement cables have not been obtained for all launchers as previously mentioned under the Repair Parts Category. EIR (control number Q10254) has been submitted. This EIR recommended that an improved type of cable that will withstand high heat encountered in regions of hot humid climates be utilized.

5. Repair by Replacement: The repair by replacement program on tactical generators has continued to be successful. To date 20 generators have been replaced under this program. No generator has had to be run over 6,000 hours due to lack of a replacement. Three generators issued as replacements, however, were found to be defective due to the protective bags being filled with water. These generators had to be evacuated.

d. Construction:

(1) During the reporting period Hq Btry has completed construction of all but six (6) maintenance buildings utilizing self help program. One of the six (6) maintenance buildings is currently under construction. A request was submitted by this battalion to have constructed an Operations Center Complex. This complex will consist of four (4) buildings, housing the Battalion Operations Center and associated personnel and equipment. The request was recently approved and is being included in the Hqs Btry construction program.

(2) The occupancy of "A" Btry's new site has been hampered by the lack of laterite to make hardstands for the tactical area. The laterite was being delivered by a contractor who has failed to meet his contracted obligations. A new contract has been signed and the battery has recently begun to receive laterite. To date 2000 meters have been received.

(3) "B" Btry's new site is currently being constructed under a combined Engineer Troop and Self Help program. Beneficial Occupancy Date for the new site is 1 November 1966, but some slippage will be encountered.

(4) Construction Materials: In general the availability of construction materials has been adequate. Shortage of materials listed in last quarters report (Ref: Section I, para 5d) no longer exists. However, one serious drawback has been the non-availability of aggregate and sand. The lack of these two items has caused an overall slow down in the progress of this battalion's construction program. The materials are needed to make cement floors for buildings. No date can be obtained as to when the materials will become available.

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e. Repairs and Utilities:

(1) During this reporting period a Repair and Utilities Facility was organized in the Long Binh area. The facility was just established and is still getting organized, consequently services have been inadequate but are expected to improve within a short time.

(2) Two (2) each 100KW, 60 cycle, generators were recently received by Hqs Btry to provide power for its administrative areas. Action has also been initiated to obtain generators for the rest of the battalion's units.

(3) None of the wells mentioned in last quarters report are operational because of the continuing non-availability of pumping equipment.

SECTION II: (C) Commanders Observations and Recommendations

1. (C-MHA) Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned)

a. Personnel/Records

(1) Item: Personnel Files (DA Form 210, DA Form 20, and DA Form 2143 (FDRF), etc).

(2) Discussion: Non-receipt of newly arrived enlisted men's records continues to be major problem. In most cases individuals indicated that their records were mailed by their former unit because of Article 15's being inclosed as a portion of the records. In some instances records did not arrive until three (3) months after the individual arrived. Delay of records creates a serious morale problem for individuals concerned as they are unable to receive maximum pay.

(3) Observation: All personnel assigned to the Republic of Vietnam, regardless of grade and/or record of punishment, should be allowed to handcarry their records in a sealed envelope so as to enable the gaining organization to initiate and complete all required in-processing actions.

b. Special Services/Motion Pictures

(1) Item: Motion Pictures

(2) Discussion: Prior to 10 October 1966, this unit was issued motion pictures on the basis of one film per day. On 10 October 1966, the local SSO reduced this rate to five films per week per existing regulations. It has been the experience of this unit that these films are among the best of the morale-building devices available. It is anticipated that this curtailment of issue will have adverse effect on this unit's morale program.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,  
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

(3) Observation: An important morale service could be improved if additional films were obtained and the basis for issue of films within USARV was increased to seven per unit per week.

c. Intelligence/Sentry Dogs

(1) Item: Lack of Sentry Dog NCO supervisor at Battalion Level

(2) Discussion: This battalion is authorized, by augmentation to the TOE, twenty Sentry Dogs and handlers, four in each of five batteries. The present TOE calls for 10 PFC (E3), 5 SP4 (E4) and 5 CPL (E4) to fill each of these slots. There is no provision in the TOE for a supervisor at Battalion level.

(3) Observation: That a dog handler supervisor (MOS 95B4D) in grade of Sgt (E5) be added at battalion level to evaluate the sentry dog program and make recommendations to the commander for improvements. A request has been submitted for a change to the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery TOE, TOE 44-235D, to authorize a Sergeant, E5, MOS 95B4D.

d. Intelligence/Small Arm Fire

(1) Item: Use of Weapons for Perimeter Defense.

(2) Discussion: VC tactics used against the Long Binh site appear to be an attempt to draw fire into adjacent friendly units and the village of Ho-Nai, located approximately 700 meters north of the position. The VC have appeared between the site and the village on numerous occasions and have been observed bobbing up and down in obvious attempts to draw fire. The use of TOE weapons under these conditions presents the danger of inadvertently directing fire into friendly areas.

(3) Observation: Positive control of small arms fire must be maintained at all times. Personnel must be briefed on hazards involved and instructed to insure that all fires are kept low to minimize the possibility of inflicting friendly casualties. Hand grenades and command detonated mines should be employed in lieu of direct fire weapons whenever possible. Grenade launchers extend the area covered by fire beyond hand grenade range without endangering friendly areas and provide greater flexibility to the defense than do mines.

e. Intelligence/Night Observation

(1) Item: Illuminating Devices.

(2) Discussion: This unit's Long Binh site is situated in an area which is partially secured. Activity outside the perimeter after dark cannot be assumed to be either hostile or friendly unless the unit is

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actually fired upon. The local population is apparently suspicious of both sides and if challenged at night will attempt to avoid detection and disappear into the brush. For this reason, standard sign and countersign challenging techniques are useful only for avoiding contact with friendly troops and means of positive visual identification of civilians is required. Therefore VC have the advantage of being able to occupy preplanned positions close to his objective with impunity. In order to prevent this, a means of illuminating the area around the unit perimeter is required. The signal, illumination, ground cluster, white star, FSN 1370-028-6005, initially used for this program has proven unsatisfactory because of the delay between ejection from the hand held launcher which produces a loud noise and the beginning of actual illumination. Intruders are warned by the noise of ejection and take cover before the area is illuminated. A means of providing illumination without warning is required. Two methods of providing instant illumination have been successfully used by this unit. Trip flares mounted on tent stakes with half of a NO. 10 can as a reflector are triggered by a line run to the nearest bunker. These work very well but are limited in the duration of illumination and the area covered. In addition, they are one shot devices and once used, cannot be replaced that night. A searchlight, powered by a 5KW 60 cycle generator, provide a long lasting flexible means of illumination. It is believed that the use of this light has caused at least one attempted penetration to be abandoned. The search light has the disadvantage of being only as reliable as its power source. It can be disabled by gunfire and the generator is exposed to enemy fire.

(3) Observation: A means of observation which would allow identification to be made without alerting the intruder, such as the starlight viewing device or sniperscope, would be an ideal solution to this problem. Any method involving illumination will yield at best a glimpse of intruders before they take cover. This headquarters has requested that twenty (20) starlight scopes, four (4) per battery be issued as soon as possible.

f. Supply/Typewriters

(1) Item: Office Machines (Typewriters).

(2) Discussion: Much emphasis is placed on accurate and timely correspondence, especially reports and monthly payrolls for over 1000 personnel assigned to this organization.

(3) Observation: Adequate maintenance facilities for typewriters and other office machines should be offered in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. Presently, all maintenance is performed in the overcrowded shops at the "Rice Mill" in Saigon, RVN.

g. Chemical/Defoliation

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SUBJECT: Operations Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,  
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(1) Item: Clearing Fields of Fire.

(2) Discussion: This unit's Long Binh site is situated in a area of heavy underbrush which provided very good concealment to within 10 to 30 meters of the perimeter. The only means available to the unit for clearing this brush is hand clearing by troop labor. Because of the large area requirement of a Hawk unit, there are also large areas within the perimeter itself which must be continuously kept cleared. A disproportionate amount of available troop man-hours is required for this purpose.

(3) Observation: A chemical defoliate should be made available for use by ADA units in sufficient quantity to achieve continuous control of vegetation in and around battery areas. Estimated savings in man-hours: 1200 man-hours per month. At this time, this headquarters is determining which herbicide is most appropriate for our needs so that it may be requisitioned.

h. Engineer/Generators

(1) Item: Administrative Power.

(2) Discussion: The Hawk Battery TOE does not provide sufficient power generation capacity for semi-permanent emplacement. However, USARV Reg 420-43 authorizes 300KW of administrative power generation capacity for each battery.

(3) Observation: S4 of Battalions currently in country and those of arriving Battalions should arrange to procure administrative power generators for all batteries for the Battalion, as soon as possible, rather than having the batteries attempt to procure their own on an individual basis.

i. Engineer/Generators 100KW

(1) Item: Camp Power Generators

(2) Discussion: On 8 September 1966, this unit received two 100KW generators with two civilian operator/maintenance personnel, under government contract from Pacific Architects and Engineers. Prior to this time camp (non-tactical) power had been supplied by two 45KW tactical generators from the battalion maintenance floats. The tactical generators were strained to capacity to provide the required output in addition to their not being available for their intended purpose.

(3) Observation: The two 100KW commercial generators, with civilian operator/maintenance personnel, provide a steady and reliable source of camp power without drain on unit manpower or tactical equipment resources.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966,  
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j. Engineer/Construction

(1) Item: Construction Machinery and Equipment.

(2) Discussion: Since the US buildup in the Long Binh area, this unit has found it increasingly difficult to obtain machinery and equipment to proceed with the self-help construction program. Items, such as graders, bulldozers and dump trucks, are especially difficult to obtain. A number of construction Projects especially road repair and construction of the tactical areas, are delayed awaiting availability of equipment.

(3) Observation: A relatively small fleet of heavy vehicles and equipment, pooled in the Long Binh area exclusively for use in self-help construction and repair projects, would expedite projects underway in a large number of local units. Encouragement of these self-help projects would substantially reduce the amount, and cost of Engineer construction required.

k. Engineer/Generator Repair Parts

(1) Item: Generator Repair by Replacement Program.

(2) Discussion: This program does not effect generators which are non-operable due to lack of major parts which are not available.

(3) Observation: That the generator repair by replacement program be extended to cover generators which have a major item out.

l. Ordnance/Melting Cables

(1) Item: Melting of Interconnecting Cables on HAWK launchers, SM78E3.

(2) Discussion: The very high temperatures in this area melt the insulator compound in the cables, thereby causing malfunctions in missiles and launchers.

(3) Observation: That heat resistant cables be developed to replace the cables currently used. EIR (control number Q10254) has been submitted. This EIR recommended that an improved type of cable that will withstand high heat encountered in regions of hot humid climates be utilized.

m. Ordnance/Test Equipment

(1) Item: Excessive Downtime of Test Equipment.

(2) Discussion: When test equipment is turned into support maintenance for repair, it usually takes in excess of 90 days.

(3) Observation: That test equipment be given higher priority at support maintenance.

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n. Ordnance/Vehicle, PLL

(1) Item: Master Cylinders and Wheels cylinders on all TOE vehicles.

(2) Discussion: Rain and high humidity builds up and rusts master cylinders and wheel cylinders. Support Maintenance does not always have the necessary repair parts. This causes excessive deadline time.

(3) Observation: That master cylinder and wheel cylinder repair kits be added to the unit PLL.

2. (U) Part II: Recommendations

None

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*Peter B Farrell*  
PETER B. FARRELL  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

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BATTERY B  
6TH BATTALION, 56TH ARTILLERY  
APO 96491

6 October 1966

SUBJECT: After Action Report (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
97th Artillery Group  
ATTN: AVGH-B  
APO 96307

1. (C) At approximately 0145 hours, 6 Oct 66, the security force of B Btry, 6th Bn, 56th Arty, located at YTO82117 was hit by an unknown number of VC (est. 10 persons) with small arms and two (2) automatic weapons. No friendly casualties were sustained and one (1) VC WIA is suspected due to blood found on trail leading from site.
2. (C) At approximately 2400 hours, 5 Oct 66, loud clicking noises were heard at the SW, SE and NW corners of the site. The incident was investigated by the OD and Sergeant of the Guard with nothing found.
3. (C) At 0145 hours, 6 Oct 66, all bunkers were reporting suspicious noises and movements around the perimeter. The Battery fired flares and as soon as the areas was illuminated, the unit started receiving small arms fire from the north and east and automatic weapons fire from the north and southeast. Fire was returned on the automatic weapons and they broke off the engagement. Sporadic small arms fire continued. At the time the first flare went off, a man was spotted under the fence in the NW corner of the site. Fire was brought on him as he fled. At approximately 0300, a flare ship was contacted, and by 0310, illumination was present over the area. Sporadic small arms fire continued until 0400, at which time contact was apparently broken.
4. (C) An estimated 150 rounds of small arms ammunition was fired into the area. There were no casualties and no damage to the equipment.
5. (c) An investigation of the area the following morning disclosed the following things:

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SUBJECT: After Action Report

6 October 1966

a. A bloody trail leading from the point at the north-east corner of the fence where the attempted intrusion occurred toward the village of Ho-Nai.

b. Positions and tracks indicate there were approximately 10 persons occupying areas to the north and east of the site.

6. (C) Items that occurred of special interest were:

a. The VC apparently had a signal system striking two pieces of wood together in a sort of Morse code fashion. This noise was heard several times before the attack and was answered by other similar clicking noises.

b. The VC apparently were trying to draw fire into the village 600 meters to the northeast of the site.

7. (C) Action taken to minimize recurrence:

a. M-18 anti-personnel mines have been placed around all bunkers.

b. Trip flares have been placed along likely avenues of approach.

c. Arrangements have been made to facilitate contacting flare ships.

d. M-79 grenade launchers have been hand receipted to allow firing toward the northeast without endangering the village.

A TRUE COPY

*Mark O Gentry*  
MARK O. GNETRY  
Captain, Artillery  
Adjutant

/s/ John H. Little  
/t/ JOHN H. LITTLE  
Captain, Artillery  
Commanding

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comeback

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AVHGC-DH (7 Nov 66) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSPOP-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 18 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CSPOP-OT  
APO 96358

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 6th Artillery, 56th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph a, Part I, Section II, Page 14:

(1) Nonconcur. Paragraph 16c(5), AR 640-10 specifically states that personnel in grades E4 through E6 are not authorized to hand-carry their personnel records jacket if the records jackets contain record of punishment imposed under Article 15, UCMJ; court martial orders; record of time lost under Section 972, Title 10, USC, and subsequent to normal date ETS; waiver for enlistment or reenlistment; bar to reenlistment; or declaration of intent to reenlist or not to reenlist.

(2) This procedure was designed to prevent the unauthorized destruction of such documents. Records for such individuals are mailed by the most expeditious means directly to the overseas organization specified in the individual's orders so as to arrive at the appropriate destination either prior to or concurrent with the arrival of the personnel concerned.

(3) The problem of non-receipt of records should diminish after the establishment of the USARV Transient Detachment effective 1 April 1967. At that time the records of all personnel assigned to USARV who are not authorized to hand-carry their records will be mailed to the USARV Transient Detachment instead of the many different units located in RVN.

(4) Recommend that Department of the Army iterate to all commands the requirement for forwarding records so as to arrive at the appropriate destination prior to or concurrent with the arrival of the individual presently contained in paragraph 16d, AR 640-10.

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Letter for Roke  
13/1/20 Hatan 67  
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LTC HEARD cc, A341, Record Copy - Return to AVHGC-DH  
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AVHOC-DH (7 Nov 66)

13 JAN 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

b. Reference Paragraph 5a(1), Section I, Page 9; and Paragraph 1, 1st Indorsement: Earlier meeting of the main board should allow sufficient time for planning. Availability of fruits and fresh vegetables is increasing steadily in Pleiku. Arrival of the 45th General Support Group at Pleiku Sub-Area Command has already evidenced better results.

c. Reference Paragraph 5a(2)(a), Section I, Page 9; and Paragraph 1, 1st Indorsement: Receipts of these items from COMUS since mid-November have been substantial and are expected to continue to arrive in quantity. Action taken by the indorsing headquarters to secure requisition data is considered appropriate.

d. Reference Paragraph b, Part I, Section II, Pages 14 and 15: Sixteen MM motion pictures are procured from American and Motion Picture Industries by the Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service for showing in Vietnam and other operational areas. Approximately 170 16mm films are produced each year; therefore, the supply is limited to 5 films entering the circuits each week, of which some films are repeat showings.

e. Reference Paragraph 1f, Section II, Page 16; and Paragraph 1, 1st Indorsement: In addition to a severe repair parts shortage, there is a critical personnel shortage in the 79th Maintenance Battalion (which performs this function). This has led to three civilian contracts being negotiated to reduce the present backlog. This additional capability, coupled with the programmed movement of the 79th Maintenance Battalion to the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area, should eliminate this problem.

f. Reference Paragraph 1j, Section II, Page 18, as pertains to unit's desire for a pool of heavy vehicles/equipment for use in self-help projects: Concur with unit's premise that such a pool would substantially reduce the amount and cost of engineer construction; however, the limited availability of engineer equipment precludes establishing such a pool.

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AVHOC-DH (7 Nov 66)

18 JAN 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

g. Reference Paragraph 1a, Section II, Page 18, as pertains to down time of test equipment: This Command does not possess a maintenance calibration capability, an integral part of instrument repair. Consequently, most instrument repair must be performed out of country, leading to greater repair times. This headquarters has requested facilities (AN/TSM-55A) and contract technicians to provide this capability in-country.

h. Reference Paragraph 2, Part II, Section II, 1st Indorsement: This headquarters has received unofficial notice that MTOE 44-12E, dated 19 December 1965, has been approved by Department of the Army; however, no General Order has been published by USARPAC.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
no

R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

MEMO FOR RECORD

11 Jan 67

ORLL was staffed to:

G3OT	See para 2h, MAJ Burt/31306.
G4	See para 2b, c, e, f, and g, MAJ Cummings/439.
SS	See para 2d, LTC Leornard/653.
AG	See para 2a, MAJ Mahan/565.

No further coord is necessary. Back up papers are attached to record copy. Action Officer: LTC Heard.

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