

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 1ST BATTALION (155MM/8INCH) 82D FIELD ARTILLERY
 23D INFANTRY DIVISION
 APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-ATPO

31 December 1970

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Award of the Meritorious Unit Commendation

THRU: Commanding Officer
 23D Infantry Division Artillery
 APO San Francisco 96374

TO: Commanding General
 23D Infantry Division
 APO San Francisco 96374

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 203, AR 672-5-1, recommend that the 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery be awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for actions during the period 1 August 1968 to 31 December 1970 in the Republic of Vietnam.
2. Upon arrival in the Republic of Vietnam on 24 July 1968, the unit was assigned the mission of providing general support artillery fires in support of the 23d Infantry Division and reinforcing the fires of the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery and 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. The unit's reputation for delivering safe, accurate, and timely fire support was quickly established and is known to all free world forces operating in the Southern I Corps Tactical Zone. Working long and arduous hours, the men of the batteries fired thousands of rounds of artillery under the most adverse conditions of terrain and weather to defeat the enemy in every encounter. The battalion's aggressive attitude coupled with constant application of artillery axioms were instrumental in effecting the success of eleven major combat operations. Indeed, on the opening day of Operation RUSSELL BEACH/BOLD MARINER all direct support artillery was unable to establish a firing posture due to unbelievably adverse weather conditions. The medium and heavy artillery of this unit reacted to the demanding situation in a flawless manner and provided total artillery support during that crucial phase of the highly successful multi-nation, multi-service operation. The phenomenal accuracy of this combat support was fully realized when 8" fires were required within 150 meters of friendly elements. Firing over ten miles, even the slightest error would be fatal to personnel and certainly affect the success of the combat operation. During operation ELK CANYON I elements of this battalion operating in Khem Duc in a general support-reinforcing role displayed the alertness and quick reaction characteristic of this outstanding artillery unit. In the early morning hours of 5 August 1970, under a moonless sky our position reported receiving small arms and mortar fire. Under the continuing mortar fire, sappers, clad in shorts, with bodies blackened, breached the artillery perimeter wire. The

SUBJECT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

The 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY was activated at Ft. Lewis, Washington on 10 January 1968 by DA message 838618, dated 3 October 1967. Basic unit training began in February 1968. The battalion arrived in Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam during the period 24-28 July 1968 after having gone from a non-existent status to a combat ready status, completely processed for overseas movement in 138 days.

Three of the firing batteries were assigned within the Chu Lai TAOR with Battery A (155MM) occupying Hill 54 (BT 396 143) on 5 August, Battery D (155MM) moving into LZ Gator (BS 571 963) on 8 August. On 8 August, Battery C (155MM) became operational in the Duc Pho Area of Operations with four howitzers at LZ Liz (BS 757 432) and two howitzers at LZ Thunder (BS 869 318). Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Battery established a base camp at LZ Hurricane (BT 533 036). Thus the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY had become fully operational in the Republic of Vietnam on 8 August 1968. The battalion was employed along highway (QL) 1 in the Chu Lai Area of Operations, except Battery C which was OPCON to the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery in the 11th Infantry Brigade Area of Operations. All moves to fire support bases were by road and occurred without incident.

All firing batteries displayed unusual skill and initiative in quickly constructing excellent fire support facilities. Emphasis was placed in the area of fire base security and on highly imaginative defense networks designed to protect the battalion's personnel and equipment. These construction efforts coupled with systematic defense plans and dauntless personnel were soon to show their worth in aborting aggressive enemy sapper attacks on all firing batteries. Simultaneously, headquarters personnel were applying their efforts towards development of a complete battalion base area to insure the most comprehensive communications, logistics, and maintenance support possible would be provided to subordinate elements.

To augment the counter-rocket capability of Chu Lai Base, Battery A re-located a platoon of howitzers at LZ Fat City (BT 439 075) (see TLD B) on 12 August. As two batteries were already split firing units, stringent road back control measures were initiated to preclude the firing of erroneous data possibly transposed through radio relay.

Fully aware of the susceptibility and lack of teamwork that are usually associated with large elements that have never tasted combat, the Viet Cong habitually stage full scale attacks against new units. The enemy, of course, waits several weeks until the apprehension and related high readiness posture have disappeared. On 23 August the Viet Cong found out that the perseverance and combat efficiency of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY never disappears. Staging a savage early morning sapper/mortar attack on LZ Dottie, the aggressive enemy force merely served as a catalyst for many valorous acts that were commonplace in the defense of the fire base and the subsequent rout of the once determined foe. A sweep of the fire base and adjacent perimeter area revealed fourteen enemy bodies and countless blood trails. Several weapons, to include one light machine gun, two AK-47 rifles, and two RPG launchers were captured along with various demolition materials. Four members of Battery D were awarded the Bronze Star with "V" and one received the Army Commendation Medal with "V" for distinguishing themselves in combat during the five hour siege. The unit sustained no personnel or equipment losses during the hostile attack.

ACT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

On 22 September, Battery A at Hill 54, and Batteries B and D at LZs Gator and Dottie, respectively, were targets for a coordinated series of simultaneous attacks. In all instances the tenacious artillerymen repelled the violent attacks while simultaneously supporting adjacent fire bases with deadly artillery fire.

From 3-24 September the 11th Infantry Brigade deployed its forces for Operation CHAMPAGNE GROVE with three US battalions and three ARVN battalions to take pressure off the besieged Ha Thanh Special Forces Camp. The officers and men of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY soon became aware of the highly complex and demanding airmobile operation and the inherent problems associated with deployment to a forward landing zone to support combat operations in remote areas. Although they had received no previous airmobile training, on 11 September, Battery B conducted a highly successful aerial move to LZ Chevy (BS 428 714) (see TAB C) as they placed four howitzers on an isolated mountain top. Although adverse terrain and weather conditions were prevalent, zealous efforts by firing battery personnel were plainly evident as they simultaneously constructed firing battery and ammunition storage facilities while giving unparalleled fire support. The extraordinary accuracy and punctuality of Battery B fires greatly contributed to the allied effort and exploitation of the once trenchant foe. The battery returned to LZ Gator upon restoration of free world control in the Ha Thanh area.

Operation LOGAN FIELD was conducted from 7-12 October as the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry moved into the Batangan Peninsula. As the fire capability of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY already included the entire Batangan area, it was unnecessary to displace to provide general support fires for this combat operation. On 13 October, Battery B moved two 155MM howitzers by road to LZ Dottie (see TAB D) to provide Quang Ngai Province/2d ARVN Division headquarters and Binh Son and Son Tinh District Headquarters illumination support.

On 25 October, Operation VERNON LAKE I commenced with the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry and the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry operating in the Son Ve Valley. On 28 October the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry moved into the area of operations to complete the task force. To support this combat operation, Battery B moved four howitzers to Hill 10 (BS 583 722) (see TAB E). All four howitzers returned to LZ Gator on 1 November upon successful completion of all combat objectives.

During Operation VERNON LAKE II (2 November 1968-22 April 1969), the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY provided general support fires for the 11th Infantry Brigade, and reinforcing the fires of the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery. To accomplish the mission it was necessary to relocate two howitzers from Battery A at Hill 54 to LZ Cork (BS 448 612) (see TAB F). On 2 November, Battery A conducted its first aerial displacement in an extremely efficient manner and without incident. The platoon was attached to Battery C, which remained further attached to the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery.

It came immediately apparent that the enemy feared the presence of the artillerymen who were to support their forced removal from supply routes, training, and staging area in the heretofore undisputed Viet Cong sanctuary, as the first and third night of the occupation of LZ Cork were interrupted by intense mortar attacks. The enterprising members of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D FIELD ARTILLERY,

SUBJECT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

however, had been constructing an excellent firing battery facility to include protective bunkers and fighting positions, in addition to providing matchless artillery support for the ground gaining arms. The Viet Cong soon realized the mortar attacks were producing no casualties or equipment damage and therefore did not justify the large ammunition expenditures, equipment, personnel and ammunition losses inflicted by the superlative counter-mortar fires from Battery A. Future attacks were limited to random harassing rounds, and then with extended periods of non-contact between incidents.

The unusually high (1,900 feet) firing location at LZ Cork combined with the surrounding mountainous terrain features added many complexities to the already involved gunnery problem. Numerous intermediate crests posed a continual threat to the accomplishment of the mission and the safety of friendly elements. A careful analysis of each target was accomplished to insure appropriate artillery support was provided to the maneuver elements while guaranteeing their complete safety. The high altitude of the LZ also contributed to weather problems as fog would often reduce visibility to the point where standard aiming post lighting devices were ineffective. A thorough knowledge of field artillery principles coupled with a profound sense of devotion to duty led members of the platoon on LZ Cork to develop an efficient field expedient aiming post reference technique that reduced non-operational time to an absolute minimum. Numerous similar examples of initiative combined with highly imaginative methods of attack succeeded in fully embarrassing the enemy and directly contributed to his subsequent defeat within the VERMION LAKE II Area of Operations.

During the early morning hours of 17 November, the Viet Cong staged a sapper attack against Battery A at Hill 54. The relentless foe quickly breached the infantry perimeter, generating the necessity for the intrepid cannoners to repel the persistent enemy from their howitzer pits. This inimitable display of perseverance directly resulted in the repulsion of the fierce attack. Battery A suffered no personnel or major equipment losses during the battle.

To provide additional combat support within the VERMION LAKE II Area of Operations, Battery C deployed two howitzers to LZ Snoopy (BS 705 610) (see TAB G) on 1 December. The platoon then moved to LZ Dragon (BS 727 533) (see TAB H) on 8 December, where they continued to provide superlative supporting fires for 11th Infantry Brigade maneuver elements.

On 13 December, Battery A moved four 155MM howitzers by road to LZ Ross (BT 028 341), where they were further deployed by air to LZ Snorer (AT 869 359) on 14 December. The 196th Infantry Brigade began Operation PAYETTE CANYON with Battery A(-) being attached to the 3rd Battalion, 82d Artillery.

It is significant to note that at this point, the battalion was operating in a unique situation that is seldom experienced by a field artillery battalion. The battalion was employed throughout the entire 23d Infantry Division Area of Operations (see TAB I), providing peerless artillery support for all three Infantry Brigades. Nine firing positions were simultaneously occupied, with Battery C at LZ Thunder and Battery A at LZ Snorer being separated by 144,000 meters. Many complex communications and logistics problems were generated by the extreme separation of firing elements, however, these perplexities were promptly solved with the solutions being recorded for future reference should other battalions be required to deploy so extensively.

EOT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

Operation FAYETTE CANYON objectives were to accelerate combat operations in the area north and northeast of Hiep Duc and to destroy VC Main Force/NVA units operating in the area. At 1600 hours on 15 December, maneuver elements succeeded in establishing heavy contact with a large size enemy force. The two platoons fired 245 rounds of artillery at the dazzled foe as their exceedingly accurate and timely fires accounted for nineteen confirmed enemy deaths. Firing on suspected mortar location at 2100 hours, 18 December, Battery A, expending 157 rounds, detonated seventeen secondary explosions on the lucrative target. During the period 19-21 December, elements of the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry and 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry conducting search and clear operations, discovered no less than 101 NVA that had been killed by artillery during previous preparations.

Adjusting to the changing VERNON LAKE II tactical situation, the two Battery C howitzer sections at LZ Dragon returned to LZ Snoopy (see TAB J) on 18 December. Accomplishing their fourth move that month, the platoon returned to LZ Liz on Christmas Day.

Upon accomplishment of all FAYETTE CANYON objectives, the members of Battery A destroyed all facilities on the mountainous landing zone and evacuated to LZ Ross on 31 December. Having received credit for excellent infliction of battle damage, to include, 61 confirmed kills and 21 secondary explosions during the two week operation, Battery A road marched from LZ Ross to Hill 54 on New Year's Day. At Hill 54, they relieved the platoon of Battery B which subsequently returned to LZ Gator.

On 2 January 1969, two howitzers from Battery C were deployed to the VERNON LAKE II Area of Operations. The platoon occupied 2,820 foot, Landing Zone Amy (BS 473 527) (see TAB K). Operations in this unusually high altitude environment would prove only to be another challenge that would allow the 1st BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY to distinguish itself in combat.

On 8 January 1969, Battery A vacated Hill 54 and relocated at LZ Fat City. There, they were joined by two 8" self-propelled howitzers of Battery D that had been deployed to provide heavy artillery support for the northern portion of the Chu Lai Area of Operations (see TAB L). This marked the first time that all batteries were simultaneously operating from two or more fire support bases.

Operation RUSSELL BEACH/BOLD MARINER commenced in January under the control of Task Force Cocksey. A USMC Special Landing Force, the 198th Infantry Brigade, and elements of the 2d ARVN Division participated in the joint operation. Initially, the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY reinforced the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery from one location, with four howitzers from Battery B (155MM) and two Battery D, 8" self-propelled howitzers providing supporting fires from LZ Dottie. The direct support elements of the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery were airlifted to LZ South (BS 699 826) the first morning of operations in extremely adverse weather conditions. Consequently they were unable to assume a firing posture as difficulties were experienced in establishing survey control in the heavy rain and resultant loss of visibility. As the area of operations contained many spiderholes and tunnel complexes, the ground commanders chose to begin the combat operation in inclement weather to fully exploit the enemy who would be denied the use of their flooded facilities. Although the enemy had instructions

31 December 1970

to avoid contact, the flooded terrain coupled with an effective cordon produced heavy contact with a determined enemy. As a result of the inability of all air lifted artillery to emplace, the six howitzers on LZ Dottie were providing the entire artillery support for the ground gaining arms. Having assumed the impromptu direct support mission, the artillerymen of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY quickly realized the requirements of direct support artillery and were continually shifting their medium and heavy artillery pieces in support of tactical emergencies. During the period of heaviest contact the battery fired an average of one round every fifteen seconds for a period of three hours. This, of course, is no small feat even when not firing 100 or 200 pound projectiles in adverse firing conditions caused by thick mud and driving rains. Every infantryman on the battlefield was totally aware of the phenomenal accuracy of the artillery support they were receiving as on several occasions fire was called for and delivered within 150 meters of friendlies with 8" and 75 meters with 155MM support. The exemplary artillery support provided by elements of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY allowed free world forces to keep the initiative while sustaining minimum casualties during this critical phase of the combat operation. Direct support artillery obtained an operational status on the second day of the operation. On 27 January, one platoon of Battery B howitzers was lifted forward to LZ South (see TAB M) to add a medium artillery capability as the operation progressed out of the LZ Dottie-155MM range capability.

On 5 February, the two Battery B howitzers at LZ South returned to their battery base camp at LZ Gator. This was the first of three moves that would be accomplished by the battalion during the week 5 through 11 February. The Battery C platoon at LZ Amy was released from the VERMILION LAKE II Area of Operations on 7 February and airlifted to LZ Liz. Four days later, Battery B, less the platoon at LZ Dottie, which continued to support Operation RUSSELL BEACH/BOLD MARINER and provide illumination for province and district headquarters, departed from LZ Gator and road marched to LZ Snoopy (BS 705 610) (see TAB N) where they established their battery base area. At their new location, Battery B would support operations in the Song Ve Valley and Duc Pho Area of Operations.

At 0117 hours on 23 February, enemy forces launched a coordinated series of attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Within the 23D Infantry Division Area of Operations, all attacks were characterized by extensive employment of indirect fire weapons against US and RVN installations. Ground probes were received at several locations. Several landing zones occupied by elements of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY were victims of this initial phase of the Post-Tet offensive. LZ Gator received over sixty rounds of mortar fire, several 107MM rockets, and an attempted sapper attack. Landing Zones Gork and Dottie each received over fifty incoming mortar rounds, accompanied by intense rocket-propelled grenade and automatic weapons fire. The battalion suffered no personnel losses during the attacks. The fact that all battalion units had successfully repelled the fierce attacks was certainly impressive, however, an even more remarkable accomplishment was recognized upon review of the night's firing records. Although under attack themselves, and in addition to firing their own direct fire, counter-mortar, and self-illumination defensive fires, the officers and men of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY computed, checked, and fired no less than three hundred independent fire missions in support of besieged free world forces. All these supporting fires being provided in a mere three hour period.

31 December 1970

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DO: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

On 12 March, the Battery D platoon at LZ Fat City was redeployed to LZ Liz (see TAB C) to provide additional supporting fires in the defense of Duc Pho. The amazingly accurate and destructive battery fires succeeded in destroying many bunkers and caves that prior to the arrival of the 8" howitzers, had been literally impregnable. Even massive B-52 strikes had failed to destroy these stubborn targets. Aware that the coilings of these structures were heavily reinforced, the Battery D artillerymen concentrated their fires on the entrances and achieved excellent results. On one occasion, fires were brought to bear on a cave with a steel door. Firing at a range of over six miles, the door was destroyed with the fourth round and subsequent fire ravaged the contents of the storage area.

On 18 March, two combat operations commenced within the 23d Infantry Division Tactical Area of Responsibility, with the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY providing fire support for both actions. The 198th Infantry Brigade, operating with the 6th Regiment, 2d ARVN Division and GVN forces, initiated Operation GENEVA PARK. The combat operation was designed to locate and destroy VC/NVA military units, logistical networks, and routes of infiltration in the 23d Infantry-2d ARVN Division Joint Area of Operations. A simultaneous pacification operation would be conducted to eliminate VC political apparatus. A related objective was to increase the effectiveness of ARVN and GVN forces within the operational zone. Operation IRON MOUNTAIN had similar objectives except that a reconnaissance in force operation, designed to isolate VC/NVA forces from their bases of popular support was included. IRON MOUNTAIN was conducted by the 11th Infantry Brigade operating jointly with 4th Regiment, 2d ARVN Division and GVN forces. As the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY area of coverage already included the GENEVA PARK and IRON MOUNTAIN Operational Zones, it was unnecessary to deploy firing elements to provide reinforcing fires for the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery and 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery, respectively.

LZ Amy was the recipient of a punishing enemy sapper attack during the early morning hours of 19 March. Wisely selecting an evening with no natural illumination, the NVA demolitions personnel initiated their assault on the isolated, one-half mile high landing zone with violent rocket-propelled grenades and satchel charges. The enemy was depending on the lack of visibility combined with the numerous explosions to cause confusion and allow the grenadiers to move unchallenged throughout the artillery outpost. The cannoneers of Battery C, however, quickly reacted to the situation and pointed their howitzers tubes nearly straight up to provide illumination to allow adjacent 105MM howitzer sections to fire their deadly anti-personnel ammunition and abort the attack before the enemy could inflict personnel or equipment losses.

On 31 March, the two howitzers operating on LZ Liz reverted to Battery D control and returned to LZ Dottie.

Upon cessation of operations within the VERBON LAKE II Area on 22 April, the platoon of Battery A howitzers on LZ Cork was released from Battery C control and subsequently airlifted to LZ Gator. There, the sections constructed a firing area and assumed the mission of augmenting the counter-rocket program in support of the defense of the Chu Lai Area of Operations (see TAB P).

SUBJECT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

To support an Arc Light (B-52) exploitation south of the Tra Bong Special Forces Camp, Battery A deployed two howitzers to LZ Cindy (BS 343 685) (see TAB Q) on 2 May. On 6 May, the platoon moved from LZ Cindy to the Ha Thanh Special Forces Camp (LZ Shirley, BS 382 700) in support of the same operation (see Tab R). As the operation was being conducted in an area beyond Battery A communications capability, Battery D at LZ Dottie was assigned the mission of providing fire direction data for the platoon during the exploitation. The replete professional competence of the members of the battalion's fire direction centers was fully recognized during this operation. The firing battery was computing data for two different caliber weapons at three locations, while the Battalion Fire Direction Center controlled the artillery fires of the six separate firing positions.

The primary goal of providing safe, accurate, and timely artillery fire support for the ground gaining arms is always attained by battalion fire directional personnel. To insure the highest possible standards are maintained, a comprehensive system of double checks is incorporated into normal computation and processing operations. Several counter-insurgency fire direction techniques have been developed and published for cross reference, and a written refresher test was produced for unit fire direction personnel. In addition, a battalion gunnery inspection, to include live firing, is administered to all firing batteries on a monthly basis.

The enemy initiated a new offensive beginning 12 May, with Battery B at LZ Snoopy being one of the primary targets. A greenstar cluster, fired by a NVA Major at 0215 hours, signaled the start of a fierce ground attack that was the initial phase of a ten day siege against the isolated fire support base. A barrage of over fifty 32MM mortars supported the assault by aggressive sapper squads, who within the first few minutes had 35 grenadiers breach the perimeter. Upon termination of the mortar barrage, intense rocket-propelled grenade and automatic weapons fire ensued as a reserve element began to assault the landing zone. The steadfast defenders had assembled an effective reaction force and had killed or repulsed all sappers that had originally penetrated their defenses. Several personnel were seriously wounded in the courageous defense of the position area, however, the perimeter was restored and held until the arrival of gunships some sixty minutes later. The early morning sun rose to disclose 37 enemy dead and numerous weapons, equipment, and demolition materials scattered about the battle-torn area. A subsequent sweep of the perimeter revealed several more weapons and numerous blood trails that indicated over twenty additional enemy had perished during the attack. The next four days were characterized by random mortar attacks throughout the day and night. At 0050 hours on 18 May, the determined VC/NVA Battalion Combat Team staged another sapper attack on LZ Snoopy. The assailant's mortar support, however, was quickly checked by Battery B counter-mortar fire that ravaged at least one mortar and crew. Six of the demoralized enemy were captured at daylight as they tried to escape from the outer wire. The mortar attacks continued until 21 May, the last day of the siege against the landing zone. The unwavering perseverance and fortitude displayed by the officers and men of Battery B were the significant factors that contributed to the erosion of enemy forces and supplies and led to his eventual defeat.

SUBJECT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

Only hours after the offensive of 12 May began it was readily apparent that Tam Ky City was one of the principal 2d NVA Division objectives. Nui Yon outpost (BT 248 169), only five kilometers from Tam Ky itself, was promptly overrun and occupied by communist forces. On 13 May, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was airlifted to Tam Ky airfield to support operations against the 2d NVA Division in the Tam Ky area. Upon arrival, the brigade was placed under operational control of the 23D Infantry Division and assumed control of the southern portion of the 196th Infantry Brigade Operational Zone. This operational zone was designated LAMAR PLAIN. In addition to recapturing Nui Yon outpost, Operation LAMAR PLAIN objectives were to find, fix and destroy VCMF/NVA Battalions operating in the vicinity of Base Area 117 and posing a threat to Tam Ky City and pacification operations in the New Duc area. To provide general combat support for Operation LAMAR PLAIN, Battery D moved two 8" howitzers from LZ Dottie to the Tam Ky airfield on 13 May (BT 305 190) (see TAB S). Setting up a hasty firing position, the cannoners immediately began to shower the enemy with deadly artillery fire. When friendly maneuver elements were in position to attempt a counterattack on the outpost, the platoon placed fires at the bottom of the fortress and walked their extraordinary support up the hill as the infantry and cavalry followed the devastating preparation to the objective. Routed from his defensive positions by the overwhelming bombardment, the enemy retreated and offered only sporadic resistance to the assault forces. On 30 May, the platoon was relieved by an 8" platoon from Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery, and returned to LZ Dottie.

The enemy executed a coordinated series of mortar, rocket, and sapper attacks during the early morning hours of 8 June 1969. The attacks were primarily confined to Quang Ngai Province, with two 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY landing zones being assaulted. Observing a twelve man NVA Sapper Team moving to attack positions near their fire direction center at LZ Liz, members of Battery C notified Company B, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry of the situation, who in turn dispatched a patrol to ambush the intruders. Placing several vehicles on the edge of the inner-perimeter, members of Battery C suddenly turned on all vehicle headlights to surprise the unsuspecting enemy and allow the infantry ambush force to place effective fire on the confused foe, in the process, killing ten of the sappers. A short time later, another sapper element launched an attack on the opposite side of the hill. Having already successfully breached the perimeter, the enemy quickly destroyed both the main generator area and communications bunker and swept to the fire direction center where they met the battery reaction force. Fighting the determined foe on a hand grenade for hand grenade basis, the valiant artillerymen succeeded in repelling the assault while killing two and capturing one NVA soldier. One artilleryman died and twelve were wounded in the defense of the fire direction center and the subsequent counter-attack. With the assault on LZ Liz, the 406th NVA Sapper Battalion simultaneously staged a fierce attack against Battery D at LZ Dottie. Intense rocket-propelled grenade, mortar, and automatic weapons fire covered the enemy assault on the main gate of the landing zone. With the attached Battery B platoon providing self-illumination, the 8" howitzer sections placed devastating final protective heavy machine gun fires on the entrance

SUBJECT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

barrier. Unable to penetrate the wall of red tracers, the enemy gathered up his wounded and withdrew into the night. The NVA experienced heavy losses with 21 dead and three captured in addition to several rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and numerous hand grenades, satchel charges, and miscellaneous munitions also captured. One Battery D artilleryman lost his life when hit by rocket-propelled grenade fragmentation.

On 11 June, Battery C was again the target of an enemy sapper effort as the 2d Company, 40th Sapper Battalion (AKI 90th Engineer Battalion), 3rd NVI Division attacked LZ Liz at 0345 hours. On this occasion, the forceful demolitions element directed their attack against the battery howitzer sections. Initiating the attack with heavy rocket-propelled grenade fire, the enemy charged up to the howitzer parapet walls. The tenacious defenders were equal to the occasion, however, as they utilized section volleys of hand grenades to discourage the determined aggressors. Two of the enemy eventually breached the defenses and ran through the firing battery area throwing grenades and satchel charges until they were finally killed by members of the battery reaction force. One of the two enemy, displaying unusual stamina when hit by several rounds of rifle fire was found to be six feet, five inches tall. Total body count was fourteen enemy killed and one captured with an assortment of weapons and equipment. One Battery C commander was killed by the communists.

On 20 July, the 198th Infantry Brigade, a United States Marine Corps Special Landing Force (Battalion Landing Team 2-26), and the 6th Regiment, 2d ARVN Division jointly inaugurated Operation NANTUCKET BEACH/BRAVE ARMY. The combat operation, designed to destroy VC/MF/LF units, eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure and Viet Cong political apparatus, and restore GVN control in the support of the 1969 accelerated pacification campaign, would receive general support artillery fire from Batteries B and D on LZ Dottie.

On 19 August, Battery A moved its four howitzers from LZ Fat City to LZ Dottie to replace the two howitzers of B Battery which moved to LZ Stinson. The battalion thus increased its effective fire in support of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry operating in the NANTUCKET BEACH AO while providing reinforcing fires to the 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery, providing direct support for the QUELEVA MAPK AO (see TAB T). The recent termination of the successful operation LAMAR PLAIN had precluded the need for our howitzers at Fat City.

On 7 December, two 8 inch howitzers of D Battery moved to LZ Brance (BS 812 391) in general support of the 11th Brigade and to reinforce the fires of the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (see TAB U).

On 6 and 7 January, Troops A and B, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry and two infantry companies, combining to organize two separate teams, engaged an unknown size enemy force west of Tan Ky in the vicinity of (center of mass) BT 1130 and BT 2520. Attached to the cavalry in this operation were two forward observer teams and an artillery liaison team from the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY. An armored cavalry operation puts special demands upon the supporting artillery. The lightning fast movement on the battlefield and the large

31 December 1970

of contact required exacting coordination between the artillery and the supported cavalry units. The liaison and forward observers effectively coordinated their fires with close in air support and the basic maneuver formations employed by the ground commanders to successfully rout the enemy from their positions and defeat them. When the vanquished foe finally broke contact the exemplarily executed combined arms engagement had produced 110 MVA killed, 20 individual weapons and five crew-served weapons while 23d Infantry Division losses were five killed and 20 wounded.

An integral part of the pacification program being intensely pursued by the 23d Infantry Division is to train the soldiers of the Republic of Vietnam. During the period of 16-30 January the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY conducted a FADAC Operator Course for five personnel from the 2D ARVN Division Artillery. On 1 February, the battalion participated in the 2D ARVN Infantry Division Organization Day by displaying a FADAC in Quang Ngai. The ARVN soldiers trained in our battalion fire direction center operated the equipment on display.

On 28 February, Battery A conducted an administrative move from LZ Gator to Artillery Hill (BT 514 040) with two howitzers, due to the closure of LZ Gator (see TAB V).

During early April, intelligence indicated a sizeable build up of enemy activity in the village of Nghie Hinh (BS 616 642) (see TAB W). In response to this intelligence the versatile cannoneers of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY conducted an artillery raid. The six 155MM howitzers of C Battery from LZ Debbie and LZ Liz and the four 8 inch howitzers of D Battery from LZ Dottie and LZ Bronco converged on Nghie Hinh. Realizing the impending threat to friendly civilians the men of the "Can and Will" battalion fired their sustained rate of fire during the eighteen hour operation, returning to their respective positions after having thwarted the enemy threat to that area.

At 121200 hours July 1970 Operation ELK CANYON was initiated with the mission of interdicting enemy lines of communications and supply lines to disrupt his logistics system. The initial phase of this combined operation began when the 6th ARVN Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Battalion of the 196th Brigade seized the old Special Forces Camp at Kham Duc (ZC 007082) (see TAB X) in the Western Quang Tin Province. Supporting this operation was Battery B, 1st Battalion, 14th Artillery in direct support and Battery A (-), 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY with three 155MM howitzers, general support-reinforcing. The artillery fires consisted mainly of counter-mortar, counter-rocket, defensive concentrations, targets of opportunity, and destruction and interdiction missions on known and suspected enemy trails. The rapid response to calls for fire and accurate observer adjustment were a decided factor in lessening the effect of enemy probes and indirect fires which characterized the initial phase of this operation. The climax of this recon phase came in the early morning hours of 5 August. Striking on a black, moonless night, heavily armed sappers clad in shorts, with bodies blackened, cut through the Battery A perimeter wire. Under a blanket of small arms and mortar fire the sappers belly-crawled to bunkers and gun pits to focus their attack on Alpha's artillery pieces. With the initial explosion of a guard bunker and generator pit came the shattering words "Sappers inside the wire!"

31 December 1970

Most instantly the fearless gun chiefs rallied their crews and started firing illumination as the sappers continued moving further inside the perimeter. The steadfast artillerymen opened up with M16 and M60 fire. Four NVA were killed as they took cover under a 2½ ton truck, another was cut down as he aimed his rocket-propelled grenade launcher at the Fire Direction Center. When the first ray of sunlight lit up the LZ, a total of 14 enemy dead were found inside the perimeter, with two more just outside the wire. Two of A Battery's men died valiantly defending the position. Captured in action were five AK-50s three RPG launchers, fifty assorted grenades, two hundred pounds of Petna and sixteen NVA packs. The courageous cannoneers had inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy, not in the usual manner, but, through close combat hand to hand techniques characteristic of the ground gaining arms it so unfailingly supports. Three men from Battery A received the Silver Star, nine received the Bronze star with "V" and 2 received the Army Commendation Medal with "V" for their heroic actions during this siege. With the repulse of the sapper attack, combined with the success of the patrol elements in the adjacent plateau area the enemy was forced to divert its effort from a southerly to a more northerly, tack only to be repulsed in their efforts in that sector. Having successfully accomplished its mission, A Battery returned to LZ Fat City, joining one of their guns which had been moved from LZ Dottie on 24 August, where it now plays an important role in the defense of Chu Lai and surrounding areas (see TAB Y).

Between the hours of 242010 and 250600 October the 271st Radar Detachment sighted three targets southwest of OP-3. True to the tradition, even though in the midst of a tropical storm, the gunnery team of C Battery at LZ Liz and D Battery at LZ Bronco leaped to the task at hand providing timely and accurate fires for in excess of nine hours. A sweep of the target area by the Infantry at first light resulted in the following: Two NVA KBA, one each 60MM mortar, fifteen packs, 23 Chi Com hand grenades, one bangalore torpedo, one M16 AP mine, one anti-tank mine, eight each 60MM mortar rounds, four each 105MM rounds, 270 rounds small arms ammunition, 100 pounds of rice, documents and miscellaneous military and medical supplies captured and evacuated. The findings by themselves are excellent, however, evidence indicated that many more enemy soldiers were either killed or wounded and carried away. More important, a planned attack on some fire base, was probably halted and dispersed. It is this response to artillery calls for fire which has characterized the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY as it continues to provide supporting fires in all three brigade AOs.

During its first two years in country, the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY compiled one of the finest combat records ever amassed by a field artillery battalion in the Republic of Vietnam. Receiving credit for over fifteen hundred confirmed and four hundred probable enemy killed, the devastating fires of the unit also are credited with the confirmed destruction of over two thousand military structures, five hundred bunker complexes, one hundred and fifty tunnel complexes, countless trench and spider hole complexes, fifty rice caches, three hundred secondary explosions, forty mortar tubes, ten anti-aircraft weapons, and numerous beasts of burden. Considering the

SCT: Tasks Performed

31 December 1970

fact that only approximately twenty-five per cent of the unit's fires are observed, this excellent battle damage assessment is even more impressive. This striking testimony to the superlative accuracy and timeliness affirms the peerless combat support provided by the dedicated officers and men of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY.

WILLIAM P. O'BRYAN
LTC, FA
Commanding

NOT: Statistical Summary

31 December 1970

PART I. Record of Absence without leave in relation to unit strength.

MONTH	STRENGTH	CASES	PERCENTAGE	MONTH	STRENGTH	CASES	PERCENTAGE
Aug68	599	0	.00%	Nov69	645	0	.00%
Sep68	622	0	.00%	Dec69	632	0	.00%
Oct68	614	0	.00%	Jan70	616	0	.00%
Nov68	589	0	.00%	Feb70	657	0	.00%
Dec68	570	0	.00%	Mar70	628	1	.16%
Jan69	583	0	.00%	Apr70	646	1	.15%
Feb69	593	0	.00%	May70	609	1	.16%
Mar69	592	0	.00%	Jun70	487	0	.00%
Apr69	607	0	.00%	Jul70	537	0	.00%
May69	593	0	.00%	Aug70	533	0	.00%
Jun69	652	0	.00%	Sep70	536	0	.00%
Jul69	645	1	.15%	Oct70	546	0	.00%
Aug69	660	0	.00%	Nov70	548	0	.00%
Sep69	603	0	.00%	Dec70	579	2	.35%
Oct69	634	0	.00%				

PART II. Record of punishments under Article 15, UCMJ, in relation to unit strength.

MONTH	STRENGTH	CASES	PERCENTAGE	MONTH	STRENGTH	CASES	PERCENTAGE
Aug68	599	9	1.50%	Nov69	645	26	4.03%
Sep68	622	6	.96%	Dec69	632	24	3.79%
Oct68	614	21	3.42%	Jan70	616	17	2.76%
Nov68	589	12	2.02%	Feb70	657	27	4.11%
Dec68	570	11	1.93%	Mar70	628	20	3.18%
Jan69	583	12	2.06%	Apr70	646	26	4.03%
Feb69	593	14	2.36%	May70	609	23	3.78%
Mar69	592	7	1.18%	Jun70	487	16	3.29%
Apr69	607	5	.82%	Jul70	537	22	4.09%
May69	593	15	2.51%	Aug70	533	11	2.06%
Jun69	652	19	2.91%	Sep70	536	11	2.05%
Jul69	645	17	2.61%	Oct70	546	10	1.83%
Aug69	660	9	1.36%	Nov70	548	10	1.82%
Sep69	603	26	4.31%	Dec70	579	18	3.11%
Oct69	634	12	1.89%				

PART III. Record of courts-martial convictions in relation to unit strength.

MONTH	STRENGTH	CASES	PERCENTAGE	MONTH	STRENGTH	CASES	PERCENTAGE
Aug68	599	1	.17%	Apr69	607	0	.00%
Sep68	622	2	.32%	May69	593	0	.00%
Oct68	614	1	.16%	Jun69	652	0	.00%
Nov68	589	1	.17%	Jul69	645	1	.15%
Dec68	570	1	.18%	Aug69	660	0	.00%
Jan69	583	0	.00%	Sep69	603	1	.17%
Feb69	593	1	.17%	Oct69	634	3	.47%
Mar69	592	0	.00%	Nov69	645	0	.00%

SUBJECT: Statistical Summary

1 December 1970

PART I. Record of Absence without leave in relation to unit strength.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
Aug68	599	0	.00%	Oct69	634	0	.00%
Sep68	622	0	.00%	Nov69	645	0	.00%
Oct68	614	0	.00%	Dec69	632	0	.00%
Nov68	589	0	.00%	Jan70	616	0	.00%
Dec68	570	0	.00%	Feb70	657	0	.00%
Jan69	583	0	.00%	Mar70	628	1	.16%
Feb69	593	0	.00%	Apr70	646	1	.15%
Mar69	592	0	.00%	May70	609	1	.16%
Apr69	607	0	.00%	Jun70	487	0	.00%
May69	593	0	.00%	Jul70	537	0	.00%
Jun69	652	0	.00%	Aug70	533	0	.00%
Jul69	645	1	.15%	Sep70	536	0	.00%
Aug69	660	0	.00%	Oct70	546	0	.00%
Sep69	603	0	.00%				

PART II. Record of punishments under Article 15, UCMJ, in relation to unit strength.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
Aug68	599	9	1.50%	Oct69	634	12	1.89%
Sep68	622	6	.96%	Nov69	645	26	4.03%
Oct68	614	21	3.42%	Dec69	632	24	3.79%
Nov68	589	12	2.02%	Jan70	616	17	2.76%
Dec68	570	11	1.93%	Feb70	657	27	4.11%
Jan69	583	12	2.06%	Mar70	628	20	3.18%
Feb69	593	14	2.36%	Apr70	646	26	4.03%
Mar69	592	7	1.18%	May70	609	23	3.78%
Apr69	607	5	.82%	Jun70	487	16	3.29%
May69	593	15	2.51%	Jul70	537	22	4.09%
Jun69	652	19	2.91%	Aug70	533	11	2.06%
Jul69	645	17	2.64%	Sep70	536	11	2.05%
Aug69	660	9	1.36%	Oct70	546	10	1.83%
Sep69	603	26	4.31%				

PART III. Record of courts-martial convictions in relation to unit strength.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
Aug68	599	1	.17%	May69	593	0	.00%
Sep68	622	2	.32%	Jun69	652	0	.00%
Oct68	614	1	.16%	Jul69	645	1	.15%
Nov68	589	1	.17%	Aug69	660	0	.00%
Dec68	570	1	.18%	Sep69	603	1	.17%
Jan69	583	0	.00%	Oct69	634	3	.47%
Feb69	593	1	.17%	Nov69	645	0	.00%
Mar69	592	0	.00%	Dec69	632	3	.47%
Apr69	607	0	.00%	Jan70	616	3	.49%

SUBJECT: Statistical Summary

1 December 1970

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CASES</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
Feb70	657	0	.00%	Jul70	537	1	.19%
Mar70	628	0	.00%	Aug70	533	0	.00%
Apr70	646	2	.31%	Sep70	536	1	.19%
May70	609	0	.00%	Oct70	546	2	.37%
Jun70	487	0	.00%				

RALPH F. JAMES
LTC, FA
Commanding

SUBJECT: Listing of Units

1 December 1970

UNITS.

Part I. Units assigned and recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
1. Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery	1 August 1968- 31 October 1970	NONE
2. Battery A (155MM, Towed), 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery	1 August 1968- 31 October 1970	NONE
3. Battery B (155MM, Towed), 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery	1 August 1968- 31 October 1970	NONE
4. Battery C (155MM, Towed), 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery	1 August 1968- 31 October 1970	PUC, 2 Nov 68 -28 Feb 69 (Pending)
5. Battery D (8 Inch, Self-propelled) 1st Battalion, 82d Artillery	1 August 1968- 31 October 1970	NONE

Part II. Units attached and recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
NONE	N/A	N/A

Part III. Units assigned but not recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
NONE	N/A	N/A

Part IV. Units attached but not recommended for award of the Meritorious Unit Citation.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Previous US Unit Decorations and Dates</u>
N/A	N/A	N/A

RALPH F. JAMES
LTC, FA
Adjutant

PROPOSED CITATION

MERITORIOUS UNIT COMENDATION

BY DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 203, AR 672-5-1, THE MERITORIOUS UNIT COMENDATION IS AWARDED TO THE FOLLOWING NAMED UNITS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY FOR EXCEPTIONALLY MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OUTSTANDING SERVICE DURING THE PERIODS INDICATED:

THE 1ST BATTALION (155MM, TOWED; 8 INCH SELF-PROPELLED), 82D ARTILLERY AND ASSIGNED UNITS:

HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE BATTERY, 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY

BATTERY A (155MM, TOWED), 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY

BATTERY B (155MM, TOWED), 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY

BATTERY C (155MM, TOWED), 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY

BATTERY D (8 INCH, SELF-PROPELLED), 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY

THE CITATION READS AS FOLLOWS:

THE 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY AND ASSIGNED UNITS DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FROM AUGUST 1968 TO OCTOBER 1970. UPON ARRIVAL IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ON 24 JULY 1968, THE UNIT WAS ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF PROVIDING GENERAL SUPPORT FIRES IN SUPPORT OF THE 23D INFANTRY DIVISION AND REINFORCING FIRES IN SUPPORT OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 14TH ARTILLERY AND 6TH BATTALION, 11TH ARTILLERY. THE UNIT'S REPUTATION FOR DELIVERING SAFE, ACCURATE, AND TIMELY FIRE SUPPORT WAS QUICKLY ESTABLISHED AND IS KNOWN TO ALL FREE WORLD FORCES OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. WORKING LONG AND ARDUOUS HOURS THE MEN OF THE BATTERIES FIRED THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY UNDER THE MOST ADVERSE TERRAIN AND WEATHER CONDITIONS TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY IN EVERY ENCOUNTER. THE BATTALION'S AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE COUPLED WITH CONSTANT APPLICATION OF ARTILLERY AXIOMS WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN EFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF ELEVEN MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS. WHETHER THE MISSION WAS TO PROVIDE INSTANTANEOUS COUNTER-ROCKET FIRES IN SUPPORT OF CHU ALI BASE, CONTINUOUS OFFENSIVE FIRES IN SUPPORT OF TACTICAL EMERGENCIES, OR REPELLING A SAVAGE HOSTILE SAPPER ATTACK, THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY CONTINUALLY DISPLAYED A REMARKABLE DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN MEETING ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FLUID TACTICAL SITUATION. INDICATIVE OF THE UNIT'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND ITS CIVIL AID PROJECTS TO INCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND INTENSE PRIDE DISPLAYED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNIT IN DELIVERING ACCURATE ARTILLERY FIRE SUPPORT CONTRIBUTED INMEASURABLY TO THE ALLIED EFFORTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THE REMARKABLE PROFICIENCY AND DEVOTION TO DUTY DISPLAYED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY ARE IN KEEPING WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICE AND

PROPOSED CITATION

REFLECT DISTINCT CREDIT UPON THEMSELVES AND UPON THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

RALPH F. JAMES
LTC, FA
Commanding

SUBJECT: Lineage and Honors

1 December 1970

Lineage and Honors of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY

**Campaign Participation Credit
(pre-Vietnam)**

World War II

New Guinea
Bismark-Archipelago
Leyte (with arrowhead)
Luzon

Korean War

UN Defensive
UN Offensive
CCF Intervention
First UN Counteroffensive
CCF Spring Offensive
UN Summer-Fall Offensive
Second Korean Winter

Decorations

Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered, October 17, 1944 to July 4, 1945.

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered, Waegeon-Taegu

Chryssoun Aristion Andrias Bravery Gold Medal of Greece, Streamer embroidered, Korea

RALPH F. JAMES
LTC, FA
Commending

SUBJECT: Administrative Accomplishments

1 December 1970

Providing combat support can often prove to be a thankless task. Morale and welfare of the troops, therefore, is of utmost importance if a unit is to continually display the combat prowess demonstrated by the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY. Realizing this, a rotating standdown program was initiated allowing four to six members of each firing battery to return to the battalion base area for rest and relaxation purposes. To occupy stand-down personnel during the 72 hour period many excellent facilities were constructed at the base area, to include, a volleyball court, a cement basketball court (both with lights for evening enjoyment), a spacious EM/NCO club with internal stage area, and a 40 x 60, kit type swimming pool with adjacent lounging area and gardens. The latter facility was praised by Special Services personnel as being the finest such installation in the Republic of Vietnam.

During April 1969, the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY was administered the 23d Infantry Division Annual General Inspection. The long and arduous hours of preparation paid excellent dividends as all battalion units were rated satisfactory (ratings of satisfactory and unsatisfactory only being considered). The unit's superlative showing during the inspection was so impressive, the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY was selected to represent the 23d Infantry Division Artillery during the USARV Annual General Inspection. Inspected in July, the battalion fulfilled all expectations by receiving a satisfactory rating. Although adjectival classifications of satisfactory and unsatisfactory were the only overall ratings awarded, the USARV AGI Team utilized four separate ratings for subordinate inspection areas. A total of 20 Outstanding, 715 excellent, 132 satisfactory, and 27 unsatisfactory ratings were awarded to the 28 23d Infantry Division units inspected. The 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY received a total of 5 Outstanding, 32 excellent, and 3 satisfactory ratings during the inspection. The battalion received twenty-five percent of the outstanding ratings awarded to inspected division units, while having no unsatisfactory areas.

In October 1969, the Inspector General's team, 23d Infantry Division, conducted another Annual General Inspection of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY. The Battalion again made an excellent showing as all of the units received satisfactory ratings and no major deficiencies were noted by the inspection team.

One hundred and forty members of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY extended their foreign service tour, while specifically requesting they continue to serve with the unit.

The officers and men of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY proved they "buy bonds where they work," as eighty-one percent of the unit's personnel participated in the United States Savings Bond Program.

SUBJECT: Administrative Accomplishments

1 December 1970

As a majority of the 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY firing locations have been situated along Highway (QL) 1, normal resupply has been accomplished by road. Averaging over 60,000 miles a month, the battalion has consistently amassed more road mileage than any other unit in the 23d Infantry Division Artillery. The 1ST BATTALION, 82D ARTILLERY has complied an excellent vehicle safety record since arrival in the Republic of Vietnam. Although operating in adverse driving conditions, to include, poor road networks, inclement weather, capricious driving habits of local nationals and a hostile fire zone, the unit has been involved in only ten minor accidents (only three of which was the fault of unit personnel) while conveying over 1,600,000 miles.

RALPH F. JAMES
LTC, FA
Commanding

SUBJECT: Individual Achievements

1 December 1970

UNIT	SILVER STAR	BRONZE STAR W/"V"	ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL W/"V"
Btry A	3	19	6
Btry B	1	9	22
Btry C	1	5	4
Btry D	0	4	2
H&S Btry	0	2	0
Bn TOTAL	5	49	37

RALPH F. JAMES
LTC, FA
Commanding