

## PART I - PREDEPLOYMENT

### A. Mission and Resources.

1. Mission. "The 11th Infantry Brigade is the US Army Pacific Reserve. It is prepared to move by sea or air and fight anywhere, anytime." This mission was accomplished in December when the Brigade deployed to Southeast Asia.

### 2. Organization.

a. New units. The following units were activated and assigned to the 11th Infantry Brigade:

(1) 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery, activated on 1 March 67.

(2) 6th Engineer Company, activated on 15 June 67.

(3) 4th Battalion 21st Infantry, activated on 1 November 67.

### b. Reorganization.

(1) The 11th Infantry Brigade was reorganized and redesignated 11th Infantry Brigade (LT) by MSG DA 825745 dtd 291659 Jul 67 and USARPAC GO #147 dtd 7 Aug 67. Under the new organization the 11th Light Infantry Brigade was assigned the following units:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>STR</u>
11th LIB, HHC	77-102T (Modified)	287
E Trp, 1st Cav	1757E (Modified)	198
6th Engr Co	5-107T (Modified)	165
6th Spt Bn	29-245T (Modified)	461
Spt Bn HHC	29-246T (Modified)	(66)
Co A (Admin Co)	12-197T (Modified)	(117)
Co B (Maint Sup Co)	29-247T (Modified)	(194)
Co C (Med Co)	8-197T (Modified)	(84)
6th Bn, 11th Arty (105 Towed)	6-115T (Modified)	474
H & S Btry	6-116T (Modified)	
A, B, & C Btry	6-117T (Modified)	
415 ASA Det, Bde	32-57F	48
90th Cml Det (CBRC)	3-500E	5
52d MI Det Sep	30-14F	32
MI Det (Aug) TMHD	30-500D	5
MI Det (Aug) TMJB	30-600D	4
30 MH Det	20-17E	2
31 PI Det TMFB	45-500E	2

23d MP Det TMFB	19-27G	
1 Plat HQ		39
3 Scty Sqds		(3)
11th Sig Plat Fwd Area	11-38G	(36)
Plat HQ		50
Com Ent Sec		(3)
Tele Sec		(6)
Radio Sec		(5)
Install Sec		(5)
Radio Tml Carr Sec		(8)
Radio Car Tml T RC	11-500D	(9)
Radio Relay RM RH	11-500D	(9)
70th Inf Det LRP	7-157EMTOE	(5)
		61

(2) The following maneuver battalions were assigned and reorganized, each with 1 HHC (TOE 7-176T), 4 Rifle Co's (TOE 7-177T), 1 Cmbt Spt Co (TOE 7-178T), as modified by MTOE's USARPAC 1/68:

3d Bn, 1st Inf	931
4th Bn, 3d Inf	931
1st Bn, 20th Inf	931

(3) The 6th MP Co (-) was inactivated by referenced message and General Orders and personnel were reassigned.

(4) Brigade Staff. With the reorganization to a Separate Light Infantry Brigade, certain Brigade staff changes were made as follows:

a. The Deputy Brigade Commander position no longer existed. COL Oran K. Henderson became the Executive Officer, LTC Frank A. Barker, Jr became the S3, and MAJ Robert Longino was assigned as the S1 and later became the Executive Officer of the 4th Bn, 21st Inf.

b. MAJ Dale E. Johnson was assigned to the new staff position of S5. He became non-deployable in November and was replaced by CPT Donald J. Keshel.

c. Another new position, Provost Marshall, was filled by MAJ John L. Pittman who was the Commanding Officer of the 6th MP Company (-) which was deactivated. MAJ Pittman maintains operational control and supervision over the 23d MP Platoon.

d. Other staff officers that maintain operational control over platoons or detachments are as follows:

1. MAJ Frederick R. Dart, Signal Officer, over the 11th Signal Platoon.

2. MAJ Jerome S. Arter, Chemical Officer, over the 90th Chemical Detachment.

over the 31st Public Information Detachment.

3. 1LT John W. Moody, Information Officer,  
(5) Reorganization was completed on 21 Aug 67.

3. Personnel Activities.

a. Predeployment Medical Activities.

(1) The year 1967, prior to deployment, was spent in vigorous field and classroom training to prepare each medic to function under the most strenuous of circumstances. This entailed classroom lectures and demonstrations by the MC officers and well-trained NCO's, OJT at Schofield Dispensary in x-ray, laboratory techniques and emergency-room and sick call procedures. An OJT program at Tripler General Hospital was also initiated in which 30 men underwent 60 days of patient handling in wards, the operating-room and recovery room.

(2) Field training ran the gamut from individual tests such as being aidmen during squad and platoon maneuvers, through rugged terrain like the Kahuku Range, to full battalion and brigade exercises involving the setting up, functioning and moving of aid and clearing stations under combat conditions.

(3) The highlight of training was the conduct of Joint Amphibious Exercise Coral Sands II. This amphibious operation involved prior studying and planning of amphibious techniques, the formulation of amphibious operation orders and the conducting of medical support throughout a combat operation. The two-fold nature of medical support, playing the war game and caring for actual casualties, provided an adequate stimulus for a superb training program.

(4) Following Coral Sands, the emphasis switched to specialties and polishing individual training. Soon after, however, the alert orders were received and all efforts went into planning and packing for deployment to RVN.

b. Predeployment Religious Activities.

(1) On Monday, 16 January 1967, another Brigade Commanders and Chaplains Luncheon was held at 1200 hours in the Anthurium Room Schofield Barracks Officers Open Mess. At that time Chaplain (LTC) Fredrick L. Von Husen, USAR retired, was the guest speaker and presented a very fine challenge to the officers present. As a follow-up, the battalion commanders each had a luncheon for their company commanders and Brigade Chaplains. During the two week period of 16-28 January 1967, similar luncheons were held in all companies with company officers and key NCO's (including platoon sergeants) present. The intent of the above luncheons was to stress the religious responsibility inherent in officer and NCO military leadership. On 23 January 1967 Chaplain (CPT) Jesse R. Campbell departed the Brigade for a thirty day leave before leaving on a PCS to Vietnam.

(2) 1 February 1967 was designated as Brigade Religious Emphasis Day by the Brigade Commander. Some 325 Catholic men in the Brigade took part in a Catholic Retreat held in Chapel L-3 and in the Special Services Club. Father J. Churchill from Waianae was the visiting priest. Some 375 Protestant men took part in the Protestant Retreat which was held at the Post Chapel Center. Guest speaker was Dr E. Stanley Jones, a world famous Protestant missionary. These retreats took place between 0900 and 1200 hours.

(3) During February, March, and April, elements of the 11th Brigade underwent training at PTA, Island of Hawaii. The Catholic Chaplain, Chaplain (CPT) John C. Carey, remained at PTA. Sunday through Wednesday the Brigade Chaplain, Chaplain (MAJ) David M. Johansson, flew from Schofield Barracks for Protestant coverage.

(4) In April, Chaplain (CPT) Harry P. Kissinger, III and Chaplain (CPT) Robert H. Ackley were assigned to the Brigade, increasing the Chaplain's Section to four assigned chaplains.

(5) From the end of June through the first of September, the Brigade Chaplain went TDY to Bangkok, Thailand, as Staff Chaplain for USMACTHAI/JUSMAG.

(6) On 1 October, Chaplain (MAJ) Raymond P. Hoffman, Jr. was assigned to the Chaplain's Section of the 11th Brigade, increasing the assigned chaplains to five. With the assignment of the fifth chaplain the attachments of the chaplains were made as follows:

Chaplain (MAJ) Hoffman to the 4th Bn 3d Inf  
Chaplain (MAJ) Carey to the 6th Spt Bn  
Chaplain (MAJ) Kissinger to the 1st Bn, 20th Inf  
Chaplain (CPT) Ackley to the 3d Bn, 1st Inf

(7) Sunday, 3 December, a Protestant Christmas Program at Chapel A at 1830 hours concluded the Protestant Brigade-sponsored services at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Catholic Brigade-sponsored services ended also.

(8) A round-figure tabulation of religious activities is as follows:

	<u>OCCASIONS</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Group Religious Services Conducted	1200	60,000
Religious Education and Chapel Organizations	400	20,000
Pastoral Visits	2,000	
Character Guidance	120	28,000
Off-Post Community Activities	80	
Administrative and Staff Activities	400	

#### 4. Logistics.

a. S4 Section Organization. The Brigade S4, MAJ Donald Vest was assisted by CPT Robert Cowling, CPT Robert Dallas, CW2 William Meredieth, MSG Thomas, SFC Smith and SP4 Martinez.

b. Amphibious Exercise. A great amount of logistical planning was made prior to the conduct of Exercise Coral Sands II. The logistical situation was unique in that all back-up supplies were to be provided by the Navy. The Brigade carried a 5-day basic load of Class I, III, and V supplies. The exercise terminated on the 5th day, therefore Navy back-up supplies were not required. Water supply for the land forces was in critical demand. The exercise on Molokai was conducted during the dry season and local procurement of water was prohibited. To obtain potable water the Beach Party from 6th Support Battalion sent water trailers out to the ships each day in landing craft. Each ship had the capability to produce a limited amount of potable water each day. During the entire exercise, no major breakdowns occurred in the logistical system.

c. Reorganization. When the Brigade reorganized to become a Separate Light Infantry Brigade in August, the general effect was to increase the amount of infantry troops and reduce the heavy equipment such as vehicles. The turn-in and reissue of equipment was accomplished by the 6th Support Battalion. All vehicles and equipment were inspected, repaired as necessary, and turned-in on schedule. The major part of the transfer of equipment was completed in 30 days.

#### d. Food Service.

(1) Due to a shortage of cooks, a 3-week Cook's course was conducted during January-February 1967. The course graduated 21 personnel who were qualified as cook's helpers. The Brigade Food Adviser, CW2 William R. Meredieth was chief instructor with two assistants, SGM Buck and SFC Childe, USARHAW Food Service Supervisors.

(2) The Brigade Best Mess Program was revised in February 1967. Each month the best company-size mess of each battalion and separate company competed in the Brigade Best Mess Program. The unit winning the Best Mess the most number of times during the year was given a permanent plaque. HHC 3d Bn 1st Inf was awarded the plaque on Thanksgiving Day by BG Andy A. Lipscomb after winning 4 times. Trp E, 1st Cav was runner-up after winning the Best Mess 3 times.

(3) The Brigade activated 15 company-size messes during 1967. During May-June 1967 all company-size messes converted from plasticware (trays, cups and bowls) to glassware (plates, cups, saucers, glasses, dessert dishes and bowls) which was highly appreciated by all personnel.

(4) When the Brigade reorganized, each infantry battalion TOE of mess personnel was reduced from 29 to 26. The 4 company messes (HHC, A, B, C) were reorganized into 3 messes (HHC-A, B-C, D-E). This system proved very efficient for garrison mess operations.

## 5. Intelligence.

a. Intelligence training was integrated with regularly scheduled training, FTX's ATT's, amphibious, airmobile and jungle warfare training. Formal training for unit intelligence specialists was conducted weekly. Special intelligence training and section training was conducted by and for the 52d MI Det and 70th Inf Det (LRRP) after they were activated in August.

b. Weather support was provided by Det. 4, 1st Weather Wing, Wheeler AFB for field operations and MET data, as required, by the 6th Bn, 11th Arty. Forecasts were received regularly and disseminated to all units of the Brigade.

## B. Operations and Training.

1. General. During January 1967 the 11th Infantry Brigade continued to remain assigned and under operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific with the mission of PACFORCE Reserve. On 1 February 1967 the 11th Infantry Brigade was assigned to USARHAW under operational control of CG, USARHAW.

3. 1967

## 2. Air Mobility Training.

a. Air mobility training was conducted during the period 1 Feb to 30 March simultaneous with the Brigade's participation in Moon Dust VI and VII exercise moving the Brigade (-) to Pohakulua Training Area, (PTA) Hawaii. 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry; 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry; 1st Battalion 20th, Infantry; and E Troop, 1st Cavalry participated as did elements of Headquarters and Headquarters Company 11th Infantry Brigade and necessary support elements of 6th Support Battalion. The 6th Military Police Company (-) provided necessary traffic control, convoy escorts and town patrols in addition to continuing preparation for its company test to be administered in April, prior to the return of the 11th Infantry Brigade to Schofield Barracks.

b. The air mobility training conducted by the Brigade was effective and well received. This training included:

- (1) Loading and lashing of vehicles and equipment.
- (2) Marshalling area procedure.
- (3) Basic troop orientation.
- (4) Familiarization with type aircraft.

(5) Over water safety

3. Pohakuloa Training Area.

a. The Brigade moved to PTA during joint services exercises (Moon Dust). Working relationships with sister services were strengthened by the professional manner in which the Brigade functioned during the exercises.

b. Training conducted while at PTA consisted primarily of live fire exercises and preparing units for annual company tests. Company tests were conducted during the last week of each battalion's stay in Pohakuloa Training Area. Tests were administered to six of the nine rifle companies then assigned. Elements scoring low or indicating need for additional training, were retested in late April and early May in the training areas at Schofield Barracks. While the Brigade was participating in the Moon Dust Exercises, E Troop 1st Cavalry and 6th Military Police Company were administered appropriate company tests. The Brigade completed the Moon Dust Exercises with a Brigade CPX in March.

4. Training Accomplishments. The following objectives had been established and met during Fiscal Year 1966:

- a. Continue basic unit training.
- b. Conduct air mobility training.
- c. Conduct marksmanship training.
- d. Conduct annual individual weapons qualification firing.
- e. Conduct crew served weapons training and qualification firing.
- f. Conduct annual company testing.
- g. Improve the combat posture of the Brigade.

h. Continue to support the Reserve, National Guard, and ROTC training programs as directed by Commanding General, US Army Hawaii.

5. Advanced Individual Training.

a. Upon the return of the Brigade to Schofield Barracks, it was assigned the mission of training BCT filler personnel in AIT subjects on a train-and-retain basis. Programs and schedules were formulated, finalized and approved. 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry was assigned the mission of conducting the training with cadre personnel assigned. Instruction commenced in early April. 1st Bn, 20th Infantry was assisted by instructors sent to the 11th Infantry

Brigade from CONARC to assist in the special problems peculiar to AIT training. The instructors arrived in late April from Forts Lewis, Ord and Jackson.

b. Simultaneous to the arrival of the CONARC instructors, DA sent 400 fully trained infantrymen to the Brigade to bring the battalions to strength in order that they could meet the emergency deployability criteria established by DA. An accelerated training program was planned and implemented. The Brigade continued to conduct the AIT program with assistance from USARHAW and CONARC.

c. The 11th Infantry Brigade commenced training in April at the 11th Infantry Brigade Jungle Warfare Training Center located on the East Range, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. This facility had been previously used by the 25th Infantry Division and after the division's departure, had deteriorated substantially to an unserviceable condition. Utilizing personnel assigned, the Brigade rebuilt the center, prepared a POI and commenced instruction utilizing non-commissioned officers who had previous service in RVN as the primary instructors. The Brigade required all personnel scheduled for deployment to attend the course. Many VIP demonstrations were presented and well received during the period.

6. SEATO Exercise. Selected officers and enlisted men of the 11th Infantry Brigade participated in a major SEATO exercise, Exercise Aurora, conducted in May at Bangkok, Thailand. This exercise was extremely beneficial to the Brigade, allowing the staff to gain an inside view of SEATO and operations conducted in conjunction with other services and allied nations.

7. Infantry Army Training Tests. In June the Brigade administered rifle company ATT's to the three companies yet untested and conducted Battalion ATT's modified to Vietnam type situations and emphasizing counter-insurgency operations by testing land navigation, search and clear operations, use of supporting arms, am-bushes, and mines and booby traps. Situations were developed to cause commanders to conduct multiple, simultaneous small unit operations. Aggressor elements concentrated on hit-and-run type activities.

8. West Point Cadet Training. 26 West Point Cadets were assigned in two increments to the Brigade for the period 29 June thru 29 July 1967 and 31 July - 29 Aug 1967. The Cadets were integrated into leadership positions, e.g. platoon leaders positions, and allowed to command a rifle platoon during field training and training exercises. Adequate supervision ensured correct procedure, and techniques of good leadership were maintained and applied. A complimentary report of the training presented by the Brigade was received from the Commandant, West Point Academy.

## 9. Amphibious Training

a. After the Battalion ATT's, all efforts were directed to prepare the Brigade for participation in Coral Sands II, a joint services amphibious exercise scheduled for August. Preliminary training of primary staffs began in early May with instruction presented by the mobile training teams from Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, Coronado, California. The Brigade's training program for Coral Sands II included:

- (1) A rigorous physical training program.
- (2) Dry net training.
- (3) Non-swimmer training.
- (4) Three hour orientation on amphibious operations to include:
  - (a) Discipline aboard ship.
  - (b) Conduct aboard ship.
  - (c) Safety at sea and during landing.
- (5) Training on preparation of and loading vehicles for amphibious assault.
- (6) A CPX oriented to amphibious operations was conducted to acquaint the staff with terms and reports required.

b. Exercise Coral Sands II was conducted during the period 1-10 August. The exercise included preparation of troops, vehicles and equipment; embarkation; wet net training; fire power demonstration rehearsal; conduct of a raid; and the extraction of land forces. The amphibious raid was conducted on the island of Molokai. In addition to the 11th Infantry Brigade, participating services included the Navy, Marines and Air Force. The weather and surf conditions were good, and the entire exercise was conducted smoothly and with professional competence.

10. Artillery Army Training Tests. 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery successfully completed their Battery ATT's and moved to the Pohakuloa Training Area on 28 August to continue battery and battalion live-fire training. The Battalion ATT was administered successfully and the unit returned to Schofield Barracks 10 October. Joint services exercise Laughing Leprechaun I & II were utilized to assist the 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery in conduct of air mobility training. Again the unit participated by conducting all movements as professionals.

11. Engineer Training. The 6th Engineer Company completed BUT and AUT training and was administered their ATT during 22 November to 2 December.

12. Field Training Exercises/Command Post Exercises. The 11th Infantry Brigade participated in, or sponsored the following FTX's/ CFX's:

- a. Moon Dust Exercises VI, VII February - April 67 (Joint Services).
- b. Bde CFX (unnamed) - March 67 (Bde).
- c. SEATO Ex Aurora - May 67 (SEATO).
- d. CPX Coral Sands II - 25 to 26 July 67 (Bde).
- e. FTX Coral Sands II - 1 to 10 Aug 67 (Joint Services).
- f. FTX Kick Off - 18 to 21 Sept 67 (Bde).

13. Demonstrations and Ceremonies: The Infantry Brigade sponsored and/or participated in the following demonstrations and ceremonies:

- a. Bde Review - Schofield - Jan 67.
- b. Bde Review - Schofield - Mar 67.
- c. Change of Command - Schofield - Mar 67
- d. Somoan Day Parade - Honolulu - 22 Apr 67
- e. Bde Review - Schofield - May 67
- f. Armed Forces Day - Schofield
- g. Memorial Day Ceremony - Schofield - 30 May 67.
- h. 50th State Fair, Honolulu - 30 June to 9 July 67.
- i. Organization Day Review - Schofield - 1 July 1967.
- j. 4 July Ceremonies - Schofield - 4 July 67.
- k. Windward Independence Day Parade - Kaneohe - 4 July 67
- l. Independence Day Parade - Kailua - 4 July 67.
- m. Wahiawa District Fair - Oahu - Aug 67
- n. Fire Power Demonstration - Schofield - 22 Aug 67

- o. Waialua County Fair - Waialua - 25 - 26 Aug 67
- p. Maui County Fair - Maui - 11 - 14 Oct 67
- q. Hawaii County Fair - Hawaii - 25 - 29 Oct 67
- r. Brigade Award Ceremony and Review - Schofield - 9 Nov 67

## PART II DEPLOYMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

### A. Deployment Preparations upon Receipt of Alert.

#### 1. Personnel.

a. Records were screened to remove the non-deployable personnel. AWOL, hospitalized, civil defendant, and confined personnel were also cleared from the Brigade.

b. Deployable personnel completed their finance actions. Legal assistance was provided for the preparation of wills and power of attorneys, and for personal affairs.

c. An information pamphlet was prepared and disseminated to all sponsors of dependents. This pamphlet contained all the necessary information required for moving dependents. Personnel with non-command sponsored dependents were informed that they must move their dependents at their own expense. Extreme hardship cases in this category were forwarded to higher headquarters. All officers and warrant officers that desired to leave their families at Schofield Barracks were required to relocate their dependents to the 1300 enlisted and NCO area. Only some of the families were able to relocate prior to the husbands departure. Eligible enlisted and NCO dependents were permitted to remain in their present quarters. A Processing Center was established to process dependent movement to CONUS and to screen Brigade personnel for current immunizations and identification cards and tags. Movement orders authorizing shipment of household goods and movement of dependents were late in arriving in some instances. This created hardships for some of the families on clearing quarters and meeting departure dates.

d. Personnel inventories were made against TOE's and requisitions were submitted to fill existing vacancies. Also, deployable excess personnel were placed in vacant positions related to their MOS for on-the-job training. Excess personnel that could not be utilized to fill MOS vacancies were reassigned to USARHAW.

a. A Red Cross representative, Mr Marvin W. Oxford, was attached to the Brigade just prior to deployment.

#### 2. Logistics.

a. Requisitions were submitted for tropical uniforms and boots, OG underwear and other items authorized in RVN; CONEX containers and packing and crating materials; and base camp developmental items. Expendable items were obtained from the Self Service Supply Center.

b. Unauthorized or excess property such as Army Green uniforms, mountain sleeping bags and field jacket liners were turned in.

c. XM16E1 rifles were exchanged for the new M16A1 rifles shortly before deployment.

d. A Movement Control Center was formed to coordinate all deployment movement of Brigade elements. It was planned that the Brigade would deploy in four phases: Phase I, Advance Planning Group; Phase II, Advance Party; Phase III, Main Body; and Phase IV, Rear Detachment.

e. All station property, except mess hall equipment, was left in place and turned over to USARHAW Quartermaster just prior to departure of the main body.

3. Intelligence. The Brigade began receiving the Americal Division daily intelligence summaries in September. Commanders and staff were briefed weekly on VC/NVA activities by an Order of Battle Officer from the 52nd MI Detachment. USARPAC G2 also provided briefings and intelligence documents for the Brigade Commander and staff. More than 2000 security clearances were granted to personnel prior to deployment. Intelligence SOP's from units in RVN were used as a reference in preparing the Brigade Intelligence SOP. Unannounced security inspections of units increased the emphasis on control of classified information. A basic load of maps of the area of interest in RVN was obtained prior to deployment.

#### 4. Operations and training.

a. Deployment planning conferences. Initial planning conferences were held with USARHAW on receipt of deployment orders and scheduled on a periodic basis thereafter. These conferences dealt primarily with training matters and were the chief instrument in obtaining priorities for the Brigade in allocation of training areas, ammunition for service firing and other related areas essential to final preparation of the brigade for deployment. Frequent planning conferences were held with subordinate units to define training objectives and goals in an accelerated training program and to insure maximum use of time and facilities. The planning conference served as the primary means of solving problems related to the accelerated training program and announcing operational and training guidance for implementing POM requirements.

b. Actions upon receipt of alert for deployment.

(1) Pre-embarkation training.

(a) Language training. Selected individuals attended special Vietnamese language classes presented by the USARHAW Education Center. The first graduating class was sent on TDY to MACV to gain practical experience in the employment of their language skills.

(b) Weapons Training.

(1) Individual. All personnel within the brigade participated in familiarization or record firing with their basic weapon. Individuals failing to qualify were required to re-fire. This procedure resulted in a very high percentage of personnel who were qualified with their basic weapons prior to deployment. New M16 rifles were issued to all personnel armed with this weapon approximately two weeks prior to deployment of the Brigade. Special classes were conducted and all personnel were required to zero their newly issued M16. Range firing for qualification of newly assigned personnel and zero firing was conducted up to the last minute to insure compliance with POM requirements.

(2) Crew Served Weapons. Command emphasis was placed on firing of crew served weapons, particularly 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars. All weapons crews received a maximum amount of classroom type instruction as well as field firing service ammunition.

(c) Vietnam Social Environment. Maximum use was made of the vast amount of reference material available on the VN conflict, especially the ORLL's of units operating in VN. Intensive effort was made to thoroughly familiarize personnel with the VN people, customs, geography, climate and the nature and causes of the conflict in that country.

(d) Vietnam Tactical Environment.

(1) ORLL's also proved to be a valuable asset in determining procedure and doctrine for incorporation in field training of Brigade units.

(2) A large percentage of field grade officers and senior NCO's with previous experience in VN contributed many worthwhile suggestions which lead to improved training emphasizing the tactics employed in VN.

(3) Liaison visits to VN by senior commanders and staff officers led to an increased understanding of training requirements which were geared to the area of operation where the Brigade was to be deployed.

(4) The Schofield Barracks training areas, from a terrain and climatic stand point, proved to be ideal for conditioning troops and acquainting tactical commanders with the difficulties and problems that they would face in the employment of their units in the northern province of South Vietnam

(e) Counterinsurgency and Jungle Oriented Training. All tactical units of the Brigade were required to emphasize this type training in their training activities. The primary vehicle used by the Brigade was the Jungle Warfare School, which all subordinate units were required to complete. This school was organized with 11 stations which included among others: Mountain-eering; Survival; Ambush; Counterambush and Patrolling; River Crossing Expedients; A Typical Southeast Asian Village where the soldier learned the proper methods of securing, searching and clearing villages, and how best to work with the civilian population; a Mines and Booby Trap Station which employed the more common types used by the VC in RVN; and A Quick Fire Range which emphasized "Quick Kill" techniques.

(f) Unit Training. All units of the Brigade completed their ATT's prior to deployment. Following these tests the companies and battalions conducted numerous field training exercises and concentrated on maximum field training under simulated combat conditions which stressed live fire exercises. At Brigade level one FTX was conducted to incorporate an unconventional environment such as that which exists in RVN.

#### B. Actions Taken During Deployment.

1. Advance Planning Group. An advance planning group of 15 personnel, representing all major subordinate units and Brigade staff sections, departed Schofield Barracks by aircraft. This group deplaned at TAN SON NHUT Air Base, RVN on 27 Nov 67 where they were met by USARV and Americal Division representatives, and were subsequently transported to CHU LAI. On 29 Nov 67 the planning group was greeted by Major General Koster, CG Americal Division, and briefed by the Division staff on training and employment of the Brigade. Subsequently arrangements were made for an exchange of information and detailed discussion between the Brigade representatives and their counterparts on the Americal Division staff. Discussions were also held with the S3, 198th Infantry Brigade. As a result of these meetings tentative plans were made regarding the move and reception of the Brigade and forwarded to the Brigade at Schofield Barracks. On 30 November 1967 the planning group departed CHU LAI Barracks for DUC PHO, the area in which the Brigade was to be employed. One representative remained at CHU LAI to coordinate reception of the Advance Party. The Planning Group was received at DUC PHO by representatives of the 3d Brigade, 4th Division, which was assigned as the sponsoring unit for the Brigade. The period of 30 November 1967 to 4 December 1967 was occupied with planning conferences relating to reception of the Advance Party, reconnaissance of the area to be occupied by the Brigade during the in-country training phase, and coordination with 3d Brigade, 4th Division on the preparation of an

in-country training program and on availability of resources and support required to make the Brigade base liveable.

2. Advance Party. The Advance Party departed Hawaii by aircraft for RVN on a phased schedule which extended from 28 November 1967 through 4 December 1967. The Advance Party consisted of 350 personnel with token representatives from all Brigade units and a minimum amount of essential equipment. Both personnel and equipment were airlifted to either DANANG or CHU LAI and subsequently airlifted to DUC PHO. All members of the Advance Party were temporarily billeted in facilities provided by 3d Brigade, 4th Division. On 6 December 1967 the Advance Party moved from DUC PHO to LZ CARENTAN to establish a temporary base camp and commence preparations for reception of the Main Body. Security for the Advance Party was provided by Company C, 1st Battalion 20th Infantry which had been deployed as a part of the Advance Party for that purpose. The Advance Party had approximately two weeks to prepare for arrival of the Main Body. During this time detailed planning and reconnaissance was made for unit locations, organization, and defense of the base camp area. During this phase the Advance Party relied quite heavily on support provided by 3d Bde, 4th Div. Excellent cooperation was extended in this area.

3. Main Body. The Main Body moved by sea to RVN. The USNS General Gordon departed Hawaii on 5 Dec 67 and USNS General Weigel on 6 Dec 67. Half of the Main Body personnel were on each ship. The voyage staff for each of the troop ships included the Commander of Troops, Executive Officer, Compartiment Commanders and various staff officers. The Commanders of Troops were MAJ James R. Bell on the USNS Gordon and MAJ Delmar L. Corbin on the USNS Weigel. The morale and discipline of the troops during the voyage was excellent. Cargo ships USNS Sea Train and Sea Lift transported most of the vehicles, equipment and supplies of the Brigade. The troop ships also carried a limited amount of supplies and equipment. The Main Body debarked at Qui Nhon on 19 and 22 Dec 67. "Hanoi Hanna", the English-speaking North Vietnamese propagandist, welcomed the 11th Infantry Brigade to Vietnam over the radio. She said the convoys of the Brigade would be attacked and destroyed as they moved north. This proved to be another one of her many lies. The Main Body moved north to Duc Pho a distance of 65 miles, by trucks and aircraft. Drivers of Brigade vehicles sandbagged the floors of the vehicles for protection against road mines. Drivers and "shotgunners" were issued flak jackets. The convoys, escorted by gun vehicles and air cover, moved on Highway 1 to LZ Carentan, near Duc Pho. The only incidents were a few rounds of sniper small arms fire that caused no damage. Part of the Main Body flew from Qui Nhon to Duc Pho and then trucked to nearby LZ Carentan.

4. Rear Detachment. The Rear Detachment, commanded by COL Oran K. Henderson, Brigade Executive Officer, consisted of 48 officers and enlisted men. The Rear Detachment departed Hawaii by aircraft on 8 Dec 67 and arrived in-country on 9 Dec 67 at Ton Son Nhut Air Base. On 10 Dec 67 they were in Chi Lai and arrived at LZ Carentan on 11 Dec 67.

5. 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry. The 4th Bn, 21st Inf, being newly-formed did not deploy with the Brigade to RVN. This battalion remained at Hawaii to complete its organization and training.

C. Establishment of Brigade Base Camp. By the time the Main Body arrived at LZ Carentan, the Advance Party had the temporary base camp well-established. Most of the tents were set up for offices and living quarters. Mess halls were rapidly set up and "A" rations were served to all personnel within a few days after arrival of the Main Body. All of the Brigade's equipment arrived at the base camp within a few weeks from Qui Nhon.

D. Coordination With Host Unit. Close coordination was effected at every level of command and staff between the 11th Infantry Brigade and the sponsoring unit, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Following one month of in-country training, the 11th Brigade was scheduled to replace the 3rd Bde, 4th Div in its Area of Operations (AO). The coordination between the two units included planning conferences on current procedures and support activities, insurance of continued source intelligence information, joint reconnaissance of the AO, observations of all aspects of combat operations and participation of Brigade company commanders in field operations with their counterparts. Brigade Headquarters and 6th Support Battalion coordinated with their counterparts in the 3rd Bde, 4th Div for the move of the Brigade from LZ Carentan to LZ Bronco and occupation of the facilities at Bronco.

E. In-Country Training. While at LZ Carentan the elements of the Brigade received valuable training. The 2nd ARVN Division conducted Vietnamese Village training. The 3rd Bde, 4th Div presented a Vietnamese Orientation Course. The 174th Avn Co. instructed Brigade personnel on the characteristics of gunships and "slicks" and conducted combat assault training for the infantry units. Other types of training included search and destroy operations, VC "hole hunting", ambush techniques, and destruction of fortifications and rice caches.

Annex A - 11th Infantry Brigade Commanders and Staff

1 Jan - 31 Dec 67

Brigade Commander -	MG John H. Hay COL Oran K. Henderson BG Andy A Lipscomb
Deputy Bde Cmdr-	COL Oran K. Henderson
Executive Officer-	LTC James F. Price LTC Frank A. Barker, Jr. COL Oran K. Henderson
Brigade Sergeant Major-	SGM Joseph W. Walsh
S1-	MAJ Delmar Corbin LTC James Pennington MAJ Carl Kastenbaum MAJ Harrison Stewart MAJ James Cox MAJ Robert Longino MAJ Charles C. Calhoun
S2 -	MAJ Richard K. Blackledge
S3 -	MAJ Robert Longino LTC Frank A. Barker, Jr.
S4 -	MAJ Robert Wright MAJ Paul Osborne MAJ Donald L. Vest
S5 -	MAJ Dale E. Johnson CPT Donald J. Keshel
ALO -	LTC William I. MacLachlan
Sig O -	MAJ Frederick R. Dart
Cml O -	MAJ Jerome S. Arter
Surg -	CPT Harvey M. Freedman
PMO -	MAJ John L. Pittman
Chap -	MAJ David M. Johansson
PIO -	1LT John W. Moody
Avn O -	MAJ Fred Smith

Annex B - Unit History Briefs (1967)

Appendix 1 - 6th Engineer Company

Appendix 2 - 11th Signal Platoon

Appendix 3 - 23d Military Police Platoon

Appendix 4 - 30th Military History Detachment

Appendix 5 - 31st Public Information Detachment

Appendix 6 - 52d Military Intelligence Detachment

Appendix 7 - 90th Chemical Detachment

### 6th Engineer Company

The 6th Engineer Company was activated on 15 June 1967 and assigned to the 11th Infantry Brigade. Prior to this, the unit was designated as the 6th Engineer Battalion (Combat) which had been deactivated and controlled by the Department of the Army.

Upon being activated and redesignated, the company was assigned the mission of increasing the combat effectiveness of the Brigade by providing engineer combat support. During the period of reorganization, the 6th Engineer Company was located at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

On 15 August 1967 the 6th Engineer Company was reorganized according to MTOE 5-107T. The mission remained the same but at full strength the unit was able to provide:

- (1) Engineer planning for organic and attached engineer troops.
- (2) Engineer reconnaissance and engineer intelligence for the brigade.
- (3) Construction, maintenance and repair of roads, bridges, fords and culverts to facilitate the movement of the brigade.
- (4) General construction work including construction of assault landing strips.
- (5) Personnel and equipment for the purification and supply of potable water.

From the day of activation until December 1967 the company began organizing and training the assigned personnel. Personnel received instruction on combat engineering for the future overseas deployment.

On 1 December 1967 an advance party of one officer and four non-commissioned officers left Schofield Barracks, Hawaii for the Republic of Vietnam. They made the necessary preparations for the arrival and deployment of the engineer company.

On December 1967 the engineer company departed from Hawaii by ship, to begin the ocean-voyage to Vietnam. Though new vehicles and equipment were received and loaded until departure time, the authorized equipment and personnel was not at full strength until the unit reached Vietnam.

On 22 December 1967 the unit arrived at Qui Nhon, Vietnam where they unloaded from the ship. Traveling north in convoy, the engineer company met the advance party at LZ Carentan. Here they bivouaced with the 11th Light Infantry Brigade.

The 6th Engineer Company supported the brigade at Duc Pho with numerous construction projects, road network improvements and daily minesweeping of the road between LZ Carentan and LZ Bronco.

Appendix 2 to Annex B

11th Signal Platoon (Forward Area)

The 11th Sig Plt was initially designated the 11th Signal Detachment (Forward Area). It was assigned to the Brigade and attached to 6th Spt Bn on 15 Aug 67. The platoon is authorized 2 LT's, 11 NCO's and 37 EM. Most of the personnel in the platoon came from other units within the Brigade. Personnel initially assigned to the platoon were 1LT Roger L. Chafens, Platoon Leader, SFC Ronnie F. Nance and PFC Thomas L. Dixon.

The 11th Sig Plt is the equivalent of a forward area signal center platoon of a B company of a division signal battalion. The mission of the platoon is to provide and maintain communications between Division and Brigade headquarters, and between all attached and supporting units and Brigade headquarters.

Appendix 3 to Annex B

23d Military Police Platoon

The 23d MP Plt was assigned to the Brigade and attached to HHC, 11th Inf Bde on 15 Aug 67. The platoon is authorized 1 LT, 5 NCO's and 33 EM. 1LT Dennis E. Vanoni was assigned as Platoon Leader. On 15 Sept 67 the platoon received 33 E-2's who had just completed their Advanced Individual Training. The platoon then conducted Basic Unit Training and Preparation for Overseas Movement training. Upon arriving in Vietnam on 20 Dec 67, LT Vanoni was informed that the 23d MP Plt would be deactivated soon after the first of next year.

Appendix 4 to Annex B

30th Military History Detachment

The 30th Mil Hist Det was assigned to the Brigade on 23 Dec 66 and attached to HHC, 11th Inf Bde on 15 Aug 67. The detachment is authorized 1 MAJ and 1 E-5. MAJ Alexander Charleston was assigned as the Historian.

The mission of the detachment is to support the Dept of Army military history program by collecting information in the field to supplement and amplify the factual accounts of events as recorded by elements of the Brigade in the course of their operations.

The Historian compiled two significant after-action reports from which a great amount of historical information was obtained. These covered the reorganization and the deployment of the 11th Inf Bde.

### 31st Public Information Detachment

The 31st PI Det was assigned to the Brigade on 23 Dec 66 and attached to HHC, Brigade on 15 Aug 67. The detachment is authorized 1 CPT, 1 LT, 3 E-5's, and 4 E-4's. 2 LT's Carol H. Rehm, Jr. and Arthur J. Dunn joined the detachment on 23 July 67 and were assigned as Information Officer and Press Officer respectively.

The mission of the 31st PI Det is to inform the public about the 11th Inf Bde and the US Army through external releases to all types of news media.

A comprehensive publicity and information program was conducted for all members of the 11th Infantry Brigade, the local civilian populace in Hawaii, the "home town" resident audience, and in Vietnam for the general public.

Through civilian and military news releases, pictures, television and radio broadcasts, the image of the 11th Brigade as a combat ready, jungle-trained, infantry unit, organized for and practiced in counter-insurgency warfare was promoted to the general public.

At various times, local news, television and radio reporters were invited to examine and be briefed on Brigade training activities. A fine rapport was developed with the news media. As a result, the Brigade and the general public benefitted greatly from the dissemination of information.

Operation Coral Sands II, the Brigade amphibious assault on the island of Molokai, was thoroughly covered by television, radio and newspaper releases from the headquarters of the Army and Navy commands to the soldier on the hills of Molokai.

Besides local dissemination of information, a thorough program of home town news releases was maintained.

After arriving in Vietnam, the Public Information Office was immediately concerned with setting up liaison with various news agencies. A survey was taken to determine the type news releases and on-the-spot stories which were most acceptable for publication. A dark room was built in order that the photographic section could develop and print their own pictures.

A new personal-type home town news release was initiated in the Brigade. These releases emphasized personal opinions, quoted statements and provided short biographies and job description of the soldiers.

A command information program was initiated with the purpose of getting the most important and useful information to the troops. Such information included health care, maintenance of weapons and the proper attitude, as promoted by General Westmoreland, to have toward the Vietnamese people, stressing the "Soldier-Diplomat" concept.

As an additional form of information a weekly Brigade newspaper, "The Trident", was published. This newspaper emphasizes the actions of small units and individual soldiers as well as world and national news.

## Appendix 6 to Annex B

### 52d Military Intelligence Detachment

The 52d MI Det was assigned to the Brigade and attached to HHC, Brigade on 15 August 67. On 20 September 1967, Major Robert G, Fletcher MI, assumed command. Throughout the months of October and November, the detachment received its TO&E equipment, and all personnel (41 in number) arrived on station. A vigorous and comprehensive training program was instituted and supervised by the four section chiefs: Captain Murry B. Watt (Imagery Interpretation), Captain Albert C. Labriola (Interrogation, Document Exploitation, and Technical Intelligence), Captain Harvey W. White, Jr. (Counter-intelligence), and 1LT Norman J. Klym (Order of Battle).

On 6 December 1967, the detachment departed Honolulu with the Main Body of the 11th Infantry Brigade and arrived at the port of Qui Nhon, Republic of Vietnam on 22 Dec 67. Since arriving in Vietnam the detachment has provided the Brigade with timely and productive intelligence so that operations might be planned and successfully executed.

Appendix 7 to Annex B

70th Infantry Detachment (Long Range Patrol)

The 70th Inf Det (LRP) was assigned to the Brigade and attached to 6th Spt Bn on 15 Aug 67. CPT Ralph Clark was assigned as the Detachment Commander. The mission of the unit was to provide long range reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition patrol capability to the Brigade. The 70th Inf Det was deactivated on 19 Dec 67.

Appendix 8 to Annex B

90th Chemical Detachment (CBR Center)

The 90th Cml Det (CBRC) was assigned to the Brigade on 23 Dec 66 and attached to HHC, 11th Inf Bde on 15 Aug 67. The detachment is authorized 1 CPT, 1 E-7, 2 E-5's and 1 E-3. 2LT Joseph M. Reid was assigned to the Brigade on 29 June 67 and became the Commanding Officer of the detachment on 15 Aug 67. SFC Francis L. Hennigan was assigned on 25 Sep 67 and 2LT Steven J. Myers, an excess chemical officer, on 1 Nov 67.

The TOE mission of the detachment includes implementation of CBR plans, chemical and biological target analysis, nuclear fallout prediction, chemical and biological effectiveness and hazard prediction, control of CBR surveys and dissemination of CBR information.

The actual mission of the 90th Cml Det in the RVN includes aerial personnel detection of unobserved enemy personnel, aerial employment of semi-persistent and non-persistent riot control agents (CS), and providing demonstrations and training on flame field expedients, portable flamethrowers, CS munitions and ground-based defoliation equipment.

Unit History

11th Light Infantry Brigade

1 January 1967 to 31 December 1967

Prepared by:

MAJ Jerome S. Arter

Headquarters, 11th Lt Inf Bde

Approved by:

*Oran K. Henderson*  
Oran K. Henderson

Colonel, Infantry

Commanding

Headquarters, 11th Inf Bde

APO San Francisco 96217

## INTRODUCTION

The year 1966 was important in the history of the 11th Infantry Brigade since it marked the Brigade's reactivation and initial organization and training. However, 1967 proved to be even more historically significant. Training highlights of the Brigade included successful completion of Army Training Tests by each company, battery, troop and battalion; participation in Joint Service Amphibious Exercise Coral Sands II; and the completion of jungle warfare training. The structure of the Brigade changed when it reorganized to become a Separate Light Infantry Brigade. The most significant event during the year was the deployment of the Brigade to Southeast Asia for combat in the Republic of Vietnam. At the time of deployment many records and files were retired. Therefore, certain statistical information is not included in this historical report.

This then is the history of the 11th Infantry Brigade from 1 January 1967 to 31 December 1967.

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