


HANDBOOK

FOR

MILITARY SUPPORT



OF

PACIFICATION

FEBRUARY 1968

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222


FOREWORD

The "Handbook for Military Support of Pacification" has been developed as a basic reference document designed for use by United States forces, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and Free World Military Assistance Forces operating in the Republic of Vietnam. Prior to its publication, it was distributed in draft form to the field for a three month evaluation and has been completely coordinated with the Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. In the near future, the handbook will be published in the Vietnamese language by The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

In view of the recent dynamic changes in the government of Vietnam and the pacification program, it is considered that the publication of this handbook at this time is especially appropriate.

The handbook will be revised periodically by this headquarters. New pages will be distributed for insertion into the handbook when appropriate. Recommended changes or suggestions for improvement should be forwarded to Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ATTN: MACJ3, APO 96222.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Pacification, as it applies in the Republic of Vietnam is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity. The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units, if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies. Once adequate security has been established, Revolutionary Development (RD) can begin. An understanding of pacification is necessary in order to execute the tasks which the reader may be called on to perform.

a. Revolutionary Development, the leading edge of pacification, is the formalized government of Vietnam program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets generally within RD campaign areas. It includes the local security for those hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level.

b. Nation building is the economic, political, and social activity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban centers. It is related to pacification in that it builds on the results of pacification and contributes to the establishment of a viable economic and social community.

2. The military plays an indispensable role in pacification. Without initial military security operations to establish the essential secure environment, the civil aspects of pacification cannot progress. Only under relatively secure conditions can progress be made in the rectification of the political, economic, and sociological imbalances which are the root causes of, and support the continuation of insurgency. In this handbook, the role of the military forces in providing territorial security for pacification and the relationship between the military and civil agencies involved will be explained.

3. The purpose of this handbook is to give the reader an understanding of the pacification process, with particular emphasis on the doctrine for provision of territorial security and the conduct of RD programs. However, the detailed execution and administration of the pacification concept is subject to rapid evolution as it adapts to changing situations. Therefore, it will be necessary to use this handbook in conjunction with current directives.

CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES OF PACIFICATION

Section I

BACKGROUND

4. Although the present objectives of pacification do not differ in significant points from former programs and plans, both GVN and US planners have benefited from the mistakes as well as the successes of the past. As a result of lessons learned, the present pacification process, from initiation of the planning cycle until successful execution, is significantly different from those of past years. The following discussion traces the major trends to the present programs.

5. The Chien Thang (Victory) National Pacification Plan published in 1964 was the first comprehensive GVN document on pacification. The Chien Thang established the "spreading oil spot" concept for its two phases --- restoration of security (clearing and securing), and development --- and outlined military support for the 1964 pacification effort, but the overall military and civil aspects of the 1964 pacification plan lacked coordination. Accurate and timely programming of US and GVN requirements for manpower, funds, and material was not achieved. As a result, information from province governments on their resource requirements was not gathered until September 1964.

6. On 25 December 1964, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces - Joint General Staff (RVNAF - JGS) published AB 139, the military portion of the 1965 pacification plan. This plan incorporated certain Mission Council proposals to improve definitions, roles and missions, and, in these respects, corrected some of the weaknesses of the Chien Thang plan. Improved military-civil coordination was achieved, and instructions on programming were published in December that extended the 1964 pacification plan and budget into 1965. On 5 April 1965 the GVN supplanted the term "pacification" with "rural construction". This term was changed to "Revolutionary Development" in February 1966.

7. On 11 November 1965, the GVN Central Rural Construction Council published its 1966 RD plan. It directed provinces, under the aegis of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, to develop integrated plans for 1966 in coordination with and subject to the approval of division and corps commanders. Provincial plans were required to be signed by the Province Chief and by both a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representative.

8. On 15 December 1965, JGS/RVNAF published AB 140, the basic GVN military plan for support of 1966 rural construction activities.

This plan directed corps commanders to concentrate their efforts to support rural construction. The plan further established roles and mission for military and civil police forces in support of rural construction. Combined Campaign Plan AB 141 was published by MACV/RVNAF-JGS on 31 December 1965 as the combined military plan for 1966.

9. Civil RD activities began slowly in 1966, primarily because of the shortage of trained RD cadres, delays in staffing the various regional and provincial revolutionary development councils and permanent bureaus, and a shortage of local management experienced in executing plans. However, the Minister of Revolutionary Development, by his personal visits to all provinces, provided a great deal of direction and motivation. By midyear, RD programs were in full swing and local bureaus were staffed and began to function effectively. The first RD teams, now known as RD cadre groups, were graduated on 21 May 1966 and deployed to the field shortly thereafter.

10. On the military side, RVNAF military support of RD did not materialize in 1966 to the extent planned. A transition period was required to reorient the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and to subordinate the primary combat role. Special training was required in order to prepare ARVN commanders and troops to execute this vitally important mission. This training was initiated on a priority basis and was conducted by JGS assisted by MACV.

11. As the buildup of United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF) troops in RVN continued during 1966, it became apparent that the increased presence of these forces would permit JGS to commit more ARVN resources to RD. In June and July 1966, the Chief of the JGS/RVNAF tasked ARVN to increase the tempo of its support of RD during the last half of 1966.

12. During the early spring of 1966, with 1966 RD in progress, and using the experience gained during the 1966 planning exercise, planning was begun on 1967 programs. A Joint US Agency Planning Group was formed in late 1966 to participate with the GVN in combined planning for RD and all agencies concerned began to develop 1967 estimates. While the RD planning was proceeding, MACV and JGS began parallel planning to develop a combined military plan for 1967. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development continued to shape the 1967 concept and to consider the results of the military and civilian planning as it progressed.

13. Early in the RD planning cycle, the primary concern of the Joint US Agency Planning Group in RD planning was the compilation of recommended guidelines to be furnished to the Ministry of Revolutionary Development for combined discussions. These guidelines were concurred in by the Ministry and became the basis for preparation of individual provincial plans. An English translation of the guidelines

was published to the field to assist the US advisors in providing advice and assistance to their counterparts in the preparation of the provincial plans.

14. In early November 1966, the Ministry of Revolutionary Development dispatched four teams to the field for the purpose of providing assistance to individual provinces in the development of their plans. Review and approval of the provincial plans was accomplished by the Minister of Revolutionary Development, assisted by a combined US/GVN team, between 14 November and 23 December. It might be noted that the appropriate ARVN division and corps commanders were required to endorse the province plan prior to its submission to the Minister for approval in order to signify his concurrence and ability to support it militarily. Consequently, military planning for the Combined Campaign Plan - 1967, AB 142 was coordinated closely and integrated with RD plans.

15. For the first time, the Combined Campaign Plan - 1967, AB 142 established definite RD missions for ARVN and US/FWMAF forces. ARVN's primary responsibility was to provide the military support to RD, while the primary responsibility of US/FWMAF was to seek out and destroy VC/NVA main force units, base areas, and LOCs. Secondly, however, US/FWMAF assisted RD by providing security within and around its Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) and bases. These balanced mission assignments ensured the increased military support essential to the progress of RD.

16. The Combined Campaign Plan - 1968, AB 143 requires subordinate headquarters to coordinate their military plans with provincial RD plans. Each province chief in developing his plan establishes his individual goals based on the guidelines, civilian, and military resources available, and progress of RD within his province. In effect, the 1968 National Revolutionary Development Plan consists of 44 province plans and the supporting military plans. In developing future Combined Campaign Plans, it is envisioned that the same type of careful coordination will be accomplished so that each plan succeeds the other in logical fashion.

Section II

CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES

17. PACIFICATION.

a. Behind the shield provided by the containment and offensive operations of the US/FWMAF and ARVN forces in Vietnam, a GVN pacification program of systematic and accelerated activities in

military, political, economic and sociological programs is being conducted with the assistance of the US. It is supported by and provides the foundation for nation building activities. Pacification has three objectives:

- (1) To provide sustained territorial and internal security against VC local forces, guerrillas, terrorists, subversives and VC infrastructure of a level adequate to permit the uninterrupted and accelerated conduct of economic, social and political programs;
- (2) To establish an effective political structure at the local level capable of responding to and eliciting the participation of the people; and,
- (3) To stimulate self-sustaining economic activity capable of expansion.

b. The pacification campaign to provide sustained territorial security in the countryside and concurrently to introduce political, economic and social reforms which will establish conditions favorable for further growth and stability, is just as important as anti-aggression operations. Operations to annihilate the enemy while clearly essential to pacification, are, by themselves, inadequate. The people must be separated and won over from the enemy--and this can be done only with the active cooperation of the people themselves.

c. The essential first step towards pacification is to create a secure environment in which activities designed to elicit the participation of the people in the elimination of injustice, fear and misery can begin with some promises of success. The requisite degree of security is to be applied by the RVNAF forces, the National Police and the Revolutionary Development cadre groups themselves, in closely coordinated combinations that will vary from place to place depending upon the threat and the importance of the area. Ultimately, the people themselves participate in their own defense.

d. Concurrent with the provision of territorial security, efforts to identify and eliminate or neutralize the VC infrastructure are intensified.

e. Integral to pacification is RD which covers those specific endeavors undertaken by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development in the hamlets and villages. It includes all organized efforts to extend GVN presence and control throughout the country through the use of the RD cadre groups, the Montagnard Truong Son teams, Civil-Military RD teams and similar teams as well as hamlet and village sponsored self-help projects.

f. Political, and sociological programs designed to develop local government and to gain the participation of the people are called New Life Development programs. Introduced by the RD cadre groups or other means, these programs provide for the stimulation of, and support for, self-sustaining economic and political activity, which is strengthened and continued through community development follow-on programs.

18. SECURITY.

a. The key to pacification is the provision of sustained territorial security. Territorial security is defined as security from VC local forces and guerrilla units and VC/NVA main force units if any are in or threatening the area. It also includes the protection of the people within a hamlet from the VC infrastructure and bullies.

b. The principal RVNAF forces for territorial security are Popular Forces (PF) and Regional Forces (RF). ARVN battalions will be assigned to the territorial security force where the PF and the RF strengths are inadequate. The two parts to territorial security are:

(1) Security for areas undergoing RD; and

(2) Security for other important areas including previously pacified areas, LOC, resources and government centers.

19. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

a. Within the pacification process, RD is conducted in specified areas to focus priority government effort, to bring the people under GVN control and to provide them with a new life. In these RD areas, the GVN, through its RD cadre groups, establishes a channel of communications between the people and their government and, through their productive work, gains the support and loyalty of the people. RD transforms hamlets and villages into Real New Life Hamlets (Ap Doi Moi) where a new life will be developed for the people within a secure environment and where improved standards of living will prevail for all. Annex A lists RD hamlet definitions, criteria and objectives.

b. Security for RD, as stated above, is provided by territorial security forces. Security is maintained, ideally, in the following manner:

(1) Revolutionary Development Peoples Groups (RDPG), or hamlet self-defense forces, provide active and passive defense for the hamlet to include shelters, gathering of intelligence for military forces, warning to the population of attack and similar actions. When these forces are armed, they will provide for internal security of the

hamlet and may establish guard posts, listening posts and patrols, depending upon their capability and the situation.

(2) RF/PF conduct security operations in the immediate vicinity of the hamlets and villages, while ARVN forces primarily conduct security operations on the periphery of the campaign area.

(3) The National Police Field Force in coordination with the Special Police is responsible for collecting and processing information so as to track down and eliminate the VC Infrastructure. The National Police are also responsible for suppressing riots and disturbances among the people and supporting with police operations the pacification and revolutionary development programs. The National Police also have the capability of supporting RVNAF on search operations that involve the civil population.

c. The role of the civil and selected military elements is to initiate political, economic and social activities within hamlets and villages, to establish firm government control and to involve the people in these activities. This involvement is achieved through organized teams augmented and assisted by personnel from other GVN agencies, who work in hamlets of the selected villages.

20. PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS.

a. Because pacification is an integrated military and civil undertaking, joint planning and supervision must be exercised at all echelons. The GVN is organized to effect this joint planning and supervision as follows:

(1) RD councils composed of both military and civil representatives function at national through district level. At the national level, the Central RD Council develops policies and manages the overall program. Many civil activities are administered through the Ministry of Revolutionary Development to the provinces and the districts. The technical ministries' activities are administered directly to the province from the ministry. Military activities are administered through the Ministry of Defense and subordinate RVNAF echelons to province and district levels. Regional, provincial, DTA, and district RD councils review RD activities and ensure that the military and civil aspects are coordinated. More detailed discussion of RD councils will be found in Chapter 3.

(2) Detailed RD plans developed at province/sector level are reviewed by regional RD councils and approved by the Minister of Revolutionary Development. Approved province RD plans are implemented

at province and district level. Military support is provided by military forces operating either in direct support of sector and subsector or under the operational control of commanders of these areas as appropriate. The military plans will be designed to support the achievement of the goals as stated in established province RD plans.

(3) New detailed RD plans are developed and submitted for approval as previously undeveloped areas become available either because of military successes or changes in the security situation.

b. In the areas planned for pacification, RD campaigns will be organized at the province or district level or at the level of any appropriate military unit according to the degree of importance. RD campaigns are not organized in all areas chosen for the development of hamlets; however, if available forces can be put into use, campaigns can be organized in the areas operated by three or more RD cadre groups. The limits of the campaign encompass the RD area and the necessary contiguous territory to provide security for the RD area.

(1) Participation in the campaign is required for the ARVN units attached in support of the RD campaign. These may include the RF/PF, RD cadre groups, RDPG, personnel of regional military agencies and administrative and technical personnel belonging to the various civil services and offices in the province. National Police, including National Police Field Force (NPFF) may be furnished to carry out police functions during these operations.

(2) The province chief/sector commander will designate campaign commanders. The campaign commander will be responsible to the province chief/sector commander for direction of the RD campaign.

21. PROVINCE PACIFICATION.

a. In coordination with the province senior advisor, the province chief will prepare a Combined Province Pacification Plan which will include provisions for security for previously pacified areas, areas undergoing RD and areas in which other pacification activities are underway.

b. ARVN units employed in support of RD will operate normally under the operational control of province/sector. The authority that exercises control will designate a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) or tactical area of interest (TAOI) for the unit; this TAOR/TAOI must be approved by corps.

c. Psychological operations are directed at the people in the area as well as at the enemy. Whether the people be initially

friendly, uncommitted or hostile toward the government, the objective of PSYOPS--as of all RD--is to persuade the people to support the GVN. To this end, disciplined, well behaved troops showing a friendly, sincere interest in the people and a respect for individual rights and property will have the most favorable impact upon the local people. PSYOPS themes will include explanations of why troops are in the area and what RD can do for the people by their cooperating with the GVN. Against the enemy, the PSYOPS objective is to persuade the individual soldier to stop supporting the enemy cause and to rally to the GVN through the Chieu Hoi and Doan Ket programs. Hence, PSYOPS themes will stress the positive benefits of RD and sow doubt about the justice of an enemy cause that opposes RD.

d. Military civic action is conducted by all military elements in cooperation with province and district officials in such a manner as to ensure maximum credit to the GVN. The use of military management and technical skills is emphasized. Civic action programs of all US/FWMAF and RVNAF will be coordinated at province level with the province chief or his designated military commander.

CHAPTER 3

ORGANIZATION

Section I

GENERAL

22. This chapter discusses the many governmental agencies, military and civilian, Vietnamese and United States, which are participating in or supporting pacification. Although each major agency is discussed separately, it must be borne in mind continually that there is a complex interaction between all of these separate agencies at every level of the military or civil government. At some levels, military and civilian functions blend and the same individual is responsible for both. The primary task of the United States agencies in Vietnam is to advise, support and assist the GVN counterpart agencies. The US Mission Agency which has primary military and civilian responsibility for support of pacification is USMACV. It is necessary to keep the distinction between military and civil responsibilities in mind during the discussion that follows, as it will assist in determining who and what agency has primary responsibility for a given function and in what channels it operates.

Section II

GVN ORGANIZATION

23. GENERAL.

The government of Vietnam is in a transition stage at this time in that an elected constitutional structure has just come into being. The present government cannot be divided simply into "civil organization" and "military organization". The military government of Vietnam had by its very nature introduced military officers into every level of the government. Many of them occupied then, and will occupy in the future, governmental positions concerned only with civilian functions. Others now occupy positions concerned only with military functions. However, there remain many whose job assignments combine military and civilian functions in a single office. This is not only a characteristic of the present government but is a foreseeable long term trend, as many of the most able and experienced Vietnamese administrators are in uniform. It is important to understand the distinction between the purely military line officer and the officer whose responsibilities include both military and civilian functions, as the actual responsibility may vary considerably from apparent rank.

24. CIVILIAN FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION:

a. Presently, the top echelon of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is essentially civilian in character, although military or former military personnel presently occupy some of the top-ranking and policy-making positions. Currently, this echelon consists of the President, Vice President, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Revolutionary Development. Below the top echelon, the majority of the governmental employees are civilian. Elections recently completed in September and October 1967, represented final steps toward constitutional government which had its beginning in September 1966. During that month the newly elected Constituent Assembly was convened.

b. The Constituent Assembly set about drafting a constitution which was unanimously approved in March 1967. The form of government ordained in the constitution is a modified presidential system. The constitution calls for a President as Chief of State who will designate a Prime Minister and a Cabinet to implement the government's policies and manage the affairs of the nation. It also provides for a two chamber legislature known as the National Assembly.

c. An independent judiciary is established with the highest legal authority vested in the Supreme Court. An Inspectorate is provided for by appointment. This body of representatives has the duty of guarding against corruption and other acts harmful to the national interest at all levels of government and in public and private agencies.

d. Revolutionary development councils composed of both military and civil representatives function at national through district level. At the national level, the Central RD Council (CRDC) develops policies and manages the overall program. Its organization is shown at Figure 3-1. Many civil activities are administered initially by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development to provinces and districts until they are taken over by the appropriate technical ministry. The activities of technical ministries are administered directly to the province from the ministry. Military activities are administered by the Ministry of Defense through subordinate RVNAF echelons to province and district levels. Regional, provincial, DTA, and district RD councils review RD activities and ensure that the military and civil aspects are coordinated. The CRDC has the following specific duties:

(1) To determine the basic RD policy.

(2) To examine and approve all RD plans and programs.

e. The CRDC has a Permanent Bureau. The chief is the Secretary General of the CRDC who is also the Minister of RD. The

CENTRAL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL




Figure 3-1

permanent bureau which is, for all practical purposes, the Ministry of RD, acts as an executive agency for the CRDC, and as such, executes all decisions made by the CRDC and coordinates with all ministries to assure smooth operation. Regional, provincial, DTA, and district RD councils also have permanent bureaus which function in much the same way. See Figure 3-2.

f. The corps commander has civil as well as military responsibilities, is responsible for governmental functions within a region, and is concurrently the GVN regional representative. The region boundaries correspond to the military corps boundaries known as Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). The corps commander is assisted in his civil functions by a Deputy for Civilian and Territorial Affairs, and by regional deputies from the ministries in Saigon.


g. The commander of the Division Tactical Area (DTA) has limited responsibilities pertaining to civilian governmental functions. His role is discussed more fully in paragraph 38.

h. The province chief is the "key" man for success of the pacification program. He is responsible for developing a province pacification plan containing a detailed RD plan. Further, he is responsible for the control of all civil and military resources to be applied in support of pacification. Each technical ministry has a service representative in each province, but the province chief is, as an individual, responsible for all government functions within his province. The province chiefs are supervised through Region/CTZ for some functions, directly by Region/CTZ for other functions, and directly from the central government for others. The technical ministries give guidance directly to the service chiefs. This gives rise, on occasion, to policy conflicts which must be resolved by the province chief or higher authority.

i. The main operational element for the civil aspects of RD is the RD cadre group which is composed of 59 RD cadre (Fig 3-3). As soon as the required degree of military security is established, the RD cadre groups are introduced into the hamlet and begin the task of organization and development. The RD cadre group consists of three main elements:

- (1) Staff (7 men) responsible for:
 - (a) Command and Control.
 - (b) Coordination.
 - (c) Reporting.

GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS




(*Figure on Div Bureaus includes CMD and 24th Special Tactical Zone (Rung Sat Special Zone has no RD council). Permanent Bureaus are authorized for 124 districts and three autonomous cities where priority revolutionary development activities are taking place.)

(**The JGS has requested RVNAF Force Structure spaces for these billets. MACV J3 has stated that the spaces should be filled by civilians.)

Figure 3-2

THE 59-MAN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE GROUP

Figure 3-3



(2) Reconstruction Inter-Team (18 men) responsible for:

(a) Studying and improving the political, cultural, social and economic situation.

(b) Determining the aspirations of the people.

(c) Planning self-help projects.

(d) Motivating and assisting the people to build their own hamlet.

(3) Militia Inter-Team (34 men) responsible for:

(a) Making security plans to protect the RD cadre and the hamlet inhabitants.

(b) Coordinating with the Census Grievance unit of the reconstruction inter-team to discover and eliminate the VC infrastructure.

(c) Organizing and training the Revolutionary Development Peoples Groups (RDPG) as self-defense forces.

j. The basic RD cadre group may be augmented by technical cadre from any GVN ministry in order to give proper emphasis or additional assistance in developmental areas outside the competence of the RD cadre group. For example, textile, fisheries, lumber products, ceramic products; these and other special problems might require specialized cadre skills applicable only in a limited geographical area and/or for a limited period of time. The province chief in these cases may request technical augmentation of his RD cadre group from the appropriate ministry in Saigon.

k. The RD cadre group operates under the operational control of the province chief, principally within the hamlets, to establish initial government administration, organize the people for self-defense, and initiate simple economic and social development projects to win the confidence and loyalty of the people. A Provincial Revolutionary Development Cadre Group (Fig 3-4) provides the province chief with a planning and control group to assist him in the execution of his responsibilities.

25. NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE ORGANIZATION.

a. The National Police Field Force (NPFF) is a component of the GVN National Police. It consists of lightly armed tactical elements, whose major function is, in collaboration with the Special

PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE GROUP




Figure 3-4

Police Branch, to eliminate the VC infrastructure in the district, village, and hamlet. Once this task is discharged, the NPFF has the primary responsibility of preventing VC resurgence and the ultimate mission of safeguarding the extension of other National Police presence into the rural area. The NPFF operates within the direct line of National Police command and supports other local police elements. The basic NPFF operating unit is the company.

b. Command of the NPFF is exercised by Commander, NPFF, who is an Assistant Director General of NPFF. Necessary staff is provided by the Directorate General of National Police.

c. Every member of the NPFF is fully trained as a policeman and is further trained in the counterinsurgency aspects of military operations. The internal administration, logistical support, and disciplinary functions of the NPFF are designed to support tactical operations as well as to carry out their primary mission of VC infrastructure eradication in collaboration with the Special Police Branch.

d. Extending the supervisory and reporting capability of Headquarters NPFF in Saigon, the Commander, NPFF, is represented at the headquarters of regions and provinces by officers of NPFF attached to the offices of the Regional Chief of Police and Province Chief of Police respectively. The duty of these officers is to ensure continuous and adequate logistic and administrative support from Headquarters NPFF; to keep Commander, NPFF continuously informed on all aspects of the status of his companies; and to ensure a proper working relationship between NPFF company commanders and the province/district administration. In particular, they ensure that the NPFF field elements are used only for those purposes for which they have been provided; i. e., VC infrastructure eradication and necessary field operations at the village level. NPFF are not responsible for providing the personal security of province or district chiefs; their equipment is not to be diverted to non-NPFF elements; nor should they be used as scouts for ARVN/RF/PF tactical operations.

e. It is the prerogative of the province chief to decide which districts will employ NPFF as part of his province plan. He may decide that:

(1) The local security has so deteriorated that NPFF will be withdrawn because they cannot handle the local situation.

(2) The local security has so improved that NPFF operations will pass to the uniformed National Police.

f. It is the responsibility of the Province Chief of Police to ensure that the police administrative and intelligence machinery

cooperate and coordinate with all other government agencies (particularly the armed forces).

g. It is the task of the NPFF representative at Province Headquarters to ensure that the NPFF companies are operationally effective.

h. Relationships - District Chief/District Chief of Police/NPFF Company Commander.

(1) The district chief will decide in which villages of his district the NPFF platoons will be deployed. Subsequent redeployment will reduce the operational effectiveness of the NPFF, depending on the intelligence posture, familiarity with the area, and the degree of rapport established with the local population.

i. Relationship - Village Chief/NPFF Platoon Commander. The NPFF Platoon Commander will work in close and cordial association with the village chief of the village to which his platoon is assigned. However, the village chief has no authority over the Platoon; and the Platoon Commander has no authority over the Village Chief. The relationship of NPFF is collaboration with the village and hamlet authorities.

j. Organization:

(1) The basic NPFF unit is the company.

(2) Normal deployment calls for one company to each "task district" (a district selected by the province chief for NPFF operations). A task district will contain several "task villages", which have been selected by the District Chief for NPFF operations.

(3) The company is a flexible sized unit. The number of platoons will vary with the number of task villages in the district.

(4) The allocation of companies to a province will vary with the number of task districts in the province.

(5) Weapons. Although there is a nationally established TOE, allocation of weapons within a platoon is at the discretion of platoon leader who may decide to group all shotguns, or all BARs or all rifles, or any combination appropriate to his task. Similarly, unless otherwise directed, the squad leader may group his weapons.

(6) Vehicles. The allocation of vehicles provides for

one truck, 1/4 ton (Jeep) per platoon and one for company headquarters. In addition, the company headquarters is authorized two trucks, 1 1/2 ton.

k. The Public Safety Division, MACCORDS, is responsible for providing advisors to the NPFF as well as programming the support provided to the NPFF by the United States.

26. MILITARY FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION.

a. The Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (JGS/RVNAF) is the senior Vietnamese military headquarters in Vietnam. The Deputy Chief of the JGS, RVNAF assists the Chief of JGS in all matters pertaining to RVNAF and directs RVNAF's support of RD and Pacification programs. The Deputy is also the commander and responsible to the Chief for all matters pertaining to RF and PF affairs.

b. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) includes the regular Army (ARVN), Air Force (VNAF), Navy (VNN), Marine Corps (VNNMC) and the Regional Force and the Popular Force (RF/PF). The basic missions of VNAF and VNN are to provide support to ARVN. The battalions of the VNNMC, along with ARVN airborne battalions, normally in general reserve, will be allocated to the operational control of a corps commander for specific operations. Normally, RF units are under the command of the province chief/sector commander and PF platoons are under the command of the district chief/subsector commander. The military command echelon below the JGS/RVNAF is the corps.

c. In his military role, the corps commander is responsible for all military operations within his assigned area of responsibility.

d. ARVN.

(1) The general mission of the ARVN, at corps level and below, is to plan and execute military operations in support of the joint military effort, and to support the RF/PF and civil pacification effort at province level.

(2) Below corps level, ARVN is organized along conventional US lines into divisions, regiments and battalions (Figure 3-5). Divisions are assigned military responsibility for division tactical areas (DTA). Subordinate elements of the division may be assigned tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) for providing military support of pacification. The boundaries between DTAs and the designation of TAORs are normally based on the provincial political boundaries.

(3) Division, regimental and battalion headquarters are dispersed within the DTA, sited in the large towns and cities. Although

ORGANIZATION OF THE RVNAF




Figure 3-5

physically located within provinces and districts, ARVN tactical units remain within the ARVN chain of command unless higher authority has directed otherwise. Therefore, the normal relationship between commanders of ARVN units and the province/district chief is mutual liaison and coordination. However, when assigned to provide territorial security for pacification, ARVN units normally will be placed under the operational control of the sector commander who may also be the province chief.

e. Regional Force/Popular Force.


(1) An RVNAF reorganization study recently completed and approved by both MACV and JGS/RVNAF calls for modification of the RVNAF organizational structure. Charts in this handbook dealing with RF/PF reflect the current organization and, in so far as possible, the pending changes as known at the time of publication.

(2) The mission of Popular Force (PF) platoons operating in a contiguous belt or zone outside the hamlet or village is to conduct night saturation patrols and to establish and maintain outposts, thus providing local security for RD. The Popular Forces organize civic groups to participate in local security in rural areas, support the Pacification Program and assist in the protection of vital highways and key installations when Regional Forces (RF) are not available. The RF company operating throughout another belt contiguous to that of the PF, but more distant from the hamlet or village, has a similar mission of providing local security to RD. Regional Forces will also protect villages, hamlets, population resources, communications systems and other fixed installations when Popular Forces are not available.

(3) The Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) is the military organization specifically established for assignment to the command of the sector and subsector commanders. Although RF/PF is within the RVNAF command structure, its function more nearly approximates that of militia rather than that of regular forces (Fig 3-6). It can be seen from the subparagraph above that its mission is more locally oriented than the mission of ARVN. Its organization and equipment is considerably lighter than that of a corresponding ARVN organization, consequently its combat firepower and effectiveness are not comparable to an equivalent ARVN organization. In spite of these limitations, the RF/PF has consistently demonstrated its capability in the field. RF/PF collectively constitute approximately one-half of the manpower in the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(4) As the general rule, the Regional Force is province oriented while the Popular Force is district oriented. This does not, however, preclude inter-district or inter-provincial combat operations or limited duty station transfers for RF personnel. A typical provincial organization is shown at Figure 3-7. The number of RF companies will vary from province to province, depending upon size, population and priority of the province. The same applies to the number of PF platoons assigned to a district.

RF/PF ORGANIZATION



- NOTE: (1) Upon reorganization of RVNAF in CY68, the corps commander deals directly with the province chief on matters of RD.
 (2) No responsibility for supervision of RF/PF administration, training or logistics beginning in the first half of CY68.
 (3) To be deleted in the first half of CY68.

RF/PF ORGANIZATION WITHIN A PROVINCE/SECTOR




Figure 3-7

(5) PF platoons usually are assigned as village or hamlet security forces. They also are used for Line of Communications (LOC) and bridge security, for maintaining outposts, intelligence and security patrols, and night and day ambushes. Generally, the PF is assigned to the command of the subsector commander, but is supported logistically by the province Administrative and Direct Support Logistical Company (A&DSL CO).

(6) RF units are assigned to the sector commander. He may retain operational control or may place them under the operational control of the subsector commander. The sector commander may employ multi-company formations and conduct combat operations over a relatively long period of time. In some cases the sector commander will employ one or two RF companies as a province reaction force. In addition, the RF is used normally for the defense of the more critical outposts and forward operating bases within the sector. RF battalions, while subordinate to the sector commanders, are assigned special missions by the corps.

f. Paramilitary Forces. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces are paramilitary forces under Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) command. The LLDB are advised and supported by the US Army Special Forces (USASF). Since many of the missions, tasks and operations of these forces are classified, a discussion of the CIDG program in this handbook is not possible. The reader may refer to Annex K (Employment of CIDG) to the Combined Campaign Plan 1968, AB 143, for a more detailed discussion of CIDG forces and their employment.

Section III

US ORGANIZATION

27. GENERAL.

a. The Ambassador of the United States is the personal representative of the President of the United States to the Government of South Vietnam. He is the senior member of the US Mission, and is responsible for the conduct of all United States Governmental activities in Vietnam.

b. The Embassy, Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA), and US Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (USMACV) are the United States Government Agencies presently in Vietnam. Collectively, they comprise the US Mission which is identified as the US Country Team.

c. The Embassy provides facilities and staff to support the Ambassador and is responsible for all exchanges between the US Government and the RVN at the national level.

d. JUSPAO is organized to meet the specific public affairs requirements imposed by United States interests in Vietnam.

e. USAID is responsible for assisting and advising on the development of the civilian economy. It provides advice and support over the entire spectrum of nonmilitary assistance in Vietnam.

f. USMACV is charged with the dual responsibility for providing military assistance support to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and, as a subordinate unified command under the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), for the command of US military forces committed to assist the RVN. By agreement, COMUSMACV coordinates the activities of the military forces contributed by other Free World Nations in support of the RVN.

g. The top coordinating body is the US Mission Council. The council is also the senior advisory body to the Ambassador. The senior officer or senior member of each US agency is a member of the Mission Council.

28. CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS) STAFF ELEMENT ORGANIZATION.

a. The Commander, USMACV (COMUSMACV) has the responsibility to provide single manager direction of all US civil/military pacification activities in the RVN. The Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) is responsible to COMUSMACV for discharging these duties. Specifically, he is charged by COMUSMACV with supervising the formulation and execution of all policies and programs, military and civilian, which support the RVN's pacification program.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, is assigned the following responsibilities:

(1) Advise COMUSMACV, MACV staff elements, and all US civilian agencies on all aspects of US civil/military support for the RVN pacification program.

(2) Develop joint and combined plans, policies, concepts, and programs concerning US civil/military support for pacification, in conjunction with RVN authorities.

(3) Supervise the execution of plans and programs for US civil/military support of pacification.

(4) Provide advice and assistance to the RVN, including the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD), RVNAF, Joint General Staff (JGS), and other RVN agencies on US civil/military support for pacification including US advisory and logistical support.

(5) Develop requirements for military and civil assets (US and RVN) to support pacification.

(6) Serve as the contact point for sponsoring agencies for RD programs. Maintain liaison with supporting agencies in representing their interest in civil non-RD programs and activities in the field. Maintain direct operational communications with field elements for these programs.

(7) Be responsible for program coordination with the various US mission civil agencies in the planning and implementing of community development and nation building activities.

(8) Provide a MACV focal point for economic warfare including population and resources control and for civic action by US forces.

(9) Evaluate all civil/military pacification activities including the provision of territorial security for pacification by US/FWMAF/RVN military forces and report on the progress, status, and problems of pacification support.


(10) Act on all pacification support policy matters pertaining to subordinate echelons.

(11) Direct advisory relationships with the RVN on pacification matters.

(12) Exercise overall staff monitorship, in conjunction with the other HQ MACV staff agencies in their areas of primary staff interest, for the RF/PF Advisory Group in all matters related to the pacification effort.

c. Region/CTZ: The staff element organization for CORDS conforms generally to Figure 3-8 allowing for differences in the situation in the various regions or Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ), provinces, and districts.

REGION / CTZ CORDS ORGANIZATION



- X-X-X** Coordination--Military and CORDS matters.
- XXXX** Operational Control when unit assigned on RD direct support mission.

Figure 3-8

(1) The Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support to the Force Commander/Senior Advisor (SA) in all the corps is a civilian. He is charged with supervising the formulation and execution of all military and civil plans, policies, and programs which support the RVN's pacification program including civic action performed by US units.

(2) The Deputy Senior Advisor (DSA) assists the Deputy for CORDS in all matters relating to RVNAF military support for pacification.

(3) The Assistant Deputy for CORDS at region/CTZ level is a civilian. He heads an integrated civil/military staff which parallels the MACCORDS organization. He also directs headquarters based RD-related and non-RD technical programs.

d. Province.

(1) An integrated military/civilian advisory team is assigned to each province.

(2) The province senior advisor is the province team chief. He may be military or civilian. The province senior advisor is chosen by the Force Commander/Senior Advisor and his deputy for CORDS, with the concurrence of the Deputy COMUSMACV of CORDS. If the province senior advisor is military, the deputy province senior advisor must be civilian and vice versa.

(3) The province senior advisor receives operational direction from the Deputy for CORDS to the Force Commander/Senior Advisor. Province teams receive military administrative and logistical support from the ARVN division advisory teams.

(4) Where ARVN units are in direct support of pacification in a province, advisors to these units will be under the operational control of the province senior advisor.

(5) The province senior advisor serves as principal advisor to the province chief. However, technical advice will be given to the province chief or his representative by the most qualified member of the province team. The province senior advisor must be made aware of the advice given and will establish policies to which this advice will conform.

e. District.

(1) The district advisory team is an integrated military/civilian team.

(2) The district team advises the district chief on military/civil matters and implements all US military/civil support programs within the district.

(3) The district senior advisor is the district team chief. He is selected by the province senior advisor with the concurrence of the Deputy for CORDS to the Force Commander/SA. The district senior advisor and the deputy senior advisor may be either military or civilian. If one is military, the other must be civilian if there is a civilian representative present at district level.

29. US MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

a. USMACV is the US mission agency charged with the responsibility for military support of pacification. By exercising its influence through advisory channels, MACV guides and advises ARVN in the execution of that part of its mission related to the military support of pacification. By virtue of its operational command authority over US military components and operational control over Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), MACV assigns missions to its subordinate commanders which contribute to or directly support the pacification effort.

b. US Military Advisory Organization:

(1) US advisory detachments are provided to the RVNAF regular forces down to battalion or equivalent level (Fig 3-9). The advisory chain of command parallels the RVNAF chain of command. The organization of the US advisory detachment also provides for an independent communication capability which parallels that of ARVN, extending from USMACV through corps, division and regiment to battalion.


(2) The US Force Commander in I, II and III CTZ also functions as the Senior Advisor. This dual responsibility of the CG, III MAF, CG, I FFORCEV and CG, II FFORCEV allows effective coordination between RVNAF and US/FWMAF units conducting combat operations in support of pacification. IV Corps, which does not have a corresponding US tactical commander, has only a Senior Advisor and advisory detachment.

(3) Within each corps the senior advisor at each echelon is responsible for the US military advisory effort in the geographical area encompassed by his counterpart commander. The province senior advisor is supervised by the corps senior advisor of the corps in which the province is located.

c. US/FWMAF:

(1) COMUSMACV exercises operational command through the

ARVN/US ADVISOR ORGANIZATION



* CG, III MAF is I Corps SA
 CG, I FFORCEV is II Corps SA
 CG, II FFORCEV is III Corps SA
 SA, IV Corps is IV Corps SA

————— Command
 - - - - - Advice

Figure 3-9

service component commanders over all US forces in the RVN. The FWMAF maintain their national identity, but by agreement are under the operational control of COMUSMACV.

(2) The primary responsibility of US/FWMAF is the destruction of VC/NVA main force units and neutralization of VC/NVA base areas. US/FWMAF will also conduct military operations in support of RD within assigned Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) and in the vicinity of US/FWMAF base areas.

CHAPTER 4

US AND VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIPS AND COORDINATION

Section I

GENERAL

30. Achievement of GVN/US objectives in the Republic of Vietnam requires the full utilization of all available civilian and military resources and complete continuing coordination between all agencies at all levels. The following procedures have been directed by the Ambassador and COMUSMACV and agreed to by GVN officials.

a. The primary channel of communications and liaison between US tactical commanders and US civilian agencies or GVN officials at the province level will be through the MACV province senior advisor.

b. US/FWMAF tactical units will establish liaison with the MACV province senior advisor during operations within the province to ensure coordination of military operations and military civic action with provincial plans and operations.

c. The senior US tactical commander and MACV senior advisors will hold periodic meetings to ensure complete and continuing coordination of all military and civilian activities.

31. Chapter 3 discussed the major civil and military organizations, US and GVN, which have responsibility to support pacification. This chapter will discuss the interrelationship between these various agencies at Province, DTA and CTZ levels.

Section II

PROVINCIAL LEVEL

32. One of the principal indicators of success of GVN/US strategy in the Republic of Vietnam is the results achieved by the pacification program. The key individual in the planning and execution of the pacification program at the province level is the province chief who is responsible for preparing the province pacification plan. After the plan has been reviewed and approved at CTZ level, the province chief is responsible for its detailed execution.

33. The province pacification plan is a single plan incorporating all aspects of pacification, including territorial security for RD campaigns, territorial security for previously pacified areas, hamlet security, the RD plan to include RD campaign plans, other activities

associated with RD, and other community development activities. The plan lists the budgetary and commodity support required for RD and establishes time phased objectives and goals. After the plans are approved, the monetary and commodity resources are furnished directly to the province chief from the national level in accordance with the established time frame. Military resources required in excess of available RF/PF are provided by the appropriate DTA Commander.

34. An RD campaign is a device for control, coordination and integration of military, RD cadre groups, and administrative elements in support of RD in province priority RD areas. In those areas, an RD campaign must be organized where three or more RD cadre groups operate. The limits of the campaign will encompass the RD area and the necessary territory to provide security for the RD area.

35. The province pacification plans are of major importance to both GVN and US agencies as they directly affect budgeting, procurement, and military planning. For this reason, advisory effort is as essential during the planning phase as during the execution of RD. The preparation of realistic plans requires the closest coordination between the advisory agencies and the province chief. Additionally, the province level advisory detachments must coordinate with the district advisory level and the DTA or CTZ advisory level as appropriate. Advisory relationships are illustrated in Figure 4-1. (It should be noted that the Region/CTZ and Province/Sector levels are separated to illustrate separate chains of direction, command and advice for both civil and military functioning.)

36. At the province level, there are three major limiting factors to the rate of progress of pacification. These are: (1) availability of military resources; (2) availability of financial and material resources; (3) availability of RD cadre groups.

a. Military resources are essential to the establishment of the secure environment in which pacification can proceed. The MACV province advisor has full responsibility for providing assistance and advice. During the planning phase, he is concerned with the feasibility of the plan, the impact of the plan on assigned and programmed forces and the availability of forces from DTA to support the plan. He assists in the preparation of the security plan. During execution, he provides advice on the employment of forces to achieve the objectives of the plan.

b. Responsibility for furnishing the financial and material resources rests with the various ministries in Saigon. Allocation is made directly to the province chief concerned. Many factors may

US ADVISORY ORGANIZATION




Figure 4-1

contribute to delays in obtaining these resources; slippages in shipment and handling, delays in procurement, in-country transportation delays and administrative delays. US assistance in resolving these difficulties is furnished by the province advisory team.

c. RD cadre are recruited at the local level, trained at the RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau and upon return to the province are organized into RD cadre groups. The approved province pacification plan is the basis for allocation of RD cadre groups to be organized in each province. In addition to RD cadre groups, the province chief may form Civil-Military RD teams from local resources. These teams are similar to the RD cadre group, however, they do not receive the same training. Consequently, they may be employed only in hamlets other than Ap Doi Moi undergoing RD. If the province chief needs US assistance to resolve difficulties encountered, he may request aid from the province senior advisor.

37. During execution of the plan, constant coordination is required between the GVN officials and the MACV advisors in order that a full interchange of information be achieved. Adjustments of schedules must be made in response to day to day developments in the province. RD is a step by step process, necessarily geared to achieving certain criteria or achievement at one stage, step, or area before going to the next; therefore, the flow of material must be adjusted to the actual need and expenditures; military operations must be planned and executed so as to exploit progress previously achieved. Premature commitment of resources probably may fail to achieve the desired result and therefore, will be wasteful. Military civic actions in particular must be coordinated with the provincial plan in order to ensure that they contribute to the overall program. US commanders will coordinate their civic action program through the province/district advisors.

Section III

DTA LEVEL

38. The DTA commander is responsible for providing military support for pacification. During the planning phase, the DTA commander should assist in the development of the province pacification plan prior to its submission to the CTZ commander for approval. By assisting in preparation of the pacification plan the DTA commander can determine if he can provide the required degree of military support. The MACV division senior advisor has the responsibility of advising and assisting the DTA commander during the planning and execution phases. A continuous interchange of information must be maintained between the DTA and province advisors.

39. It must be kept in mind during the planning phase that all material, financial and civil personnel resources required to support the plan will be geared to the planned rate of military progress. Due to the lead times for many of these resources, subsequent reprogramming is difficult and tends to become less responsive to changing situations than is desirable. Therefore, the review of the province plans must be characterized by a realistic assessment of the total impact on ARVN resources, the expected length of time that forces will be committed, and the anticipated VC/NVA reaction. Overly optimistic estimates during the review may result in subsequent over-commitment of ARVN forces during execution to the point where the DTA commanders lose the degree of flexibility necessary to respond to changing situations. Conversely, overly pessimistic reviews will result in military resources being available but not contributing to progress in pacification. During execution, the progress of pacification must be monitored continuously in order to detect as early as possible any significant deviations from the plan which will require modifications or adjustments in the program.

40. The commander always should retain sufficient flexibility to exploit unexpected successes or to reinforce areas where the program may require additional forces to remain on schedule. The DTA commander should avoid committing his total force, thereby losing his flexibility. Unless reinforced, he has no recourse but to reallocate his available forces within the DTA, thus increasing security forces at one point only at the cost of reduction at another. Once pacification programs are initiated in any given area, continuation of security is vital in gaining the support of the people.

41. The division senior advisors, as far as US agencies representatives are concerned, are in the most advantageous position to detect impending military over-commitments. To prevent military over-commitment, the division senior advisor must be prepared to recommend alternate courses of action such as reprogramming, reinforcement from corps or general reserve forces or realignment of missions. Such recommendations must be the product of close coordination between the US agencies involved in order to preclude diverse and conflicting advice at each level.

Section IV

CTZ LEVEL

42. US/FWMAF have a primary mission of destruction of the VC/NVA main force units and secondarily that of providing military security within their respective TAORs. The primary US/FWMAF mission in itself

supports and complements ARVN in their primary mission. The major threat to progress inside a selected RD area will be the VC/NVA main force units outside the area who may seek to penetrate and disrupt GVN efforts. Accomplishment of the US/FWMAF mission by destroying this threat directly benefits the progress of pacification.

43. Conversely, the planned employment of ARVN in extending territorial security for pacification will have a long-range effect on probable areas of US/FWMAF operations. As GVN influence is extended and as ARVN causes the eviction of significant VC/NVA main force units, probable areas for US/FWMAF operations will become more clearly defined.

44. During clearing operations for a new area, US/FWMAF operations may support directly or reinforce those of ARVN.

a. Combined ARVN/US/FWMAF operations may be the most desirable initial step in a heavily contested area, taking maximum advantage of the massive initial forces available to locate and destroy VC/NVA main force units. When the enemy threat has been reduced to manageable proportions, the US/FWMAF may be withdrawn for employment elsewhere while ARVN continues with their primary mission.

b. US/FWMAF may be tasked to provide contingency reserve forces in the event ARVN commanders become over-committed during clearing operations. Such assignment normally will be of limited duration, only until the ARVN commander reconstitutes a reserve force or additional forces are deployed from general reserve.

c. US/FWMAF may be required temporarily to assume responsibility for providing territorial security for pacification. A situation which may require this commitment would be one where VC/NVA forces are making a determined offensive to destroy RD progress in the area. ARVN forces may, under such conditions, become depleted by combat and partially ineffective. Under these circumstances, US/FWMAF may be committed temporarily pending the reorganization of ARVN capabilities. As the commitment of US/FWMAF in such a role tends to compromise their primary mission, it will be done only on order of COMUSMACV or as part of the approved plan developed by a senior field commander.

45. The above factors indicate the requirement for the close and continuous coordination and exchange of current information that must be accomplished between the ARVN corps headquarters and the US tactical command. ARVN plans for the support of pacification and its progress in providing this support is of vital concern to US/FWMAF, just as the results of US/FWMAF operations are of vital concern to ARVN commanders.

46. In addition to ensuring coordination between ARVN and US/FWMAF, the force commander/senior advisor is responsible for providing advice and assistance to the ARVN corps commander in the execution of his primary mission. The Deputy for CORDS will be in close and continuous contact with the various aspects of pacification.

Section V

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

47. Area Security Coordinating Center (ASCC). An ASCC is an ad hoc group which may be employed at province and/or district level for the purpose of coordinating military and civic action activities at the appropriate level among participating elements, formed from resources available to the participating forces and agencies.

a. The ASCC has a coordinating rather than a command function. In a joint operation at district level, for example, the district chief, and the US/ARVN battalion commanders would be the key participants and the decision makers. They will be assisted by the district senior advisor.

b. Three of the major functions of an ASCC are to:

(1) Plan and coordinate military and civil operations in the area of operations.

(2) Direct the support afforded to the RD cadre groups and coordinate military civic actions.

(3) Coordinate and exploit the activities of the Combined Intelligence Center.

c. Normally, the US/ARVN battalion commanders provide direct support to the district chief but retain command of their units during military and civic action operations. If present, the US battalion commander, who is normally the highest ranking military representative, will make every effort to ensure all parties work as a team. In so doing, he would set the example by his attitude and actions. Success of the concept of the ASCC depends on the smooth, harmonious relationship established among its members.

d. The district chief will be consulted on civic action projects in order to support his RD plan and ensure maximum utilization of these resources. The military commanders will endeavor to support his desires to the best of their ability.

48. Combined Intelligence Center (CIC). The CIC is an agency set up to collect and process tactical intelligence at the lowest level to facilitate swift combat reaction. Conceptually, it is designed to take advantage of the inputs from all possible intelligence gathering agencies. In addition, every effort is made to obtain the up-to-the-minute information necessary to penetrate the enemy infrastructure. Experience has shown that any wasted motion will permit the enemy to evade contact and escape. Close cooperation and energetic follow-up by all agencies concerned are the keys to success. Intelligence gathered by use of interrogation centers and document exploitation along with clandestine operations form the basis for an outstanding operational capability.

49. District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). In selected districts where they are now operating or are to be established combined GVN/US DIOCC's will be operated for the purpose of achieving rapid evaluation and dissemination of infrastructure intelligence and for the purpose of planning quick reaction operations targeted on disrupting, harassing, capturing, and eliminating local VC infrastructure. The US senior province advisor is charged with advising the GVN on establishing DIOCC's and assisting in their efficient functioning.

50. RD Campaign Headquarters. In those provinces where an RD campaign has been planned, a campaign headquarters will be set up by a designated campaign commander and will include representatives from the forces and agencies participating in the campaign. The province chief is responsible for assigning adequate personnel (military, administrative, and technical) to the campaign headquarters so that the campaign commander can coordinate the military, civil affairs, and RD activities within the framework of the campaign.

CHAPTER 5

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Section I

GENERAL

51. In Chapter 2, Section II, the concepts and objectives of pacification were discussed. The overall strategic concept includes these separate but mutually supporting tasks:

a. Military Offensive. US/FWMAF have been assigned primary responsibility for conducting the military offensive to defeat the VC/NVA main force units. RVNAF participates in this task when possible in conjunction with their primary task of military support of pacification. It should be noted that in IV CTZ, RVNAF currently has the primary task for the military offensive as well as the support of pacification.

b. Revolutionary Development. RVNAF and GVN civil elements conduct this task with RVNAF having the primary responsibility for providing territorial security for RD. US/FWMAF is assigned this responsibility when directed by COMUSMACV. This task is conducted in three phases which are clearing, securing, and developing.

c. Nation Building. Government of Vietnam civil elements conduct this task with assistance of US/FW civil agencies to complete the development of a nation-wide political, economic and social institutions necessary for a viable, free noncommunist Republic of Vietnam.

52. This chapter will present certain of the tactics and techniques applicable to operations of the military offensive and those in support of pacification when US/FWMAF/RVNAF are supporting a GVN/US civil effort. In all cases, military operations should be so conducted as to be integrated fully with civil pacification objectives.

Section II

TACTICS

53. US/ARVN doctrine and tactics are being reviewed continuously to determine their adequacy and effectiveness in the combat environment of Vietnam. This continual review has proved that combat doctrine as published and taught in US service schools is valid for application in Vietnam. The "Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam", April 1967, is a valuable source of tactical guidance in concentrated form to augment the standard doctrinal sources. Additionally, "Combat Tips" and

"Lessons Learned" are published by the various headquarters from time to time to update doctrine and to disseminate information on successful combat tactics and techniques. This body of doctrine is valid for and applicable to the conduct of the military offensive and military operations in support of pacification. In actuality, military support of pacification is a unit mission, not a special and identifiable military maneuver. In order to accomplish this mission, units will employ standard tactics and techniques adapted as necessary to meet the requirements of terrain, enemy forces, and rules of engagement.

54. In the initial phase of pacification, offensive operations are conducted to clear the area. By definition, an area is cleared when organized VC/NVA main force and guerrilla units have been destroyed or evicted. During this phase, the clearing forces normally will operate in company and battalion size operations, although regiment or division size operations may be required initially, depending on VC/NVA capabilities and probable reaction. Later, when the VC/NVA cannot operate in large formations, the clearing force will be able to operate correspondingly in smaller formations covering larger areas. Saturation patrolling, day and night operations, and search and destroy operations will be conducted to locate, engage, and destroy remaining main force and local guerrilla units. Psychological operations will be conducted in support of these activities with emphasis on persuading the VC/NVA military and civil cadres to defect from the VC/NVA cause and rally to the GVN. In coordination with province officials, short term, high impact civic action projects are accomplished. The area will be outposted to give surveillance and early warning of enemy movements. Larger scale operations will move outward to the perimeter of the area undergoing clearing and/or in adjacent areas, in order to prevent the VC/NVA from reentering. During clearing, military operations will be oriented on the enemy within a designated area.

55. In securing an area, continued emphasis is placed on small unit operations (company and platoon), outposting, day and night ambushes, and security missions. Military operations are oriented on providing area security, but are characterized by aggressive offensive operations throughout the area. Psychological operations, particularly in civic actions, are intensified. Securing continues until the VC capability is reduced to individual terrorist activities.

Section III

TECHNIQUES

56. GENERAL. A number of techniques have evolved as US and RVNAF forces have worked together in coordinated military operations. The techniques described here in no way describe the limits of this type of operation. Imagination and adaptability to local circumstances

are the only limits to the development of other similar techniques.

57. PATROLLING. Saturation patrolling previously has been identified as one of the principle tactics of clearing and securing operations. US forces have developed several variations of this tactic, variously identified as SATURATION PATROLLING, RECONDO, CHECKERBOARD, and HUNTER KILLER. All have basic similarities, the minor variations primarily being adaptations to the existing state of training, terrain, enemy, and resources availability (primarily helicopters).

a. SATURATION PATROLLING as a Technique for Finding and Fixing the Enemy. SATURATION PATROLLING is the most expeditious and effective means of finding and fixing the enemy in a specified area of operations (AO).

(1) To implement this technique an infantry battalion base of operations, with supporting artillery and an appropriate security/reaction force, is centrally located in an AO. Rifle companies may occupy different bases of operations, from which platoon and squad patrols are dispatched. The positioning of the 4.2 inch mortar platoon in a company base of operations increases the patrol range while remaining within range of indirect fire support. Platoons and squads may be airlifted into landing zones several thousand meters from the company or battalion base of operations to search assigned areas generally leading back to either a base area or a predetermined ambush site. A variation of this technique is to land separate elements of a company in several landing zones and have them converge on a common, selected location while searching the area of operation enroute. When patrols and companies are issued two or three days rations, disclosure of friendly unit locations by resupply helicopters is eliminated. There are many variations of this technique, all involving rapid movement and helicopter support. Centrally locating the battalion base of operations enables an infantry battalion to search and clear an area of approximately 144 square miles without moving its base or displacing the supporting artillery.

(2) SATURATION PATROLLING by helicopters has certain disadvantages which should be noted. First, heliborne assaults require extensive artillery and air preparations on selected landing zones. This, in conjunction with the presence of large numbers of helicopters, definitely alerts the enemy to the intended area of operations. Secondly, the enemy can be expected to leave the area, hide, or move into prepared and advantageous positions to fight on his own terms.

b. RECONDO - CHECKERBOARD Concept of Operations. The CHECKERBOARD concept is a tactical technique whereby patrols--steadily moving from one small topographical square to the next--are played like checker pieces, intending to jump or block the enemy.

(1) The key to this operation is the dispersal of counter-guerrilla equipped units, preferably platoons, in night operations. These units, provided an increased communications capability and light equipment to increase mobility, are called RECONDO patrols. These RECONDO patrols are kept constantly on the move and normally occupy the same position for one or two days only. They are delegated the authority to exploit enemy targets within their capability. Control is decentralized to the lowest level possible, and the primary direction from higher headquarters is in the form of specific geographic areas in which each patrol concentrates its efforts. Experience has demonstrated that decentralized execution tends to foster maximum ingenuity, initiative, and guile on the part of the small unit leader. Since such operations provide a good flow of current intelligence, sizeable enemy units are located occasionally. The RECONDO patrols act autonomously in their assigned area of responsibility until an enemy unit is located, or the area threatened. Battalion headquarters thereafter directs various adjacent units to occupy blocking or ambush along likely avenues of escape, while others are directed to converge on the target. The overall battalion objective is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. Where RECONDO squads or platoons encounter superior forces, the requirement is to fix the enemy until adjacent units can converge and/or additional forces can be introduced by helicopter.

(2) The best method of employment is to have two companies infiltrate and saturate the TAOR in a CHECKERBOARD configuration. Each company employs its platoons in the following manner:

(a) At night one squad from each platoon, as required, moves out approximately 3-6 kilometers, remains overnight, and is in place the following day with the mission of observing selected trails or suspected enemy areas from concealed locations.

(b) The following night each platoon (-) infiltrates to positions where the squad has previously been located, and a squad again moves forward 3-6 kilometers.

(c) This procedure is followed until contact with the enemy forces is established at which time the squad or platoon attempts to exploit. In the event the enemy force is too large to destroy, contact is maintained and the battalion commander assumes control to employ the resources within his capability. These resources can be other CHECKERBOARD units, a reserve company, or the normally available brigade reserve and supporting elements.

c. HUNTER-KILLER Concept. The HUNTER-KILLER force consists of two components carefully tailored to the mission, situation, weather,

and terrain; a swift, highly mobile, lightly equipped, hunter element to seek out the enemy; and a much larger, heavily supported killer force which remains centrally poised and carefully positioned ready to pounce on and destroy enemy located by the hunters. As the hunt progresses, the killers carefully monitor its progress and tentatively plan commitments that might materialize.

(1) When the killers are committed, the principle of mass (sudden application of overwhelming force) both in combat power and helicopter lift must be observed. The size of the committed force will depend on the situation. The principle of economy of force will also be followed - measured forces might be applied. To provide rest for the constantly moving hunters, rifle platoons from the killer force should be rotated with those of the hunter force. In this manner, the hunter phase would be maintained for considerable periods, but there always would be fresh units in the killer force ready to close with the enemy.

(2) This concept offers many advantages. In this war the big problem is to find the enemy. Large areas can be searched with minimum cost in manpower and helicopter time; infantrymen do not wear themselves out searching; the "stay time" of a battalion or brigade in the field with all supporting elements is increased; searches of remote areas are easier to support; and fresh units are always ready to pounce upon any force located.

58. CORDON AND SEARCH.

a. The CORDON AND SEARCH may be used alone or may be integrated with the County Fair, Hamlet Festival or Go Team, which will be discussed later. The concept of the CORDON AND SEARCH operation is to form a blockade around the target area - usually a hamlet - prevent movement into or out of the target area with one force, and then conduct a detailed search with a separate force. The CORDON AND SEARCH is most effective when the cordon is established silently and under the cover of darkness. This frequently will entrap draft evaders, deserters, and local guerrillas or VC local forces who have spent the night in the hamlet; therefore, the cordoning forces must maintain surveillance and be prepared to engage enemy forces inside the perimeter as well as outside the perimeter.

b. Although the cordoning force may be ARVN, US, or FWMAF, the searching force should always be Vietnamese. They may be ARVN, RF/PF or NPFF. The searching force should receive special training on the tactics and techniques of conducting a search, should be organized into search teams, each with specific assigned tasks, and should be briefed on the specific area or hamlet to be searched. Whenever possible, aerial photographs or a sand table should be used