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## Chapter 5

### VIETNAM ADVISOR TRAINING METHODS AND BACKGROUNDS

The Military Advisor Debriefing Questionnaire and Supplement contained many items developed for the purpose of evaluating methods, techniques, courses, and background sources that relate to training advisors for duty in hostile environments. The results are presented in this chapter in terms of training methods, military assistance courses, college background courses, and topics relating to training in advisory procedures.

The advisors were asked to evaluate importance to their job effectiveness of orientation and training in each of 18 topics. Table 30 presents these topics in order of their mean ratings.

Table 30

Importance to Job Effectiveness of Training Topics<sup>2</sup>

| Item No. | Training and Orientation Topic                                    | N   | Mean Rating | Percent |            |          |        |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------|---------|------------|----------|--------|
|          |                                                                   |     |             | 4 High  | 3 Moderate | 2 Slight | 1 None |
| 234      | Host-country culture, customs, behavior of host-country people    | 590 | 3.6         | 69.2    | 23.2       | 6.8      | 0.9    |
| 247      | The advisor as viewed by counterparts                             | 587 | 3.6         | 65.8    | 27.1       | 6.0      | 1.2    |
| 248      | Relationships between counterparts and their superiors            | 584 | 3.6         | 69.2    | 24.3       | 5.5      | 1.0    |
| 251      | Host-country military organization, operations, limitations, etc. | 588 | 3.6         | 67.7    | 25.9       | 5.5      | 1.0    |
| 239      | Host-country language                                             | 590 | 3.5         | 60.2    | 28.8       | 10.5     | 0.5    |
| 240      | U.S. objectives in host country                                   | 585 | 3.5         | 58.6    | 31.5       | 9.1      | 0.9    |
| 246      | Definition of role as an advisor in host country                  | 589 | 3.5         | 60.8    | 29.7       | 8.3      | 1.2    |
| 249      | Host-country internal development programs and advisor's role     | 587 | 3.5         | 53.8    | 37.8       | 7.5      | 0.9    |
| 250      | Host-country internal defense programs and advisors role          | 588 | 3.5         | 61.9    | 31.3       | 5.8      | 1.0    |
| 235      | Host-country government and laws                                  | 590 | 3.3         | 43.2    | 40.5       | 15.1     | 1.2    |

(Continued)

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Table 30 (Continued)

## Importance to Job Effectiveness of Training Topics<sup>a</sup>

| Item No. | Training and Orientation Topic                         | N   | Mean Rating | Percent |            |          |        |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------|---------|------------|----------|--------|
|          |                                                        |     |             | 4 High  | 3 Moderate | 2 Slight | 1 None |
| 242      | MAP in the host country                                | 582 | 3.3         | 48.3    | 36.4       | 13.4     | 1.9    |
| 236      | Host-country history and politics                      | 587 | 3.2         | 39.4    | 43.1       | 15.9     | 1.7    |
| 238      | Host-country geography                                 | 588 | 3.2         | 41.3    | 35.7       | 20.2     | 2.7    |
| 237      | Host-country economy and resources                     | 590 | 3.1         | 33.2    | 47.0       | 17.3     | 2.6    |
| 241      | U.S. civilian programs (AID, USIS, Peace Corps, etc.)  | 584 | 3.1         | 37.5    | 37.2       | 19.5     | 5.8    |
| 243      | Advising in a cross-cultural work situation            | 583 | 3.0         | 31.1    | 42.1       | 22.1     | 4.8    |
| 245      | Living conditions in host country                      | 589 | 3.0         | 35.3    | 34.3       | 27.7     | 2.7    |
| 244      | Practical exercises in a cross-cultural work situation | 583 | 2.8         | 25.9    | 38.8       | 28.5     | 6.9    |

<sup>a</sup>Listed in order of the mean ratings.

## HOST-COUNTRY MILITARY SYSTEM

Among the items with the highest average ratings were two that dealt with the host-country military system. More than 90% of the advisors said that training and orientation in host-country military organization, operations, and limitations were of either High or Moderate importance to job effectiveness (Table 31, item 251). An almost identical rating was given to the topic of relationships between counterparts and their superiors (item 248).

Table 31

## Host-Country Military System

| Item No. | Importance to Job Effectiveness                                   | N   | Percent Answering High or Moderate |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------|
| 248      | Relationships between counterparts and their superiors            | 584 | 93.5                               |
| 251      | Host country military organization, operations, limitations, etc. | 588 | 93.6                               |

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The counterpart is often reported to be unable to act because of the constricting influence of the host-country military organization, and the procedures that require approval by superiors of many of the decisions that counterparts make. Thus, even though a counterpart might agree with his advisor, often he cannot act upon advice because of problems between him and his superior. The advisor also needs to know whether there is friction among officers and enlisted men.

### ROLE OF THE ADVISOR

Four items concerning the role of the advisor also ranked high in mean ratings; more than 90% of the advisors rated each of them either High or Moderate in importance (Table 32, items 246, 247, 249, and 250). Some counterparts were said to view advisors strictly as a source of logistical support. It was suggested that unbiased evaluation of each advisor's mission is needed. A serious effort to understand the counterpart was thought to be essential in advisory work.

Table 32

#### Role of the Advisor

| Item No. | Importance to Job Effectiveness                               | N   | Percent Answering High or Moderate |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------|
| 246      | Definition of role as advisor in host country                 | 589 | 90.5                               |
| 247      | The advisor as viewed by counterparts                         | 587 | 92.9                               |
| 249      | Host-country internal development programs and advisor's role | 587 | 91.6                               |
| 250      | Host-country internal defense programs and advisors' role     | 588 | 93.2                               |

### UNITED STATES PROGRAMS IN THE HOST COUNTRY

Three of the items in Table 30 pertained to U.S. programs in the host country. United States objectives received either High or Moderate ratings from nine in ten of the advisors (Table 33, item 240). Over four-fifths rated the topic of MAP in the host country as being at least Moderately important (item 242), and three-fourths of the advisors gave at least Moderate ratings to training and orientation in U.S. civilian programs such as AID, USIS, and the Peace Corps (item 241).

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Table 33

## United States Programs in the Host Country

| Item No. | Importance to Job Effectiveness                                | N   | Percent Answering High or Moderate |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------|
| 240      | United States objectives in host country                       | 585 | 90.1                               |
| 241      | United States civilian programs (AID, USIS, Peace Corps, etc.) | 584 | 74.7                               |
| 242      | MAP in the host country                                        | 582 | 84.7                               |

## ADAPTATION TO THE HOST COUNTRY

Several items that concern adaptation to the host country received ratings indicating that they were at least moderately important to job effectiveness (Table 34, items 243-245). The reasons for attributing High importance to the culture-related items in Table 30 are not immediately apparent, but they suggest that the concept of "culture shock" might play a larger role in the success of many advisors than has hitherto been believed to be the case.

Table 34

## Adaptation to the Host Country

| Item No. | Importance to Job Effectiveness                        | N   | Percent Answering High or Moderate |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------|
| 243      | Advising in a cross-cultural work situation            | 583 | 64.7                               |
| 244      | Practical exercises in a cross-cultural work situation | 583 | 54.7                               |
| 245      | Living conditions in host country                      | 589 | 69.6                               |

## AREA STUDY TOPICS

Area study topics also were rated low in importance to job effectiveness as training and orientation topics, with one plausible exception: Host-country culture, customs, behavior of host-country people (Table 35, items 234-239). Nevertheless, all items received at least Moderate ratings from more than three-fourths of their samples. Acceptance of the advisor by the host-country people is necessary in order for the advisor to be effective. Therefore, an understanding of the host-country social/cultural environment is essential in advisory positions, since lack of understanding of the counterpart's customs can lead to serious advisory problems. One of the more important values of language

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training concerned rapport. Ability to speak the language was thought to get the advisor "on the right side" of his counterpart almost immediately.

Table 35  
Area Study Topics

| Item No. | Importance to Job Effectiveness                                | N   | Percent Answering High or Moderate |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------|
| 234      | Host-country culture, customs, behavior of host-country people | 590 | 92.4                               |
| 235      | Host-country government and laws                               | 590 | 82.7                               |
| 236      | Host-country history and politics                              | 587 | 82.5                               |
| 237      | Host-country economy and resources                             | 590 | 80.2                               |
| 238      | Host-country geography                                         | 588 | 77.0                               |
| 239      | Host-country language                                          | 590 | 89.0                               |

## VALUES OF TRAINING TO ADVISOR EFFECTIVENESS

Three possible hindrances to effectiveness as an advisor give an idea of the importance of training to advisory duty performance. Only small fractions of the advisors found the lack of knowledge about their duties or about host-country military hardware to be a Moderate or Serious hindrance (Table 36, items 90 and 93), but over one-third (35%) said they were hindered by insufficient training for advisory work (item 82).

Table 36  
Advisory Training

| Item No. | Hindrance to Job Effectiveness                                                                 | N   | Percent |        |          |         |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|----------|---------|
|          |                                                                                                |     | None    | Slight | Moderate | Serious |
| 82       | Insufficient training for advisory work                                                        | 481 | 29.3    | 35.4   | 22.0     | 13.3    |
| 90       | Insufficient knowledge of obsolete and foreign military hardware used by host-country military | 470 | 55.3    | 28.1   | 11.1     | 5.5     |
| 93       | Insufficient understanding of own advisory duties and responsibilities                         | 485 | 68.9    | 21.9   | 5.2      | 4.1     |

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## EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING TECHNIQUES

The eight items listed in Table 37 concern evaluation of the effectiveness of training techniques in preparing advisors to work in hostile environments. Note that there is wide variation in the size of the samples ( $N \pm 133$  to 519), which suggests that respondents to one item are not necessarily equivalent to any other group, in terms of their ability to judge the effectiveness of all the training courses. Since such equivalence might not actually exist, conclusions about relative effectiveness of training techniques should be considered tentative.

Table 37  
Effectiveness of Training Techniques

| Item No. | Effectiveness of Training                                                         | N   | Percent |        |            |        |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|------------|--------|
|          |                                                                                   |     | Useless | Barely | Moderately | Highly |
| 438      | Realistic simulated combat training                                               | 423 | 10.2    | 18.9   | 31.7       | 39.3   |
| 439      | Leadership reaction course                                                        | 347 | 11.0    | 18.5   | 35.5       | 35.2   |
| 440      | Ranger training                                                                   | 133 | 12.8    | 6.8    | 26.3       | 54.1   |
| 441      | Survival training                                                                 | 322 | 5.3     | 14.3   | 37.6       | 42.9   |
| 442      | Case histories                                                                    | 377 | 5.8     | 20.2   | 47.0       | 27.1   |
| 443      | Lessons learned from experiences of previous advisors                             | 519 | 1.7     | 11.0   | 38.4       | 49.0   |
| 444      | Training the advisor as a guerrilla in order to teach him to think like the enemy | 274 | 9.0     | 17.2   | 29.9       | 44.9   |
| 445      | Practical exercises with built-in frustrations                                    | 305 | 11.5    | 15.7   | 35.4       | 38.4   |

Ranger training (item 440) was considered Highly or Moderately effective by 80% of the responding advisors, and had the largest percentage of Highly effective responses of any item in the table. Some advisors believed that ranger training should be mandatory for all advisors. More ranger type of training for student advisors, who are to be assigned to hostile environments, might profitably be integrated into training programs. Before doing this, however, it should be determined why almost 20% of the advisors who had received ranger training felt it to be only Barely effective in preparing them for their jobs under hostile conditions.

Survival training (item 441) is another technique that a majority of advisors rate highly; there were 80% who said this technique was either Highly or Moderately effective. The actual benefits that survival training provides for advisors in hostile environments should be identified. Survival training also might profitably be incorporated into the advisor training curriculum.

Lessons learned from previous advisors were considered Highly or Moderately effective as a training technique by 87.4% of the advisors; almost half the total number of respondents (49%) said it was Highly effective (item 443).

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More emphasis should be placed on systematic collection, preservation, evaluation, and interpretation of advisors' experiences.

Case histories are akin to lessons learned in that both are derived from the experiences of previous advisors (item 442). Case histories, however, received a much lower percentage of Highly effective responses than did lessons learned. Perhaps many advisors consider lessons learned to be short anecdotes, and believe case histories to be unnecessarily detailed and lengthy.

Training the advisor as a guerrilla in order to teach him to think like the enemy (item 444) was rated either Highly or Moderately effective by almost three-fourths of the respondents. Almost half (45%) the respondents said it was Highly effective.

Realistic, simulated combat training (item 438) and the leadership reaction course (item 439) were rated either Highly or Moderately effective by more than seven-tenths of the advisors, and the distribution of their responses was similar.

Practical exercises with built-in frustrations were rated either Highly or Moderately effective by 74% of those who had had such training (item 445). It is thought that many advisors might be unable to cope with frustration and/or lack patience to cope with long periods of relative inactivity. Clearly, a certain amount of frustration is to be expected in an advisory job, and its sources should be identified and used for training purposes. The degree to which advisors can be trained to cope with job-related frustrations also needs further investigation. Training situations that confront a student with innumerable problems while under stress might enhance his advisory potential.

### IMPORTANCE OF ADVISORS' BEHAVIORS IN DEALING WITH COUNTERPARTS

Almost all the advisors apparently felt that gaining full understanding of the situation before advising is important to effectiveness, since almost 95% rated this item as being of either Great or Moderate importance (Table 38, item 332). It also is evident from the same table that, in many situations, time for assessment is limited; about 88% of the advisors rated responding quickly and decisively as being of Great or Moderate importance (item 333).

There are certain factors that complicate and impede the process of assessment and decision for advisors. Linguistic and cultural differences obviously are important. Not being able to identify the enemy is a major concern. Probably the most important factor is the necessity for the advisor to understand the situation as seen through the counterpart's eyes as well as through his own. An advisor can reach his decision only after careful consideration of how his counterpart will receive and understand his advice, the counterpart's ability and authority to act upon advice, possible compromises with the counterpart, and the counterpart's motivation to carry out the advice. Since the ability to gain full understanding of the situation assumes considerable importance in advisory duty, further research should be directed at identifying factors that confuse and delay understanding. Then advisors should be trained to cope with such factors. A large number of advisors (92%) said that it is of either Great or Moderate importance to make it clear that you are there to help, not to inspect or evaluate (item 329). This result indicates that some counterparts are likely to misunderstand the function of the advisor, either because of their own attitudes and experiences, or because of the advisor's attitudes and behavior toward his counterpart. Advisors should be warned about the potential danger of appearing to be one who inspects or evaluates.

The way an advisor faces the dangers of a hostile environment will greatly influence his effectiveness. It can be determined from Table 38 that 90% of the advisors said that

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Table 38

## Importance of Advisors' Behaviors In Dealing With Counterparts

| Item No. | Behavior                                                               | N   | Percent |       |          |       |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|-------|----------|-------|
|          |                                                                        |     | None    | Small | Moderate | Great |
| 327      | Showing courage and ability under fire                                 | 585 | 6.5     | 6.3   | 28.2     | 59.0  |
| 328      | Keeping physically fit                                                 | 583 | 3.8     | 12.2  | 40.3     | 43.7  |
| 329      | Showing that you are there to help, <i>not</i> to inspect or evaluate  | 583 | 2.2     | 5.3   | 22.3     | 70.2  |
| 330      | Proceeding slowly and deliberately                                     | 583 | 6.0     | 14.6  | 42.2     | 37.2  |
| 331      | Being assertive                                                        | 572 | 7.9     | 30.3  | 42.0     | 19.9  |
| 332      | Gaining full understanding of the situation before advising            | 584 | 0.9     | 4.5   | 21.4     | 73.3  |
| 333      | Responding quickly and decisively                                      | 585 | 1.7     | 10.6  | 32.3     | 55.4  |
| 334      | Doing your counterpart's job when he is slow to respond or incompetent | 580 | 47.6    | 32.4  | 13.5     | 6.6   |
| 335      | Sharing the same dangers                                               | 584 | 4.1     | 5.7   | 20.7     | 69.5  |

sharing the same dangers (as one's counterpart) is of either Great or Moderate importance (item 335). Also, 87% gave the same ratings to showing courage and ability under fire (item 327). While an individual's courage in the face of danger has always been crucial to combat effectiveness, it seemed especially important to the respondents that advisors should demonstrate such qualities to their counterparts.

Keeping physically fit was rated either Great or Moderate in importance by 84% of responding advisors (item 328). There also were 79% who said that proceeding slowly and deliberately was of at least Moderate importance (item 330) and about 62% said the same for being assertive (item 331).

Of all the items listed in Table 38, most advisors gave the lowest ratings to doing the counterpart's job when he is slow to respond or incompetent (item 334). Four-fifths rated it Small or None in importance, with almost half saying None. Nevertheless, 20% of the advisors said that taking over command under these circumstances was at least of Moderate importance.

339. I had to take over command because my counterpart was ineffective (N=490):

|              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| Always       | 0.2%  |
| Very Often   | 0.4%  |
| Often        | 1.0%  |
| Occasionally | 7.2%  |
| Never        | 91.2% |



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## Chapter 6

### ADVISOR TRAINING COURSES

The sources of information that are of potential value for success as a military advisor are many and varied, ranging from highly specialized military courses such as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) to general college courses, such as International Relations. Just how valuable any given course of study will be for any particular advisor will, of course, be a function of the nature of his duty assignment, and where it is located. In the hope that some order of value could be placed on the many courses that are relevant to a military advisor's duty, we asked our sample to evaluate their experiences with such courses.

Since not all advisors took all eight of the military assistance courses that were listed on the questionnaire, nor all the college courses that were thought to be of potential relevance to advisory duty, the number of cases available to evaluate the courses is highly variable. Attempts to interpret the results for any one or more of them should be made with careful reference to the sample sizes. Comparisons between courses are likely to be in error, since the samples are neither the same nor equivalent.

The final section of this chapter presents the results of advisors' recommendations as to the amount of emphasis that should be placed on a selected list of advisory procedures that are needed when dealing with a counterpart who does not accept advice.

### VALUES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE COURSES

Advisors were asked to evaluate military assistance courses in terms of helpfulness to advisory efforts. The results<sup>1</sup> are presented in Table 39.

Several factors must be taken into account when analyzing responses concerning military assistance courses. For example, selection criteria may have screened advisors from particular courses. The attractions that caused certain individuals to volunteer for, or at least more readily accept, assignment to certain courses also must be considered.

Apparently only 194 of the 605 advisors in the total sample had attended the Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course. Three-fourths of these rated the course either Essential or Very helpful; one-third felt that the MATA course was Essential (Table 39, item 183). Some advisors felt that the course was too much of a "cram" session, too general, and that too many subjects were taught in a superficial way. Thus, although the content of the MATA course is generally judged to be valuable, more intensive treatment of selected topics might be needed in order to make it comprehensive with respect to actual advisory work.

Over nine-tenths (91%) of the advisors who had completed the Special Forces course rated it as either Very helpful or Essential to their advisory efforts (item 191). Further

<sup>1</sup> Five courses had been attended by a dozen or fewer respondents, and hence were not considered suitable for statistical analysis and are omitted from Table 39. The courses were MAO Command and STAFF, IML, SANZ, COIN, and FAST.

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Table 39

## Helpfulness of Military Assistance-Related Courses to Advisory Efforts

| Item No. | Course                                            | N   | Percent   |              |                  |             |             |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------|-----|-----------|--------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|
|          |                                                   |     | Essential | Very Helpful | Somewhat Helpful | Of No Value | Detrimental |
| 182      | Military Assistance Institute (MAI) <sup>a</sup>  | 17  | 35.3      | 47.1         | 11.8             | 0.0         | 5.9         |
| 183      | Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA)       | 194 | 33.5      | 40.7         | 22.7             | 2.1         | 1.0         |
| 185      | Military Assistance Programmer (MAP)              | 55  | 49.1      | 40.0         | 9.1              | 0.0         | 1.8         |
| 190      | Foreign Service Institute (FSI)-AREA <sup>a</sup> | 45  | 51.1      | 26.7         | 13.3             | 6.7         | 2.2         |
| 191      | Special Forces                                    | 34  | 41.2      | 50.0         | 0.0              | 3.0         | 5.9         |
| 192      | Special Warfare Counter Insurgency (CI)           | 37  | 46.0      | 40.6         | 5.4              | 2.9         | 5.4         |
| 195      | Civil Affairs                                     | 66  | 37.9      | 33.2         | 22.7             | 4.6         | 1.5         |
| 196      | Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)                 | 63  | 30.2      | 38.1         | 27.0             | 1.6         | 3.2         |

<sup>a</sup>Now discontinued.

research could determine which Special Forces skills are most useful in various non-Special Forces advisory jobs.

A total of about 87% of the advisors who had completed the Special Warfare CI (Counter Insurgency) course thought that it was either Very helpful or Essential to their advisory efforts (item 192). The Military Assistance Programmer (MAP) course was rated either Very helpful or Essential by about 90% of the advisors who took it (item 185).

Training given at the Military Assistance Institute (MAI) (now discontinued) was completed by a small number of advisors, most of whom (83%) rated it either Very helpful or Essential (item 182). The results are difficult to interpret, however, not only because of the small number of graduates but because two courses were conducted at MAI, one for "planners" and the other for "advisors." The courses were similar except for 17 hours of instruction related to the future specialization of the students.

The Civil Affairs course was rated at least Very helpful by 74% of those who completed it (item 195). Since taking the course usually meant a specialized assignment in the civil affairs field, the reasons why the remaining advisors rated the course no more than Somewhat helpful are worthy of further investigation. A similar situation prevails for the PSYOPS course (item 196). In that case, 68% rated the course as at least Very helpful, but an even larger portion than for the Civil Affairs found it no more than Somewhat helpful.

The Foreign Service Institute-AREA course (now discontinued) apparently was highly valued by most advisors who took it, since 78% rated it as being at least Very helpful, and more than half rated it as Essential (item 190).

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## VALUES OF COLLEGE COURSES

Certain college courses were hypothesized to be related to advisory duty assignments; types of college courses listed in the Military Advisor Debriefing Questionnaire are shown as Table 40. The advisors who served in hostile environments were asked to rate each course on a five-point scale with respect to how helpful each was to their advisory efforts.

Table 40

### Helpfulness of College Courses to Advisory Efforts

| Item No. | Course                   | N   | Percent   |              |                  |             |             |
|----------|--------------------------|-----|-----------|--------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|
|          |                          |     | Essential | Very Helpful | Somewhat Helpful | Of No Value | Detrimental |
| 197      | Sociology                | 185 | 10.8      | 41.1         | 37.3             | 9.7         | 0.5         |
| 198      | Social Psychology        | 180 | 14.5      | 40.0         | 36.1             | 8.9         | 0.6         |
| 199      | Personality              | 108 | 21.3      | 40.8         | 23.2             | 13.9        | 0.9         |
| 200      | Ethnology                | 33  | 12.1      | 15.2         | 27.3             | 42.4        | 3.0         |
| 201      | Anthropology             | 53  | 11.3      | 15.1         | 35.9             | 35.9        | 1.9         |
| 202      | Personnel Administration | 150 | 11.3      | 34.7         | 42.0             | 11.3        | 0.7         |
| 203      | Industrial Relations     | 92  | 5.4       | 27.2         | 35.9             | 30.9        | 1.1         |
| 204      | Marketing                | 98  | 3.1       | 16.3         | 27.6             | 52.1        | 1.0         |
| 206      | Political Science        | 192 | 16.2      | 35.9         | 37.5             | 9.9         | 0.5         |
| 207      | International Relations  | 160 | 20.6      | 45.6         | 23.8             | 9.4         | 0.6         |
| 208      | History                  | 276 | 16.0      | 35.5         | 33.0             | 15.2        | 0.4         |

Marketing and Industrial Relations, along with Anthropology and Ethnology, produced the largest percentages of responses on the low end of the scale. Although anthropological and ethnological information tends to be valued by most advisors (Table 35, item 234), the above results probably reflect the need for information related to the specific culture to which they are assigned rather than for more general information.

International Relations received ratings of either Essential or Very helpful from over two-thirds of the advisors who had taken such a course (Table 40, item 207).

Courses dealing with behavior also were rated high by large majorities of the advisors who had taken them. For example, courses in personality were rated at least Very helpful by 62% (item 199). Social psychology received similarly high ratings from 54% (item 198).

Courses in the social sciences received ratings of at least Very helpful from half the respondents: 52% for political science (item 206), 52% for sociology (item 197), and 50% for history (item 208).

Substantial numbers of advisors also rated high the courses in personnel administration and the study of languages. There were 46% who said that personnel administration courses had been Very helpful, or better, to their advisory efforts (item 202).

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As Table 40 shows, all the courses were Somewhat helpful, or better, for large proportions of those advisors responding. Detailed study is needed in order to ascertain which information from each type of course is of potential value for all advisors, and which is of value for only a selected few.

### TRAINING ON ADVISORY PROCEDURES

Table 41 presents the advisors' ratings of emphasis needed during training on various actions that could be taken when a counterpart does not accept advice. In making comparisons among items in this section, it should be kept in mind that the procedures are not mutually exclusive, since some can be undertaken simultaneously.

Unless the counterpart is made to understand the advice offered him, use of other procedures probably is irrelevant. Thus, almost all (94%) of the advisors said that at least Moderate emphasis should be placed on making sure the counterpart actually understands the advice (item 259). Moreover, slightly over three fourths said the above procedure should receive heavy emphasis in training. Similarly, there is little to be gained by "pushing" advice that the counterpart is not authorized to act upon. There were 85% of the advisors who said that making sure that one's counterpart is authorized to act on advice should receive either Heavy or Moderate emphasis (item 262).

In the process of persuasion, the advisor must communicate in a meaningful way the rationale behind his advice. Responses indicate that relating the advice to improvement of unit performance is one of the best ways (item 253). Thus, almost nine of every ten advisors (89%) said such a procedure should receive either Heavy or Moderate emphasis in training. Giving the counterpart a study paper to assist him in reviewing the subject, and putting recommendations to the counterpart in writing are methods of ensuring that the counterpart has an accurate comprehension of the rationale behind the advice, as well as of the advice itself. There were 57% and 54%, respectively, of the advisors who said these procedures should receive at least Moderate training emphasis (items 260 and 261).

Appealing to the counterpart's professional pride also was highly rated as a possible course of action. Over three-fourths of the advisors said that it should receive either Heavy or Moderate training emphasis (item 255). Appealing to a counterpart's friendship for the advisor was not as highly rated as the other procedures. Opinion was almost equally divided between those advisors who felt that appeals to friendship should receive either Heavy or Moderate emphasis, and those who thought emphasis should be Slight or None (item 252).

Two of the items described procedures involving indirect pressure on the counterpart. Asking a MAAG superior to attempt to influence the counterpart informally was rated either Heavy or Moderate in training emphasis needed by 67% of the advisors (item 254). (But a variation of the above procedure might be more appropriate, i.e., asking a MAAG superior to attempt to influence the counterpart's superior informally.) Less than half the advisors said that going through official channels to get compliance should receive either Heavy or Moderate training emphasis (item 258).

Compromising on less than full acceptance of advice and dropping the advice until a better occasion arises (unless advice is extremely important) received at least Moderate ratings from 66 and 68% respectively (items 256, 263).

The procedure that ranked the lowest of those listed involves negotiating by using materials or assistance in other matters for bargaining purposes (item 257). Only 30% of the advisors said that it should receive either Heavy or Moderate emphasis. However, 41% said it should receive no emphasis. Several comments pertaining to such bargaining

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Table 41  
Advisory Procedures<sup>a</sup>

| Item No. | Training Emphasis Needed                                                              | N   | Mean Rating <sup>b</sup> | Percent |            |          |        |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------|---------|------------|----------|--------|
|          |                                                                                       |     |                          | 4 Heavy | 3 Moderate | 2 Slight | 1 None |
| 250      | Making sure counterpart actually understands the advice                               | 581 | 3.7                      | 77.1    | 16.7       | 4.7      | 1.6    |
| 262      | Making sure counterpart is authorized to act on advice                                | 579 | 3.5                      | 63.0    | 22.6       | 10.2     | 4.2    |
| 253      | Relating advice to improvement in unit performance                                    | 579 | 3.3                      | 46.3    | 42.5       | 9.7      | 1.7    |
| 255      | Appealing to counterpart's professional pride                                         | 578 | 3.1                      | 43.6    | 32.4       | 17.3     | 6.8    |
| 263      | Dropping advice until a better occasion arises (unless advice is extremely important) | 581 | 2.9                      | 33.1    | 34.6       | 21.2     | 11.2   |
| 256      | Compromising on less than full acceptance of advice                                   | 584 | 2.8                      | 22.1    | 43.8       | 25.9     | 8.2    |
| 260      | Giving the counterpart a study paper to assist him in review                          | 580 | 2.7                      | 27.6    | 30.4       | 26.7     | 15.7   |
| 261      | Putting your recommendations to counterpart in writing                                | 582 | 2.6                      | 26.0    | 28.4       | 29.6     | 16.2   |
| 258      | Going through official channels to get compliance                                     | 582 | 2.5                      | 20.6    | 24.0       | 36.3     | 18.2   |
| 252      | Appealing to counterpart's friendship for advisor                                     | 586 | 2.4                      | 17.2    | 30.9       | 29.9     | 22.0   |
| 254      | Asking MAAG superior to attempt to influence the counterpart informally               | 580 | 2.3                      | 13.3    | 23.8       | 40.7     | 22.3   |
| 257      | Negotiating by using materials or assistance in other matters for bargaining purposes | 580 | 2.0                      | 10.2    | 20.2       | 29.0     | 40.7   |

<sup>a</sup>When a counterpart does not accept advice.

<sup>b</sup>Listed in order of mean ratings.

procedures indicated that they can be detrimental to advisor-counterpart rapport, and should be used only as a last resort, if at all.

The variability of the distributions of responses to each item in Table 41 serves to underscore the fact that there is no common agreement among experienced advisors concerning the "best" advisory procedures. What appears to be needed now is exploration of the meanings of the differences among the procedures. For example, it was said that

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the importance of only making recommendations and suggestions to counterparts was exaggerated in the MATA course, and that the tendency to avoid offending hosts was carried to an extreme. It was commented that counterparts knew of the advisors' creed of non-assertion and sometimes took advantage of it.

Some advisors, at least, believe that more can be accomplished by direct advice that is accompanied by pressure, provided the advice is sound. Some advisors say that they were repeatedly told that, because of the Vietnamese culture and customs, direct advice would not be readily accepted and would hinder advisory efforts. It was noted that, since the counterpart must understand the advisor's techniques, and he must also be absolutely free to accept or reject the advice offered, making acceptance of advice the criterion of advisory success can lead to deceit and "game playing" by both the advisor and his counterpart.

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## Chapter 7

### COUNTERPARTS' CHARACTERISTICS

The advisors were asked to indicate how often they observed certain behaviors that could apply to their counterparts. The Military Advisor Debriefing Questionnaire contained a list of 37 descriptive statements of such behaviors. During preliminary studies that led to the development of the questionnaire, advisors reported that these behaviors had been displayed by their counterparts.

During the development of the Supplement to the questionnaire (Military Advisors in Hostile Environments), additional preliminary studies indicated that certain behaviors relating to combat situations also had been observed by advisors in such situations. Consequently, nine additional items were developed to cover combat relevant counterpart behaviors. The complete results for the advisors' observations of counterpart behaviors are presented in Table 42. The combat relevant items are at the end of the list.

The items in Table 42 were divided into desirable and undesirable counterpart behaviors for purposes of discussion and comparison. Each type of behavior is treated separately in the remaining portion of this chapter, in conjunction with information acquired about counterparts' relationships with their advisors.

### ADVISOR-COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS

On the whole, most advisors reported that they have favorable personal relationships with their counterparts. Only about 4% reported either impersonal or unfriendly relationships (item 271):

271. How would you describe the personal relationship between you and your counterpart (N=557)?

|                       |       |
|-----------------------|-------|
| Very close            | 25.7% |
| Close                 | 40.4% |
| Friendly acquaintance | 29.8% |
| Impersonal            | 3.4%  |
| Unfriendly            | 0.7%  |

Insofar as personal relationships develop against a background of job-related attitudes and feelings, it is significant that nine out of ten advisors said that their counterparts viewed the Military Assistance Program (MAP) as being in the best interest of their country (item 274, below). But one well may wonder what causes almost 9% to disagree that the Military Assistance Program is in the best interest of South Vietnam.

274. Does your counterpart view MAP as being in the best interest of his country (N=538)?

|      |       |     |      |
|------|-------|-----|------|
| Yes. | 91.3% | No. | 8.7% |
|------|-------|-----|------|

Friendly personal relationships, and a generally favorable view toward MAP probably contributed to the readiness of most counterparts to accept advice and cooperate with

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Table 42

## Frequency of Counterpart Behaviors

| Item No. | Behavior                                                           | N   | Percent    |       |              |       |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------|-------|--------------|-------|
|          |                                                                    |     | Very Often | Often | Occasionally | Never |
| 275      | Cooperates with his advisor                                        | 578 | 60.0       | 29.4  | 10.6         | 0.0   |
| 280      | Tries to understand advice and the reason for it                   | 574 | 47.4       | 32.4  | 18.1         | 2.1   |
| 284      | Tries to answer his advisor's questions                            | 573 | 66.9       | 21.8  | 11.0         | 0.4   |
| 285      | Accepts new concepts and procedures                                | 573 | 27.8       | 38.2  | 31.4         | 2.6   |
| 288      | Provides accurate information                                      | 573 | 38.5       | 39.8  | 20.3         | 1.4   |
| 289      | Assists advisor in his relationships with other counterparts       | 562 | 55.3       | 26.0  | 14.0         | 4.1   |
| 290      | Not available to advisor when needed                               | 540 | 3.5        | 9.3   | 53.3         | 33.9  |
| 291      | Ignores suspense dates                                             | 521 | 4.6        | 11.7  | 50.1         | 33.6  |
| 292      | Refers most of his decisions to his superiors                      | 560 | 17.9       | 19.5  | 45.0         | 17.7  |
| 293      | Circumvents advisor's efforts to improve host-country military     | 540 | 7.0        | 16.5  | 38.7         | 37.8  |
| 294      | Tries to get advisor to make his decisions for him                 | 565 | 4.3        | 5.7   | 33.8         | 56.3  |
| 296      | Acts contrary to advice or recommendations                         | 565 | 5.3        | 9.9   | 63.9         | 20.9  |
| 297      | Delays implementing advice unnecessarily                           | 560 | 6.1        | 12.2  | 49.1         | 32.7  |
| 300      | Ignores proper MAP procedures                                      | 512 | 3.7        | 11.5  | 53.1         | 31.7  |
| 303      | Acts impersonal and "strictly official" with advisor               | 564 | 4.6        | 5.7   | 35.3         | 54.4  |
| 305      | Appears to resent advice                                           | 566 | 5.0        | 6.4   | 47.4         | 41.4  |
| 307      | Asks for favors that advisor cannot legitimately provide           | 572 | 17.7       | 14.3  | 46.5         | 21.5  |
| 309      | Provides timely information                                        | 570 | 36.2       | 38.8  | 21.6         | 3.5   |
| 310      | Tries to get advisor to do his requisitioning for him              | 558 | 20.6       | 40.3  | 40.3         | 22.1  |
| 313      | Appeared to suffer from combat fatigue                             | 530 | 1.4        | 1.9   | 21.5         | 75.3  |
| 314      | Went to pieces during a fight                                      | 521 | 2.0        | 1.0   | 8.6          | 88.5  |
| 318      | Threatened non-cooperation to get more supplies and/or air support | 545 | 4.2        | 7.0   | 21.5         | 67.4  |

their advisors. A total of 77% of the advisors said that their counterparts often accepted their advice on combat matters (item 311).



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341. When *under fire*, my counterpart accepted my advice on combat matters (N=505):

|              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| Always       | 10.3% |
| Very often   | 39.6% |
| Often        | 26.9% |
| Occasionally | 20.0% |
| Never        | 3.2%  |

The relationships between advisors and their counterparts were examined more closely by asking advisors how frequently certain counterpart behaviors were observed. Desirable counterpart behaviors are presented in Table 43.

Table 43  
Desirable Counterpart Behaviors

| Item No. | Behavior                                                     | N   | Percent Answering Never or Only Occasionally |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------|
| 275      | Cooperates with his advisor                                  | 578 | 10.6                                         |
| 280      | Tries to understand advice and the reason for it             | 574 | 20.2                                         |
| 284      | Tries to answer his advisor's questions                      | 573 | 11.4                                         |
| 285      | Accepts new concepts and procedures                          | 573 | 33.8                                         |
| 288      | Provides accurate information                                | 573 | 21.7                                         |
| 289      | Assists advisor in his relationships with other counterparts | 562 | 18.7                                         |
| 309      | Provides timely information                                  | 570 | 25.1                                         |

One-third of the advisors said that their counterparts Occasionally or Never accepted new concepts and procedures (item 285). Acceptance of a new idea is dependent, in part at least, on a counterpart's understanding of the reasons for it. Advisors reported that most of the time counterparts tried to understand advice and the reasons for it, but one-fifth said their counterparts did this only Occasionally or Never (item 280).

Three items in Table 43 concern information furnished to the advisor by the counterpart. To the question of how frequently the counterpart provided accurate information, over one-fifth of the advisors answered only Occasionally or Never (item 288). Over one-fourth said the counterpart provided timely information only Occasionally or Never (item 309). Apparently, however, when advisors questioned their counterparts, the desired information usually was obtained, since only about one out of ten advisors said their counterparts only Occasionally or Never tried to answer their questions (item 284).

Table 43 shows that about 10% of the advisors said that their counterparts either Never or only Occasionally cooperated with them (item 275). Almost one-fifth said that their counterparts either Never or only Occasionally assisted them in their relationships with other counterparts (item 289).

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Table 44 presents the undesirable behavior of counterparts. Almost one-quarter of the advisors (23.5%) said that their counterparts Often or Very often circumvent advisors' efforts to improve the host-country military (item 293).

Table 44  
Undesirable Counterpart Behaviors

| Item No. | Behavior                                                           | N   | Percent Answering Often or Very Often |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------|
| 290      | Not available to advisor when needed                               | 540 | 12.8                                  |
| 291      | Ignores suspense dates                                             | 521 | 16.3                                  |
| 292      | Refers most of his decisions to his superiors                      | 560 | 37.4                                  |
| 293      | Circumvents advisor's efforts to improve host-country military     | 540 | 23.5                                  |
| 294      | Tries to get advisor to make his decisions for him                 | 565 | 10.0                                  |
| 296      | Acts contrary to advice or recommendations                         | 565 | 15.2                                  |
| 297      | Delays implementing advice unnecessarily                           | 560 | 18.2                                  |
| 300      | Ignores MAP procedures                                             | 512 | 15.2                                  |
| 303      | Acts impersonal and "strictly official" with advisor               | 564 | 10.3                                  |
| 305      | Appears to resent advice                                           | 566 | 11.4                                  |
| 307      | Asks for favors that advisor cannot legitimately provide           | 572 | 32.0                                  |
| 310      | Tries to get advisor to do his requisitioning for him              | 558 | 60.9                                  |
| 313      | Appeared to suffer from combat fatigue                             | 530 | 3.3                                   |
| 314      | Went to pieces during a fight                                      | 521 | 3.0                                   |
| 318      | Threatened non-cooperation to get more supplies and/or air support | 545 | 11.2                                  |

Five other items in Table 44 also described behaviors involving noncooperation or resistance to advisory efforts (items 290, 296, 297, 303 and 305). Percentages of advisors answering either Often or Very often ranged from 10.3 to 18.3%. There were 16.3 and 15.2%, respectively, who said that their counterparts ignored suspense dates and ignored MAP procedures at least Often (items 291 and 300).

Almost one-third of the advisors said that their counterparts either Often or Very Often asked for favors that advisors could not legitimately provide (item 307). Several advisors reported that their counterparts treated acceptance of advice as a personal favor to the advisor, one that obliged the advisor to do a favor in return.

It is generally conceded that for an advisor-counterpart relationship to function effectively substantial amounts of mutual respect and trust are necessary. The content of the foregoing section on counterpart behaviors suggests that minorities of advisors (usually less than one-third) had problems that involved establishing and maintaining a

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relationship of mutual trust and respect with their counterparts. The questionnaire asked advisors to indicate how well the following item described their counterparts.

321. Did not trust his advisor (N=579):

| <u>Very Well</u> | <u>Moderately Well</u> | <u>Poorly</u> | <u>Not at All</u> |
|------------------|------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 22.5%            | 23.3%                  | 14.7%         | 39.6%             |

Thus, 46% said that their counterparts could be described as not trusting their advisors either Very well or Moderately well.

## THE COUNTERPART IN HIS MILITARY SYSTEM

The advisor-counterpart relationship is the contact point between two military systems. While in theory the advisor and his counterpart share common objectives, in practice they may not. Sometimes they do not even share a common understanding of their objectives. Among the factors that interfere with their mutual understanding are cultural and political influences, differences between their respective military systems, and their dissimilar personalities.

In order to be successful, an advisor must approach and understand his counterpart, both as an individual and as an element of a military system. The following tables and discussions concern specific characteristics of counterparts and particular problem areas of advisor-counterpart relations. Advisors' comments also presented that clearly show the importance of the interaction between the counterpart and the host country military system.

Almost half the advisors agreed that conditions inherent in the host-country military system either moderately or seriously limit an advisor's effectiveness.

99. Conditions inherent in host country military system, a hindrance to Effectiveness.

| <u>None</u> | <u>Slight</u> | <u>Moderate</u> | <u>Serious</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 17.5%       | 36.6%         | 25.7%           | 20.2%          |

Table 45 shows that one such condition, the slow response of the host country system, was either a Great or Moderate hindrance for almost two-thirds of the advisors (item 428).

Table 45

### Advisors' Effectiveness Related to Counterparts

| Item No. | Hindering Conditions                               | N   | Percent |        |          |       |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|----------|-------|
|          |                                                    |     | None    | Slight | Moderate | Great |
| 424      | Lack of experience compared to that of counterpart | 527 | 39.5    | 36.8   | 18.2     | 5.5   |
| 427      | Counterpart's lack of aggressiveness               | 541 | 31.6    | 30.0   | 21.6     | 16.8  |
| 428      | Slow response of host-country system               | 551 | 8.9     | 26.5   | 35.2     | 29.4  |
| 429      | Not being collocated with counterpart              | 448 | 46.9    | 30.8   | 16.8     | 5.6   |
| 432      | Graft and corruption                               | 556 | 14.9    | 33.5   | 26.3     | 25.4  |

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Among the undesirable counterpart behaviors listed in Table 44 by far the most frequent concerned counterparts who tried to get advisors to do their requisitioning for them. Over 60% of the advisors observed this behavior either Often or Very often (item 310). Numerous comments were made concerning the tendency of counterparts to become dependent upon advisors for material support. In effect, they acknowledged the inferiority of the host country's supply system.

Some counterparts became so dependent upon American support that they threatened noncooperation in order to get more supplies and/or air support (Table 44, item 318). There were 11% of the advisors who encountered this behavior at least Often.

Over 37% of the advisors said their counterparts Often or Very often referred most of their decisions to host-country superiors (item 295). Several comments referred to inability of counterparts to make decisions. Some advisors said it was because of the host-country system, which does not encourage initiative--especially at lower levels of command. Another problem in decision-making, possibly a result of this system, was described in Table 44, item 294: 10% of the advisors said that the counterpart tried to get his advisor to make his decisions for him. Some counterparts were said to be under orders to keep their superiors informed of advisors' recommendations.

The advisors were asked to indicate how well the following item described their counterparts.

325. Motivated more by political self-interest than by military considerations (N=582):

| <u>Very Well</u> | <u>Moderately Well</u> | <u>Poorly</u> | <u>Not at All</u> |
|------------------|------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 11.4%            | 22.5%                  | 21.8%         | 44.3%             |

Thus, over one-third of the advisors were skeptical about the professional dedication of their counterparts. The counterpart's economic self-interest caused serious problems in some cases. For example, graft and corruption were rated as either a Great or a Moderate hindrance by 52% of the advisors (Table 45, item 132).

Table 45, item 424 indicates that 24% of the advisors reported that lack of experience compared to that of their counterparts was either a Great or Moderate hindrance to their advisory effectiveness. Thus, some counterparts were more experienced than their advisors in some ways. Almost three-fourths of the advisors indicated that their counterparts had the most experience under fire (Table 46 item 326).

Table 46

## Counterpart Descriptions

| Item No. | How Well is Counterpart Described                               | N   | Percent   |                 |        |            |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----------|-----------------|--------|------------|
|          |                                                                 |     | Very Well | Moderately Well | Poorly | Not at All |
| 322      | Reluctant to take risks in trying out a new method of operation | 578 | 6.9       | 35.0            | 27.0   | 31.2       |
| 323      | Aggressive; offensively oriented                                | 581 | 32.4      | 37.5            | 20.7   | 9.5        |
| 324      | Not in a hurry to pursue the war                                | 573 | 11.2      | 31.4            | 27.8   | 28.7       |
| 326      | More experienced under fire than his advisor                    | 579 | 42.3      | 30.4            | 10.9   | 16.4       |

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In Table 45, counterparts' lack of aggressiveness (item 427) was rated as at least a Moderate hindrance to their effectiveness by 38% of the advisors. However, only 30% said that a description of their counterparts as aggressive or offensively oriented would fit Poorly or Not at all (Table 46, item 323).

Not being located with one's counterpart was considered either a Great or Moderate hindrance by 22% of the advisors (Table 45, item 429). Almost half, however, said that this was no hindrance. Some advisors perceived possible detrimental effects in collocation in that it could create an atmosphere of distrust, or cause counterparts to rely too much on advisors to do their jobs for them.

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## Chapter 8

### COUNTERPARTS' DUTY PERFORMANCES

In addition to the observations of counterparts' behaviors reported in the preceding chapter, advisors also were asked about their counterparts' duty performance. Table 47 lists the complete data for the duty performances presented by the questionnaire. It can be seen that duty performance statements, like behavior statements, carry either desirable or undesirable connotations. Consequently, in the discussions that follow, statements again have been classified according to their desirable or undesirable connotation. They are presented in separate summary tables.

In the previous chapter, it became evident that advisors generally rated their interpersonal relations with their counterparts quite highly. Similarly, in the present chapter, it will be seen that, in general, the advisor ratings of their counterparts' professional competence are also high.

Table 47

#### Frequency of Counterparts' Duty Performances

| Item No. | Duty Performance                                                                               | N   | Percent    |       |              |       |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------|-------|--------------|-------|
|          |                                                                                                |     | Very Often | Often | Occasionally | Never |
| 276      | Emphasizes the importance of making plans                                                      | 573 | 38.6       | 37.4  | 20.8         | 3.3   |
| 277      | "Follows-through" on his orders to subordinates                                                | 571 | 44.1       | 32.9  | 20.3         | 2.6   |
| 278      | Demonstrates initiative and drive in his work                                                  | 575 | 53.4       | 23.8  | 20.8         | 1.9   |
| 279      | Tries to improve his professional competence                                                   | 569 | 42.9       | 32.5  | 21.8         | 2.8   |
| 281      | Supports host-country civic action programs                                                    | 558 | 45.0       | 32.6  | 19.9         | 2.5   |
| 282      | Establishes suitable task priorities                                                           | 566 | 31.8       | 38.5  | 24.0         | 2.7   |
| 283      | Plans logical courses of action                                                                | 567 | 43.4       | 33.5  | 20.8         | 2.3   |
| 286      | Exercises careful control over utilization and accounting for money, supplies, materials, etc. | 544 | 34.8       | 31.4  | 28.1         | 5.7   |
| 287      | Insists on proper maintenance procedures                                                       | 553 | 22.4       | 31.8  | 37.8         | 8.0   |
| 295      | Allows improved procedures to "back-slide" to old, inefficient ways                            | 562 | 7.7        | 13.4  | 53.2         | 25.8  |
| 298      | Does not follow-up on requisitions                                                             | 527 | 12.9       | 17.7  | 46.9         | 22.6  |
| 299      | Mistreats or neglects welfare of host-country military personnel                               | 546 | 3.1        | 5.9   | 34.0         | 57.0  |

(Continued)

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Table 47 (Continued)

## Frequency of Counterparts' Duty Performances

| Item No. | Duty Performance                                                            | N   | Percent    |       |              |       |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------|-------|--------------|-------|
|          |                                                                             |     | Very Often | Often | Occasionally | Never |
| 301      | Seeks to replace equipment instead of maintaining it properly               | 556 | 13.0       | 18.7  | 39.9         | 28.4  |
| 302      | Has little motivation to conduct training                                   | 548 | 10.4       | 15.3  | 37.6         | 36.7  |
| 304      | Hides supplies before inspections in the hope of getting more               | 530 | 8.5        | 12.1  | 37.2         | 42.3  |
| 306      | Withholds equipment and supplies needed for training                        | 550 | 3.8        | 10.7  | 32.0         | 53.5  |
| 308      | Maintains good discipline                                                   | 569 | 51.5       | 29.7  | 16.0         | 2.8   |
| 311      | Adheres to high standards of training                                       | 563 | 25.4       | 30.6  | 35.0         | 9.1   |
| 312      | Unduly limited his actions to avoid casualties                              | 537 | 17.9       | 15.7  | 43.0         | 23.5  |
| 315      | Submitted accurate strength reports                                         | 541 | 61.0       | 17.9  | 14.2         | 6.8   |
| 316      | Submitted exaggerated reports of combat actions                             | 534 | 14.6       | 10.5  | 38.6         | 36.3  |
| 317      | Exercised proper control over supplies                                      | 558 | 50.4       | 21.9  | 21.9         | 5.9   |
| 319      | Went into the field with his troops                                         | 554 | 64.7       | 15.5  | 16.4         | 3.4   |
| 320      | Hesitated to employ available weapons and equipment for fear of losing them | 538 | 7.6        | 7.3   | 27.5         | 57.6  |

## GENERAL EFFICIENCY

Desirable performance behaviors are listed in Table 48 and undesirable behaviors in Table 49. It is immediately apparent from the summed responses in these tables that counterparts usually performed their duties satisfactorily most of the time. Possible exceptions include item 287, in Table 48, where 46% said that counterparts "Insist on proper maintenance procedures" only Occasionally or Never. Also, item 311 (Table 48) shows that 44% said that their counterpart "adheres to high standards of training" no more than Occasionally.

When asked to compare the professional performance of their counterparts with other host-country personnel of the same ranks, almost three-fourths of the advisors said that their counterparts were either Superior or Somewhat better than average, and only a few gave ratings of Below average (Table 50, item 272).

When the advisors compared the professional performance of their counterparts to those of U.S. personnel, however, counterparts were rated somewhat lower than when their countrymen were the standard for comparison. Whereas only about 6% of the advisors had previously rated their counterparts below average compared to Vietnamese, over one-third of the counterparts were rated that low when U.S. personnel were used as

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Table 48  
Desirable Counterpart Duty Performance Behaviors

| Item No. | Behavior                                                                                       | N   | Percent Answering Never or Only Occasionally |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------|
| 276      | Emphasizes the importance of making plans                                                      | 573 | 24.1                                         |
| 277      | Follows through on orders to subordinates                                                      | 571 | 22.9                                         |
| 278      | Demonstrates initiative in his work                                                            | 575 | 22.8                                         |
| 279      | Tries to improve his professional competence                                                   | 569 | 24.6                                         |
| 281      | Supports host country civic action programs                                                    | 558 | 22.4                                         |
| 282      | Establishes suitable task priorities                                                           | 566 | 26.7                                         |
| 283      | Plans logical courses of action                                                                | 567 | 23.1                                         |
| 286      | Exercises careful control over utilization and accounting for money, supplies, materials, etc. | 544 | 33.8                                         |
| 287      | Insists on proper maintenance procedures                                                       | 553 | 45.8                                         |
| 308      | Maintains good discipline                                                                      | 569 | 18.8                                         |
| 311      | Adheres to high standards of training                                                          | 563 | 44.1                                         |
| 315      | Submitted accurate strength reports                                                            | 541 | 21.0                                         |
| 317      | Exercised proper control over supplies                                                         | 558 | 27.8                                         |
| 319      | Went into the field with his troops                                                            | 554 | 19.8                                         |

the standard. Nevertheless, almost two-thirds of the counterparts were said to be performing at least as well as the average U.S. soldier of the same rank (item 277).

## SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE

A group of seven items in the questionnaire represent counterparts' performances of duties related to supply and maintenance. Failure of a counterpart to exercise proper control over supplies, money, and materials can result in inefficiency and waste, and can lead to graft and corruption. This can cause a serious loss of combat effectiveness. Table 48 shows that one-third of the advisors said that their counterparts either Never or only Occasionally exercised careful control over utilization and accounting for money, supplies, and materials (item 286); over one-fourth gave these responses for exercising proper control over supplies (item 317).

Over 45% of the advisors said their counterparts insisted on proper maintenance procedures no more than Occasionally (item 287). Almost one-third said that their counterparts Often sought to replace equipment instead of maintaining it properly, and that their counterparts did not follow-up on requisitions (Table 49, items 301 and 298).

Table 49 also shows that hiding supplies before inspections in the hope of getting more was observed Often or Very often by about one-fifth of the advisors (item 301). A total of about 15% noted that their counterparts Often or Very often withheld



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Table 49

## Undesirable Counterpart Duty Performance Behaviors

| Item No. | Behavior                                                                    | N   | Percent Answering Often or Very Often |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------|
| 295      | Allows improved procedures to "back-slide" to old inefficient ways          | 562 | 21.1                                  |
| 298      | Does not follow-up on requisitions                                          | 527 | 30.6                                  |
| 299      | Mistreats or neglects welfare of host-country military personnel            | 546 | 9.0                                   |
| 301      | Seeks to replace equipment instead of maintaining it properly               | 556 | 31.7                                  |
| 302      | Has little motivation to conduct training                                   | 548 | 25.7                                  |
| 304      | Hides supplies before inspections in the hope of getting more               | 530 | 20.6                                  |
| 306      | Withholds equipment and supplies needed for training                        | 560 | 14.5                                  |
| 312      | Unduly limited his actions to avoid casualties                              | 537 | 33.6                                  |
| 316      | Submitted exaggerated reports of combat actions                             | 534 | 25.1                                  |
| 320      | Hesitated to employ available weapons and equipment for fear of losing them | 538 | 14.9                                  |

Table 50

## Evaluations of Counterparts' Professional Performance

| Item No. | Professional Performance                      | N   | Percent  |                 |                          |               |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------|-----|----------|-----------------|--------------------------|---------------|
|          |                                               |     | Superior | Somewhat Better | About the Same (Average) | Below Average |
|          | Compared to the average performance of.       |     |          |                 |                          |               |
| 272      | Host-Country officers (NCOs) of the same rank | 558 | 38.5     | 34.2            | 21.3                     | 5.9           |
| 273      | U.S. officers (NCOs) of the same rank         | 566 | 9.7      | 14.9            | 39.1                     | 36.4          |

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equipment and supplies needed for training (item 306). One possible explanation mentioned by the respondents is that hiding supplies before an inspection is one method of hoarding, and hoarding might be necessitated by inadequacies in the Vietnamese supply system. In certain cases, ARVN Tables of Organization and Equipment may not authorize enough equipment and supplies for the assigned mission of the unit.

### TROOP DEVELOPMENT, COMMAND, AND CONTROL

Nine statements in the questionnaire describe duty performances that concern troop command and control. For example, one symptom of problems in the ARVN supply system is the hesitancy of some counterparts to employ available weapons and equipment for fear of losing them (Table 49, item 320).

Of great importance from the standpoint of development of troops is the performance of counterparts with respect to ARVN troop training. One-fourth of the advisors noted that their counterparts Often had little motivation to conduct training (Table 49, item 302). Over 44% said that their counterparts adhered to high standards of training no more than Occasionally (Table 48, item 311).

Table 48, item 277 concerns following through on orders to subordinates. There appears to be a need for improvement on the part of over 20% of the counterparts, since many of their advisors said that counterparts follow through on such orders only Occasionally or Never. One problem in dealing with counterparts concerns their tendency to allow improved procedures to "back-slide" to old inefficient ways (Table 49, item 295). Over 20% of the advisors said that their counterparts Often were guilty of such ineffective performance. With respect to control of troops in general, advisors give a similar picture of their counterparts' performances. About 19% said that counterparts maintained good discipline only Occasionally, or even Never (Table 48, item 308).

Command and control of combat operations were touched on by means of several items in the questionnaire; the results are in Table 49. Over one-third of the advisors noted that their counterparts unduly limited their actions in order to avoid casualties (item 312). There are, of course, different standards involved in making such a judgment. What is appropriately called undue limitation of combat action by American standards might not be appropriate from the viewpoint of the South Vietnamese, since our affluent replacement system must be contrasted with their relatively limited resources. Also, from the standpoint of appropriate tactics for the South Vietnamese, there is an apparent difference of opinion among advisors. Thus, not all advisors agree with teaching the South Vietnamese the U.S. tactic of disengaging, pulling back, and introducing artillery and air attacks.

Some advisors commented that under the conditions of warfare in South Vietnam, ARVN units should retain the offensive in order to reduce casualties, because the enemy usually had an advantage of weaponry, strength and terrain. When not on the offensive, they claim, their counterparts lost freedom of action, and received casualties from mortars and encircling enemy reinforcements. Thus, some advisors recommended emphasis on mobility.

Some advisors (25%) noted that their counterparts often submitted exaggerated reports of combat actions, possibly as a result of the above (Table 49, item 316). Most counterparts, however, submitted accurate strength reports (Table 48, item 315), but it was commented that AWOLs usually were reported on the low side. Friendly and enemy casualty reports appear to present the greatest problems for advisors. About 20% of the

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advisors said that they had counterparts who went into the field with their troops either Occasionally or Never (item 319).

Almost three-quarters of the advisors indicated that their counterparts had more experience under fire than they did themselves (Table 46, item 326). Over 69% of the advisors thought that their counterparts could be described at least Moderately well as "Aggressive; offensively oriented" (item 323). On the other hand, many counterparts apparently were viewed by advisors as "Not in a hurry to pursue the war," since 43% were said to be thus described at least Moderately well (item 324). In part, the latter observation might have been derived from the advisors' perception of counterparts as "Reluctant to take risks in trying out a new method of operation." There were 42% who said that their counterparts were well described by such a statement (item 322).

### PLANNING

Table 47 contains a group of items that relate to planning and problem-solving. Apparently most of the counterparts (over three-fourths) were perceived as being able to take initiative even though some advisors say that the ARVN military system does not encourage initiative.

About 20% of the counterparts were said to demonstrate initiative in their work no more than Occasionally (item 278). About the same percentage were said to emphasize planning (item 276), plan logical courses of action (item 283), and establish suitable task priorities (item 282) no more than Occasionally.

Involved in planning activities are nation building and self-improvement efforts. Over 75% of the counterparts were said to try to improve their professional competence, and to support the host country's civic action programs (Table 48, items 279 and 281).

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## Chapter 9

### IMPROVING ARVN

The questionnaire asked advisors to indicate the degree of emphasis their successors should place on each of 36 topics concerned with improvement of ARVN. The results are presented in Table 51. All the topics listed were rated by large majorities of the advisors to be worthy of at least Moderate emphasis by their successors. There are 15 items in Table 51 that were rated as needing Heavy emphasis by about 50% or more of the advisors in each sample of respondents.

Table 51

#### Improvement of the Host-Country Military

| Item No. | Emphasis Needed                                                             | N   | Mean Rating <sup>a</sup> | Percent |            |          |        |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------|---------|------------|----------|--------|
|          |                                                                             |     |                          | 4 Heavy | 3 Moderate | 2 Slight | 1 None |
| 148      | Motivation of host-country military to serve their country                  | 566 | 3.4                      | 63.4    | 20.9       | 10.4     | 5.3    |
| 151      | Technical/professional competence of host-country NCOs                      | 570 | 3.4                      | 55.1    | 29.3       | 13.0     | 2.6    |
| 153      | Host-country military training programs, methods, and evaluation techniques | 565 | 3.4                      | 51.7    | 36.5       | 11.0     | 0.9    |
| 125      | Effective use of host country staff personnel                               | 539 | 3.3                      | 51.0    | 31.7       | 12.8     | 4.5    |
| 126      | Elimination of unnecessary delays                                           | 548 | 3.3                      | 52.6    | 27.9       | 14.6     | 4.9    |
| 129      | Promotion in host-country military on basis of merit                        | 530 | 3.3                      | 54.3    | 24.7       | 13.2     | 7.7    |
| 130      | Management procedures and techniques                                        | 549 | 3.3                      | 52.5    | 33.0       | 10.6     | 4.0    |
| 132      | Internal development programs                                               | 533 | 3.3                      | 46.7    | 36.6       | 13.7     | 3.0    |
| 133      | Staff coordination and cooperation                                          | 545 | 3.3                      | 50.1    | 32.9       | 12.7     | 4.4    |
| 135      | Acceptance of responsibility by subordinates                                | 558 | 3.3                      | 54.0    | 24.2       | 14.9     | 7.0    |
| 137      | Effective expenditure of supplies                                           | 554 | 3.3                      | 54.0    | 26.9       | 11.7     | 7.4    |
| 139      | Maintenance and repair of equipment                                         | 562 | 3.3                      | 54.4    | 26.2       | 15.3     | 4.3    |

(Continued)

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Table 51 (Continued)  
Improvement of the Host-Country Military

| Item No. | Emphasis Needed                                              | N   | Mean Rating <sup>a</sup> | Percent |            |          |        |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------|---------|------------|----------|--------|
|          |                                                              |     |                          | 4 Heavy | 3 Moderate | 2 Slight | 1 None |
| 146      | Requisition and distribution methods                         | 551 | 3.3                      | 54.6    | 26.9       | 14.2     | 4.4    |
| 147      | Internal defense programs                                    | 546 | 3.3                      | 49.8    | 31.7       | 14.1     | 4.4    |
| 152      | Host-country military standards of excellence and values     | 571 | 3.3                      | 48.5    | 36.4       | 13.8     | 1.2    |
| 159      | Troop morale                                                 | 573 | 3.3                      | 51.7    | 30.6       | 14.5     | 3.3    |
| 128      | Operational performance                                      | 560 | 3.2                      | 47.0    | 32.5       | 15.2     | 5.4    |
| 131      | Inventories and inventorying                                 | 505 | 3.2                      | 47.7    | 27.3       | 17.4     | 7.5    |
| 142      | Delegation of authority to subordinates                      | 560 | 3.2                      | 48.8    | 29.5       | 15.7     | 6.0    |
| 145      | Decision making and its encouragement                        | 566 | 3.2                      | 49.7    | 30.6       | 13.8     | 6.0    |
| 150      | Technical/professional competence of host-country officers   | 551 | 3.2                      | 47.9    | 31.6       | 15.3     | 5.3    |
| 138      | Communications upward through the chain of command           | 563 | 3.1                      | 45.3    | 30.0       | 15.6     | 9.1    |
| 140      | Acceptance of change and innovation                          | 556 | 3.1                      | 41.9    | 34.2       | 19.3     | 4.7    |
| 143      | Welfare of host-country troops                               | 560 | 3.1                      | 41.8    | 35.4       | 17.2     | 5.7    |
| 144      | Coordination among units within same command                 | 561 | 3.1                      | 42.6    | 28.4       | 21.4     | 7.7    |
| 149      | Staff functioning (estimates, planning, etc.)                | 532 | 3.1                      | 39.9    | 38.4       | 17.5     | 4.7    |
| 154      | Inspection of facilities                                     | 563 | 3.1                      | 40.9    | 35.2       | 21.0     | 3.0    |
| 156      | Distribution of trainees, training equipment, and facilities | 533 | 3.1                      | 38.3    | 37.5       | 18.8     | 5.5    |
| 127      | Command direction/supervision                                | 539 | 3.0                      | 39.5    | 30.3       | 21.9     | 8.4    |
| 134      | Compliance with orders                                       | 546 | 3.0                      | 41.8    | 25.1       | 20.7     | 12.5   |
| 141      | Cooperation among the separate services                      | 499 | 3.0                      | 38.9    | 28.7       | 21.9     | 10.6   |
| 155      | Discipline                                                   | 568 | 3.0                      | 39.4    | 26.1       | 25.0     | 9.5    |
| 136      | Record keeping                                               | 551 | 2.9                      | 34.9    | 29.0       | 23.8     | 12.4   |
| 157      | Reduction of unnecessary paper work                          | 549 | 2.9                      | 37.7    | 29.5       | 22.4     | 10.6   |
| 158      | Updating host-country military regulations                   | 505 | 2.9                      | 29.3    | 37.4       | 23.6     | 9.7    |
| 124      | Cooperation with MAAG effort                                 | 496 | 2.8                      | 32.3    | 31.9       | 22.0     | 13.9   |

<sup>a</sup>Listed in order of the mean rating.

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## MATERIALS CONTROL

It appears evident from the results presented in Table 52 that there was a widespread need to improve the material control and management procedures of ARVN. Inventory, supply, and maintenance were indicated as needing improvement emphasis by three-fourths or more of the advisors to whom such matters applied (Table 52, items 131, 137, 139, 146). Effective expenditure of supplies, maintenance and repair of equipment, and requisition and distribution methods were seen to require heavy emphasis by more than half the responding advisors (Table 51, items 137, 139, and 146).

Table 52

### Materials Control

| Item No. | Improvement Emphasis Needed         | N   | Percent Answering Heavy or Moderate |
|----------|-------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 131      | Inventories and inventorying        | 505 | 75.0                                |
| 137      | Effective expenditure of supplies   | 554 | 80.9                                |
| 139      | Maintenance and repair of equipment | 562 | 80.6                                |
| 146      | Requisition and distribution method | 551 | 81.5                                |
| 154      | Inspection of facilities            | 563 | 75.1                                |

## TRAINING AND PERSONNEL STANDARDS

With respect to personnel and training standards, Table 53 suggests that improvement of the technical and professional competence of Vietnamese NCOs probably was as pressing a problem as improvement of the officer corps. Almost 80% of the advisors perceived need for at least Moderate emphasis on improving the technical and professional competence of ARVN officers (item 150), and 84% where NCOs were concerned (item 151). It was noted that company grade officers rarely were tactically proficient and knowledgeable about conventional fire and maneuvers. Excessive reliance on and control of gunships, and stringent control of subordinates, were said to be weaknesses of regimental commanders. Encouraging the host country to send its "best" troops to school (rather than the personal choices of commanders) was said to be a possible means of improving the proficiency of the junior officer corps. In general, weaknesses were said to be in leadership, initiative, and adaptability.

Table 53 contains two items that deal specifically with training management. Almost 90% of the advisors said that at least Moderate emphasis should be put on the improvement of ARVN military training programs, methods, and evaluation techniques (item 153). The distribution of trainees, training equipment, and facilities also was said to need improvement by over three-fourths of the advisors (item 156). But, whereas over half the advisors recommended Heavy emphasis on training and professional competence, only 38% felt distribution of trainees and equipment required this degree of emphasis (Table 51).

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Table 53

## Training and Personnel Standards

| Item No. | Improvement Emphasis Needed                                                | N   | Percent Answering Heavy or Moderate |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 150      | Technical/professional competence of host-country officers                 | 551 | 79.5                                |
| 151      | Technical/professional competence of host-country NCOs                     | 570 | 84.4                                |
| 153      | Host-country military training programs, methods and evaluation techniques | 565 | 88.2                                |
| 156      | Distribution of trainees, training equipment, and facilities               | 533 | 75.8                                |

## INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

Over four-fifths of the advisors noted that both internal defense and internal development programs needed at least Moderate improvement emphasis (Table 54, items 132 and 147); almost half the respondents said that the emphasis should be Heavy (Table 51). One of the biggest problems was application of the fundamentals of defense, including integration of fire support. It was commented that ARVN had no appreciation for field fortifications, fire plans, or dispersion. Night ambush tactics constantly emphasized through the advisor chain went unheeded.

Table 54

## Internal Defense and Development

| Item No. | Improvement Emphasis Needed   | N   | Percent Answering Heavy or Moderate |
|----------|-------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 132      | Internal development programs | 533 | 83.3                                |
| 147      | Internal defense programs     | 546 | 81.5                                |

## MILITARY PERSONNEL

The various problems concerning host-country military personnel in general that were included in the questionnaire are listed in Table 55. Although almost two-thirds of the advisors reported a need to emphasize improvement of discipline (item 155), about four-fifths indicated that the other problems represented in the table (promotion, welfare, motivation, and morale) required at least Moderate emphasis on improvement (items 129,

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Table 55  
Host-Country Military Personnel

| Item No. | Improvement Emphasis Needed                                | N   | Percent Answering Heavy or Moderate |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 129      | Promotion in host-country military on basis of merit       | 530 | 79.0                                |
| 143      | Welfare of host-country troops                             | 560 | 77.2                                |
| 148      | Motivation of host-country military to serve their country | 566 | 84.3                                |
| 155      | Discipline                                                 | 568 | 65.5                                |
| 159      | Troop morale                                               | 573 | 82.3                                |

143, 148, 159). The situation with respect to motivation to serve seemed to be particularly pressing, since over 60% said that the emphasis on improvement of such motivation should be Heavy (Table 51, item 148). The latter problem probably is due, at least in part, to overlooking the welfare and needs of ARVN troops at all levels.

## ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

Administrative management problems of ARVN were noted by over four-fifths of the respondents. They recommended that at least Moderate emphasis be placed on improving management procedures and techniques, and also on elimination of unnecessary delays (Table 56, items 126 and 130). About two-thirds of the respondents also recommended at least Moderate emphasis on improving records keeping, and reduction of unnecessary paperwork (items 136, 157).

## CHAIN-OF-COMMAND PROBLEMS

Table 57 lists chain-of-command problems that need emphasis in order to attain improvement of ARVN. Personnel control problems (encouragement of decision making, delegation of authority, and acceptance of responsibility) were cited as in need of attention by about four-fifths of the advisors (items 135, 142, and 145). Similarly, about three-fourths noted that at least Moderate emphasis is needed on improvement of communications upward through the chain of command (item 138). About two-thirds saw a need for improving compliance with order (item 134).

With respect to command direction and supervision in particular (Table 57, item 127), there were over two-thirds of the sample who recommended improvement. The ARVN military system was said to be extremely stifling to young officers. For example, rarely were company commanders given reasonable latitude to function, make decisions, or perform important tasks leading to the development of leadership and tactical proficiency. Aloofness of senior commanders, or their lack of personal interest in subordinates, were pointed out as critical shortcomings.



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Table 56

## Administrative Management

| Item No. | Improvement Emphasis Needed          | N   | Percent Answering Heavy or Moderate |
|----------|--------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 126      | Elimination of unnecessary delays    | 548 | 80.5                                |
| 130      | Management procedures and techniques | 549 | 85.5                                |
| 136      | Records keeping                      | 551 | 63.9                                |
| 157      | Reduction of unnecessary paperwork   | 549 | 67.0                                |

Table 57

## Chain-of-Command Problems

| Item No. | Improvement Emphasis Needed                        | N   | Percent Answering Heavy or Moderate |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 127      | Command direction/supervision                      | 539 | 69.8                                |
| 134      | Compliance with orders                             | 546 | 66.9                                |
| 135      | Acceptance of responsibility by subordinate        | 558 | 78.2                                |
| 138      | Communications upward through the chain of command | 563 | 75.3                                |
| 142      | Delegation of authority to subordinate             | 560 | 78.3                                |
| 145      | Decision making and its encouragement              | 566 | 80.3                                |

ARVN was said to need to decentralize authority and responsibilities, and particularly, to delegate enough authority to junior officers and NCOs. NCOs, apparently, were not used as effectively as they should be. As an example of a problem in delegation of authority, it was noted that occasionally an operation was hampered because orders for the installation of communications equipment had to be formally transmitted to the action officer in the field before the action was started.

Another inherent problem condition that was specifically mentioned concerned the state of morale among the soldiers. Although efforts were made to improve the well-being of the ARVN soldiers and their families, it was said that generally the command structure showed only passive interest in morale-generating activities.

## STAFF EFFECTIVENESS

Problems involving staff effectiveness of ARVN were said to need emphasis on improvement by about four-fifths of the respondents: use of staff personnel, operational performance, staff coordination and cooperation, staff estimating and planning, and military standards of excellence and values.

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About three-fourths of the advisors noted that coordination among units and also among the separate services needed Moderate to Heavy emphasis in order to improve them (Table 58, items 141 and 144).

The magnitudes of the assessments in Table 58 suggest that virtually all staff officer functions needed improvement in both regular and militia forces and in both large and small units. Examination of Table 51 also shows that about half the advisors recommended heavy emphasis on improving staff and operational performance (items 125, 128, 133 and 152).

Table 58  
Staff Effectiveness

| Item No. | Improvement Emphasis Needed                              | N   | Percent Answering Heavy or Moderate |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 125      | Effective use of host-country staff personnel            | 539 | 82.7                                |
| 128      | Operational performance                                  | 560 | 79.5                                |
| 133      | Staff coordination and cooperation                       | 545 | 83.0                                |
| 141      | Cooperation among the separate services                  | 499 | 67.6                                |
| 144      | Coordination among units within same command             | 561 | 71.0                                |
| 149      | Staff functioning (estimates, planning, etc.)            | 532 | 77.9                                |
| 152      | Host-country military standards of excellence and values | 571 | 84.9                                |
| 158      | Updating host-country military regulations               | 505 | 66.7                                |

Concerning coordination among units in particular, it was said that units had to go to regimental level for permission to support each other during enemy contact. It was reported, for example, that on at least one occasion an RF company made contact with an ARVN unit operating in the RF unit's assigned area of operations, which resulted in casualties on both sides. On other occasions, RF could not get fire support from their own units when in contact with the enemy.

About two-thirds of the respondents believed that updating of ARVN regulations needed at least Moderate emphasis (Table 58, item 158). It was commented that one reason why counterparts act contrary to advice about combat operations is because their regulations do not read the same as U.S. regulations.

### MOTIVATION TRAINING

A mean of 9% was reported as training time spent on "troop information and education" in ARVN units<sup>1</sup>. Such a small amount of time spent on these subjects can be

<sup>1</sup>Item 364 of the Questionnaire.

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related to the training emphasis needed on getting the Vietnamese interested in their own government and defense (Table 21, items 381, 382). Responses to these items indicated that motivation of the host-country people was a problem—but very little was being done. Vietnamese soldiers appeared to be very much in need of political indoctrination in order to become firm believers in what they are fighting for, and to overcome their fear of the enemy. The host-country system apparently needs to increase emphasis on such training.

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## Chapter 10

### JOB SATISFACTION

#### LIKING ADVISORY DUTY

Degrees of satisfaction with advisory assignments were expressed by the sample on a five-point scale, as follows:

35. How well did you like your advisory assignment (N = 589)?

|                               |         |
|-------------------------------|---------|
| Liked it very much            | (64.4%) |
| Liked it somewhat             | (21.4%) |
| Neither liked nor disliked it | ( 5.4%) |
| Disliked it somewhat          | ( 5.1%) |
| Disliked it very much         | ( 3.7%) |

Thus, about 86% had at least a minimally favorable attitude (Liked it somewhat) toward their advisory assignments, and relatively few actively disliked the duty.

There were 57% of the advisors who cited excessive periods of inactivity as a hindrance to their effectiveness (Table 19, item 88). Some advisors said that they had spent much of their time on a Vietnamese firebase, or engaged with the Vietnamese in what was termed "search and avoid" operations. The comments of the advisors indicated that they believed that after one year an advisor can effectively handle much more responsibility than a newly assigned advisor, and that if incentives were provided many might be willing to spend longer tours of duty in assignments in hostile environments.

Almost three-fourths of the sample would prefer to serve as advisors if they were again ordered to MAAG duty as seen by their responses to item 27. The remaining 26% would prefer either a nonadvisory assignment within the MAAG, or would have no preference.

27. If you were to be ordered to another tour of MAAG duty at some later date would you (N = 566)?

|                                                   |         |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Prefer to serve again as an advisor?              | (74.2%) |
| Have no preference?                               | (10.1%) |
| Prefer a non-advisory assignment within the MAAG? | (15.7%) |

The generally favorable attitudes held by the respondents toward duty as advisors in hostile environments also can be evaluated in term. of the fact that more than 90% agreed that their tours were both interesting and challenging (Table 59, items 60 and 62).

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Table 59

## Attitudes About Advisory Jobs

| Item No.                      | Personal Attitudes                                      | N   | Percent |          |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|----------|
|                               |                                                         |     | Agree   | Disagree |
| My job as a Military Advisor: |                                                         |     |         |          |
| 60                            | Is interesting to me.                                   | 590 | 93.2    | 6.8      |
| 61                            | Gives me a feeling of real accomplishment.              | 585 | 77.3    | 22.7     |
| 62                            | Is a professional challenge.                            | 589 | 90.7    | 9.3      |
| 63                            | Requires compromise of my professional standards.       | 588 | 44.2    | 55.8     |
| 64                            | Requires compromise of my personal standards.           | 589 | 40.8    | 59.3     |
| 65                            | Calls for excessive participation in social activities. | 587 | 17.9    | 82.1     |
| 67                            | Provides little to show for my efforts.                 | 588 | 35.2    | 64.8     |

## SUITABILITY OF ASSIGNMENT

Job satisfaction is a function of the suitability of the job to the capabilities of the job holder. The relationship for advisors was explored with the following question:

28. How frequently does being a military advisor give you an opportunity to do things on the job that you feel you can do best (N = 591)?

|                            |         |
|----------------------------|---------|
| 0-25 percent of the time   | (13.7%) |
| 26-50 percent of the time  | (18.1%) |
| 51-75 percent of the time  | (36.9%) |
| 76-100 percent of the time | (31.3%) |

Thus, about two-thirds of the sample believed that they were doing things that they could do best more than half of their duty time. There were 43% who agreed that they gained valuable personal experience by "Working at a higher level than I could in a U.S. unit" (Item 40, N = 591).

## IMPORTANCE OF ADVISORY DUTY

Another facet of job satisfaction is the degree of value that the advisor places on his assignment. As seen in item 34, below, over four-fifths of the responding advisors who served in hostile environments considered their assignments to be at least Moderately important to the MAP.

34. How important to MAP do you consider your advisory assignment to be (N = 588)?

| <u>Highly</u> | <u>Moderately</u> | <u>Slightly</u> | <u>Not Important</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| 54.9%         | 32.0%             | 9.7%            | 3.4%                 |

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## COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER ADVISORS

Among the fundamental requirements for success and satisfaction as a military advisor is good communications with fellow advisors, in order to ensure adequate coordination. With respect to insufficient contacts with other advisors, only 17% of the respondents indicated that this was either a Moderate or a Serious hindrance to their effectiveness as advisors. The distribution of responses is given in Table 19, item 97. Military communications facilities were said to be inadequate (Table 19, item 83), which might partially explain insufficiency of contacts with other advisors. The isolated locations of many advisors' duty assignments was another possible influence on job satisfaction in general.

Although most advisors in hostile environments appear to have had adequate opportunities to meet other Americans socially, over 28% did not.

119. I did not have sufficient opportunity to meet other Americans socially (N = 518):

Agree (28.8%)

Disagree (71.2%)

## PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL STANDARDS

Although the majority of advisors disagreed with statements that said that their jobs as military advisors required compromise of their professional and personal standards, there were substantial numbers (over two-fifths) who agreed (Table 59, items 63 and 64). If an advisor takes his counterpart's point of view, he sometimes finds himself in a conflict concerning certain U.S. actions. Also, if an advisor compromises his standards, his counterpart might use this as leverage against the advisor.

## MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

A large majority (over three-fourths) of the respondents agreed that the advisory assignment gave them a feeling of real accomplishment (Table 59, item 61).

It should be noted, however, that well over a third of the sample agreed that the job of military advisor provided little to show for their efforts (Table 59, item 67). In spite of generally feeling satisfied with their tours, there were some advisors who noted a need for greater support in terms of both military and civic action materials.

The above indications of job satisfaction among advisors who served in hostile environments, however, are tempered by the fact that 29% contended that limited freedom to make their own decisions was at least a Moderate hindrance to their effectiveness (Table 19, item 94). The limitation on opportunities to take the initiative and make decisions apparently eliminated an important source of job satisfaction for a substantial portion of the sample.

More than four-fifths of the respondents indicated that shortages of host country funds or equipment hindered their effectiveness to some degree (Table 19, item 89). More than 40% of the respondents cited shortages for advisors of instructional material, and inadequate supplies, equipment and transportation as at least Moderate hindrances to their effectiveness (items 85, 95, 107, 131).

There were 46% of the advisors who attributed at least Moderate hindrances to their effectiveness to conditions inherent in the host-country military system (Table 19, item 99).

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## ADAPTATION TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Table 60 shows that most advisors believed that adapting to the environment of Vietnam was relatively easy (item 116), and that it was relatively easy to become friendly with the people there (item 113). But almost one-third did not agree that the host-country people welcomed them (item 121).

Over two-thirds of the respondents said that their jobs required some experience in-country before starting to work (item 70). Lack of transportation (item 123) was a serious personal problem for 40% of the advisors. A majority noted theft of personal possessions (item 111). Limited recreational opportunities, and environmental conditions that made Americans ill (items 114 and 115) were cited by substantial minorities. In spite of the many undesirable characteristics of their advisory situations, however, a large majority of the respondents agreed that another tour of duty in South Vietnam would be acceptable to them (item 117).

Table 60

### Adaptation to the Host Country

| Item No. | Condition Influencing Adaptation                                             | N   | Percent |          |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|----------|
|          |                                                                              |     | Agree   | Disagree |
| 70       | My job requires some experience in the host country before starting to work. | 588 | 69.1    | 31.0     |
| 108      | My pay and allowances adequately meet my living expenses.                    | 587 | 83.8    | 16.2     |
| 110      | I enjoy many local host country foods.                                       | 582 | 55.7    | 44.3     |
| 111      | Personal possessions frequently are stolen.                                  | 585 | 60.7    | 39.3     |
| 113      | It is relatively easy to become friendly with the host-country people.       | 585 | 80.5    | 19.5     |
| 114      | Recreational opportunities are adequate.                                     | 562 | 48.6    | 51.4     |
| 115      | Environmental conditions cause considerable illness among Americans.         | 584 | 45.4    | 54.6     |
| 116      | Adapting to the environment of the host country is relatively easy.          | 588 | 69.4    | 30.6     |
| 117      | Another tour of duty in the same host country would be acceptable to me.     | 586 | 62.0    | 38.1     |
| 121      | Host-country people appear to welcome Americans.                             | 571 | 70.2    | 29.8     |
| 123      | Lack of adequate transportation is a serious personal problem.               | 546 | 39.9    | 60.1     |

With respect to advisors' general living circumstances, a substantial minority (two in five) did not agree that their housing conditions were satisfactory. In the host-country environment,

109. Housing conditions are satisfactory:

Agree (55.7%)

Disagree (44.3%)

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## CROSS-CULTURAL EXPERIENCES

Very high percentages of the respondents agreed that they gained valuable personal experiences in their tours as military advisors. The kinds of experiences gained are listed in Table 61.

Table 61

### Values of Cross-Cultural Experiences to Military Advisors

| Item No. | Personal Experience                                                   | N   | Percent |          |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|----------|
|          |                                                                       |     | Agree   | Disagree |
|          | As a military advisor, I gained valuable personal experience through: |     |         |          |
| 36       | Working with people of a different culture.                           | 592 | 97.1    | 2.9      |
| 37       | Working with a foreign military organization.                         | 592 | 88.2    | 11.8     |
| 38       | Learning to exercise patience and tact with host-country nationals.   | 592 | 94.6    | 5.4      |
| 39       | Solving problems in ambiguous situations.                             | 590 | 78.5    | 21.5     |
| 41       | Helping a host-country unit improve performance.                      | 588 | 88.8    | 11.2     |
| 42       | Gaining cultural awareness of myself as an American.                  | 591 | 81.6    | 18.5     |
| 43       | Learning to respect cultural values other than my own.                | 591 | 94.8    | 5.3      |

## PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Psychological stress resulting from threats of enemy action probably is felt to some degree by every individual in a hostile environment, but most advisors consider it no more than a Slight hindrance to their effectiveness. Table 62 presents a set of items that concern the types of combat stress that advisors experience. Less than one-third said that being under constant threat of attack was either a Great or Moderate hindrance (item 423). Only 17% gave these ratings to heightened fear of death or injury at both the beginning and end of tour (item 434). About 20% said that severe stress from prolonged threats of enemy attacks, mines, and boobytraps was at least a Moderate hindrance (item 437). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that enemy mines and boobytraps received one of the highest mean ratings as a subject on which training emphasis is needed (Table 11, item 409).

While pressures of combat complicate the task of evaluating and analyzing a situation, most advisors felt that such pressures did not present any great difficulties. Only 25% said that the difficulty of conducting a calm assessment of enemy actions was more than a Slight hindrance (Table 62, item 433).

Just about one-fourth of the advisors reported that lack of knowledge of the combat situation was either a Great or Moderate hindrance to effectiveness (item 430). Lack of specific knowledge that enables one to identify the enemy is evidently a more serious problem. Over half said that not being able to identify the enemy is either a Great or Moderate hindrance (item 420).



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Table 62

## Combat Stress

| Item No. | Hindrance to Effectiveness                                                   | N   | Percent |        |          |       |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|----------|-------|
|          |                                                                              |     | None    | Slight | Moderate | Great |
| 420      | Not being able to identify the enemy                                         | 555 | 14.6    | 29.2   | 27.4     | 28.8  |
| 423      | Being under constant threat of attack                                        | 557 | 23.5    | 45.3   | 21.6     | 9.7   |
| 430      | Lack of knowledge of the combat situation                                    | 512 | 34.4    | 40.0   | 19.2     | 6.5   |
| 433      | Difficulty of conducting a calm assessment of enemy actions                  | 530 | 31.1    | 43.2   | 20.4     | 5.3   |
| 434      | Heightened fear of death or injury at both the beginning and end of tour     | 544 | 48.2    | 35.1   | 9.9      | 6.8   |
| 435      | Frustration from not being able to take direct aggressive action             | 565 | 13.8    | 32.8   | 31.2     | 22.1  |
| 437      | Severe stress from prolonged threats of enemy attacks, mines, and boobytraps | 542 | 40.0    | 39.9   | 14.6     | 5.5   |

Frustration from not being able to take direct aggressive action was either a Great or Moderate hindrance for 53% of the advisors (item 435). The necessity for working through a counterpart who may be lacking in aggressiveness and through a less responsive host-country system (Table 45, items 427 and 428) can present problems for advisors trained in an achievement-oriented system that places a high value on direct, aggressive action. Often, it was commented, an advisor must wait long periods to get things accomplished, and then he must forego awards. It was said that counterparts should receive recognition in order to provide encouragement for accomplishment of future tasks. Some advisors were said to have failed to understand their role in the success or failure of their counterparts.

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## Chapter II

### ADVISOR PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

#### THE VALUE OF PRIOR EXPERIENCES

The importance of previous experience as an advisor to advisory effectiveness is generally recognized. A very large majority of the advisors agreed that recurrent assignment of capable advisors is desirable in the interests of MAP effectiveness (Table 63, item 49). But some do not think that it is to their individual advantage, since over one-fourth agreed that their advisory experience was only Somewhat valuable in enlarging their competence (Table 64, item 73). About two-thirds of the responding advisors agreed that a special career pattern for military advisors is needed for advisors who are not in the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) (Table 63, item 48).

Many advisors attribute value to prior advisory experience, either in CONUS USAR-USNG assignments, or any advisory tour. Repeat advisory tours in the same country serve to capitalize on the best training and experience available. It was pointed out by some respondents, however, that advisory duty was valued well below duty with U.S. units by many advisors.

Gaining the experience of serving as a military advisor apparently caused a reassessment of the value of advisory duty to military careers. Comparing ratings of value before and after such experience shows an upward shift of percentages in the highest rating categories (Table 64, items 71 and 72). Ten percent of the advisors shifted their ratings upward from the Somewhat valuable category to Very valuable or Extremely valuable, after gaining experience as an advisor.

Some advisors commented that for an advisor in a combat zone, prior experience under fire with an American unit is of great value. Personnel who are drawn from the support branches (e.g., Air Defense Artillery and Quartermaster personnel) and assigned to infantry and artillery advisory duties were said to lack the knowledge that is necessary to serve in an effective manner.

Table 63

#### Advisors' Career Problems

| Item No. | Advisor Attitude                                                                                        | N   | Percent |          |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|----------|
|          |                                                                                                         |     | Agree   | Disagree |
| 48       | A special career pattern for military advisors is needed (excluding MAOP).                              | 591 | 63.5    | 36.5     |
| 49       | Recurrent assignment of capable advisors is desirable in the interests of MAP effectiveness.            | 586 | 81.8    | 18.3     |
| 66       | My job assignment as a military advisor caused me to fall behind in my military occupational specialty. | 590 | 31.0    | 69.0     |

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Table 64

## Values of MAAG Advisory Assignments

| Item No. | Evaluation of Assignment                                                                           | N   | Percent            |               |                   |             |             |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|--------------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|
|          |                                                                                                    |     | Extremely Valuable | Very Valuable | Somewhat Valuable | Of No Value | Detrimental |
| 71       | Before being ordered to MAAG duty, how valuable to your military career did you think it would be? | 288 | 20.4               | 25.0          | 37.1              | 14.1        | 3.4         |
| 72       | Now how valuable to your military career do you think your MAAG assignment will be?                | 585 | 23.4               | 31.3          | 26.8              | 14.7        | 3.8         |
| 73       | How valuable has your advisory experience been to you in enlarging your professional competence?   | 589 | 39.1               | 33.5          | 20.4              | 6.3         | 0.9         |

## INFLUENCES OF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

The problems of a considerable number of advisors in hostile environments were said to be compounded by higher MAAG personnel, who fail to understand the nature of the problems. A substantial number of advisors (15%) indicated that hindrances derived from the above source were at least Moderate. The complete results are as follows.

### 105. Insufficient understanding of advisors' problems at higher MAAG levels (N = 539):

Hindrance to effectiveness.

| <u>None</u> | <u>Slight</u> | <u>Moderate</u> | <u>Serious</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 22.5%       | 32.5%         | 25.6%           | 19.5%          |

Examples mentioned concerned certain demands from higher headquarters for information, and reluctance of the headquarters to believe what was reported from the field. It was recognized by some advisors that governmental policies observed by both countries operated against completely solving such problems. But, it was commented, if MAAG support and command personnel had gone to the field to see what was going on, substantial improvements might have been possible.

## ADVISOR EFFECTIVENESS

Table 65 shows that recognition and evaluation of advisors' effectiveness is seen as a problem area by a large majority of the sample. About 90% agreed that greater recognition of advisors' initiative and extra efforts is needed (item 53). Almost three-fourths of the advisors recognized that satisfactory criteria for objective evaluation of their duty performances are lacking (item 56).

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Table 65  
Advisor Performance Evaluation

| Item No. | Advisor Attitude                                                                            | N   | Percent |          |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|----------|
|          |                                                                                             |     | Agree   | Disagree |
| 53       | Greater recognition of advisors' initiative and extra efforts is needed.                    | 591 | 88.5    | 11.5     |
| 54       | Advisor effectiveness evaluations by superiors often are based on insufficient observation. | 590 | 78.8    | 21.2     |
| 56       | Satisfactory criteria for the objective evaluation of advisor performance are lacking.      | 588 | 70.9    | 29.1     |

Comments suggest that it is difficult to establish objective criteria, because there are so many variables that come into play that can be beyond the advisor's control. But a supervisor who is trained and experienced as an observer of advisors' performances might be able to make fairly accurate observations, provided the advisor is given realistic objectives by which his progress could be judged, and sufficient time is allowed to evaluate his tangible accomplishments. Although it is acknowledged to be difficult to evaluate a good advisor, it was said to be fairly easy to detect a poor one.

In the light of the above discussion of advisor evaluation, it is not surprising to find that almost four-fifths of the sample agreed that advisors' effectiveness evaluations were based upon insufficient observations by superiors (item 54). Advisors' comments point out a number of reasons why so many agreed with this statement. In some instances, ratings were apparently made by officers who were primarily involved in administration and/or internal operations. It was said that such raters did not fully appreciate the local problem of getting a foreign force to act, knew little about requirements and conditions of advisory duty, or were unaware of host country needs and program results.

Advisors' comments indicate concern about equitable distribution of awards and decorations for service under fire. To some advisors, it appeared that personnel located in areas where hostile fire was rare were more apt to be decorated when it occurred, than personnel located in areas of frequent hostile fire. Whereas some advisors think that "the men in the rear" get all of the awards and decorations, others are concerned that if additional recognition is given it might become known as "ticket punching," leading people to become too interested in symbols of recognition for recognition's sake.

Opinion was almost evenly divided as to the relative career value of combat experience as an advisor or combat experience with a U.S. unit. There were 47% who agreed that experience under fire as an advisor does not help a military career as much as combat experience with a U.S. unit (item 365). Almost two-thirds (63%) agreed that command time as an advisor of a host-country combat unit does not help one's career as much as command time with a U.S. combat unit (item 366).

## SCREENING CANDIDATES FOR ADVISORY DUTY

The responses tabulated in Table 66 indicate that many advisors reported a need to improve the screening of candidates for assignment to advisory duty. More than 90% agreed that greater care is needed in screening candidates for professional competence (item 44).

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Table 66

## Advisor Screening

| Item No. | Advisor Response                                                             | N   | Percent |          |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|----------|
|          |                                                                              |     | Agree   | Disagree |
| 44       | Greater care is needed in screening for professional competence.             | 592 | 90.3    | 9.6      |
| 45       | Many advisors lack tact and patience in dealing with host-country personnel. | 591 | 88.2    | 11.8     |
| 46       | Advisors should be screened for high personal stability.                     | 593 | 94.4    | 5.6      |
| 47       | Only those individuals who are willing should be assigned as advisors.       | 591 | 79.4    | 20.7     |
| 51       | Pre-deployment medical screening of advisors is satisfactory.                | 598 | 73.8    | 26.5     |
| 74       | I requested (volunteered for) MAAG duty.                                     | 507 | 24.3    | 75.7     |
| 75       | I was offered MAAG and accepted.                                             | 493 | 14.4    | 85.6     |
| 76       | I was ordered to MAAG duty and was satisfied.                                | 521 | 64.1    | 35.9     |
| 77       | I was ordered to MAAG duty, but would have preferred a different assignment  | 500 | 22.8    | 77.2     |
| 78       | I requested (volunteered for) advisory duty.                                 | 531 | 29.0    | 71.0     |
| 79       | I was offered advisory duty and accepted.                                    | 513 | 19.7    | 80.3     |
| 80       | I was ordered to advisory duty and was satisfied.                            | 540 | 62.8    | 37.2     |
| 81       | I was ordered to advisory duty, but would have preferred a non-advisory job. | 518 | 19.3    | 80.7     |

The latter result supports the belief that the most competent personnel are not necessarily assigned as advisors in Vietnam.

Table 66 shows that more than 70% of the advisors apparently did not explicitly request either MAAG duty (item 74) or advisory duty (item 78). There were only 29% of the respondents who explicitly requested advisory duty, either before reaching their MAAG, or afterward (item 78). Over 35% of the advisors were not satisfied with advisory duty (item 80). Only small minorities said that they were offered advisory duty assignments (item 79).

Four-fifths of the sample agreed that candidates for advisor training should be chosen only from among those who are willing to be assigned as advisors (item 47). Problems appear to result from assigning personnel as advisors who dislike the host-country people. For example, it was commented that some NCOs who were assigned as advisors in Vietnam had previously served with U.S. units there and had developed dislike and distrust for the Vietnamese as a result of incidents that occurred during combat actions. Although it might be possible simply to limit screening to first-tour personnel, thereby eliminating those who had served with U.S. units in Vietnam, it would be more efficient to eliminate only those who possess the prejudices concerned. In addition, there are apparently some advisors who can't get along with any people who are different from themselves. They seem to think that they are better than non-Americans and, it was said, it doesn't take them long to convey their attitudes to their counterparts. Another reason for assigning only those who desire to be advisors is that there is more than enough to do in handling counterpart problems, without having the added burden of motivating advisory staff personnel. A frequent

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comment was that personnel should be given the option to refuse specific advisory duty assignments. Advisors who serve reluctantly can cause problems for other advisors.

It is important that military personnel being assigned to advisory duty be thoroughly screened on factors such as professional competence and attitudes toward the host country. Missions can be accomplished better with fewer people if only the most qualified and most mature personnel are sent to advisory duty. Since an advisor must be technically and tactically proficient, only the most professional volunteers should be assigned to this duty. With this caliber advisor, a host country would be assured of the best possible advice.

It was commented frequently that those assigned as advisors should not have reached their last tour of duty before retirement. An important step would be to have the career branches assign only their best soldiers as field advisors. This would make advisory assignments a status symbol, and create a desire to demonstrate ability to serve as an advisor. To us, for advisory duty, the Army should select promotable officers who will provide aggressiveness and new ideas.

The ability to get along with people and to understand their problems is critical to the advisory role. Many instances have been reported of advisors being transferred because they could not get along with the Vietnamese. Screening for high personal stability was recommended by almost all advisors; 94% of the respondents recognized that it was needed (Table 66, item 46).

There also are conditions in Vietnam situations that place great psychological stress on some advisors. For example, it was commented that some advisors are affected by being confined to a small compound. In other cases, comments indicate, some advisors are unwilling to compromise military professional principles, if military considerations are overridden by international and internal political situations.

A common belief—expressed by 90% of the sample of advisors—is that many advisors lacked tact and patience in dealing with Vietnamese personnel (item 45). Tact and patience are thought by many to be a sort of touchstone, possession of which virtually automatically produces success as an advisor.

The following narrative summary of advisors' comments gives the essence of their belief about advisor screening. Personnel being screened for advisory duty should be checked to see that they really do meet all of the required qualifications, including necessary personal characteristics. The advisor should have a desire to serve, and a willingness to try to succeed in his advisory mission. He should be free from strong prejudices or xenophobia. He must be long on patience and tact, and adaptable to ways of thinking other than our own. He must accept and understand the host-country culture, and if necessary, be willing to live their way. Thus, an advisor must be willing to try to understand the culture and traditions of the people he advises. It also was said that an advisor must have patience, sense of humor, general knowledge of the host country, broad military knowledge, and outstanding leadership abilities.

There appear to be many advisory assignments that require advisors to be trained across branches in order to perform most effectively. For example, the advisor might need to know logistics and maintenance of weapons used by his host-country unit, in addition to his branch specialty. A good advisor also should have knowledge of personnel management.

One finding that is related to screening of advisors for assignments in Vietnam is that over one-fourth of the respondents disagreed that pre-deployment medical screening of advisors is satisfactory (Table 66, item 51). The problem seems to involve evaluation of pre-existing medical conditions (e.g., malaria) that can cause personal and command problems. Even when physical medical problems are handled effectively, many advisors recommended screening for mental stability, flexibility, alcoholism, and attitudes that could be indicators of psychiatric conditions.

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Advisors should be in good physical condition and capable of undertaking assignments involving manual effort. In some instances, it was reported, Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) could not take their medics on operations because of their poor physical condition (caused from being over-age, as well as other reasons).

## TOUR LENGTH

The shortness of Vietnam advisory tours was seen as at least a Moderate hindrance to effectiveness as an advisor by 31% of the respondents. The results are shown below.

100. Shortness of advisors' tour of duty (N = 524):

Hindrance to effectiveness.

| Serious | Moderate | Slight | None  |
|---------|----------|--------|-------|
| 12.6%   | 18.3%    | 24.8%  | 44.3% |

Very short tours were seen as complicating the advisory situation for some advisors, because counterparts had many advisors in short periods of time. The six-month alternation of field advisory personnel and division staff personnel was considered by some advisors to be a waste of experience, and of rapport that takes much time to establish. It was said that the frequent rotation of advisors influenced many changes in village-hamlet defense plans at MAC, Vietnam level. Some advisors said that they would have been willing to serve longer, if there had been a system of two or three short leaves to visit their families.

The advisors were asked for their recommendations as to length of tour in their advisory jobs, under two conditions: (a) if they were accompanied by their families, and (b) unaccompanied. The results are in Table 67, item 8. A large majority appear to agree with the policy of a one-year unaccompanied tour in hostile environments. Nevertheless, over one-fourth of the advisors said that the tour length for their advisory jobs should have been at least 18 months. Also, 14% recommended tours shorter than one year. Some very effective Mobile Advisory Team missions have been performed in periods as short as three months. Those who recommended tours longer than one year undoubtedly recognized that by the time most advisors really learn their jobs their tours are nearly half over. Tours of two years, with 30 days of leave at the half-way mark, also were mentioned. Coupled with orientation sessions in Washington, such a leave policy could contribute to the senior advisor's ability to keep current on U.S. objectives and other matters.

Table 67

### Recommended Months Per Tour

| Item No. | Family Accompaniment | N   | Number of Months (%) |       |       |      |       |       |      |     |     |
|----------|----------------------|-----|----------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|------|-----|-----|
|          |                      |     | 0-11                 | 12-13 | 15-16 | 18   | 24-26 | 28-30 | 36   | 48  | 60  |
| 8a       | Accompanied          | 489 | 26.8                 | 14.1  | --    | 13.3 | 31.9  | 1.4   | 11.9 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| 8b       | Unaccompanied        | 587 | 13.8                 | 60.3  | 0.4   | 20.3 | 4.8   | 0.2   | 0.4  | --  | --  |

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## Chapter 12

### MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP MANAGEMENT

#### CONFLICTING ORDERS

The advisors were asked to rate a number of problems that could be traced to management practices of the MAAG, by using the rating scale shown in Table 68. Conflicts between advisors' orders from the MAAG and their counterparts' orders from ARVN headquarters were cited as at least Moderate hindrances to advisory effectiveness by 47% of those who experienced such problems (item 96).

Table 68

#### MAAG Administrative Problems

| Item No. | Hindrance to Effectiveness                                                                                        | N   | Percent |        |          |         |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|----------|---------|
|          |                                                                                                                   |     | None    | Slight | Moderate | Serious |
| 84       | Insufficient information about MAAF (Mission, MilGps) policies, plans and objectives                              | 483 | 39.1    | 31.7   | 16.8     | 12.4    |
| 87       | Conflict between meeting MAAG requirements and maintaining good advisor-counterpart relations                     | 527 | 34.7    | 28.3   | 23.9     | 13.1    |
| 96       | Conflicts between advisors orders from MAAG (Mission, MilGps) and counterparts' orders from host-country military | 550 | 17.8    | 35.3   | 26.7     | 20.2    |
| 101      | Frequent changes in MAAG policies                                                                                 | 495 | 53.5    | 31.7   | 8.3      | 6.5     |
| 102      | Lack of coordination between MAAG and other U.S. agencies                                                         | 496 | 37.9    | 31.5   | 17.3     | 13.3    |
| 104      | Insufficient support from higher MAAG (Mission, MilGps) levels                                                    | 519 | 34.7    | 31.2   | 19.3     | 15.0    |

In part, the conflicts derived from: an apparent lack of understanding at higher U.S. command levels that advisors did not command troops, and therefore could not order the Vietnamese to do things that were required by U.S. headquarters. In addition, higher U.S. command levels apparently sometimes failed to use the ARVN chain of command, which would fail to tell counterparts what was to be done.

#### ADVISORY SUPPORT AND COORDINATION

One of the biggest problems encountered by advisors was lack of logistical and combat support. About one-third of those who responded indicated that they had experienced



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insufficient support from higher MAAG levels, and that this constituted at least a Moderate hindrance to their advisory effectiveness (Table 68, item 104). Other Moderate to Serious hindrances attributable to MAAG conditions were said (by 29%) to be due to having insufficient information about MAAG policies, plans, and objectives (item 84). About 31% cited lack of coordination between MAAG and other U.S. agencies as at least a Moderate hindrance (item 102). Particular emphasis was needed on coordination and cooperation between MAAG staff elements and U.S. agencies in the Republic of Vietnam.

Frequent changes of MAAG policies do not appear to have been involved to any great degree, since only 15% thought that frequent policy changes were either Moderate or Serious hindrances to their effectiveness (item 101).

MAAG requirements can interfere with good advisor-counterpart relations to at least a moderate degree, according to 37% of the respondents (item 87). Some advisors commented too many reports (and demands for information that did not exist) were required from higher U.S. echelons. A basic cause of advisor-counterpart conflicts noted by some advisors was that MAAG plans and policies were imposed on counterparts through MAAG channels.

### ADVISORS' ASSIGNMENTS

Stability of assignments was discussed in Chapter 11. Another area concerning MAAG management that was covered in the questionnaire was Duty Assignment Problems (Table 69). About three-fourths of the respondents agreed that assignment of advisors to principal duties for which they were not qualified hurt the program (item 57). For example, there was almost unanimous agreement (91%) that language-qualified personnel should be used more effectively (item 52).

Table 69

#### Duty Assignment Problems

| Item No. | Problem                                                                                                                       | N   | Percent |          |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|----------|
|          |                                                                                                                               |     | Agree   | Disagree |
| 52       | Language qualified personnel should be used more effectively.                                                                 | 590 | 91.0    | 9.0      |
| 57       | Assignment of advisors to principal duties for which they were not professionally/technically qualified has hurt the program. | 589 | 74.5    | 25.5     |
| 60       | Job could be done by someone less qualified than I am.                                                                        | 587 | 19.3    | 80.8     |
| 69       | Job could be done by someone of lower rank than mine.                                                                         | 589 | 29.9    | 70.1     |

Several cases were reported of advisors who had inadequate capability as regards professional schooling. One example of the problem concerns young, inexperienced officers (01 and 02). Because of their inexperience and lack of knowledge of staff and tactical operations, they were of little value to experienced ARVN captains and majors to whom they were assigned as advisors.

A disparity between the rank of the advisor and the rank of the counterpart frequently was noted by advisors as a detriment to the effectiveness of the relationship. Advisors also said that they were sometimes assigned areas of responsibility that were too high for their

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levels of training and experience. Vietnamese officers generally disliked taking advice from an NCO or an officer of lower rank. It was commented that in this situation, the junior American Infantry officer generally depended upon his experienced NCOs for technical and tactical advice (especially concerning heavy weapons), and relayed it to his Vietnamese counterpart.

About 30% of the respondents agreed that their jobs could have been done by an advisor of lower rank than theirs (item 69), and about one-fifth indicated that their advisory jobs could have been handled by someone less qualified (item 68). It was noted that HqMAC, Vietnam and each intermediate headquarters took the people they wanted before making advisory assignments. Some advisors commented that, for this reason, many personnel trained by Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) never reached the field. It was said that the ratio of field advisors to HqMAC, Vietnam staff should have been reversed; but the nature of such a ratio needs further study.

One inquiry included in the questionnaire concerned the appropriateness of MAAG duty assignments with respect to advisors' MOS qualifications. When asked to "describe briefly any serious inconsistencies between your job as a military advisor and your qualifications based on MOS, experience, and training," about 15% of the respondents indicated job-related inconsistencies (item 26). A more direct question asked about suitability of assignment yielded similar results.

59. My job assignment as a military advisor is well-suited to my abilities (N = 588):

Agree (84.7%)

Disagree (15.3%)

The appropriateness of duty assignments also can be estimated from the advisors' judgments of the amount of time that they performed duties that they can do best (see item 28, p. 72). Over two-thirds of the advisors held that they were using their skills appropriately more than half of the time that they were on advisory duty.

Table 70 shows that about one-fifth of the advisors indicated that at least Moderate hindrances to effectiveness resulted from other MAAG assignment problems, such as being assigned extra nonadvisory duties (item 91), needing skills that were outside of one's MOS (item 92), and being required to brief and escort visitors (item 103). A minority of the sample (13%) claimed that frequent changes in their advisory assignments were at least Moderate hindrances to their effectiveness (item 98).

Table 70

## MAAG Personnel Management Problems

| Item No. | Hindrance to Effectiveness                       | N   | Percent |        |          |         |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|----------|---------|
|          |                                                  |     | None    | Slight | Moderate | Serious |
| 91       | Additional nonadvisory duties                    | 499 | 51.5    | 27.9   | 12.0     | 8.6     |
| 92       | Skills required outside of my MOS                | 518 | 46.1    | 30.9   | 15.3     | 7.7     |
| 98       | Frequent changes in my advisory duty assignments | 415 | 73.3    | 13.5   | 8.2      | 5.1     |
| 103      | Briefing and escorting visitors                  | 493 | 48.9    | 31.0   | 14.0     | 6.1     |