


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Authority NNP974345  
By M NARA Date 09/26/03

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AMERICAL DIVISION  
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED  
FOR PERIOD  
1 August 1968 --- 31 October 1968



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FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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ARV688 3433

Authority NNP974345  
By M NARA Date 09/24/03

AVDF-GC (15 Nov 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (6th Battalion, 56th Artillery)

DA, Headquarters, Americal Division, APO 96374

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

1. Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1968.

2. This Headquarters concurs with the observations and recommendations contained in the basic communication.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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as

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AVHCC-DST (15 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery, for the period ending 31 October 1968, RCS C3P0R-45 (K1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 21 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning redeployment support, page 13, paragraph K1: Nonconcurrence. The recommendations are not considered appropriate for implementation by this headquarters. The unit being deployed should have submitted requirements for support through command channels.

b. Reference item concerning transportation, page 14, paragraph E2: Nonconcurrence. The present system for unit water movements is adequate. TMA and the outloading port are the only two organizations the unit need deal with. Additional liaison should not be required. Current procedures have proven adequate in many moves. While MSTS is knowledgeable on LST operations in RVN, they are not the point of contact for shippers. There are several types of LSTs and therefore cargo planning must be based on the type of LST available for the move. This is a port function. Planning conferences and a single point of contact are desirable but are not a formal requirement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

By furn:  
HQ Americal Div  
HQ 6/56th ArtyG. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
O/C AG CLASSIFIEDDowngraded per  
automated downgrading  
instructions, 30 Jan 72  
by Sgtn H. K. Davis, CDR  
m/s/

CONCURRENCE NONCONCURRENCE: Appropriate comments were received from:

G1: MAJ Kaplan/4578  
G1 OPNS: LTC Olcott/4636

ACTION OFFICER: MAJ Klingman/4433

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COL READ, AGCIS, C3

RECORD COPY RETURN TO AVHCC-DST

CONFIDENTIALDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-AT

15 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery,  
for the period ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65  
(RI) (U)

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SECTION 1, OPERATIONS:  
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A. (C) Command: During the reporting period the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery, less Battery C, was alerted for in-country redeployment, released from the air defense mission in the Saigon-Bien Hoa area, deployed to Chu Lai by combined sealift and airlift, relieved the 2d Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion (UCMC) and assumed the mission of providing low and medium altitude air defense for the Chu Lai vital area. On 10 October 1968 the battalion was reassigned from the 97th Artillery Group (Air Defense) to the Americal Division Artillery.

B. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline

## 1. Personnel and Administration

	OFFICER		WARRANT		ENLISTED	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
Aug	40	42	15	14	803	812
Sep	40	44	15	15	803	845
*Oct	55	45	17	16	851	957

\*Reorganization of HHC and Battery C under approved concept plans and pending MTOE action.

C. (C) Intelligence and Counterintelligence:

1. During the reporting period the battalion deployed from III Corps to I Corps. As a result, the intelligence gathering and reporting procedures have changed accordingly. The Americal Division G2, serving as a central agency for intelligence activities, disseminates intelligence summaries and periodic intelligence reports. Significant activ-

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ties within the Chu Lai area are posted and disseminated by the Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC) Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to the subordinate sectors. This headquarters operates the CLDC Sector V TOC. All pertinent intelligence is disseminated to tenant units in the sector as well as the HAWK batteries within the battalion.

2. The battalion arrived in the Chu Lai area during the autumn transitional season between the southwest and northeast monsoon. The most significant local weather feature was "TYPHOON BESS" which struck the coast of Vietnam, between Da Nang and Chu Lai, during the period 3-4 September 1968. The Chu Lai area experienced winds of 40 knots velocity and heavy rains. Approximately 12 inches of rain were recorded during September and 23 inches during October. These adverse weather conditions existed while the battalion was occupying the tactical sites and returning to an operational status; however, normal operations were not affected to any great extent.

3. The obtaining of Military Security Services (MSS) clearance for Vietnamese Nationals has ceased to be a problem in the Chu Lai area. The industrial relations office processes local Vietnamese and grants their clearances prior to employment in the battalion. Battery D, on Ky Hoa Island, has to transport Vietnamese Nationals to the Industrial Relations Officer to get the required MSS clearance.

4. Physical security coordination has been initiated with the Amrical Division as well as Division Artillery. When all units occupied their tactical sites a thorough security inspection of all facilities was conducted IAW USARV Regulation 380-5. Entrance and exit criteria to all tactical sites remain the same except that additional procedures are required for Battery D which is located on Ky Hoa Island. In addition Battery D has established an augmented security force due to its relative isolation. Perimeter/Security lighting is limited to that provided by the Chu Lai Defense Command.

5. The classified repository received 132 SECRET documents during the period. The semi-annual inventory of classified documents was completed on 4 October 1968, and resulted in the destruction of 52 SECRET documents which were no longer needed.

6. Upon arrival in the Chu Lai area, the sentry dogs required a ten day period to get acclimated to the heat. Due to the non-availability of dog kennels on the tactical sites, temporary kennels have been constructed pending installation of permanent kennel facilities. After a thorough study of the local security requirements, several changes in sentry dog handler utilization were effected. Battery D, located on Ky Hoa Island, was augmented with the four assigned sentry dog handler teams from Battery B. The dog handler teams located at Battery A are utilized to secure the southern perimeter of Sector V CLDC. Headquarters Battery uses the sentry dogs on the battery perimeter due to the possibility of infiltration. Battery C, located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, lost their

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sentry dog handler team authorization on 31 October 1968 due to implementation of a Department of the Army approved concept plan and resulting MTOE action.

D. (S) Plans, Operations, Training and Organization:

1. HAWK Redeployment

(a) The relocation of the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery from the Saigon-Bien Hoa area to Chu Lai was the result of an extensive study of air defense requirements in RVN by USARV, 7th US Air Force, MACV and CINCPAC. The resulting HAWK redeployment which involved the relocation of this battalion as well as the withdrawal of one Army and one USMC HAWK battalion from RVN was directed by JCS SECRET message 06760, 082258Z August 1968. COMUSMACV SECRET message 192358Z August 1968 directed implementation of the withdrawal and redeployment within country. In preparation for the in-country move, 97th Artillery Group (AD) had published OPLAN 20-68 in April 1968 which was reviewed and approved by the 2d LAAM BN (USMC), USARV, 7th US Air Force and MACV. Upon implementation, 97th Artillery Group (AD) published OPORD/ADMINO 20-69 which established an execution date of 26 August 1968 and a completion date of NLT 31 October 1968.

(b) As a result of HAWK redeployment the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery is the only US Army HAWK unit in RVN. This has required several augmentations to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery in order to fulfill additional missions not normally found at battalion level. In preparation for this possible action 97th Artillery Group (AD) submitted a concept plan in January 1968 which identified additional missions, personnel and equipment requirements and modifications to operational procedures. This concept plan was approved and upon implementation of HAWK redeployment the necessary MTOE action was prepared and submitted to USARV by 97th Artillery Group (AD) on 10 October 1968.

(c) Relocation of this battalion to Chu Lai was completed minus Battery C, which remained at Tan Son Nhut Air Base (XT846518). This battery is programmed for future deployment to Thailand under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Current estimate for deployment is December 1969. Pending redeployment, the battery remains assigned to the battalion and under operational control of 7th US Air Force via Central and Reporting Center (CRC) Tan Son Nhut. In order to perform this contingency mission, a concept plan was required to identify additional missions, personnel and equipment requirements and modification to operational procedures. This concept plan was submitted by 97th Artillery Group (AD), approved by Department of the Army and when HAWK redeployment was implemented the necessary MTOE action was prepared and submitted to USARV by 97th Artillery Group (AD) on 25 September 1968.

2. Operations:

(a) The battalion was involved in normal operations, training and

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support from 1 August to 24 August 1968. Commander 7th US Air Force SECRET message, 240605Z August 1968 released the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery, minus Battery C, from the assigned air defense mission in the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Tan Son Nhut area effective 241600Z August 1968. This was necessary to prepare for and execute in-country redeployment.

(b) Concurrently with preparations for movement, the battalion was completing a 100% exchange of HAWK peculiar mission equipment. New equipment was airlifted to RVN from Redstone Arsenal, Alabama and Fort Bliss, Texas. Exchanged equipment was retrograded to CONUS and Korea for rebuild. This program involved the receipt and retrograde, via channel airlift, of 156 major pieces of HAWK equipment. This program was completed on 10 September 1968.

(c) Upon release from the air defense mission this battalion also completed a 100% missile exchange. One hundred and forty-four (144) on-site missiles were turned in to the ASP in the Long Binh area for retrograde as USAMICOM directs. One hundred and eight (108) backup missiles, maintained by the ASP, were airlifted to Chu Lai, issued to the batteries upon arrival in this area and are presently operational on site. Battery C, remaining in the Tan Son Nhut area, also exchanged the basic load. Action has been initiated to position a 100% backup load of missiles (108 ea) at Chu Lai. The backup missiles for Battery C (36 ea) will be stored at the Long Binh ASP.

(d) Movement from the Saigon-Bien Hoa area to Chu Lai was accomplished by both sea and airlift. Ten (10) Landing Ship Tank (LST) were utilized to scalift the battalion equipment. The following is a recapitulation of key activitics related to the move:

(1) The advance party was airlifted from Bien Hoa Air Base to Chu Lai on 8 September 1968.

(2) The first LST, containing the HAWK peculiar equipment, minus a basic assualt fire unit of Battery D, was loaded at the Newport Facility, Saigon on 11 September 1968.

(3) LST #1 and #2 containing all the mission peculiar equipment of Battery D arrived at Chu Lai on 15 and 16 September respectively. Battery D replaced Battery A, 2d LAAM BN (USMC) and was declared operational 192030 September 1968 at BT 515159.

(4) The mission peculiar equipment of Battery A, aboard LST #4 and #5, arrived at Chu Lai on 20 and 21 September 1968.

(5) The last LST departed Newport Facility Saigon on 24 September 1968.

(6) The rear party was airlifted from Tan Son Nhut Air Base to Chu Lai on 25 September 1968.

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(7) The mission peculiar equipment of Battery B, aboard LST #7 and #8, arrived at Chu Lai on 24 and 25 September respectively.

(8) Battery A replaced Battery C, 2d LAAM BN (USMC) and was declared operational 26200H September 1969 at BT 563043.

(9) 7th US Air Force SECRET message 270845Z September 1968 released the 2d LAAM BN (USMC) from their assigned air defense mission in the Chu Lai area and transferred the mission to the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery.

(10) The Battalion Operations Center assumed its fire distribution mission in a manual mode on 27 September 1968.

(11) Battery B replaced Battery A, 2d LAAM BN (USMC) and was declared operational 021646H October 1968 at BT 536102.

(12) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery departed the staging area and occupied the Headquarters and Service Battery area, 2d LAAM BN (USMC) on 12 October 1968 at BT 553054.

(e) Upon arrival in the Chu Lai area, the battalion resumed normal operations, training, and support activities with primary emphasis on improving tactical and administrative sites, hardening of mission peculiar equipment and preparations for possible severe weather during the monsoon season.

(f) Relocation of this battalion has required an additional operations commitment. US Army air defense personnel are presently required at the 7th US Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) and Control and Reporting Center (CRC), Tan Son Nhut Air Base to monitor the HAWK air defense activities of Battery C as well as advise US Air Force operations personnel on ground based air defense system capabilities and employment. This commitment has also been extended to Control and Reporting Center (CRC) Da Nang due to the location of the battalion, minus Battery C, in the Da Nang air defense subsector. All commitments are being adequately fulfilled as approved concept plans and MTOE actions provided for the personnel and equipment required.

(g) On 19 October 1968 the battalion received the AN/GSA-77 data converter. This new piece of equipment will replace the present battery terminal equipment (Coder-Decoder Group) in the AN/TSU-38 semi-automatic fire distribution system. The assigned Department of the Army Missile Maintenance Technician will provide the initial instruction for operator and maintenance personnel as well as provide technical assistance on any problems encountered during initial installation, integration and daily operation.

(h) On 1 October 1968, this headquarters assumed operational control of Sector V, Chu Lai Defense Command (CLDC). This involves providing a command element for coordination and direction of all sector ground

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defense activities. The sector presently has an outer perimeter of approximately 8.5 miles. The command element currently requires the full time efforts of seven personnel (1 - CPT; 2 - E6; 4 - E4) who man the Sector V tactical operations center on a 24 hour a day basis. This battalion is currently training three rapid reaction forces to be deployed on short notice to block any enemy penetration within the Chu Lai Defense Command. During the past month, experience has shown that daily details, provided by sector units, are required to maintain wire communications, bunkers and obstacles. Composite details have allowed maximum coordination, standardization and produced marked improvements in the entire perimeter. On 1 November 1968, the southern boundary of Sector V will be extended. This will require additional guards and communications. Action is currently underway to insure a smooth takeover when this additional responsibility is effected.

### 3. Training:

(a) Redeployment of the battalion provided an excellent training vehicle for all personnel in march order and emplacement of equipment, preparation for sealift, packaging and crating, convoy procedures and LST loading and unloading procedures. Upon arrival in Chu Lai the conventional and VHF communications as well as the semi-automatic distribution system had to be emplaced and integrated with the firing batteries. This again provided valuable training to personnel acclimated to a static environment.

(b) However, HAWK redeployment, including withdrawal of the other US Army HAWK battalion from RVN, created considerable personnel turbulence due to deployment criteria. This has necessitated an extensive OJT program within this battalion to reestablish the teamwork essential to mission accomplishment. This includes, but is not limited to increasing HAWK missilemen qualification LAW FM 44-19 and HAWK target engagement simulator training using the AN/TPQ-21.

### 4. Organization:

(a) HAWK redeployment necessitated significant organizational changes. On 10 October 1968, the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery was reassigned from the 97th Artillery Group (AD) to the Americal Division LAW USARV GO 4664, 8 October 1968. Due to the expanded and additional missions of the Headquarters and Battery C, previously approved concept plans were used to prepare extensive MTOE actions.

(b) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery basic TOE (TOE 44-236D) required an augmentation of 17 paragraphs. This involved a composite direct-general support platoon for HAWK peculiar maintenance and supply operations and liaison elements for USARV, Americal Division Artillery and 7th US Air Force Control and Reporting Center Da Nang. The resulting personnel authorization is a 37 space increase over present MTOE strength and includes 26 officers, 8 warrant officers and 285 enlisted men.

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(c) The Thailand AFP contingency for Battery C required that the battery personnel authorization be increased from 5 officers, 2 warrant officers and 137 enlisted to 14 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 155 enlisted men. These augmentations provide organic VHF communications, HAWK peculiar direct support platoon, and liaison personnel for MACTHAI J3, US Air Force Control and Reporting Center, US Air Force Tactical Air Control Center and Air Operating Center. This modification to TOE 44-237D was submitted to USAFV on 21 September 1968.

(d) As a result of these two MTOE actions the battalion authorized strength, based on approved concept plans and pending MTOE actions is as follows:

OFFICER	WARRANT	ENLISTED	TOTAL
HMB	26	8	285
Btry A	5	2	137
Btry B	5	2	137
Btry C	14	3	155
Btry D	5	2	137
BN	55	17	851
			923

E. (C) Logistics:

1. During the reporting period the most significant logistics activity was the relocation of this battalion from the Saigon-Bien Hoa area to Chu Lai. Battery C remained at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The move entailed ten (10) LST loads (16,600 measurement tons) and nine (9) air-lifts involving approximately 375 personnel. In general, only sufficient personnel to drive the vehicles were transported by LST. All other personnel were airlifted so as to be available to assist in off loading LSTs and expedite equipment emplacement.

2. The movement was divided into five phases. Phase I and V utilized airlift; Phase II, III, IV were a combination of sea and airlift. This phasing was established to accomplish the following objectives:

(a) Rapidity in achieving an operational status upon arrival. This was accomplished by designating a firing battery as the major element in each phase. The supporting elements in headquarters and headquarters battery were distributed throughout all the phases to insure continuous support upon arrival in new location. Special attention was also given to providing communication and control facilities to the forward elements as soon as possible. The maintenance, messing, medical, and administrative elements were split so that they were available to both the forward and rear elements.

(b) Reduction of the time in the forward staging area to a minimum. This was accomplished by sending the batteries forward in the same order in which the relieved USMC units phased out.

(c) Equal distribution of bulk cargo among the phases. This was

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programmed to insure an even flow of cargo at the forward area to expedite unloading and redeployment. Also this made it easier to stage at the rear area since the work load involved in preparing and transporting this cargo was evenly spread out over a period of time.

3. The LST loads within the various phases were planned with the following objectives:

- (a) Getting the mission essential equipment moved first. This was accomplished by sealift of a firing battery on the first LST of each phase.
- (b) Dividing the critical loads among the LSTs so that the unit could perform its mission if one of the LSTs were delayed or lost. This was accomplished by loading either a basic or augmented assault firing unit on the second LST. The float H.WK peculiar equipment was placed on the last LST of the first sealift phase.
- (c) Distributing the administrative support among the LSTs so that the firing unit could operate if one of the LSTs was delayed or lost.
- (d) Shipping individual critical items of equipment, such as the 5 ton wrecker, on the first LST of each phase so it would be available upon arrival for off loading.
- (e) Planning the various LST loads in such a manner that the plans could be easily changed to allow for unforeseen contingencies. This was accomplished by cross referencing the loading diagrams with individual Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) on each item of cargo. If a certain item had to be changed, the TCMD for that item was inserted into the loading plan, and the TCMD on an item with the same general dimensions was removed.

4. The following is a recapitulation of movement phasing to include datos, contents and sea/air lift data:

(a) Phase I - Airlift

- (1) Date departed: 8 Sep 68
- (2) Date arrived: 8 Sep 68
- (3) Composition: 31 personnel, 4 vehicles with trailers

(b) Phase II - Sealift

	LST #1	LST #2	LST #3
(1) Date loaded:	11 Sep 68	12 Sep 68	15 Sep 68
(2) Date arrived:	15 Sep 68	16 Sep 68	19 Sep 68
(3) Composition:	D Btry (-) VHF Equip	D Btry AFU Medical Sec	DSP FMTE, H.WK Float Equip

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## (c) Phase III - Sealift

	LST #4	LST #5	LST #6
(1) Date loaded:	16 Sep 68	17 Sep 68	19 Sep 68
(2) Date arrived:	20 Sep 68	21 Sep 68	23 Sep 68
(3) Composition:	A Btry (-) VHF Equip	A Btry AFU A Btry Train Bn Op Center	DSP Tech Supply

## (d) Phase IV - Sealift

	LST #7	LST #8	LST #9	LST #10
(1) Date loaded:	20 Sep 68	22 Sep 68	23 Sep 68	24 Sep 68
(2) Date arrived:	24 Sep 68	25 Sep 68	26 Sep 68	27 Sep 68
(3) Composition:	B Btry (-) Bn Comm VHF Equip	B Btry AFU DSP Vehicles	HHB Trains	B Btry Trains Conexes

## (e) Phase V - Airlift

(1) Date loaded: 25 Sep 68  
 (2) Date arrived 25 Sep 68  
 (3) Composition: 50 Personnel, 1 vehicle w/trailer

## F. (C) Civil Affairs Civic Action

1. During the reporting period the civic action program of the battalion was partially disrupted due to relocation. While stationed in the Saigon-Bien Hoa area, the battalion had the Chieu Hoi center in Bien Hoa as an assigned civic action project. Prior to departure for Chu Lai the current activity involved installation of electrical power on the Chieu Hoi compound. Although the project was not completed, the battalion did provide material and supervisory personnel to get the project well under way and had witnessed the erection of 20 utility poles by 20 August 1968.

2. By early October 1968, the battalion had arrived in the Chu Lai area. With the relief of the 2d LAM BN (USMC) virtually completed, the Artillery Division Artillery transferred the Marine civic action area of responsibility to this battalion. This area consists of two small islands, Ky Hoa and Fish, north of the Chu Lai area with a population of approximately 6300 inhabitants. The most immediate need of the island inhabitants was that of medical assistance. As a result an extensive MEDCAP program was initiated. This involves two or three visits to the island weekly by the battalion surgeon and medical specialists. Each MEDCAP treats between 100 and 125 patients. The program has been very successful and has resulted in a noticeable decrease in infections and skin disease among

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the island inhabitants.

3. Additional civic action activities on Ky Hoa Island involves care and feeding of four hogs, previously obtained by the USMC from CONUS. Efforts are being made to teach the island inhabitants some of the modern methods of pig farming and breeding in order to produce a better grade of pork and in greater quantity.

4. On 2 October 1968, the battalion participated in the celebration of National Children's Day on Ky Hoa Island. As a result of troop donations, the battalion was able to procure, prepare and distribute 1200 packages of candy and cookies to the island children. The battalion commander and S-5 personnel were on hand, as invited guests of the island chief, at the Children's Day celebration.

5. Recapitulation of Civic Action Program:

<u>DATE(S)</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>AREA</u>
1 Aug-20 Aug	Installation of 20 utility poles	Bien Hoa
2 Oct	Distribution of 50 pounds of cookies and candy on Children's Day	Ky Hoa Island
10 Oct-31 Oct	MEDCAP treatment of 760 local nationals.	Ky Hoa Island
10 Oct-31 Oct	Care and feeding of 4 hogs	Ky Hoa Island

6. Future civic action activities involve continuing programs already in effect. In addition, English classes and training of local girls as nurses to assist in the MEDCAP program are scheduled.

G. (U) Inspector General - N/A

H. (U) Information - N/A

I. (U) Headquarters Support - N/A

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~~SECRET~~SECTION 2, LESSONS LEARNED  
COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## A. (S) Personnel

## 1. Requirement for personnel stability during deployment.

(a) OBSERVATION: HAWK redeployment involved relocation of this battalion, with drawal of another US Army HAWK unit from RVN and the in-country inactivation of an air defense group headquarters and two support units. These units as well as this battalion contained many personnel in a volunteer and extension status. In addition most personnel had air defense missile peculiar MOS. In attempting to comply with inflexible personnel deployability criteria, this battalion was subjected to excessive personnel turbulence to accommodate personnel with missile peculiar MOS, volunteers and extendees. This personnel turbulence occurred prior to, during and immediately after relocation.

(b) EVALUATION: The resulting reassignment of personnel into and from the battalion during redeployment created several problems in maintaining organization, teamwork and continuity of operation. This turbulence was compounded by the inability of the system to fill key slots until after relocation was completed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the need for personnel stability during deployment be truly appreciated and every effort exerted to minimize the degrading effect of personnel turbulence at this time. Special attention is required in RVN due to the peculiarities of the volunteer and extension program.

## B. (U) Operations

## 1. Movement of Direct Support Platoon (DSP)

(a) OBSERVATION: The organic HAWK Direct Support Platoon was moved in phases during relocation of this battalion. This provided a streamlined support maintenance and supply capability to accompany the first battery into the Chu Lai area. The remaining semi-trailer mounted and Conex packed tech suppl. section was moved in subsequent phases.

(b) EVALUATION: Upon arrival in Chu Lai and emplacement of the HAWK peculiar equipment, the need for critical and low demand repair parts exceeded the supply within the advanced DSP element. Communications between the Chu Lai area and the battalion rear in Saigon were unsatisfactory and even when possible, produced limited results due to Conex pack of a multi thousand line item authorized stockage list.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That due to the dependence on a timely and continuing supply of repair parts, the mobile HAWK battalion direct support platoon be provided adequate and mobile repair parts storage to accommodate the entire authorized stockage list (ASL). In addition, particular attention should be given to DSP movement phasing to insure timely arrival and immediate availability of all repair parts.

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2. Movement of PCS property

(a) OBSERVATION: This battalion deployed from the Saigon-Bien Hoa area with all PCS property.

(b) EVALUATION: Although not directed, this action was based on the limited assets available in the Chu Lai area. After relocation the presence of this property was a boon to unit morale and efficiency. However, in preparation for and during the move, this additional material limited the inherent mobility of the battalion and increased transportation problems.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That this decision was wise and valid; however, it should have been handled as a separate phase of the battalion deployment.

3. Timely receipt of repair parts

(a) OBSERVATION: USAMICOM has approved the continued operation of the special support program for HAWK in Vietnam (Project Code YY4). This program involves direct requisitioning for HAWK peculiar repair parts from the battalion direct support platoon to the USAMICOM NICP. In addition all requisitions are expedited in CONUS and airlifted from Travis AFB, California to Da Nang.

(b) EVALUATION: This special program is an absolute necessity for successful US Army HAWK operations in Vietnam. However, considerable problems were encountered in transferring shipment of these supplies from CONUS to Da Nang instead of the previous Vietnam termination at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. In addition the in-country cargo distribution at Da Nang has a considerable backlog and efforts by this headquarters to expedite shipments have not succeeded. During the interim period, while the mechanics of the system are being finalized, this battalion suffers from a timely and continuing supply of critical repair parts. As a result the unit PLL and DSP ASL are rapidly being depleted.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That greater external coordination and direction be provided in future transfers of such a costly yet effective system.

C. (U) Training

1. In-country sealift

(a) OBSERVATION: Relocation of this battalion was accomplished by LST shipment of all equipment. This unit computed LST requirements, developed LST loading plans, prepared TCMs, loaded and unloaded LSTs.

(b) EVALUATION: This unit had little experience in the preparation and conduct of sealift operations. This was primarily due to the normal deployment handling of cargo by terminal service units. Once tasked with this requirement, the battalion gained a vast amount of experience in all phases of sealift operations using LSTs and successfully moved all equipment from Saigon to Chu Lai.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That sealift operation by LST be added to the mobility training of all US Army HAWK units. This training is of special interest due to the normal requirement that unit personnel accomplish the majority of the planning, administration, loading and unloading.

2. Replacement Training

(a) OBSERVATION: Americal Division Combat Center conducts a seven day training program for all newly arrived replacements.

(b) EVALUATION: Prior to assignment to this division, the battalion and battery personnel were tasked with accomplishing this mandatory replacement training for all new arrivals. This was a time consuming operation and produced varying degrees of proficiency. The Americal Division program is completed prior to receipt of a replacement, involves all enlisted men and officers, through the grade of Captain, provides combat training not readily available within an air defense unit and accomplishes many mandatory and recurring training requirements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the efficiencies and benefits of consolidated replacement training be exploited to the maximum extent for all units in Vietnam.

D. (U) Intelligence - None

E. (U) Logistics

1. Redeployment Support

(a) OBSERVATION: Support units were not given adequate direction by higher headquarters to support this unit's move.

(b) EVALUATION: There were apparently no formal, specific directions given to any of this unit's supporting agencies informing them of our move. The unit found itself in the position of having to notify the various support units and then asking for the special additional support required to displace. Fortunately the support units generally cooperated and aided this unit in an outstanding manner on an informal basis. They were never levied with requirements or directed by higher headquarters to render additional support. Due to the informalities of this arrangement, an unfunc amount of time was spent procuring the necessary additional support. In some areas no support at all was given. Examples:

(1) Although this unit was authorized to bring station property, no support or materials were given to pack this equipment. Liaison visits were made to the 1st Log Command, 506th Field Depot and Saigon Support Command with no results. There was a small quantity of cardboard boxes procured, again on an informal basis.

(2) There was no cargo handling equipment made available to this unit. Again the liaison visited support agencies which yielded no results. Finally one fork lift was procured from the 185th Maintenance Battalion on a "favor" basis.

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## (c) RECOMMENDATION:

- (1) That supporting units be levied with requirements to support a unit move.
- (2) That the unit making a move be supplied with a list of the support available and which units will render this support.

## 2. Transportation

(a) OBSERVATION: All transportation requests demanded extensive follow-up action to avoid breakdowns in arrangements.

(b) EVALUATION: There were four main transportation agencies with which the unit had to coordinate for LST transportation.

(1) 3d Region (Traffic Management Agency) which processed the initial request, and forwarded requirements to 4th Transportation Command.

(2) 4th Transportation Command which planned the cargo loads and relayed the request to Military Sea Transport Service.

(3) The Military Sea Transport Service scheduled the LSTs.

(4) USAT - Newport called the cargo forward and loaded the LSTs. Although each individual agency was most cooperative there were numerous communication failures between the various offices. Examples:

a. MSTS initially planned the move by deep draft vessels. They erroneously thought there would be no problem for the unit to stage at some intermediate deep water port and move from there at some future date to present location. This error was discovered by this unit in sufficient time to correct without serious delay.

b. MSTS initially did not know the time requirement nor the priority of the move. Consequently the first proposed LST schedule was completely inadequate. Once the urgency was explained and the priority of the move established, corrective action was immediately taken and acceptable schedule was proposed.

c. The terminal's method of calling cargo forward was not timely to meet the unit's requirements. The terminal personnel waited until the morning that loading was to begin before notifying the unit. This delay was caused by the late hour in which the terminal received confirmed LST arrival times. Fortunately this problem had been anticipated and the unit was able to get advance information on LST arrival times through MSTS. Often the unit knew before the terminal personnel when LSTs were to arrive.

d. Cargo planning personnel at 4th Transportation Command did not know all the loading parameters of the various LSTs. For example, no  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks or larger should be planned to be loaded on the weather deck. The ships equipped with elevators can not get these large trucks on this upper deck.

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By MN NARA Date 09/26/03

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(c) RECOMMENDATION:

(1) Prior to initial planning, there should be a conference with all the involved transportation agencies and the unit to insure that any difficulties between the unit's requirements and transportation capabilities are resolved.

(2) Also one officer in TMA should be named project officer for a unit move in order to concentrate all transportation contacts to one single knowledgeable person.

3. Movement Planning

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit developed a very efficient method of movement to and loading of LSTs.

(b) EVALUATION:

(1) As the plans for each LST were developed, one officer was placed in charge of the LST cargo. He was responsible for forming the convoys, bringing the following stock to the terminal, insuring that the correct pre-staged cargo was loaded, developing contingency loading plans to take care of the different capabilities of ramp and elevator equipped LSTs, and supervising the actual loading.

(2) Prior to loading date a conference was held with each element which had cargo on an LST. The night prior to loading a convoy was formed in the order of position on the boats. The convoy departed for the terminal at 0600 hours. This early hour reduced travel time and accident vulnerability due to the limited traffic on an otherwise congested route, yet it was late enough to reduce danger of ambush. This action also afforded sufficient time to organize at the terminal prior to loading. Usually the LSTs could not be loaded until mid-afternoon. In addition, all Conexes, bulk cargo, and towed loads without prime movers were pre-staged at the terminal area well in advance of the actual loading. This accomplished three objectives: it aided in closing out battery areas prior to departure for ease in cleaning old sites; it reduced loading time at the docks; and it made extra cargo available in the event that the planned cargo did not completely fill an LST.

(3) Initially, 15 LSTs were planned based on the amount of cargo offered. As a result of the above action, this unit utilized only 10 LSTs. In addition, the average load per LST was 1660 measurement tons with one LST loading at 1950 measurement tons. Also this unit never took over 7 hours to load any LST. In one case the LST was loaded in less than 3 hours. Due to this short turn around time, every LST was able to leave with the tide the day after arrival.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None

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F. (U) Organization - None

G. (U) Other - None

SECTION 3,  
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION

## A. ESCAPE, EVASION AND SURVIVAL

1. Information - None
2. Lessons Learned - None

*Robert W. Foye, Jr.*  
 LAWRENCE M. JONES, JR.  
 Colonel, Artillery  
 Commanding

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