

16. Reports.

a. Monthly Fiscal Report: The village sends a monthly fiscal report to the District Chief. This report is a complete breakdown of receipts and expenditures and the balance of funds on hand for each village in the District. The Province consolidates the district reports and sends a monthly report to DGBFA in Saigon containing the same information.

b. Quarterly Reports: The District makes expenditures by Chapter, Article and Item. The Province Finance Service Chief consolidates these reports and sends a quarterly report to DGBFA. The fourth quarter report constitutes the yearly report to DGBFA.

c. Fiscal Report to MOI: The Ministry of Interior also requires a monthly report which includes specified financial data. Both MOI and DGBFA check on the subsidy payments.

17. Spot Audits. A principal duty of the Canton Chief, a position now being phased out, is auditing village accounts twice monthly, and reporting his findings to district and province. The district chief is directed to check village books at least once each quarter, reporting his findings to the province chief. The province chief or his representative is expected to make occasional unexpected visits of this sort also. Finally, particularly where some irregularity is suspected, inspectors from the Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid or the Ministries of Finance and Interior may be sent to make spot audits.

18. Fiscal Responsibility: Usually, where an irregularity is detected, the village is simply ordered to rectify it. However, if it is clear that public funds have been squandered or misappropriated, the authorizing official may be held personally accountable.

D. THE VILLAGE SELF-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

19. The Village Self-Development (VSD) program was inaugurated in 1969 as a key element in the village oriented Pacification-Development strategy. It was based on the principle of community spirit and designed to strengthen village and hamlet governments and to stimulate the rural economy.

20. Self-Help Programs have always been an important element in the Nation-Building/Revolution Development efforts of recent years; but VSD was specifically planned to overcome a number of the obstacles which had handicapped these other Self-Help programs. In particular, VSD was intended:

a. To insure the development projects directly benefit the people and reflect their aspirations.

b. To foster active participation by villagers in community development planning and execution.

c. To stimulate village leadership into efforts to mobilize organic resources and local contributions for community development programs, and

d. To simplify procedures for local development funding.

21. The 1969 Village Self-Development Program was revolutionary in that:

a. Substantial development grants were given directly to village governments, and

b. Villages were assigned primary responsibility for the planning of all projects and the implementation of those projects with funding of 50,000\$VN or less.

22. The 1969 funds were allotted in such a way that every village would receive 400,000\$VN while those with an elected government would be given an additional 600,000\$VN. This was an attempt to focus attention on the importance of village elections and to give elected governments more resources with which to solve village problems. However, in 1970 the funds were allocated on a population basis. Every village continued to receive a basic amount of 400,000\$VN but then for each increment of 500 people over a population of 2,500, 50,000\$VN was added to the development fund.

23. This money was taken from the Ministry of Rural Development budget and deposited in accounts for each village in the province treasury. This simplified the usual bureaucratic procedures for expenditure of funds. Thus, the Self-Development program was not part of the regular village budget, described in previous paragraphs of this chapter; it was managed separately by the VAC and the grant managed specifically by the Village Finance Commissioner.

24. In 1969, there were three categories of projects: Those costing not more than 50,000\$VN which were approved by the village, those from 50,000 to 150,000\$VN and those above 150,000 -- for the latter two, province approval was needed. Under the 1970 Plan, development grants were classified into two categories only: Those under 100,000\$ were approved by the village and those over 100,000\$ required approval from province. In both programs, however, the decision as to what projects were selected remained with the village. Also, in both 1969 and 1970, the types of projects have been classified as either public use (schools, bridges, roads, dikes etc.) or income-producing (animal raising, farm machiner, crop production, etc.).

25. The VSD program of 1971 has maintained many of the salient points of its predecessor programs or seen them partially modified: The types of projects are the same, so too is the government financial support except for the fact that it can be increased depending on the village contribution to the project. Public Utility Projects will be carried out as before but project categorization has been slightly altered: those projects amounting to 200,000\$VN or below to Category I and will be approved by the village: those costing more than 200,000\$VN are Category II and will require province approval.

26. At the same time VSD in 1971 has taken a step in a new direction, a step that hopefully will develop the program into one that is entirely self-supporting. Under the new guidelines, all income-producing projects will be placed on a loan rather than grant basis and will be implemented under the Rural Development Credit Program. If successfully managed, this loan aspect will eventually constitute a revolving fund capable of supporting a future rural credit program.

27. While 100% of the village VSD fund can be inverted into Public Utility Projects, only 50% will be allowed to be put into the credit program. The actual decision is to be determined by the village council in consultation with the Village Assembly. Only members of People's Common Activity Group (PCAGs) will be eligible for those loans with those not having participated in income-producing projects in either 1969 or 1970 being given priority. To implement this, each village will have a Village Credit Committee (VCC) that is appointed by the village council and is composed of the village chief, the Agricultural and the Financial Commissioners, and four private persons of the village who are not members of either the Village Council or the Village Administrative Committee. The VCC will screen applicants for loans, make recommendations on loan applicants to the Agriculture Development Bank (ADB), determine if loans are being utilized for the purpose requested, and collect all loans due. The maximum loan to be granted to any one PCAG member is 50,000\$, to be repaid in one year at 18%. Finally, as a stimulus to the VCC and in order to establish this revolving fund, a bonus of 20%, coming from the profit reserved for the bank, will be given to the VCC if all loans (capital and interest) are collected and paid to the bank on or before they are due.

28. Since its inception, the VSD program has stressed the need and value of local contributions (money, labor, and resources) in the realization of these projects - this is the essence of the self-help concept. In 1971, it has been planned to "reward" such "matching funds" from the village budget (called the village Special Resource Fund) with extra funds of from wither MORD or ADB. For Public Utility projects, when the village does contribute financially,

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additional MORD funds equal to that allotted by the village, provided it is not less than 25% of the VSD fund reserved for public use projects, will be granted. In no case, however, MORD additional funding exceed 1,000,000VN\$. (See example below.)

<u>VSD Fund</u>	<u>Vil. Special Resources Fund</u>	<u>MORD Additional Fund</u>	<u>Total</u>
Village A - 200,000VN\$	50,000VN\$ (25%)	50,000VN\$ - (100%)	300,000VN\$
Village B - 200,000VN\$	200,000VN\$ (100%)	200,000VN\$ - (100%)	600,000VN\$
Village C - 200,000VN\$	1,200,000VN\$ (600%)	1,000,000VN\$ - (Max.)	2,400,000VN\$

For villages contributing to the Rural Credit Program, ADB will put up capital ranging from 100% to 200% of the total village funds (VSD fund plus village contribution) reserved for income-producing projects. For village contributions which are 50% or less of the VSD fund, ADB will put up 100% of the total village fund. For village contribution of from 51-75%, ADB will put up 150% of the total fund. Finally, for village contributing 76-100% (or more) ADB will put up its share equivalent to 200% of the said total fund.

<u>VSD Fund</u>	<u>VSRF</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>ADB</u>	<u>Grand Total</u>
Vil A - 200,000VN\$	100,000VN\$ (50%)	300,000VN\$	300,000VN\$ (100%)	- 600,000VN\$
Vil B - 200,000VN\$	150,000VN\$ (75%)	350,000VN\$	525,000VN\$ (150%)	- 875,000VN\$
Vil C - 200,000VN\$	200,000VN\$ (100%)	400,000VN\$	800,000VN\$ (200%)	- 1,200,000VN\$

29. Fundamental to the VSD Program is the People's Common Activity Group or PCAG, which could be defined simply as that group of individuals who having the same occupations, interests or problems are united together to lobby for and carry out a desired project. Through this program, direct incentives are given to the people to motivate them to contribute their own resources (money, labor, and/or materials to the very activities which they initiate and consider beneficial. In this way, the "felt needs" of the people are being realized and they themselves are involved in the actual decision-making, and planning, and development. To be remembered above all is that the projects are only means to an end and not ends in themselves. The civic consciousness, community identity, and political maturity that is

formed are of incalculably greater worth than the physical landmarks.

30. The importance of the Rural Development Cadre role in Village Self-Development can hardly be exaggerated. The 10-man RD Cadre Groups assigned to most villages provide essential fuel and lubricant for the VSD machinery. The cadre are the activists who generate enthusiasm among the village population and who provide the reservoir of added organizational and technical expertise needed to keep the VSD projects moving despite obstacles or frustrations. The subordination of the cadre to the village chief is intended to insure that pacification and development policies and programs are coordinated within the village framework.

E. LAND REFORM

31. In an agricultural economy such as Vietnam, no single factor has a greater bearing on political and economic development than the pattern of land tenure. Farmers who own their own land have a stake in society and tend to support the government which recognizes and protects that stake; tenants, who may be exploited by absent landlords, have no such stake in society and are more susceptible to propaganda from insurgents who seek their support by promising land ownership.

32. There are two major land reform programs in Vietnam, both aimed at giving the farmer ownership of his land. One is the Land-to-the-Tiller program; the other is the Montagnard Land Identification and Registration Program.

a. Land-to-the-Tiller (LTTT)

(1) In Vietnam previous to the Land-to-the-Tiller Law roughly 60 percent of the riceland was farmed by tenants. The prevailing pattern is the tenant farmers, managing and cultivating a plot of about one hectare (2.5 acres), and paying a rent in secure areas of about 35 percent of this crop.

(2) A measure of land redistribution and rent controls was accomplished in the early years of the Republic of Vietnam, before the Communist insurgency brought the land reform program to a standstill. Gradually improving security made possible by 1967 a limited revival of this program. By 1969 plans were being made for a much greater effort.

(3) In February 1969, the Prime Minister declared a freeze on land occupancy and rents in newly-pacified areas. The provisions of Circular #33, dated 12 February 1969, include:

(a) Returning landlords may not collect back rents nor evict tenants cultivating the land;

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(b) No new rents can be collected for one year;

(c) Any farmer who has occupied a piece of land for more than one year is guaranteed the right to remain on the land as legal tenant of the rightful owner or to become the owner of an equivalent hectare of GVN-owned land;

(d) Former tenants (who had abandoned the land) are accorded priority in the distribution of GVN-owned land.

(4) At about the same time the GVN ordered provinces to distribute by the end of 1969 some 147,000 hectares (353,000 acres) of land expropriated from French colonialists which still remained in GVN hands. Eighty-five percent of this land is in MR 4.

(5) To meet farmers' aspirations for land, the "Land-to-the-Tiller", (LTTT) land reform law was promulgated on 26 March 1970. The day was also designated a national holiday.

(6) Land-to-the-Tiller is a revolutionary program. The goal is to distribute about 1.2 million hectares (about 3 million acres), which constitutes about 50% of the riceland and secondary cropland in Vietnam, over a 3-year period beginning in 1970. Similar land reform programs have been carried out in a few countries, but never of the size and scope of this one. The purpose of LTTT is to virtually eliminate tenancy and to provide ownership of land to those persons who actually till the soil. The potential benefits of the program are enormous. Economically, a new middle class will be generated where farmers receive the fruits of their labor and their investments on the land. Socially, former tenants and squatters will acquire new status as middle class land owners. As land owners, farmers are expected to develop an increased involvement in hamlet and village government and an increased commitment to the defense of their home, land and nation.

(7) The main provisions of the Land-to-the-Tiller law are:

(a) Expropriate all riceland and secondary cropland (with some exceptions) that is not directly cultivated by the owner of his family or heirs.

(b) Grant land ownership free-of-charge to the actual tiller of the land regardless of the tiller's status (tenant, squatter) or his politics.

(c) Retain up to 15 ha. of land for landlords or their families or heirs who are actually tilling the retained land. Landlords who do not directly cultivate cannot legally retain any land.

(d) Exempt land recipients from all land transfer fees, and from paying land tax for one year.

(e) Compensate landlords for expropriated land at the rate of 2 1/2 times the land's average annual yield.

(f) Distribute a maximum of 1 ha. per farmer in I and II Corps and 3 ha. per farmer in III and IV Corps.

(g) Forbid landlords from collecting rent on expropriated riceland and secondary cropland after 26 March 1970.

(8) The village government is the key to the implementation of LTTT. The actual work of distributing land is performed at village level, largely by two village officials, the Village Land Reform and Agricultural Commissioner (VLRAC) and the Village Land Registrar (VLR). The decision-making body at village regarding LTTT is the Village Land Distribution Committee. The Village Land Distribution Committee has to examine and approve the work of the VLRAC and the VLR. The village chief provides overall direction and supervision of the LTTT program. He has the authority and power to get the job done.

(9) Each village should periodically schedule its LTTT work for the period ahead. A work schedule is a good tool to encourage more rapid LTTT work at village. Each village should have a LTTT goal (number of hectares to distribute). The village work schedule simply lays out, in the village, who will do how much work, when and where.

(10) Technical assistance and encouragement on land reform is provided to villages by the Province Land Affairs Service. The Provincial Land Affairs Service has a "team leader" for every 5 villages to help plan, guide and check the villages' work. In addition, the PLAS is responsible for conducting continuous training programs for village officials in 1971. The VLRAC and VLR were trained for 2 weeks at Vung Tau in late 1970, but the training was insufficient. The VLRAC and the VLR should have a copy of the "Village LTTT Handbook" that explains each step of the procedures distributing land. (Handbook to be sent to villages in March 1970).

(11) Resettlement (return-to-village) will be a vital pacification program in 1971 in many villages where land is still abandoned for security reasons. Resettlement should be coordinated with land distribution to provide greater incentives for refugees to return home. Also land can be distributed to other persons (secondary recipients such as former soldiers etc.) who wish to farm it.

(12) As with all village programs, the Province and District Chiefs have responsibility for directing the villages to do

a good job. They can use the monthly IBM computer supplied statistics to monitor the progress of LTTT at village. The computer prints a monthly report showing by village the number of applications approved for land, titles printed and titles distributed.

b. Montagnard Land Identification and Registration

(1) The Montagnard in Vietnam have traditionally claimed the land they farm plus other land within the general area which they use in making a living, e.g. grazing, forest, ceremonial, and housing land. But they have never had a legal ownership title to any of their lands. Even as late as 1959 the GVN said they only had the right to the produce of the land and not outright ownership of it. This lack of ownership right, plus steady encroachment upon their traditionally held lands by lowlanders, was the principal cause of dissatisfaction by the Montagnards with the GVN.

(2) In 1967 the GVN recognized that it must satisfy the Montagnards' claims to land ownership and promulgated two decrees on 29 August 1967. One decree, 033/67, is a broad statement of rights for Montagnards and also states that another decree would be promulgated which would confirm Montagnard land ownership in a manner compatible with their traditional customs. The second decree issued the same day, 034/67, gave Montagnards right of ownership on land they are cultivating, including land lying fallow in the shifting cultivation system.

(3) The right of ownership only to their cultivated land still did not satisfy the Montagnards' aspirations for ownership of their traditionally held lands. Therefore, in 1970, they asked the GVN for ownership of land communally used by each hamlet. On November 9, 1970 the GVN promulgated decree 138/70 which orders identification of hamlet living areas.

(4) The Montagnard land ownership program for 1971, based on decrees 034/67 and 138/70 consists of two parts: identification of hamlet living area and identification and registration of individually owned holdings. Hamlet living area identification is first priority, followed by individual holding identification. The goals for 1971 are identification of 600 hamlet living areas and 20,000 hectares of individual holdings.

(5) The main provisions of the Hamlet Living Area identification Program according to decree 138/70 are:

(a) Determination of a "principal area of living" for each Montagnard hamlet and establishment of a boundary around it.

(b) Land within the boundary which is not

privately owned cultivated land will be given to the village as communal land for the use and benefit of the people of the hamlet.

(c) The size of the "living area" including privately owned land and communal land, will be on the basis of 10 ha. per family of the hamlet if all cultivated land is of a permanent nature (such as paddy riceland) and 20 hectares if all the cultivated land is in the shifting cultivation system.

(d) The traditional land of hamlets which have been relocated will be reserved for them, if the people say they wish to return after security is restored in the former area. Relocation of Montagnard hamlets is seen as the biggest potential obstacle to a successful Montagnard land identification and registration program. In this respect the advisor in the field should view with extreme caution proposed relocations of Montagnard hamlets predicated on a "lack of security" reason given by GVN officials. It will be essential that the advisor keep in mind the stated policy of the GVN of "security to the people; not the people to the security".

(e) The identification of the hamlet living area does not affect an individual's right to private land ownership.

(6) Privately Owned Montagnard Land

(a) The Montagnard program for identification and registration of privately owned cultivated land, according to Decree 034/67, provides that Montagnards are to be given title to the land they are cultivating. Cultivated land also means the land currently lying fallow in the shifting system of cultivation. This program got underway in early 1970.

(b) A basic difference between the Montagnard land identification program and Land-to-the-Tiller, is that LTTT transfers ownership from one owner to another and the Montagnard program provides for a title on land that already belongs to the individual.

(c) Information on procedures of implementation for both the Montagnard and Land-to-the-Tiller can be obtained from the CORDS Provincial Land Reform Advisor.

F. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT

33. Chronic indebtedness has historically afflicted the Vietnamese farmer. Loan money has been available through private channels only at exorbitant rates - sometimes as much as one half of a farmer's crop. Pawn shops are allowed to charge 3% per month. The GVN's Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), established by decree in

1967, is beginning to meet the demand for development loans. Offices located in 43 of the 44 provinces extend loans at from 14 to 24% for the development of agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery and forestry. Interest rates on savings accounts were increased from a previous range of 3 to 4% to a range of 10 to 20% effective October 1, 1970.

34. Surveys indicate that the ADB's activities have speeded the mechanization of Vietnamese agriculture and fishery appreciably by enabling rural entrepreneurs to purchase outboard motors, water pumps and small tractors. Approximately 70% of the loans processed are not secured by collateral. Village loan committees are being established to accept, recommend and collect ADB loans under 50,000,000VN\$. These will be unsecured loans.

35. A system of private rural banks was established with the inauguration of 3 private banks in 1969 and 1 in 1970. 24 additional banks will be chartered in 1971 with a goal of 200 such banks in the next 4 years. This system is similar to the Philippine private rural bank network. The GVN provides matching capital and the ADB has supervisory and discounting privileges.

C. WAR VICTIMS

36. As hamlets become secure, many inhabitants, who have fled their homes because of terrorism or dangers of war, return to their original village. The Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW) has a program for helping many of these returnees in the initial stage of re-establishing themselves. This assistance includes VN\$7,500 and ten sheets of roofing per family, and a food allowance of VN\$3,600 for each member.

a. To be entitled to these commodities and funds, all that a returnee needs is an official certification of his refugee status. This may be a green registration card which he has formerly received in a refugee temporary or resettlement center. Or it may be a white census form which many displaced persons, who sought refuge outside of refugee camps, have received during a recent nationwide survey. Lacking either one of these official certificates, a returnee can obtain a statement of his refugee status from the Village Administration where he sought refuge. Any one of these certificates entitles a returnee to the benefits provided by the return-to-village program of the MSW.

b. If the village, to which refugees return, has a functioning administration, it is the responsibility of the Village Council, and particularly of the Commissioner for Social Welfare and Culture (See Chapter II, paragraph 15, e) to inform the returnees of their rights and to assist them in obtaining this available assistance. It is urgent that the Provincial Administration be

notified of the arrival of returnees so that the Province Social Welfare Service Chief can immediately check into their refugee status, assist them if necessary in getting a refugee certificate, and present a list of legitimate refugee returnees to the Provincial Administration.

c. Upon approval of the Province Chief, the SWS Chief will take the necessary steps to distribute commodities and disburse funds. This return-to-village allowance will assist the refugees in re-establishing their families so that once again they can become productive citizens of their original village.

37. When enemy action or allied military operations destroy homes or cause injury and death, commodity and monetary assistance is available by reason of the War Victim Relief Program of the MSW. As soon as the Provincial Administration is notified of the incident, the SWS Chief arranges for immediate relief assistance, which includes rice, blankets and cloth. An indemnity is paid for wounds and death. And, depending on the amount of house damage, the owner will receive either VN\$3,000 or VN\$7,500 and 10 sheets of roofing. It is the responsibility of the Village Administration to inform War Victims of their rights and to help them obtain relief assistance.

38. Another function of the Commissioner for Social Welfare is to notify the Village Administration of the arrival of refugees who have fled their hamlet because of enemy action and war related dangers. This information is relayed to the Provincial Administration. Immediately the SWS Chief will arrange for relief assistance, which includes rice and money during seven days, or longer if necessary. During this time, the SWS will plan either the return to original village or the resettlement of these refugees.

39. The Commissioner for Social Welfare and Culture can also coordinate with the appropriate provincial services to obtain the following assistance:

a. Through the SWS Chief, he can assist war victims, including orphans, widows and physically disabled, to receive vocational training; he can also request funds to implement special development projects in the village.

b. Through the War Veterans Service Chief can arrange for physically disabled to receive treatment at the Rehabilitation Institute in Saigon or its branches in Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Can Tho. Veterans or dependents may receive allowances which vary according to the rank and status of the person (commissioners should assist in gathering data needed to complete dossiers and in the dissemination of information on Ministry of War Veterans programs).

c. Through the Public Health Service Chief, he can seek

assistance with medical problems or hygiene.

d. Through the Labor Service Chief limited assistance can be obtained in finding jobs.

e. In addition, the Commissioner should help the village to identify critical social needs. Village Self Development or provincial funds may often be obtained to respond to these needs.

IV

Village Security

A. SUMMARY

1. Village-level security elements have two paramount tasks:

a. Defense of the entire populated area against infiltration by small armed enemy elements, and

b. Collecting and reporting to the DIOCC all VCI information and assisting the DIOCC in the neutralization of the VCI and other individuals who actively support the enemy.

The thorough accomplishment of both of these missions is crucial to successful (i.e., permanent) pacification. Only when a climate of day and night security, including freedom from enemy taxation and terrorism, is present in every hamlet can effective administration and village self-development be expected to follow.

2. Security responsibilities have been delegated increasingly to village governments, and the principal village-level security elements, i.e., Popular Forces, National Police and People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) are now under the operational control of the village chief, as are Rural Development Cadre, which have a secondary security role. It is the responsibility of the village authorities to so coordinate the activities of each of these elements as to insure a unified, village-wide security effort.

3. The active involvement of the entire population in their own defense is a particularly important village pacification objective. This can occur only when each individual perceives that non-involvement is no safeguard and that his own best interest lies in joining with his fellows to resist enemy exploitation. After the enemy's countrywide attacks at Tet, 1968, the GVN placed renewed emphasis on the formation, training and utilization of "people's groups" particularly the PSDF, an armed village/hamlet defense

organization.

4. Experience has shown that when local security elements (however weak individually) are closely integrated, when they are able to establish close ties with the population and when they can rely on effective support by province/district when needed, dramatic advances in local security usually result. It is a primary mission of the district military command and of district and MAT advisors to actively, yet unobtrusively, foster such developments.

B. THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL SECURITY


5. Although Village Administrative Committee (VAC) have been charged, on paper, with extensive responsibilities in the area of security since 1966, not until recently (1969) has it become common for them to play the leading role which was envisioned.

6. Decree-Law #198 (December 1966) stated that the village chief, assisted by a commissioner for security, "sees to the maintenance of security and public order in the village; in this respect required, to request Popular Forces in the area to provide support for security measures" (Article 26). Despite this sweeping delegation of responsibility, the involvement of village authorities in security matters was usually minimal throughout 1967 and 1968. A mid-1967 directive placed Popular Forces village temporarily under the command of the Village Administrative Committee. In practice, however, this rarely occurred. On one hand, PF platoon leaders were reluctant to take orders from civilians who often had little experience in military matters. On the other hand, many village officials were quite content to remain uninvolved, sometimes on the premise that they were less likely to become enemy targets if they stuck to purely civil matters. District and province chiefs were generally opposed to the directive. Thus it was rarely given more than lip service.

7. In accordance with the strategy of revitalizing village government, the 1969 Combined Campaign Plan redefined the PF-Village relationship unambiguously; "PF, under the operational control of the VAC, will be employed near villages and hamlets from which recruited to provide protection to the people, material and installations." The creation of the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF), beginning in 1969, placed another asset under the control of many village chiefs. Similarly, steps were taken in later 1968 to stimulate the deployment of National Policemen to the village level under the control of the village chief. Rural Development Cadre Teams were reorganized and, beginning in January 1969, deployed in 30-man groups under the operational control of village chiefs. Finally, village government structure was reorganized in April 1969 (Decree #45). The reorganization did not change the village's statutory responsibility for the maintenance of security. Rather, it gave to

CHART #IV-1

SECURITY ORGANIZATION
(District to Village)



village administration the authority and assets necessary to the job. (See Chart #IV-1)

8. First, the village chief's operational control of Popular Forces and all cadre regularly active in the village received the force of law. Second, the village chief received assistance in the execution of these duties through creation of the positions of deputy village chief for security, village military commissioner, deputy hamlet chief for security and hamlet military assistant. The post of village commissioner for security was abolished.

9. Deputy Village Chief for Security

The deputy village chief for security is the village chief's principal assistant for "problems concerning administrative and judicial police, public order, military draft and military affairs". Additionally, he is charged with monitoring "political activities, intelligence organizations, People's Self-Defense Forces, Youth and Sports". Like the deputy village chief for administration, he is appointed by the province chief on the recommendation of the village chief (and with the approval of the village council and the district chief). He is fully responsible for the management of political and military affairs in the village chief's absence.

10. Military Commissioner

The village military commissioner must be a PF platoon leader and ordinarily is the ranking platoon leader in the village. On behalf of the village chief and the deputy for security, he exercises operational control of all village Popular Forces. He is appointed in the same fashion as the civil commissioners, i.e., his appointment is made by the village chief with the approval of the village council, subject to the review of the district chief. However, the military commissioner continues to command directly his old unit and to draw PF pay, supplemented by "one-fourth of a commissioner's position allowance" which is paid by the village budget. Under current laws, this is a negligible 125\$ a month.

11. Deputy Hamlet Chief for Security

The deputy hamlet chief for security assists the hamlet chief for security in the same fashion that the deputy village chief assists the village chief. Like the hamlet deputy for administration, he is appointed by the village chief on the nomination of the hamlet chief and with the district chief's approval.

12. Hamlet Military Assistant

Like the Village Military Commissioner, the hamlet military

assistant is drawn from the ranks of the PF. He is generally a senior squad leader. He is chosen in the same fashion as the deputy hamlet chief. He is delegated operational control over all hamlet PF, retains direct command of his old unit and, under current pay schedules, receives only his PF pay. However, in some areas PF platoons have been put under the operational control of the RF company commander in whose area of operations the PF platoons are located. This temporary measure is designed to simplify command lines in those areas where the village chief or deputy for security have limited military experience. As soon as sufficient experience is gained, control will be turned back in accordance with Decree #45. During the period that PF platoons are under operational control of RF, the RF company commander must coordinate closely with the village chief."

13. The district chief may move a PF unit from a village in a case of "military emergency". Further, "the village chief must place the PF under the general control of subsector...in case of an operational plan of an inter village character".

14. By 1969, the new GVN emphasis on strengthening village government had on paper given village authorities the means "to maintain security and public order" under normal conditions. It remained to be seen, however, whether the various military, paramilitary and PSDF elements would work in harmony and would respond energetically to village direction. It was also unclear how village authorities would respond to the mandate which had been thrust upon them. It was quite clear, however, that only with sustained command emphasis by district and province authorities could old habits and jealousies be overcome and PF, RD Cadre, National Police and PSDF be induced to work in concert under village leadership.

C. ROLES AND MISSIONS.


15. Each village-level security element has a clearly defined, role to play in village defense. Some, such as PF and PSDF, are oriented toward defense against armed intrusion; others, such as the police, are more concerned with anti-infrastructure operation. RD Cadre perform a multitude of special tasks, some of which are security-related. The effective performance by each element of its role is greatly dependent on the cooperation it receives from other elements. Historically, such cooperation has been the exception rather than the rule; thus forceful leadership by the village authorities and command emphasis at higher levels is imperative.

16. The Popular Forces

a. The Popular Forces, or PF, serve near the villages and hamlets from which they are recruited. They are paid a modest salary. PF are organized into platoons under the operational control of the village chief, who in turn is responsible to the subsector (See Chart #IV-2).

CHART #IV-2

POPULAR FORCES



b. PF are charged with maintaining a secure zone including the entire populated area of a village. They establish a mobile defense against enemy small-unit infiltration, operating around and between hamlets. Their principal target is the local enemy guerrilla unit.

c. PF coordinate activities with RF or ARVN/FWMAF units assigned AO's farther from the village area. They establish bases as points of departure for operations. They conduct night saturation patrols, ambushes and other anti-guerrilla tactics. PF further conduct limited daytime operations, such as small sweeps, attacks on enemy tax points or caches, and in support of the National Police, assist in document checks and searches. If RD Cadre are present in a village, PF assist them in training PSDF. If there are no RD Cadre, the PF are charged with this training mission.

d. In some areas the PF platoons have been placed under the operational control of the RF company commander in whose area of operations the PF platoons are located. This temporary measure is designed to simplify command lines in those situations in which the village chief or the deputy for security have limited military experience. As soon as sufficient experience is gained, control will be turned back in accordance with Decree #45. During the period that PF platoons are under the operational control of the RF, the company commander must coordinate closely with the village chief. For additional information on the PF, see the RF/PF Handbook for Advisors, MACCORDS-TSD, 1 Jan".

17. People's Self-Defense Forces

a. The PSDF are unpaid citizens who serve as a village/hamlet defense force. Ideally, every able-bodied man in the village other than those in regular military service is an active PSDF member. PSDF receive rudimentary training and serve within their own hamlets. Each PSDF member stands guard about one night in three.

b. PSDF are responsible for essentially static defense within hamlets, a necessary job which in the past has too often pre-occupied the Popular Forces. Now it is the PSDF who establish armed listening posts throughout the hamlet area, freeing the PF for mobile patrolling and ambushes. They have direct responsibility for the protection of village and hamlet officials. The PSDF maintain 35-man Key Inter-teams as their reaction capability and fire-fighting and first-aid auxiliaries, The PSDF organization further opens a convenient channel for reporting information of possible intelligence value. (See para 37, below, for further discussion of the People's Groups concept. See also the Peoples Self-Defense Force Handbook, MACCORDS-TSD, Nov 69.)

18. Regional Forces, ARVN and FWMAF

a. These elements provide security in depth for the pacification effort. They are usually assigned responsibility for the initial clearing of a pacification campaign areas, for which responsibility, after large enemy forces have been eliminated or driven out, is transferred to village level forces.

b. The Regional Forces (RF) are classed with PF as "Territorial Forces". The basic RF organization is a 123-man rifle company, which may operate independently or as a part of a Battalion or Company Group. Weapons employed consist of M16 Rifles, M79 Grenade Launchers, M60 Machine Guns and 60mm Mortars. Communications consist of AN/PRC-25 Radios. RF troops are locally recruited units employed in their home provinces. This force can provide security to a village or hamlet. It is capable of assuming responsibility for an assigned area of operations and of exerting tactical command/control over other smaller military and paramilitary forces for joint operations. The company is responsive to request from the Village Chief, but remains under the operational control of the District Chief. The RF is usually the primary reaction force for the relief of the villages which come under substained attack. For additional details on the RF, See the RF/PF Handbook for Advisors, MACCORDS-TSD, Jan 71.

c. ARVN and RVNAF operations in the hinterlands are expected to hinder enemy attempts to infiltrate large elements into pacification zones and other populous areas. As needed, ARVN and FWMAF units are available as relief and reaction forces in the event of large scale enemy attacks on villages. District officials and advisors may play an important intermediary role between village authorities and the commands of FWMAF and ARVN units with operational and/or civic action responsibilities in or near these villages.

19. National Police

a. In late 1968, provincial National Police Services were ordered to deploy at least fifty per cent of their strength (excluding NPPF and Special Branch) at district level and below by the end of 1969. It was envisioned that a minimum of six policemen would be assigned to each relatively secure village, under control of the Village Administrative Committee. At present the National Police have deployed 50.6% of their personnel to District level and below. There are at present 11,374 policemen assigned to 1,816 villages under control of the Village Administrative Committee. As security conditions improve, greater responsibility for the maintenance of public order will be assigned to the National Police assisted by PSDF while PF and RF elements will be redeployed into less secure areas.

b. Each police subdistrict includes both uniformed and


plain-clothes policemen. Uniformed police handle civil functions - investigation of crimes and accidents, registration and classification of the population, control of resources and the like. Plain-clothes (Special Branch) police are charged with the establishment and direction of intelligence networks. Where a subdistrict is established, the police chief thus assumes a great many of the responsibilities otherwise discharged by the village deputy for security, his immediate superior. It should be noted that police assigned to subdistrict level are explicitly required to visit every GVN-controlled hamlet of a village at least once weekly. At no time are National Police to be held responsible for a village defense role.

20. National Police Field Force

National Police Field Forces - NPFF platoons are stationed at district level as the operational arm of the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). These highly-trained combat policemen are available for anti-infrastructure operations at village level as needed. (See Chart #IV-3)

CHART #IV-3

NATIONAL POLICE SUBDISTRICT ORGANIZATION



21. Census Grievance Cadre

Up until 1970 there was a Census Grievance Service with Cadre in many villages and hamlets. They were to record popular aspirations and grievances along with intelligence information. Their records may be of great assistance to the advisor.

22. Rural Development Cadre

a. No element of the pacification program in recent years has been so widely discussed - or so often misunderstood - as the "RD Cadre". A cadre is neither a soldier nor official (the two classes which the Vietnamese peasant traditionally views dimly). In theory he is a trained political organizer, who works among the common people to win their support for a cause through his deeds as well as his words. He must be highly motivated, politically sophisticated, of exemplary character. Particularly, he must be able to relate his cause to the needs and aspirations of the humblest farmer or fisherman.

b. A purist might find that only a few RD Cadre meet this high ideal. He would find, however, that these well-trained black-pajamaed individuals have a significantly greater rapport with the villagers than other outsiders, in direct proportion to the degree to which they approach the ideal.

c. RD Cadre are organized along paramilitary lines. Previously, a Cadre Team (then 59 men and women) would work in a hamlet largely on their own for as long as six months. The objective was - and still is - to motivate and organize the population to take care of their own defense against the Viet Cong and to raise their standard of living with some assistance from the government. This approach often worked well as long as cadre remained present in a contested hamlet, but to a disappointing degree the gains proved transitory. Thus in the last few years the trend has been to integrate RD Cadre Operations more closely with other elements of the pacification program. This trend culminated in early 1969 when RD Cadre were reorganized into 30-man groups and assigned to work under the operational control of village chiefs in more than 1400 contested villages. In mid-1970 the RD Cadre began an accelerated reorganization, restructuring, and modification of its existing 30-man groups with the ultimate aim of streamlining its objectives and rearranging cadre priorities. It became evident toward the end of the year that many of the national objectives of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan would fall short of their pre-arranged target dates for completion. Therefore, under Presidential Decree the Ministry for Rural Development began detaching several thousands of RD Cadre, the government's political arm in the rural contested areas, to other GVN ministries and governmental agencies to provide that all important shot in the arm in an all out effort to accelerate completion

of the unfinished tasks of the 1970 national plan, particularly in village self-development.

d. The RD Cadres detached to assist in the completion of many of the governmental programs provided the stimulant and motivation, in addition to their organizational and technical capabilities, necessary to organize, assist, train, and guide the villagers in the rural contested areas toward the timely completion of many of the village/hamlet projects. The selection of the RD Cadre to provide this manpower and organizational and technical expertise, added fresh blood to the seemingly unending list of unfinished projects that required the skills provided by the cadres, and was obviously a sound choice by the GVN.

e. The cadres detached from deployed 30-man groups filled such positions as school teachers, information cadres, land-use surveyors for the Land Reform Program, Intelligence Cadres to the Phuong Hoang Program, Urban Cadres to Urban Development, organizers and promoters of PCAG's in support of Village Self-Development, medic cadres in support of village Public Health, technical cadres in support of Public Works projects, to name but a few.

f. On 1 March 1971 the RD Cadre underwent yet another significant change when they reorganized from 30-man groups to 10-man groups. The new 10-man group organization is shown in chart #IV-4.

g. The primary mission of the RD Cadre in 1971 will be much the same as it was in 1970; that is to continue to stimulate pro-GVN political action in targeted villages in the rural contested areas of the nation to which they have been deployed, and assist the villages in improving their quality and standard of living. The new 10-man groups will be more flexible, easier to manage and control, and will be able to direct maximum effort at their major objectives: assisting, leading, guiding, training, and organizing the villagers toward eventual self-defense, self-government, and self-development.


h. Under the reorganization there will be two types of cadre groups: the 10-man village group, and the 5-man district group. The 10-man village groups will continue to be deployed to C-D-E villages with greater emphasis on ameliorating and strengthening village development, and assisting and organizing the various village committees in carrying out their own self-help projects. The 10-man group will consist of 1 group leader, 1 liaison cadre, who will also act as the intelligence and medic cadre. Each group will have 2 operational cells, each with a cell leader and 3 cell members. These deployed groups will remain heavily armed. The 5-man district group will consist of 1 district group chief, 1 liaison cadre, 1 intelligence cadre, and 2 development cadre. The 5-man group will assist the district chiefs in guiding the village chiefs in the

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deployment and use of the RDC groups and in the execution of the various programs in connection with the Regional Community Self-Development Plan. The reorganization into smaller groups will provide greater utilization of the cadres and insure more effective span of control over their activities.

CHART #IV-4

CHART SHOWING THE ORGANIZATION OF 10-MAN RDC GROUPS



23. Information/Chieu Hoi Cadre

Information cadre are assigned at District, Village / Hamlet level by the Ministry of Information (MOI). These cadre are under the operational control of district, village, and hamlet chiefs and receive guidance and support from district and province Vietnamese Information Service Chiefs (VIS). The People's Information Committee, headed by the province chief, has the executive responsibility for implementing the People's Information Program (PIP) in the province. The PIP has the following priorities: Phung Hoang; PSDF; Land-to-the Tiller Program; Chieu Hoi; Veterans and War Widows relief.

D. VILLAGE SECURITY OPERATIONS

24. It is not possible to develop a SOP for village security activities which is universally applicable. Nonetheless, when objectives are clearly understood and locally available means are closely coordinated, pacification can be successfully accomplished in the majority of Viet-Nam's villages without the introduction of large friendly units. Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that when local security elements work closely together, when they are able to establish strong ties with the population and when they are able to rely on effective support by district/province, dramatic advances in local security result. In this section some means of accomplishing this are outlined. It must be stressed however, that each village security system must be modified in accordance with the particular situation (terrain, degree of security, cohesiveness, size and available resources) of a village. See the Village Security Planning Guide for Advisory Personnel, MACCORDS-TSD, undated.

25. The village government's security role was discussed above, paragraphs 5-11 and 13. The roles and missions of various military and paramilitary elements present or operating in the village were outlined in paragraphs 14 to 22.

26. Four major village security tasks may be identified:

a. To so deploy and maneuver village security forces as to provide round the clock protection of the population against enemy incursions or harassment.

b. To destroy undercover enemy village organization by identifying and detaining enemy agents and active sympathizers.

c. To report to higher authorities in timely fashion intelligence on enemy activity in or near the village.

d. To organize and to motivate the entire population to support the GVN and its security objectives.

27. Territorial Security

a. Defense in Depth

(1) PSDF man listening posts and organize mobile patrols within each hamlet nightly. Sometimes PSDF serve as bodyguards for village or hamlet officials.

(2) Popular Forces, freed from static security shares by the PSDF, ambushes and patrols in the vicinity of the village. They coordinate with the other security forces to develop effective plans for ambushes and patrols. A maximum of forces is employed at night to prevent entry of the enemy into the village or hamlet. The PF assist the RF and RDC in the training of the PSDF, and conduct combined ambushes and patrols with the PSDF around the periphery of the village. During the daytime, they may sweep the fields and near-jungles, assist the police in document checks and searches, etc.

(3) Regional Forces operate much like PF, but farther from populous areas and along LOC's between villages.

(4) ARVN/FWMAF operations sweep remote areas and prevent the enemy from launching large-scale attacks on pacified villages.

b. Coordination and Support. No village defense plan, however attractive in theory, can work well in a crisis if the following conditions are not present:

(1) Command channels are clearly established and communication between various elements is rapid and sure.

(a) It may be desirable, particularly if the village chief or his deputies lack military experience, for the former to designate the military commissioner, who is a senior PF platoon leader, as "field commander" in event of a sustained enemy attack or other emergency.

(b) Some central, defensible location, such as the PF Platoon Post, should be selected as the site for a simple TOC. Here some interface should be established between the different radio systems used by PF, RD Cadre, Police and Village/Hamlet (See Chart #IV-5, Village Radio Net). Additionally, a system of signal flares and runners, usually the youth, should be established to maintain PSDF-PF-hamlet communications.

(2) The various security elements are completely integrated and are well-versed in their roles and a number of contingency plans have been developed and practiced. Fighting positions and barriers have been systematically constructed.

VILLAGE SECURITY

(a) Care should be taken to guard against assigning roles beyond the PSDF. Each PSDF element must be able to depend on rapid support by PF or other elements. The PSDF should be reinforced immediately upon making contact. A good system of intra-hamlet defenses, including gates which may be used to block off alleys at night, will add greatly to the initial advantage which thorough knowledge of the terrain confers on the defenders.

(b) Village officials responsible for security should inspect the security forces in each hamlet regularly. District and MATS advisors may find it mutually beneficial to invite the officials to accompany them on occasional inspections.

(c) Regular village-wide meetings to discuss and coordinate security matters are also desirable. Key village and hamlet officials and the leadership of the PF, PSDF, RD Cadre and police should attend. In this way, a "village focus" can develop gradually. Occasionally, district staff officers, US advisors or officers from nearby RF units may be invited to discuss matters of mutual concern.

(d) A regular and continuous training program, with emphasis on joint exercises by PF, PSDF and possibly police, is highly desirable. At least two hours of field problems and critique should follow every hour of "classroom training".

(3) All village security elements are confident that they will receive, in case of need: rapid and effective air, artillery and ground support; rapid medical assistance and evacuation; prompt (i.e., day-after) resupply.

(a) District and MATS advisors can make a great contribution in this area. Here again contingency planning makes the difference, and the measures suggested below are simply extensions to the village level of standard doctrine.

(b) Air and artillery support-defensive concentrations should be plotted and coded for the entire village area with the assistance of village security leaders. Similarly, village security leaders can ensure that fire arrows are in good condition and that each post is supplied with at least a few flares. It is highly desirable that briefings on procedures for air-ground and artillery coordination be organized at the village level, preferably with the participation of US advisors and FAC personnel.


(c) Medical Assistance

1 District medical personnel, in cooperation with US medical advisors, may be stimulated to organize village-level inspection and refresher training of PF, RD Cadre and PSDF medics.

CHART #IV-5

VILLAGE COMMUNICATIONS NET

(IDEAL-TYPICAL)



LEGEND:

- Radio Communication
- Runners or Lights

NOTES:

1. The Province/District Military Net is always present wherever there is an RF or PF platoon, although equipment is not always up to TO&E strength. The Village/Hamlet Radio System, still in development, is primarily intended for civil traffic but can play a vital security role. RDC communications are somewhat confused following reorganization into 30-man groups. It is anticipated that RDC HT-1's will continue to operate on a separate frequency.
2. Despite TO&E shortages, there are usually sufficient radios within a village to maintain permanent communication between all key elements and points. It is essential that military, VHRS and RDC communications be co-locate at village level. As PSDF have no organic radio, PSDF must maintain contact with other elements through a system of runners or lights (dotted lines).
3. All operators must be trained in radio-telephone procedures and current SOI's. District staff should inspect periodically to insure

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that communications assets at village/hamlet level are properly distributed and kept in good repair. This is a proper subject for advisory emphasis.

4. Many FF platoons are issued AN/PRC-10 radios in lieu of the AN/PRC-25 radio.

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Such training should stress the use of supplies easily available at village level.

2 It is desirable that one or more helicopter pads be prepared and proper emergency lighting arranged. Alternate evacuation routes from the various hamlets and posts to these landing pads should be determined by village security authorities. The reluctance of US medevac personnel to land if there is no US presence on the ground may sometimes be overcome if an American district advisor accompanies the "dustoff" helicopter. Again, it is suggested that drills be organized. They should be held at night if a VR helicopter or aircraft can be obtained.

Actual landings are unnecessary - it is only necessary that one or more district advisors be able to locate the various helicopter pads at night and, either by relay through the district TOC or by direct air-ground communication, have personnel on the ground light up these pads.

(d) Ground Support - Contingency planning again is highly desirable. Reaction forces and alternate routes from the village center to outlying hamlets should be decided by village security leaders. Similarly, alternate routes which reaction forces from outside the village might follow should be determined and coded through consultation between district and village authorities. Explicit provision must be made for the securing of these routes.

(e) Resupply - Resupply is a continuing headache. Preferably, a modest stock of standard ammunition, mines and flares should be maintained for emergency issue at all times by the district S-4. Sustained advisory emphasis is highly important.

c. Tactical Concept

(1) A highly effective concept for the tactical employment of PF platoons, RD Cadre teams and PSDF in defense of hamlets is laid down in JGS Directive 300-12/TTM/P3, subject: Mobile Defense of Hamlets, dated 20 January 1969.

(2) In summary, the mobile defense concept requires that a standing patrols and small ambushes be placed out on enemy avenues of approach. These groups provide an early warning and can delay the approach of an enemy party. The positions are occupied after dark. They are changed each night and, if practicable, during the night. This creates for the enemy a "zone of insecurity" around the hamlet so that he has difficulty in concentration and attacking a specific target. A reaction/counterpenetration force is held centrally and is ready to move to a number of previously reconnoitered positions to meet the threat. Rehearsal and practice by the reaction force is essential so that positive and rapid defensive

measures are taken.

(3) Employment of the mobile defense concept usually ensures repulsion of enemy attacks in up to platoon size and that company-plus attacks can be held until reaction forces from district are deployed.

(4) RD Cadre should not be employed in a patrolling or early warning role, because of the reduced strength of RDC groups and their increased employment in pacification/development activity. They may be effectively employed in a village or hamlet reaction force, however.

(5) PSDF should be trained in the mobile defense concept and may form part of the village or hamlet reaction force. PSDF should never be given sole responsibility for patrolling/early warning activity beyond the hamlet perimeter although well-trained PSDF may be employed in this fashion in conjunction with PF.

(6) Within a village, each hamlet/defense force should have an area of responsibility which has clearly defined boundaries. (See, for instance, the map in Chart #IV-5). These boundaries should be changed fairly often to prevent the enemy from using boundary areas to his advantage. It is of utmost importance to define respective areas of responsibility whenever RF Companies, ARVN and particularly FWMAF elements are deployed (permanently or temporarily) within the village area. In general, ARVN/FWMAF tactics and organization are inappropriate to pacification-type operations within populated areas and responsibility for the security of the hamlets proper should remain with PF and PSDF subordinate to the village. If the latter feel that they are likely to be mistaken for enemy by other friendly forces they will rapidly cease mobile defense activity at nighttime. Advisors should anticipate such problems and prevent them from arising.

d. Logistical Support

(1) Each security element at district level, PF platoons, for instance, submit requisitions to the district S-4, who in turn draws supplies from the province Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Center (SM&DSLCL), (RF companies, if present, may draw directly from the SM&DSLCL). PSDF have been also supplied through the district S-4; this function may be transferred to a system of PSDF "cadre" now being organized.

(2) Chapter 6 of the RF-PF Handbook for Advisors, (MACCORDS-TSD, 1 January 1971) supplies further information on RF/PF logistical support. Advisors should, in the course of inspections, be particularly attentive to the adequacy of support to the PF platoons. This is a key morale factor, and deficiencies should be brought to the attention of counterparts. Additionally, deficiencies

may properly be brought to the attention of the Village Chief, his Deputy for Security and/or his military commissioner. They should be encouraged to raise such problems through their own channels.

28. Phung Hoang Program

a: It is not sufficient simply to prevent armed forces from entering populated areas. As completely as possible, the enemy must be denied access to the population. His political, finance/economy and intelligence organizations must be eliminated. The elimination of this Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) is the goal of the Phung Hoang Program which is organized at provinces, district and village level. Prime Ministerial Decree #0326/UBPHTU/VPPT/NK, subject: Establishment of Village PHUNG HOANG Committees, dated 23 Mar 1970 and PHUNG HOANG SOP #3, sets forth the organizational structure for PHUNG HOANG Committees at village level and delineates Committee responsibilities.

(1) The Village PHUNG HOANG Committee is composed of the following:

Chairman	Village Chief
Vice Chairman	Deputy Village Chief for Security
Secretary	Village National Police Chief
Member	Village Committee Member for Military Affairs
"	Hamlet Chiefs
"	RF Unit Leaders
"	PF Unit Leaders
"	PSDF Unit Leaders
"	RD Group Leaders
"	VIS Cadres (If assigned to village)
"	Chieu Hoi Cadre (If assigned to Village)
"	Technical Cadre (If assigned to Village)

(2) The responsibilities of the Village PHUNG HOANG Committees are to support the DIOCCs by accomplishing the following tasks:

(a) To organize an intelligence network within the village.

(b) To investigate and classify the villagers in order to assess the VCI situation.

(c) To report information and the VCI situation within the village to the DIOCC.

(d) To respond to intelligence requests and directives of the DIOCC.

(e) To assist the DIOCC in screening operations.

(f) To meet at least twice a month to discuss matters concerning the neutralization of the VCI.

29. The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)

a. The remarkable tenacity of the Viet Cong insurrection may, in large part, be ascribed to the enemy's success in organizing, either overtly or covertly, portions of the rural population of Viet-Nam in support of his objectives. He has relied on both persuasion and terror, with rather greater emphasis on the latter in years. As seen above (Chapter I, paragraphs 7-10) he has focused his effort at the village level, and particularly in the early years of the insurgency, was able to neutralize traditional village leadership to a degree. He has substituted, where possible, his own leadership elements, collectively referred to as low-level Viet Cong infrastructure, or VCI.

b. It is the enemy infrastructure which has mobilized rural Vietnamese to enter enemy ranks as soldiers, guerrillas and laborers, to hide and supply enemy units and to provide intelligence on friendly activities. The strength must not be minimized. Ironically, it is precisely this echelon which is most vulnerable to sustain, comprehensive attack - at the village level. To retain control of the population, the enemy's cadre must remain among them constantly exhorting and threatening. Wherever his grip of fear can be shaken, therefore, the enemy cadre is in mortal danger of exposure and elimination.

30. The Village and the VCI

a. Encouraging as the PHUNG HOANG successes were in 1969, it was clear that the anti-infrastructure program had only begun at village level. The program was notably stronger in urban than in rural areas, and in many cases village and some district authorities displayed a pronounced lack of enthusiasm for the program.

b. Infrastructure elimination at the village level, particularly when accomplished by village forces, is an excellent index of progress in pacification. It indicates that village leaders, and the villagers themselves, have committed themselves decisively to the government cause. Stated another way, it means that the population has come to believe that it has more to gain from the elimination of the enemy apparatus than from continued coexistence with it.

c. Conversely, assurances from village officials that

"everyone here is pro-GVN" should rarely, if ever, be accepted at face value. In remote areas this is a firm indication that a tacit "accommodation" may exist between the local GVN and VC authorities. It may be that this is the only course which allows the GVN officials to stay alive. Or, a stable local equilibrium may have been established. There is much circumstantial evidence that local VC leaders, like many low-level GVN officials, often rationalize that "whatever I do, the way is not going to be decided in my village" and that any local escalation would only provoke reprisals without producing any permanent change. (See also Chapter II, Paragraph 31 d).

d. Increased reports of enemy activity are thus, paradoxically, often a sign that the enemy's strength in an area is waning. If the reports are exploited successfully, a sort of momentum can develop. Growing confidence on the part of village security elements and the population at large will lead to more VCI eliminations until the entire enemy apparatus is either wiped out or driven out. Only when this happens can pacification be termed "successful".

31. Elements of a Village Anti-VCI Campaign

A successful anti-VCI program must be built on three mutually reinforcing elements:

- Comprehensive Population Control
- Reliable Intelligence
- Effective Counter-Organization

The last of these elements is also a vital technique in building village cohesion and, as a by-product, support for the GVN. As a security measure, it is discussed separately below, paragraph 34, "People's Groups". Throughout the discussion of population control and intelligence methods which follow, however, it should be remembered that only effective counter-organization is a reliable defense against the resurgence of enemy organization.

32. Population Control Measures

a. The National Police play a central role in all population control (and resources control) measures, assisted by other security elements as appropriate. As always, thorough coordination is essential.

b. Census. The first step is an accurate census of the population. Each family head is interviewed in some detail by Police RD Cadre or Census Grievance Cadre. Information and basic bio-data is elicited from each family head not only on his own family but also on his neighbors. Census taking usually occurs during the first stages of pacification and may profitably be coupled with the

VILLAGE SECURITY

distribution of propaganda and queries on the aspirations of the population. Carefully done, a census will provide a wealth of useful information about a village or hamlet. For instance, the frequency of evasive answers is a good index of enemy influence. The census should also be used to identify potential leaders of village development and self-defense programs. An update to the basic village/hamlet census should be made following any significant population movement.

c. Mapping. From census data and other observation, the RD Cadre or Police proceed to make a careful map of the surveyed area, showing the location of each house, path, stream, field, orchard and other significant terrain feature. District and MATS advisors will find it useful to secure copies.

d. Documentation. In the middle stages of a pacification campaign considerable energy must be devoted to documentation of the population and for this purpose extra administrative assistance often must be provided by district or province. Where there has been a substantial GVN presence, if only by day, however, most of the population will have such essential documents as:

- Personal Identity Cards
- Family Books (documents listing all inhabitants of a particular residence)
- Voter Registration
- Draft Registration (as appropriate)

The issuance and updating of these documents is a major task of the village administration and of the police. Additionally, GVN law requires that permits be issued for the transport of a wide variety of commodities, including food. As a citizen in a GVN-controlled area is virtually unable to move without such documents, the population is willing to suffer much to obtain them.

e. Classification. Another major intermediate step in population control is classification of the population into "pro-GVN", "fencesitters" and "neutralist or pro-communist" elements. Properly done and recorded on the village/hamlet map, this can be an invaluable aid.

f. Checks and Searches

(1) All of the information developed through the census, mapping, documentation and classification process should be retained and used by village security authorities. Combined with whatever intelligence may be developed, the data serves as the basis for a coherent and regular program of stakeouts, searches and document checks.

(2) House searches should ordinarily be conducted at night, during curfew hours. They usually may be carried-out by one or two policemen supported by a small PF or PSDF element (large enough, however, to seal all exits from a building). Care should be taken that the targets remain secret to all but the operation commander until the operation is underway. House-to-house searches are ordinarily ineffective as the element of surprise is lost. More properly, a few searches of scattered dwellings (either at random or on the basis of intelligence) might well be incorporated in the nightly patrols of PF and especially PSDF elements.

(3) Movement checks are essential to hinder enemy supply activity. This includes not only the often-abused resources control checkpoints on major arteries, but also searches of oxcarts, sampans, carrying baskets and the like of people using paths and streams from the village into nearby fields and forests. This latter task is properly a function of the village security forces. Particularly when the population or a portion of it must regularly go into enemy-dominated areas in order to earn their living, it is important to institute such checks. They should be made on access paths and streams, at least occasionally at some distance from the populated area. In one hamlet of woodcutters it was found for instance that the people, under pressure of the enemy, were caching sandbags full of rice and other goods a half-kilometer outside the hamlet. After their oxcarts had been checked at the village gate, they would pick up the hidden sandbags and transport them to enemy cadre deep in the jungle. A more effective system of checks, while it probably did not stop this traffic entirely, was reported to have at least given the woodcutters an excuse for not meeting the enemy's extortionate demands.

(4) It may be seen that the population control measures described above may be easily abused. Document checks and searches offer opportunity for bribe-taking, while classification has been known to serve as a vehicle for local vendettas among non-communist rivals. District and MATS advisors should be alert to the possibility of such abuses and may often be effective in curbing them. The development of strong local leadership and community spirit, together with the checks and balances inherent in utilizing PF, Police and PSDF jointly, can prove a much more efficient deterrent, however.

33. Intelligence

a. The creation of an effective village intelligence system is simple in concept, sometimes difficult in execution. As in most other village security tasks, strong leadership at the village level is a pre-requisite. Additionally, there must be:

(1) A regular, two-way flow of information between the village and the DIOCC, either through the village deputy for security

or the Special Branch policeman assigned to the village.

(2) Energetic exploitation of timely intelligence by village forces, augmented as necessary by NFFF, PRU or district intelligence squads.

b. In recent years there has been a proliferation of intelligence networks at the village level. In the same hamlet different individuals - or even the same individual may be reporting to the district S-2, the Police Special Branch, RD Cadre, MSS and PRU. With some exceptions these agent/sympathizer reports are collated at the DIOCC. Rarely, however, has this collated information been passed back to the village security authorities.

c. Where feasible, it is desirable that village-level intelligence collection be more closely coordinated. The deputy village chief for security is charged with the organization of intelligence networks. He should thus be the principal point of contact between the village government and the DIOCC, assisted by the Special Branch policeman if one is assigned to the village. Specific channels for information reporting should be clearly established. It is most important that each RD and PSDF group leader and each PF platoon leader have clear instructions. All intelligence information developed by PF, PSDF, RD Cadre and village-level National Police should be passed by them to the deputy village chief for security, either directly or through the hamlet deputies for security. The village deputy for security should be responsible for collating this information and passing it expeditiously to the DIOCC together with his evaluation of it. Where the information is "actionable" by village forces, they should be encouraged to react to it at the discretion of the village deputy for security. District forces should be employed as a reserve to operate jointly with village security forces when needed or to be used when intelligence cannot be exploited conveniently at the village level.

d. In nearly all cases, DIOCC's should give greater emphasis to "feedback" to the village level. For example, the village deputy for security should be briefed as completely as possible on relevant intelligence developed by assets not under village control. He in turn can brief the village chief and other village security leaders on a need-to-know basis. The reporting of experienced agents and sympathizers can improve greatly when they are assigned specific targets and provided such background information (EEI) as is available on these targets.

e. Intelligence orientation should be given to PF and PSDF periodically. These elements are generally a greatly underemployed intelligence asset. Many advisors consider PSDF, with their extensive family ties, to be potentially the best source of low-level information. Further, studies have shown that the best PF platoons

invariably enjoy highly accurate intelligence reporting from sympathizers among the population. Advisors should try to ensure that this intelligence is collected, passed upward and reacted to whenever possible. During PF/PSDF orientation, stress must be laid on capturing enemy cadre, rather than killing them. VCI neutralization competitions have proven effective in some districts.

g. The village and hamlet Information/Chieu Hoi cadre should always form part of the village "intelligence community". Not only do their jobs carry them into areas where useful information can be collected, but also the information cadre can prove invaluable in developing leaflets and face-to-face propaganda themes targeted against local enemy units and personalities.

34. People's Groups

a. The formation of people's groups is a key step in the establishment of permanent village security. People's groups have been discussed above as elements in the political mobilization and self-development process (sections III and IV). Further, the basic organization and security mission of the People's Self-Defense Force was outlined in paragraph 16.

b. It cannot be stressed too often that political and security objectives are united in the people's groups program. Without an overt commitment from the population in favor of GVN objectives, pacification is hardly distinguishable from military occupation. People's groups, and especially the PSDF, are the vehicle through which such a commitment is begun.

c. In 1971 the GVN has set up a program to actively encourage the formation and development of People's Organizations. Within this program it is the responsibility of all government officials to encourage and assist People's Organizations, but not to control them. In other words, GVN officials are not supposed to be officials in any people's organizations nor exert undue influence over them. Additionally, 25% of the province development budget is available to People's Groups, at their request, to aid them with organizational expenses such as office supplies and publicity materials but not for financing any permanent construction or special projects. Organizations of a cultural, professional, athletic and work related type are included within this program as well as such groups as Farmer's Associations and small scale cooperatives.

d. People's Self-Defense Groups are most likely to succeed when the villager believes that:

(1) He will be supplied with adequate means (weapons, ammunition, training and support when needed) to defend his interest.

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(2) His neighbors will all join and he will not be an isolated target.

(3) He and his neighbors will be allowed to defend their interests against terrorism from any quarter.

(4) The Self-Defense Force is truly a People's Self-Defense Force and not a puppet-like auxiliary to the RVNAF.

(5) Active participation in the PSDF offers a real opportunity to escape from otherwise interminable oppression and exploitation.

e. Participation in the PSDF, particularly the initial act of accepting a weapon, leads the villager toward a conditional pro-GVN commitment. If, through sponsoring PSDF and other programs, the GVN clearly helps the villager to preserve his life, family and property while the Viet Cong/NVA threaten them, the villager will become pro-GVN.

f. Encouraging this conditional commitment is a fundamental GVN/US objective. It is a calculated risk, for the same weapons may be turned on despotic local GVN representatives or undisciplined government troops. Early experience with the PSDF program indicates, however, that:

(1) Where the PSDF concept has been earnestly implemented, village/hamlet security has risen dramatically; the villager has not hesitated to accept arms once he is sure that the conditions outlined in subparagraph d, above, have been met;

(2) Once the great step of accepting weapons from the government has been taken a link is established which almost inevitably leads to a greater individual and community willingness to make further pro-GVN commitments.

g. The PSDF is ordinarily the first people's group which is established at the village level. The task should not end there, however. The entire population should be drawn into self-defense efforts. Children, old men and women can be trained to report information of intelligence value and to warn of suspicious developments. Teenaged boys and girls render valuable service as runners and ammunition carriers and can help to establish and maintain an intra-hamlet system of barriers and firing positions.

h. The transformation of a "typical" Vietnamese village into the sort of "combat village" discussed above is by no means an easy task. That it is possible, however, is demonstrated by the dozens of such villages (often solidly Catholic or Hoa Hao) which already exist as well as enemy successes with similar organizational

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techniques. The keys to success are two: firm adherence to the conditions outlined in subparagraph d, above, and sustained emphasis by village, district and province officials and district and province advisors. This command emphasis must take the form of constructive,, patient support and encouragement; the temptation to prod, coerce or meddle into matters which the PSDF themselves or the village as a whole should determine must be resisted.

i. The military role of PSDF should not dominate the organization however to exclude efforts at political mobilization and community involvement. PSDF can only exist successfully where the people are united in support of their community and government. Command emphasis should be placed on PSDF as a community effort.

V

The American Advisor and the Village

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Detailed knowledge of the villages in their areas of responsibility is essential to personnel assigned to district and MATS advisory teams. To a lesser extent, such knowledge is important to civic action and province advisory personnel.

2. This handbook is an aid to personal investigation and to problem solving. Necessarily, it has dwelt on formal structures at the expense of informal relationships and has offered general statements at the expense of specific examples. Throughout, however, it has stressed the diversity of village life, the many variables which make each village a unique community. It is up to the individual advisor to become sensitive to these variations and to modify his strategy for dealing with each village problem accordingly.

3. Section B of this chapter offers some general guidance on the advisory role in village development. Section C is a short discussion of low-level corruption - a problem which every advisor must face at some time. Section D offers some tips on the "style of work" which help to maximize advisory effectiveness at the village level. Section E suggests that a systematic program of information collection will greatly enhance the advisory efforts of district teams.

B. THE ADVISORY ROLE

4. Village problems are but one area - although an extremely important one - of the many functional areas which demand the attention of the advisor. A hit or miss approach accomplishes little. It

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may even be counterproductive if it generates expectations and then fails to fulfill them. The advisor's involvement in village affairs must be organized, focused, and purposeful.

5. It is essential that the advisory presence in village affairs - as in nearly every activity - be supportive rather than preemptive. At all times the advisor must encourage the development of constructive relationships between the village, district and province. This point is stressed because in many cases village officials will attempt to press unilateral relationships on the advisor in hopes of avoiding normal bureaucratic hurdles. Alternatively, he may hope to enlist the advisor as an ally against the district or province chief. Although the district advisor may support his counterpart in urging a course of action upon province authorities, his proper role in conflicts of village and district interests is one of firm impartiality and adherence to establish pacification/development objectives.

6. The advisor can do much to determine whether district and province play a constructive, supporting and encouraging role or a destructive, domineering role in relation to the village. Many district and province officials seem to feel that amplification of village authority and responsibility implies a corresponding diminution in their own status. Through word and deed, advisors must reflect this assumption. The district chief is a key figure in the implementation of the village development strategy. He must be encouraged to adopt a new role. Clearly his job is no longer the detailed direction of village and hamlet activity. He is a general manager. His primary job is to speed the development of strong and viable village governments. The district chief must lead the village officials to accept their new responsibilities and become effective local leaders, as well as administrators. The district chief's task is to coordinate the activity of the village in all areas, to supervise judiciously and to trouble-shoot when necessary, and to ensure that the village receive energetic support from above.

7. Vis-a-vis the village the advisor, like the district chief, must play a judicious, supportive role. This activity should normally be undertaken in concert with his counterpart. Emphasis should be placed on supplementing and enhancing projects or programs developed by the villages, rather than pushing one's own ideas, no matter how logical. US resources, as available, should be used as a stimulus to maximum possible mobilization of village and GVN resources.

8. The statutory roles and responsibilities of the various village officials have been discussed extensively in preceding chapters. Advisory influence must be exercised in a manner which reinforces the reorganized village structure. The principle of unity of command must be strictly respected. The village chief or, in his absence, the deputies for security and administration, are the responsible authorities for the entire range of village affairs. Their

subordinates, such as the village commissioners, the hamlet chiefs, the PF leaders, the RD Cadre group leader and the police chief, are useful sources of information. They should not be permitted to go out of channels in dealings with advisors, however, any more than this should be encouraged in their dealings with district authorities. For example, no request from a hamlet chief for assistance in a project should be entertained if it has not been countersigned by the village chief or his deputy for administration. If a PF platoon leader wishes an advisor to help him talk the province SM&DSL into increasing his allocation of grenades, the request should be routed through the village chief or his deputy for security. Finally, if village officials request assistance in a matter of some importance, the advisor might quite properly require that the request be approved by the village council before he acts on it.

9. The advisor must function as a middleman between village authorities and US/FWMAF units operating in or doing civic action in his area. It is his job to ensure that these units work through the village and district governments; that their activities are designed to stimulate maximum complimentary effort on the part of the villages. Failure to integrate the operational responsibilities of village security forces and nearby US or FWMAF units is as deplorable a lapse as failure to integrate civic action projects into an overall village development plan. It is desirable to institutionalize relations between village authorities and US/FWMAF elements operating in an area on a continuing basis. The most successful device is the "Community Relations Council" which permits village leaders, district officials, advisors and representatives of friendly units to discuss and solve problems in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and candor.

10. MAT advisors: MAT's are generally assigned to work with a specific Regional or Popular Forces unit for a two to three month period. Recently some have been assigned to work with PF on a village-wide basis, and additionally to assist the village governments on civil matters. MAT leaders should discuss with their superiors the degree to which they should work actively with the village government or governments in their area of assignment.

C. A NOTE ON CORRUPTION

11. Corruption is the pervasive vice of the Vietnamese administrative system. Although corruption is somewhat less rampant now than in the recent past, it is nonetheless likely that every advisor will have to grapple with it at some point in his tour.

12. The multiple checks on village fiscal autonomy appear to have developed largely in an effort to prevent corruption. Ironically, their combined effect is to promote if not corruption -- irregularities and inactivity. The activist village or district chief is caught in a squeeze - he can do his job only by bending the

regulations on occasion, because the grant of fiscal authority given the village (or district or province) is not appropriate to the degree of responsibility assigned to it.

13. Corruption in rural Viet-Nam is not the black and white situation which Americans tend to make of it. To the Vietnamese, corruption is injustice. Conscious fiscal irregularities, if they contribute to the common good, are not viewed as "corruption". Taking money from the village budget to buy a coffin for a dead PF is an example of this. "Inviting" rich landlords to contribute money to repair a bridge or buy a generator for the elementary school is also thought unobjectionable. An official becomes "corrupt" when he abuses his power by lining his own pockets at the expense of the less fortunate.

14. The law, of course, does not recognize questions of relative morality. Such a situation is made to order for the unscrupulous. Any official who allows an irregularity inevitably becomes a target for those who can audit his books. An official who does not "play along" is subject to reprisals.

15. Solutions are rarely to be found in denunciations and counter-denunciations. Rather, they are to be found in decentralization, simplification and a general matching of authority and responsibility. In this respect, recent decrees increasing the formal assets and authority of the village government are constructive first steps. The local advisor should not hesitate to bring cases of flagrant corruption to the attention of his counterpart and his superiors. It is equally incumbent on him, however, to attempt to secure removal of the informal restrictions which, together with statutory over-control, act to encourage corrupt activity.

D. STYLE OF WORK

16. The villager, even the village officials, is far less attuned to alien behaviour than the city dweller, the district or province official or the ARVN soldier. This is both an advantage and a pitfall. One hand, village leaders are rather more ready to accept American good intentions at face value than the city-bred "sophisticate". On the other hand, village leaders will be more readily confused and, perhaps, irritated by an inappropriate "style of work" on the part of the advisor.

17. By "style of work" the Vietnamese means the behavioral patterns and relationships which a person adopts in order to get a job done efficiently and harmoniously. In this respect, Americans are most often criticized for being insensitive, over-direct and over-loud, condescending and impatient. The back-slapping, jocular form of approach, which Americans adopt among themselves to establish a friendly, tension-free atmosphere (harmony) is poisonous in dealing

with unsophisticated Vietnamese. Unless it is between very close friends, such behavior is interpreted as extreme condescension.

18. In light of the above, the cardinal rule in dealing with village people is to be your well-behaved self. Remain calm, collected, patient and a little bit formal. Don't exaggerate gestures and facial expressions; this inhibits rather than increases understanding. Loud laughter is a sign of uneasiness, for instance. Smile and speak slowly in an ordinary tone of voice. Try to develop the habit of saying something is, for instance, "not very clean", rather than "dirty". The ability to speak Vietnamese is an advantage and a good ice-breaker, but it is not half so important as being able to adapt behavior to a pattern which effectively expresses your feelings to the Vietnamese.

19. The advisor should not be inhibited by the cautions expressed here, but should be guided by them. An effective style of work can only be learned through practice. Only by getting out into the villages regularly, and while there learning all that he can about a community's background and special characteristics, does an advisor acquire the understanding necessary to deal effectively with village problems.

20. It is desirable to get acquainted with and to show respect for village elders and religious leaders. Solicit their ideas. Work, however, only through the constituted authorities. Do not jump to hasty conclusions about these personnel and do nothing to show disrespect either by work or deed.

21. A project, however attractive, is not worth doing if it is not enthusiastically supported by village leaders. They must be willing to mobilize village resources and make a project a village project. The advisor may be asked to contribute resources; this is an occasion for bargaining. A study of the village budget and development plan will show what resources the village can be expected to contribute.

22. Avoid rash promises. Keep in mind that a conditional promise is often misunderstood as a commitment. When embarking on a major project, be sure to make a written (bi-lingual) agreement.

23. Focus team effort. Select for emphasis areas where the maximum return on invested energy and resources is possible in terms of the overall US/GVN objectives. Bear in mind that while extra effort is usually necessary in the more remote villages, the potential pay-off is also greater.

E. VILLAGE FILES - AS INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY FOR ADVISORY TEAMS

24. Adequate information is essential to effective advisory

influence in village development. Collection of such information should be a continuing responsibility of every member of a district advisory team, to include MAT advisors.

25. Data collection should be systematic. The objective of a district data collection program should be the creation of a set of village files which may serve as a sort of "institutional memory" for district and MAT advisors. They are invaluable for briefing new arrivals, for handy reference in meeting reporting requirements and, most important, as a tool for planning and for supporting recommendations to counterparts.

26. Following is a suggested procedure for the collection of basic data on village affairs:

a. Objective data is usually available from province and district records and from visits to the villages. The initial collection of this information requires a fair amount of legwork. The job should be divided either geographically or functionally among all capable members of a district team. One team member, such as the Deputy District Advisor for Civil Affairs, should be assigned to coordinate the project. He should brief counterpart officials on the project and enlist their assistance if possible.

b. The Village/Hamlet Administrative Status Handbook, which is maintained by the province and district administrative services, is a good point of departure. It contains the names of all village/hamlet officials and other basic information on the administration of each village. If a copy can be obtained, it may be taken along on visits to the villages and its accuracy checked with village officials. It is a convenient springboard for further questioning and discussion.

c. Preferably, information should be collected in the course of a series of visits to each village, rather than all at once. When possible, these visits can be made in the company of a variety of counterparts, such as the District Administration, Finance and RD Service Chiefs, or the S-1, the S-4 and the S-5 as well as with their superiors. In general, service chiefs and staff officers at district level do not visit the villages often enough - frequently through lack of transportation.

d. Through repeated visits by district advisory team members the initial wariness of village officials concerning requests for detailed information will generally give way to readiness to assist as well as they are able. Overnight visits are excellent for a leisurely review of village history and traditions with village leaders, as well as confidential discussion of their more serious problems.

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e. Where possible, copies of current village budgets should be secured. Often district deputies for administration will provide them. These are an invaluable guide to nearly all aspects of village activity.

f. Map-making is an important adjunct of village data collection. Free-hand maps of village areas are usually posted in village offices. These maps go into considerable detail - showing village and hamlet boundaries, the locations of houses, public buildings, defensive installations and terrain features. They may be traced or copied on a smaller scale. Advisory teams may wish to consider a planning aid for their own use and the use of district and village officials.

g. TFES and RFES statistics, of course, should be made part of the village file.

h. Once the basic data is on file, periodic updates and editing will be relatively painless. At this point it is desirable to capitalize on advisors' familiarity with the villages by beginning to incorporate subjective evaluations. These may include notes on village problems, on relations between village and district personalities, on the reputation and character of village leaders, on village performance on development projects, on evidence of corruption, and so forth. At a minimum, each departing district or MAT advisor should be required to edit and update the village files and to add his own comments.

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